



To the Graduate School:


I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Robin Hardin entitled "A Thematic Analysis of Published Responses by Three Newspapers to Vietnam and Press Issues during the Persian Gulf War." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Communications.


C. Edward Caudill, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and
recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:


Associate Vice Chancellor and
Dean of The Graduate School

A Thematic Analysis of Published Responses by Three Newspapers
to Vietnam and Press Issues during the Persian Gulf War

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Science Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Robin Hardin
May 1996

ABSTRACT

This study was a thematic analysis of published responses in the *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times* and *Washington Post* concerning Vietnam and press issues during the Persian Gulf War. All types of articles were examined for themes pertaining to Vietnam and press issues. Editorials, news stories, news analyses and columns were all examined in the process of gathering the data. Vietnam and press issues were very much on the mind of journalists and the press during the war, and these themes appeared throughout the time frame of the study. Journalists were somewhat shocked at the restrictions placed on them during the war, but this should have come as no surprise considering the way the press had been treated in the two previous military conflicts leading up to the Persian Gulf War. Vietnam and the Vietnam syndrome were on the minds of the military and the rest of the country and many allusions to Vietnam appeared in the news. The military may have a case for censorship considering the only war where censorship was not imposed, Vietnam, was the only war the United States lost. With technology so advanced, information can practically be transmitted anywhere in the world in seconds, and information may need to be safeguarded by the military to prevent aiding the enemy.

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Chapter I

Introduction

From the founding of this republic, the United States military and the American press have interacted with one another during all military conflicts. During the nineteenth century the press and the military were somewhat adversarial. There was little cooperation from the press to keep the nation from dividing during the Civil War, as most Southern newspapers supported succession. The Spanish-American War is often blamed on newspapers, and William Randolph Hearst is often credited with provoking this war so he could provide his newspapers with something to report.¹

The first half of the twentieth century did not see this adversarial situation. The press and military were considered a team during World War I and World War II. The press was a viable outlet for the military and government to get information out to the public. The press mostly cooperated, as it wanted to help stop the aggression and threat to world peace that the Axis forces were presenting.

The Committee on Public Information was established in 1917 so the government and military would have an agency to relay information to the press during World War I.² The Office of War Information was introduced during the World War II era as an outlet for information about the military.³ Many feel the information flowing from these agencies was propaganda, but nonetheless the press rarely questioned the validity of the information or the censorship imposed.

¹ Carlson, Oliver and Ernest Sutherland Bates. *Hearst Lord of San Simeon*. Page 92.

² Rhodes, Anthony. *Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion in World War II*. Page 139.

³ Rhodes. Page 144.

Censorship was not questioned during the World War II, and the government did not even try to hide the fact that it was imposing censorship, as it established the Office of Censorship in 1941.⁴ President Franklin D. Roosevelt had this to say about censorship when he created the office:

All Americans abhor censorship, just as they abhor war. But the experience of this and of all other nations has demonstrated that some degree of censorship is essential in wartime, and we are at war.

The important thing now is that such forms of censorship as are necessary shall be administered effectively and in harmony with the best interests of our free institutions. It is necessary that a watch be set upon our borders, so that no such information may reach the enemy, inadvertently or otherwise, through the medium of the mail, radio or cable transmission, or by any other means. It is necessary that prohibitions against the domestic publication of some types of information, contained in long-existing statutes, be rigidly enforced.

Finally, the Government has called upon a patriotic press and radio to abstain voluntarily from the dissemination of detailed information of certain kinds, such as reports of the movements of vessels and troops. The response has indicated an universal desire to co-operate.⁵

The military had a virtual free reign on controlling the press. Editors and broadcasters displayed high patriotism in realizing the release of some information could be harmful to the war effort.⁶ Editors and broadcasters readily cooperated with the Office of Censorship and helped draw codes of wartime practices.⁷ Not many negative things were written about American policy or involvement in these wars. The military censored everything from the soldiers' letters home to the newspapers being published in the United States. Even this censorship was not questioned as the press was helping the military stop the Nazis and the Japanese from world conquest.

But the second half of the twentieth century has seen the revival of the adversarial role between the press and the military. The first notable negative reporting of any kind

⁴ Price, Byron. "How Censorship Can Help Win the War." *America Organizes to Go to War*. Page 223.

⁵ Price. Page 224.

⁶ Price. Page 230.

⁷ Price. Page 230.

about the military after World War II came during the Korean War. It came from Don Whitehead, who was a war correspondent representing the Associated Press. His articles were about the unfavorable conditions the soldiers were enduring. He questioned some decisions made by the military, as he wrote about the inadequate winter clothing that was being provided for the soldiers and the flaws in General Douglas MacArthur's command that ultimately led to his dismissal as commander in Korea.⁸

The Vietnam era brought about a change in the way the press and the military interacted. During the early 1960s all the reliable information about the situation in Vietnam came from Washington from government spokesmen and government-gathered information.⁹ When correspondents did start going to Vietnam in the early 1960s the team concept that the press had with the military during the World Wars was thought to be the standard by the military.¹⁰ American involvement in Vietnam was thought to be another attempt to stop the Communist aggression as it had occurred just like in Korea or Cuba. American involvement in Vietnam should be supported by the press and public. The military and the press should once again unite to help stop imperialism by the Communists, or this is at least what the military believed should occur.

This was the case early in Vietnam as the military was able to control the flow of news out of Vietnam and Washington. But as the war escalated so did the tension between the military and the press. One thing that led to this modern adversarial role between the press and military was the development of the so-called credibility gap.¹¹ What led to this credibility gap may have been the continuous asking for more troops. In mid-1965 General

⁸ Broadbooks, Jon. *Reporting from the Devil's Cauldron: The Wartime Dispatches of Don Whitehead*. Page 47.

⁹ Rashke, Edward. *A Survey of Professional Army Officers' Affective Attitudes Toward the News Media*. Page 2.

¹⁰ Rashke. Page 3.

¹¹ Rashke. Page 3.

William Westmoreland, American military commander in Vietnam, asked that troop strength be increased from 150,000 to 350,000, and he declared that the war could be won soon. More troops were requested in 1966, and still an additional 463,000 troops were requested in 1967.¹² But perhaps the greatest blow to the Army's credibility came on January 30, 1968. The "Tet" offensive demonstrated the enemy's ability to strike at will and throughout all of Vietnam.¹³

Frances Fitzgerald, who was writing for the *Atlantic Monthly* and the *New York Times* Sunday Magazine in South Vietnam during the war, wrote in her Pulitzer Prize winning book *Fire in the Lake* (1972) about the Army's credibility:

Over the past year Westmoreland, (Ellsworth) Bunker, and (Robert) Komer had given the impression that the enemy threat had receded, that the American troops had pushed the main force units out of the populated areas into the jungles of the border. Now there were pictures of the mission coordinator, George Jacobson, leaning out of the chancellery window with a pistol, and television reports of fighting in the center of Saigon. It was incomprehensible. The fact that the American Command had been unprepared for such a gross movement raised doubts about the quality of American Intelligence and wisdom of American military strategy over the past two years.

Another journalist, David Halberstem, also questioned the Army's credibility in his book, *The Best and the Brightest* (1972):

The credibility of the American strategy of attrition died during the Tet offensive; so too did the credibility of the man who was by now President (Lyndon) Johnson's most important political ally, General Westmoreland.

This was some of the early criticism by the press about the military. In order to uncover the truth, the news media sent an additional 500 correspondents to Vietnam after the Tet offensive in 1968. This made the ratio of one correspondent for every 1,050 soldiers in Vietnam.¹⁴ But the exact number of correspondents in Vietnam is in dispute, as

¹² Rashke. Page 4.

¹³ Rashke. Page 4.

¹⁴ Rashke. Pages 4-5.

one report says that the total number of correspondents covering Vietnam at its peak was only 400.¹⁵

The close scrutiny and enormous daily output of these correspondents quickly exposed the American public to the realities of the war. These are some of the stories that flooded the American press: "Viet Reds Storm U.S. Camp" (*Chicago Tribune*, February 7, 1968, p. 1); "Unofficial Tabulation Indicates U.S. Casualties Exceed Those of Korean War" (*New York Times*, March 9, 1968, p. 2); "General Westmoreland Makes Clear Recent Enemy Offensive Was Unexpected" (*New York Times*, March 21, 1968, p. 1); "U.S. Planes Bomb Saigon Suburb But Viet Cong Fight On" (*Los Angeles Times*, May 11, 1968, p. 1); "Army and Marine Corps Are Sending 24,000 Men Back for Involuntary 2d Tours of Duty" (*New York Times*, October 15, 1968, p. 1). All of this led a decline in home-front support of the war, but this was not the only reason support for the war was declining. These articles just made the public aware of some of the things occurring in Vietnam.

Evidence of this decline is reflected in the surveys by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC). In 1964, the SRC asked, "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Vietnam, or should we have stayed out?" Sixty percent of the respondents thought we did the right thing. In 1968, only 36 percent believed we should be in Vietnam.¹⁶ Gallup polls using similar questions had essentially the same results. Only 40 percent of the respondents to a Gallup Poll in 1968 felt the United States did the right thing by sending troops to Vietnam.¹⁷

¹⁵ Quester, George. "Grenada and the News Media." *American Intervention in Grenada*. Page 118

¹⁶ Rashke. Page 5.

¹⁷ Gallup, George. *The Gallup Poll Public Opinion 1935-1971*. vol. 3. Page 2,125.

The official Army reaction to these changing views is not exactly known, but several high ranking Army officers blamed the news media for the loss of public support .¹⁸ General Maxwell Taylor said, "This division at home has been furthered by the behavior of the publicity media."¹⁹ General Hamilton Howze said, "There has been ample evidence of slanted reporting--reporting specifically designed to denigrate the military service no matter the price to national honor and well-being and to the outcome of the war."²⁰ One of the harshest comments made by anyone connected with the military came from retired Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall. He said:

In days of yore, the American correspondent when moving with a field army, was expected to behave no less accountably than a line officer. He was not a sacred being with limitless freedom, privileged to move between lines or to traffic with the opposing camp. The rules of security were as binding on him as on any soldier. He was an American first, a correspondent second. This old-fashioned standard seems to have been forgotten in Southeast Asia. Some old-timers still play the game according to the rules. There is a breed that acts as if it believes a press ticket is a license to run wild.²¹

These statements about the media helped lead to the animosity that was building up between the press and the military. What was causing all of these problems between the two? Historian Edwin Emery believed part of the military's problems with the news media in Vietnam were partly its own fault. He criticized the military for withholding information believed to be detrimental to stated policy, and for the establishment of "elaborate statistical counts to justify the policies of the White House and Pentagon."²²

This led to different ways the press and military were going to interact. Some control must be exercised in order to maintain secrecy and security. But how the military handled and interacted with the press definitely changed after Vietnam. Since Vietnam,

¹⁸ Rashke. Page 5.

¹⁹ Norman. L. "Speaks to DINFOS." *The Journalist*. Page 4.

²⁰ Rashke. Page 6.

²¹ Rashke. Page 6.

²² Emery, Edwin. "The Press in the Vietnam Quagmire." *Journalism Quarterly*. Page 619.

there have been three military encounters by the United States that have received major news coverage. Two of the encounters were brief and lasted less than 30 days.

The United States invaded Grenada in 1983 in order to prevent a potential hostage situation. American students were being held against their will as a revolution was occurring in Grenada in an attempt to topple the government. The military handling of the press here was an example of overkill. When the decision was made to invade Grenada, no real news surfaced to indicate the impending invasion. Journalists were taken to the Caribbean Sea on a ship by the government. The ship was about 100 miles off the coast of Grenada when the invasion actually took place, and the journalists had no access to information about the invasion and could not see for themselves what was actually occurring on the island nation. Some journalists even tried to make it ashore by other means, but when they neared the shore shots were fired at them by American ships.²³

The government argued that the reason for the exclusion was for the protection of the journalists and the secrecy needed by the military.²⁴ The press argued that it had the right to access to the events on the island, but the general public supported the exclusion of the press and the invasion of Grenada.²⁵ The reasons for this may include the general distrust of the media, and the thought of an easy military victory on the island of Grenada. This victory may have helped the United States rid its closet of some of the skeletons from Vietnam but did nothing to ease tensions with the press.

But this exclusion shows the relationship of the press and military in 1983, as this was the new way the press and military were going to interact. Grenada set the precedent and pattern for similar operations that would occur in the future. Up to 1967, the press

²³ Quester. Page 109.

²⁴ Quester. Page 112.

²⁵ Quester. Page 115.

was enlisted as a "good soldier" in the military. The president of the United States could have once called the editors of newspapers and asked them not to print certain things, and the editors would have agreed. The press was ready to do self-censorship and have self-restraint in "the public interest."²⁶ But now with the precedent set in Grenada it appeared that the press and military would take on adversarial roles.

The second short military engagement was in Central America. Operation Just Cause in Panama saw much of this same type of strict control. The decision to go to Panama was in order to restore an ousted president to office. Access to the battlefield was not easy for the journalists in Panama, and the military did little to help keep the journalists informed.²⁷

Operation Just Cause in Panama was the first instance of strictly pool reporting being used by the military.²⁸ Reporters in Panama would be assembled in a press pool and the military would give the reporters the information it wanted the reporters to have. Much information about the events occurring in Panama was not given to reporters until hours after the events had actually occurred. Photographers were not allowed to take pictures of the coffins of dead soldiers or equipment that had been destroyed.

The press did do some things that violated security and endangered American lives.²⁹ The press wanted to describe the equipment that had been destroyed and take pictures of parts of the equipment, such as radar and weapon systems, that were top secret. Photographers also wanted to be flown across the country in military aircraft to take

²⁶ Quester. Page 20.

²⁷ Watson, Bruce. "Accessing Press Information." *Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama*. Page 137.

²⁸ Watson. Page 135.

²⁹ Watson Page 140.

pictures of the fighting, and this provided unnecessary risks to American pilots. So some concern is warranted by the military about the issue of security and secrecy.

Since these were such brief encounters, not much could be written about the handling of journalists during these military conflicts. Criticism flowed afterwards from the press about the restraints put on it during these encounters. The next military encounter was Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf. Control of journalists reached new heights during this military engagement.

Pool reporting and briefings were basically the only way news was gathered concerning the situation in the Middle East. Pool reporting in the Persian Gulf was when a limited number of reporters were selected to go out into the field to visit the troops. The reporters would gather information and then return and share it with other reporters. This may have worked, but the military put strict guidelines on where and when the pools could go out in the field. The pools always had a military escort with them as well. No real hard news was gathered this way. This was the policy from the beginning of the campaign. Captain Ron Wildermuth, the public affairs officer for the United States Central Command, stated in a document that all news media representatives will be escorted at all times.³⁰ Almost all information about the war came from briefings in Saudi Arabia, at the White House or from the Pentagon. This may have showed the military learned a lesson from Vietnam by not allowing the to press become a major player in devolping policy toward Iraq or any other Middle Eastern nation.

The government had an elaborate public relations campaign to gain support for the war.³¹ Even though some public relations were used in Vietnam, this was the first full-

³⁰ DeParle, Jason. "Long Series of Military Decisions Led to Gulf War News Censorship." *New York Times*. May 5, 1991. Pages A1, A20.

³¹ Mossber, Walter. "The U.S. Used the Press as a Weapon." *Wall Street Journal*. Feb. 28, 1991. Pages A3, A6.

scale public relations campaign waged by the military. Despited what the military wanted the American public to believe this was a war that was basically fought for economic reasons more than humanitarian reasons.³² The United States could not let Iraq gain control over a major portion of the world's oil supply, and the American public showed overwhelming support for American involvement.

The tight control placed over journalists was evident. From the public and the press standpoint, everyone realized the military was leading the press around and when it was possible only letting it see and hear what the military wanted it to see and hear. Even when Peter Arnett, a reporter for CNN, went into Iraq to gain the inside story of the war, people back in America did not respect his courage. Instead, they questioned his loyalty toward America and called Arnett a traitor.

Under Pentagon reporting rules, American military officials decided which American units could be visited by reporters, how long a visit would last, which reporters could make the visit, and to some extent what soldiers could say, and what could be written.³³ To enforce this policy the pool system was adopted. The pools were officially escorted when they went out the gather news, and the reports from these pools were subject to a "security review" before the information was disseminated.³⁴

Statement of the Problem

Articles were published describing the troubles the press experienced in attempting to gather information. The press wrote articles that complained of the restrictions of pool reporting and the censorship imposed on them. Many allusions were also made to Vietnam

³² Mueller, John. *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War*. Page 144.

³³ Lemoyne, James. "Pentagon's Strategy for the Press: Good News or No News." *New York Times*. Feb. 17, 1991. Page E3.

³⁴ Lewis, Neil A. "Government's Strict Orders Limit Reporters." *New York Times*. Jan. 18, 1991. Page E3.

in describing military policies and actions in the Persian Gulf. Vietnam still haunts many American policy makers and military leaders. If one question could summarize what this research is trying to do it is: What was the major newspapers' published response to the way the way the military treated the press in the Gulf, and what references were made to Vietnam?

Research categories are the published responses to Vietnam issues and press issues. Under Vietnam issues, categories are the Vietnam syndrome, lessons learned from the Vietnam War, and comparisons to how the Persian Gulf War was like and not like the Vietnam War. Categories under press issues are responses to censorship, pool reporting, and the public relations campaign of the military.

Methodology

This research is a thematic analysis of the *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*, and *New York Times* and what was written in them concerning they way the military treated journalists and what allusions were made to Vietnam. All types of articles will be examined. Editorials, news stories, news analyses and columns were all examined. These newspapers will be used because they are respected sources of news, have a nationwide circulation and are watched by other major media. They also represent different political views. The *Wall Street Journal* is considered a conservative newspaper in both news coverage and editorials, and the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* are considered liberal newspapers. The *New York Times* is considered to be the newspaper of record in this country.³⁵ The *Washington Post* is "the insider's" newspaper in Washington D.C. For most people the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* present the equivalent of

³⁵Grossman, Michael and Mantha Kumar. *Portraying the President*. Page 266.

"that's the way it is" in the United States.³⁶ These newspapers also had correspondents in Persian Gulf, giving them first-hand accounts of the events occurring there. The time frame was from January 17 to May 31, 1991. January 17 is the first day acts of war took place and the liberation of Kuwait began. The war ended in March and the two months following would give ample to time for journalists to write what they felt about the Gulf War during it and after it was over.

