Doctoral Dissertations

Date of Award

8-1992

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Major

Philosophy

Major Professor

L. B. Cebik

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to set forth and defend an interpretation of Nietzsche's Übermensch. The interpretation offered here is not an entirely new one, but one that represents a synthesis of two approaches that might be taken toward the Übermensch concept. This is not to say, however, that nothing new is to be found either in the interpretation itself, or in the consequences of the interpretation for Nietzsche scholarship. The originality of this study is manifested through several different aspects.

First, the Übermensch is not explained in the context of Nietzsche's biography or psychological make-up. Instead, the Übermensch is approached as a legitimate philosophical concept or idea, with the usual attendant errors and misinterpretations that accompany any concept or idea under philosophical scrutiny. Of course, it may be that the description "philosophical concept" itself takes on a different meaning when discussing Nietzsche as opposed to other philosophers. Nietzsche's conception of philosophy and what it means to do philosophy is explored, but here, too, the biographical is not allowed to play a role.

A second aspect of this study that contributes to its originality concerns the handling of Nietzsche's texts including the unpublished notes. Too often interpreters and scholars of Nietzsche interpret and critique a concept in isolation, looking exclusively at passages where the particular concept is mentioned. Too, many scholars cite passages that support their particular reading of Nietzsche while ignoring others. Although this study is indebted to much previous Nietzsche scholarship, the method of "explanation through excision” is a particular problem for interpretations of the Übermensch and is abandoned here in favor of a more thorough reading of Nietzsche.

In addition to a more complete examination of Nietzsche's texts, other interpretations of the Übermensch are examined. A distinction is made between “Übermensch as ideal model” explanations and "Übermensch as idealized attitude” readings. For various reasons both kinds of interpretation are considered deficient; however, each kind of treatment has something to recommend it, and at this point a synthesis can begin to be constructed. Such a synthesis is only possible in the context of a full understanding of Nietzsche's overall project and the importance of other of Nietzsche's concepts and ideas in this project.

Toward this end Nietzsche's epistemology and ontology are examined. Nietzsche's perspectivism, his notion of will to truth, and the distinction between being and becoming are explored and evaluated. Nietzsche does not posit a theory of knowledge nor a theory of reality; his critique of such pursuits, as well as his objections to theories in and of themselves, contributes to an understanding of the Übermensch. Nietzsche's concepts of will to power and eternal recurrence also are examined. The interpretation of Übermensch offered here will relate directly to these two concepts and will facilitate a better understanding of them.

Too often in the past interpreters of Nietzsche have considered his Übermensch idea an embarrassment, aberration, or something to be ignored altogether. This study draws none of these conclusions. Nietzsche's Übermensch is understandable and valuable, but only as a synthesis of the ideal and attitude reading, and only if this synthesis is accomplished in the overall context of Nietzsche's aestheticism, stylistic pluralism, and critique of morality.

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