Reference and Perspective in Intuitionistic Logic
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2007
Abstract
What an intuitionist may refer to with respect to a given epistemic state depends not only on that epistemic state itself but on whether it is viewed concurrently from within, in the hindsight of some later state, or ideally from a standpoint “beyond” all epistemic states (though the latter perspective is no longer strictly intuitionistic). Each of these three perspectives has a different—and, in the last two cases, a novel—logic and semantics. This paper explains these logics and their semantics and provides soundness and completeness proofs. It provides, moreover, a critique of some common versions of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic and suggests ways of modifying them to take account of the perspective-relativity of reference.
Recommended Citation
Nolt, John, "Reference and Perspective in Intuitionistic Logic" (2007). Faculty Publications and Other Works -- Philosophy.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_philpubs/4
