



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
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A Cold War Army of Occupation?
The U.S. Army in Vienna, 1945-1948

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Ralph W. Brown III
May 1995

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation acknowledges that although from an international perspective the relationship between the Americans and Soviets in Vienna was relatively trouble-free, at the ground-level American-Soviet contact not only failed to escape the chill of the Cold War but at times could be the setting for deadly conflict. Despite an initial brief period of harmony and later outward appearances to the contrary, American-Soviet relations in Vienna rapidly declined after World War II and, by 1948, had degenerated into the beginnings of a covert struggle which saw the Americans reacting to Soviet authorities kidnapping people off the streets of the city.

The scholarly research which relates to this topic can be divided into two main areas of research. The first area generally concerns Austria under American occupation, focusing upon topics such as the American role in revitalizing Austrian political life, organizational histories of the American military government in Austria, and the relaxation of American control over the Austrians due to the pressures of the Cold War. The second area concerns the Austrian question on the international level. Here scholars intensively study the problems and successes of the Allied mission in Austria and its relationship to the Cold War.

This work fills a significant gap in the work on Austria under Allied occupation since heretofore there has been no study done from the viewpoint of the soldiers at the ground-level. It is not the argument of this dissertation that these incidents alone caused the Cold War conflict, but rather that they were part of a complex reciprocal process in which local tensions and outside pressure together weakened and finally destroyed

the original alliance between the Americans and the Soviets. Certainly, the Americans initially viewed the Red Army in Vienna as an allied force and the Austrians as a defeated enemy. Sustained American contact with both peoples comes to reverse this view. Most significantly, these conflicts in Vienna illustrated the different political and cultural backgrounds of American and Soviet military men and the practical difficulties facing any attempt to continue the wartime Grand Alliance.

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Introduction

During the early days of the Allied occupation of Vienna, relations between the Americans and Soviets in the city were usually remarkably cordial, allowing for everything from volleyball matches between American and Soviet soldiers to the establishment of the city's famous International Patrols. Certainly both the Americans and the Soviets distrusted the Austrians, a recently defeated common enemy. In this context, General Mark W. Clark, commander of American forces in Austria, initially attempted to accommodate his Soviet opposite in many matters such as establishing an Allied Council for Austria on Soviet and not British terms and accepting Soviet face saving measures against the newly created Austrian government.

Yet, as even Austrian historian Manfred Rauchensteiner has pointed out, Vienna under Allied occupation became the grimly exotic setting for the famous film adaptation of Graham Greene's The Third Man¹ and, during the 1950's, a notorious nest of spies from around the world. Though the situation in Berlin was outwardly far more dramatic, an examination of events in Vienna from the ground-level suggests that American-Soviet relations in Vienna not only failed to escape the chill of the Cold War but could at times be the setting for deadly conflict. Despite the superficial appearance of continued good relations between Americans and Soviets in the city, by the late 1940's, one U.S. serviceman and an American civilian official had lost their lives to soldiers in Soviet uniforms. As for

¹Manfred Rauchensteiner, "Die Wiener Interalliierte Kommandantur, 1945-1955," in Jahrbuch des Vereins für Geschichte der Stadt Wien (1977). p.417.

incidents between American and Soviet soldiers which only produced injuries, the Americans attributed such relatively benign outcomes not to good relations but to good fortune. As a result, for many Americans in Vienna, living close to the Soviets proved anything but comfortable. In American eyes, the Soviets rapidly went from being comrades-in-arms to paranoid and secretive totalitarians who marched in lock step to the orders of a tyrant. Certainly, American fears of a blockade and the Soviet practice of kidnapping even women and old men off the streets of Vienna put the Americans in the city on the front lines of the Cold War. Undoubtedly the decline in international relations between the two powers worsened relations between the Americans and Soviets in Vienna, yet at the ground level daily contact with the Soviets produced its own problems, giving the Americans in the city plenty of reasons for a distrustful Cold War view of the Soviets. Thus, the American-Soviet Cold War in Vienna was a complex reciprocal process, in which outside pressure and ground-level pressure produced tensions in the city.

To understand the decline of relations in Vienna and the changing American view of the Soviets, several basic questions concerning the American role in the Austrian occupation need to be addressed. In the year of Allied victory, what was the American military's view of the Soviets, and did this view influence policy? Certainly, American and Soviet military men brought with them to Vienna a vastly different set of intellectual baggage. Would, as historian Wilfred Loth has suggested, the essentially different backgrounds of American and Soviet military men partly contribute to the growing

irreconcilable divisions between the two Allied armies?²³
The difficulties of simply maintaining the city on a subsistence level must have been immense. This elementary but thorny problem inevitably illuminated such irreconcilable divisions. The different ideological and national perspectives may be most fruitfully analyzed by studying the sometimes touchy relations between members of the International Patrol, common American and Red Army soldiers, as well as in the clashes between the Americans and Soviets over the Soviet kidnapping campaign of Eastern Europeans or Austrians who operated as American informants.

An investigation of the initial American policy regarding the Austrians and the Soviets in Austria will be the focus of chapter one. This entails a discussion of the views of the Anglo-American contingent of the first Western reconnaissance mission to Soviet occupied Vienna in June 1945. Since policy is not implemented in the abstract world of ideas, the question of how American military men first viewed both the Austrians and the Soviets is important. Was the basic thrust of early American policy in Austria anti-Soviet or anti-Austrian? Following war with the Third Reich, what approach would have been more likely? Also, what was the American reaction to Austrian stories concerning the rapes of thousands of Viennese women by the Red Army?

Chapter two deals with the sometimes self-contradictory American policy and view of the Soviets in Austria. Why did the Americans adopt a Vienna zone and an airfield in the midst of the Soviet Zone? What was General Mark W. Clark's early view of the Soviets? Did Clark view the Soviets in 1945 as untrustworthy

²Wilfred Loth, The Division of the World, 1941-1955 (London: Routledge, 1988), p.85.

opponents in Austria, or did he take a more moderate view? Did Soviet actions transform Clark's thinking concerning the Soviets and the Austrians? The American general shaped policy in Austria, yet in examining his later published works, Clark made two contradictory claims: first, he portrayed himself as a Cold Warrior from his early days in Austria, and second, he claimed to have attempted to cooperate with his Soviet opposite in Vienna. Part of the task of this chapter will be to decide which of his contradictory courses Clark pursued in 1945-1946.

In order to have a full sense of the difficulties facing the city during the three and a half years following the demise of the Nazi regime, chapter three will examine the difficult economic and social conditions found in post-war Vienna. Did differing conceptions about how the people of Vienna should be treated and whether they could be redeemed from the sin of Nazism spark conflict between the two Allies? With the city facing the threat of starvation, the rise of a black market economy, and uncontrolled crime, what approach did the Americans take to these problems, and what approach did the Soviets take?

Finally, chapter four will attempt to bring out specific examples of sustained ground-level contact, beginning with the establishment and early operations of the International Patrols. Also, this chapter attempts to highlight a number of American-Soviet difficulties in the city, including the problem of Soviet interference with American trains to Vienna, incidents between Allied soldiers, Austrian protests in the city, and the influence of worsening international relations on the situation in Vienna. Why did the Soviets allow the Western Allies to continue traveling between Vienna and the Western Zones, and did the Western Allies fear a blockade of the city would be undertaken? What was the

American response to the Soviet kidnapping of civilians in the Austrian capital during 1948, and did these actions help spark the beginnings of a covert war which revealed that the situation in Vienna could be deadly for those caught in the conflict between East and West? At this point, the dissertation will conclude by answering this question: was the American Army in Vienna actually a Cold War Army of occupation?

Though many historians and political scientists are devoting increasing attention to various aspects of the postwar Allied occupation of Germany, including the development of Cold War conflict at the ground-level, only a comparatively small number of scholars have yet considered Austria under Allied occupation.³ Of this group, the Austrian historian Josef Leidenfrost, the American historian Donald R. Whitnah, and the political scientist Kurt K. Tweraser are the only scholars to have recently focused directly upon the changing role of the American military in Allied occupied Austria during the Cold War.

Josef Leidenfrost exhaustively examined the influence of American occupation forces on Austrian political development immediately following the Second World War, but revealed little interest in directly discussing the American military's evolving view of the Soviets.⁴ Instead, he explored the American military government's role in the revival of Austrian political life and the early implementation of American denazification in the U.S. Zone within the context of

³For an example of a study which focuses on the American military's application of policy and ground-level relations with the Soviets in occupied Germany, see Gilbert Eugene Jones, "The Allied Reconstruction of the Berlin Police, 1945-1948" University of California, San Diego, PhD. diss., 1986.

⁴Josef Leidenfrost, "Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht und der Wiederbeginn des Politischen Lebens in Österreich, 1944-1947" University of Vienna, Phil. diss., 1986.

the emerging Cold War. Given Leidenfrost's approach, his two volume dissertation produced for the University of Vienna used almost exclusively as its primary source material American diplomatic records, Austrian records not being necessary. These records were drawn mainly from the thick files of the "General Records of the Department of State" and the American "Vienna Legation Files."

Donald R. Whitnah also made use of American records as his primary sources for his two works concerning the American occupation of Austria.⁵ In his first work, written with co-author Edgar L. Erickson, Whitnah produced a narrative organizational history, focusing on planning for the occupation and going into little depth concerning Allied relations. In Whitnah's second work, an account of Salzburg under American control written with the help of his Austrian-born wife, he produced an interesting memoir concerning Salzburg after the war. Unfortunately, as James F. Tent, an American historian of the occupation of Germany, has pointed out, Whitnah neglected to draw upon American military government documents found in the U.S. National Archives.⁶ As in his earlier work, Whitnah had little to say regarding the rise of American-Soviet antagonisms in Austria,

⁵Donald R. Whitnah & Edgar L. Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria: Planning & Early Years (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), and Donald R. Whitnah & Florentine Whitnah, Salzburg Under Siege: U.S. Occupation, 1945-1955 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991).

⁶James F. Tent's review of the Whitnahs' Salzburg Under Siege can be found in the Journal of American History vol. 79, no.2 (September 1992): p.724. For a sometimes useful guide to American archival sources relating to occupied Austria see Robert Wolfe, "Records of the U.S. Occupation Forces in Austria, 1945-1955." Also, Robert Knight produced a helpful guide to British records in the PRO, see his "The Main Records of the Public Record Office for Post-War Austria." Both guides are in Günter Bischof and Josef Leidenfrost, Die bevormundete Nation Österreich und die Alliierten, 1945-1949 (Innsbruck, Hayman-Verlag, 1988).

focusing instead on internal problems within the American occupation force. Although Whitnah drew upon American military records, such as the papers of American General Mark W. Clark and records in the U.S. National Archives for his work with Erickson, in the main he derived the bulk of his work from an earlier study produced by Erickson concerning the Army's Civil Affairs Division in Austria.⁷

Most recently, Kurt K. Tweraser published an article concerning the American use of military justice as a policy instrument in Austria.⁸ Like Leidenfrost and Whitnah, Tweraser relied upon American primary sources, though in his case he turned to the many military government records found in the U.S. National Archives. In approaching his topic, Tweraser took care to fit his essay into the theme earlier developed by others in the field such as Leidenfrost, demonstrating how the Austrians moved from complete American military government control to more autonomy partly as a result of the Cold War.

In addition to Leidenfrost, Whitnah, and Tweraser, other historians have taken an interest in Austria under Allied occupation from the perspective of international diplomacy. This group, however, barely has touched upon the actual conduct of the American occupation force, and has not been particularly concerned with viewing the

⁷Unfortunately Whitnah's method of citation is no longer useful since the American military records relating to Austria in the National Archives have apparently been reorganized in recent years. Fortunately, I received help in finding records in the National Archives from Dr. Robert W. Kesting. In the early 1990s he was producing finding aids to records relating to Austria and the Holocaust for the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum which proved extremely useful to my own work.

⁸Kurt K. Tweraser, "Military Justice as an Instrument of American Occupation Policy in Austria 1945-1950: From Total Control to Limited Tutelage," Austrian Studies Yearbook, vol. XXIV (1993).

occupation from the perspective of the American military in Austria. Instead, they focused on Austria's role in the larger Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, the special path Austria took towards neutrality during the Cold War, or Austrian actions to promote their own interests.⁹

As for other scholars who have considered the Austrian question, diplomatic historian Günter Bischof has pointed out that many have tended in general to identify and confuse the situation within Austria's borders with that of next-door Germany. The result is that when mentioned, Austria under occupation has for years simply been regarded as a minor "sub-German" problem.¹⁰ Certainly, with the exception of Austrian historian Manfred Rauchensteiner, scholars have neglected to even examine the actions of the Allies in the Austrian capital. Rauchensteiner, who has written the one scholarly article concerning the Allies in Vienna, spends little time focusing on the emergence of ground-level American-Soviet tensions during the years immediately following the Second World War; instead, he portrays relations between the Allies in the Vienna Kommandatura as calm compared to relations in Berlin. It is interesting to note that Rauchensteiner's approach involved using almost exclusively American diplomatic records to discuss relations within the Allied

⁹William B. Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966); Audrey Kurth Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit Österreich 1945 bis 1955, (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1979); and Günter Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation: Austria in International Politics, 1940-1950" Harvard University, Ph.D. diss., 1989.

¹⁰Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," pp. xx & 624; Richard Hiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p.57.

Kommandatura in Vienna. He concluded that Vienna escaped much of the chill of the Cold War.¹¹

As a result, on the surface, Vienna under Allied occupation appeared to be a point of sustained contact between American and Soviet forces which was not particularly tension-filled. At its best, for some outside observers like American journalists, Vienna even seemed to allow for the development of a real and lasting friendship between the two Allied peoples, thereby bridging a small part of the political and cultural gap which separated them. When the topic of Vienna was discussed during 1948, American journalists generally focused upon the unique International Patrols or "Four men in the Jeep," one from each of the World War II Allied Powers, which symbolized the continuation of a level of harmony between East and West and was in stark contrast to the situation that developed in Berlin. According to American correspondent John Gunther, the Austrian capital was "probably . . . the only place in the world where Americans and Russians still work together closely with fairly harmonious relations." He went so far as to claim that "the barrier to good relations on a local level is neither intrinsic nor insuperable." The only necessary ingredient for cooperation was "intelligent leadership" on the part of Vienna's military overlords.¹² In short, in Vienna little significant tension appeared to have plagued Allied relations, so that the wartime Allies continued ostensibly to tolerate each other's presence in the city.¹³

¹¹Manfried Rauchensteiner, "Die Wiener Interalliierte Kommandantur, 1945-1955."

¹²John Gunther, Behind the Curtain (New York: Harper & Brothers 1949), p.290.

¹³Ernest O. Hauser, "Vienna Isn't Berlin--Yet," The Saturday Evening Post (November 13, 1948), p.27. Also, Andy Logan, "Letter

A brief comparison of Allied relations in Berlin with relations in Vienna seems to bring home the argument for a milder Cold War in Austria. Though the Americans in Austria's capital, like their counterparts in Berlin, found themselves stationed deep within a Soviet Zone, they never faced a comparable Soviet blockade. At the Allied Commission level, the tenor of Allied relations between the Allied commanders in Vienna remained correct. As a British member of the Allied Commission's Political Division in Vienna recounted, "The atmosphere in which the Austrian Commission worked was totally different, as visitors from Germany . . . were quick to notice."¹⁴ Most important, in Vienna the Soviet Commissioner continued to meet with the other Allied Commissioners throughout the Berlin crisis.

In addition, Vienna differed from Berlin in its size and organization. As Vienna was a smaller city than Berlin, communication between the Allies in Vienna was easier, undoubtedly forestalling some misunderstandings. Perhaps most important, Vienna contained an international zone in the city center known as the Erster Bezirk (first district) or Innere Stadt, the medieval core of the Austrian capital. Here, the four Allies alternated control on a regular basis throughout the occupation decade. Outside the Innere Stadt, Vienna had six different sectors or zones--one American, two British, one French, and two Soviet--but these remained undivided from one another. Also, the two western airfields, Tulln and Schwechat, were located outside the city in the Soviet zone. Significantly for

From Vienna, " The New Yorker (November 20, 1948), p.76. For contrasting view see John MacCormac, "U.S., Soviet Troops at Odds in Austria," The New York Times, February 8, 1948.

¹⁴Michael Balfour & John Mair, Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp.314-5.

American-Soviet relations, according to an Allied agreement, the Western Allies had unrestricted transit rights to their two airports and, just as important, to their own Austrian Zones from Vienna.¹⁵

Other reasons can be found for the relative calm relations between the Americans and Soviets in Vienna. Despite the quadripartite occupation and division of Austria, the country had a government which exerted considerable influence, though without sovereignty, throughout the occupation period, 1945-1955. The Austrians were also fortunate that a number of important agreements between the Allies which shaped the second republic's postwar history took place prior to the complete deterioration of American-Soviet relations.¹⁶ For instance, in November 1945 the Allies allowed the Austrians to elect a new government, while in June 1946 a Second Control Agreement granted substantial authority to this recently installed Austrian central government.

From the standpoint of political realism, the most significant reason for surface calm in Vienna was that Germany and not Austria was the key to both Soviet and Western plans for Europe.¹⁷ Quite clearly, though Austria held a strategic location in Europe and traditionally influenced Central Europe, it remained a minor player in deciding the continent's fate. During the occupation, one observer went so far as to dub Austria a "sideshow" in the emerging superpower struggle.¹⁸ Without a doubt, as the Cold War began, both sides tended to be cautious in risking their prestige over a country of secondary importance. In short, for both America and the Soviet Union, Austria was not a

¹⁵Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.129.

¹⁶Bader, Austria Between East and West, p.58.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Gunther, Behind the Curtain, p.296.

prize worth risking a general war.¹⁹ As a result, during the Cold War era few headline-grabbing American-Soviet incidents occurred in Austria prior to the signing of the State Treaty in 1955. Then, the Austrian settlement came to be seen as a possible model for solving the German predicament.

This investigation will focus upon the unfolding of ground-level American-Soviet relations in Vienna, 1945-1948. It acknowledges that on the international level relations between the Allies in Vienna were relatively mild, but argues that under this calm surface there was another face to American-Soviet relations in the Austrian capital. For primary source material, it draws mainly upon largely untapped military and diplomatic records relating to Austria found in the U.S. National Archives, The Citadel Archives, Boston University's Mugar Library, The U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, the British Public Record Office, and the George C. Marshall Library. In addition, a number of Army intelligence documents have been obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. In approach, an attempt will be made to view the situation in Vienna thorough the eyes of participants of the day rather than through the lens of later experience. This dissertation is not primarily a study of the influence of Washington and Moscow on events in Vienna. A thorough examination of the various twists and turns of American, British, and Soviet diplomatic policy during the first five years of the occupation can be found in Günter Bischof's two volume dissertation produced for Harvard University. As with other recent works on the occupation period, this study does not claim to be a comprehensive account of

¹⁹Robert L. Ferring, "The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War," The Western Political Quarterly XXI (December 1968): p.651.

the occupation, nor a study of Austrian domestic affairs after World War II. Also, it omits the British and French experience in Vienna. Instead, this dissertation hopes to use the example of American-Soviet ground-level relations in Vienna as an illustration of the fundamental cultural and political differences which divided the American and Soviet peoples immediately following World War II and helped produce the heretofore overlooked ground-level tensions in the city.

Chapter I

The Vienna Mission: A First American Look at Vienna
Under Soviet Occupation, June 1945

Introduction

Though on a diplomatic level the collapse of the Third Reich heralded an end of the "Grand Alliance," U.S. Army officers in Central Europe during the spring and summer of 1945 viewed the Austrians and the Soviets through the lens of wartime experience. Accordingly, inasmuch as they considered the matter, most American military men generally admired their Red Army counterparts as fellow crusaders against Nazism and remained suspicious of all things German, which to their minds included the Austrians. Combined with such wartime feeling, American policy and practical necessity ensured that the Army's entry into Austria was not so much an Army of liberation as a conquering force bent upon punishing and then rehabilitating an enemy people.

A clear illustration of this early American approach can be found by examining the reports of the first Western reconnaissance mission to visit Vienna in June 1945. Determined to avoid manipulation by the Viennese and under strict orders to cooperate with the Soviets, the Americans who took part in the Vienna mission usually disbelieved or thought greatly exaggerated Austrian accounts of Red Army atrocities during the city's liberation. In the cases where the Americans reluctantly acknowledged Red Army terrorism of the city's civilians, many believed that the Austrians had simply to accept the harsh consequences of war and, in some cases, even deserved severe punishment. By comparison, though also distrustful of the Austrians,

the British officers generally entered and left the city somewhat more suspicious of the Soviets.

Even for the Americans, over a week of direct contact between the Western Allies and their Soviet allies was not without difficulty, particularly when it came to inspecting airfields in the Vienna area. Also, the Americans took note that the Soviets had a radically different approach to dealing with the most elemental questions and that a political and cultural chasm separated their two peoples. Still, the Americans returned from Vienna believing that the spirit of Allied friendship far outweighed political and cultural differences, differences which only later would help to weaken the wartime friendship in Vienna. Most significant, for the moment, the Soviets seemed generally cooperative, and the Viennese remained in the camp of defeated American enemies.

