Doctoral Dissertations

Sujian Guo

Date of Award

5-1999

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Major

Political Science

Major Professor

Yang Zhong

Committee Members

Jeffrey Berejikian, Patricia Freeland, Hao Yen-Ping

Abstract

Two decades of Chinese reforms have brought about a considerable change in many aspects of post-Mao China. While many have begun to talk with great relish about the changes and even rejoice in celebrating some "fundamental" changes in China, those critical or fundamental aspects of the Chinese communist system and central realities of China tend to be pushed aside, neglected, and very rarely mentioned. The actual picture of the empirical world is one with two sides. A comprehensive and all-sided assessment of the twenty-year change will counterbalance the one-sided view and make an important theoretical contribution to the study of regime change in post-Mao China. The assessment requires a coherent and effective macro-model or conceptual framework for defining the political regime, examining what has been changed and what has not, and assessing the nature of change in the post-Mao regime and its significance in the future of China's political development.

However, a theoretical problem in defining "regime identity" of a political regime in conceptual and comparative terms is that there are no generally accepted theoretical criteria that could be used to demarcate the beginning and ending of a political regime and to assess the nature and characteristics of a regime change in communist and postcommunist countries. This dissertation attempts to address the significance of this problem, revisit the utility of the totalitarian model, and develop a refined macro-model that can serve as the means to solve the problem - as conceptual reference points to define regime identity, measure or assess, and interpret the regime change in theoretical and comparative terms.

This study challenges the widespread view that post-Mao China has moved away from communist totalitarianism and the totalitarian model is no longer useful in the Chinese studies. This study applies the newly refined model to the study of regime change in post-Mao China to test if the refined model can serve as conceptual reference points that can be used to observe, explain, and evaluate the regime change in post-Mao China. On the other hand, the case study itself provides confirming evidence for the utility of the refined totalitarian model in defining "regime identity" of a political regime and assessing the nature of change in the political regime.

Chapter I (Theoretical Framework) addresses the research problem under consideration, the importance of the problem, and how to solve this problem. The importance of this problem is elaborated as follows; first, we have to define exactly what constitutes the "essence" of the communist regimes, in order to specify the precise point from which a transition departed and the precise time at which the Soviet or Chinese regime ceased to be a totalitarian dictatorship. Second, we must have conceptual reference points against which to measure change. Without generally accepted reference points, we would find ourselves left without a common basis for discussing either what existed before or what has come into being. Third, studies of communism must rely, implicitly or explicitly, on a model that can be used to collect facts for their political relevance, to present them in a coherent manner, and to provide a conceptual framework for comparative communist studies. Finally, this effort helps us understand what the postcommunist regimes carry as legacies, what they are trying to overcome, and what they have accomplished so far.

This is followed by the effort to revisit the utility of totalitarianism as a macromodel in defining "regime identity" of a political regime and assessing the nature of change in the political regime, and the attempt to establish that the totalitarian model has undeniable analytic utility in communist studies and should be amended rather than discarded. My major argument addressed to the utility of the totalitarian model is that naive falsification, lack of generally accepted theoretical criteria for defining "regime identity," misuse of the conceptual categories in the study of regime change ("conceptual stretching"), and discretional use of key concepts and terms without their being clearly defined all lead to the premature abandonment of a potentially useful model in comparative analysis.

Then, a great effort is made to refine the totalitarian model on more theoretical and comparative grounds so that it can serve as conceptual reference points against which to define regime identity, measure and explain the regime change in general, and enrich our understanding of specific cases in particular. This newly refined model has clearly defined and identified the distinguishing core features of a totalitarian regime from other operative features, and established the criteria for assessing and measuring the regime change of totalitarianism. Therefore, the refined model has several useful features that can serve as the means to solve the general problem proposed at the beginning of this study.

For the purpose of both empirical elaboration of the refined model and practical need of this specific case study, the refined model is then put in more concrete terms by taking China as an actual case for further elaboration and defining the "hard core" and "protective belt" of Chinese communist totalitarianism according to the refined model. The hard core and protective belt of the refined totalitarian model can effectively serve as conceptual reference points against which we are able to (1) define what existed before post-Mao China or what is the original point fi-om which the post-Mao regime has departed or the change has occurred; (2) to identify what has changed and what has not, in degree or in kind, developmental or genetic in nature; (3) to explain what features of the totalitarian "syndrome" the regime can loss but still be totalitarian or what degree of ideological, political, legal, economic, and social change can occur but still leave the old regime's identity essentially unaffected; and (4) to evaluate whether or not the post-Mao changes have made the defining features or the "hard core" of communist totalitarianism insignificant or have changed them altogether into something different.

Chapter II (Method and Data) justifies the case study as a method for testing a theory by addressing the problem of external validity (generalizability) of the case study method in social sciences and by distinguishing statistical generalization in which a sample is used to enumerate sample fi^equencies and generalize to a larger population fi-om analytic generalization in which case studies attempt to generalize a particular set of observed results to some broader theory rather than to some population in survey research. This chapter further addresses our major concern about the validity of selected measures for assessing the change in post-Mao China by developing an operational measurement scheme which can serve as a regular, step-by-step procedure to direct the actual operation of measuring the regime change, in particular, the data collection of the ensuing case study in post-Mao China. Finally, this chapter also identifies the primary and secondary data sources to be used in the case study.

