In search of a better metaphysical description of animals : Wittgenstein and Cook versus Cartesian dualism

Author

Linda Anne Rankin

Date of Award

12-1988

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Major

Philosophy

Major Professor

Rem B. Edwards

Committee Members

Betsy Postow, Charlie Reynolds, Ken Newton

Abstract

Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas are employed, with the help of John Cook's interpretation, to support a wholistic view of humans and animals. This wholistic view precludes those metaphysical descriptions of and epistemological problems about the nature of humans and animals that have their roots in Cartesian dualism and conceptually related forms of behaviorism. Such descriptions and problems have resulted in a bifurcation of humans and animals that has been used to try to exclude all animals from but include all humans in the arena of moral concern.

The first part of the thesis shows how Wittgenstein's ideas, particularly the refutation of the private language theory, help to dismantle the mind/body problem. This accomplished, I am free in the second part of the thesis to employ and develop more of Wittgenstein's ideas as we take a fresh look at the nature of animals. In particular I suggest that the basis of any understanding and of any linguistic or non-linguistic communication among humans is shared "form(s) of life" (Wittgenstein's term) and natural expressions. Then I suggest that to the extent that humans share form(s) of life with various kinds of or even individual animals, there is the basis for some degree of mutual understanding and communication. The main purpose of this second part of the thesis is to show how Wittgenstein's ideas may be used to justify our attribution of intentionality to animals.

The overall goal of the thesis, then, is (1) to show that in general it is proper to attribute intentionality to animals, and (2) to indicate how we might determine specific kinds and levels of intentionality for specific animals. This is the groundwork for a future work that will show that an animal's intentionality is the basis for the attribution of characteristics to that animal which will qualify it as a proper object of moral concern and which will determine the specific shape that moral concern should take.

Recommended Citation

Rankin, Linda Anne, "In search of a better metaphysical description of animals : Wittgenstein and Cook versus Cartesian dualism. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1988.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/13315