The aim of the research is to give an honest account with little or no interpretation of the observations made by the researcher. The philosophical principle underlying the approach is that by presenting this faithful account, the researcher's biases and presence will not intrude upon the data. In this perspective, the researcher's scholarly obligation is to observe and report, somewhat akin to a journalist.³⁷

Because the researcher cannot possibly present all the data to the readers, it is necessary to reduce the data. The principle here is to present an accurate description of what is being studied, though not necessarily all of the data that has been studied. Reducing and ordering materials of course represents selection and interpretation. The researchers who advocate or primarily produce accurate description also typically intersperse their own interpretative comments in and around descriptive passages and quotations. The interpretations of the descriptive material vary in their level of abstraction from researcher to researcher.³⁸

The observation unit for catagorizing is a story unit, which is part of a larger article. Articles can have more than one theme or focus, so it was necessary to be able to break whole articles into smaller pieces. Each story unit has been analyzed and catagorized on the

³⁶ Johnson, Karen Sue. *Impression Management During the Presidential Transitions of Nixon, Carter, and Reagan: A Quantitative Content Analysis and Thematic Analysis*. Page 46.

³⁷ Straus and Corbin. Page 21.

³⁸ Straus and Corbin. Page 22.

basis of the themes expressed in it. The story unit was then placed in a category which best represents the theme it is presenting. This method of analysis looked at the articles with general categories and then placed them in the appropriate category. After breaking an article into story units, the question was asked, what is the theme of this article or story unit? The story unit was then placed either under Vietnam issues or press issues based on its theme. The story unit was categorized even further after placing it under Vietnam issues or press issues. Under Vietnam issues are the themes of the Vietnam syndrome, lessons learned from the Vietnam War and comparisons to how the Persian Gulf War was like and not like the Vietnam War. Under press issues are the themes of the response to censorship, pool reporting and the public relations campaign of the military.

Chapter II

History of Press-Military Relations

In examining the relationship of the press and military during the Persian Gulf War a look at coverage of previous wars and military conflicts may help. Throughout the brief history of the United States censorship and press restrictions have been opposed, but during some wars, such as World War I and World War II, censorship has been tolerated for the greater good of the country and the war effort. New innovations and other circumstances have also greatly influenced press coverage of the wars. The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees freedom of the press, and says Congress shall make no law abridging this freedom, but this has not always been the case.

The Early Republic

The first war coverage in America predates the founding of the republic. During the Revolutionary War, the various newspapers and journals in the colonies attempted to keep their readers abreast of major developments and battles in the rebellion against Great Britain. However the papers being published in 1775, the year the Revolution started, lacked the means to provide regular, reliable war coverage.³⁹ The flow of information was frequently interrupted by blockades and the operations of British military forces. In occupied cities such as Boston and New York, it was difficult to publish whatever news was received.⁴⁰

³⁹ Thompson, Loren B. "The Media Versus the Military: A Brief History of War Coverage in the United States." *Defense Beat The Dilemmas of Defense Coverage*. Page 5.

⁴⁰ Thompson. Page 5.

As a result of these problems, news of important battles did not reach some cities until weeks after they had occurred. Because of the delay in receiving news, many papers resorted to printing rumors and speculation as the Revolution continued.⁴¹ This tendency was encouraged by the intensely partisan character of many papers. Most papers favored the Patriot cause, but there were at least 15 loyal to the crown.⁴² For the most part, papers relied on the irregular arrival of private correspondence and official communiqués for war news, or they reprinted stories that had appeared in other papers.⁴³

Despite the absence of an organized method for collecting and disseminating war news, papers in particular cities occasionally cooperated to improve the quality of local coverage. In New York, several weekly papers agreed to publish on different days of the week so that fresh accounts of the war could appear daily.⁴⁴ Some papers also advanced their days of publication or published extra editions when important war news was received. In most cities, though, coverage of the war was haphazard and unreliable throughout the war.⁴⁵

Similar conditions prevailed during the War of 1812. Although the number of newspapers and frequency of their appearance had been increasing steadily, the same problems of insufficient resources, inadequate methods for transmitting news, and disruptions caused by military operations resulted in coverage that was late and unreliable.⁴⁶

In fact one of the most famous battles of the war, the Battle of New Orleans, took place after the war had officially ended. The news the war had ended did not reach New

⁴¹ Thompson. Page 5

⁴² Thompson. Page 5.

⁴³ Thompson. Page 6.

⁴⁴ Hudson, Frederic. *Journalism in the United States from 1690 to 1872*. Page 140.

⁴⁵ Thompson. Page 6.

⁴⁶ Thompson. Page 6.

Orleans in time to stop the battle because of the inadequate methods of disseminating news. In the years following the war, however, the rapid growth of the nation, and the emergence new technologies greatly improved the ability of newspapers to provide timely and detailed coverage of distant events. In the first half to the nineteenth century, the population of the United States grew to more than 17 million people, and with this population boom along came a boom in the need for news. Thus, almost every major city had competing dailies by 1840.⁴⁷ The larger dailies now had both the resources and the space to provide extensive coverage of important news developments locally and abroad.

New technologies made it possible to transmit news much more quickly. In 1825, the first commercially successful railroad was opened in the United States, that began a period of rapid improvement in the transportation system in the United States and culminated with the completion of a transcontinental system in 1869.⁴⁸ After the telegraph was patented in 1837, most major cities in the East were linked by telegraph lines. The telegraph revolutionized newspaper reporting by allowing nearly instantaneous transmission of information over great distances.⁴⁹ A transatlantic telegraph cable was laid in 1866, bringing to an end the long delays that had previously typified American coverage of European news.⁵⁰

The Mexican-American War occurred between 1846-1848, that was in the midst of this technological transformation, and war coverage benefited to a limited degree from the new means of transportation and communication. Since this war took place in remote locations where rail lines and telegraph lines had not been laid, the traditional method of

⁴⁷ Thompson. Page 6.

⁴⁸ Thompson. Page 6.

⁴⁹ Thompson. Page 6.

⁵⁰ Thompson. Page 7.

transmitting news by ship and horseback continued to be used.⁵¹ But two important innovations did result from the Mexican-American War as a result of the increasing wealth of metropolitan dailies. They were the creation of a dedicated overland express on horseback to hasten the delivery of war dispatches and the establishment of a network of field correspondents to provide more accurate and detailed accounts of military developments.⁵² The overland express showed the dedication newspapers had in providing news to the public, and the correspondents helped establish a tradition of professional, eyewitness news coverage that would become firmly rooted in the Civil War.

The Civil War

The Civil War was the most cataclysmic event the young nation of the United States had faced since its birth.⁵³ For four years the United States was a ravaged nation where practically everybody in the country was affected by the war. The scale of suffering and destruction caused by the American Civil War far exceeded that of other conflicts which occurred in the mid-nineteenth century. The Civil War was a war of movement in which multiple fronts shifted back and forth across hundreds of miles of territory. As the fronts moved, millions of civilians were displaced and their property destroyed. The struggle was conducted so indiscriminately that historians would later describe the four-year period as the first example of total war.⁵⁴

The all-encompassing nature of the war was reflected in the nation's newspapers. Papers often devoted a third or more their space to news and commentary about the war.⁵⁵ Northern newspapers sent about 500 journalists to cover the war, with about 150 of them

⁵¹ Thompson. Page 7.

⁵² Thompson. Page 7.

⁵³ Thompson. Page 7.

⁵⁴ Mathews, Joseph J. *Reporting the Wars*. Page 80.

⁵⁵ Thompson. Page 9.

as special field correspondents representing specific papers.⁵⁶ For the papers that could not afford to send a correspondent to cover the action of the war the newly created Associated Press (AP) pooled the resources of many subscribing papers to field correspondents.⁵⁷

Competitive pressures and the absence of relevant experience for covering so massive and desperate a conflict led journalists on both sides to engage in questionable practices. The *New York Herald*, one of the Union's leading papers, was accused of bribing government officials to obtain news. Many correspondents exaggerated their accounts of military operations and in some cases resorted to outright fabrication of so-called eyewitness reports.⁵⁸ Despite an Article of War in the North proscribing trafficking in sensitive information, newspapers on both sides routinely published facts helpful to the enemy. General Robert E. Lee often studied Union newspapers for useful intelligence, and Generals Ulysses Grant and William Sherman both considered resigning because of the propensity of journalists to uncover and report their plans.⁵⁹

Correspondents at the front faced problems other than that of just being killed. Senior military officers were often helpful to journalists, but could be just as disruptive as well. Confederate generals frequently denied Southern journalists permission to travel with troops. Some generals picked favorites and those received preferential treatment, and others manipulated journalists to write what they wanted.⁶⁰ The favoritism and disdain that many top officers showed toward journalists made it difficult for correspondents to write balanced, objective accounts of the war.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Mott, Frank Luther. *American Journalism, A History 1690-1960*, 3rd edition. Page 330.

⁵⁷ Thompson. Page 9.

⁵⁸ Thompson. Page 10.

⁵⁹ Mathews. Page 86.

⁶⁰ Thompson. Page 11.

⁶¹ Mathews. Pages 84-85.

Correspondents at the front faced two other problems as well. One was unreliable communications and the other was uneven application of government policies toward censorship. Even though telegraph lines were running throughout the eastern United States, they were often cut, and military officials routinely prevented the transmittal of news they considered harmful to the war effort.⁶² In August of 1861, the War Department issued an order that warned journalists that they were subject to court-martial if they disclosed sensitive military information. Editors and reporters ignored the order, so the Lincoln administration decided to intervene more forcefully in the transmission of war news.⁶³ In February 1862, Congress authorized the president to place all telegraph lines within Union territory under military supervision. Then, any war news being carried by telegraph lines in the North was subject to censorship regardless of its origin.⁶⁴ However, there was never a clear or consistent policy concerning what news was appropriate for publication; thus, censorship was applied capriciously and unpredictably.⁶⁵ Some censors were lax in what they considered sensitive news, while others censored anything that contained even a hint of criticism toward the Union. Correspondents could never be certain whether their dispatches would be transmitted or suppressed.⁶⁶

With news from the front being frequently delayed or censored, many papers turned to their Washington bureaus for information on the progress of the war. But official statements from the War Department often contained a hodgepodge of disconnected facts and figures that did little to tell whether the Union was winning the war.⁶⁷ Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton deliberately distorted accounts of key battles and manipulated

⁶² Thompson. Page 11.

⁶³ Mott. Pages 88-89.

⁶⁴ Thompson. Page 11.

⁶⁵ Thompson. Page 11.

⁶⁶ Mathews. Page 82.

⁶⁷ Thompson. Page 12.

casualty figures to present a more positive picture of the war. When negative reports of the Union's performance were published, Stanton resorted to banning correspondents, arresting editors, and suspending papers for violating censorship rules. In one case, he even ordered a reporter to be shot for refusing to hand over sensitive information.⁶⁸

Papers in the South faced many of the same problems papers in the North did, but some to a greater extent. The South's newspapers had fewer resources to field correspondents, and the treatment they received at the front was worse than their Union counterparts. Some Confederate commanders expelled correspondents from their headquarters, and the South was deprived of much war news. For a battle to be waged without Union papers represented would be exceptional, for the South not to be represented was commonplace.⁶⁹

The Southern states also imposed heavy censorship on newspapers throughout the war.⁷⁰ For editors already struggling with small staffs and poor communications, censorship was just another added burden that compromised their ability to provide adequate war coverage.⁷¹

For all the failings of the press and all the obstacles placed in its path by hostile or indifferent authorities, correspondents managed to provide coverage that was unparalleled in any previous conflict. By the time the war ended in the spring of 1865, a tradition of extensive and reasonably professional war coverage had been established.⁷²

⁶⁸ Knightly, Phillip. *The First Casualty*. Page 29

⁶⁹ Mathews. Page 95.

⁷⁰ Mott. Page 365.

⁷¹ Thompson. Page 14.

⁷² Thompson. Page 14.

The Spanish-American War

The final decade of the nineteenth century saw a surge in nationalism that led some to advocate the creation of an overseas American empire. This impulse was short-lived and controversial, but it was strong enough to bring about a war with Spain in 1898. Some people believe the press was responsible for causing this war, specifically William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer who owned competing daily newspapers in New York City.

For years the American press had railed against Spain's misrule of its empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Spain was accused of maintaining a despotic rule that regularly committed atrocities against native peoples.⁷³ In 1895, a rebellion broke out in Cuba, and U.S. papers began to report that Spanish military forces were carrying out atrocities not only against the natives, but American residents.⁷⁴ The reports were wildly exaggerated and in some cases clearly intended to provoke a U.S. military response.⁷⁵

There was so much distorted, untrue reporting about the situation in Cuba in the late 1890s, that W.A. Swanberg, a Hearst biographer, characterized the performance of the press during the period as "the most disgraceful example of journalistic falsehood ever seen."⁷⁶ The routine publication of fabricated and inflammatory stories came about as a result of competition between Pulitzer's *World* and Hearst's *Journal* in New York City.⁷⁷ Both papers were representative of a new journalism phenomenon, which was the mass circulation dailies. The spread of literacy and the emergence of the urban working class had begun a new breed of papers that emphasized crime and scandals.⁷⁸

⁷³ Thompson. Page 16.

⁷⁴ Thompson. Page 16.

⁷⁵ Thompson. Page 16.

⁷⁶ Swanberg, W.A. *Citizen Hearst: A Biography of William Randolph Hearst*. Page 108.

⁷⁷ Thompson. Page 16.

⁷⁸ Thompson. Page 17.

The trend was most apparent in New York City, and a circulation war between the *World* and the *Journal* fostered a competitive spirit that rationalized publishing any story, no matter how vulgar or misleading as long as it attracted readers.⁷⁹ The Cuban rebellion with its reports of struggling revolutionaries, vicious colonial rulers, violated women and the like was well suited to this new type of "yellow" journalism. Accounts continued to pour out of Cuba detailing all of the atrocities occurring, but the fact was no correspondent knew much about what was occurring because their movement was limited and the dispatches censored.⁸⁰ In early 1898, the McKinley administration was under heavy pressure from Congress and the public to act more decisively. The battleship *Maine* was dispatched to protect American citizens in Cuba, but the *Maine* was destroyed by an explosion.⁸¹

The cause of the disaster was never clearly established, but the press immediately seized on it as a pretext for declaring war against Spain. A headline in the *Journal* read "the warship *Maine* was split in two by an enemy's secret infernal machine."⁸² Following this lead, newspapers across the country whipped up a war fever that forced a reluctant President McKinley to put the question of war before Congress. Despite the fact that Spain had met most of the demands made by the United States, Congress declared war.⁸³

The New York papers covered the Spanish-American War as vigorously as they had promoted it. Some estimates put the total number of reporters, artists, and photographers sent to cover the war in the Caribbean and the Pacific as high as 500, the number that covered the Civil War.⁸⁴ The *New York Journal* had a fleet of ten boats in and

⁷⁹ Thompson. Page 17.

⁸⁰ Thompson. Page 17.

⁸¹ Thompson. Page 17.

⁸² Thompson. Page 17-18.

⁸³ Swanberg. Page 145.

⁸⁴ Thompson. Page 18.

around Cuba, including the personal yacht of Hearst from which the publisher directed his correspondents' coverage.⁸⁵

The quality of coverage was another matter. Although some newspapers attempted to provide balanced accounts of the war, many papers followed the lead set by the *Journal* and *World* in providing emotional, misleading, and occasionally fabricated coverage.⁸⁶ Military censorship of the correspondents' dispatches was quite lax, due in part to the highly positive tone of most of the coverage.⁸⁷ Papers often carried detailed reports about military maneuvers, troop strength, and details about the military without suffering official criticism. An attempt was made to censor sensitive information, but it was not very effective. The war ended so quickly that there was no opportunity to impose more effective controls.⁸⁸

Historians often refer to the Spanish-American War as a key event in the emergence of the United States as world power. This may be true, but the war also marked a low point the coverage of conflicts by the press. The war was unquestionably avoidable and occurred largely to satisfy the promotional goals of competing New York papers.⁸⁹ Once the war was underway, the yellow press exploited the action shamelessly to sell papers and did little to illuminate the large implications of a U.S. victory.⁹⁰

World War I

The next major conflict that journalists would be involved in was World War I. Even before the United States entered the war, Americans sent to cover the war realized they were facing an extraordinary journalistic challenge. The scale of the conflict dwarfed

⁸⁵ Mott. Page 537.

⁸⁶ Thompson. Page 19.

⁸⁷ Thompson. Page 19.

⁸⁸ Thompson. Page 19.

⁸⁹ Thompson. Page 19.

⁹⁰ Thompson. Page 19.

the resources of most papers for covering it, and the stringent censorship rules imposed by both sides often prevented the transmission of news that was gathered.⁹¹ When the less restrictive policies of the Germans resulted in favorable coverage of their military performance, the Allies loosened their own restrictions somewhat. But both sides insisted on strict censorship of all cable and mail dispatches by war correspondents.⁹²

Since the United States remained neutral during the first two-and-half years of the war, few limits were placed on what American newspapers could print. The absence of formal restraints on U.S. coverage began to change as soon as the United States entered the war. Ten days after war was declared against Germany in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson said any publication providing "aid or comfort" to the enemy would be subject to prosecution for treason.⁹³ Two months later Congress passed an espionage act imposing stiff fines and imprisonment on publishers deemed to be promoting disloyalty. This was followed by the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, which authorized censorship of all overseas messages.⁹⁴ Further control was still exerted when in October of 1918, when Congress passed the Sedition Act, which made it an offense to print any material that contained "disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language about the form of government in the United States."⁹⁵ The legal framework for censorship had been well established.

A bureaucratic apparatus had also been created to regulate war coverage and encourage support for the war effort. The Trading-with-the-Enemy Act created a Censorship Board that worked closely with the attorney general and the postmaster general to prevent transmission of dissemination of information which would harm the war

⁹¹ Thompson. Page 23.

⁹² Mott. Pages 615, 619.

⁹³ Thompson. Page 23.

⁹⁴ Thompson. Page 23.

⁹⁵ Mott. Page 623.

effort.⁹⁶ A propaganda agency, the Committee for Public Information, was established to release official information about the war and promote public support for it.⁹⁷ With the exception of a few news organizations, most of the major papers accepted the need to back the war effort and maintain public morale.⁹⁸

The restrictions on American journalists at the front, while less restrictive than those of other countries, were much more demanding than in past wars. In order to be accredited as a correspondent with the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France, a reporter was required to swear an oath of loyalty before a representative of the secretary of war, pay a \$1,000 fee for equipment and maintenance, and post a \$10,000 bond as a guarantee for his good behavior. Once at the front, the reporter had to wear a green armband identifying him as a reporter and submit all of his dispatches to official censorship.⁹⁹

Censorship at the front was managed by the Military Intelligence Service. A former war correspondent, Fredrick Palmer, accepted a commission in the Army to monitor reporters' activities.¹⁰⁰ The military initially sought to limit the number of accredited correspondents with the AEF to 31, but it allowed non-accredited journalists to cover the war as visiting reporters. But as many as 400 showed up, and the system for monitoring them broke down.¹⁰¹ Censorship was so thorough that it sometimes extended to the deletion of unimportant information such as the what the weather conditions were. The official war releases by Palmer's office contained little useful information and exaggerated the success of the AEF.¹⁰² As a result, much of the coverage from the western front was

⁹⁶ Thompson. Page 24.