The Soviets Take Vienna, April 1945

As late as March 1945, Adolf Hitler somehow hoped to block the Red Army's drive toward his Ostmark.¹ To do so, Hitler ordered eleven of his few remaining Panzer divisions, which included the famous 6th S.S. Panzer Army under Sepp Dietrich, to retake the Hungarian capital of Budapest. Beginning the offensive to the southeast of Vienna around the Hungarian Lake Balaton, the Wehrmacht briefly repulsed Stalin's army, but the drive collapsed by mid-month. Then, Marshal Fedor I. Tolbukhin's 3rd Ukrainian Front with the aid of Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky's 2nd Ukrainian Front resumed the Soviet march on the former Austro-Hungarian frontier.

¹Austria had been effectively part of the Third Reich since the March 1938 Anschluss. At this time, Austria officially became known as Alpen-und Donau-Reichsgaue and unofficially as Alpen-und Donau-land.

After a fierce fight, the Red Army became the first Allied force to cross into Austria. With German resistance now crumbling, Soviet troops continued to press forward and to close upon the former Habsburg capital of Vienna.²

Unknown in the West at the time, in early April anti-Nazi Austrian staff officers of the Vienna Wehrkreiskommando (district defense command) sent two "peace envoys" to establish secret contact with the rapidly advancing 3rd Ukrainian Front.³ After discussions, the Soviet military and the Austrian resistance devised a plan for the city's liberation from the west, not the east. Austrian resistance elements received instructions to seize public buildings and clear a way of entry for the Soviet Army.⁴ Also, Viennese socialists were to spark civil unrest in various Bezirke (districts) in Vienna. Then, as the socialists and disaffected military struck, Austrian assassination squads would "rub out Sepp Dietrich." Unfortunately, before the plan could be completely carried out, German counterintelligence captured, executed, and then left on public display two leading members of the Wehrkreiskommando resistance group.⁵

²Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (London: Arthur Baker, Ltd., 1971), pp.554-8. For a history of the 6th S.S. Panzer Army see Georg Maier, Drama zwischen Budapest und Wien. Der Endkampf Der 6. Panzerarmee 1945 (Osnabrück: Munin-Verlag GmbH, 1985).

³S. M. Shtemenko, The Last Six Months: Russia's Final Battles with Hitler's Armies in World War II, trans., Guy Daniels (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1977), p.328.

⁴Reinhold Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria: The Political Reports & Analysis of Martin F. Herz, Political Officer of the U.S. Legation in Vienna, 1945-1948 (Salzburg: Verlag GesmbH, 1984), p.62 & "Intelligence Summary," no. 20, 20 Oct 1945, folder: 51, box 6, USFA Historical File, Record Group 260, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NA-RG 260).

⁵Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p.62. Also see Shtemenko, The Last Six Months, pp.327-331.

Though confusion remains to this day, the Red Army next seems to have made contact with Communist elements of the Austrian resistance in Vienna. By doing so, Soviet forces managed to avoid the German defensive lines to the west of the city along the Hütteldorferstrasse.⁶ Several days of intense street fighting followed which involved severe artillery exchanges and, at times, fierce hand-to-hand fighting.⁷ In the course of the battle for Vienna, an unknown number of Viennese resistance fighters, deserters, and foreign workers aided Soviet troops against the Wehrmacht. Also, the Austrian resistance claimed credit for a number of anti-German acts that ranged from cutting wire communications with Berlin and removing the detonators from demolition charges on the Reichsbrücke, the main bridge over the Danube, to the aiding of thousands of deserters from the Wehrmacht and Volkssturm.⁸

In the years to come the Austrians would proudly point to their actions against the Germans as evidence that they had contributed to Vienna's liberation. At the time, however, such efforts failed to win support or even acknowledgement from the Allies. Immediately after Vienna's liberation, the Red Army ordered the Austrian resistance to surrender all arms and refused to recognize it as a legitimate political group. As for the Austrians, a number of resistance fighters bitterly grumbled that during the fighting they had suffered some

⁶Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p.62.

⁷Bader, Austria Between East & West, p.12 & Red-White-Red Book: Descriptions and Proofs to the Antecedents and History of the Occupation of Austria (Form Official Sources) (Vienna: Austrian State Printing House, 1947), p.181. For an official Soviet view see, A. A. Grechko, ed., Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War, trans., David Fidlou (Moscow: Progress Pub., 1975), pp. 286-289.

⁸Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p.63.

1,000 casualties from mistaken attacks made on them by the Red Army.⁹ Far from Vienna, in April, the Anglo-American allies knew little of what had transpired during the liberation and were not particularly interested in the shadowy Austrian resistance. In the days to come only a few faint contacts would be made, and mystery continued to obscure the role of the Austrian resistance.¹⁰

During the battle and initial penetration of Soviet forces, Vienna, which had already suffered from American air bombardment, received a cannonade which caused extensive destruction. German S.S. artilleryman, perhaps enraged at seeing the famous St. Stephen's Cathedral fly a white flag, shelled and destroyed the church's ancient tiled roof.¹¹ The subsequent Soviet actions destroyed other buildings such as the renowned Burgtheatre which had survived the initial battle.¹² All this only began to become clear in the West several months later after the first American reconnaissance team inspected Vienna. Then, the American team reported that, though a few first class hotels remained in acceptable condition, most of the Innere Stadt had been badly damaged and many of the larger buildings needed

⁹Oliver Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik: Vertrauliche Berichte der US-Militäradministration aus Österreich 1945 in englischer Originalfassung (Vienna: Hermann Böhlau Nachf, 1985), p.285.

¹⁰According to Fritz Molden, an Austrian who served with American forces and was a member of the Austrian resistance outside the country, the Austrian resistance in the West just barely made contact with Austrians in Vienna in late April. See his, Exploding Star: A Young Austrian Against Hitler, trans., Peter & Betty Ross (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1979), p.254.

¹¹Some attribute the cause of the St. Stephen's fire to the Red Army.

¹²Richard Hiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp.17-18.

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extensive repairs.¹³ Also, the city's southeast side had been particularly hard hit, and a considerable portion of the entire city had been completely destroyed.¹⁴

In April, as the Red Army had fought its way into the city, Marshal Tolbukhin issued a proclamation which sought to reassure the war-weary people of Vienna that Soviet intentions were noble. He claimed that the Red Army had "entered the territory of Austria . . . solely with the aim of defeating the inimical German fascist forces and liberating Austria from dependence on Germany." Attempting to play upon the cultural differences between the Austrians and the Germans, Tolbukhin maintained that the Red Army was "waging a war on the German aggressors and not the inhabitants of Austria." Then, he urged the Viennese to join the Red Army in "the cause of liberating Austria from the German fascist yoke!"¹⁵

In part, Tolbukhin's address to the Austrians derived from the earlier 1943 Moscow Declaration. At that time, the Allies had agreed that Austria was "the first free country to fall victim" to "Hitlerite aggression." They had decided that the German-speaking Austrians would be "liberated" and ultimately treated more leniently than their northern neighbors. The "Big Three," however, also had stipulated that Austria must be held accountable for supporting the Nazi war effort and, therefore, "in the final settlement" notice would

¹³John Erhardt to the Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers 1945, vol. III, European Advisory Commission: Austria: Germany (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), (hereafter FRUS, EAC, vol. III), p. 143.

¹⁴Lester D. Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission (U.S. Contingent)," 15 June 1945, The Lester D. Flory Papers, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Penn. For the annexes to the Vienna mission report see, folder: 1945, box 1, Top Secret General Records, POLAD, Record Group 84, U.S. National Archives (hereafter NA-RG 84).

¹⁵Shtemenko, The Last Six Months, p.327.

"inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her [own] liberation."¹⁶ In April 1945, Tolbukhin seemed to forget the latter injunction and went beyond the Moscow Declaration by promising to the rank and file members of the National Socialist party in Austria that they would not be punished if they demonstrated their allegiance to Soviet troops.¹⁷ Here, the Soviet marshal foreshadowed his government's initial policy of attempting to win over the "small" Austrian Nazis to support the Soviet occupation.

In appealing directly to the Austrian people, Tolbukhin simply followed a theme developed by earlier Soviet propaganda pronouncements from Moscow which had sought to divide the supposed slavophile Austrians from the heartless Prussian-Germans. When discussing the latter, the Soviet press had declared that in the "new liberated Europe[,] the Germans will not succeed in repeating the hocus-pocus of the Versailles period." Come what may, they would not even be able to "hide their wolves' ears and claws under a grandmother social democratic kerchief." On the other hand, the Soviet press had regarded the Austrians as distinct from the Germans and even asserted that "the soft sound of a Slav language . . . seemed more familiar to the Austrians . . . than the 'snarling Prussian accent which betrays a cold and disdainful attitude towards the rest of

¹⁶Handbook for Military Government in Austria, found in the microfilm set Reports of the U.S. Military Government of Austria, 1945-1950 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1983). In Austria in World War II: An Anglo-American Dilemma (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), Robert H. Keyserlingk claims that the Moscow Declaration was merely wartime propaganda and that the United States and Great Britain had throughout the war regarded Austria as part of Germany.

¹⁷"General Distribution From Moscow to Foreign Office," 9 April 1945 Pravda, British Military Government, Civil Affairs & the Allied Commission for Austria (British Element), Foreign Office 1020/970, British Public Record Office (hereafter PRO-FO 1020).

humanity.'" Finally, Soviet propaganda had made ample use of historical rivalry between the two Germanic peoples and urged the Austrians "to fight in the spirit of Kunersdorf."¹⁸

Yet despite Tolbukhin's assurances and wartime propaganda, many Viennese soon found the Red Army "liberators" more akin to the invading Turks of centuries past. As had earlier been the case in the "liberated" countries of Eastern Europe, Red Army troops took the traditional view that they had the rights of conquest. The entering soldiers, "many of them the most primitive of Mongolians, unleashed a holocaust of rape and looting that terrified and alienated the population."¹⁹ Perhaps, as historian John Mair put it, these "primitive" soldiers' very lack of civilization had been a necessary ingredient for their victory over the Nazi Germany. Given the poor record of Red Army behavior in Eastern Europe, it was hardly surprising that after a long bitter campaign few Soviet soldiers now made distinctions between one German speaker and another.²⁰ Instead, they naturally continued to fight the "racial war" begun by Hitler. It is certain, moreover, that the Red Army had a policy of living off the land. Worsening the situation even more, Soviet soldiers in Vienna soon discovered the large stocks of wine and schnapps in many city cellars.²¹ Finally,

¹⁸"The Soviet Press and Germany, Austria." 28 March 1945, PRO-FO 1020/970. At Kunersdorf in 1759, Prussian King Frederick the Great suffered his worst defeat at the hands of an Austro-Russian force.

¹⁹Bader, Austria Between East & West, p.12. Though Austrian accounts of Red Army atrocities must be read with caution due to traditional anti-Slav feeling and Nazi propaganda, most sources indicate that the Red Army's liberation of Eastern Europe could be a quite brutal affair. For a differing view, see Rathkolb, Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik, p.268.

²⁰Mair, Four-Power Control in Austria, p.298.

²¹Hiscocks, Rebirth, p.17. Also see Rathkolb, Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik, p.285.

according to the Viennese, many Soviet soldiers sought to humiliate the highly cultured Viennese by taking special pleasure in "relieving themselves on the furniture and carpets of 'capitalists.'"²²

Even in Vienna's working class districts, the Red Army caused great havoc and made few comrades. According to one account, when Soviet soldiers entered working class housing projects, which had been constructed by the pre-Dollfuss socialist city government, they exclaimed, "'Ah, kapitalist!'" They did so because it was beyond their experience that anyone who was not part of the capitalist exploiting class "could live in the modest comfort--extravagant by Russian standards--that the Austrian workers had attained."²³ The effects of the Soviet liberation were long-lasting, and without a doubt the Austrian workers, whose apartments Red Army troops plundered and whose families men from the "Motherland of Socialism" abused, came to have little use for the Soviet supported Austrian Communist Party.²⁴ By the end of it all, the Viennese could be heard sarcastically remarking, "Austria . . . might possibly survive a third World War, but it would certainly not survive a second liberation."²⁵

For the average Soviet soldier, however, the shock of coming to Vienna may have been even more dramatic. Many in the Red Army were "peasants in uniform" with little if any knowledge of the outside world. During the war, they moved farther away from home than ever before and had undreamed of experiences outside the insular Soviet Union. According to a Soviet officer who

²²Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p.164.

²³Ibid., pp.165-66.

²⁴Bader, Austria Between East & West, p.13.

²⁵Hiscocks, Rebirth, p.24.

deserted the Red Army after World War II, even the relative wealth of the western Ukraine astonished many of the men in the Red Army. Once they had entered Germany, "their rapturous amazement was changed . . . into outright disbelief." After coming upon German village after German village, Soviet soldiers decided that they had discovered "miniature cities" populated by "capitalists" and that the dwellings of the "exploited workers" must be concealed in the surrounding woods. Only later, after searching, did it "dawn on the men that the former conceptions of the West, inculcated by the Soviet press, did not correspond to reality."²⁶ Clearly, many Soviet soldiers came westward with a world-view very unlike that of the average American soldier.

The Western Allies Enter Austria, April-May 1945

After the Soviets had overrun Vienna, the Western Allies approached Austria. In the European Theater of Operations (ETO), elements of the 6th Army Group under General S. L. Devers, which included French troops, and the 12th Army Group under General Omar N. Bradley advanced from the west and northwest respectively. With the retreating German army collapsing, late April found the two army groups of the ETO no longer even engaged in "pursuit warfare" but more of a "motor march under tactical conditions" through southern Bavaria and over into Austria.²⁷ With the Americans spilling into Austria, soon Innsbruck fell first to the Austrian

²⁶USFA, "Special Weekly Reports, G-2," no. 36, p.D-1, 11 July 1947, box 106, NA-RG 338.

²⁷Charles B. MacDonald, The European Theater of Operations: The Last Offensive (Washington, D.C.: Office of Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1973), p.441.

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resistance and American OSS.²⁸ Then, on the evening of 3 May, Innsbruck came under American military occupation.²⁹ Early the following day, the Americans took Salzburg without a fight and by 5 May were in Linz.

To the south, the 15th Army Group under General Mark W. Clark in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) approached the Austrian border from northern Italy. Unlike the 6th and 12th Army Groups, the 15th Army Group continued to encounter stiff resistance until almost the end of the war. As a result, it was only in late April that the American and British soldiers of the 15th Army group began to crack the Wehrmacht, and several more days passed before the American troops from MTO met their fellows of the ETO. Also, it took until VE-Day for the British from the MTO finally to reach Klagenfurt in southern Austria.³⁰

Though generally better disciplined than Soviet soldiers, the American troops who entered Austria did not completely abstain from either rape or plunder.³¹ Indeed, an unknown number adopted a distinctly liberal interpretation of the term "liberator" and ultimately took home with them many Austrian "souvenirs." This could easily be done when the Army requisitioned homes from civilians. Also, American sexual relations with Austrian women failed to show the more admirable qualities of the American character. In discussing the American advance into Germany, historian Edward N. Peterson points out that, unlike the Soviet soldier, the Americans had access to cigarettes, chocolate, and other goods which gave them great power over German women.

²⁸Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.139.

²⁹Karl Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty: Austria in the Post-War World, trans. Lionel Kochan (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), p.15

³⁰Mair, Four-Power Control in Austria, p.301

³¹Whitnah & Whitnah, Salzburg Under Siege, p.49.

With Germany's men dead, in prison camps or missing, many German women had to support their families in a time of great want. According to Peterson, American soldiers, along with some German civilians, were quick to forget their morals and show their entrepreneur spirit by organizing "free-enterprise brothels." As a result, American soldiers paid for sex rather than committing outright rape.³² There seems little doubt that an unknown number of American soldiers behaved in a similar fashion in Austria.³³

American lack of discipline aside, with the collapse of the Third Reich, the U.S. Army had begun planning for American military government operations in Austria.³⁴ Originally, the United States had resisted taking up an Allied occupation zone in Austria, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt only agreed to do so in late 1944.³⁵ At the end of the war, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had incorrectly anticipated that Allied forces would enter Austria from the Italian Theater.³⁶ With an advance from the south in mind, Army planners stationed military government staffs destined for Austria in Italy. The Army even established in Italy a special

³²Edward N. Peterson, The Many Faces of Defeat: The German People's Experience in 1945, (New York: Peter Lang Pub., 1990), p.341.

³³Kenneth D. Alford even goes so far as to claim that members of General Clark's staff looted valuable artworks and that Clark himself took some of these treasures with him to Vienna, see The Spoils of World War II: The American Military's Role in Stealing Europe's Treasures (New York: A Birch Lane Press Book, 1994), pp 259-260.

³⁴Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.21.

³⁵Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.55.

³⁶"United States Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II," folder: 252, NA-RG 260.

training school for future military government personnel to study the coming Austrian occupation in detail.³⁷

By May 1945, the slow Anglo-American advance up the Italian peninsula coupled with the more rapid moves of western forces in the ETO changed the situation dramatically. As a result, the Army had no choice but to introduce military government units into Austria which had been prepared only for Germany. The Austrian politician, Dr. Karl Gruber, later recalled that the early occupation had been one of great confusion for American forces. He rather sarcastically remembered that the first American military government contingent which arrived in Innsbruck barely even knew that it was in Austria. According to Gruber, the Americans knew the details concerning Stuttgart--including the size of the German city's police force, usual consumption of gas, and the sites of its important buildings--and nothing concerning Innsbruck.³⁸

Though correctly illustrating a problem of the early occupation, Gruber failed to take into consideration the "friction" of war. At the end of a long campaign, few would expect anything other than chaos and general confusion. Scattered across Central Europe in and around Austria, the U.S. Army had parts of twelve divisions, four army corps, two field armies, and two army groups. Quite understandably, these forces had been deployed along tactical lines. Terrain, not military government concerns, determined the boundaries between units. To muddy the waters further, many American divisions and all higher units were partly in Germany and partly in Austria. As a result, it was

³⁷"United States Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II," folder: 252, NA-RG 260 & Mair, Four-Power Control in Austria, p.302.

³⁸Gruber, Between Liberation and Liberty, p.19. Innsbruck ultimately became part of the French zone.

inevitable that Army initially treated Austria like Germany, with the same policies and methods applied to both countries.³⁹ Most significant, the first American military government teams which arrived in Austria were from the ETO and, therefore, they conducted themselves as if they were in Germany.⁴⁰

In addition, a host of practical problems inevitably hampered the initial American occupation. The war had brought business and industry to a halt. Communications by post, telephone, and telegraph no longer functioned. Many railways ceased to operate altogether. To control the civilian population, the Army forbade Austrians to travel more than about four miles from their homes. In Austrian territory under American occupation, the presence of some quarter million German prisoners of war and 700,000 displaced persons and refugees placed a great strain upon the local economy. Combined with the headache of excess population, the 1,750,000 Austrians now in American care traditionally relied upon other areas of their country for an adequate food supply.⁴¹

Within a few months, the military government did restore a measure of order to Austria, but many difficulties remained unsolved. Helping matters, by August, American troops in Austria were under the sole command of General Mark W. Clark.⁴² Also, the proper Military government units assigned to Austria had arrived upon the scene. Still, many new problems plagued the recently arrived military government. For instance, the task of identifying and capturing Nazis, a

³⁹A Review of Military Government, 1 June 1946, p.3.

⁴⁰"United States Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II," p.1, folder: 252, NA-RG 260.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Kurt K. Tweraser, "Military Justice as an Instrument of American Occupation Policy in Austria 1945-1950: From Total Control to Limited Tutelage," p.157.

process known as denazification, had only begun. Upon entering Austria, both military government teams and the G-2's Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) immediately began arresting those Nazis and fascists which it deemed important and dangerous. Yet the CIC in particular found its early activities hampered by the reduction in American forces and constant redeployment. In one case, seven different CIC teams held the responsibility for denazification in Linz between May and August.⁴³

Like the Red Army, the American forces which entered Austria proclaimed adherence to the 1943 Moscow Declaration. Nevertheless, the Army remained aware that it had taken territory which had been recently held by Nazi Germany and treated the Austrians accordingly. Leaving nothing to chance, the Army placed the Austrian civilian population under strict curfew and decreed that violators would receive harsh punishment. Also, the Army warned the Austrians that espionage, killing Allied personnel, unlawful possession of firearms, falsely claiming to be an Ally, and illegally wearing an Allied uniform were capital crimes.⁴⁴

Additional clear examples of the lack of distinction between Austrians and Germans can be found in the early American policy towards surrendered Wehrmacht soldiers. In some cases, facing the problem of dealing with great numbers of surrendered Wehrmacht soldiers, the Army simply discharged in Austria many Germans who falsely claimed to be Austrian. This created the problem of a large number of Germans illegally residing in Austria. In other cases, the Army failed to distinguish between Austrians and Germans in

⁴³"United States Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II," p.3, folder: 252, NA-RG 260.

