![Masters Theses](../../assets/md5images/ebc0648ded2cd429f55e0a2fe4407546.gif)
Masters Theses
Date of Award
5-1998
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts
Major
Political Science
Major Professor
Jeffrey Berejikian
Committee Members
Robert Peterson, Yang Zhong
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate whether North Korea is irrational, rational, or non-rational in its foreign policy. Until today, the two perspectives based on irrationality and rationality have been dominant in understanding the aggressiveness of North Korea. From the standpoints of these two perspectives, policy makers or scholars have dealt with the aggressiveness of North Korea. This thesis assumes that due to such obstinacy, most specialists have failed to predict the inconsistent behavior of North Korea in light of what its goals are.
In order to examine that North Korea is a risk acceptant actor in a losses frame, this thesis applies prospect theory to four cases which the proponents of irrationalism and rationalism have used-(i.e. the tree-cutting incident in 1976, the bomb blast in Rangoon in 1983, the bombing KAL Flight 858 in 1987, and the nuclear crisis from 1992 to 1994). The essential hypothesis of prospect theory (people are risk acceptant in a losses frame, while people are risk averse in a gains frame) allows us to explain why North Korea has taken riskier choice sets rather than safer choice sets. This study uses four variables in order to determine the frames of North Korea with respect to the reference points. The four variables are Juche' ideology, economy, military expenditures, and diplomacy. These variables are driven by the relative competition of North Korea with South Korea.
Through four cases, we can realize that North Korean policy is not irrational. Although North Korea calculated their preferences, they chose larger but uncertain losses instead of discarding smaller but certain losses in a losses frame. This means that North Korean policy is not also rational. Under this situation, the rational choice model cannot explain its behavior. Furthermore, this model cannot predict North Korea's future action. In this sense, it is necessary to adopt prospect theory as a new alternative.
As a result, we need to reconsider deterrence policy based on rationality on the Korean peninsula. Prospect theory implies that we can minimize and prevent future aggressive behavior of North Korea through controlling the North Korean frame. According to Berejikian, states in a gains frame pursue absolute gains and are risk averse while states in a losses frame pursue relative gains and are risk acceptant. The key point is to change the losses frame of the North into a gains frame in the dimensions of the reference points of Juche' ideology, diplomacy, economy, and security.
In this regard, the West needs to accept the North Korean government based on Juche' ideology as a legitimate representative in the North and help NK to improve relations with the West, especially the US and Japan. It is essential to consider extending nonpolitical exchange with the North. Furthermore, the West needs to guarantee the North's security through building a multilateral security regime, including the two Koreas, the US, China, Japan, and Russia. Such consideration will contribute to a change of in the North's frame. In a gains frame, the North will try to pursue absolute gains rather than relative gains, at least within low politics. This will allow us to stabilize security on the Korean peninsula. In addition, we need to remember that the North may take a riskier choice set in a perfect gains frame based on complete national superiority over the South in the fields of ideology, military capacity, diplomacy, and economy.
Recommended Citation
Park, Mun-Sik, "Risk acceptant behavior of North Korea as a non-rational actor : the application of prospect theory to four cases. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1998.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/10338