Chamberlain, Italy, and "The General Appeasement of Europe," 1935-1939
The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 placed a severe strain on Anglo-Italian relations at a time when German ambitions in Europe were causing deep concern. While Chancellor of the Exchequer under Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain began to take a keen interest in restoring relations with Italy, even though he was contemptuous of Mussolini and appalled by the Duce's willingness to spend Italian lives to gain Ethiopia. He realized that a successful Italian invasion of Ethiopia would upset the League of Nations' system of collective security, producing a dangerously unstable situation in Europe. Economic and colonial concessions in Africa, Chamberlain believed, could be used to appease Italy in order to rebuild the Stresa Front of April, 1935. However, Italian participation in the Spanish Civil War from July, 1936, onward further complicated the question of how to restore relations with Italy.
When Chamberlain became Prime Minister on May 28, 1937, he was intent on restoring Anglo-Italian relations in order to use Italy as a counter to Germany. He hoped to be able to link recognition of the Italian Empire with a settlement of the Spanish Civil War, thereby contributing to the general appeasement of Europe. Chamberlain was eager to begin conversations with Italy to attain this end. This policy led to increasing friction with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who finally resigned on February 20, 1938. Following Eden's resignation, Chamberlain secured the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16, 1938--his first success in foreign policy and a document which was to have a profound effect on subsequent approaches to both Italy and Germany.
Meanwhile, the German annexation of Austria in March, 1938, had caused Chamberlain to change the aim of his Italian policy. Because Italy had not opposed the German move, Chamberlain believed it would be impossible to rebuild the Stresa Front. He concentrated instead on trying to use Mussolini to moderate Hitler's ambitions. He maintained that the Munich Agreement, for which he gave all the credit to Mussolini, had been made possible by the Anglo-Italian Agreement and was a sign that his policy was succeeding. Chamberlain's belief that Mussolini had acted with disinterested good will at Munich caused him in the last year of peace to communicate with the Italian dictator in full candor, which only led Mussolini to the conclusion that the democracies of the West were not worth supporting.
With the outbreak of war in September, 1939, Chamberlain returned to his 1935 assessment of Mussolini. He realized that the Italian dictator's professions of peace were cynically motivated. Mussolini, unlike Chamberlain, had no interest in peace merely for the sake of peace. From September, 1939, until May, 1940, Chamberlain withdrew from active participation in diplomatic approaches to Italy. In June, Britain and Italy were at war. Ultimately, Chamberlain was a victim of his own self-confidence and abhorrence of war.
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