⁹⁷ Thompson. Page 24.

⁹⁸ Mott. Page 623.

⁹⁹ Knightly. Page 124.

¹⁰⁰ Thompson. Page 24.

¹⁰¹ Hammond, William M. *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media 1962-1968*. Page 5.

¹⁰² Knightly. Pages 128, 130-131.

mainly human interest stories and minor events with little bearing on the progress of the war.¹⁰³

American newspapers had described the war as a crusade to make the world safe for democracy, and with the war over most Americans wanted to return to domestic problems. The idealistic tone of war coverage reinforced the feeling that America was above the problems of Europe. The United States did not return to absolute isolationism after the war, but it was clear that many leaders had not learned that the United States must stay involved in European politics, because the United States was facing another potential war 20 years later.¹⁰⁴

World War II

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's views on foreign commitments changed rapidly after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, but those of most other Americans did not. In September of 1941, after the fall of France and the bombing of London, nearly 80 percent of Americans still opposed participation in the war.¹⁰⁵ Roosevelt tried to prepare the nation for war by gaining partial repeal of the neutrality acts, increasing the military budget, and aiding Great Britain. He was limited to what he could do by the antiwar sentiment, though.¹⁰⁶ A segment of the press was bitterly opposed to U.S. intervention and vigorously criticized any administration policies that appeared to make U.S. involvement likely. But after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, resistance to war ceased.¹⁰⁷

By December 1941, the American media had been covering the war for more than two years. The war had been a big story before the United States entered it, but now it

¹⁰³ Thompson. Page 25.

¹⁰⁴ Thompson. Page 26.

¹⁰⁵ Paterson, Thomas G., J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagen. *American Foreign Policy: A History to 1914*. 2nd ed. Page 382.

¹⁰⁶ Thompson. Page 27.

¹⁰⁷ Thompson. Page 28.

became a story that eclipsed all others.¹⁰⁸ The number of correspondents covering the war reflected the scale of the conflict. During the four years the United States was involved in the war, up to 2,600 journalists were accredited to cover the war. Not all were active simultaneously, but it is estimated about 800 journalists were covering the war at any given time.¹⁰⁹

The character of American coverage during World War II reflected changes in both the nature of warfare and the types of communications media. Radio, news weeklies and feature magazines, and newsreel companies all entered the arena as ways of communicating news of the war.¹¹⁰ More than just the means of covering the war changed during World War II. The attitude of the government toward war coverage changed as well. When World War I began, correspondents were thought of as nuisances and a threat to the war effort. But when the war began to bog down, the leaders of each country enlisted the press in the campaign to maintain public morale. By the time World War II commenced, the idea that the media would play a role in building support for the war was widely accepted.¹¹¹

This made the correspondents' job easier, but it was expected that reporters write positive, supportive stories that would reflect well on the military and its policies. Many correspondents understood and accepted the limits on what they could write. Much of the coverage of the war was concerned with the experiences of individual soldiers and small units at the front. This was necessary not only because of the restraints on the press, but the reporters were trying to take something that was engulfing the world and flooding people with information and break it down into something meaningful.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Thompson. Page 28.

¹⁰⁹ Desmond, Robert W. *Tides of War: World News Reporting, 1931-1945*. Pages 448-449.

¹¹⁰ Thompson. Page 29.

¹¹¹ Thompson. Pages 29-30.

¹¹² Thompson. Pages 30.

As in World War I, responsibility for censorship of war coverage in World War II was divided between military and civilian authorities. Censorship within the United States was under the direction of Byron Price who was head of the Office of Censorship. As director of the office, Price had "absolute discretion" to review all cables, mail, and radio copy entering or leaving the United States. Communications could pass with no changes, some changes, or be suppressed altogether.¹¹³

One of Price's first acts was to prepare, along with the help of editors and publishers, a voluntary code of restraint for editors and publishers. The codes described in detail the kinds of war information considered inappropriate for publication or broadcast.¹¹⁴ A civilian Office of War Information was also created to foster support for the war effort and develop propaganda to be directed at Axis and neutral countries.¹¹⁵ The Office of War Information was headed by Elmer Davis who said a freer flow of information should come from the war zone. He argued that it would be easier to maintain public support for the war effort if citizens believed they were being told the truth.¹¹⁶

Military censorship in the war zones tended to be more restrictive than that of civilian authorities in the United States. General Douglas MacArthur, the senior army commander in the theater, encouraged favorable coverage of his own exploits, but dealt harshly with reporters who attempted to avoid censorship. Admiral Ernest King, the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific fleet, withheld information about naval losses in the Pacific long after any military justification for doing so remained.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Mott. Page 761.

¹¹⁴ Thompson. Page 31.

¹¹⁵ Thompson. Pages 31.

¹¹⁶ Braestrup, Peter. *Battle Lines: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task force on the Military and the Media*. Page 29.

¹¹⁷ Thompson. Page 31.

One of the more remarkable aspects of U.S. wartime censorship was that it was a voluntary effort that nonetheless managed to work quite well. The code of practices drafted by the Office of Censorship was not backed by any legal enforcement authority but relied on an agreement with the press that it would be observed. Editors and reporters often complained about how the code was applied but there were few violations of the guidelines.¹¹⁸

The reporting of World War II was such a massive undertaking that no single news organization could hope to cover all the important events. It became accepted practice to create press pools to ensure full coverage of military operations. This approach to news gathering broadened access to vital information but reduced the likelihood of exclusive reports. Print journalists made provisions for covering the war, such as combining all the available resources and reporters and stationing them around the world and sharing the coverage of each reporter.¹¹⁹

World War II ended on September 2, 1945, and in characteristic fashion America had waged the war as a crusade for justice and democracy just as it had in earlier wars. But World War II had obliterated the old international system, and a new world order was being introduced. Most Americans were proud of their increased stature in the world, but were also weary of being involved in the political affairs of Europe and Asia. This would be reflected in the coverage of future conflicts.¹²⁰

The Korean War

The Korean War was one of the most controversial conflicts in American history, and the relations between the press and the military reflected that controversy. Within

¹¹⁸ Mott. Pages 761-763.

¹¹⁹ Thompson. Page 32.

¹²⁰ Thompson. Page 33.

weeks after the initial North Korean attack on South Korea, more than 200 correspondents had been accredited to cover the war in Korea or at MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo.¹²¹ Most of these correspondents were from the United States. The first U.S. troops went into action July 1950 and were badly defeated. As the troops fell back, American correspondents reported the defeat in detail, including interviews with wounded and traumatized soldiers. Although no formal censorship had been imposed on press reporting, military representatives began assailing the coverage as irresponsible, too critical or helping the enemy. MacArthur, though, resisted imposing censorship, preferring to rely on the voluntary restraint of journalists.¹²²

While domestic criticism of the war mounted, American correspondents were having a difficult time reporting the conflict. In addition to the dangers associated with covering a rapidly changing conflict and primitive communications, correspondents had to contend with the growing resentment of U.S. military officers over the content and tone of war coverage. During the retreat of United Nation forces in late 1950, many correspondents wrote stories critical of the high command's performance. Because no formal censorship was in effect and correspondents could not obtain consistent guidance on what information was too sensitive, there were repeated disagreements between the press and military on whether the press was acting responsibly.¹²³

The frequent disclosure of information about troop movements, military strategy, and other details concerning the military convinced many senior officers that the voluntary censorship rule was not working. There was also the widespread perception within the military that the press criticism was negatively influencing public opinion in the United

¹²¹ Thompson. Page 34.

¹²² Mott. Pages 852-853.

¹²³ Thompson. Pages 35.

States that was undermining the war effort.¹²⁴ The Overseas Press Club also did not believe that voluntary censorship was working and asked the Defense Department to institute censorship so that journalists could receive clear guidelines on what was inappropriate for publication.¹²⁵ In December 1950, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall called media representatives to his office to discuss the problems of coverage. The results of the meeting determined that all press reports must be cleared before transmission, and an official censorship code was issued to journalists.¹²⁶

The effect of these change was to abolish the voluntary restraint and establish a stringent system of censorship at the front and in Tokyo. Double censorship was then occurring as all dispatches were censored in Korea and then in Tokyo. This caused significant delays in the transmission of stories, but at least journalists were no longer accused of providing information to the enemy by disclosing sensitive information. Military censors were empowered to delete all sensitive material from the dispatches, although they could not alter the wording of the stories. They could, however, make suggestions on what to change so the story would not have to be censored.¹²⁷

The imposition of censorship reduced but did not eliminate friction between the military and the press. Military officers continued to resent criticisms of their performance which appeared regularly in the press, and sensitive information still managed to make its way into the press from sources outside the war zone.¹²⁸ Correspondents were dissatisfied, too, because censorship was not applied evenly across the board. Not only did the Army, Navy, and Air Force have different standards for determining what was

¹²⁴ Thompson. Page 35.

¹²⁵ Sperber. Page 346.

¹²⁶ Thompson. Page 36.

¹²⁷ Thompson. Page 36.

¹²⁸ Thompson. Page 36.

sensitive, there was also disagreement between censors in Korea and in Tokyo on what was sensitive.¹²⁹

The system was improved in 1952, when the Defense Department shifted responsibility for all dispatches from intelligence to public information personnel and brought all three military services under one uniform code of censorship.¹³⁰ Military officers continued to criticize the press for negative coverage, and correspondents objected to self-serving ways in which the military tried to manage the news. Relations remained tense between the press and the military. The character of coverage in Korea was definitely different than in previous wars in the 20th century. There was no belief that correspondents should join the team with the military to help America win the war. The breakdown in the military-press relations reflected a growing disagreement between the military and the press about the proper role for war coverage.¹³¹

The Vietnam War

A generation later in Vietnam, this disagreement reappeared. But initially there were few American journalists in South Vietnam to cover the buildup of U.S. advisory personnel during the early 1960s. Major U.S. media outlets showed little interest in the growing American presence in South Vietnam.¹³² Reasons for this were the United States had little economic or political interest in Vietnam, no Americans were dying, and the Kennedy administration had developed a policy of deliberately concealing information about the U.S. involvement in the war.¹³³

¹²⁹ Mott. Page 854.

¹³⁰ Mott. Page 854.

¹³¹ Thompson. Page 37.

¹³² Knightly. Page 374.

¹³³ Thompson. Page 39.

The practice of concealing information was formalized in February 1962, in a directive that said, "it is not...in our interest...to have stories indicating that Americans are leading and directing combat missions against the Vietcong."¹³⁴ Most documents concerning the U.S. role in Vietnam were marked classified and excluded reporters from military operations where the full extent of that role would be apparent.¹³⁵ Denied access to information by senior U.S. diplomatic and military representatives, correspondents in Saigon turned to junior grade officers and Vietnamese sources for information. The evidence they uncovered painted an unflattering picture of The Diem government performance. U.S. military personnel were participating in combat because of the inability of the South Vietnam Army to successfully do so. Most of the air strikes were being flown by American pilots and were using napalm.¹³⁶ The Kennedy administration responded to the negative coverage by questioning the accuracy of stories and the ability of reporters. The administration's defense of its policies created a problem for editors in the United States. Negative dispatches were coming out of Vietnam, but all the positive reports were coming from the Washington bureaus. Most editors chose to downplay the negative and at least for a while assume that government officials had a better idea of what is going on in Vietnam than the correspondents did.¹³⁷

A buildup in U.S. ground forces was accompanied by a surge in the number of correspondents covering the war. In June of 1965 there were 23,000 ground troops in Vietnam and by the end of the year there were 184,000 troops deployed in South Vietnam.¹³⁸ By mid-1964 the number of journalists in Vietnam had grown to more than

¹³⁴ Hammond. Page 15.

¹³⁵ Thompson. Page 40.

¹³⁶ Hammond. Pages 16-17.

¹³⁷ Mercer, Derrick, Geoff Mungham and Kevin Williams. *The Fog of War: The Media and the Battlefield*. Page 243.

¹³⁸ Thompson. Page 41.

40. A year later the number had jumped to 400, and the ranks continued to grow. By 1968, more than 600 accredited and non-accredited journalists were covering the war.¹³⁹ Not all of those with credentials were actually covering the war, but by the summer of 1965, scores of U.S. reporters were attending the Military Assistance Command's daily briefings, and a few were out in the field with the U.S. troops.¹⁴⁰

As the American role in the fighting grew in 1964, American officials became concerned that the growing number of correspondents might report information useful to the Vietcong. To minimize this, Barry Zorthian, the senior press officer at the U.S. mission, negotiated a code of voluntary restraint with correspondents. Some reporters were initially suspicious but because of the reputation of openness Zorthian had, most correspondents agreed to it.¹⁴¹ The voluntary restraint system worked well, but military officials were still worried about the disclosure of useful information to the Vietcong.

Officials knew, though, since no formal declaration of war had been issued, censorship could not legally be imposed. There was no way to control the communication and transportation out of Vietnam, and it would be difficult to censor dispatches by foreign correspondents. For these reasons, the voluntary system of restraint would remain in place. The system seemed to be working well, as fewer than 10 breaches of security occurred.¹⁴²

As U.S. participation in the war increased in 1966, many correspondents wrote highly critical stories questioning the most fundamental assumptions of U.S. policy in Vietnam.¹⁴³ Lacking a system for suppressing negative war coverage, the Johnson

¹³⁹ Braestrup. Page 64.

¹⁴⁰ Braestrup. Page 64.

¹⁴¹ Hammond. Page 138.

¹⁴² Braestrup. Page 65.

¹⁴³ Thompson. Page 42.

administration mounted a public relations campaign to try to maintain public support for the war. The public relations campaign succeeded in temporarily bolstering public support for the war. But when the developments in Vietnam contradicted the administration's optimistic projections, the officials who had presented them were discredited.¹⁴⁴ When the Vietcong launched the Tet Offensive, the strength of the communist offensive led many people to conclude that Westmoreland was out of touch with the realities of the war, and he had been misleading to the public. His credibility never recovered.¹⁴⁵ The American media interpreted the offensive as a major setback in the U.S. military effort, and it contradicted claims the United States was winning the war. Public opinion turned decisively against the war, and President Johnson was forced to seek a settlement of the conflict.

The winding down of the U.S. war effort was accompanied by a decrease in the number of journalists covering the war, and by the summer of 1974, the number of correspondents had fallen to 35.¹⁴⁶ Vietnam was a severe trauma for the U.S. military, one of which would hang in the shadows for years to come. In search for explanations of the loss, many military officers concluded the critical coverage of the war had been important in bringing about the defeat. By questioning government policies, the media made it impossible to maintain public support for the war. Once the North Vietnamese understood the antiwar sentiment, they could use it to draft diplomatic strategy that would remove the U.S. from the war.¹⁴⁷

Whatever their transgressions may have been, the main objective of the war correspondent was to provide accurate accounts of the war. As the United States Army's

¹⁴⁴ Thompson. Page 43.

¹⁴⁵ Hammond. Page 349.

¹⁴⁶ Knightly. Page 298.

¹⁴⁷ Thompson. Page 47.

own official history of the media coverage in Vietnam concluded, "It is undeniable...that the press reports were...often more accurate than the public statements of the administration in portraying the situation in Vietnam."¹⁴⁸ But the belief among military officers that the media contributed to America's defeat in Vietnam has persisted and is the principle reason for the continuing animosity between the press and the media.¹⁴⁹

Post Vietnam

Soldiers and press continued to be adversarial, and the friction between the two came to head in 1983 when the United States invaded Grenada, a tiny island in the Caribbean. In order to preserve the element of surprise and minimize casualties, the operation was planned and executed in complete secrecy, with no media participation. Journalists attempting to reach the island were excluded until two days after the fighting began and then only small groups were taken ashore. Reporters already on the island were initially prevented from filing stories, and restrictions on coverage were not fully lifted until the fighting had ceased.¹⁵⁰

The exclusion of journalists from Grenada during the fighting provoked widespread criticism in the press. Reporters and editors complained that the restraints on them had deprived the public of vital information and had been imposed to hide deficiencies in the operation. The Defense Department rejected these complaints and said media participation might have jeopardized lives and the mission itself. The tone of coverage also tended to support the military's concern that reporters would be critical of the operation.¹⁵¹

So some solution had to be conceived to include journalists in military operations. The result was a pool system of reporters that would be taken to the action from

¹⁴⁸ Hammond. Page 338.

¹⁴⁹ Thompson. Page 47.

¹⁵⁰ Braestrup. Pages 19, 90.

¹⁵¹ Thompson. Page 49.

Washington D.C. to cover the operation. This was put to the test in 1989, when the United States invaded the Central American country of Panama. The operation in Panama was a success, but the pool system was a disaster. The 16-person pool arrived hours after the fighting had begun and was kept far from the action. When reporters were given permission to go out in the field, there was no transportation available and communications for transmitting stories frequently malfunctioned.¹⁵²

Problems arose again in August 1990, when the United States began a deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia. The Pentagon initially decided not to activate the pool, reversed itself and then later changed again and let hundreds of journalists into Saudi Arabia. Journalists did complain that the guidelines for reporting were too restrictive, and they were being denied access to important information.

Pool reporting was going to be the standard in the Persian Gulf. Pool reporting in the Persian Gulf was when limited numbers of reporters were selected to go out in the field with military escorts to gather news. The pools were told where to go and when to go. After interviewing soldiers, the reporters shared the information they gathered with other reporters. But little information about the war was obtained this way, and reporters rarely gathered any hard news.. Almost all information about the war came from briefings in Saudi Arabia, at the White House or from the Pentagon. This may have showed the military learned a lesson in Vietnam about allowing journalist to roam free with no restrictions. It was not going to let the press become a major player in policy toward Iraq or any other Middle Eastern nation.

The government had an elaborate public relations campaign to gain support for the war. Even though some public relations were used in Vietnam, this was the first full-scale

¹⁵² Thompson. Pages 51-52.

public relations campaign waged by the military. This was a war that was basically fought for economic reasons as the United States could not let Iraq gain control over a major portion of the world's oil supply, and the American public showed overwhelming support for American involvement. The tight control placed over journalists was evident. From the public and the press standpoint, most everyone realized the military was leading the press around and trying to control the press to the point of only letting the press see and hear what the military wanted it to see and hear.

