Masters Theses

Date of Award

6-1982

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Major

History

Major Professor

Arthur G. Hass

Committee Members

John Morrow, Paul Pinckney

Abstract

Throughout history, there have been men who have contributed to events, those who have made the most of them, and others who have merely coexisted with them or been overwhelmed by them. Prince Max of Baden, Imperial Chancellor of Germany during the last six weeks of World War I, was one of the latter. Although he lived during a dynamic period of German history, his own contribution to it was negligible. The story of his six weeks as Chancellor depicts why he did not do more than he did.

Using the Prince's own memoirs as a basis for the research, the six-week period of his Chancellorship is examined from his point of view. This perspective allows us to empathize with the hopelessness of the Prince during his sojourn in the Chancellor's office while acknowledging his failure to confront effectively the problems of his office. The Prince actually shares responsibility for three major successes of his government: the signing of an armistice in spite of the revolution, Ludendorff's dismissal, and the democratization of the German constitution. The latter two, unfortunately, had little effect either internally or externally; the armistice, therefore, remains as the Prince's one true success as Chancellor.

The inadequacies of the Prince as Chancellor predominate. Weak and vacillating, he was unable to exert his own opinion in the face of others' disagreement, even when he believed his own judgment to be correct. The notes he planned to send Wilson (written for him by Walter Simons in the Foreign Office), never left Berlin without significant alterations imposed by the Cabinet, even though the Prince felt these changes robbed the notes of their effectiveness. Determined to demand the Kaiser's abdication, he never actually approached Wilhelm until two days before the revolution. Even the dismissal of Ludendorff occurred with the minimum effort on the Prince's part. And he was totally ineffective in finding a way to deal with the revolutionary movement within Germany. Ironically, however, it is not so much the ineffectiveness of the Prince but his lack of determination when dealing with a crisis situation that marks him as a poor Chancellor. Others might have been equally frustrated by the events of October/November 1918, but not all would have been so completely overwhelmed.

In the final analysis, an assessment of Prince Max as Chancellor is almost as vacillating as he was. Even though he was ineffective as a leader, it is impossible to estimate whether he actually worsened the situation in Germany. Suffice it to say that he certainly did not improve it. And perhaps no one else could have done more, even had they been more effective as leaders.

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