Masters Theses

Date of Award

8-1995

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science

Major

Aviation Systems

Major Professor

Ralph D. Kimberlin

Committee Members

Charles Paludan

Abstract

The United States Special Operations Command has a worldwide deployment mission. In support of this mission, the United States Army provides helicopter support with the MH-60K and the MH-47E. Both aircraft are equipped with a glass cockpit architecture called the Integrated Avionics System (IAS). The IAS is not user friendly. It is cumbersome to work with and does not facilitate the mission flexibility required in this hostile flight environment. The special operations flight environment is high workload. The overly complicated and poorly designed IAS installed in the MH-47E was a causal factor in a near accident.

The poor IAS design and implementation is caused by the designer and manufacturer failing to follow established guidelines as outlined in the Military Standards and Specifications. This incident was precipitated by the violations of the intent of the applicable Standards and Specifications. The Multi-Function Displays' design is cluttered and needlessly "busy". It is further concluded that the cockpit integration violates the intent of any aircraft enhancement. Any enhancement to an aircraft system (helicopter and/or pilot) should reduce the pilot workload by either off-loading tasks or automating functions. It is apparent that systems and controls have been automated to integrated within the IAS just because the technology permitted it. The obvious lack of system analysis by the designer is considered a causal factor. The lack of a system engineering breakdown of critical flight tasks, specifically mode switching is a major deficiency. The implications of the system engineering deficiencies include the lack of crew coordination, pilot workload, pilot situational awareness and crew excess capacity versus workload saturation.

Finally, the U.S. Special Operations Command is faulted for expecting this aircraft/pilot system to be capable of performing all the missions envisioned. The MH-47E is too complicated and crews will never fully understand the systems due to the shear volume of information and complexity.

There are two possible recommendations to fix the IAS. The first would be to start all over from the beginning. This approach, although appearing to be possible, is fiscally and politically not possible. The second approach is to fix what can be fixed and continue to improve the IAS and it's components. The later approach has the best possibility of success. A carefully thought out plan is the most realistic.

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