Chapter III

Analysis of Wall Street Journal

There were many allusions made to the Vietnam War in the *Wall Street Journal* by people writing about the situation in the Persian Gulf. Vietnam still lingers in the minds of many Americans today, especially the debate on whether the United States even belonged in the civil war of another country. Articles were written about the possibility of the situation in the Persian Gulf turning into another Vietnam. The United States would send troops to perform a quick and efficient mission, but the war would drag on for a decade in the Persian Gulf, much like it did in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam

Saddam Hussein, Iraq's president, was compared to the North Vietnamese leader during the Vietnam War, Ho Chi Minh. The comparison was to tactics Hussein could use for political victory in the United States instead of a military victory much like Ho Chi Minh did with the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. One thing Hussein could do to demoralize Washington and the United States would be to launch a surprise armored assault using poisonous gas to cause the loss of hundreds of American lives and numerous casualties. Although Tet was a military setback for North Vietnam and the Viet cong, it showed the vulnerability of the United States to an attack in South Vietnam, and was demoralizing in Washington D.C., and raised sentiment against the war by the citizens of the United States. Hussein could achieve a like victory with a poisonous gas attack just to kill American soldiers with no real benefit to military victory, but a great political victory. But Hussein also hurt his chances for political victory, unlike Minh. Without apology,

Hussein gassed the Kurds, the natives of northern Iraq, mistreated POWs, blindly fired SCUD missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia, and held Westerners hostage.¹⁵³

Comparisons also were made about the treatment of prisoners of war in the Persian Gulf to Vietnam. The POWs were being used as propaganda by Iraq to turn American sentiment against the war, much like the POWs were used in Vietnam. In both instances, the POWs were brought out in front of television cameras and told to read messages denouncing the United State's actions. But in the case of Iraq, it was clear the POWs had been beaten and forced to recite political messages denouncing the United States. ¹⁵⁴

Changes in military policy on how to make the United States a more efficient fighting machine were mentioned. The policy in Vietnam was to use limited bombing campaigns and fight a limited war. But in the Persian Gulf the United States used "overwhelming force to hit Saddam's primary assets early, not 10 years later."¹⁵⁵ References were made to how a limited and lengthy bombing campaign and no ground war could turn into the same situation in as Vietnam, by prolonging the inevitable ground war. ¹⁵⁶

Some other changes were brought about by a piece of legislation called the Goldwater-Nichols Reforms, which helped eliminate interservice rivalry. Each branch of the service would cooperate in transporting troops and equipment rather than each branch just taking care of its own interests and disregarding the other branches as occurred in Vietnam. The essence of the legislation, which was passed in 1986, was that it stripped

¹⁵³ Braestrup, Peter. "Ho Chi Minh's Tricks Won't Work for Saddam." *Wall Street Journal*. Feb. 5, 1991. Page A22.

¹⁵⁴ Rabinowitz, Dorothy. "POWs Upstage Anti-War Activists on TV." *Wall Street Journal*. Jan. 22, 1991. Page A14.

¹⁵⁵ "State of War." *Wall Street Journal*. Jan. 23, 1991. Page A12.

¹⁵⁶ "Another Vietnam." *Wall Street Journal*. Feb., 6, 1991. Page A12.

power from the service chiefs in the Pentagon and gave it to a single, unified commander in the field. It also clarified the line of command by giving the chairman of the Joints Chiefs much more power to deal directly with the president. Former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin, D-Wisconsin, said the Goldwater-Nichols reforms were the "critical difference" in the war with Iraq. The reforms made Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf the clearcut masters in the war with Iraq, and they controlled what was going to happen, when an event would occur, and who would execute the desired action. During Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson approved all bombing targets, but in the Persian Gulf, the field commander, General Schwarzkopf, would determine the bombing targets. The bill also clearly defined the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell, and the commander in the theater of operations, Schwarzkopf.¹⁵⁷

These and other lessons were learned from the mistakes the United States and its leaders made during the Vietnam War. One possible reason the mistakes were so well remembered and destined to not be repeated was that most of the officers leading the military during the Persian Gulf War were junior-grade officers in Vietnam. Thirteen senior ranking officers in the Persian Gulf War were in the military during the Vietnam war.

The all-out initial assault on Iraq with practically all the firepower of American forces showed that the leaders of the military would not let another Vietnam occur by just using limited action. A clear objective had been set in Iraq unlike in Vietnam. The goal and mission of the United States was to destroy Saddam's military capacity and clear him from Kuwait.¹⁵⁸ With Powell and Schwarzkopf both being infantry veterans from Vietnam,

¹⁵⁷ Seib, Gerald. "Military Reform Has Given Field Commanders Decisive Roles and Reduced Interservice Rivalry." *Wall Street Journal*. Jan. 24, 1991. Page A12.

¹⁵⁸ Gigot, Paul. "The Men Who've Learned from Vietnam." *Wall Street Journal*. Jan. 18, 1991. Page A8.

they knew the importance of bombing to prepare for a ground war and the importance of air support for ground troops.¹⁵⁹ With the leaders of the military knowing what war is like from their experiences in Vietnam, they would be cautious entering a ground war. They knew how fast public sentiment against the war could rise if Americans start getting killed.¹⁶⁰

Press Issues

Journalists also wrote about the press restrictions, censorship and pool reporting that was imposed on them during the Persian Gulf War. The public relations effort of the government and military also caught scrutiny by the press, but the most common thread that appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* was the opposition to press restrictions.

One article described what the editor of *Soldier of Fortune* magazine was experiencing as he tried to obtain information about the war. Robert Brown has seen 15 wars and insurgencies as combatant, as correspondent and sometimes as both. He had never met a war he did not like until the Persian Gulf War. His dislike was due mainly to the press restrictions. Journalists were supposed to be gathering their information in press pools controlled by the military. The military decided who got into the pools and who the people in the pools could see and interview. What was frustrating for Brown was that he could not independently gather information, and he was not admitted into a pool for information gathering. Brown attempted to enter the Saudi Arabian desert to gather information numerous times before the ground assault started, only to be turned back by

¹⁵⁹ Gigot, Paul. "Capital Hesitates at Rumors of Ground War." *Wall Street Journal*. Feb. 8, 1991. Page A12.

¹⁶⁰ Fialka, John and James Perry. "Generals Who Would Lead U.S. Forces to Battle, Vietnam Vets All, Want to Fight on Their Own Terms." *Wall Street Journal*. Jan. 18, 1991. Page A4.

military personnel. He admitted some restrictions are necessary for the safety of journalists, but not as many as were being imposed during the Persian Gulf War.¹⁶¹

Articles in the *Wall Street Journal* went so far as to say the press and the military were waging a war with one another over the right to information. Shortly after the Persian Gulf War started another war erupted as the press began attacking military censorship and the Pentagon's rules governing coverage. Articles mentioned how television correspondents were reporting on the restrictions placed on them, and it is their right in a free society to report on events affecting the American public.¹⁶² A reference was also made on how journalists were fighting a war for the public's right to know. In Vietnam two restrictions were placed on journalists. First, no information about troop movements before engagements could be reported, and, second, the faces of dead and wounded soldiers could not be shown until families were notified. The press readily agreed with these limitations placed on them. The guidelines in the Persian Gulf were pool journalism, which allowed the military to orchestrate and control the news before it reached the American public. Eric Ober, who was the president of CBS News in New York and an enlisted soldier in the Army from 1963 to 1965 wrote the losers in this secondary war were the American people:

The American public would be ill served by such restrictions. While I fully understand the concern that violent scenes or disturbing reports could be unsettling, the alternative could be disastrous. I do not think the American public wants its news sanitized. I believe Americans want the whole picture. All sides. The good and the bad. In short, the truth.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Horwitz, Tony. "Robert Brown Finds Riyadh Is No Place for a War Buff." *Wall Street Journal*. Feb. 20, 1991. Pages A1, A5.

¹⁶² Rabinowitz, Dorothy. "Are Reporters Neutral?" *Wall Street Journal*. Feb. 11, 1991. Page A10.

¹⁶³ Ober, Eric. "A War Is Waged for the Public's Right to Know." *Wall Street Journal*. Jan. 17, 1991. Page A10.

But a response to this article came from Warren Schmitt , a private citizen from Spartanburg, S.C, who wrote in a letter to the editor that the restrictions were necessary, because journalists at the time were not objective and could not be trusted because they were adversarial.¹⁶⁴

The news blackout that was enforced prior to the ground war was an unprecedented move that drew comparisons to World War II and Vietnam. In those wars journalists were able to roam the battlefield to gather information for their articles and imposing a blackout was wrong and denied the American public its right to know. But public opinion polls showed the American public supported the military on its press restrictions. If the restrictions saved American lives, it was worth waiting 12 or 24 hours for news. A poll conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press had results which showed that 79 percent of people agreed that restrictions on news reports were a good idea.¹⁶⁵

The military used a public relations effort to gain favor for the war from both the press and the public. Observations were made by James McAvoy, a public relations professional, who is executive vice president of Ruder Finn in Washington D.C. on the public relations campaign of the military. He wrote:

In the public relations business we have learned how to work with the media to protect our clients' interests without compromising the public's need to know. We help corporations, interests groups and foreign governments communicate their story to the public. We must argue our side as forcefully as possible and trust the news media will search out the opposing view. The media have no right to expect the military to do more than present its own side as factually and forcefully as it can...it is obvious to me that the military is making an effort at cooperating with the media.

¹⁶⁴ Schmitt, Warren. "Mistrustful Journalists Are Also Mistrusted." *Wall Street Journal*. Jan. 28, 1991. Page A11.

¹⁶⁵ Perry, James. "Pentagon Imposes News Blackout in Bid to Deny Useful Information to Enemy." *Wall Street Journal*. Feb. 25, 1991. Page A10.

McAvoy then offered some suggestions on how the military could improve its public relations campaign. He suggested having only one source of news, either from Riyadh in Saudi Arabia, or the Pentagon. The military should tell the press why some questions cannot be answered, instead of just ignoring the questions. The military should allow the journalists to go ahead and go to the front lines, because they will eventually go there with or without military permission when the ground war starts. The military should have limited the number of visuals depicting bombing strikes, so the press would stay interested and be impressed with them.¹⁶⁶

The military even used the press as part of its public relations campaign. The Pentagon relied on news coverage, carefully constructed by military briefers, to help deceive Iraq and bolster public support for the war. One Army officer said the media was a battlefield, and the United States and its enemy wages a war to win on it. The military was glad the press played up a possible amphibious landing by the Marines on the coast of Kuwait. It gave Hussein and Iraq something to think about even though it never happened. The military also reported high numbers when reporting the results of bombing missions, and then would later report lower numbers. The excuse was it is hard to determine right after a mission the effectiveness of it. This may have led to the development of a credibility gap like in Vietnam.¹⁶⁷

The credibility gap in Vietnam developed mostly out of the military saying the war was under control and South Vietnam was safe and secure. Then the Tet Offensive showed the vulnerability of U.S. forces to an attack in South Vietnam. After Tet mostly everything said by the military was heard very skeptically. A review of press briefings

¹⁶⁶ McAvoy, James. "Tactics for the Military in the Media War." *Wall Street Journal*. Feb. 7, 1991. Page A14.

¹⁶⁷ Mossberg, Walter. "The U.S. Used the Press as a Weapon." *Wall Street Journal*. Feb. 28, 1991. Pages A3, A6.

during the Gulf War showed that the military served up contradictory or confusing figures about battle damage. Iraqi ships were declared out of action and then managed to re-emerge as targets. The count of Iraqi planes destroyed rose and fell, and the numbers associated with tank destruction were also ambiguous. But fortunately for the military the war did not last long enough for a credibility gap to develop.¹⁶⁸

The *Wall Street Journal* like other press and media outlets did mention the strict control placed over journalists in the Persian Gulf, but it was not a something that dominated the pages. Vietnam issues were also not given a great deal of attention, instead the *Wall Street Journal* continued its style of long feature-type articles that gave an insight of the war not given by other major newspapers. The *Wall Street Journal* did write about the war and the war's aftermath, but it explored how businesses were affected by the war and gave insight to the people involved in the war.

¹⁶⁸ Mossberg. "The U.S. Used Press as a Weapon." *Wall Street Journal*." Feb. 28, 1991. Pages A3, A6.

Chapter IV

Analysis of *New York Times*

The *New York Times* had many references in comparing the Persian Gulf War to the Vietnam War. Articles were written about how with a victory in the Gulf the United States would finally be able to shed the Vietnam Syndrome. Articles were written describing how the Persian Gulf War was like and not like Vietnam War. Articles mentioned how the leaders of the military during the Gulf War were Vietnam veterans and they along with the rest of the military learned from lessons in the war in Vietnam. Journalists also wrote and complained about the way they were not given access to information and were not free to pursue the news of the war on their own, but had to gather it in pools. There were some articles that responded to the public relations effort of the government as well.

Vietnam

R.W. Apple Jr., who was the *New York Times* bureau chief in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, wrote in a news analysis about one theme that appeared during the war -- the obsession of forgetting the Vietnam War. The so-called Vietnam syndrome was mentioned in several articles. President George Bush wanted to invoke memories of World War II, not Vietnam, when the war started in the Gulf. The liberation of Europe began June 6, 1944, and Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, referred to that when he announced to reporters that the liberation of Kuwait had begun with the start of a bombing campaign. Apple wrote:

Since the beginning of the crisis in the Persian Gulf more than five months ago, Mr. Bush has sought to liken his struggle against Saddam Hussein and Iraq to that against Hitler and Germany, a struggle that united the American people and much of the world and ended gloriously for the coalition arrayed against fascism.

Indeed, the President has repeatedly called Saddam Hussein a Hitler, said that he would not repeat (Neville) Chamberlain's appeasement of Germany at Munich and compared the use of poison gas in earlier wars to Nazi atrocities.

Tonight, in a broadcast to the American people on which he has said to have worked for three or four days, the President again used language evocative of Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. He said "the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless nation" and then "raped, pillaged and plundered" it.¹⁶⁹

He may have been doing this to bring to mind an American victory in war not a defeat as in Vietnam. Apple also wrote how the United States will not soon forget its sins and humiliations in Southeast Asia a generation ago, but it has learned from them.

President Bush said at the conclusion of the Gulf War, "By God, We've kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all."¹⁷⁰ One editorial went so far as to say it was as if two wars ended, not just one, with the American-led coalition's quick and decisive victory over Iraq. When the guns fell silent, President Bush proclaimed, "The specter of Vietnam had been buried forever in the sands of the Arabian Peninsula." The postwar diplomacy in the Middle East began immediately after the war, but the postwar diplomacy in Vietnam had been mired in bitterness since its end. With this victory the United States was able to banish the ghosts of Vietnam.¹⁷¹

Not only were ghosts of Vietnam banished, but U.S. servicemen and women who fought and died in the Persian Gulf War also earned back honor for those who served and died in Vietnam. Vietnam, was an unpopular war fought by men who did not choose to be there, but the Gulf War was highly popular and provided many heroes for the American public to admire. This brought back pride and the feeling of honor to wear a uniform. The feeling is somehow connected to the resurrection of professionalism. Vietnam left military professionals with a deep inferiority complex. But the Gulf showed just how efficient the

¹⁶⁹ Apple, R.W. Jr. "Defining the Issue: The White House Works to Evoke World War II Memories, Not Vietnam." *New York Times*. Jan. 17, 1991. Page A16.

¹⁷⁰ Apple, R.W. Jr. "Done. A Short, Persuasive Lesson in Warfare." *New York Times*. March 3, 1991. Pages E1, 3.

¹⁷¹ "Good Morning, Vietnam." *New York Times*. March 20, 1991. Page A14.

military can be. It moved 541, 425 people with arms in place to wage a war within months. The United States military made Iraq fight on its terms and did not waste lives. These are the marks of fine generalship, and showed the American public the military is a well-run, efficient organization.¹⁷²

Another theme was how the lessons learned in the Vietnam War were being used in fighting the war in the Gulf. Many lessons were learned in Vietnam on how to conduct a war and not conduct a war. Army Chief Staff General Colin Powell, a Vietnam veteran, knew gradual escalation like that used in Vietnam would not work well, so he wanted the hallmark of this war to be overwhelming force used relentlessly. Bush said troops would not be asked to fight a limited war like the one in Vietnam, but would be given the necessary means and go ahead to be able to win this war swiftly.¹⁷³ The list of lessons learned in Vietnam and used in the Gulf were: never go to war before ensuring domestic consensus and establishing international support; never go the war without a clear objective; take no half measures.¹⁷⁴

The air war was under the leadership of Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, who was the commander of the Air Force in the Persian Gulf. He learned his lessons of war in the jungles of Vietnam. He flew 111 combat missions in Vietnam as a highly decorated F-105 fighter pilot. "Many of us here who are in this position now were in Vietnam, and that war left a profound impact on our feelings about how our nation ought to

¹⁷² Gelb, Leslie H. "Best and Brightest." *New York Times*. May 26, 1991. Page E11.

¹⁷³ Apple Jr., R.W. "Defining the Issue: The White House Works to Evoke World War II Memory, not Vietnam." *New York Times*. Jan. 17, 1991. Page A16.

¹⁷⁴ Apple, R.W. Jr. "Done. A Short, Persuasive Lesson in Warfare." *New York Times*. March 3, 1991. Pages E1, E3.

conduct its business," the general said at the time. A war in Iraq "should not be dragged out in an effort to achieve some political objective."¹⁷⁵

The commander of the Coalition Forces also learned from his tours of Vietnam. General Norman Schwarzkopf learned a military leader must have more than enough force on the battlefield and more than enough political backing at home. He described himself as neither dovish or hawkish but owlsh -- wise enough to understand that you want to do everything possible to avoid war; that once you're committed to war then be ferocious enough to do whatever is necessary to get it over with as quickly as possible in victory. Vietnam taught him the value of understanding an enemy's strengths and weaknesses, and how to strike at its vulnerabilities. He would not make any predictions about the war's duration that could return to haunt him like leaders in Vietnam did.¹⁷⁶

The published images of combat in Vietnam were bloody and the counts of enemy dead were often exaggerated.¹⁷⁷ Columnist John Cushman wrote because of the controversy concerning body counts in Vietnam, no early estimates were made about the number of deaths inflicted on the Iraqi Republican Guard. Military officials mentioned four main reasons not to estimate the number of enemy dead. First it is impossible to do so accurately. Second, in military terms the number of dead is not considered as important as the number of hits against command centers, communications links, airfields and major weapons. Third, officers in Vietnam remembered that they were criticized for how they reported the enemy dead in that war. Fourth, it could be politically imprudent to

¹⁷⁵ McFadden, Robert D. "General Who Planned Air Assault, with Lessons of Vietnam." *New York Times*. Jan. 19, 1991. Page A10.

¹⁷⁶ Schmitt, Eric. "Tough but Political Chief." *New York Times*. Jan. 28, 1991. Page A10.