Chapters III - VII apply the refined model to the study of regime change in post- Mao China to test the utility of the totalitarian model. Post-Mao China in the last twenty years has indeed experienced considerable quantitative changes that have had a great impact on socioeconomic life, compared with the situation under Mao's regime. However, the question is not whether changes have taken place in some aspects of the totalitarian regime, but whether these changes have been significant enough to affect the fundamental character of the regime. The key point here is to distinguish the changes within the system and the change of the system itself. The former is "developmental change" within the regime or change at the operative level, while the latter is "systemic change" of the regime or change at the fundamental level. The nature of a political regime remains fundamentally unchanged, if its hard core or essential characteristics are sustained. Through a systematic survey of party documents and resolutions, leaders' speeches and policy statements, official publications, published empirical data, and general academic studies on the post-Mao reform in English and Chinese, these five empirical chapters examine in depth post-Mao changes across the most critical empirical aspects of regime change (ideological, political, legal, social, and economic) and the most important dimensions of each of these aspects, assess their nature and significance in terms of regime change - developmental change within the regime or systemic change of the regime, and determine whether post-Mao China can still be described as totalitarian or if those changes have transformed the post-Mao regime into post-totalitarianism, authoritarianism, soft-authoritarianism, fragmented authoritarianism, market-oriented capitalism, or anything fundamentally different from communist totalitarianism.

Chapter VIII draws some conclusions about a set of results observed in this case study which can be used to generalize to the theory of totalitarianism and provide confirming evidence for the utility of the totalitarian model. The findings of this study demonstrates that, in spite of incoherence among the components of the regime or inconsistency between the regime and related behavior, the practice of post-Mao reform remains not only rooted in but also committed to the "hard core" of communist totalitarianism, such as the "universal truths" of Marxist-Leninism, the ultimate goal or end-goal of communism, the ideological commitment to its fundamental principles and norms, the hard core of political, ideological, legal, social and economic systems of Chinese communist totalitarianism, and many typical totalitarian practices, which do not contradict the regime's commitment to the intermediate goal of economic modernization, but make only adjustments to the action means of achieving them. The post-Mao regime has never abdicated its totalitarian political tradition and practice to transform human nature and thinking. It has continued to control over the media and require uniformity in the press and the public opinion. It has continued to stress the "pedagogical" role of the press in educating, transforming, and perfecting human nature to mold a new type of socialist citizens.

The post-Mao regime has attempted to resurrect the political tradition and political theory of the mid-1950s and based the political doctrine and practice of the post- Mao regime on the "Four Cardinal Principles," which are considered as defining the core elements of the post-Mao regime and the direction, scope, content and limits of its reform programs. The post-Mao regime has continued to consolidate and institutionalize the totalitarian party-state apparatus, which has come down fi-om Mao's era, as an appendage of the communist party who decides what should be done and what steps or measures should be undertaken. The totalitarian party has continued to control and dominate all sectors of the state and has remained the locus or the "core of leadership" or "political nucleus" for all state institutions, public and social organizations.

The post-Mao regime has continued to define and promulgate the constitutional rules and give orders or directives to the governmental organs in lawmaking and implementation. The party's exercise of power is not limited by law. The party is the "supreme lawmaker" or "lawgiver." Party decisions or policy changes need not be formally justified by reference to legal rules. There are no such institutions as independent judiciary, independent legal profession, independent private bar, and special public law jurisdictions for review of administrative action and the constitutionality of legislation. Laws are not made clear, noncontradictory, and accessible. The party can manipulate laws to further its own ends. Post-Mao legislative and legal reforms have not given the Chinese people and their "representatives" remarkably more say over important matters of the state. The communist constitution, laws, and legal system are as a matter of fact an instrument of the single one-party dictatorship to extend its control over society, maintain its political and economic order, and achieve its policy goals.

The post-Mao regime has not made any substantial retreat from either the state or the civil society, though the party-state has relaxed its control over its citizens' daily life, economic activities, and social mobility to correct the traditional dysfunctional system of controlling society. The "administrative state" and "administrative society" of Chinese communist totalitarianism have remained fundamentally unchanged, and the state power has continued to perform comprehensive or all-embracing functions of administration, such as the economic function of organizing major economic activities, the social function of administering major means of production and exchange, the ideological function of cultural education, and the political/legal function of maintaining socialist political and legal system. Under the world's most austere license system, all social organizations have become party-led, state-licensed, or government-controlled, with no real meaning of self-government, independence, or autonomy (except those popular clubs and societies strictly limited within non-political areas). The muscle of the police apparatus has been greatly boosted to keep a tight leash on society, and party organizations have continued to penetrate and dominate almost every comer of society.

The post-Mao regime has attempted to preserve the socialist character of the economy over the past twenty years since Deng's reform. The goal of post-Mao economic reforms is to restructure state socialism and establish the "Socialist Market Economy," which does not suggest any attempt by the post-Mao regime to transform the Chinese economy into a capitalist one or to abandon its ultimate goal of communism. Public ownership, the governance structure of state socialism, and the administrative command system have continued to dominate the Chinese economy, while a fledgling or distorted market has just started to emerge -within the general framework of state socialism and the political context of party-state power structure. The reforms have not changed the nature of economic system or gone so far as to reverse this system. All the fundamental or core features of communist totalitarianism have remained unchanged, only with the means of achieving ends being adjusted.

In short, this study has provided confirming evidence for the analytic utility of the paradigm of totalitarianism, which, rather than outmoded, is still useful and applicable to the study of the Chinese communist regime. The post-Mao communist regime has remained totalitarian rather than turning into "authoritarianism" or "soft authoritarianism" or "evolving away from the authoritarian regime of the Deng era." Both Mao's regime and the post-Mao regime are communist totalitarianism at the fundamental level, though they do have many differences from each other at the operative level. The change has been in degree rather than in kind; it is the developmental change within the regime rather than the systemic change of the regime.

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