The subject of consciousness and survival of death : a Strawsonian approach
Date Issued
December 1, 1981
Author(s)
Gilmore, Donald Ralph
Advisor(s)
Richard Aquila
Additional Advisor(s)
Charles H. Reynolds
Abstract
The question whether there is an enduring subject of one's experience has occupied considerable philosophical discussion since Hume concluded that there can be no empirical observation of the "self." More recent writers on the question have shifted the emphasis from discussion concerning the "self" to discussion concerning whether there is a "subject" of one's experience. In the first three chapters of the dissertation I contend that the "subject" view is an essential element in the proper concept of a person. In Chapter I and Chapter II, I examine the sort of no-subject approach that is characterized by an attempt to define the "endurance" of apparently enduring subjects in terms of relations among experiences "of" that subject, and without appeal to any common relation in which all such experiences stand to some enduring entity of any other sort. This approach, which I have designated the "classical" or Humean form of the no-subject view, thus does not avail itself of reference to a common causal relation in which all such experiences might be supposed to stand to an enduring body. This latter form of no-subject view, which I have termed "nonclassical," is discussed in Chapter III. Having argued for the necessity of a "subject," in Chapter IV and Chapter V I discuss the question whether the nature of this subject raises any special difficulties for the possibility of a person's surviving death. I raise this question with special regard to P. F. Strawson's argument that the subject of one's experiences must be the very same thing to which ordinary physical predicates are ascribed. I conclude in Chapter IV that Strawson is really committed to a sort of "contingent" identity theory, although this conclusion appears to stand at odds with the basic Strawsonian premise that a person is a unique sort of thing. In Chapter V, I examine the types of "survival" theories with which Strawson's view is compatible. Finally, in Chapter VI I examine a broader perspective concerning the logical coherency of survival theories in general. I conclude that some body will be necessary for post-mortem survival to be possible, although it may turn out that the concept of bodily identity will not be necessary in a "survival" world.
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Major
Philosophy
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