Tax competition among local jurisdictions : changes in sales tax rates of Tennessee counties
Competition between governments can be defined as "rivalrous behavior in which each government attempts to win some scarce beneficial resource or to avoid a particular cost" (Kenyon and Kincaid 1991). For example, local governments can try to attract retail sales by lowering sales tax rates and encouraging residents of other jurisdictions to cross border shop. Of course, this predatory behavior must be balanced against governments' desire to raise revenues. Considerable theoretical research has investigated interjurisdictional tax competition, but the subject has received relatively little empirical analysis. This study uses data from Tennessee to examine the extent to which local governments compete and attempt to limit cross border shopping by changing sales tax rates. The study also tests the propensity of local governments to consider neighboring jurisdictions' tax rates in setting their own tax rates and analyzes the responsiveness of sales tax rates to changes of the tax base and vice-versa.
The study finds that the sales tax rates of the home and competing counties will affect the sales tax base of the home county because of the possibility that shoppers will cross borders to take advantage of differences in tax rates between counties. In addition, the results show that local governments do consider the local option sales tax rates of neighboring counties in setting their own tax rates. Depending on the sub-sample, the response of counties to changes in neighbors' tax rates may be due to political or economic factors.
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