The "veil of ignorance" and "general knowledge" of human nature in John Rawls' A̲ Ṯẖe̲o̲ṟy̲ o̲f̲ J̲u̲s̲ṯi̲c̲e̲

The purpose of this study was to examine the conditions of knowledge involved in a feature of John Rawls' work, A Theory of Justice. Specifically, the notion of the "veil of ignorance" was the object of study, along with the related concept of "general knowledge." Within the "original position," the hypothetical contract situation established by Rawls, several rules are invoked to govern the contractual choice of principles of justice. The "veil of ignorance" functions as one of these rules of the initial situation of choice, and it directs any contractor in the situation of choice to use only general information in arriving at principles of justice. Besides the stipulation of general information, or "general knowledge," the contractor is also prohibited from using particular information at the incipient level of decision.

Primarily, the attention of the study was directed toward the extent to which a contractor could adopt the rule of the "veil of ignorance," considering the "veil's" prohibition on particular knowledge and affirmation of "general knowledge." The procedure of the examination involved two facets: (1) the feasibility of someone's adopting the perspective of the contractor was assessed in relation to the inadmissability of particular knowledge; (2) an estimate was made regarding the contractor's having a supply of "general knowledge," obtained from the behavioral sciences. Generally, the critical task was devoted to the possibility of a contractor's assumption of the total or complete "veil of ignorance," since the total "veil" over particular knowledge appeared fundamental to the contractual situation established by Rawls.

The principal findings of the critical study may be stated in two parts. First, it was determined that several difficulties affected the possibility of a contractor's assuming the perspective required by the "veil of ignorance," although these difficulties in themselves were not deemed as an utter refutation of Rawls' "veil" over knowledge. Secondly, the consideration of extracting statements of "general knowledge" from the behavioral sciences resulted in substantial doubts that such statements could be obtained adequately.

Finally, the conclusion of the study judged that the "veil of ignorance" could not be accepted as fulfilling its functions relative to the censoring of knowledge. It was found to be somewhat inappropriate to the conditions of the human chooser and to knowledge of human behavior.