¹⁷⁷ Cushman Jr, John H. "Pentagon Seems Vague on the Iraqi Death Toll." *New York Times*. Feb. 3, 1991. Page 14.

overemphasize the bloodshed, undermining support for the coalition effort both at home and abroad.¹⁷⁸

To keep high support for the Gulf War, military leaders drew both on lessons from Vietnam and Korea. Tom Wicker, a columnist for the *New York Times* wrote how support for both wars was high until a bloody ground war started, but if a clear aim is developed like in the Civil War and World War II, America can withstand the bloody war. But no aim in Korea and Vietnam led to discontent.¹⁷⁹

Vietnam left the Army divided and disturbed. It took the brunt of the blame in Vietnam and used that lesson to prepare for future conflicts. It is used its budget to improve soldiers and readiness, and it paid off in the Gulf. Reserves also showed they can be dependable and will be counted on more.¹⁸⁰

With Vietnam so much on the minds of journalists, of course comparisons would be made to how the Gulf War was like the Vietnam War. The war in the Gulf was like Vietnam in the problems that it posed, if not the predicted outcome. Bush was trying to substitute firepower for manpower, much like Johnson did in Vietnam. The Allied strategy was to bomb Baghdad and the rest of Iraq into military impotence much like the bombing of Hanoi in North Vietnam. Though Iraq did not have the cover of the jungle, communist suppliers or trails into other countries, it had what Hussein said was "the superior willpower and patience" of a country that saw itself menaced by a huge alien force.¹⁸¹

But more often journalists were writing about how the Gulf was not another Vietnam because a *New York Times* editorial said the situation in the world was totally

¹⁷⁸ Cushman Jr, John H. "Pentagon Seems Vague on the Iraqi Death Toll." *New York Times*. Feb. 3, 1991. Page 14.

¹⁷⁹ Wicker, Tom. "The Key to Unity." *New York Times*. Jan. 30, 1991. Page A23.

¹⁸⁰ "A Mean Army Made Leaner." *New York Times*. March 30, 1991. Page 18.

¹⁸¹ Apple Jr., R.W. "Devil of a War." *New York Times*. Jan. 27, 1991. Page E1.

different during the Gulf War than during the Vietnam War. The United States was no longer involved in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and there was no global commitment that a Pax Americana, John F. Kennedy-style would require. There was no great fear of another nation entering the Gulf War, but in Vietnam there was concern that China or the Soviet Union would enter the war on the North Vietnamese side.¹⁸²

Journalists also mentioned how technology made a major difference in the Gulf War and the Vietnam War. Technology made the weapons more deadly and more accurate, and technology made the Gulf War a real-time war. A speech by Hussein or a Pentagon briefing could have been seen live simultaneously in London, Washington and Baghdad. Technology also made available the ability to show weapons destroying targets and instantly can link a correspondent in Dhahran to editors in Los Angeles or New York. Apple wrote:

Pilots in Vietnam could do little more than find their way from one airstrip to another after sunset, worrying all the while about running into a mountain. For the most part, the enemy owned the night.

This time, if the new-fangled scopes and gadgets work as they're supposed to work - and that's still a large, "if," though early evidence is highly encouraging - allied infantrymen and tank crews will have the upper hand in the dark, as the allied pilots already do.

Comparing the endearing little UH-1 Huey helicopter, which saved so many lives and seemed like such a piece of technical wizardry, to the fearsome Apache attack helicopters here is like comparing a Model T to a Lamborghini.¹⁸³

One article featured retired General William Westmoreland, commander of forces in Vietnam from 1964-1968. He said there were major differences in Vietnam and the Gulf War. He said one of the biggest differences was there was no threat of world war erupting like there was in Vietnam. Havens were granted in Laos and Cambodia for North Vietnamese because President Johnson was afraid that China or the Soviet Union would

¹⁸² "Why the War in the Gulf Is Not Vietnam." *New York Times*. Feb. 2, 1991. Page 22.

¹⁸³ Apple Jr., R.W. "Hueys and Scuds: Vietnam and Gulf are Wars Apart." *New York Times*. Jan. 23, 1991. Pages 1, 6.

enter the war. This threat really did not exist in the Gulf War. Westmoreland added the air attack was more effective because the White House was not selecting targets but the field commanders were with no restrictions to bombing targets. In an interesting sidelight he also believes history will show that America actually won the Vietnam war. He said:

We won the war after we left, in effect. One of our great strategic aims was to stop the Communist advance in Southeast Asia, and when you look at Southeast Asia today, the Communists have made no great gains. Today, Vietnam is a basket case run by a bunch of old men and is a threat to no one but itself.¹⁸⁴

Soldiers in the Persian Gulf War were also different from soldiers in Vietnam.

Sergeant Major Charles A. Robinson of the Second Brigade was a young squad leader in Vietnam and unlike Vietnam the soldiers in the Persian Gulf War are high school graduates, and they all wanted to be in the Persian Gulf War to do the job. But the main difference is the soldiers in the Persian Gulf War are part of the military by choice and doing what they chose to do, unlike Vietnam in which most of the soldiers were drafted. "This is a chance to put the Vietnam stigma behind me," said First Sergeant Don Leftwich, who served as a Marine rifleman in Vietnam. "And my troops will never have to put up with it."¹⁸⁵

The Gulf War differed from Vietnam in fundamental ways. First, for the Americans, Saddam Hussein is a clear cut "Bad Guy." Second, troops in the Gulf volunteered to serve. Third, casualties were remarkably low. Dov S. Zakheim, who was a deputy under secretary of defense in both Reagan administrations, wrote that the Vietnam syndrome lies buried in the sand of the Persian Gulf. Now that the public understands military force can reflect national values, it is unlikely the syndrome will rise again.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Butterfield, Fox. "As a New War Is Raging, Opposing Voices from the Past Sound Out." *New York Times*. Jan. 25, 1991. Page A14.

¹⁸⁵ Kifner, John. "New GI's Shake Off Vietnam Ghost." *New York Times*. Feb. 26, 1991. Page A14.

¹⁸⁶ Zakheim, Dov S. "Is the Vietnam Syndrome Dead?" *New York Times*. March 4, 1991. Page A17.

Press Issues

Vietnam was on the minds of many soldiers and journalists, but one theme that was mostly related to journalists was the censorship and pool reporting that was imposed on the press during the Gulf War. Vietnam also may have played a role in this. Local commanders in the Middle East had made timely publication of stories nearly impossible. Reporters were forced to withhold information on the grounds that it might aid the Iraqis only to see it released later by the military. This secrecy is driven by recollections of Vietnam. Many people in the military still believe that unfavorable news coverage made the war unpopular at home and ultimately lost it. According to a *New York Times* editorial this misrepresents history, though, as Americans lost faith in that war because they gradually realized the government had misled them.¹⁸⁷

Some journalists felt that the pool reporting and censorship were a result of Vietnam, and this was apparent in their dispatches. Apple wrote:

However many assurances they are given to the contrary, reporters are convinced that senior military officers, many of whom think critical reporting destroyed public support for the Vietnam War in the United States, are determined to do everything they can to minimize critical reporting here.

"They are creating the credibility problem," said Otto Kreisher of the Copley News Service. "You're seeing the imprint of Vietnam on everything that the military does here."¹⁸⁸

There was widespread agreement in the military that the distrust of the press and the Pentagon's rules for coverage of the Gulf War is due in part to the legacy of Vietnam.¹⁸⁹

The Vietnam Syndrome also played into the pool reporting system. Colonel Darryl Henderson, a retired, decorated Vietnam veteran, said the reason for the pool system was not for operational security but because of the impression within the military that the press

¹⁸⁷ "Back up the Bombing Blasts." *New York Times*. Jan. 23, 1991. Page A18.

¹⁸⁸ Apple Jr., R.W. "Press and Military: Old Suspicions." *New York Times*. Feb. 4, 1991. Page A9.

¹⁸⁹ Lewis, Neil A. "Government's Strict Orders Limit Reporters." *New York Times*. Jan. 18, 1991. Page A11.

caused the erosion of public support for the Vietnam War. As a result, he said, the military started training public affairs officers to market the viewpoint of the military and make sure only positive publicity about the war made it back to the United States.¹⁹⁰

It was not until the Vietnam War that the press claimed a broader public right to know, but the aggressive journalism earned the enmity of the Pentagon, which accused the press of presenting a distorted view of the war.¹⁹¹ The military had been thinking of the press long before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Retired Major General Winant Sidle, who served as chief military spokesman in Vietnam said, "One thing Vietnam did to us (the military) is nobody says, 'Oh don't worry about public affairs.'"¹⁹² So the system in the Gulf had its roots in the military dissatisfaction of the news coverage of Vietnam, which some officials still argue was lost by the news media. This is no more prevalent than in statement made by a senior Air Force officer during the early stages of the air war in front of an auditorium in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, filled with journalists. He said, "Let me say up front that I don't like the press. Your presence here can't possibly do me any good, and it can hurt me and my people."¹⁹³

Vietnam was not the only cause for new press rules. Press coverage of the invasion of Panama was also a source in determining how the press would be treated in future conflicts. One journalist reported that a decision was made not to let the arrival of the dead soldiers from the Gulf be broadcast. After the invasion of Panama in 1989, the coffins of the dead were shown arriving back in the United States on a split screen with Bush

¹⁹⁰ Wicker, Tom. "Marketing the War." *New York Times*. May 8, 1991. Page A23.

¹⁹¹ Schiffer, R. Michael and Michael F. Rinzler. "No News Is No News." *New York Times*. Jan. 23, 1991. Page A19.

¹⁹² DeParle, Jason. "Long Series of Military Decisions Led to Gulf War News Censorship." *New York Times*. May 5, 1991. Pages A1, A20.

¹⁹³ Browne, Malcolm W. "Conflicting Censorship Upsets Many Journalists." *New York Times*. Jan. 21, 1991. Page A10.

laughing with reporters on the other side. The military would not allow this to happen again.¹⁹⁴

But the restrictions in the war zone were for the well-being of the reporters according to the Pentagon. Without restrictions Pete Williams, chief spokesman for the Pentagon, said masses of reporters would try to wander through the war zone, risking their lives and those of the troops. But reporters did not buy into this theory of exclusion. "It is only the lightest form of exaggeration to suggest that the U.S. military is also at war in the Persian Gulf with the news media," said Craig Hines, Washington Bureau chief of the *Houston Chronicle*. Malcolm W. Browne, a *New York Times* reporter in the Gulf who won a Pulitzer Prize with the Associated Press in Vietnam, said the pool system in the Gulf was preventing reporters from truly finding out what was going on closer to the war zone and turning them into "essentially unpaid employees of the Department of Defense."¹⁹⁵

The restrictions made it difficult to fully analyze the Pentagon assessments, because of the extraordinarily strict information policy imposed by the Bush administration.¹⁹⁶ But reporters also were confused and upset not just about the policy, but by the inaccuracies in it. Journalists were told not release certain information in an article, but later the information would be released by the military, and this caused even more conflict about the restrictions and censorship. Browne had been in a pool where officers on the scene had said American forces had destroyed laboratories where the Iraqis were thought to be developing nuclear potential. Permission to report the attacks was denied by the unit commander, who said the information could aid the Iraqis. Correspondents complied, but

¹⁹⁴ "Homecoming without Honors." *New York Times*. Feb. 28, 1991. Page A24.

¹⁹⁵ Berke, Richard L. "Pentagon Defends Coverage Rules, while Admitting to Some Delays." *New York Times*. Feb. 21, 1991. Page A14.

¹⁹⁶ Gordon, Michael R. "American Defenses Block Attack on Saudi Arabia." *New York Times*. Jan. 18, 1991. Pages A1, A8.

the information was later reported in detail by the American military commanders during their daily briefing in Saudi Arabia.¹⁹⁷

Carl Nolte, a veteran reporter for the *San Francisco Chronicle* who was in the Middle East covering the Gulf War, said the military did not have to censor dispatches directly, but successfully censored stories through "access and delay." The rules for reporters that really counted in Desert Storm were those that organized reporters into pools and then only provided limited access to areas and then reviewed the pool reports. Under this system the military did not have to worry about information going back to the United States, because it essentially controlled everything leaving the Middle East.¹⁹⁸ Another way the military controlled the news was by deciding whom a reporter could interview. If a reporter had been writing negative accounts about the war and United States policy, his chances for gaining an interview with a high ranking military official was slim to none. This was just another, but subtle, way of controlling journalists and the news.¹⁹⁹ One other way of controlling what news is reported is the Big Brother role of the public information officer. A public information officer may be present when a reporter talks to a soldier, which puts an insulting zipper on the soldier's mouth.²⁰⁰ Not only did the military control information about the desert war itself, it also clamped down on the Department of Energy officials in the United States about the environmental impacts of the oil well fires in Kuwait.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ Browne, Malcolm W. "Conflicting Censorship Upsets Many Journalists." *New York Times*. Jan. 21, 1991. Pages A10.

¹⁹⁸ Wicker, Tom. "Marketing the War." *New York Times*. May 8, 1991. Page A23.

¹⁹⁹ LeMoyné, James. "Pentagon's Strategy for the Press: Good News or No News." *New York Times*. Feb. 17, 1991. Page E3.

²⁰⁰ Rosenthal, A.M. "War: The One-Week Jitters." *New York Times*. Jan. 25, 1991. Page A29.

²⁰¹ Wicker, Tom. "Smoke Over Kuwait." *New York Times*. March 3, 1991. Page A21.

After the war many of the nation's top journalists wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney protesting the pool system and how they felt it was a way for the military to control and manipulate the news. The letter, in part, said that pools do not work as stories were late and lost, and access to men and women in the field was interfered with by a needless system of military escorts and copy review. The letter went on to say the pool system was used in the Persian Gulf war not to facilitate news coverage but to control it.²⁰²

Many correspondents, including Richard Pyle of the *New York Times*, complained about the pool reporting and lack of information and facts given to reporters. Pyle was also a reporter in Vietnam with the Associated Press and won a Pulitzer Prize for his war correspondence in Vietnam. He said information in Vietnam was much more readily available to reporters.²⁰³ Without access to American troop units, correspondents were unable to verify statements made at press briefings in Riyadh. They could not fully describe the ground fighting. They were unable to convey the emotions, thoughts, morale of the front-line soldiers -- often the essence of war correspondence.²⁰⁴

Because of the restrictions placed on the press, rarely have so many labored so hard to convey so little. The restrictions were presented as necessary to protect the national interest, and few would argue in favor of press reports that endanger American lives. Michael Schiffer and Michael Rinzler, who are associated with the New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, wrote in a column that the restrictions jeopardize national security in an equally critical fashion by preventing full reporting of the

²⁰² "15 Top Journalists Object to Gulf War Curbs." *New York Times*. May 2, 1991. Page A17.

²⁰³ Apple Jr. R.W. "Press and Military: Old Suspicions." *New York Times*. Feb. 4, 1991. Page A9.

²⁰⁴ Apple Jr., R.W. "Correspondents Protest the Pool System." *New York Times*. Feb. 12, 1991. Page A14.

war to reach the public and policy community.²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, some journalists felt it was better to be there and get part of the story than to leave a major area of the war uncovered. Otherwise there would be no point in having reporters in Saudi Arabia, where it was the Pentagon officials doing the news-managing, making sure that reporters only saw what the military wanted them to see and go only where the military wanted them to go, and detaining them when they tried to provide a less-orchestrated version of events.

The Pentagon eventually broadened access to the front line units into the war, but still had the pool system in effect. All parties agreed that the traditional prohibitions of the use of information that could cost allied lives, such as exact unit locations and operational plans, would have to be observed. Reporters were detained by military police who tried to cover the war without proper credentials, outside the pool system and without military escorts.²⁰⁶

Michael Getler, the assistant managing editor for foreign news for the *Washington Post*, said he was dismayed by the restricted flow of information. "It seems to me that 24 hours after the first strike they should be able to provide a more detailed assessment as to what's happened," he said. Over protests of news executives, the Pentagon adopted rules that limited the coverage of hostilities to reporters assembled in officially escorted groups, known as pools. The pool reporting would be subject to a "security review" by military officers before the information could be disseminated.²⁰⁷ Journalists were not the only

²⁰⁵ Schiffer, R. Michael and Michael F. Rinzer. "No News Is No News." *New York Times*. Jan. 23, 1991. Page A19.

²⁰⁶ Apple, R.W. "Pentagon Moves to Widen Reporters' Access to the Gulf Ground Units." *New York Times*. Feb. 13, 1991. Page A15.

²⁰⁷ Lewis, Neil A. "Government's Strict Orders Limit Reports." *New York Times*. Jan. 18, 1991. Page A11.

people complaining about censorship; so were the troops. Soldiers said news had been reduced on armed forces radio and the lack of news made them anxious.²⁰⁸

From the moment the allied operation began, some news executives felt that the Pentagon had dominated news coverage through a combination of sophisticated public relations techniques and restrictions on information. Michael K. Deaver, who was credited with successfully manipulating news organizations as deputy chief of staff under President Ronald Reagan from 1980-1985, believed the military did an outstanding job in its public relations campaign. He said, "The Department of Defense has done an excellent job of managing the news in an almost classic way. There's plenty of access to some things, and at least one visual a day. If you were going to hire a public relations firm to do the media relations for an international event, it couldn't be done any better than this is being done."²⁰⁹

Many journalists felt the military did this very tactfully. The daily press briefings concentrated on total number of sorties flown. Little emphasis is placed on the fact that only 50 percent of those sorties are offensive, the remainder being defensive combat air patrols, refueling sorties and resupply runs. Broad numbers can mislead and they are often designed to do so. Announcements that bombing is concentrated on equipment not troops fail to emphasize the equipment is manned.

The number of Iraqi casualties was consistently de-emphasized in much the same way as the accuracy of precision bombing has been emphasized. Estimates of the damage to the Republican Guard ranged anywhere from 40 percent to 15 percent degradation in their fighting capability. To some extent, the American public had been told about one war

²⁰⁸ Shenon, Philip. "Soldiers Fault Lack of News Since War Began." *New York Times*. Jan. 22, 1991. Page A12.

²⁰⁹ Jones, Alex S. "Process of News Reporting on Display." *New York Times*. Feb. 15, 1991. Page A15.

while another war is being fought. The allies and the Iraqis took Winston Churchill's advice, "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."²¹⁰

Judith Coburn, who covered wars in Central America, Vietnam and the Middle East, said the military had done a "brilliant job" on its own behalf in raising support for the war.²¹¹ There's nothing new in wartime about exaggerated claims of success, or inflammatory charges of enemy atrocities. The need to keep public support for the war at home is obvious, and since the days of the Alexander the Great it has been acknowledged that the first casualty of war is the truth.²¹² The military did distort the facts of the war about the accuracy of bombs and number of targets hit, but the fact that the military was so successful in controlling information about the war, enabled it to tell the public anything and the public believed it.²¹³

Journalists commended the military for the good job of public relations it did. One of the best public relations tactics used by the military was that only videos of precision weapons were shown the public. The American government never showed a bomb that missed its target, and the videos shown hitting targets had an "enormous impact on the American public."²¹⁴

Based on news stories and editorials the *New York Times* was definitely upset by the strict control placed over journalists, and the censorship placed over them. Articles ran almost daily concerning what was happening with the press and other media during the

²¹⁰ Dewar, Michael. "Deception as Strategy." *New York Times*. Feb. 15, 1991. Page A35.

²¹¹ Wicker, Tom. "Marketing the War." *New York Times*. May 8, 1991. Page A23.

²¹² Wicker, Tom. "An Unknown Casualty." *New York Times*. March 20, 1991. Page A29.

²¹³ Wicker, Tom. "An Unknown Casualty." *New York Times*. March 20, 1991. Page A29.

²¹⁴ DeParle, Jason. "Keeping the News in Step: Are the Pentagon's Gulf War Rules Here to Stay?" *New York Times*. May 5, 1991. Page A9.

war. The *New York Times* was a leader in making the public aware of the censorship that was occurring in the Middle East. Vietnam issues were also highly visible in the *New York Times*, as articles ran concerning the Vietnam syndrome and other issues daily as well. The *New York Times* did live up to its reputation of being the newspaper of record in the United States by providing extensive and coverage of the war and the issues surrounding the war.

Chapter V

Analysis of *Washington Post*

The *Washington Post* is the newspaper of Washington D.C. With that comes the ability to influence the nation's legislature and other government officials. The newspaper also has the ability to set part of the agenda which will be on the minds of the nation's leaders, and with that comes a great responsibility. But during the Persian Gulf War, the *Washington Post* of course emphasized the events of the war, and it also covered issues of the Vietnam War in relation to the Persian Gulf War and the issue of restrictions on the press.

Vietnam

The so-called Vietnam syndrome was finally put to rest with the victory in the Persian Gulf was a theme that appeared in the *Washington Post*. From the beginning of the Persian Gulf War, Bush opened a second front in it and aimed it squarely at the audience at home. He led a fierce assault against what had been called "the Vietnam syndrome," and just as the president declared victory over Saddam Hussein, so did he proclaim that the syndrome had been vanquished. "By God," the president declared, "we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."

The Vietnam syndrome was open to many interpretations, but more than anything, it was the belief that any large-scale American military intervention was doomed to practical failure. There was no more powerful symbol of the transformation than the helicopters landing Marines on the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. The last collective memory of helicopters hovering above an embassy involved the chaotic evacuation of Americans

and their local allies from Saigon as North Vietnamese troops closed in on the city.²¹⁵ The ultimate antidote to the Vietnam syndrome. The image of February 28, 1991 was: American Marines landing by helicopter on the roof of the American Embassy in newly liberated Kuwait City. It was a mirror image of the pictures of April 30, 1975: American helicopters in Saigon lifting off from the roof of the American Embassy in panic and retreat.²¹⁶ "This will allow us to put a lot of baggage from Vietnam behind us," one four-star general said.²¹⁷

Some journalists felt Bush and his advisors did not want to find a solution to the problem with Iraq other than war so the Vietnam syndrome could be put to rest. Fear of a peace deal at the Bush White House had less to do with oil, Israel and Iraqi expansionism than with the bitter legacy of a lost war. "This is the chance to get rid of the Vietnam syndrome," one senior aide said. "We can show we are capable of winning a war."²¹⁸ There were arguments to be made against U.S. intervention, but the president did not make them, and he simply raised the specter of Vietnam. Bush did little at the beginning of the war to rid the Vietnam syndrome from the minds of Americans, by talking about it he just proved the Vietnam syndrome lived, and he gave it new life.

But that may have been good, and perhaps the most important effect (on Americans) of the Persian Gulf War was to give a new generation of Americans a sense that they could be again what they had been in World War II and throughout most of this century: liberators. America the liberator was well-known to the French, Italians, Koreans,

²¹⁵ Dionne Jr., E.J. "Kicking the 'Vietnam Syndrome.'" *Washington Post*. March 4, 1991. Pages A1, A21.

²¹⁶ Krauthammer, Charles. "Good Morning, Vietnam." *Washington Post*. April 19, 1991. Page A23.

²¹⁷ Atkinson, Rick. "U.S. Victory Is Absolute." *Washington Post*. March 1, 1991. Pages A1, A30.

²¹⁸ Evans, Rowland and Robert Novak. "No Vietnam Syndrome." *Washington Post*. Feb. 25, 1991. Page A9.

and Filipinos - millions still bless the day that American troops marched into their towns and villages - but not to young Americans. They knew only Vietnam.²¹⁹

Bob Gittens, a retired mailman who was living in a Los Angeles suburb during the Gulf War said the war was necessary but was going to be unpopular at the beginning because of Vietnam. "This is a necessary war, but it's still going to be an unpopular war because people are fed up with wars," he said. "Vietnam did something to do this country that's going to take a long time to heal."²²⁰

But the the Persian Gulf War apparently had some healing power. A Protestant minister, A.M. Houghton, who flew 161 combat missions in Vietnam as a Navy Pilot, wrote a letter to Bush after the war which in part said, "For nearly two decades I have felt the Vietnam years of my life were a worthless waste. I am writing to thank you...for taking a stand that is bringing healing to the hearts of this and many other wounded Vietnam Veterans."

Exorcising the sad and angry memories of Vietnam was a high objective in Bush's fierce determination to conduct an all-out war against Saddam Hussein. The letter from Houghton, whose views reflect those of hundreds of thousands of veterans from the Vietnam conflict, demonstrated the forgotten political potency of victory on the battlefield.²²¹

Practically everyone was glad to see and feel that the Vietnam syndrome had been put to rest. At a flag-waving rally held for American serviceman home from the Persian Gulf War in Sumter, S.C., shortly after the war, Bush said American forces "not only

²¹⁹ Krauthamme, Charles. "Good Morning, Vietnam." *Washington Post*. April 19, 1991. Page A23.

²²⁰ Walker, Jill. "Veterans Applaud President's Action." *Washington Post*. Jan. 17, 1991. Page A30.

²²¹ Evans, Rowland and Robert Novak. "The President's Big Chance." *Washington Post*. March 1, 1991. Page A15.

liberated Kuwait, but helped this country liberate itself from old ghosts and doubts."²²² Lt. Gen. Jimmy D. Ross, the Army's deputy chief of staff logistics during the Gulf War said it felt good to win a war and be rid of the ghosts of Vietnam.²²³ A parade was held in Chicago after the victory in the Gulf not only to celebrate the victory in the Gulf War, but to honor the veterans of all wars. During the parade, which Colin Powell led, Lillian Albert, whose Marine son died in Vietnam in 1969 and whose grandson served in the Gulf War, said the tribute to veterans that included those who served in Vietnam was "long overdue."²²⁴

But there are some people who believed the Gulf War only vanquished part of the Vietnam syndrome. Conservative columnist George Will wrote there were two Vietnam syndromes and only one was dismissed with victory in the Gulf. He wrote:

When Iraq capitulated, many Americans crowed that we had knocked "the Vietnam Syndrome" into a cocked hat. But there actually two Vietnam Syndromes, one of which is, alas, very much alive.

Syndrome II, which came at the end of the Vietnam War, was the false and dangerous lesson that military power could accomplish little. But a decade before that, there was Vietnam Syndrome I, which is proving to be a durable weed in the national garden. It was - is - the supreme political hubris of believing in "nation building." This belief is that nations are like Tinker Toys, to be rearranged by Americans who have a right to be rearrangers because they are such clever social engineers.

Such an "obligation" tends to be perpetually renewing, deepened by each intervention taken to fulfill it.²²⁵

Sen. Bob Kerry (D-Neb.), who lost a leg in Vietnam and won the Medal of Honor, doubted if the Persian Gulf War victory did anything to rid the nation of the ghosts of Vietnam. He was one of those who was not sure that the passing of the syndrome is an

²²² Balz, Dan. "No One...Doubts Us Anymore,' Bush Tells Gulf Vets." *Washington Post*. March 18, 1991. Page A19.

²²³ Weiser, Benjamin. "In Logistics, Desert Storm Victory Is Only Half the Battle." *Washington Post*. March 5, 1991. Page A16.

²²⁴ Walsh, Edward and Lauren Ina. "Chicago Cheers Gulf Vets." *Washington Post*. May 11, 1991. Page A3.

²²⁵ Will, George. "Stay Out of the Carnage in Iraq." *Washington Post*. April 4, 1991. Page A23.

unmitigated good for the nation's soul. And he's not sure that Vietnam veterans feel all that was healed by the triumph in the Persian Gulf War. They might have even felt a pang when they saw the elaborate homecoming parades for the veterans of the 42-day war against an evaporating enemy. The Vietnam vets came home to cold stares, organized their own memorial and finally, to dedicate it, held their own homecoming parade, a shattering of an affair that began with a file of wheelchairs pushed by men in tattered uniforms.²²⁶

But there is some belief that a Vietnam syndrome did not exist. Most Americans believed the success in the Gulf chased ghosts and doubts about Vietnam away. But contrary to this belief the United States' win in the Gulf War did not cause much change in American public opinion on foreign policy, just as the Vietnam War did little to alter the public's fundamentally cautious view of the military as a policy tool. Richard Brody, a professor of political science at Stanford University, and Richard Morin, director of polling at the *Washington Post*, wrote:

As a characterization of American public opinion toward foreign policy, the Vietnam syndrome argues that after 1975 the American public turned inward, against intervention, against the use of force to protect vital interests of the United States. Or more succinctly, in the words of Dov S. Zakheim, a former deputy undersecretary of defense in the Reagan Administration, the syndrome entailed "... a reluctance to engage in any overseas operations and to provide the wherewithal to do so."

It is more that a quibble to point out that, since long before Vietnam, Americans have been reluctant to support overseas operations. George Washington warned in his farewell address of the dangers of "overgrown military establishments" and foreign alliances, and those fears have endured to this day.

For example, before World War II the United States was deeply divide on whether to oppose Japan militarily and believed the war in Europe was that continent's business, not the United States. Similarly, many Americans rejected the notion to use troops to oust the Castro regime in Cuba during the spring of 1963. There is no evidence that Vietnam

²²⁶ McGrory, Mary. "The Real 'Vietnam Syndrome.'" *Washington Post*. March 7, 1991, Page A2.

produced a fundamental change in the way in which Americans form their impressions about foreign policy and the desirability of using military power as a policy instrument.²²⁷

But whether the Persian Gulf War ended the Vietnam syndrome or not, it was clear all efforts were made in the Persian Gulf War to avoid the same ending as the war in Vietnam. Everything was done in the Persian Gulf not to invoke memories of Vietnam. One thing that was done in Vietnam that was not done in the Gulf was the nightly body counts. The deaths on the Iraqi side were not counted and no attempt was made to count them. The numbers of dead so assiduously sought in the paddies and the jungles of Vietnam were forbidden in the sands of the Arabian Peninsula.²²⁸

Casualties were a sensitive topic among the U.S. military serving in the Gulf, many of whom recall how the Vietnam War's daily "body counts" and vivid television coverage of wounded servicemen helped shift American public opinion of that war. In the Persian Gulf War casualty information was kept very quiet and handled by official military spokesmen. Lt. Col. John Cassidy and his company were responsible for identifying and shipping the remains of killed Marines back to the United States, and he admitted the sensitivity in the Gulf was partly due to Vietnam. He said:

"It's a television war. Opinion can be molded. You know that as well as I do. I'm very sensitive to having you (reporters) around here, to tell you the truth. It's not appropriate" because "we deal with some very private things here ... What we're doing is trying to take care of people and not publicize it ... You don't go and look in a morgue in a hospital. We're not a morgue, (but) it's not appropriate for general knowledge. People could misunderstand very easily."²²⁹

Bush wanted to end the war as quickly as he could, because when the body bags start piling up, the soul of a country is sucked out. The Vietnam War was lost in the court of

²²⁷ Brody, Richard A. and Richard Morin. "From Vietnam to Iraq: The Great American Syndrome Myth." *Washington Post*. March 31, 1991. Pages B1, B2.

²²⁸ McGrory, Mary. "War's Much-Improved Image." *Washington Post*. May 28, 1991. Page A2.

²²⁹ Murphy, Caryle. "Marine Unit's Task: To Register the Dead." *Washington Post*. Feb. 5, 1991. Page A15.

public opinion long before it ended in the jungles because of the casualties.²³⁰

Another lesson from Vietnam was not to predict the outcome of any war. Almost everyone had predictions when the war would end and the political consequences of the war. No one knows what is going to happen in a war and what the outcome will cause politically. It is best to wage a war with clear objectives as swiftly and safely as possible.²³¹ *Washington Post* staff writers Haynes Johnson and D.J. Dionne Jr. that the Korean War was fought with no clear objective as was Vietnam. It was the first war since the War of 1812 that did not end in glorious American victory, but in a frustrating stalemate. Then the Vietnam War made the frustrations grow even more. That war was 11 years of escalating violence that divided the nation like no thing had since the Civil War. It ended in defeat and left a legacy in which Americans and their leaders vowed never again to wage war without clear objectives, united country, and a determination to win. Bush said that the Persian Gulf War would not be another Vietnam. The objective was to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait with the all the congenital firepower the United States had.²³²

After the war in the Gulf, Bush drew on images of Vietnam to help develop policy about the Kurdish refugees and requests to set up a new government Iraq. Bush insisted the United States would not be drawn into a "Vietnam-style quagmire" by attempting to set up a new government. Bush was urged to make deployed of troops protecting the Kurds a permanent fixture, but he chose to take that path and avoid any chance of the United States becoming involved in a possible civil war of another country.²³³ To justify in part his

²³⁰ Kornheiser, Tony. "Not Another Vietnam." *Washington Post*. Jan. 20, 1991. Pages F1, F6.

²³¹ Cohen Richard. "Unpredictable Enterprises." *Washington Post*. Jan. 25, 1991. Page A23.

²³² Johnson, Haynes and D.J. Dionne Jr. "This Time, the Outbreak Comes as No Surprise." *Washington Post*. Jan. 17, 199. Page A32.

²³³ "Back Into Iraq." *Washington Post*. April 18, 1991. Page A20.

refusal to provide permanent help to the Kurds, Bush used lingering anxieties about a Vietnam-like entrapment in Iraq.²³⁴

Not only did Bush call on Vietnam to help him develop policy, he also knew it should be not be politicians but generals who plan strategy for the war. In Vietnam, politicians took part in planning strategy for the war, and this caused much dissent in the military. Like Bush, many senior military leaders called on their experiences in Vietnam to help develop war plans for the Persian Gulf War. Commander of the coalition forces, General Norman Schwarzkopf, earned two Purple Hearts in Vietnam, and said the war had a dramatic impact on the way he and his senior commanders ran the Gulf War. Constant attention was paid to the morale of the troops and the way the war was portrayed to the American public. Schwarzkopf said:

I can still remember (Gen. William C.) Westmoreland saying, 'The light is at the end of the tunnel, just give me a hundred thousand more,' and then he got a hundred thousand more and he said, 'The light is at the end of the tunnel, all I need is a hundred thousand more.' People can say anything they want about Central Command's plan but the one thing they can't say is we came in here shyly.²³⁵

Along with Schwarzkopf, Powell, Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, also served in Vietnam. Both knew what life in the field was like and the how costly combat can be. This may have effected the decision to delay the ground war until a complete air bombardment on Iraq was complete. Neither of them wanted another sad black wall decorated with the thousands of names - with 84 percent of them being infantrymen.²³⁶

Virtually all of the senior officers in the Gulf War served in Vietnam, and they saw a U.S. military destroyed - by war, by drugs and by racial hatred, by animosity at home - and for 20 years had worked to put the military back together knowing the one in Vietnam

²³⁴ "Out of Iraq." *Washington Post*. April 8, 1991. Page A16.

²³⁵ Moore, Molly. "'Tyrant' Turns Team Leader." *Washington Post*. Feb. 11, 1991. Page A1.

²³⁶ Truscott III, Lucian K. "Spare the Infantry." *Washington Post*. Feb. 6, 1991. Page A17.

could not be a effective and efficient fighting machine. They redesigned the force, demanded and received an end to micromanagement from government civilians, concocted the doctrine and, ultimately, shaped the war plan. Many of them saw the crushing of Iraq as a vindication - just desserts for having kept the faith, honored the flag, and done their duty for two decades.²³⁷

Another lesson from Vietnam was obtaining full accountability of POWs and people missing in action. Unlike Vietnam, the United States got fast action by Iraq in returning POWs to the United States. Many people felt the reason for the Iraq's fast action was because of the United States' victory, and the United States government realized that it too must take fast action, because of the outcry over POWs and MIAs in Vietnam. The government, including Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) who was a POW in Vietnam, would not let the POW issue remain unsettled. McCain said:

"The critical difference here is that we won," which may make it easier to get a full accounting of former prisoners and the missing. "In our exhaustion and relief in 1973, we neglected the issue and it came back. This is another lesson" from Vietnam, "that American people prize individual Americans beyond all else."²³⁸

Vietnam also taught the lesson of not having ambiguity. The United States citizens have patience for a long war as demonstrated by the two World Wars, but it is the ambiguity that they do not have the patience for. By the time the United States was well into the Vietnam conflict, the ambiguities overwhelmed the American public. It was hard to distinguish between the Viet cong and the South Vietnamese. It became increasingly difficult to discern any objective from continuing the fighting, except to redeem the deaths of the thousands who had died. Vietnam also presented another troublesome ambiguity, as many Americans found it impossible to oppose U.S. intervention in Vietnam without

²³⁷ Atkinson, Rick. "U.S. Victory Is Absolute." *Washington Post*. March 1, 1991. Pages A1, A30.

²³⁸ Priest, Dana. "Nation is spared Anguish Over POWs." *Washington Post*. March 7, 1991, Pages A25, A27.

hoping for American defeat. For a while the anti-war protesters just wanted the United States to find an alternative to the war, but by the end they were chanting, "Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh; Viet Cong are gonna win."²³⁹

Like the government and the military, the American people also learned from the war in Vietnam. They can protest the war and governmental policies, but it is important to remember the men fighting the war. Rep. Charles B. Rangel (D-N.Y.) addressed a crowd of war protesters in Washington, D.C., and reminded them to "support the warriors, (if) not the war." The protesters wanted to help stop the war, but did not want to undermine the efforts of the troops.²⁴⁰

Vietnam may have been a complete disaster to the United States militarily and diplomatically, but if any thing it served as a lesson on how not to fight a war. "If Vietnam served any kind of good purpose ... it represents a mirror by which future things can be judged," said Nguyen Ngoc Bich, a Vietnamese community activist near Washington, D.C.²⁴¹

Although many lessons were learned in the Vietnam War, there were still some similarities of the Gulf War to the Vietnam War. One thing that was similar to Vietnam and most other wars as well was the wholesale environmental destruction, which is an ancient tool of war and perhaps its inevitable consequence. In 146 B.C, the Romans destroyed the Carthaginians' fields by spreading them with salt. Genghis Khan wrecked Mesopotamia's irrigation system. Medieval armies hurled the corpses of dead animals over the walls of besieged towns to pollute the water supply. The Chinese flooded vast areas in order to

²³⁹ Raspberry, William. "The Psychic Toll of a Ground War." *Washington Post*. Jan. 28, 1991. Page A11.

