Interest groups and state initiatives: insights on the activities of interest groups at the state-level

The proliferation of initiatives in the American states is a well-documented phenomenon. So is the rise of interest group activity at the state-level. However,little systematic research has been undertaken to understand the role of interest groups in the initiative process. This dissertation investigates the linkages between ballot initiatives and interest groups at the state-level. In particular,this study examines group activity in two ballot campaigns—California'sProposition 5 and Missouri's Amendment 9. Gamblinginterests were successful in each election. Both campaigns dealt with the protection and extension of gambling activities in the respective states.Through the examination of secondary sources,I generate an analytical framework to understand interest group behavior in the initiative process. This framework enabled to address various questions relating to the activities,involvement,and impact of groups in two ballot campaigns. The study is an attempt to further understand thePopulistParadox enunciated by Gerber(1999). This paradox questions whether organized interest groups dominate ballot campaigns,contrary to the original intention of ballot initiatives. The paradox is further distinguished by organizationalresources groupsenjoy. In particular,citizen groups are hypothesized to maintain an advantage in mobilizing personnel resources over economic groups,while economic groups supposedly maintain an advantage in mobilizing monetary resources over citizen groups. My findings suggest that groups do indeed attempt to mobilize both personnel and monetary resources. Further, Gerber's thesis is in part affirmed. This study found that citizen groups were capable of mobilizing personnel resources and economic groups certainly were able to mobilize monetary resources. However,economic groups were not at a loss in their pursuit of personnel resources. Theyindeed were able to mobilize individuals to contribute their time and energy to their campaigns. Moreinqjortant, while organizational resources were significant to the outcome of each campaign,the strategies crafted and conveyed to the public were essential to the success of gambling interests in each in both California and Missouri. Therefore,it is apparent that without a winning message,it is unknown how organizational resources affect the outcome of a ballot campaign. In sum,a Step has been taken to solve the Populist Paradox. While groups are the primary campaigners in ballot campaigns,of their message simply is not consistent with the attitudes of the citizenry, groups cannot"buy" initiative elections.