A philosophical analysis of needs as a foundation of right

That some rights should be founded upon needs is an issue that has been addressed most recently in terms of the right to health care. Unfortunately, an adequate study of the concept of needs has not been given. As a result, many things could be included as needs, thereby rendering a needs-based theory of rights implausible. In order to prevent this result and thus to make such a theory of rights most plausible, a careful analysis of the concept of need must be undertaken. Sucn an analysis, drawn from the literature on needs and rights, is given in Chapter II.

Chapter III focuses on several main problems related to this analysis. In particular, the notion of well-being raises many problems associated with three kinds of relativism: over time, across cultures, and among individuals, the latter being the most problematic. To avoid the problems associated with relativism, most needs-rights theorists restrict the theory to universal needs, those needs shared by all humans. The problem is then to determine on what basis kinds of needs are distinguished. In Chapter IV, several bases are examined, and each is found to be problematic. The basis of survival connected with quality of life is probably the most plausible, yet it is still problematic. Since the distinction among needs cannot be made in a morally significant, unproblematic way, quite a long and varied list of things can be subsumed under the concept of need. Thus, a needs-based theory of rights faces the same problem as it did initially. It is concluded that needs-based theories of rights are implausible, unless certain major problems can be resolved.

Chapter V addresses some major problems in connection with the concept of need for a right to health care based on needs. More specifically, problems associated with allocation of resources, as well as sexism, are discussed. It is concluded that though grounding a right to health care on needs is quite problematic, perhaps that right could be defended in another, more plausible way.