²⁴⁰ McGrory, Mary. "Marchers Revel in Numbers." *Washington Post*. Jan. 29, 1991. Page A2.

²⁴¹ Hsu, Evelyn. "Vietnamese Man: 'My War' Was Lesson." *Washington Post*. Jan. 20, 1991. Pages D1, D3.

stop the Japanese armies, as did the Dutch to stop the Germans in 1940. The United States sprayed herbicide over Vietnam with arguably greater consequences on crops and civilians than on the Viet Cong. Iraq's intentional oil spills and its bombing of Kuwait's oil wells fall squarely within this long tradition. The acts could have had military utility if the war had lasted longer. The oil spill could have drifted down the Persian Gulf and affected desalination plants and thus the United States troops' water supply. The spill could also have been set on fire to help spoil an amphibious assault by U.S. forces on Iraq.²⁴²

As in Korea and Vietnam, the United States was playing the role of world policeman in the Persian Gulf region when it went to aid Kuwait.²⁴³ Another similarity between the wars was the use of POWs by the enemy to denounce the United States. As in Vietnam, American POWs were put before television cameras and recited their names and gave messages to their families. This was an attempt by Iraq to raise sentiment against the war in the United States.²⁴⁴

But more often than not, the Persian Gulf War differed from the Vietnam War. The United States was not alone in the Persian Gulf War, was not there without a clear purpose and was not there without a moral mandate. Congress and the president were in the Gulf War together, and the inequity of the draft was moot with a volunteer army. Even the protests were different. At the beginning of the Vietnam War, anyone who protested it was called anti-American and pro-Communist. During the Gulf War, nobody thought the protesters were anything but loyal Americans. The protests were far less confrontational, and nobody was being clubbed by police nor was anybody calling American troops the enemy.²⁴⁵

²⁴² Mathews, Jessica. "Acts of War and the Environment." *Washington Post*. April 8, 1991. Page A17.

²⁴³ Wilson, James Q. "Why We Are Fighting..." *Washington Post*. Jan. 17, 1991. Page A21.

²⁴⁴ Baker, Donald P. "New War, Old Images." *Washington Post*. Jan. 24, 1991. Pages D1, D5.

²⁴⁵ Kornheiser, Tony. "Not Another Vietnam." *Washington Post*. Jan. 20, 1991. Pages F1, F6.

Bush built the largest military force since Vietnam before the war started instead of a gradual buildup of troops. There was no Vietnam-style gradual escalation of fighting, and the objective was clear and narrow: to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The United States went to war with support from the United Nations and not in the face of scorn from much of the world and won backing for the war from Congress.²⁴⁶

The Persian Gulf War was a war in which Americans took pride in their country and its troops compared to the way troops were treated during Vietnam.²⁴⁷ One other thing that differed from Vietnam and helped play a role in maintaining public support for the war was clearcut aims from the beginning and sticking to them. The United States goal was an unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In Vietnam aims and goals kept changing. The United States went from assisting the South Vietnamese as advisors to making war against North Vietnam, and finally a war that was supposed to save democracy was ended just to save face for the United States. Bush stuck to his original war aims and kept the American people behind him. A *Washington Post* - ABC poll showed 82 percent of the American people supporting Bush's ultimatum to Iraq to pull out of Kuwait or face a ground war that would push Iraqi forces out.²⁴⁸

Postwar Iraq was not remotely like Vietnam either. The United States Army had been humiliated in Vietnam, as it was being stretched to the breaking point by a massive popular rebellion. The United States not only had total control of the air, but in contrast to Vietnam had effectively destroyed enemy air defenses, vastly reducing the risk of any air action.²⁴⁹ Another result of victory was the United States had the leverage to make Iraq

²⁴⁶ Johnson, Haynes and E.J. Dionne Jr. "This Time, the Outbreak Comes as No Surprise." *Washington Post*. Jan. 17, 1991. Page A32.

²⁴⁷ Johnson, Haynes. "Bloodless Casualties." *Washington Post*. Feb. 8, 1991. Page A2.

²⁴⁸ Cohen, Richard. "Dying for Time." *Washington Post*. Feb. 24, 1991. Page B7.

²⁴⁹ Krauthammer, Charles. "Good Morning, Vietnam." *Washington Post*. April 19, 1991. Page A23.

deal on U.S. terms, and this was the biggest factor in getting the swift return of POWs, unlike Vietnam. The difference was clearest to the families of POWs.

"Sunday and Monday I had lost a daughter and Tuesday morning I got her back," said Donald Scott, father of Army Maj. Rhonda Leah Cornum, who was a POW. "I asked for a miracle, and I got it."²⁵⁰

The soldiers who fought in the Gulf War were also different from the ones in Vietnam. The soldiers in the Gulf War were not drafted, and now an 18-year old cannot get into the military without a high school diploma. Ninety-eight percent of enlisted men and women are high school graduates, and new recruits in military cannot stay in unless they avoid drugs and alcohol abuse. They also cannot move up the ranks in the military unless they continue to study and train and continue to strive for professional growth and excellence.²⁵¹

The homecoming for these soldiers was also different. Parades and celebrations started immediately for these war veterans, but as earlier mentioned Vietnam veterans had to organize their own homecoming years after the war had ended. The American Legion, made up of veterans, helped play a hand in making sure returning soldiers from the Gulf would not be scorned like the soldiers coming home from Vietnam. Returning veterans were embraced not scorned, and the Vietnam veterans would not allow troops to be scorned. Albert Hunnewell, a Green Beret who served in Vietnam said, "One thing's for sure - the Vietnam vets will not let happen to them what happened to us."²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Priest, Dana. "Nation Is Spared Anguish Over POWs." *Washington Post*. March 7, 1991. Pages A25, A27.

²⁵¹ Gergen, David. "Bringing Home the 'Storm.'" *Washington Post*. April 28, 1991. Page C2.

²⁵² Pressley, Sue Anne. "Veterans See "Cleansing" in Support for War." *Washington Post*. Feb. 26, 1991. Page A17.

Press Issues

Vietnam also had another effect on the way news would be gathered in the Persian Gulf War. In Vietnam reporters basically had a free reign over the country, and if they could get where they wanted to go, they would be allowed to stay. Reporters covered battles as they occurred and interviewed soldiers just as fire fights ended. This was not to be the case in the Persian Gulf. Many people believe Vietnam was the cause of censorship and pool reporting, and the *Washington Post* carried articles expressing sentiments concerning these issues.

Arguments were made openly by the military for the reasons for press control, but behind them was the deep suspicion of the press in the American armed services. The press lost Vietnam, and the military was not going to let it happen again. The attitude is understandable, though. Vietnam became an unpopular war and the men who fought were mistreated on the home front. Some media accounts of the war were openly hostile to the military mission. More important, the press brought the news home that made the war unpopular and everyone knows what happens to the messenger bearing bad tidings.

Powell opened a news briefing by summing up the government's position in just two words: "Trust me." Reporters were not persuaded though, because it is part of a journalists obligation to be skeptical. However unfairly, Bush and Powell carried a burden in the Persian Gulf War that Lyndon Johnson and William Westmoreland put on their shoulders. The generation of journalists covering the Gulf War had been misled before about matters of the war, and they would be fools to think it could not happen again.²⁵³

²⁵³ Kaiser, Robert G. "Trust Me" *Washington Post*. Jan. 27, 1991. Page C7.

The military did give daily briefings, but they were more dodging the questions than answering them. Howard Kurtz, who covers the media for the *Washington Post*, gave this briefing from Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly as an example of how a question and answer session went.

We're not discussing the number of Patriot missiles expended...We have air superiority. I'm not going to give you actual numbers...I'd be reticent to hang a percentage on it right now...The Israelis are working hard on that. You'll have to go ask them what the specifics are...I'll have to check on that and get back to you.

Journalists' reactions were not supportive of this type of briefing. David J. Lynch of the *Orange County Register* said with a studied understatement, "I wouldn't say (that briefing) was wildly informative." Melissa Healy of the *Los Angeles Times* said, "With every new day in this campaign, they think of more reasons why they can't tell us how they're doing. They've sharpened their ability to tell you why they can't tell you something."²⁵⁴

Many journalists believed there was no military necessity for the censorship in the Persian Gulf War. No requirements of secrecy or sensitivity should supersede the people's First Amendment rights. But the reasons for the censorship were twofold. The United States got bogged down in a backwater war that turned stagnant in Vietnam. When military tactics did not dislodge the Viet Cong and when American bloodshed stopped being tolerated, the generals blamed the media. Secondly, the Pentagon has poured billions of dollars into high-tech weaponry that may not perform well under battle conditions, and the Pentagon does not want to hear an outcry from the public. As the war with Iraq grew nearer, the military replaced the Bill of Rights with self-serving regulations to hobble war

²⁵⁴ Kurtz, Howard. "At the Pentagon Briefing, Words but No Wisdom." *Washington Post*. Jan. 23, 1991. Pages B1, B2.

correspondents.²⁵⁵ The military did have both a right and a duty to withhold information that could have imperiled the lives of allied soldiers. But it went further than that. Its censors interfered in routine news gathering, even on occasion changing a word here or there that gave a story a different slant.²⁵⁶ Army Lt. Col. Larry Icenogle said the military did not censor people but “security-reviewed” people.²⁵⁷

Despite complaints from journalists about the restricted coverage during the Gulf War, 78 percent of people who responded in a survey by the Times Mirror Center for People and the Press supported the restrictions and nearly 60 percent said “more control” over the media should be used.²⁵⁸

The height of censorship occurred when the Pentagon imposed a blackout on news before the ground assault into Kuwait. Some journalists agreed that blackout was necessary, and reluctantly accepted it. Jonathan P. Wolman, Washington bureau chief for the Associated Press said:

A blackout can be defended in the early hours of a military operation like this one, but it can slip into censorship in the wink of an eye. I haven't got a problem with the military trying to control information that might go to the enemy in wartime. But I'm troubled by a blackout. Surely there is some information interesting and relevant to the public (that could be released) but not dangerous to friendly forces.²⁵⁹

Others believed that this move was just further evidence of the military trying to manage news. Jack Nelson, the *Los Angeles Times* bureau chief in Washington D.C., did not agree with the blackout. He said:

²⁵⁵ Anderson, Jack and Dale Van Atta. “Pentagon Dampens the Right to Know.” *Washington Post*. Jan. 21, 1991. Page B8.

²⁵⁶ Cohen, Richard. “Tell Us the Bad News, Too.” *Washington Post*. Feb. 15, 1991. Page A21.

²⁵⁷ Isikoff, Michael. “In Dhahran, the Press In a Pressure Cooker.” *Washington Post*. Jan. 23, 1991. Pages B1, B2.

²⁵⁸ Kurtz, Howard. “Media's Mixed Reviews.” *Washington Post*. Jan. 31, 1991. Page C2.

²⁵⁹ Kurtz, Howard. “Despite Concern About Blackout, Media Defer to Pentagon for Now.” *Washington Post*. Feb. 214, 1991. Page A24.

They don't want anybody to see the ugly face of war because they're afraid of how the public could turn against them. It goes back to what they did in Panama and Grenada," where the news media access was limited during military operations. "I think they're going to get with it, in terms of public reaction and in terms of what we can do about it. It's total censorship." The Bush administration's motivation is essentially "political" rather than based on legitimate security concerns.²⁶⁰

Journalists also accused the military of not granting interviews to reporters who wrote critical articles that commanders did not agree with. Some articles said that reporters access had been curtailed because of negative news reports and that some military commanders would not see reporters who wrote negative articles.²⁶¹ The public's need and right to know is not surrendered in a war. And even if the majority of the public is willing to surrender it, the press will not. It is the press's job to ask the questions. It is the Pentagon's job to answer the ones it feels are appropriate. But an unasked question never gets answered. The people who are paying for this war -with their money and their lives - know only what their government wants them to know about the details. Fewer than 100 journalists were assigned to pools to cover the activities of 500,000 soldiers.²⁶²

One effective way the military imposed censorship in a round about way was by the pool reporting method. But journalists did not agree with the pool system and said it was not an effective way of gathering news. "The pools are bordering on dysfunctional," Chris Hedges, a *New York Times* reporter said. "Those trying to get out and report are prohibited from doing so...It's frequently impossible to do reporting on the situation when every conversation you have is being managed by the military." The government justified pool reporting when Justice Department lawyer Neil Koslowe said some control had to be

²⁶⁰ Kurtz, Howard. "Despite Concern About Blackout, Media Defer to Pentagon for Now." *Washington Post*. Feb. 24, 1991. Page A24.

²⁶¹ Kurtz, Howard. "Pentagon Aims to 'Discourage' Restrictions on Media." *Washington Post*. Feb. 21, 1991. Page A28.

²⁶² Anderson, Jack and Dale Van Atta. "Government Stenographers." *Washington Post*. March 3, 1991. Page C7.

exerted over journalists covering combat, especially since over 1,300 journalists showed up for the war.²⁶³

At stake, in the view of critical journalists, was whether reporters would have any hope of penetrating the fog that hung over the war effort, or whether they would serve essentially as conveyer belts for the scanty information dispensed at official briefings and information gathered in the limited pools.²⁶⁴

The pool system restrictions also had its most dramatic affect on the biggest day of the war. On February 26, 1991, the Iraqi Army was in full retreat. Marines were on the outskirts of Kuwait City and Army tanks were fighting Iraq's Republican Guard as thousands of enemy soldiers dropped their weapons and marched into allied custody. There were 142 combat pool reporters who accompanied U.S. ground forces into Kuwait, but by either design or default, hardly any of them filed a dispatch that arrived in time for morning publication and none provided a first-hand account of the ground combat.²⁶⁵

Another effect the pool system had was it helped the military wage its public relations effort. By managing the news, the military was able to prevent any damaging publicity from getting out to the public and were able to put a positive spin on the news that did leave the Pentagon and the Middle East. Little information about the war was known in the early stages of it. This was the result of the government effort to bolster public support for U.S. forces and not to make public anything that may have given aid and comfort to the enemy. Several aides said the Bush administration was presenting a picture of the war

²⁶³ "U.S. Says News Rules Case Is Now Moot." *Washington Post*. March 9, 1991. Page A15.

²⁶⁴ Kurtz, Howard. "Journalists Say "Pools" Don't Work." *Washington Post*. Feb. 11, 1991. Pages A1, A22, A23.

²⁶⁵ Gugliotta, Guy. "Signs of Breakdown in Pool System." *Washington Post*. Feb. 27, 1991. Pages A27, A32.

designed to bolster domestic support, keep the coalition together, and push Saddam Hussein toward early capitulation.²⁶⁶

The early reports from the war placed Iraqi dead at 150,000 (*San Jose Mercury News*) at the end of the first day of the bombing campaign and that Iraq's Republican Guard was decimated. This was what Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney called the country's "initial euphoria." A reassessment produced the unusual spectacle of a Defense Department chief cautioning reporters that the war was not going as well they had written. But many news officials were skeptical of this, saying the military had helped fuel the initial optimism and continued to distort the coverage by releasing little hard information about the success of the initial assault. Barbara Cohen, CBS's Washington bureau chief, said the media and the military "were feeding off each other" during that initial combat. "They had a tremendous need to report success, and we had a need to come with a headline. Everyone was in love with the smart bombs and Patriots."²⁶⁷

Henry Allen a *Washington Post* staff writer wrote when the military makes a mistake in combat, its own people die. When the press makes a mistake, it runs a correction. The military was able to make the press look bad at times because it polished its public relations techniques with courses at Fort Benjamin Harris and studied the master, Ronald Reagan, and the way he handled the press.

Bernard Trainor, a retired Marine lieutenant general wrote in an Army War College publication that: "Today's officer corps carries as part of its cultural baggage a loathing for the press...Like racism, anti-Semitism, and all forms of bigotry, it is irrational but nonetheless real. The credo of the military seems to have become 'duty, honor, country,

²⁶⁶ Smith, B. Jeffrey. "Official Accounts of Battle Leave Many Gaps." *Washington Post*. Jan. 22, 1991. Pages A15, A18.

²⁶⁷ Kurtz, Howard and Barton Gellman. "War Reports: From Euphoria to Ambiguity." *Washington Post*. Jan. 24, 1991. Page A23.

and hate the media."²⁶⁸ The government's use of public relations was not a secret to anyone. An article in the *Washington Post* about Pete Williams, the chief spokesman for the Pentagon, carried a headline on the jump page that read "The Pentagon PR Man."²⁶⁹

The *Washington Post* like the *New York Times* was one of the newspapers that took the lead in criticizing the military and the government for the strict policy placed on journalists. The *Washington Post* had article after article telling how the press was being treated and how the military was hindering the news-gathering process. Vietnam issues were also prominent in the *Washington Post* as references to Vietnam and comparisons to the Gulf War situation made the news often.

²⁶⁸ Allen, Henry. "The Gulf Between Media and Military." *Washington Post*. Feb. 21, 1991. Pages D1, D2.

²⁶⁹ Romano, Lois. "Pete Williams, Playing It Cool." *Washington Post*. Jan. 21, 1991. Pages C1, C12.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

The press is always fighting the last war. The Vietnam War gave the press something to compare to the Persian Gulf War. Members of the press seemed to be dismayed at the restrictions placed on them and the censorship that occurred in the Persian Gulf War, but historically that really should not have come as a surprise. Considering the way the press and the facts surrounding the events in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989 were treated, the press should have expected to have strict guidelines placed on it. These two events set the precedent for how closely guarded news was going to be in military conflicts.

Is there reason for this concealing of facts and watching the press closely? With technology making the transmission of news quicker and more efficient everyday, maybe there is some need for safeguarding information. A briefing in a war zone can be broadcast live to practically every spot in the world, and information could appear hours later in a newspaper. Information that can give any advantage to the enemy may need to be kept secret for days, weeks or until the operation is completely finished.

The press has no real recourse in addressing the situation. The military can conceal whatever it deems appropriate. The press has seemed to accept the conditions as well. Although the issues of censorship and restricted pool reporting were mentioned in articles, no great sentiment or hatred toward the military developed in the Persian Gulf War. In Vietnam there was widespread distrust of the military by the press and the public, and this changed in the Persian Gulf War. With the results of opinion polls showing there was general distrust of the press by the public, the shadow of Vietnam may have still been

hanging over the press as well as the military. The reputation of the press was damaged in Vietnam and the journalists do not rank high the lists of the most trusted professions. A Gallup Poll conducted in 1994 showed only 20 percent of the respondents felt the honesty and ethical standards of journalists were very high or high. This is a decrease from 1992 and 1993.²⁷⁰ The statements made by some of the officials involved in the Persian Gulf War showed the military distrust of the press since Vietnam, and it was evident in the way the military limited the press's access to information. This was shown in the *New York Times* by a quote from a senior Air Force officer who said, "Let me say up front that I don't like the press. Your presence here can't possibly do me any good, and it can hurt me and my people."²⁷¹ An excerpt from an Army War College publication written by Bernard Trainor, a retired Marine lieutenant general, appeared in the *Washington Post* and also expressed a negative attitude toward the press. It read: "Today's officer corps carries as part of its cultural baggage a loathing for the press...Like racism, anti-Semitism, and all forms of bigotry, it is irrational but nonetheless real. The credo of the military seems to have become 'duty, honor, country, and hate the media.'"²⁷²

In World War I and World II, the press readily cooperated with the military concerning censorship because it was felt that these wars were justifiable. The United States had to pull all its resources together to stop Germany from conquering the world. The Persian Gulf War did not present the same global threat. There was no immediate threat that Hussein would continue to try to conquer more nations. This war was justifiable to many for the economic reasons involved. Iraq was going to control much of the world's

²⁷⁰ Gallup Jr, George. *The Gallup Poll Public Opinion in 1994*. Pages 151, 153.

²⁷¹ Browne, Malcolm W. "Conflicting Censorship Upsets Many Journalists." *New York Times*. May 5, 1991. Pages A1, A20.

²⁷² Allen, Henry. "The Gulf Between Media and Military." *Washington Post*. Feb. 21, 1991. Pages D1, D2.

oil supply and could have a significant influence on the world's economy. The United States was not going to let this situation occur and took action to stop it.

This could be a reason there was not a great deal of tension between the press and the military. At times it seemed that the press and military were combatants, but the press accepted the guidelines. Though the press really had no other option but to accept the guidelines, it did not fight as hard as it could to get the guidelines changed. Reporters seemed to be content to have the news fed to them at briefings. Only in a few instances did the press go to the limit to provide coverage and gather information about the Persian Gulf War. CNN's Peter Arnett stayed in Iraq to report the war, and Bob Simon of CBS and his crew were captured by the Iraqi's in an attempt to gather news. The press may have also been looking at the economic side of things as well. The reputation of the press was not high at the time and perhaps journalists did not want to do anything to lower their reputations even more. This may result in lower paper sales, which would be less revenue for the publication. Whether anybody likes it or not, the primary function of a newspaper is to make money.

After analyzing the data, a trend began to emerge that might very well call for censorship in military conflicts. Censorship has been imposed in all U.S. military conflicts except one. Coincidentally the one war where censorship was not used, the United States lost. That war was Vietnam. The press of course was not the only reason for the defeat. The military strategy in the war has been questioned since its end, but the press had an impact on public opinion during the war, and that may have influenced the decisions of policy makers in Washington, D.C.

Censorship may be needed in future military conflicts. Some information needs to be kept from the enemy, the press, and the public. Even though the guidelines placed on

reporters, and the censorship inhibited coverage of the war, an adequate job was still done by the press in covering the war. Plenty of information about the war was available; it just made the job of writing the articles more difficult with some key facts missing. But it is well worth a little more work and delays in information, if it is going to provide the United States with an edge in fighting a war. Regardless of what a journalist is doing, every American citizen's top priority should be the safety and security of the United States.

Comparisons

The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were more outspoken than the *Wall Street Journal* about the press issues and Vietnam issues. Many more articles appeared in them than the *Wall Street Journal* about press issues and Vietnam issues. This could have been predicted with the reputations of the papers involved. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* have reputations of being liberal, so it could be expected that they would be strongly against censorship. The *Wall Street Journal* did mention censorship, but it was not as big an issue as it was in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*. The *Wall Street Journal* is also a business paper, and it did not have the space to print as many editorials and straight-news articles about the Gulf War as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*. The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* each ran disclaimers in their papers about the strict guidelines their reporters had to work under. The *Wall Street Journal* did not run any disclaimer about the restrictions or censorship in the Persian Gulf. The disclaimer from the *New York Times* read:

With the start of the war, the American-led military command in Saudi Arabia put into effect a system worked out beforehand under which journalists from many newspapers, news agencies, television and radio stations are assembled into groups and given access to various military sources.

These pool reporters obtain their information while under military escort and their accounts are subject to scrutiny by military censors before they are distributed. Much of the information in the accompanying article was obtained from such reports.

The disclaimer from the *Washington Post* read:

Journalists covering the Persian Gulf War from Saudi Arabia operate under rules of the U.S.-led military command. Small groups of reporters are assembled in pools and, with military escorts, are given access to military sources in various locations. The journalists' reports must be reviewed by military censors. Some information in today's editions was gathered under those conditions.

Vietnam was also more prominent in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* than in the *Wall Street Journal*. During Vietnam, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were leaders among the media in exposing discrepancies about what was actually occurring in Vietnam and what the government was telling the public. The *New York Times* was the first newspaper to run excerpts from the Pentagon Papers, which were the secret government documents that told what really went on in Vietnam. The *Washington Post* soon followed.²⁷³ These two papers also published more about Vietnam in relation to the war in the Persian Gulf than did the *Wall Street Journal*. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* differed as well. The *New York Times* devoted more articles to press issues, and the *Washington Post* was more focused on Vietnam issues and in particular the Vietnam syndrome.

Further Research

Research needs to be done to help the develop a policy on how the press and military will interact with both agreeing on the terms for future military conflicts. The military seems to have set its policy, and it will not budge, but it is not one the press likes. There is little the press can do except to keep raising public awareness about the situation and, hopefully, successfully lobby to be granted more freedom in gathering news during military conflicts. But there is also the question of whether this really can be done, because

²⁷³ Teeter Jr., Dwight L. and Don R. DeLuc. *Law of Mass Communication*. Page 42.

the public may not want any changes, and the public has developed a general distrust of the press.

There may good reason for censorship with the advent of technology making it possible for information to be instantly transmitted worldwide. Research could focus on how this technology has led to more and more censorship. Research could also be done that would compare what the United States military was telling the public and what CNN's Peter Arnett was conveying from Iraq. It would be interesting to discover if the military was telling the truth about certain events and how much discrepancy was involved in the two sides.

The press can definitely be a thorn in the side of the military. Whether the press led directly to defeat in Vietnam can be debated, but it certainly did have an impact on public opinion and policy making. This was not forgotten by the military and government, and they did all they could do to prevent unfavorable reporting from occurring again. Grenada and Panama offered a glimpse of how the press and military would interact after Vietnam, but the Gulf War showed what kind of stand the military was going to take concerning press freedoms. The press complained, but its complaints fell on deaf ears in the military and non-sympathetic ears in the American public because many people had developed a general distrust of the media. All of the press reporting about the restrictions did little to change public sentiment that favored the tight control placed on the press. The military did little to accommodate journalists, and the American public also favored the strict guidelines on the press. The Persian Gulf War did show was the press may be able to do little to change the military's stand on press restrictions. The press complained and even filed a lawsuit to obtain access to information, but all the work done by the press did not accomplish much. The lawsuit was unsuccessful and the military gave little ground.

Of course during and after the Persian Gulf War, much was written about the actual fighting and strategy in waging the war. The new hi-tech weapons the United States was using also received coverage. After the war the plight of the Kurds in Iraq, the Kuwaiti oil-well fires, the rebuilding of Kuwait, and the terms of the cease fire dominated the news. Then as quickly as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait dominated the headlines, the news of Operation Desert Storm disappeared from the pages of newspapers. But press restrictions and pool journalism seem to be the way the military has decided to treat the press in future wars.

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Appendices

Appendix A

A Persian Gulf War Chronology²⁷⁴

July 1990

- 17 - Saddam Hussein accuses the U.S. and the Gulf states of conspiring to cut oil prices.
- 18 - Saddam Hussein openly threatens to use force against Arab oil-exporting nations if they do not curb their excess production.
- 25 - Bush Administration says U.S. has dispatched two aerial refueling planned to United Arab Emirates and sent combat ships to sea in a rare exercise with Persian Gulf nations after Iraq threatens military force.
- 27 - OPEC raises oil target price.

August 1990

- 2 - Iraqi troops cross Kuwaiti border.
- 3 - UN votes to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
- 3 - Iraq asserts it is aiding popular uprising in Kuwait and assembles troops in on Saudi Arabian border.
- 5 - European Community embargo on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait.
- 6 - Bush demands total Iraqi withdrawal.
- 7 - UN orders trade and financial boycott of Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
- 8 - Bush sends thousands of paratroopers, an armored brigade, and jet fighters to Saudi Arabia.
- 9 - Iraq formally declares Kuwait annexed.
- 10 - U.S. and allies announce naval blockade of Iraq.

²⁷⁴ This chronology of events was taken from *Seeing Through the Media* by Susan Jeffords and Lauren Rabinovitz and from *Taken by Storm* by W. Lance Bennett and David L. Patatz.

- 10 - Iraq orders foreign governments to close their embassies in Kuwait.
- 11 - First Egyptian troops arrive in Saudi Arabia.
- 13 - Bush orders U.S. military to block exports of Iraqi oil and of all imports to Iraq except some food shipments.
- 13 - First press pools arrive in Saudi Arabia.
- 15 - Iran-Iraq war formally ends.
- 16 - Iran announces use of "human shields."
- 17 - Ten of thousands of American troops land in Saudi Arabia in largest American troop deployment since Vietnam.
- 22 - U.S. calls up 22,000 reservists.
- 23- Bush signs order putting 40,000 reservists on active duty by end of the month.
- 26 - UN adopts resolution giving U.S. and others right to enforce economic embargo.
- 26 - Pentagon disbands press pools.
- 27 - OPEC votes 10-1 to increase oil production.

September 1990

- 2 - Iraq releases 700 foreign women and children it had been preventing from leaving the country.
- 4 - U.S. secretly deploys combat aircraft in several Persian Gulf nations to help defend Saudi Arabia.
- 9 - Bush and Gorbachev arrive in Helsinki for summit on crisis.
- 11 - ABC obtains and broadcasts Iraqi transcript of a July 25, 1990 meeting between April Glaspie and Saddam Hussein.
- 11 - Bush addresses Congress on his actions.
- 19 - Iraq seizes all assets of nations complying with UN sanctions against Iraq.

26 - UN votes to extend economic blockade to include air traffic.

October 1990

1 - Bush addresses the UN.

3 - Saddam Hussein visits Kuwait and speaks to troops.

3 - Senate approves resolution that supports Bush's actions so far in the Gulf.

9 - Bush administration shuts down government for a day due to budget impasse.

13 - UN approves compromise resolution condemning Israel for violence in Jerusalem that resulted in Palestinian deaths and injuries.

18 - Senate Foreign Relations Committee members demand that Bush get congressional approval before any military attack on Iraq.

24 - Bush is politically weakened by budget crisis, which becomes an issue in midterm election campaign.

25 - Congressional leaders reserve the right to reconvene Congress in case Bush administration decides to go to war against Iraq.

25 - Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announces another 100,000 troops will be sent to Saudi Arabia. U.S. reservist active duty is increased from 180 to 360 days.

28 - Republican candidates damaged by Bush concessions in budget talks.

30 - UN approves resolution warning of further, unspecified measures unless Iraq withdraws from Kuwait.

November 1990

3 - Secretary of State James Baker embarks on a seven-nation tour to establish coalition force.

5 - Defense Department decides to call up major combat units from reserves, totalling thousands of troops, to join troops in Persian Gulf in next few months.

6 - Election day: Democrats gain in Congress.

8 - Pentagon announces that Bush administration will send at least 100,000 additional troops to Gulf by late December, bringing total to approximately 350,000.

8 - Bush announces a shift from a "defensive position to an "offensive military option."

9 - Bush orders more than 150,000 additional American ground, sea and air forces to Gulf area to provide "adequate offensive military option."

10 - Formal U.S. military plans are drawn up to envelop Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

14 - Bush urged by both parties to convene special session of Congress on Gulf crisis.

15 - Bush assures Congress he would consult with it before using force in Gulf.

22 - Britain's Prime Minister Margret Thatcher resigns.

28 - John Major becomes the new British prime minister.

29 - UN Resolution 678 establishes January 15, 1991, as the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and authorizes "all necessary means" thereafter to effect withdrawal.

December 1990

1 - Bush invites Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz of Iraq to Washington.

5 - House Democrats adopt nonbinding policy statement that Bush should not initiate offensive military action in Gulf without formal approval of Congress.

7 - Saddam Hussein says he will free all foreigners held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait.

10 - More than 1,000 foreigners leave Iraq.

January 1991

3 - NATO to send three squadrons of jet fighters to Turkey to strengthen its border with Iraq.

4 - The 102nd Congress convenes.

- 5 - Iraq accepts U.S. offer for meeting in Geneva between Secretary Baker and foreign Minister Tariq Aziz,
- 5 - Senate sets debate on Gulf War resolution.
- 7 - Saddam Hussein tells his armed forces to prepare for war.
- 7 - An U.S. public opinion poll indicated that almost two-thirds of Americans favored the use of force if that is what it took to solve the crisis in the Gulf.
- 9 - Bush calls on Congress to adopt resolution supporting use of force against Iraq if it does not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15.
- 11 - Congress begins debating resolution supporting force in Gulf.
- 12 - Congress, by a slim majority in Senate and a solid majority in House appears ready to authorize Bush attack on Iraq.
- 13 - Congress approves military action in Gulf by votes in Senate (52-47), and House (250-183).
- 14 - UN secretary meets with Saddam Hussein.
- 14 - The Pentagon issues official guidelines to the media.
- 15 - Iraqi Parliament votes unanimously to follow Saddam Hussein into combat with U.S.
- 15 - Bush gives written authority for military action.
- 16 - U.S. deadline expires at midnight EST.
- 17 - U.S. and allies open drive to oust Iraq from Kuwait with night air strikes.
- 18 - Saddam Hussein launches missile attack against Israel.
- 18 - Bush warns the media about overoptimism.
- 18 - An U.S. opinion poll shows more than four-fifths of Americans support the Desert Storm effort and that more than two-thirds of Americans disapprove of antiwar protests.

- 19 - Most foreign journalists are expelled from Iraq; CNN's Peter Arnett remains in Baghdad.
- 20 - Iraq displays seven captured coalition pilots on Iraqi television.
- 21 - CBS's Bob Simon and his three-person crew disappear on Kuwaiti-Saudi border.
- 21 - First Kuwaiti oil fields reported set on fire.
- 23 - Iraq continues Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia.
- 23 - Iraq begins publishing footage of civilian damage.
- 26 - Iraq releases millions of gallons of Kuwaiti crude oil into Persian Gulf.
- 28 - Iraq issues warnings of worldwide terrorist action.
- 29 - More than 80 Iraqi planes fly to Iran.
- 29 - Iraqis attack Khafji, a Saudi Arabian city near the border of Kuwait.
- 30 - Eleven U.S. Marines killed, the first casualties of the ground war.
- 30 - CNN begins live broadcasts of pictures from Iraq.
- 31 - More than 20,000 reservists are called up as part of deployment of Individual Ready Reserves.
- 31 - Coalition forces retake Khafji.

February 1991

- 2 - Western journalists still remaining in Iraq are taken to civilian damage sites.
- 3 - New media-coalition guidelines are arranged.
- 7 - Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.) calls Peter Arnett a "sympathizer" with Iraq.
- 11 - Two major broadcast network executives accuse CNN of making concessions to Iraqis in exchange for special access.
- 12 - The largest combined air-, sea- and land-based shelling of the war is initiated by the coalition forces.

- 14 - Peter Arnett says he is not under the thumb of Iraqi censors.
- 19 - House rushes to pass bill to help troops deal with economic hardships at home.
- 21 - Ground war begins; more than 450 Iraqi prisoners of war are taken.
- 25 - Over 600 oil fields are left burning as Iraqis begin evacuation.
- 27 - Iraqi troops retreat across Kuwait; allied forces enter Kuwait City.
- 28 - Bush says he has ordered halt to offensive combat in Gulf War; says "Kuwait is liberated" and Iraq's army defeated.

March 1991

- 2 - Bob Simon and three others from CBS crew are freed; they report that they were beaten and accused of spying during captivity.
- 3 - UN approves resolution effectively endorsing Bush's call for allied troops to remain in Gulf until Iraq complies with his peace terms.
- 6 - Baghdad radio reports that Saddam Hussein has voided annexation of Kuwait.
- 6 - Forces loyal to Saddam Hussein begin suppression of Kurdish insurrection.
- 8 - House votes 380-19 to appropriate \$15 billion to pay for Gulf War. Democrats join Bush in celebrating victory.
- 11 - U.S. troops begin to return from Gulf.
- 14 - House approves benefit package of veterans.
- 15 - Senate approves benefit package for veterans but is less generous than House.
- 19 - Senator Simpson extends a qualified apology to Peter Arnett.
- 20 - Senate approves \$15 billion in appropriations for Gulf War.
- 21 - April Glaspie appears before Senate committee.
- 22 - Kurdish rebels claim military victory in Kirkuk, Iran, in campaign to topple Saddam Hussein.

23 - UN Security Council lifts embargo on food supplies to Iraq.

26 - Bush declines to intervene in Iraqi civil war.

27 - Bush decides to let Saddam Hussein put down rebellions in his country without American intervention.

April 1991

1 - U.S. Army will begin withdrawing about 20,000 troops from southern Iraq within two weeks.

4 - UN approves resolution that offers to end Gulf War and progressively lift most sanctions against Iraq if Saddam Hussein accepts series of tough military and financial conditions.

7 - Iraq accepts without condition UN terms for formal cease-fire in Gulf War.

18 - A U.S. federal judge dismisses a lawsuit filed in January by a group of news organizations against the Defense Department challenging the constitutionality of press restrictions.

22 - General Schwarzkopf returns home.


May 1991

7 - General Schwarzkopf addresses joint session of Congress.

10 - U.S. reaches agreement with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf governments about storing of American military equipment and other steps to maintain a long-term military presence in the region.

Appendix B

Map of the Persian Gulf War Zone²⁷⁵



²⁷⁵ This map was taken from *The Media and the Gulf War* edited by Hedrick Smith.

VITA

Robin Hardin was born January 1, 1970, in Elizabethton, Tenn. He attended public schools in the Elizabethton City School System and graduated from Elizabethton High School in 1988. He then started attending East Tennessee State University in Johnson City, Tenn., in January of 1989. In September of 1990, his National Guard unit, the 776th Maintenance Company, was activated for duty in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. After serving nine months in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in support of the war, he was released from active duty in May of 1991. He then finished his studies at ETSU and received a Bachelor's degree in Mass Communications in August of 1993. He enrolled at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville in August 1994 and earned his Master's degree in Communication in May of 1996.