⁴⁴Whitnah & Whitnah, Salzburg Under Siege, p.15. Also see Tweraser, "Military Justice as an Instrument of American Occupation Policy in Austria," p.157.

its use of Disarmed Enemy Forces (DEF). Required for tasks such as clearing mine fields and reconstruction work, DEF counted both Austrians and Germans in its ranks. For the Americans actually conducting policy, during the first months after the war, one German speaker seemed like any other.⁴⁵

The American military government which replaced the combat forces followed a similar stringent anti-Austrian policy. The official policy guide for Austria, known as the Handbook, restricted any "fraternization" with the civilian population.⁴⁶ In both Austria and Germany, the policy of "nonfraterization" proved next to impossible to enforce, but nonetheless remained in effect in Austria until September 1945.⁴⁷ Instructions regarding the other Allied powers clearly aimed to prevent the Austrians from fostering any Allied disunity. The Handbook firmly noted that any anti-Allied action or remark by an Austrian was a punishable offense. Finally, like the combat soldiers who first entered Austria, the new military government personnel received a warning that they had come to "an enemy country" and "that enemy, or at least hostile elements" remained to be dealt with.⁴⁸

On an official level, the few distinctions which the military government did make between the "liberated" Austrians and "defeated" Germans were hardly complimentary. For instance, the Handbook characterized

⁴⁵"United States Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II," p.524, folder: 252, box 31, NA-RG 260. Tweraser makes this same point concerning the chief American legal officer for the Army in Austria, see his "Military Justice as an Instrument of American Occupation Policy in Austria," p.154.

⁴⁶Also see Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.161.

⁴⁷Erhardt to Acting Secretary of State, 22 September 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.603 and Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Occupation, 1945 vol.VI (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), np.179.

⁴⁸Handbook for Military Government, pp.5-6

the Austrians as a well mannered but generally irresponsible people who had "a highly developed sense of the ridiculous." The Handbook darkly added that though Austrians were inheritors of a great culture, they naturally had a "streak of cruelty."⁴⁹ In terms of policy, the first military government men who went into Austria were not supposed to trust the Austrians any more than the Germans. In practice, most Americans made little distinction between the peoples.⁵⁰

The Great Powers Divide Austria, March-May 1945

As the Third Reich collapsed, great power relations for the diplomats far from the battlefield became increasingly uncertain. Complicating matters in Austria during the initial occupation period, the European Advisory Commission (EAC)--a body created in 1943 for the purpose of hammering out the details of Allied agreements concerning postwar Austria and Germany--failed to reach a complete agreement for the Allied division of Austria. When Vienna had fallen to the Soviets, Stalin had urged the Western Allies to send representatives to the liberated city for the purpose of determining the city's division.⁵¹ Later, however, Marshal Tolbukhin refused to grant approval for a visit by a special mission to Vienna. Then, citing their lack of information about Vienna, the American and British representatives in the EAC refused to complete an

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰HQ 15th Army Group, "Intelligence Summary," no. 1, 27 May 1945. This report is found in the microfilm edition of NA-RG 59, 863.00/5-2945 (Wilmington Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1988), cited hereafter as NA-RG 59 (microfilm).

⁵¹Harriman to Secretary of State, 13 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.61.

agreement on zonal division until Western representatives had inspected Vienna.⁵²

Earlier, in March 1945, the EAC had reached an understanding that Austria would be divided into four occupation zones--American, British, French, and Soviet--and that Vienna would also be divided between the Allies. Even though the war in Europe was now over, the Allies continued to disagree about Vienna's internal division and the city's size. The American and British representatives insisted that the larger Gau (Nazi district) boundaries for Vienna be retained and that the Innere Stadt be placed under "joint administration."⁵³ At this point, the Western representatives in the EAC expressed a hope that Gau might contain both suitable airfields for each of the Allies and training grounds for their occupation troops. In contrast, the Soviet representative rejected the retention of any institution which smacked of Nazi innovation, even one which might bring administrative convenience, and demanded that Vienna be divided along its smaller 1937 boundaries. In response to the Western demand for airfields, the Soviet representative offered Tulln airfield, located some thirteen and a half miles northwest of Vienna and within the Soviet zone.⁵⁴

⁵²For a discussion of the EAC and the Vienna mission see Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," pp.115-132. It is interesting to note that in late April George Kennan had been "inclined to question the advisability of our representatives proceeding to Vienna before general agreement has been reached on the airport question and before we can be sure that they will be received and treated in a manner entirely consistent with the dignity of their position." See 22 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.83.

⁵³Mair, Four-Power Control in Austria, p.306. Also see Caffery to the Secretary of State, 18 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.72.

⁵⁴Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.104. For Tulln's precise location see, "Airfield Reconnaissance Report," Annex B to the Vienna Mission Report, folder: 1945, box 1, Top Secret General Records, 1945-1946, POLAD, NA-RG 84.

In Austria itself, the Soviets did little to reassure those in the West who doubted their Eastern Ally.⁵⁵ Without consulting the other Allies, the Soviets unilaterally helped to establish, and then recognized on 29 April, a provisional Austrian government under the longtime Austrian socialist Karl Renner.⁵⁶ British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and George Kennan, the American Chargé in the Soviet Union, immediately suspected Soviet skullduggery. In particular, Kennan took a dim view of Austrian Communists running two important ministries, education and interior, in the new Renner government. He feared that Renner was a merely Stalin's puppet and that the Soviets were about to shut the Western powers out of Austria as they had already done in Romania.⁵⁷ Heightening such suspicions, the Western Allies lacked reliable information concerning what had transpired in Vienna since the Soviet military arrived in the city.⁵⁸

As a result of these mysteries and suspicions, Austria became important enough to be discussed at the highest level. In mid-May, President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Churchill broached directly with Stalin the question of an Anglo-American mission to Vienna. In addressing the Soviet leader, they expressed dismay at the Soviet refusal to permit Allied forces to enter the Austrian capital. Stalin responded by declaring that he had always believed that Western

⁵⁵Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, & the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp.267-268.

⁵⁶One source disagrees. On 8 July 1945, the Austrian Communist politician Johann Koplenig claimed that the provisional government was merely tolerated, not recognized by the Red Army. See, HQ USFA, "Intelligence Summary," no. 8, p.8, 21 July 1945, NA-RG 59, 863.00/7-2645 (microfilm).

⁵⁷Churchill to Truman 30 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.102 and Kennan to the Secretary of State, 30 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, pp.105-106.

⁵⁸Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.89.

troops would arrive in the city after the necessary Allied agreements concerning Austria had been reached. Stalin added, however, that he had no objections against Western representatives traveling to Vienna for the purpose of acquainting themselves with the situation in the city.⁵⁹ He then promised to allow a military mission to inspect the city by early June.⁶⁰

The Vienna Mission, June 1945

Accepting what was in effect Stalin's second invitation, British Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander informed Soviet Marshal Tolbukhin in late May that an Anglo-American reconnaissance team would shortly be arriving in Vienna. Alexander also told Tolbukhin that the party would leave from Klagenfurt, which was under British control, and travel overland into the Soviet occupied territory to Vienna by way of Wiener Neustadt. Alexander added that each nation would send a contingent of eighteen officers and sixty enlisted men and that they would begin their trip on 2 June. Alexander concluded his message to Tolbukhin by requesting that the Soviet marshal make ready the necessary accommodations for the Western reconnaissance mission in Vienna.⁶¹

As for the Vienna mission itself, Brigadier General Lester D. Flory commanded the American contingent while Major General T. J. W. Winterton did the same for Great Britain. The French ultimately joined the mission as well with a smaller party under Général de Brigade Paul

⁵⁹Leahy to Secretary of State, 19 May 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.122.

⁶⁰Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, pp.111-12. Also see Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.119.

⁶¹Leidenfrost, "Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht," p.186.

Cherrière. To accompany Flory, the Army sent along Brigadier General Ralph A. Snavely, Commander of Air Task Force for Austria, and an air engineer, charging them with inspecting the city's airfields. Also, Flory's party included a number of Civil Affairs officers, as well as public health and signal communications specialists. Several of these men were responsible for writing reports on various aspects of Vienna's current condition.⁶² Later commenting upon the mission's size, one participant characterized it as containing enough "'experts'" to run Vienna "three times over."⁶³

OSS Agent, Lt. Col. Charles W. Thayer was of particular importance for both gleaning information concerning Soviet activities in Vienna and understanding relations in the field between the two powers in 1945. Having often had tiresome dealings with Soviets while acting as an American translator with Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia, Thayer found to his surprise that the Soviets in Vienna were generally cooperative. Since the mission lacked a political officer, the Americans refrained from including one to avoid raising unfounded Soviet suspicions, Thayer acted as an unofficial political officer. In this capacity, he issued reports which provided the State and War departments with an analysis of the political conditions of Vienna and the intentions of Soviets. Later, during the Cold War, Thayer would briefly discuss the Vienna mission in his book, Hands Across the Caviar. However, his OSS report

⁶²Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.113.

⁶³Charles W. Thayer, Hands Across the Caviar (Philadelphia, Pa.: J. B. Lippincott, 1952), p.175.

of July 1945 is more serious in tone and gives a more detailed picture of relations with the Soviets.⁶⁴

Accompanying Thayer on the Vienna mission as a key player in the later occupation of Vienna was Lt. Col. W. Alexander Samouce. Ultimately attached to USFA and attending ninety-four Vienna Kommandatura conferences, Samouce also played a significant role in the early American understanding of Soviets plans for Vienna. Born in the Ukraine to Russian parents and one of a handful of Russia speakers working for the Army, Samouce, like Thayer, had had rather difficult dealings with the Soviets during the war. Though wary of the Soviets from the beginning, he was not, however, an anti-Bolshevik émigré with an axe to grind; his family had left Russia prior to World War I. After the Cold War began, Samouce wrote but never published a manuscript about his days in Vienna. In it, he characterized early relations between the American and Soviet military men as basically cordial.⁶⁵

For his part, Flory knew of the current difficulties in the EAC and remained unsure of the reception that the Red Army would give him and his men in Vienna. As a consequence and in accordance with American policy, Flory made clear to the Americans under his command that he wished to prevent any disagreeable incidents. The party received instructions to refrain from discussion of matters that had nothing to do with the mission. In particular, Flory declared off limits subjects such as economics, ideology and the nature of the Soviet government.⁶⁶ Flory's actions were clearly an

⁶⁴See Rathkolb, Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik, pp.283-288.

⁶⁵See W. Alexander Samouce, "I Do Understand the Russians," an unpublished manuscript in the Wellington Alexander Samouce Papers at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Penn.

⁶⁶Lester D. Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission." 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

attempt to impress upon his subordinates the importance of creating and maintaining an atmosphere of harmonious relations with the Soviets. Also, he remained determined to follow current American efforts to promote Allied cooperation.⁶⁷ As a result, he conducted the American mission in "strictly military" fashion and restricted its actions to "reconnaissance."⁶⁸

Flory's instructions to the members of the American mission to Vienna were far from unique, reflecting the American thinking of the time. For example, shortly afterward the first American reconnaissance mission to Berlin received orders which were similar to those issued by Flory. Lt. Col. John J. Maginnis, the Berlin mission's military government officer, recorded in his diary a number of instructions given to him concerning relations with the Soviets. These orders ranged from "never have a buffet dinner when entertaining Russians" to "don't be too inquisitive." Of particular significance, he received instructions to "never argue politics with a Russian and never criticize his government." Instead, he and the other members of the Berlin mission were to "try in every way to get along amiably with the Russians" because "they are our allies."⁶⁹

For Flory, the first Vienna mission was simply to make a survey which would aid the EAC in reaching an agreement regarding the zoning of the Vienna area. Later speaking flippantly, Thayer declared that the mission's purpose had been to find "a decent airfield

⁶⁷For the Acting Secretary of State's policy see his message to Kirk, 9 June 1945 FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.132.

⁶⁸Lester D. Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers. Also see, Erhardt to Secretary of State 25 May 1945, FRUS, vol. III, p.123.

⁶⁹Robert A. Hart, ed., Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1971), p.256.

for each of the Allies and . . . to inspect the city and report on what bathrooms, and so forth, were available."⁷⁰ Without doubt, the Americans coming to Vienna wished to shun the Austrian provisional government under Renner. The Americans did so partly because of Renner's lack of legitimacy in their eyes, but also to prevent political embarrassment and keep the mission's duties purely military. Most certainly, they also wanted to avoid raising the suspicions of the their Soviet ally.⁷¹

After departing from Klagenfurt and arriving in Judenburg, which marked the temporary Anglo-Soviet border, the Western missions briefly had difficulty convincing the local Soviet authorities to allow them to pass on to Vienna. Apparently, Marshal Tolbukhin had authorized only a much smaller contingent and not the more sizable party requested by Alexander. As a consequence, the Western party had to mark time for a day while the Soviets considered what to do. No grim standoff took place at the Anglo-Soviet border; rather the Vienna mission received a warm welcome complete with a Soviet brass band and honor guard. Austrian Historian Josef Leidenfrost has even suggested that the Soviets in their present mood could hardly halt the mission for an indefinite period.⁷² As Thayer recalled, a regular "international love feast" took place for several hours, which included a royal welcome by Major General Rogov of Tolbukhin's staff. Naturally, the Soviets followed the

⁷⁰Thayer, Hands Across the Caviar, p.175.

⁷¹Erhardt to Secretary of State, 25 May 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.123. According to Bischof, the British believed that if they sent a political representative, he would be at a disadvantage in dealing with the Soviets, see, "Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation," p.121.

⁷²Leidenfrost, "Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht," p.186.

welcome with many rounds of vodka, schnapps, and champagne.⁷³

In his 14 July report, Thayer noted that Rogov, for one, had failed to object to the size of the American-British-French missions and merely requested the names of all persons going to Vienna. When the Western Allies informed him that such lists were not readily available, Rogov made do with only a numerical summary of the mission's composition and then went off to warn Vienna that additional accommodations would be needed for the visiting reconnaissance teams. Thayer concluded that the difficulties at the Anglo-Soviet border were simply "housekeeping problems" due to the lack of billets available in Vienna and not an attempt to limit the size of the Allied missions.⁷⁴

As a result, on 4 June the Soviets escorted the entire Vienna mission to the Austrian capital. During the course of the journey, the group stopped at one point to watch a game of "Soviet football" and were guests of a Russian division commander.⁷⁵ Being the first Americans to enter territory in Austria held by the Soviets, Flory's men took special note of countryside and behavior of the Red Army. Though they observed evidence of Soviet looting, Flory's party also saw less sinister aspects of the occupation.⁷⁶ First, they discovered that adequate road repair and maintenance had been continued under Soviet occupation. Next, Soviet camps seen along the road were neat, well

⁷³Thayer, Hands Across the Caviar, p.175.

⁷⁴Rathkolb, Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik, pp.281-82.

⁷⁵Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.114.

⁷⁶Members of the "two ration conveyers for the U.S. Mission," which traveled from Vienna to Linz and returned, observed "machinery" being loaded onto railway cars and "Russian troops . . . apparently living 'off the land.'" see Flory's "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

constructed and well laid out. Concerning Allied relations, the Soviets appeared to be on their way to turning over part of their Austrian territory to the British, as had already been planned by the EAC. Most significant, the Americans did not dwell exclusively upon Soviet looting of Austrian industrial goods and agricultural products. Indeed, they even noticed a roadsign which read in Russian, "Obey laws and Respect other's Property."⁷⁷

Col. William P. Yarborough, who served as the American Provost Marshal in Vienna, remembers his first contact with a Red Army officer during the Vienna mission with especial vividness. Naturally, the Soviet officer struck Yarborough as exotic. This can be seen in Yarborough's description of the Soviet as having a "China blue-eyed weather-beaten slavic peasant's face" which was "split by a broad grin revealing strong serviceable teeth made of a substance that looked like stainless steel." Yarborough also noted that the Red Army officer had a "haircut square across the nape of the neck," a haircut which he would commonly see in the days to come among both Soviet soldiers and civilians. Yet in terms of military appearance, the Red Army officer was "clean shaven, and the fittings of his Sam Brown belt were shined--marks of a disciplined soldier." Most significant, Yarborough mentions in retrospect that "neither the Russian nor I had received 'the word' which was even then creeping through politico-military channels, to the effect that war-time relationships were terminated." Therefore, naturally when the Red Army officer escorted Yarborough into Vienna, both men made a point of making a display of Allied unity in front of

⁷⁷Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

the Austrian people and under huge portraits of Lenin and Stalin.⁷⁸

The American View of Soviet Behavior in Vienna

By evening, the Vienna mission arrived in the Austrian capital grandly flying American, British and French flags.⁷⁹ They found the streets covered with rubble, buildings in disrepair, and most windows without any cover other than "rough planks, tattered cloth, and oilcloth."⁸⁰ As the first official Western visitors in Vienna since the Soviet liberation, the Vienna mission found the city's inhabitants shocked and surprised by their arrival. Soon, the Viennese spontaneously formed crowds and cheered their latest guests with great enthusiasm. Thayer later claimed that the "delirious welcome" by the Viennese made him begin to doubt the Soviets had come to Vienna as liberators. He also maintained that the cheering Viennese displeased his Soviet hosts and that they reacted by directing the Vienna mission's convoy through side streets to a suburb where houses had been requisitioned for Western use.⁸¹ His report concerning the Vienna mission, however, fails to mention these problems with the Soviets.

⁷⁸Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough Papers, Mugar Library, Boston University.

⁷⁹Thayer, Hands Across the Caviar, p.175.

⁸⁰Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.117.

⁸¹Thayer, Hands Across the Caviar, p.175. Taking part in a subsequent mission to Vienna, Martin F. Herz claimed that the "people didn't even dare to cheer us when we entered Vienna, for fear that we wouldn't be staying and that they might later suffer for having greeted us." See his "A Glass of Beer With the Chancellor," Foreign Service Journal 30 (July 1953): p.25. More interesting, Marsha Williams, who was a British interpreter, claims that on the way to Vienna an elderly Austrian said to the British mission, "'Send us the Duke of Windsor. Let him be our King!" See her, White Among Reds (London: Shepeard-Walwyn, 1980), p.3.

During his reconnaissance of Vienna, Thayer soon discovered more about the Soviet liberation of Vienna and the later occupation of the city. As a result, he reported to his superiors that for several weeks after the Soviet liberation, front line Red Army soldiers had roamed the city in a drunken state. These troops had forcibly entered and searched private homes, taking whatever pleased them, smashing what remained and frequently raping the female residents. Yet illustrative of the times, Thayer did not portray such action as particularly shocking or barbaric. He also took care to note that "reliable witnesses" claimed that Soviet soldiers during the fierce fight for Vienna demonstrated "astonishing consideration" for the Viennese and even steered residents outside of range of the fire of the opposing armies.⁸²

As for the plight of Austrian women, Thayer claimed that "the tales of rape now current are probably exaggerated." He did concede that it was likely that tens of thousands of rapes had taken place, but he added that "many of these might be considered technical rape as there is evidence that a considerable portion of the female population took less than reasonable precautions to protect themselves."⁸³ Though Thayer's remarks fit the times, it would be hard to imagine such comments about Soviet behavior being written during the Cold War.

Perhaps reflecting upon Flory's orders, Thayer put the Soviets in the best light possible. He acknowledged that the Red Army could be brutal, but he found it understandable given the context of war. Like other American military men, Thayer had seen horrific violence

⁸²Rathkolb, Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik, p.285.

