Cost of capital and regulatory effectiveness in the electric utility industry : an empirical analysis
An established result in the theory of the regulated firm is that an effective rate-of-return constraint induces the firm to employ large proportions of capital inputs to noncapital inputs than would be the case in the absence of the regulatory constraint. This overcapitalization, often referred to as the Averch-Johnson effect, has been the subject of several recent empirical studies of the electric utility industry. The present study adds to this body of literature. It seeks to test for the effectiveness of utility regulation in the context of a cost minimization model which includes the allowed rate of return as an explanatory variable and permits arbitrary elasticities of substitution between any pair of inputs.
The cost function is estimated first under a restriction which implies that regulation is not effective and then with no restrictions imposed. A likelihood ratio test is then employed as a test for regulatory effectiveness. Results of the test indicate that regulation was generally effective during the years 1968-1972.
An additional feature of this study is the estimation of annual capital rental prices for the firms in the sample. This entails in part estimation of the cost of capital for the electric utility industry. This is accomplished by applying the Miller-Modigliani two-stage estimation procedure to the valuation equation of the firm. In this manner annual cost of capital estimates are obtained for each of the years under investigation.
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