Collective bargaining in the Tennessee Valley Authority : the salary policy employee experience
The purpose of this study was to provide a comprehensive examination of the collective bargaining relationship between the Tennessee Valley Authority and unions of its white-collar and professional employees. It was intended to serve as a companion to a previous study of collective bargaining between TVA and the unions of its blue-collar workers. A determination was required of whether or not efficacious aspects of the bargaining relationship were readily transferable to other bargaining settings. Also, the efficacy of each aspect of the relationship had to be judged.
TVA was created in 1933 as a government corporation and was given independence from the Civil Service Commission in fashioning its personnel policies. This flexibility, combined with the prolabor attitudes of early management, created a favorable climate for the organization of salary policy (white-collar and professional) employees into unions. In 1943, TVA recognized the Salary Policy Employee Panel, a centralized structure composed of several unions, as the bargaining agent for nonmanagement, salary policy employees. Thus began one of the earliest bargaining relationships in this country involving both white-collar and professional workers. However, TVA kept its salaries, and other major personnel policies, in line with prevailing federal practice until the early fifties. At that time, prevailing practice in the valleywide labor market became the primary determinant of salaries, fringe benefits, and other personnel policies; bargaining over these policies therefore became quite meaningful. Moreover, a written labor agreement was signed that would become increasingly comprehensive in scope.
After the midfifties, the relationship underwent a significant change. Bargaining had been characterized by a paternalistic management facing relatively immature unions. As union members became more militant, the leaders of Panel unions became more aggressive and increasingly adept in dealing with management. At the same time, management shed its paternalistic stance and adopted a harder line in negotiations. The relationship became adversary in nature, which is the norm for bargaining relationships in this country. Because of this change in the attitudinal climate for bargaining, it can be said with increasing confidence that efficacious aspects of the relationship may be readily transferable to other bargaining settings. Furthermore, it may become true that the legal framework for bargaining at TVA will lose its uniqueness vis-a-vis the legal framework affecting bargainers elsewhere in the public sector.
The examination of major aspects of the relationship revealed some weaknesses, in the grievance system and in the use of advisory arbitration for example. Yet, the strengths of the relationship were found to outstrip any weaknesses, and many of these strengths were recommended for consideration by bargainers elsewhere. The centralized Panel structure and management's decentralized structure were judged to exhibit adequate degrees of both responsibility and responsiveness to the constituencies of the bargainers. Many aspects of the collection, analysis, and use of prevailing rate data were also determined to be efficacious. Finally, important strengths of the relationship were found to exist in the union-management cooperative program, in the apparently successful use of final-offer arbitration for basic salary disputes, in the process of bargaining, and in certain features of the grievance adjustment procedure.
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