⁸³Ibid., p.285. According to Martin F. Herz, Red Army soldiers raped some 40,000 Viennese women in April 1945; Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p.559.

during the war which may have also left him numb to the sufferings of Austrian women. In addition, Thayer based his report upon information supplied by Austrian witnesses, though perhaps with Red Army officers present. According to one American report, a number of Austrian officials interviewed concerning matters of public health reported that "fifty percent of the cases of rape were due to the actions of the Austrian women themselves." As for the great number of rapes reported, the Austrians, who included the Communist Dr. Franz David, claimed that these had been grossly exaggerated. Of those rapes which had actually been committed by Soviet troops, many "occurred in houses from which there had been sniping" and, by implication, were simply understandable excesses by the Red Army.⁸⁴ It should be noted that the British received similar reports from Viennese medical officials but were not as inclined to believe them. For example, Dr. Lande of the Vienna Public Health Service denied that there had been extensive raping by the Red Army in Vienna. He claimed that the British must keep in mind that the Soviets were "simple" soldiers who might "misconstrue the welcome of the female population as an invitation" for sex. Also, Lande noted that some of the reported rapes in the city "were in fact not technically" rape. The British commented on Lande's report by claiming that "his

⁸⁴"Interview on 7 June 45 with Dr. Franz David, Under Secretary in the Austrian Dept. of Social Welfare; Dr. Schmidt, Dir. of Pub. Hlth. Dept.; and his assistants Dr. Alfred Khaum (Public Health), Dr. Schleiger (Legal) and Dr. Puntigam (Epidemiologist)," "Annex F To the report of the Vienna Mission, p.3," folder: 1945, box 1, Top Secret General Records, 1945-1946, POLAD, NA-RG 84. Another report noted that some American members of the Vienna found that Austrian Communist officials were "the most able, or at least the most aggressive and outspoken" of the Austrians with whom they had had contact. See "United States Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II," folder 252, NA-RG 260.

evidence was distinctly biased" against the Viennese women.⁸⁵

Among the Americans, however, Thayer was not alone in presenting a less than sympathetic view of the Viennese. Another member of the Flory party, Col. Fernando T. Norcross, reported that a number of civilians expressed extreme apprehension concerning the Soviet occupation and claimed that they had greatly suffered at the hands of the Red Army. He also noted that numerous reports of rape and mistreatment of civilians could be heard. Like Thayer, Norcross displayed no particular outrage concerning the thousands of rapes committed in Vienna.⁸⁶ He may have even had difficulty believing that such incidents had taken place on a mass scale because he witnessed many unescorted Viennese women on the streets late into the evening. To Norcross, this indicated that the Viennese exaggerated the danger to Austrian women. Other Americans backed up Norcross' contention and claimed to have observed Viennese girls alone in the Schönbrunn Park blithely watching over children, knitting and reading while Soviet soldiers strolled past. For his part, Norcross claimed that the Austrians under Soviet occupation had the ability freely to criticize Soviet activities and, therefore, clearly did not live under Soviet tyranny.⁸⁷ Perhaps Norcross followed Thayer's example in desiring to see and only seeing cordial relations between East and West. In any case, he seemed unaware that, with many

⁸⁵Winterton in Vienna, June 1945, p.73, PRO-FO 1020/28.

⁸⁶Masha Williams notes that Austrian women "strolled in the parks at night with Soviet soldiers." Unlike Thayer, she is aware of the possibility for misunderstanding because Soviet soldiers thought that the Austrian women who wore make-up were simply prostitutes, see her White Among Reds, p.48.

⁸⁷Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

of Vienna's men were simply no longer in the city, daily necessity often forced women to be on the streets.

Like his colleagues on the Vienna mission, OSS Agent and Lt. Col. Eager P. Allen reported that the Soviets had looted, plundered and committed rape in the city. Unlike Thayer, however, he attributed most of the worst excesses to administrative troops that followed in the wake of the Red Army's front line soldiers. Like the other Americans in Vienna, Allen repeatedly heard numerous stories of looting and rape from the Austrians he encountered on the streets of the city. Nevertheless, he cautioned the readers of his report that "it is not possible to estimate to what extent these stories are propaganda intended to create sympathy for the Austrians and dissension with the Soviets."⁸⁸ Allen's report, read with historical context in mind, reveals the continuing disdain for the Nazis, who had received the support of many Austrians, and the memory of the struggle against them. Also, it illustrates Allen's hope for future peace by continuing the American-Soviet alliance after the war.⁸⁹

At least one Austrian complaint concerning the Soviets provoked outright American disapproval. Col. C. C. Smith, Jr., reported that an English speaking Austrian woman informed him that the Soviets had done "'awful' things," such as slaughtering hundreds of deer in the woods outside Vienna. Then, she declared that the Austrians had been initially pleased to be freed from Hitler's rule but now regarded the Soviet occupation to be as bad as the Nazi occupation. Smith noted with thinly veiled disgust, however, that the

⁸⁸Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

⁸⁹John Erhardt reported to the Secretary of State that the tales of mass rape in Vienna had been exaggerated. See his report of 16 June 1945, NA-RG 59, 863.00/6-1645 (microfilm).

woman's distress deserved little sympathy. After all, the German treatment of their Austrian allies was not comparable to the Soviet treatment of an Austrian enemy. In Smith's view, obviously the Austrian woman had failed to understand the true nature of the war against Nazism.⁹⁰

While Smith listened to his "young lady," Major Lloyd H. Landau, the mission's legal affairs specialist, found that the Soviet terror in Vienna had had the unforeseen benefit of forcing down the city's crime rate. A reminder of the context helps in understanding Landau's point. Even in June, the machine-gun fire of Nazis hiding in the city's sewers could be heard.⁹¹ Not for the first time did the Red Army face the prospect of anti-Soviet elements literally hiding underground long after the bulk of Soviet force had passed from the scene.

Landau also discovered another aspect of the Soviet occupation. The Soviets occasionally arrested Austrian civilians for no apparent reason. Here he saw not the sinister hand of a sadistic secret police but an action which the residents of Vienna could find hardly unusual. Certainly the Viennese had seen far more arbitrary arrests at the hands of the Gestapo.⁹² Again, the Soviets were obviously rough and ready in their methods, but the Vienna mission did not find them comparable to the Nazis. Instead, the Soviets remained allies who had to stay alert for potential Nazi resistance. After all,

⁹⁰Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

⁹¹Samouce, "I do Understand the Russians." A British report written at the time confirms that there were "occasional shots in the night" but implies that these were the work of the Red Army, see "Soviet Behavior in Vienna, Report to the Head," PRO-FO 1020/89.

⁹²Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

in the thinking of the day, while Soviet methods might not match those of the Americans, their cause was just.⁹³

A little over a month later the American attitude remained much the same. Major Martin F. Herz, who went on to become a historian at Georgetown University, had difficulty on a later mission to Vienna believing accounts about the Soviet liberation because they were so terrible. He thought that they were too similar to Nazi propaganda. Also, he and other American officers felt sure "that the Austrians might try to drive a wedge between the American and Russian occupation forces." As a result, Herz and his American companions were "careful to parry" any "embarrassing remarks" made about the Soviets by Austrian officials. Herz retained the wartime view that the Soviets were allies who had fought at great expense against Hitler's army. Such sentiment remained common among American military men of all ranks, and they treated with suspicion attempts to fracture the Allied coalition. Like the earlier Vienna mission, Herz and his companions saw the defeated Austrians as overly hasty in forgetting their immediate past.⁹⁴

For the moment, differences ranging from language to politics between the Americans and Soviets were far outweighed by the seeming general cooperativeness of Red Army officers. Indeed, in such an atmosphere many Americans could reasonably believe that these differences were superficial and thus ultimately surmountable. Certainly, to the Americans of the first Vienna mission the Austrians deserved little sympathy, and such feelings did not come at the expense of the

⁹³HQ 15th Army Group, "Intelligence Summary," no. 4, p.1, 20 June 1945, NA-59, 863.00/7-645 (microfilm).

⁹⁴Martin F. Herz, "The View From Austria," found in Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), p.163.

Soviets. The war had but recently ended and, if they needed reminding of its cost, part of the mission's job in Vienna involved accounting for missing American pilots, several of whom the mission's members soon discovered had been killed by Austrian civilians.⁹⁵

While observing Austrian-Soviet relations during the first Vienna mission, Thayer found that even in defeat the Viennese clung to old worn notions of racial superiority. For example, he saw Vienna's residents being haunted by the fear that they now lived under a tyranny "administered by a race . . . not only inferior to their recent German masters but even beneath the consideration of civilized peoples."⁹⁶ The years of wartime propaganda, along with traditional anti-Slavic feeling, had done little to encourage friendly relations with the Soviet invaders. As Thayer expected, the horrific actions of the Red Army in Vienna merely confirmed the preconceptions of the Viennese.

Thayer also opened an interesting window to American thinking at the time. Regarding the Soviets, Thayer saw Russian soldiers as naturally lacking "emotional inhibitions." What drove Soviet soldiers were the "primitive instincts" which even "a twenty-year exposure to Soviet cultural influences" had failed to sublimate. In the flush of good relations, Thayer believed that the Soviets naturally warmed toward the Americans because the Russians lacked "emotional inhibitions" and readily expressed their natural feelings. In short, the Soviets were akin to a good-natured animal that kindness would win over. Almost wistfully, Thayer claimed that such a characteristic made the Soviets more like Americans than the inherently

⁹⁵Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

⁹⁶Rathkolb, Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik, p.287.

more aloof British and French.⁹⁷ Later, of course, a dramatic reversal took place in American thinking. Then, the Soviets no longer were emotional Allies but seemed darkly similar to the despised Nazis. They had become untamed beasts given to violent fits. Still, at both the end of the war and during the Cold War, repeated contact with the Red Army impressed soldiers like Thayer that Soviet people were naturally "primitive" and thus fundamentally different from the American people. The notion of difference was always present, only the interpretation of this difference changed with events.

Others on the mission doubtlessly agreed with Thayer. For the mission, the most striking example of political dissimilarity was the Soviet approach to basic administrative problems such as providing food for the city. During the first Vienna mission, the Americans quickly realized that, like much of postwar Europe, the food situation in Vienna was grim and, in time, the military government saw it as Vienna's worst problem. For most of the over one million people in the city simply finding bread for everyday existence proved difficult. As the Americans discovered, the Red Army made the situation much worse. With the lands surrounding Vienna under extensive cultivation, the Red Army frequently seized food that had been directed to Vienna's shops. As one American colorfully reported, Soviet soldiers were "living on the fat of the land" and Austrian authorities had grave difficulties bringing in food from the countryside. Indeed, what food there was came ultimately by Soviet allocation from Austrian food stocks. The Americans on the Vienna mission even heard rumors of "actual starvation" and some witnessed famished Austrians carving up a dead horse on the

⁹⁷Ibid., pp.284-285.

street.⁹⁸ The Austrians may have been considered a defeated enemy, but even so, the Americans believed that they should be allowed their own food. As will be discussed in chapter three, when the American military government formally took over its sector in September, the American problem-solving approach to supplying the city would clash with the Soviet practice of feeding their troops from lands that they had conquered.

In early June 1945, restaurants run for the Red Army remained the only places well stocked with food in the city. Here, the Soviets gathered Western officers to celebrate the Allied victory in Europe. Naturally these social gatherings contributed to the generally cordial relations between Americans and Soviets. Col. Samouce, for one, recalls that the Soviets treated Flory and the rest of the mission with the respect due visiting allies and held numerous grand banquets in honor of all the Allies.⁹⁹ Without doubt, few Americans could think ill of such hosts.

One particular banquet caught the friendly spirit quite well, but also revealed the cultural gap between the two peoples. On this occasion, Samouce along with an American brigadier general, hoping to avoid a nasty hangover, attempted to substitute the vodka in their glasses with white wine. Instantly, Red Army Col. Gen. Alexi S. Zheltov roared "Attention!" and "pompously" walked over to the seats taken by Samouce and his fellow officer. Looking the two men up and down, Zheltov announced "'I am going to fine you'" and seizing both the wine glasses poured them on the carpet. Next, the Soviet general refilled the glasses with vodka and filled one for himself and declared that this was the

⁹⁸Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

⁹⁹Samouce, "I do Understand the Russians."

punishment for failing to join in fully with the celebration. According to Samouce, the banquet lasted until nearly morning, during which time there were twenty-seven vodka toasts to various Allied leaders, several courses of food, and after-dinner entertainers.¹⁰⁰ The American military men found that the Soviets consistently drank them under the table.¹⁰¹

Early American-Soviet Disagreements

Though good cheer prevailed in the night, the first morning in Vienna brought forth an issue which overtly divided the Allies in Vienna. On 5 June, Soviet Lt. Gen. V. Morozov, temporary head of the Russian commission, informed the Vienna mission heads that the Western Allies might only conduct inspections within the 1937 city boundaries and, as a result, would be prevented from seeing the entire Vienna Gau. Also, the Vienna mission would only be permitted to inspect Tulln airfield, which was west of the Danube. In doing so, Morozov merely followed a policy already set forth by the Soviet representative in the EAC. Like many other Soviet officers which the Americans would encounter, Morozov followed his instructions from Moscow to the letter. Unfortunately for Morozov, the American and British understanding of their mission in Vienna differed. To further complicate matters, Morozov reported that Marshal Tolbukhin had sent word that the mission must complete its business by June 11.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹The Americans were not the only victims of Soviet alcoholic excess, Cherrière, on his first night in Vienna, got very drunk with a Soviet vice-admiral, see "Report on the activities of the British, U.S., French Missions on the Eve of 4 June 1945," PRO-FO 1020/87.

¹⁰²Kirk to Secretary of State, 6 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, pp.126-127.

Flory found Morozov's restrictions unacceptable, and the meeting with the Soviet general became, in the words of a British observer, "tense."¹⁰³ The American general made it clear that he intended to stay as long as necessary and that his mission would thoroughly examine the entire city Gau. Also, he demanded unrestricted access to all nine of the area's airfields, along with all other installations and barracks, and pointed out that a thorough inspection was necessary for the current negotiations in the EAC. As Flory discovered, part of the difficulty in traveling east came as a result of the divided Soviet military authority in the Vienna area. Marshal Tolbukhin's command extended south and west of the city, whereas Marshal Malinovsky's command, based in neighboring Czechoslovakia, covered the lands east of the Danube.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, Flory, backed by Cherrière and Winterton, initially refused to make any inspection of airfields until the Soviets allowed him to see all the area's airfields. Indeed, Flory became so displeased that, to the amazement of his Soviet host, he packed up his briefcase and abruptly left the meeting.¹⁰⁵

Fortunately, the next day's meeting and further Western questioning of Morozov brought the two sides slightly closer together on the thorny issues of airfield and Gau inspection. The improvement came when Winterton suggested that the eastern airfields might be visited if Tolbukhin and Malinovsky granted the Westerners special permission. According to an American report, Morozov seemed agreeable and promised that he would broach the matter with Tolbukhin. Winterton proved

¹⁰³5 June, 10.00 hrs, "Meeting with Lt. Gen. Morozov," PRO-FO 1020/87.

¹⁰⁴Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.124.

¹⁰⁵Thayer, Hands Across the Caviar, p.176.

helpful a second time when the question of inspecting the entire Vienna Gau arose again. Morozov, again following the Soviet line, refused to allow the Vienna mission outside the 1937 city limits. At that point, Winterton pointed out to Morozov that the Soviet policy did allow Western inspection of Tulln, which was outside the 1937 city limits, and that permission to visit it gave opportunity to reconnoiter the Vienna Gau and beyond. The British general continued by saying that since the Western Allies had no desire for a detailed reconnaissance outside city he failed to see any reason why the missions could not visit the area surrounding Vienna. Morozov conceded the point. Then, he even claimed that the lack of control posts effectively allowed the missions to go wherever they wanted in the Vienna area.¹⁰⁶

In their formal meetings with various Soviet generals in Vienna, the Western mission heads quickly realized that they had each been granted a measure of trust and, in the American case, autonomy for dealing with ground level questions concerning the city. On the other hand, the Soviets had received from Moscow scant room in which to maneuver. As they would during the entire occupation period, the Soviet generals remained firmly bound by their orders from above. As the British reported of another meeting, Red Army commanders in Vienna had far less latitude than the heads of the three missions. For instance, whenever Soviet General Zheltov received questions concerning a particular point, he quickly claimed to have to follow the strict orders of his government.¹⁰⁷ The years of Stalin's rule had produced a system which stifled the individual

¹⁰⁶Kirk to Secretary of State, 7 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, pp.129-130.

¹⁰⁷"J Mission, Outline Diary, to link up the detailed reports and telegrams already kept," PRO-FO 1020/87.

initiative of Soviet military men. The absurd case of Morozov's refusal to allow the missions to travel outside the 1937 Vienna city limits but at the same time allowing them to travel outside the larger Vienna Gau to Tulln makes this abundantly clear. Morozov followed his orders to the letter until Winterton pointed out the contradiction contained within them. Whether or not higher authority had directly ordered Morozov to hamper the Allied mission remains unknown. What became unmistakable to the Western visitors was that the Soviet system compelled Red Army officers to insist upon following strict guidelines which were sometimes contradictory and senseless.

As the Western mission heads attempted to persuade various Soviet generals to allow complete airfield inspection, the rest of the mission members set about the task of examining Vienna, a task for which they were supposed to have complete freedom of movement. In the inspection of almost all facilities other than airfields the Americans and their Western companions did have far fewer problems. Yet Flory's later report that his survey parties received permission to inspect plants, factories, arsenals, and even barracks occupied by the Soviet Army told only part of the story and, in one case, was not accurate.¹⁰⁸ For example, Samouce attempted to inspect a Soviet base in Vienna and found himself detained by a suspicious Mongolian sentry who made a point of rubbing the American in the ribs "with the muzzle of a tommy gun." In trying to explain himself to the Asiatic guard, Samouce found that his Russian was useless. Only later, after being brought before the base commander, did matters improve. By happy coincidence, it turned out that both men had been

¹⁰⁸Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

attached to the artillery during the war. Without further questioning, the Soviet commander called out his honor guard and the two men spent several hours touring the entire installation.¹⁰⁹ Like other Americans, Samouce found that there was often a certain unpredictability and inconsistency present in Soviet behavior.

A much more significant difficulty arose for Samouce when he attempted to inspect a "seedy" four story military academy barracks now occupied by the Soviet NKVD.¹¹⁰ Despite the efforts of a Soviet Lt. Colonel who had been assigned to escort Samouce, the two men were unable to gain admittance to the building. Samouce even waited for thirty minutes on the hot pavement to no avail. Afterwards, the Soviets took pains to apologize for the incident, but there is no evidence that the Americans ever inspected the secret police barracks.¹¹¹ The experience, however, taught the Americans another lesson; the Red Army lacked authority over the more powerful and much feared NKVD.¹¹²

Before departing from Vienna on the morning of 13 June, Flory's firmness with the Soviets brought some success. Though the eastern airfields around Vienna remained closed to Western inspection, some of the Vienna mission had gone beyond the Gau limits and

¹⁰⁹Samouce, "I do Understand the Russians."

¹¹⁰"Report on Accommodations and Facilities in the City of Vienna, Austria," Annex A to the Report of the Vienna Mission, folder: 1945, box 1, Top Secret General Records, NA-RG 84.

¹¹¹Flory, "Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

¹¹²Though the official name of the Soviet secret police changed a number of times during the life of the regime, I have made use of the, at times, incorrect name given to it in Western primary sources. For a helpful guide to the organization's different names see, Gordon Brook-Shepard's The Storm Birds: Soviet Postwar Defectors (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), p.365.

briefly traveled into Lower Austria.¹¹³ Years later, in an interview, Flory claimed that he personally crossed the Danube river for an informal inspection tour of eastern Vienna.¹¹⁴ A report to the Secretary of State made at the time lends plausibility to Flory's later claim. It mentions that several trips east of the Danube occurred without any difficulty.¹¹⁵ Though still displeased about Soviet restrictions placed upon the mission, Flory privately told Winterton that he found the Soviets far more cooperative than during the previous six weeks negotiations in the EAC.¹¹⁶

The British View of the Soviets & Austrians

Added to Flory's opinion, the two assessments that the American and British missions made of the Soviet behavior in Vienna de-emphasized the political differences between East and West. The British are correctly regarded by historians like Günter Bischof as having early on taken a hard line toward the Soviets in Austria. As a result, an Anglo-Soviet tension developed in the central European country before the American-Soviet Cold War.¹¹⁷ Yet in June 1945, some of the British officers of the Vienna mission considered the Soviets in a friendly light. An examination of Foreign Office records reveals that the British, like the Americans, initially found the Soviets to be usually cordial and cooperative. For instance, after first

¹¹³Erhardt to Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.138.

¹¹⁴Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.115.

¹¹⁵Erhardt to Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.138.

¹¹⁶"8 June Discussion Between Flory & Winterton," PRO-FO 1020/87.

¹¹⁷See Bischof's "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," pp. 101-115.

arriving and having a meeting with Lt. General Alexi V. Blagotadov, the British noted the Russians wanted the Western Allies in Vienna and wanted the mission to leave quickly in order to clear the way for the EAC to decide upon dividing Vienna into zones. The note went on to say that, "I do not feel we are being treated other than well" and added "Perhaps we are too suspicious?"¹¹⁸

Like the Americans, some of the British contingent distrusted the Viennese and had difficulty believing accusations of brutalities committed during the Soviet liberation. For example, the British tended to regard Austrian tales of Soviet looting and rape as so much Nazi propaganda.¹¹⁹ Beyond the politics, the British mission found that most Viennese citizens were under enormous nervous strain. As a result, the typical Austrian in the city lacked his usual powers of objectivity and could not be completely trusted for accurate information. Since Vienna was now being run along district lines and not under a central authority, the city's people were at the mercy of many unfounded rumors. As a consequence, the British believed that the large numbers of looting and rape cases constantly offered by the Austrians as authoritative could not be accepted without further stringent examination.¹²⁰

To the British, the plight of the Viennese had a quality of inevitability to it. They believed that the source of friction between the Austrians and Soviets had been the invasion of a large occupying force composed mostly of "ignorant peasants." Furthermore, lax

¹¹⁸"4 June, 1300 hrs., Meeting in the Office of Lt. Gen. Blagotadov," PRO-FO 1020/89.

