Determinants of CEO Incentives and Corporate Policy
Date Issued
May 2026
Author(s)
Li, Zhengzhuo (Zyaire)
The University of Tennessee
Advisor(s)
Matthew Serfling
Additional Advisor(s)
James Chyz
Tingting Liu
Scott Guernsey
Abstract
Corporate governance and executive decision-making are central determinants of firm performance and value creation. Although a large literature examines boards, incentives, and managerial traits, important questions remain about how institutional reforms and executive experiences shape corporate behavior. This dissertation contributes to this literature through two complementary chapters. The first chapter studies how changes in institutional voting rules influence CEO incentives and board monitoring. The second chapter examines how CEOs’ formative macroeconomic experiences affect corporate decision-making and firm outcomes.
The first chapter, “Majority Voting Legislation and CEO Incentive Compensation,” examines how strengthened shareholder control affects CEO incentive structures. Exploiting the staggered adoption of Majority Voting Legislation (MVL), which enhances shareholder influence in director elections, I find a significant decrease in CEO incentive compensation. This effect is particularly pronounced in firms with weaker ex-ante governance, including those with low board independence, no female directors, and higher levels of shareholder opposition to directors. This policy change is also associated with a notable decrease in directors holding multiple board seats, a decline in co-opted board members, diminished CEO power, and increased turnover performance sensitivity. Further analysis reveals that the reduction in incentive compensation following MVL adoption has not led to significant changes in firm policies, volatility, or profitability, which reinforces the view that strong board monitoring and CEO incentive pay can serve as substitutes in aligning managerial actions with shareholder interests.
The second chapter, “From Adolescence to Management: Prior Interest Rate Exposure and CEO Responses to Current Rates” investigates how CEOs’ past experience with interest rates shapes their responses to contemporary rate fluctuations. Contrary to the expectation of cautious investment under rising rates, CEOs with high-rate experience exhibit greater risk tolerance, pursuing more aggressive capital expenditures and R&D investments. They sustain strong hiring despite high rates, rely less on market timing in debt issuance, and are more likely to execute share repurchases. These strategies are linked to higher Tobin’s Q and superior stock returns, without increasing firm risk. It highlights the profound influence of macroeconomic experiences
on CEO behavior and decision-making processes.
Together, these chapters demonstrate that both formal governance reforms and internalized managerial experiences play consequential roles in shaping executive incentives, the effectiveness of board monitoring, and corporate policy choices.
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Major
Finance
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