State regulation of fluid milk and the processor-retailer margin
Some study has been devoted to the economic effects of federal regulation of fluid milk. This topic, however, is not dealt with in this study. . Rather, it is the purpose of the latter to examine and compare the performance which emanates from various types of regulatory approaches to fluid milk processing and retailing employed by various states.
Of the many different criteria on which a performance comparison of regulatory approach could be made, this study focuses on the distributors' gross margin. Such a margin can be computed in each market studied by subtracting the price paid to farmers from the retail price. The retailing of fluid milk is conducted through home delivery operations by processors, as well as through in-store sales by dairy specialty stores, and by other outlets such as convenience stores and supermarkets. Further, milk is retailed in different container sizes, such as pints, quarts, half gallons, and gallons. Thus in computing the distributors' gross margins, there are several possible retail prices from which to choose. This study uses data reflective of retail prices weighted by type of in-store sales of half gallon containers, and therefore, employs gross margins on instore sales of half gallons of milk as its performance criterion. The latter has been chosen because in-store sales make up an everincreasing bulk of all retail sales. Further, the half gallon has been a frequently sold type of container.
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iv Although it would have been more desirable to break down the gross margins into processor margins and retail margins, the lack of available data relative to prices received by processors precluded the computation of these margins. Likewise, the lack of available profit data eliminated the use of profits as a measure of performance.
Analysis of the data centers on (l) comparisons of simple averages of the margins among the categories for each year of the 1965-69 period, as well as for the entire five-year period; (2) a dummy variable technique used to test whether margins were significantly different among all regulatory categories, as well as between each pair of regulatory categories; (3) a simple regression of fluid milk margins on concentration to determine if margins are significantly related to concentration; and (4) Chow tests of the entire set of coefficients among and between the various regulatory categories to determine if regulation had any effect on the relationship of concentration and margins.
The principal findings of this study are (1) fluid milk margins were lowest in cities having specific fluid milk legislation of an antitrust nature, that is in cities falling in regulatory III and IV; (2) there were significant differences among mean margins among the six regulatory categories; (3) mean margins of regulatory categories III and IV were significantly lower than those of the other four regulatory categories; (4) average concentration, taken as the sole explanatory variable, was found to be significantly, but weakly, related to the level of fluid milk margins; and (5) regression coefficients among and between the six regulatory categories were significantly different
leading to the conclusion that regulation did affect the relationship between concentration and fluid milk margins.
This study suggests that specific antitrust regulation of fluid milk at the state level has resulted in better performance in terms of distributors' gross margins, than that which has been forthcoming from either general antitrust regulation or from more restrictive regulation, such as is embodied in minimum and/or maximum price control. It would, therefore, seem advisable for states to move in the direction of specific antitrust regulation of the processing and retailing of fluid milk within their respective borders.
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