¹¹⁹Mair, Four-Power Control in Austria, p.318. A British officer did witness an Austrian female being "carried off the street by a Soviet soldier." See "Soviet Behavior in Vienna," PRO-FO 1020/89.

¹²⁰"Report to Head, General Report on Conditions in Vienna," PRO-FO 1020/89.

discipline among Soviet troops coupled with the lack of a common language had prevented mutual understanding between even Viennese and Russians who might have developed a small measure of goodwill towards each other.¹²¹ Ironically, these same problems would later plague not only Austrian-Soviet relations in Vienna but Anglo-Soviet relations as well.

As for Soviet relations with the British contingent in June 1945, the British reported that after a tentative start relations had been cordial. Red Army officers at all levels gave their British counterparts full cooperation. Soviet officers had clearly taken great pains to meet with the utmost promptness British requests made of them. The British military men, in turn, took special pains to ensure that Soviet officers attended all meetings that the Royal Army held with local Austrian officials. While in Vienna, the British discovered no evidence that the Soviets had taken any special measures to spy on the movements or private conversations of members of the mission. Finally and particularly noteworthy for the British, the Soviets demonstrated their friendly attitude toward their English ally when a Soviet officer who failed to meet the British at his appointed time received as punishment five days confinement to his room on bread and water.¹²²

Though pleased with the cooperative attitude of the Soviets, the British discovered even during their brief contact with the Soviets that a great cultural gap existed between them. Like the Americans, the British regarded their Red Army comrades as primitive peasants who lacked self-discipline and had an alien world-view. The British saw this most vividly when, during a subsequent Allied mission to Vienna, they observed the

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Ibid.

behavior of Red Army officers in public was very different from their own.

For example, while at an Anglo-Soviet reception in a crowded room at the Park Hotel Schönbrunn, a fight erupted between a Soviet officer and his Russian girlfriend. The spat came to the attention of the British when the girlfriend insulted her beau by calling him "'Uncivilized.'" Enraged, he responded by denouncing her as a traitor. In reply to this, the young woman gave him a crack over his head with a beer bottle. Springing to his feet, the Soviet officer then groped for his pistol. As this occurred, several other Red Army officers attempted to subdue him, but others began pulling them away. With shots ringing out and general "Pandemonium" breaking loose, the British officers on the scene reacted by calling upon their military police. The British MPs pushed through the packed room and ultimately subdued the disruptive Soviet officer by taking him outside and banging his head against a "brick wall to the cheers of the Austrian populace" who happened upon the scene.¹²³

As might be expected, the Soviets were indignant for two reasons. First, the British military police were not responsible for maintaining order in Vienna and, therefore, lacked authority to seize a Red Army officer. Second, as a Soviet officer put it, the British MPs had beaten up an Allied officer in front of "our common enemy." The British responded with many apologies and offers of drinks. Finally the Soviet commandant relented and accepted the British apologies along with a glass of whisky. The biggest shock, however, was yet to come. As the commandant drank with

¹²³Masha Williams, White Among Reds, pp.5-6.

the British officers he said, "'Don't worry about the man. He will be shot.'"¹²⁴

If life had a different meaning to the Red Army officer corps, the British also found that Soviets lacked any English notion concerning the sanctity of private property. During the first Vienna mission, the British contingent disapprovingly noted that the Red Army in Vienna had scant respect for the private property of others. Inevitably, the British could not withhold a certain admiration for Austrians because they considered them to be "fundamentally law-abiding." Unlike their American colleagues, the British keenly observed Soviet looting and noted that Red Army soldiers had carried off bedding, radios, cars, furniture and even rifled safe deposit boxes for their gold.¹²⁵ One British report even suggested that political use might be made of the friendly attitude of the Viennese because the Austrians viewed the British and the Russians "respectively as St. George and the Dragon."¹²⁶

Most striking, however, remained the ultimate British assessment of the Soviet motivation for Soviet cooperation in Vienna. Here, the British claimed that though Soviets had been cordial and cooperative, enough evidence suggested that just under the surface of friendliness, a degree of suspicion lingered. Conceding that allowance had to be made that most Red Army officers in Vienna had had no previous contact with the Western Allies, the British warned that it could not be forgotten that reliable Central European sources claimed that Red Army troops in Hungary and the Balkans were

¹²⁴Ibid., p.6. Apparently the sentence was not carried out, White claims to have seen the same Red Army officer later "lounging drunkenly" on a Vienna bench.

¹²⁵"Report to Head, Intelligence, Soviet Behavior in Vienna," PRO-FO 1020/89.

¹²⁶"Report to Head, Intelligence, Austrian Reactions to the British," PRO-FO 1020/89.

freely discussing a possible future outbreak of hostilities between the West and the Soviet Union. The report concluded that Russian friendliness, however genuine, would be subordinated to the needs of Soviet intelligence.¹²⁷ Without doubt, some of the British mission interpreted Soviet friendliness in the worst light possible.

The American View of the Vienna Mission's Success

In contrast, the two American experts in Soviet affairs on the Vienna mission interpreted Soviet friendliness in a much more benign light. Samouce, for instance, claimed that a general spirit of cordiality prevailed in Soviet-American relations. To him, the few problems between the two powers seemed to be the product of bureaucratic misunderstanding, not political ill will.¹²⁸ As for Thayer, he reported that the personal contacts between the members of the mission and their Soviet hosts developed into "strong mutual admiration and friendship." Thayer cautioned, however, that the postwar relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would ultimately be determined by Stalin. In his experience, Thayer found that all too often, "Russian good will and friendliness can be shut off under orders from Moscow as easily as one extinguishes an electric light." Still, daily military-to-military contact and frequent social gatherings had produced an atmosphere of congeniality. Indeed, Western enlisted men also found their Red Army counterparts anxious to demonstrate the warmth of their feelings for their Allies.¹²⁹ For both

¹²⁷"Report to Head, General Report on Conditions in Vienna," PRO-FO 1020/89.

¹²⁸W. Alexander Samouce, "I Do Understand the Russians."

¹²⁹Oliver Rathkolb, Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik, p.284.

Americans and Soviets, the mood of the moment remained one of mutual admiration.

The reports of those Americans higher up the chain of command simply mirrored those made by Samouce and Thayer. For instance, General Joseph T. McNarney reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Red Army officers encountered by the Vienna mission were friendly and eager to have Westerners take up positions in the city.¹³⁰ The State Department's John Erhardt reported to the Secretary of State that the Soviet authorities in Vienna provided hospitality and were friendly toward officers and enlisted men. Erhardt, who later became the American political advisor in Austria, went on to say that "The friendliness shown by the Soviet officers was in keeping with the warmth with which the Soviet rank and file greeted the American soldiers." Erhardt, probably referring to Samouce and Thayer, also reported that some of Flory's officers with prior experience dealing with the Soviets believed that the cordiality and cooperation of the Red Army in Vienna was "without precedent in their previous experiences."¹³¹

By contrast, in 1950, a report from the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria claimed that the Vienna mission had been a failure due to Soviet obstructionism. According to the report, the Soviet attitude in Vienna was one of restricting American activities in the city and denying access to such vital installations as airfields. The report went on to speculate that the reason that the Soviets were so uncooperative was that they had yet to complete "their stripping of Vienna of

¹³⁰McNarney to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.150.

¹³¹Erhardt to Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.138. HQ 15th Army Group's "Intelligence Summary," no.3, p.1, 12 June 1945, noted that "The overall picture in Vienna is a sombre one, but shot through with the warmth of the Viennese welcome and the rosy glow of Russian hospitality," see NA-RG 59.

industrial material and other war booty."¹³² Certainly, the 1950 report neglected to mention any of the positive points concerning the Soviets which had been so frequently found in reports written at the end of the war.

Conclusion

In retrospect, one might too easily conclude that the reports of 1945 were merely naive and insignificant. After all, the Soviets and Americans were fundamentally different in terms of culture and politics. Also, future policy would be made in Moscow and Washington, not by American officers in Austria. In a sense, the Vienna mission's contact with the Soviets did provide a number of hints of the general breakdown in relations which was to come in the near future. Even prior to the political rivalry of the Cold War, American and Soviet soldiers had had different experiences both in war and peace. For instance, the Soviet liberation of Vienna was in marked contrast to the last operations by the Western Allies. For the average Soviet soldier, the "Great Patriotic War" had been a vicious racial-nationalist conflict. Also, many Soviet soldiers and officers brought the baggage of a peasant background. Cut off from the outside world, the soldiers of the Red Army found the West a fearful and wonderfully strange place which was outside the pale of their earlier experiences. Most significant, Soviet soldiers had come of age under Stalin's regime. They knew that failure to follow orders meant severe punishment. Such differences might have caused a critical observer to conclude that

¹³²"Report of the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria: Final Report," 1 October 1950 (microfilm), pp.3-4.

there was little chance for developing a common basis for understanding.

In June 1945, however, the Americans of the Vienna mission had sensible reasons for believing that future cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States remained well within the realm of possibility. In their meetings, the visiting Americans found their Red Army counterparts both friendly and, on most matters, cooperative. Also, it must not be forgotten that the Americans and British had come to Vienna with a world-view shaped by the recently concluded war against Nazi Germany. Accordingly, they saw the Soviets as allies and the Austrians as German enemies. Though the war had officially ended, for many American officers in Austria the Cold War had yet to begin.

Indeed, the depth of continued wartime feeling can be seen in the American and British reaction to the Red Army's rape of Austrian women and the American reaction to the looting of Austrian property during Vienna's liberation. When the Austrians attempted to recount Soviet brutalities, the reaction from the visiting Americans often ranged from outright disbelief to extreme skepticism. Even when some in the Vienna mission acknowledged that the Red Army had been heavy handed, the Americans saw such actions as understandable because of the context of war and, in some rape cases, the carelessness of Austrian women. Adding to the distrust of the Viennese, the British pointed out that the Viennese were unable to judge objectively the actions of the Red Army. Further, the Americans and British suspected that the Viennese hoped to win the sympathy of the Western Allies with horrific tales of Soviet behavior.

Flory's orders to the Vienna mission and American policy at the time both exemplified an American desire

for good relations with the Soviets and a mistrust of the Austrians. While on the Vienna mission, Flory showed great determination to cooperate with the Soviets and prevent any misunderstandings. Even when faced with Soviet restrictions, Flory kept the mission in Vienna and eventually reached an understanding with them. Finally, the Americans like Thayer understood that the Soviets were products of an alien culture and polity but believed that friendly relations between the two peoples would naturally develop if Stalin allowed it to occur.

Chapter II

The Coming of the Cold War in Austria: The Transformation of the American View of the Soviets, 1945-1946

Introduction

As with the Vienna Mission, wartime experience shaped early American military-diplomatic policy and opinion regarding both the Austrians and the Soviets. The division of Vienna by the European Advisory Commission (EAC) demonstrated, on the part of the Americans, a faith in the continued durability of the American-Soviet alliance. The American delegate to the EAC, with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established what would turn out to be an indefensible American zone in Vienna deep within Soviet Austria. Even more remarkable, the Americans also agreed to make use of an airfield removed from the American zone in Vienna and completely surrounded by the Soviet Zone in Lower Austria.

In order to understand the situation in Austria in July 1945, it must be remembered that the Army in Europe neither wanted nor planned for a war with the Soviet Union. Instead, the Army's focus was upon winning the war with Japan and maintaining order on the European continent. After the establishment of an occupation force in Austria, the Americans remained on their guard against possible Austrian internal unrest. In the months following the war, military intelligence concentrated its efforts on matters such as rooting out potential trouble-makers in the Austrian population and conducting denazification. Only in late 1946 did the

American intelligence begin to shift its focus directly to Soviet designs upon affairs in Austria.

Immediately following the war, most American generals attempted to foster Allied cooperation and to suppress any difficulties with the Red Army. Yet in discussing his own role as American commander in Austria, General Mark W. Clark retrospectively claims that he had been both opposed to the Soviet moves against Austria and willing to cooperate with the Soviets in Austria. An examination of evidence from the time indicates that Clark was far from a Cold Warrior in 1945. In August 1945, Clark considered the Austrians as yet-to-be rehabilitated enemies. Also, Clark sided with the Soviets against the British concerning important early questions before the Allies in Austria. Even as late as November 1945, Clark sided with the Soviets against the newly elected Austrian government in order to allow the Soviets to save face. As a result, in early relations with the Soviets, Clark went to great lengths to accommodate the Red Army in Austria in the hopes of promoting Allied unity. Only later, in early 1946, did Clark, frustrated by Soviet intransigence over efforts to rebuild Austria and unable to return home triumphant from Austria, come to view the Red Army as an enemy force bent upon preventing Austria's complete liberation.

General Flory Reports

After leaving Vienna's rubble-strewn streets on the morning of 13 June, Brigadier General Flory reported to Headquarters, 15th Army Group, which at that time was located in the southern Italian city of Caserta. Upon arrival, the American general presented brief accounts of subjects ranging from the Red Army's occupation to

the city's police problems which had been surveyed by his officers during the mission's nine day reconnaissance behind Red Army lines.¹ Shortly thereafter, Generals Winterton and Cherrière, along with the American political officer Erhardt, joined Flory and his superiors for several meetings to discuss the coming Allied occupation of Vienna.

The information provided by Flory, along with his Vienna mission report and the reports of his Western counterparts, quickly forced American diplomats to revise their plans for the future quadripartite occupation of the Austrian capital.² Thanks to the Vienna mission, American diplomats no longer relied upon "wild guesswork" about conditions inside Vienna.³ As a consequence, John G. Winant, the American diplomatic representative to the EAC in London, soon put forth new answers to the following key questions then before the body: what should be the extent of the Vienna city-

¹See Flory's "Special Report of the Vienna Mission." Flory's report of 15 June 1945 consisted of factual surveys provided to him by his officers. These factual surveys dealt with the following topics: the Red Army's occupation of Vienna, legal and financial affairs, the city's food supply, educational matters, Vienna's labor supply, displaced persons, prisoners of war, and police problems.

²Erhardt to Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.144, Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p. 119, and Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p. 123. Also see, Erhardt to Secretary of State, 31 July 1946, 863.00/7-3146 (microfilm).

³Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.104. Concerning the difficulties of communications from Vienna, it should also be noted that even the Austrian provisional government under Karl Renner was initially unable to establish contact with western Austria. See "Austria: Weekly Background Notes: no. 5," 11 July 1945, Control Office for Germany & Austria (COGA) PRO-FO 1007/340 (hereafter PRO-FO 1007). For many early Western reports concerning the city, Radio Vienna served as an important source.

boundary, and which airfields in the Vienna area should come under Western control?⁴

For several months, American officials had universally agreed among themselves that United States forces would have to have an airfield inside the, as yet undetermined, American zone in Vienna.⁵ In a cable to Erhardt, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius had pointedly remarked that the American military needed "unrestricted use" of an airfield which was capable of accommodating four-engine transport planes.⁶ The Joint Chiefs of Staff had also insisted upon control over an airfield within the future American zone in Vienna.⁷ As in the war, the military placed great reliance upon the use of air power, but now for communication, supply, and transportation as well. To go to Vienna without securing an airfield would present American forces in the city with both communication and logistical headaches. Therefore, with the requirements of the military in mind, American diplomats in the EAC had long attempted to secure an airfield for the United States. This was done even at the expense of American status within the Allied camp. For instance, at one point, Winant prepared to exchange the American claim to the Vienna Innere Stadt for an airfield.⁸

⁴Winant to Secretary of State, 22 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.150.

⁵Acting Secretary of State to Winant, 5 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.45. Also see Mair, Four-Power Control in Austria, p. 306.

⁶Secretary of State to Erhardt, 21 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.80.

⁷Acting Secretary of State to Winant, 5 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.45. Also see Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1169-3.

⁸Winant to Secretary of State, 15 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.66.

Prior to Flory's Vienna mission, the American military and diplomatic corps had incorrectly supposed that Schwechat Airfield, located within the Vienna Gau, would best suit American purposes. As a result, to American minds, it had followed that the surrounding district of Schwechat must fall within the future American zone.⁹ The Soviets, however, consistently had rejected the American plan. Instead, Fedor Tarasovich Gousev, Soviet representative to the EAC, insisted that Vienna's city-limits be reduced to those of 1938, prior to the Nazi creation of the larger Vienna Gau (district). Unfortunately, such a move prevented the inclusion of Schwechat in the American zone.

When the Americans persisted in their efforts to obtain Schwechat, Gousev responded by pressing two alternatives. First, he offered the Americans the use of Aspern Airfield, located just east of the Danube in Bezirk 22, with the restriction that the airfield remain under Red Army command.¹⁰ Winant quickly rejected the Soviet proposal because the Red Army would retain authority over the base. Later, with the Soviets facing united Western pressure, Gousev had offered Tulln, located well outside of the Vienna Gau, for use by all the Western allies. Alarmed by the prospect of a crowded airfield with planes from three different militaries, Winant had turned down the second Soviet offer and insisted that American forces must have an airfield within the future American zone.¹¹

⁹Acting Secretary of State to Winant, 5 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.46.

¹⁰Winant to Secretary of State, 15 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.66.

¹¹Winant to Secretary of State, 23 April 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.84. Also see Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.111. Whitnah & Erickson claim that the American military initially believed that Tulln was unacceptable

The return of Flory's Vienna mission dramatically transformed American thinking on the airfield problem by revealing that Schwechat would be inadequate as an American base.¹² Though located within the Vienna Gau and having a long undamaged concrete runway, Flory's men found that Schwechat's supporting buildings had been completely leveled during the war. As a result, they were in need of time-consuming repairs. Also, as both the Americans and British noted, the airfield's grass was "extremely rough" and poorly filled in bomb craters pitted the field.¹³

By contrast, Flory's men had discovered that the previously rejected Tulln Airfield provided a more appropriate air base for the American military. It had a runway in good condition, undamaged support buildings, and could immediately accommodate heavy transport planes. Indeed, both American and British reconnaissance teams on the Vienna mission reached the identical conclusions; Tulln was superior to the other airfields in the Vienna area (at least those which the Americans and British had been allowed to inspect during their June reconnaissance of the area around Vienna).¹⁴ The American and British teams arrived at their conclusions not only because of Tulln's condition but because the field's runway showed prospect for further extension

because of its location outside the Gau, unsuitability for heavy aircraft, and "poor communications with the city," p.111.

¹²Erhardt to Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.140. The Red Army refused to permit Flory's air team to inspect Aspern Airfield which was east of the Danube in Bezirk 22.

¹³"Report to the Head," PRO-FO 1020/89 and "Airfield Reconnaissance Report," Annex B to the Report of the Vienna Mission, folder: 1945, box 1, Top Secret General Records, POLAD, NA-RG 84. Also see General McNarney to Joint Chiefs of Staff, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.147.

¹⁴Erhardt to Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.142.

without great difficulty.¹⁵ Consequently the Americans now decided on Tulln, not Schwechat, as the most useful site for American purposes in the Vienna area.¹⁶

In his Caserta discussions, Flory also reminded Allied officials of two additional points which directly influenced American opinion concerning the city-boundary and airfield issues. As the Soviets had noted for some time, since the Vienna Gau had been a Nazi innovation, retaining it under the Allied occupation might appear unseemly.¹⁷ Also, the Vienna city government wanted to restore the older Vienna boundary as the city's official limits.¹⁸ Faced with Austrian hopes and political necessity, Erhardt concluded that the Americans should not continue to press for the Allied occupation of the entire Vienna Gau.¹⁹

As a result of Erhardt's conclusions, the American diplomats in the EAC decided to drop the demand for Vienna's division along Gau lines and, with the support of the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, Mediterranean Theater, redirected their efforts towards securing

¹⁵"Report to the Head," PRO-FO 1020/89. Also see General McNarney to Joint Chiefs of Staff, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.147.

¹⁶According to Erhardt, if the Gau "is taken as the area to be subdivided, one good but badly damaged airfield, two unsatisfactory airfields and a number of fair field sites would fall within the southeastern zone district 23." In the western and northwestern sections of Greater Vienna, which the Americans ultimately took up, there were no airfields. See Erhardt's report to Secretary of State, 16 June 1946, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, pp.142-143. Brigadier General Ralph A. Snaverly led the Vienna mission's inspection team to Tulln field, see "U.S. Allied Commission for Austria History," p.40b, folder 252, box 31, NA-RG 260.

¹⁷Erhardt to Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.140. The Soviets refused to agree to this arrangement, see Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, pp.123-124.

¹⁸Erhardt to Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p. 145.

¹⁹Ibid., p.143.

exclusive unrestricted access by the Army to Tulln airfield.²⁰

Despite the decision in the American camp that an airfield outside the future U.S. Zone was acceptable under the circumstances, Gousev in the EAC refused to change his earlier position and continued in his insistence that all three Western powers must make use of Tulln. With the Soviets allowing all the Western Allies only a single airfield and each of the latter insisting upon their own field, the EAC reached a deadlock on the issue and decided to move on to other matters, leaving the airfield question for resolution at the last minute.

