Essentialism and reference
The problem of reference has to do with how it is possible to use language to talk about things, whether these things are non-linguistic objects or elements of language itself. Essentialism is a doctrine about necessity and possibility--that not only do propositions have their truth values accidentally or necessarily, but that objects other than propositions may have their properties accidentally or necessarily. The most interesting form of essentialism holds that objects have both essential and accidental properties and that some properties are had essentially by some but not all objects. Essentialists also articulate their views in terms of possible worlds. A possible world is a state of affairs that might have obtained. An essential property is one which an object could not have lacked in any world and have been the object that it is.
The problem of reference and the doctrine of essentialism overlap at those points where sentences employ referential expressions in identity claims, modal contexts, analytic sentences, and claims of nonexistence. These points of intersection can be set out in the form of four puzzles. This study revolves around these four puzzles.
Many reference theorists have come to see that proper names, the most referential of terms, provide the best place to begin one's treatment of the problem of reference. A solution to the above puzzles as they regard proper names will inevitably provide a solution to the puzzles as they regard definite and indefinite descriptions. Therefore, Chapter I deals with essentialism and proper names. The views of two prominent essentialists, Saul A. Kripke and Alvin Plantinga, are considered. Kripke's basic view revolves around some distinctions involved in his essentialism as well as a distinction between kinds of referential terms, which he calls respectively rigid and non-rigid designators. Plantinga's view reflects some disagreements with Kripke. Plantinga holds that names do have meanings; they express essence concepts. Plantinga does not accept Kripke's view that names are rigid designators, understood in a straightforward manner. And Plantinga's de re/de dicto distinction is brought in.
Chapter I concludes with an assessment of essentialism's contribution toward solving the aforementioned puzzles, though the treatment of one puzzle is left for later chapters. From the vantage point of this assessment, the problem of proper names is examined with consideration given to several classic and recent proposals. These proposed solutions can now be more adequately evaluated and adjudicated, since the puzzles mentioned have played so great a part in the formulations of these solutions. Two particular kinds of theories, respectively styled 'the theory of identifying descriptions' and 'the historicalchain theory' are assessed.
Before the other puzzle is taken up, there are some significant carry-overs from Chapter I which must be considered. Chapter II deals with these matters. I first show that names do not express essence concepts. I then evaluate Plantinga's contention that it is because names express essences that the de re can be explained in terms of the de dicto (a thesis very important to essentialism). I also show that even though the notion of rigid designation is a good one, it is not the case that names are always rigid and definite descriptions are always non-rigid.
Rigid designation has to do with referring to objects in other possible worlds. This idea of referring to things in other possible worlds leads to the puzzle left unconsidered in Chapters I and II. This is the puzzle about referential expressions in negative existentials. In Chapter IIl, I examine several classic proposals, including the recent one of Keith S. Donnellan. Most views treat existential statements as general propositions of the form, 'there is no such and such,' but Plantinga insists that there are singular existentials as well. A solution to the puzzle involves some elements of traditional views as well as the clarification of a principle suggested by Plantinga. Special attention is given to negative existentials involving terms which ostensibly refer to impossible objects.
Chapter III provides a solution to negative existentials, but it leaves open the question of referring to objects which exist in other worlds but not in the actual world. In Chapter Iv, I show that 'descriptivism,' the view that fictional names refer to merely possible objects, is false. Plantinga solves the question as to the function of fictional names by suggesting that they function as stylistic variants of variables bound by existential quantifiers.
Chapter V involves two things. First, I sunmarize and collate the accomplishments of this study. Secondly, I set out a view of reference. I deal with definite descriptions in various contexts and then proper names in various contexts. I emphasize that names must be understood as functioning in a fluid social institution, namely, language. This explains the multifariousness in the use of referential expressions.
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