Judging paradigms : an examination of paradigmatic status in academic debate

The purposes of this thesis are to explain how intercollegiate debates are judged, how judging philosophies have developed since 1915, and whether judging philosophies constitute "paradigms" as that term is used in the natural and social sciences.

The two earliest judging models were that of the critic judge, who determined which of the two competing teams was more skillful in oral argument, and that of the issues judge, who determined which side of the debate resolution had been better defended. There are three more recent judging models: that of the hypothesis testing judge, who regards a policy resolution as similar to a scientific hypothesis and determines whether it has been proved true or false; that of the systems analysis judge, whose decision is based on a comparison of the costs and benefits of two competing policy systems; and that of the Tabula Rasa judge, who approaches the academic debate without commitment to a judging philosophy and who is prepared to hear contestants argue both debate theory and policy options.

Following an examination of the meanings of the term "paradigm," the five judging models are considered in order to determine their paradigmatic status. Application of definitional, situational, and linguistic criteria shows that only the issues model and the systems analysis model constitute paradigms. While consideration of paradigmatic status is a useful way to study the literature on debate judging, further clarification of the criteria for determining such status is needed.