In addition to changing the focus of the EAC's airfield debate, Flory immediately brought home a number of the practical difficulties which would inevitably complicate the quadripartite division of Vienna. To begin with, Flory convinced Erhardt that only "the wisdom of Solomon" would allow for the equitable division of key facilities inside Vienna. The battle for Vienna had destroyed or damaged many important buildings and institutions. Also, even had the war never taken place, it was impossible to devise an equitable four-way division of Vienna's facilities such as its docks on the Danube river, railroad stations, radio and cable terminals, recreational grounds and, important for prestige purposes as well as for headquarters, first rate hotels.²¹ Therefore, Erhardt came to view the Vienna situation as one in which simple necessity forced close international cooperation.

²⁰Erhardt to Secretary of State, 17 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.146 & General McNarney to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.148.

²¹Erhardt to Secretary of State, 16 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, pp.140 & 143.

Furthermore, Flory's report made it apparent that merely to restore and maintain basic order in Vienna, the Allies would have to work in harmony. Thus far, the Red Army had done little to encourage any but the most basic reconstruction work in the city, and the Vienna city government functioned only on the district level. The difficulties in Vienna were so grim that Austrian city officials made frequent lunchtime visits to local Soviet commanders in hopes of a free meal.²² Most disturbing, the Red Army had been in the process of looting parts of the city since the liberation.²³

The EAC Agreement Concerning the Allies in Vienna

By the end of June, relations between Stalin and the West allowed the EAC to conclude an agreement concerning the Allied occupation of Austria. Within several weeks, the diplomatic body arrived at a compromise agreement later known as the first Control Agreement for Austria.²⁴ In the agreement, Western representatives acquiesced to the long-standing Soviet

²²"United States Allied Commission for Austria History, Part II," p.16, folder 252, box 31, NA-RG 260.

²³Ibid. Also, General McNarney to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.149.

²⁴For three accounts concerning the negotiations in the EAC and subsequent agreement see Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," pp.115-131, Edgar L. Erickson, "The Zoning of Austria" in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Jan. 1950) vol.267, pp.106-113, and Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, pp.122-133. For the text of the agreement see, Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria, Foreign Relations of the U.S.: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, vol. I (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), (hereafter FRUS, Potsdam) pp.351-355 or The Department of State Bulletin, vol. XIII, no. 320, 12 August 1945, pp. 221-222. For the text of the "Covering Report" see, Winant to Secretary of State, 9 July 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, pp.158-159. Also see, Allied Commission for Austria: A Handbook, nd., pp.32-33.

demand that Vienna be returned to its pre-Nazi boundaries. In doing so, they removed the most troublesome source of disagreement between the Allies on the Austrian question.²⁵ Accordingly, the Allies stripped Vienna of the surrounding suburban Bezirke (districts) of Schwechat, Mödling, Liesing, and Klosterneuburg, along with those portions of Gross-Enzersdorf and residential Penzing which had been outside the city prior to 1938.²⁶

In return for the restoration of Vienna's pre-Nazi limits, the Soviets accepted the principle of joint control over most important facilities within the city. In particular, the EAC agreement on Austria contained a "Covering Report" which stipulated that Vienna's transportation system, communications network, and public utilities must be operated for mutual Allied benefit. Also, the Soviets agreed that they would provide Western forces much needed small unit training grounds and recreational areas within the Soviet zone surrounding Vienna.²⁷ At least on paper, the Allies successfully devised a detailed agreement which seemed likely to forestall any future misunderstanding in occupied Vienna. Most significant, from the American view, the first control agreement presupposed continued Allied cooperation and the desire to work towards common goals in Austria.

With the city-boundary question settled and all sides agreeing to the principle of joint control, the EAC reached agreement on the division of Vienna's districts and granted each of the Allies jurisdiction

²⁵Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.116.

²⁶Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.119.

²⁷Ibid., p.120.

over sections of the city known as "zones."²⁸ For the Americans, once again the influence of the Vienna mission report was evident. Flory had recommended that the United States take up a zone of occupation in western Vienna.²⁹ Ultimately the Americans received the Vienna western business Bezirke of Neubau, Josefstadt, and Alsergrund, each of which bordered on the Ring of the Innere Stadt. Also, the Americans received the northwestern residential Bezirke of Hernals, Währing, and Döbling. Despite damage to its water and electrical works, the American zone had weathered the war with only about 10% of its more than 13,000 buildings sustaining damage.³⁰ Feeding the nearly 370,000 residents in the American zone, however, remained a grave problem.³¹

Next to the American zone, the French sector contained the Bezirke of Mariahilf, Penzing, Fünfhaus, and Ottakring. The French had a population of over 390,000 residents, with structures generally in good repair.³² The British sector, by contrast, had over 400,000 residents and was split in two by districts under Soviet control. The division of the British sector allowed the Soviets to maintain their influence over most of the working class and industrial districts

²⁸American reports generally use the term "zone" when referring to the American districts in Vienna. Some British reports, however, make use of the term "sector" when referring to the British districts.

²⁹McNarney to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol.III, p.148 & Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.124.

³⁰Handwritten Note, folder 2, box 40, Mark Clark Papers, The Citadel Archives, Charleston, South Carolina (hereafter Clark Papers).

³¹"USFA Report of Operations: July-September 1946," p.17, NA-RG 260.

³²Ibid.

of Vienna.³³ Perhaps to compensate the British for such a peculiar arrangement, part of the British sector included a particularly desirable portion of southwest Vienna composed of Bezirke of Margarethen, Meidling, and Hietzing. It is worth noting that the British received the famous Schönbrunn Palace.³⁴ The rest of the British zone included part of the city's southeast side or the districts of Landstrasse, with its narrow streets and two giant flak towers, and Simmering. The latter district was residential and had suffered extensive damage, so much so that the French had earlier refused it as part of their zone. Landstrasse, in contrast, was the most desirable of the city's business districts.³⁵

In addition, the EAC sanctioned the Soviet occupation of the remainder of Vienna, placing a little over 510,000 people within the Soviet zone.³⁶ Part of the Soviet zone contained Vienna's largely bombed out working class neighborhoods in the southern Bezirke of Wieden and Favoriten; the remainder of the Soviet zone was east of the Danube Canal and included the Bezirke of Leopoldstadt, Brigittenau, Floridsdorf, and Gross-Enzersdorf. The Americans inspecting these districts had variously described them as being filled with "nothing but squalor" and containing "one of the worst slums in

³³"Austrian Weekly Background Notes, No.8," 2 August 1945, PRO-FO 1007/340. The Soviets maintained in the EAC that they wanted Wieden and Favoriten in order to have "adequate facilities for the quartering of Russian garrison troops," see Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p. 124.

³⁴William Lloyd Stearman claims that the British received the Schönbrunn in compensation for sharing an Schwechat Airfield with the French, see his The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria (Bonn: Siegler & Co., 1962), p.29.

³⁵Erhardt to Secretary of State, 17 June 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.146.

³⁶"USFA Report of Operations: July-September 1946," p.17, NA-RG 260.

Vienna."³⁷ Of course, all of Lower Austria, which surrounded Vienna and now included part of the former Vienna Gau, fell within the Soviet occupation zone.³⁸

Most significant for the division of Vienna, the EAC decided that the First Bezirk (District), covering the old city and the Ring Area known as the Innere Stadt, would be an international zone under joint Allied administration.³⁹ For Austria, the Innere Stadt already had particular significance because it had traditionally been the heart of Austria's government and, until the early 20th century, an influential center of political authority in Europe. In creating an international zone, the EAC demonstrated that the Innere Stadt was too significant to be in the hands of only one Allied power. Also, since the First District contained the city's principal office and government buildings, banks, stores, and hotels, an Allied occupation ensured that only a combined policy of international cooperation would permit Vienna to recover from the destruction of war.

During the Cold War, the difference between Berlin and Vienna become most apparent in that the former lacked such an international zone.⁴⁰ Also unlike Berlin, the EAC provided that Vienna's would be an international zone under the authority of the Allied Kommendatura or Inter-Allied Command. Consisting of four commandants, each of whom represented an Allied power, the Inter-

³⁷"Report on Accommodations and Facilities in the City of Vienna, Austria," Annex A to the Report of the Vienna Mission, folder: 1945, box 1, Top Secret General Records, POLAD, NA-RG 84.

³⁸Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria, FRUS, Potsdam, vol. I, pp.351-355.

³⁹Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.128.

⁴⁰Mair, Four-Power Control in Austria, p.314 & Manfred Rauchensteiner, "Die Wiener Interalliierte Kommandatura, 1945-1955," p.391.

Allied Command rotated the chairmanship of the Innere Stadt administration each month.⁴¹ In addition, the Allied commanders on the Inter-Allied command were supposed to meet every ten days and if necessary more frequently to discuss matters pertaining to the governing of the city.⁴²

With Vienna's districts now officially divided, the EAC once again returned to the all-important airfield question. Until the last minute, the Soviet position in the EAC had remained essentially the same. Gousev had continued to insist that all the Western Allies make do with a single airfield, claiming that the Soviet Union merely wished to prevent difficulties of "flight control" over the Soviet zone.⁴³ Each of the Western Allies had responded by pressing for an airfield. They had cited reasons of practicality, national pride, and the need to impress upon the Austrians an image of Allied unity and equality. After much wrangling, finally the Soviets compromised and allowed the Western Allies a total of two airfields located outside the city limits.⁴⁴ Knowing that they increasingly needed outside aid in order to feed the city, the Soviets perhaps

⁴¹For the Americans, the months were January, May, and September while the British were in charge during February, June, and October. The French months were March, July, and November. This left the Soviets with April, August, and December. See Manfred Rauchensteiner, "Die Wiener Interalliierte Kommandatura, 1945-1955," p.401.

⁴²"Detail of the Meeting of the Executive Committee," 15 September 1945, Allied Commission for Austria, Proceedings of the Executive Committee (microfilm). An examination of the records of the Inter-Allied Command reveals that its meetings were usually held every two weeks. On occasion, however, events such as the May 1947 hunger demonstration required additional meetings.

⁴³Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.127.

⁴⁴Ibid.

decided that they had little choice but to allow the Western Allies the airfields.

According to the EAC agreement, the American military government received exclusive permission to operate and control "Tulln aerodrome" along with its supporting installations. Yet the airfield remained located some eight hilly miles from the border of the American zone in Vienna. Inevitably, for American military men the distance would present potential logistical problems; still, in July 1945, they failed to envision that on several occasions in the not-so-distant future Soviet troops would temporarily halt American traffic to and from the field. The Americans also failed to foresee that even when the road to Tulln remained open, the Soviets would usually permit Americans to travel only on a single route which required about forty minutes and which was unsuitable under poor weather conditions.⁴⁵ Clearly it is doubtful that the Americans even contemplated the implications of a full blockade, like the later Berlin blockade, at the time.

In any case, in mid-June 1945 General Mark W. Clark had believed that the U.S. was "taking a big trimming" on the airfield question in Vienna.⁴⁶ By July, however, he had other concerns, and his diary leaves no hint of regrets concerning the placing of American soldiers in Vienna. Indeed, at that time he only insisted that the establishment of an American presence in Vienna "should be carefully planned and executed only after complete

⁴⁵Mark Clark's speech at the National War College, 9 October 1946, folder 6, box 1, Clark Papers and Allied Commission for Austria, p.36. Also see William Lloyd Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p.116.

⁴⁶15 June 1945, vol. 9, Box 65, General Mark W. Clark Dairies, The Citadel Archives, Charleston, South Carolina (hereafter Clark Diaries).

agreement with the Russians."⁴⁷ In all likelihood, Clark's earlier June reference to the airfield issue did not foreshadow the looming Cold War. Rather, it was due either to Flory's earlier inability to inspect all the Vienna area airfields or frustration over the fact that the American zone failed to contain an airfield. Probably, Clark followed in the footsteps of the Joint Chiefs and raised no objection to taking Tulln as long as a specific agreement had been reached with the Red Army which placed the field under unrestricted American control.

While the Americans secured Tulln, the British and French made do with a joint occupation of the Schwechat Airfield. Officially the EAC granted British and French forces joint control over the operation "Schwechat Aerodrome."⁴⁸ As was the case with Tulln, the British found in the years to come that the Red Army occasionally blocked transit between its sectors in Vienna and the airfield.⁴⁹ Again, like the Americans, the British in July 1945 did not openly express any concerns about the possibility of blockage.

Part of the reason for such Anglo-American confidence in the viability of Allied occupied Vienna had to be the specific written guarantees of transit rights which the EAC granted the Western Allies in the control agreement's "Covering Report." First, the Western Allies had "free" transit rights to move unimpeded between the Western airfields and Vienna. Second, they had the same right of transit to move back and forth between the Western Zones in Austria and

⁴⁷12 July 1945, Clark Diaries, box 66, vol. 10.

⁴⁸FRUS, Potsdam, vol. I, pp.351-355.

⁴⁹Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p.116 & Bader, Austria Between East & West, p.102.

Vienna.⁵⁰ American military authorities in 1945 remained confident that the Soviets would keep to their agreements once they had been reached by the two powers.⁵¹

Concrete evidence for the belief in the likelihood of continued Allied cooperation could be found in the protocols reached during the two meetings of the chiefs of staff of Allied commanders in mid and late July 1945. In the first protocol, the Allied chiefs of staff stipulated that all Allied military personnel garrisoned in Vienna had the "right to circulate unhampered within the city limits of Vienna."⁵² Several days later at a second meeting, the chiefs of staff issued another protocol concerning among other things the regulation of overland travel by Western forces into and out of Vienna. The American and French forces were allowed the use of the Linz-St. Pölten-Vienna highway. Also, the Americans and the French had the use of a parallel railway, three trains each way daily. Later in 1945, the Americans received Soviet permission to run the famous Mozart Express. The British, in turn, had the use of the Bruck-Wiener-Neustadt-Vienna road and the right to run two trains daily on the parallel railway. For their part, the Soviets were to maintain the roads to Vienna and promised that vehicles and trains would

⁵⁰Allied Commission for Austria, p.32.

⁵¹By contrast, after the Soviets violated their verbal agreement concerning Western transit rights to Berlin, General Clay doubted that Soviets would have kept their word had a written transit agreement been reached in the case of Berlin. After the Berlin airlift, he believed that "The Soviet Government seems able to find technical reasons at will to justify the violation of understandings whether verbal or written." See his, Decision in Germany (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1950), p.26.

⁵²Allied Commission for Austria, p.33 and PRO-FO 1020/2916. Also see Cox, "The Allied Commission and the Creation of the Second Austrian Republic," p.161 and Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.152.

move through their zone unhindered and free from inspections.⁵³ Though the two meetings of the chiefs of staff in Vienna were not trouble-free, they succeed in defining more clearly how the occupation of Vienna would actually be conducted. Later, in September, the Allied commanders in Austria reconfirmed the right of all military personnel to travel without Soviet restriction between Vienna and the Western zones.⁵⁴

Potsdam & Austria

As the chiefs of staff met to discuss ground level concerns, on the international level the Potsdam conference (16 July-2 August) shaped the context for Austrian affairs in several ways. Most important, the Allied heads of government at Potsdam agreed that, though Austria would be free from paying formal war reparations, "German assets" in eastern Austria would go to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, since the decision to grant the Soviets ownership of "German assets" came at the end of the conference, the Western powers failed to define what property in Austria was German. As a result, "German assets" became a source of disagreement throughout the occupation.⁵⁵ Soon virtually anything which the Nazis had built, financed, or seized during the Nazi occupation became a potential "German asset." In November 1947 the Soviets went so far as to claim the partly German financed "Reich's Autobahn" in Austria as German asset which, therefore, now belonged the Soviet

⁵³Allied Commission for Austria, p.34.

⁵⁴Cox, "The Allied Commission and the Creation of the Second Austrian Republic," p.161 and Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.152.

⁵⁵Cronin, Great Power Politics, p.29.

Union.⁵⁶ Naturally, such an approach weakened the Austrian economy and later clashed with American sponsored economic recovery efforts.

Two additional Allied decisions reached at Potsdam helped shape the occupation period of Austrian history. First, for administrative reasons the Allies decided to devise an Italian Peace Treaty before taking up a treaty for Austria. As a consequence, citing the need to complete treaty negotiations with Italy and other states, the Soviets refused for nearly two years to begin serious discussion of the Austrian question. Second, President Truman urged the creation of a Council of Foreign Ministers to work out the terms of peace treaties with former enemy states and other matters pertaining to the postwar settlement of European affairs. For Austria, the later acceptance of Truman's proposal, along with the demise of the EAC, elevated "abstract questions of Austrian sovereignty" to the Council of Foreign Ministers and placed the care of more practical questions relating to the Allied occupation of Austria in the hands of a body recently created by the EAC, the Allied Commission for Austria (ACA).⁵⁷

The Allied Commission for Austria

Shortly before the Potsdam meeting, the EAC had already granted sovereignty over Austria to the ACA. In addition to its governing powers, the ACA's duties consisted of coordinating occupation policy between the Allies to create a second Austrian republic purged of its fascist and Nazi past. In organization the ACA

⁵⁶"Present Situation of Reich's Autobanen in Austria," 18 November 1947, unmarked folder, box 118, NA-RG 388.

⁵⁷Cronin, Great Power Politics, p.28.

consisted of the Allied Council (ALCO), an Executive Committee (EXCO) and supporting staffs.⁵⁸ The four Allied Military Commissioners, one representing each of the Allied commanders in Austria, composed the ALCO.⁵⁹ Like the Inter-Allied Command, which it oversaw, the ALCO met every ten days in Vienna, and each member had the assistance of his respective political advisor.⁶⁰

At the first meeting of the Allied Council on 11 September, the Allied Commissioners decided that the chairmanship of the council would rotate monthly, with the U.S. chairman taking up his turn as the first Commissioner in that same month.⁶¹ The ALCO's duties included initiating plans and making decisions concerning military, political, economic matters which affected "Austria as a whole." Added to this, each Allied Commissioner would take up command over his

⁵⁸According to the "U.S. Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II, Post V-E Day to End of 1945," without the existence of an official government, the ALCO held de jure and de facto power over Austria. See folder 252, box 31, NA-RG 260. In 1946-47, The Allied Council exercised supreme authority over Austria by issuing "instructions to the Austria Federal Government," by issuing orders to the troops under the command of each commander, and "Through instructions to the Vienna Inter-Allied Command" in Vienna, see "Outline of USFA History: 1 July 1946-30 June 1947," pp. 5-6, folder 9, NA-RG 260. On 28 June 1946, the Allies implemented the "Second Control Agreement for Austria" which effectively gave control over most domestic affairs to the Austrian government. See Military Government Austria: Report of the U.S. Commissioner, no.8, June 1946, pp.1,18. For a discussion of the "Second Control Agreement," see Bader, Austria Between East & West, pp.65-70.

⁵⁹After the Second Control Agreement of June 1946, the post of Military Commissioner became that of High Commissioner. In October 1950, the post of U.S. High Commissioner came under civilian control.

⁶⁰"U.S. Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II," p.8, folder 252, box 31, NA-RG 260. In actual practice, the ALCO usually met twice a month on every other Friday, see Wagnleitner, Understanding Austria, p.577.

⁶¹Allied Commission for Austria, Proceedings of the Allied Council, Official Minutes of the meetings of the Allied Council, 1st Meeting, 11 September 1945 (microfilm).

country's armed forces in Austria and "exercise supreme authority" in the zone occupied by his forces.⁶²

As for the division of Austria's Länder (provinces), the Allies had agreed for some time that there would be four separate occupation zones. In anticipation of the EAC agreement but prior to its formal ratification by the Allied governments, the Western Allies began moving their troops from temporary positions held since the end of hostilities into permanent occupation zones. Beginning on 9 July, the Americans turned over the city of Innsbruck to the French, who already occupied Vorarlberg, and by the following day the rest of Tyrol passed into French hands. On that same day, the Army turned over most of the American-held portion of Styria to the British. By the end of the month, the Americans gave over their remaining holdings in Styria to the British.⁶³

Once the EAC agreement concerning Austria received official sanction by the home governments, Stalin granted the Americans permission to move east to the border of Lower Austria at the Enns River near the city of Steyr. By doing so, the Americans occupied Austrian territory which had been previously captured by the Red Army. A short time later, the Army's 65th Infantry Division relinquished to the Russians a portion of Lower Austria which was north of the Danube River near Linz.⁶⁴ Writing several years after the fact, Mark Clark expressed his dismay that without his knowledge Washington had devised plans to give up an

⁶²Allied Commission for Austria, Proceedings of the Allied Council, Official Minutes of the meetings of the Allied Council, 1st Meeting, 11 September 1945 (microfilm).

⁶³"USFA History: 5 July-30 September 1945," folder 4, box 1, NA-RG 260.

⁶⁴Ibid. Unlike in the case in Germany, the Red Army gave up as well as received territory in Austria to the Western Allies.

agriculturally rich portion of Upper Austria. Historians Whitnah and Erickson go so far as to claim that Clark wished to retain this portion of Upper Austria but that the EAC had already promised it to the Soviet Union.⁶⁵ Ignoring the existence of the American patrolled Czech-Bavarian border, Clark also later saw the Red Army's move as part of Communist designs on Czechoslovakia by sealing it off from American occupied Austria.⁶⁶ For the period in question, however, Clark's own diary remains silent on the issue.

By the end of July, the Americans had moved into their official occupation zone in northwestern Austria which included the province of Salzburg and all of Upper Austria situated on the right bank of the Danube River. The British had taken up a zone in the southern part of Austria which included the provinces of Carinthia and Styria. In western Austria, the French now controlled the provinces of Tyrol and Vorarlberg. Finally, the Soviet zone consisted of Lower Austria (with the exception of Vienna), Burgenland, and Upper Austria to the north of the Danube.⁶⁷

The Constraints Upon American Power

In retrospect, some in the military may incorrectly appear to have been naive in their understanding of both the Austrians and the Soviets. It must be recalled, however, that few Western military men had detailed knowledge about the peoples of either country and still

⁶⁵Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.149.

⁶⁶Clark, Calculated Risk, p.455. Clark could have correctly pointed out that the Soviets had sealed the Hungarian border from the West.

⁶⁷"USFA History: 5 July-30 September 1945," folder 4, box 1, NA-RG 260.

fewer had had contact with their counterparts in the Red Army. Moreover, from the perspective of Realpolitik American commanders recognized the limitations of their resources in Europe and the mood of the American people on the home front. With America still facing war with Japan and, shortly, demobilization pressure, commanders in Europe knew that they could ill afford a conflict with the Red Army. In making plans for the European Theater, senior American officers in Central Europe acted under the assumption, "That no one or several of the liberated and co-belligerent nations of Europe" would attack "United States forces in Europe."⁶⁸ Indeed, with many American soldiers stationed far from European ports, American commanders in Europe recognized that their men were in poor position for war with the Soviets or any other European power. Therefore, to the American military it was vital that cooperation between the wartime Allies continue. Only a continuation of the wartime alliance would allow the Army to accomplish its goals in Europe, which were the prevention of disorder in Germany and Austria, the establishment of stable governments in these two countries, and the maintenance of peace on the continent.⁶⁹

In reaching first the EAC agreement and, shortly thereafter, making specific arrangements with the Soviets in Vienna, Western military authorities did not expect the future difficulties of the Cold War and, as a result, could not act in 1945 to secure an agreement to prevent a 1948 blockade of Vienna. As Forest C. Pogue has pointed out concerning the Berlin blockade, if Clark and other American officers had had such premonitions,

⁶⁸H.Q. U.S.F.E.T., "Protective Security Plan--European Theater," 31 July 1945, Clark Papers, folder 2, box 44.

⁶⁹Ibid.

they would have hardly agreed to take up airfields within the Soviet Zone, not to mention garrisoning troops in Vienna miles from their own Austrian zones.⁷⁰

It is also worth remembering that in 1945 all the Allies focused upon an anti-German mission. In late June, the Joint Chiefs charged Clark with two tasks: to eliminate the Nazi influence and then to encourage democratic reform in Austria. The first involved the ending of German and "Nazi domination" of the country. In order to recreate a stable and peaceful Europe, the Americans deemed that the 1938 Anschluss must be revoked and that Austrian Nazis, along with any other indigenous fascist elements, had to be purged. Through this denazification process, the military government would identify, remove from positions of responsibility, as well as punish Nazi party members. Furthermore, the Army was to eliminate "Pan-Germanism, militarism, and other forces opposed to the democratic reconstruction of Austria."⁷¹ Clark's second task involved an Allied creation of a democratic Austria independent of German influence.

As historian William B. Bader has correctly pointed out, American policy in Austria was essentially reconstructive in nature, especially when compared to American occupation policy in Germany, and further, that the reconstructive American policy ultimately clashed with the Soviet Union's punitive policy towards

⁷⁰Forest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p.575. Gen. Clark attributes the awkward division of Vienna to American diplomats who were either "ignorant of the Austrian situation or were motivated by a desire to reduce our commitments and get our troops home as rapidly as possible," see his Calculated Risk, p.460.

⁷¹Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Clark, FRUS, Potsdam, vol.I, 27 June 1945, pp.338-339. Also see The Department of State Bulletin, vol. XIII, no. 331, 28 October 1945, pp.661-673.

Austria.⁷² However, in the early occupation period, the Americans also did emphasize a punitive approach and had no plan to rebuild Austria at the expense of the Soviet Union.⁷³ Indeed, the United States, along with the British and French, failed to treat "Austria as a 'liberated' country" in the first months after the war.⁷⁴ Taking into account that throughout 1945 elements of the German army along, with S.S. troops, continued to surrender to Allied forces in Austria makes the Western position much more readily understood.⁷⁵

A public illustration of the early American policy towards Austria can be found in General Clark's address to the Austrian people during the first post-war Salzburg Music Festival in August 1945. At this time, Clark mentioned that he and his forces had come to help rebuild Austria, but the Austrians must never forget that

The Moscow Declaration . . . contained an admonition to Austrians that they were responsible for their own downfall, and hence, that they must contribute to . . . their own revival. When your country, the first of many unhappy lands, was overrun by the Nazis, many Austrians, I am sorry to say, aided and abetted in the betrayal. More tragically still, in the great conflict which has so recently ended in Europe, your country was in the ranks of our enemies.⁷⁶

⁷²Bader, Austria Between East & West, pp.57-58

⁷³Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Clark, FRUS, Potsdam, vol.I, 27 June 1945, pp.338-339. Also see The Department of State Bulletin, vol. XIII, no. 331, 28 October 1945, pp.661-673.

⁷⁴Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.128.

⁷⁵"U.S Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II," folder 252, box 31, NA-RG 260, p.525.

⁷⁶"Austrian Weekly Background Notes, No.10," 15 August 1945, PRO-FO 1007/340. Emphasis added.

In almost biblical admonitions, Clark continued that, "We expect you to demonstrate that the servants of Hitler among you were a wicked minority whom you will join us in casting out."⁷⁷ Unlike his later public speeches, Clark as yet did not allude to Soviet obstructionism in Austrian affairs.⁷⁸ Rather, Clark's Salzburg speech had more elements in common with broadcasts then aired by Radio Moscow. For instance, in early July, Radio Moscow reminded the Austria people that a "dangerous residue of Nazi poison still" remained in their country and there must "be no rest" or "half-measures" until its eradication.⁷⁹ Later that month, Moscow declared that the Austrian people must break their traditional ties with Germany and "settle accounts with the warmongers" and anti-democratic elements in their midst.⁸⁰ Another broadcast in July accused the Austrians of being too "goodhearted towards the German Nazis and to traitors at home."⁸¹ Moscow radio went on to remind the Austrians that the time had come for "the Nazi scum" to "be cleared, radically and thoroughly, from the country."⁸² Throughout 1945, for both the Americans and Soviets, the Austrians remained stained by Nazism and collaboration with the Germans.

With the Austrians a long way from being transformed into allies in the Cold War or victims of

⁷⁷"Austrian Weekly Background Notes, No.10," 15 August 1945, PRO-FO 1007/340.

⁷⁸For examples of Clark's later anti-Soviet speeches, see his speech at the National War College, 9 October 1946, folder 6, box 1, Clark Papers. Also see his speech upon returning from Moscow in 1947, Military Government Austria: Report of the U.S. Commissioner, no.18, April 1947.

⁷⁹"Austria: Weekly Background Notes: No. 5," 11 July 1945, PRO-FO 1007/340.

⁸⁰"Austria: Weekly Background Notes: No. 8," 2 August 1945, PRO-FO 1007/340.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid.

Hitler's reign of terror, the Army's attitude towards the Austrians was one of deep suspicion. This does not mean that Clark was without human sympathy for the suffering of ordinary Austrians.⁸³ Yet, like any good military man, he prepared for possible Austrian resistance to the Allied occupation. Although subversive acts by Austrians were practically nonexistent between 5 July and 30 September, with the war barely over the Army took great pains to track isolated incidents such as charcoaled swastikas on buildings, threats to shave the heads of Austrian women who fraternized with American GIs, and wire strung across Austrian roads. One specific example illustrates what in hindsight appears to be the almost ridiculous extent of the Army's focus upon a phantom Austrian resistance movement. In the town of Enns, military intelligence busily investigated without success a September report of an anti-American poem posted in the town square. In the poem, Austrian women who dated American soldiers were "coarsely criticized" for "forgetting the men who had for six years been fighting for them" and becoming "prostitutes" because of their "gluttony for chocolate."⁸⁴

By contrast, it was not until late 1946 that the Army in Austria began redirecting a substantial part of its intelligence efforts towards collecting information concerning the Soviet Union and Soviet activities in

⁸³Clark to Gruenther, 31 July 1945, folder 2, box 40, Clark Papers.

⁸⁴"USFA History: 5 July-30 September 1945," folder 4, NA-RG 260. In a 24 May 1945 report to the secretary of state, John Erhardt went so far as to report that "Nazism is dead" in Austria. Though he conceded that many individual Nazis must still be "eliminated," the likelihood of the ideology surviving was "slight." Interestingly, he noted that among the Austrians "one striking residue of Nazi propaganda is frantic fear of Russians." 863.00/5-2445 (microfilm).

Austria. Though the OSS had collected information on Soviet and Communist activities in Austria even before the collapse of the Third Reich, it was not the focus of that organization's work, and the OSS's early reports can hardly be characterized as anti-Soviet or anti-Communist.⁸⁵ As for the Army, "Intelligence Directive No. 1" defined the mission of its G-2 or Intelligence Branch. According to the directive, G-2 was to "provide intelligence for the elimination of Nazism and German militarism" along with intelligence which would "contribute to the final establishment of a new and free Austria."⁸⁶ To do so, G-2 divided its effort into categories, one of which even included gathering intelligence on what the Austrians knew concerning the Japanese Army, but nothing concerning Soviet activities. An examination of the G-2's two series of reports for the period 1945-1946 confirms that in practice the Army did not single the Soviets out for special analysis, nor did its reports treat the Soviet Union as a potential enemy. Though the Army collected information concerning the Soviet zone, it also did so for the British and French zones.

Instead of collecting information concerning Austrian Communists or the Red Army, the Army's G-2 centered upon the massive task of denazification. For instance, "Intelligence Directive No. 2" noted that

⁸⁵For instance in a Civil Affairs Guide prepared by the OSS, the agency declared that as long as the Austrian Communist party "sticks to the more democratic aims and procedures it has adopted in recent years" it should enjoy the same privileges as other democratic political parties, see "Civil Affairs Guide: Attitude of Military Government Toward the Revival of Political Life in Austria," p. 87, 23 April 1945, OSS/Part V, Postwar Europe, reel 1 (microfilm). Also see the July 1945 OSS reports of Charles W. Tayer mentioned in chapter one.

⁸⁶"HQ USFA Intelligence Directive No. 1," 9 July 1945, folder 60, NA-RG 260.

elimination of Nazism required "prompt and complete denazification of Austria public life, the detention of arrestable persons," along with the removal of Nazis from public office, deportation of non-Austrian Germans, and nullifying "the efforts of Austro-Fascists to reconstitute a Nazi or Fascist state."⁸⁷ Whatever may be said in retrospect about the shortcomings of denazification in Austria, it cannot be denied that G-2 devoted a great amount of time and effort to the task.

Only in November 1946 did the 7769th Military Intelligence Service (formerly the 6825th), start to redirect a portion of its work to gathering intelligence specifically on the Soviet Union and the Soviet zone in Austria.⁸⁸ Though some information concerning Soviet industrial capabilities had been collected by individuals operating without official sanction as early as the spring 1946, the Army command had hindered such efforts.⁸⁹ As for the Army's Counter-Intelligence Branch (CIB), which collected information on individual Austrians and was responsible for protecting American interests from subversive activities, prior to May 1947 it had devoted "90 percent" of its efforts to denazification. Also, the CIB made "no effort" prior to July 1947 "to collect personality data on Austrian Communists."⁹⁰ As might be expected after a war against Nazism, the bulk of the Americans initially focused upon the defeated enemy and not the fellow ally. Other

⁸⁷"HQ USFA Intelligence Directive No. 2," 31 July 1945, folder 60, NA-RG 260.

⁸⁸"History of G-2 USFA: From Beginning to June 1947, pp. 10 & 20, folder 43, box 5, NA-RG 260.

⁸⁹"History of the Office of the Director of Intelligence, USFA," January-March 1948, p.10, folder 46, box 6, NA-RG 260.

⁹⁰"History of the G-2 Intelligence Section: July-September 1947," p.2, folder 44, box 5, NA-RG 260. Also see Tweraser, "Military Justice as an Instrument of American Occupation Policy in Austria," p.166.

branches of the Army in Austria followed much the same policy. Even in late 1946, the Army's liaison section discouraged Red Army deserters from seeking aid or employment from the Americans.⁹¹

The Organization of USFA & USACA

As the Army's role in Austria had changed from that of combat to occupation in 1945, the American zone in Austria, along with American occupied Vienna, came to be the main responsibility of the American military government in Austria, or as it was officially known, U.S. Forces, Austria (USFA). On 5 July 1945, the American contingent of the HQ 15th Army Group had received orders from Washington that redesignated it as "U.S. Occupation Forces Austria" and, shortly thereafter, USFA. American units which had been assigned to the 15th Army Group came under the command of USFA. Also, General Clark, who had been 15th Army Group commander, assumed command of all U.S. Army forces in Austria.⁹² As a later report put it, USFA was "a semi-independent command, responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, European Command, for tactical, administrative, and logistical matters, but reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . on political and Military Government matters."⁹³

In its organization, USFA consisted of Headquarters USFA, the Vienna Area Command (VAC), and Zone Command, Austria. Located in Vienna, Headquarters, USFA oversaw

⁹¹"HQ USFA, Liaison Section, Historical Report of Operations," 1 April 1946-30 November 1946, p.7, folder 171, box 19, NA-RG 260.

⁹²"USFA History: 5 July-30 September 1945," folder 4, NA-RG 260.

⁹³"Outline of USFA History: 1 July 1946-30 June 1947," folder 9, NA-RG 260.

the American occupation of Austria. In Salzburg, the Zone Command did the same for the American zone in Austria.⁹⁴ By contrast, the VAC operated only in Vienna and was under, but closely intertwined with, HQ USFA. Initially, the VAC received orders to work with representatives of the other powers in the "Vienna Allied Military Government" and to help provide the civilian population with adequate food, transportation and fuel.⁹⁵ Also, VAC issued passes for Americans traveling to Vienna and was responsible for conducting various ceremonies and guard duties within the city.⁹⁶ In early 1946, the VAC's mission would be slightly redefined to include the following duties: "the establishment and maintenance of the Community of Vienna, the provision of Area security and boundary control for Vienna, and the enforcement of discipline within Vienna."⁹⁷ Most important, the VAC was to guard against "any emergency" in the Tulln-Vienna area.⁹⁸

It should also be noted that for a brief time in the initial occupation, the VAC's responsibilities overlapped the duties of the U.S. Element, Allied Commission Austria Section (USACA).⁹⁹ Though included in Headquarters, USFA, USACA operated a separate staff from USFA but performed "in greatly extended form, the functions of a normal G-5 staff section of the

⁹⁴"Outline of USFA History: 1 July 1946-30 June 1947," folder 9, NA-RG 260.

⁹⁵"USFA History: 5 July-30 September 1945," folder 4, NA-RG 260.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷"Outline of USFA History: 1 July 1946-30 June 1947," folder 9, NA-RG 260.

⁹⁸"Headquarters Vienna Area Command, Report of Operations in Vienna," 10 January 1946, folder 184, box 21, NA-RG 260.

⁹⁹"Outline of USFA History: 1 July 1946-30 June 1947," folder 9, NA-RG 260.

Commanding General, USFA."¹⁰⁰ In his civil affairs capacity, the USFA commander, General Clark, also served as the U.S. Military Commissioner for Austria. After June 1946, USACA assisted the U.S. High Commissioner in Austrian affairs and in restoring Austria to free and independent status.¹⁰¹ Its main functions were to help determine Allied policy with the other Allies and, once policy had been determined, direct and supervise the implementation of the agreed policy with the other Allies. In the American zone, USACA also had the duty to prepare necessary instructions for the American military government, assist Austrian government, arrange for repatriation of European displaced persons (DPs), and monitor denazification.¹⁰²

American Generals & the Soviets

With USFA ordered to complete the destruction of Nazism and create a democratic Austria, only the question of actually implementing American policy remains open. The problem of implementing American policy becomes readily understandable when one realizes that generals like Clark had great autonomy in this realm and tended to settle policy matters "on the spot."¹⁰³ With this in mind, given Clark's later writings one might incorrectly suppose that top American military men came to Central Europe already predisposed

¹⁰⁰"Outline of USFA History: 1 July 1946-30 June 1947," folder 9, NA-RG 260. In the U.S. Zone outside Vienna, USFA had its own G-5, see "U.S. Allied Commission for Austria History: Part II," p.9, folder 252, box 31, NA-RG 260.

¹⁰¹"Outline of USFA History: 1 July 1946-30 June 1947," folder 9, NA-RG 260.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Bischof, "Between Rehabilitation & Responsibility," p. 154. The same was true in the cases of Douglas MacArthur in Japan and Lucius Clay in Germany.

toward viewing the Soviet Union with distrust and, therefore, would inevitably treat the Red Army as an enemy force. It might naturally, though incorrectly, follow that American commanders introduced their own anti-Soviet sentiments into the conduct of American policy. Such assumptions, however, disregard the words and actions of American commanders in 1945. As pointed out in the first chapter, many American officers regarded their peers in the Red Army as strange if not exotic. Yet, fresh from victory over their common Nazi enemy, they also respected the Red Army and even looked forward to closer contact which might bridge the gap between the two peoples. Few openly feared in 1945, like the maverick George C. Patton, that Red "Mongolian" hordes were about to engulf the West or believed that confrontation with the Soviet Union was a likely prospect.¹⁰⁴

Instead, most American commanders shared the optimistic sentiments of the highest ranking military man in Europe, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.¹⁰⁵ During a "bull session" in late May 1945, Eisenhower told his Naval Aid, Captain Harry C. Butcher that "the American and British relationship with Russia was about at the

¹⁰⁴Martin Blumenson, ed., The Patton Papers, 1940-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), p.717 & 731. Patton believed that the Soviets were "a scurvy race and simply savages," p.712.

¹⁰⁵According to Jean Edward Smith, Lt. General Lucius D. Clay, who served as deputy military governor in Germany following Eisenhower's departure from Europe, "may have been more determined to get along with the Russians," see his Lucius D. Clay, p.278. Omar N. Bradley recalled that what concerned him about the Soviets in 1945 was not the fear of Red Army attack but the need for their aid in the war against Japan, see his A General's Life: An Autobiography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p.434. Also Bradley claimed that initially, "I was no less beguiled than the others on the Soviet's friendly postwar intentions," see his Omar Bradley: A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1951), p.533.

same stage of arms-length dealing that marked the early contacts" between the British and Americans.¹⁰⁶ Eisenhower went on to explain that the lack of close contact with the Soviets during the war had unfortunately retarded mutual understanding. Nevertheless, he remained sanguine that "the more contact we have with the Russians, the more they will understand us and the greater will be the cooperation."¹⁰⁷ Indeed, Eisenhower thought that if Americans followed a pattern of friendly cooperation, they would be able work well with the Soviets. He went on to reconfirm these earlier views in his own autobiography by claiming that in 1945 he and his officers in Berlin had believed that the Soviet and Americans systems could co-exist if each power respected the other's rights, territory, and convictions.¹⁰⁸

In hopes of promoting friendly relations in Berlin, Eisenhower used his position to make American servicemen aware of what he considered to be the many virtues of the Soviet people and the Red Army. To do so, Eisenhower advocated an indirect method of indoctrination. Such an approach would be most effective because American soldiers would "not reel against something which they feel is being forced on them."¹⁰⁹ Specific steps Eisenhower outlined for American soldiers included the following: programing Russian music, showing Soviet propaganda films, education courses, and, to the horror of nervous Red Army authorities in Berlin,

¹⁰⁶Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946), p.855

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948) p.475.

¹⁰⁹July 1945, footnote, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Occupation, 1945, vol. 6, p.198.

more individual contacts with representatives of the Red Army.¹¹⁰

After the expected friendship between American and Red Army soldiers in Berlin failed to develop, Eisenhower demanded that further action be taken to foster cooperative relations at the ground level. He was especially upset by evidence that American GIs were quick to judge Soviet soldiers on external superficialities such as cleanliness and personal habits.¹¹¹ To overcome such superficial prejudice, he urged indoctrinating American troops so that they would have some sense of what heroic sacrifices the Soviets had made in the war against the Germans. Again counseling international cooperation, Eisenhower emphasized that he wanted to remind American soldiers that "the Russians have contributed mightily to the winning of this war" and, in marked contrast to Patton, even claimed that the Soviet people were "naturally a friendly race."¹¹²

Perhaps in response to Eisenhower's call, and certainly illustrative of the kind of information he wanted provided to the troops, the 19 August 1945 issue of Army Talks took as its theme "Our Ally--the USSR." It promoted Allied comradeship among the rank-and-file and encouraged Allied cooperation. For example, Army Talks maintained that "The Soviet soldier isn't a hard chap to get along with--particular when you know a little about his training and background."¹¹³ Like

¹¹⁰Ibid., p.199.

