Abstract
This study analyses the vulnerability of the physical protection system (PPS) deployed at a hypothetical facility. The PPS is designed to prevent and eliminate threats to nuclear materials and facilities. The analysis considers possible outsider and insider threats. A modified adversary sequence diagram (ASD) evaluates threat pathways to test an insider-outsider collusion case. The ASD also measures the probability of adversary interruption by demonstrating the methodology for a typical nuclear facility.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.7290/v7b56gnn
Recommended Citation
Hawila, Mohammad A. and Chirayath, Sunil S.
(2016)
"Nuclear Security Risk Analysis: An Insider-Outsider Collusion Scenario,"
International Journal of Nuclear Security:
Vol. 2:
No.
2, Article 7.
https://doi.org/10.7290/v7b56gnn
Available at:
https://trace.tennessee.edu/ijns/vol2/iss2/7
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Included in
Defense and Security Studies Commons, Engineering Education Commons, International Relations Commons, National Security Law Commons, Nuclear Commons, Nuclear Engineering Commons, Radiochemistry Commons, Training and Development Commons