Doctoral Dissertations
Date of Award
5-2021
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy
Major
Philosophy
Major Professor
Kristina Gehrman
Committee Members
Jon Garthoff, Clerk Shaw, Garriy Shteynberg
Abstract
Human beings often hold one another morally responsible for what we find funny or fail to find funny. Though this practice is common and so demands philosophical attention, it remains underexplored in the literature. The purpose of this project is to devote attention to this practice by developing an ethics of amusement.
In chapter 2, I argue for why amusement is an emotion according to incongruity theory—the dominant theory of humor and amusement. With this in mind, I argue in chapter 3 that we are responsible for our emotions insofar as we have emotional agency. In particular, while we cannot change our emotions at will, we still exercise various forms of control over them in specific moments and over time. To the extent that we can do otherwise with respect to our immediate emotions and our long-term emotional tendencies, we are responsible for them.
In chapter 4, I develop three criteria that individuals must meet for their emotions to be fitting. In some cases, an instance of fitting emotion may be praiseworthy: if it comes from a correct shift in values or from a morally good character. In some cases, an instance of an unfitting emotion may be blameworthy: if it comes from a character flaw.
Based on the criteria in chapter 4 and the discussion of incongruity theory in chapter 2, I develop three criteria for fitting amusement in chapter 5. Using the same grounds for praise, I examine examples of fitting immediate amusement and show why praise is or is not merited. I also consider when failing to find something funny is fitting and praiseworthy in some cases: when offense comes from a good moral character.
Finally, in chapter 6, I analyze unfitting immediate amusement and unfitting tendencies for amusement. I consider examples and who when and why blame is or is not merited. Lastly, I discuss why failing to be amused may be unfitting and blameworthy in some cases: when offense comes from a character flaw. I conclude with a brief discussion about some practical applications for the criteria I developed.
Recommended Citation
Mobley, Ashley Caroline, "An Ethics of Amusement. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2021.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/6661
Included in
Applied Ethics Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons