In this paper, I examine the plausibility of event-causal libertarianism, a prominent view on free will which regards indeterminism in the causal history of a decision as necessary for an agent’s moral responsibility for a subsequent action. Specifically, I investigate how Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian account fares in light of Derk Pereboom’s powerful “disappearing agent” objection, in addition to criticisms of my own. Kane concludes that Pereboom’s objection is ineffective against his account. I argue against Kane’s conclusion by highlighting a dilemma which results from Kane's response to the disappearing agent objection; either way Kane’s position is interpreted, his account is unsuccessful.
Nowell, Robert J.
"Indeterminism in Kane’s Event-Causal Libertarianism,"
Pursuit - The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee:
1, Article 13.
Available at: http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit/vol5/iss1/13