¹¹¹Eisenhower to Brigadier General Paul Williams Thompson, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Occupation, 1945, vol. 6, p.257.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Army Talks, 19 August 1945. This issue is found at the George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Va.

Eisenhower, the writers for Army Talks not surprisingly put great stock in the idea that sustained contact would win over the Soviets. Concerning ideology, Army Talks acknowledged differences between American and Soviet systems, but stoutly asserted that "[Stalin] may be a dictator, but not in the sense that Hitler or Mussolini were dictators." Apparently Stalin's dictatorship served a desirable end because, according to Army Talks, "It cannot be questioned that Stalin has been a force for good in advancing world peace." Most telling was the magazine's comparison between the Americans, British, and Soviets: "in general, the Soviet soldier in his social and his 'week-day behavior' displays a type of personality standing somewhere between the American and the English, but closer to the American." As for the future, Army Talks optimistically claimed that once Allied diplomats developed a single plan for Europe, Red Army soldiers would let down their guard and allow their "natural friendliness and curiosity" to "quickly bridge the official gap which now exists." In the meantime, to prevent unnecessary confusion and misunderstandings, Army Talks cautioned its readers to forego discussing political problems with Soviet soldiers and to avoid contrasting the American and Soviet political systems.¹¹⁴

Upon taking up his duties as commander of USFA, General Clark initially approached American-Soviet relations in Austria as Eisenhower had in Germany. At a glance, such might not appear to be the case, especially if one only goes as far as consulting Clark's two published autobiographies, Calculated Risk (1950) and From the Danube to the Yalu (1954). In the first of his

¹¹⁴Ibid.

books, Clark claims to have sympathized with the Austrians at the expense of the Soviets.¹¹⁵ He even gives the impression of having had early misgivings regarding the Soviets. Without mincing his words, Clark maintains that in May 1945 the Soviets refused "to let us into Vienna and go to work" because "they were busy looting Austria at the time and didn't want to be bothered."¹¹⁶ In his second book, published just after the conclusion of the Korean conflict, Clark presented an even stronger anti-Communist interpretation of events in Austria, claiming that Communists around the world, Korean or Russian, were simply part of "the same breed of bandits."¹¹⁷ The Communist enemy, he declared was "a voracious beast."¹¹⁸ Looking back at 1945 through the prism of the Korean War, Clark saw Communist influence in the American demobilization protests of 1945. More disconcerting for Clark remained the influence of "pinkos"¹¹⁹ in the State Department and his belief that American appeasement of the Soviets formed the basis of the early American policy in Austria.¹²⁰

Yet even in his Cold War works, Clark claims that initially he hoped to work "harmoniously with the Soviets in Austria" and portrays himself as being especially sensitive to Soviet desires.¹²¹ For example,

¹¹⁵Clark, Calculated Risk, p.455.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p.452.

¹¹⁷Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p.4.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p.5.

¹¹⁹According to Whitnah & Erickson, Clark confided his fear of "pinkos" in the state department to American diplomat Hugh Gibson. They cite as their source notes made by Gibson in 1946-1947. See The American Occupation of Austria, p.187.

¹²⁰Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp.9-11. For a discussion of supposed American appeasement in Austria, see Clark's speech at the National War College, 9 October 1946, folder 6, box 1, Clark Papers.

¹²¹Clark, Calculated Risk, p.454.

Clark discovered that pressing his Red Army opposites to make hasty decisions usually produced little more than dark suspicion concerning American actions. Therefore, Clark initially adopted a gradualist approach to dealing with problems and attempted to gently overcome difficulties which arose between himself and Soviet Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev.¹²² Indeed, Clark consistently maintained that he and Konev had very cordial personal relations and, even after East-West relations soured, the two men continued their friendship.¹²³

An examination of Clark's writing from the summer of 1945 supports the general's assertion that he attempted to maintain good relations with the Soviets, but it also destroys his image as an early Cold Warrior. First, Clark plainly believed that he could work with the Soviets, even when the British and the French had come to believe that the quadripartite relations were becoming hopeless.¹²⁴ From the beginning, Clark saw himself as representing American interests (though some might go so far as to say Clark always represented Clark's self-interest) and not the interests of anti-Communist Western alliance.¹²⁵ For example, Clark confided in a letter to his wife that he believed that each of his fellow Allied commanders had "something in the back of his head which he won't divulge" to his fellow allies. With each of the other three Allied

¹²²Clark, Calculated Risk, p.454. Marshal Konev had replaced Marshal Tolbulkin as the Red Army commander in Austria.

¹²³Clark, Calculated Risk, p.466. Also see Bischof, "Between Rehabilitation & Responsibility," p.303.

¹²⁴17 July & 9 August 1945, Clark Diaries.

¹²⁵According to Bischof, in March 1946, the British Minister in Vienna, believed that Clark was not an Anglophile but a "Clarkophile," see his "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.171.

generals less than forthcoming, Clark went on to say that only he was dealing with the Austrian question openly and honestly.¹²⁶ Clearly, though portraying himself as more than virtuous, Clark failed to single the Red Army out for any special criticism, much less abuse.

Even into late 1945, Clark continued attempting to devise concrete ways of convincing the Soviets of his friendly intentions. In a confidential letter to Eisenhower, Clark complained that Soviet Marshal Konev only read unflattering statements made in the American press about the Soviet Union. Clark believed that Konev failed to take note of the many favorable reports which emanated from the American newspapers and magazines.¹²⁷ To remedy the problem, Clark suggested that it would be very helpful for American-Soviet relations in Austria if Eisenhower's public relations staff collected and sent to him some of the many favorable reports printed concerning Soviet-American relations.¹²⁸ Undoubtedly, the very thought of writing such a letter would not have occurred to Clark in the 1950's.

Truly, Clark's actions in the July 1945 demonstrated that he did encourage good relations between American and Soviet forces in Austria. For instance, Clark attempted to solve the two problems which immediately faced the Allies: how to supply Vienna with food and when to actually set up the Allied Council in the city. Both Clark and Lt-Gen. Sir Richard L. McCreery, the British commander in Austria, had been troubled by the Vienna food question for some time and,

¹²⁶Mark Clark to Renie Clark, 26 August 1945, folder 1945, box 67, Clark Papers.

¹²⁷29 November 1945, Clark to Eisenhower, vol. 9, box 65, Clark Diaries.

¹²⁸Ibid.

with food shortages across Europe, had wished to avoid supplying their zones in the city from outside Austria. The Red Army, on the other hand, wanted to secure from Western sources an additional supply for Vienna and needed to do so without delay.¹²⁹ Under strict orders from London, McCreery, however, refused in August to go along with the formal establishment of the Allied Council until the Soviets agreed to supply Vienna from Eastern European sources, permit the Austrians to export goods to pay for imports, and compensate the Austrians for looted industries.¹³⁰

In a vain effort to forestall an Anglo-Soviet showdown in Austria, Clark arranged for his fellow Allied generals to join him in attending the Salzburg Music Festival. Since the Allied Council had not yet officially convened, Clark wanted the informal meeting so that the four Allied commanders might become acquainted and begin discussing some of the difficult problems of the Austrian occupation.¹³¹ Unfortunately, Soviet Marshal Konev, then suffering from an ulcer, was unable to attend the meeting.¹³² In his place, Konev sent his deputy, the abrasive Col. Gen. Zheltov, who

¹²⁹Charles Lawrence Cox, "The Allied Commission & the Creation of the Second Austrian Republic," p.172.

¹³⁰Erhardt to Secretary of State, 22 August 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.573-574. Also see, Charles Lawrence Cox, "The Allied Commission & the Creation of the Second Austrian Republic," p.173 and Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.170.

¹³¹Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.172.

¹³²Major T. J. Bulinski to Lt. Col. Thayer, "Report on Konev's Health," 16 November 1945, folder 4, box 43, Clark Papers. Clark claims in Calculated Risk that "Konev's illness remained forever a mystery," see p.452. Bulinski's report, however, indicates that Konev suffered from an ulcer which he had refused to have removed by operation. Also, Zheltov told Clark during the Salzburg Festival in August 1945 that Konev's illness had been brought on in part by "anxiety over Austrian problems," see Erhardt to Secretary of State, 22 August 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol.III, p.575.

represented the Red Army and served as Konev's political officer.

After the Red Army general's arrival, Clark made a great social effort to impress the less-than personable Zheltov in the hope of convincing the Russian that the United States desired Allied cooperation in Austria. For instance, he took Zheltov, along with the Allied commanders, on a "sightseeing trip" to Berchtesgaden. On the way to the Eagles' Nest, Clark made sure to travel with Zheltov in one of Hitler's armor-plated Mercedes-Benz convertibles.¹³³ Though Clark ultimately failed to establish a cordial personal relations with the "bull-necked" Zheltov, during the trip, the two military men did have an amicable conversation.¹³⁴

Most aptly illustrating the gap in understanding between Zheltov and Clark was a problem which developed that evening. At that time, Clark entertained his guests and offered a series of toasts to his fellow Allies. First, Clark recalled his days in Italy with McCreery and then his acquaintance with the French Général d'Armée M. Emile Béthouart in North Africa. Last, Clark announced that though he had not worked with the Red Army before, he looked forward with pleasure to serving with Marshal Konev, a man who had been responsible for leading the Red Army to many brilliant victories.¹³⁵

To Clark's subsequent amazement, he soon learned that Zheltov claimed that the Soviet government had been slighted by the toast. The Red Army general stoutly

¹³³For a description of several cars which had belonged to high-ranking Nazis but were now in American hands see "Historical Report of Operations," 1 April-30 November 1946, p. 25, folder 171, box 19, NA-RG 260.

¹³⁴Clark, Calculated Risk, p.457.

¹³⁵Ibid.

asserted that Clark had taken pains to emphasize his previous relations with the Anglo-French Allies and was now plotting with them against Soviet forces in Austria.¹³⁶ Hoping to correct the misunderstanding, the next morning Clark promptly called Zheltov in for a private conference and told the Red Army officer "bluntly and vigorously"¹³⁷ that no anti-Soviet block existed and, if one formed, the United States wanted no part of it.¹³⁸ Clark went on to point out that on the matter of establishing the Allied Council, the Americans opposed the British and that the United States desired the council's immediate establishment.¹³⁹ As he noted in his diary, "I told Zheltov I did not agree with the British position but that I would meet under any condition with the other three commanders in order to get started on our job."¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, the American general claimed that he was doing his best to forestall misunderstandings and establish good relations with the Red Army in Austria and that he expected the Soviets to do likewise.¹⁴¹ Finally, Clark told Zheltov that he wanted a face to face meeting with Marshal Konev without delay.

Perhaps taken aback but certainly impressed, Zheltov responded by arranging for Konev and Clark to meet at Red Army Headquarters, Baden, Austria. In Calculated Risk, Clark recalls that Konev's men spent

¹³⁶Ibid.

¹³⁷Erhardt to Secretary of State, 22 August 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol.III, p.574.

¹³⁸Clark, Calculated Risk, p.457.

¹³⁹Erhardt to Secretary of State, 22 August 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol.III, p.574.

¹⁴⁰21 August 1945, vol.9, box 65, Clark Diaries.

¹⁴¹Erhardt to Secretary of State, 22 August 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol.III, p.575. Erhardt believed that Soviet-American relations improved as a result of Clark's frank words with Zheltov.

most of the Baden meeting getting Clark's entire party "plastered" in order to avoid discussing the important issues facing Austria.¹⁴² Clark neglects, however, to make mention in his book that at Baden he personally reaffirmed to Konev that no anti-Soviet bloc existed between the Western Allies.¹⁴³

General Clark & the British

Significantly, Clark's Calculated Risk fails to give any hint of the difficulties he had with the British. In the summer of 1945, Clark believed that McCreery's refusal to allow the Allied Council to convene endangered the future quadripartite occupation effort and greatly delayed the Allied effort in Austria. As a result, in Clark's view, American forces would remain unable to take up their responsibilities in Vienna until the British changed their tune.¹⁴⁴

Soon, Clark became so frustrated that he not only refused to back the British in the emerging Anglo-Soviet disagreement but actually briefly sided with the Soviets against the British. In an August telephone conversation with McCreery, Clark pressured the British general to sanction the Allied Council's first meeting despite the still unresolved food question in Vienna.¹⁴⁵ In the conversation, Clark reminded McCreery that the Red Army already had a position of predominance in Austria and that there was little which the Anglo-

¹⁴²Clark, Calculated Risk, p.458.

¹⁴³According to Bischof, Clark told Konev at Baden that "there was no bloc" directed against the Soviet Union. See his "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.174.

¹⁴⁴Secretary of State to Winant (Summary of message from Clark), 25 August 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol.III, p.577.

¹⁴⁵Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.173.

Americans could do about it.¹⁴⁶ Clearly dismayed, the British regarded Clark as having a "defeatist attitude" and believed that it was inconsistent with the recent EAC agreement concerning Austria.¹⁴⁷ To them, Clark was preventing the Western Allies from conducting themselves as equals to the Red Army in Austria and, if he continued to do so, there was little point in remaining in the Central European country.¹⁴⁸ The British government under Clement Attlee believed that the Allied Council should not meet until the Red Army had agreed to provide food for Vienna from Eastern Europe. Since the Soviets were already having food shortages in the city, the British believed that the Western powers were in a good position to apply pressure on the Soviets.¹⁴⁹ As a result, the Foreign Office unsuccessfully tried to have Clark's orders changed from Washington and, thereby, force the American general to meet with the other Allied commanders as a commander and not as a member of the Allied Council.¹⁵⁰

When the four Allied Generals did meet in Vienna, McCreery got his way because he had refused to attend in his capacity as Military Commissioner. If the meeting were to be held at all, the other Allied Commanders had to follow suit and meet as representatives of their armies and not as members of the ALCO. Doubtlessly enraged, Clark spent the meeting reminding all assembled

¹⁴⁶Sir Oliver C. Harvey (private secretary to Ernest Bevin), Copy given to John Troutbeck (head of British Central Department concerned with German and Austrian affairs) on 13 September 1945, PRO-FO 1020/1025.

¹⁴⁷Sir Oliver C. Harvey, Copy given to Troutbeck on 13 September 1945, PRO-FO 1020/1025.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹Charles Lawrence Cox, "The Allied Commission & the Creation of the Second Austrian Republic," p.174.

¹⁵⁰Secretary of State to Winant, 24 August 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol.III., p.575.

that the British were standing in the way of the Allied Council's operations in Austria. The British felt that Clark had attacked McCreery's position even when "it had little or no relevance to the agenda under discussion."¹⁵¹ Clark emphasized his dissatisfaction with McCreery so strongly that at one point Marshal Konev became embarrassed by the American general's outbursts.¹⁵²

It is worth noting that the French and Soviet Allied commanders clearly agreed with Clark. Even in the bland diplomatic language of the official record, the three Allies remarked that the British had made it "impossible to implement the agreement of the four Governments concerning the zones of occupation and control machinery for Austria."¹⁵³ At least for August 1945, Whitnah and Erickson are clearly mistaken in claiming that the Americans and French hesitantly supported McCreery against the Soviets; rather, the reverse was true.¹⁵⁴

John Erhardt, Clark's own political advisor in Austria, regarded as disconcerting the American general's dealings with the British. Later, Erhardt had to repair the damage done by Clark. In doing so, he conceded to a visiting British official that "General Clark had not shown up at his best" in Vienna and that the general "was impetuous and impulsive and sometimes said things which he had to recall very shortly

¹⁵¹Sir Oliver C. Harvey, Copy given to Troutbeck on 13 September 1945, PRO-FO 1020/1025.

¹⁵²Ibid.

¹⁵³Allied Commission for Austria, Proceedings of the Allied Council, Official Minutes of the meetings of the Allied Council, 1st Meeting of the Four Commanders-in Chief of the Allied Forces in Austria, 23 August 1945, p.3 (microfilm).

¹⁵⁴Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.177.

afterward."¹⁵⁵ Erhardt attempted to mollify the British by telling them that he had already spoken to Clark several times concerning the problem of asserting the principle of Allied equality in occupied Austria. According to Erhardt, Clark eventually changed his mind and claimed that what he had really meant to say to McCreery was that the Soviets wanted to assert their dominance in Austria but, of course, he opposed such action.¹⁵⁶

Though the American and British governments were closely allied, the British had good reason to remain suspicious of Clark and, for his part, the Anglophobic Clark had no great love for McCreery.¹⁵⁷ According to Clark's diary, the USFA commander fully recognized that he had placed McCreery in an embarrassing position over the Allied Council issue.¹⁵⁸ The American general believed, however, that the British had only themselves to blame for their difficulties in Austria and needed to adopt "a reasonable position."¹⁵⁹ As Clark had already told Zheltov, the American general viewed his mission in Austria as being one of finishing the job and going home. Clearly, in August 1945 Clark viewed the British as standing not only in the way of rebuilding Austria, but of his return to the United States.

¹⁵⁵Sir Oliver C. Harvey, Copy given to Troutbeck on 13 September 1945, PRO-FO 1020/1025.

¹⁵⁶Sir Oliver C. Harvey (private secretary to Ernest Bevin), Copy given to Mr. Troutbeck on 13 September 1945, PRO-FO 1020/1025.

¹⁵⁷Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.178.

¹⁵⁸21 August 1945, vol.10, box 66, Clark Diaries.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

General Clark & the Cold War

Perhaps in his criticism of others, Clark unwittingly provides historians with an insight into the motivations which guided him in Austria. In Calculated Risk, Clark blamed State Department officials for what he later came to see as the problem-filled division of Austria and the disadvantageous position of the American forces in Vienna. Clark claimed that the first Control Agreement had been signed by those who either knew little about Austrian affairs or "were motivated by the desire to reduce our commitments and get our troops home as rapidly as possible."¹⁶⁰ Most striking, both of these criticisms applied to Clark himself. By his own admission Clark knew nothing about Austria before coming to the country.¹⁶¹ Also, once in Austria, he was more interested in returning home than working in Austria.¹⁶²

With Clark's early thinking in mind, two questions then arise; when did the American-Soviet entente break down in the Central European country and, most important, when did Clark change his position regarding the Red Army in Austria? For his part, Clark claims that "the real end of anything other than pretended collaboration by the Russians" came as a result of the November 1945 elections in Austria.¹⁶³ In the elections, the Austrian Communists garnered a mere 5.44% of the vote, and it became apparent to Moscow that the Austrian

¹⁶⁰Clark, Calculated Risk, p.460.

¹⁶¹Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.166.

¹⁶²According to a quotation cited by Cronin in Great Power Politics & the Struggle Over Austria, p.36, in February 1946, the British Foreign Office believed that Clark was "not a very reliable ally" and "apt to take the most irresponsible line" because he was "mainly thinking of getting back to America as soon as possible."

¹⁶³Clark, Calculated Risk, p.470.

people had little use for the Soviet brand of socialism.¹⁶⁴ As a result of the election, Clark recalls that the Soviets decided to punish Austria for refusing to more fully support the Communist party. Also, at about this same time internal pressures forced a purge of Red Army personnel who were friendly with Westerners.¹⁶⁵

Clark's Cold War view of the Austrian situation is partly supported by the evidence from the period. Undoubtedly the election results disappointed the Soviets, and an internal purge of the Red Army did begin in early 1946. Shortly after the election, Clark is on record as warning the new Austrian Chancellor Leopold Figl that the Soviets would most likely adopt a more hostile policy toward Austria.¹⁶⁶ Also, contemporary reports by the British Foreign Office indicate that a change in Soviet policy took place.¹⁶⁷ In March 1946, the State Department declared that the Soviet Union had hardened its policy towards Austria following the November election and was now attempting to "punish the

¹⁶⁴Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.296. Bischof notes that since many Austrian men were prisoners of war or interned as Nazis, the bulk of the voters in the November election were women. The election allowed the most conservative Austrian party, the Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People's Party), to have an outright majority of seats in the new government. For the final tally of the November election see Erhardt to Secretary of State, 27 November 1945, 863.00/11-2745 (microfilm). According to Erhardt, 94% of the electorate participated, giving 1,598,474 votes (49.84%) to the People's party, 1,428,441 votes (44.54%) to the Österreichische Sozialistische Partei (Austrian Socialist Party), and only 174,387 (5.44%) to the Österreichische Kommunistische Partei (Austrian Communist Party). In Vienna, the socialist secured 500,116 votes (57.44%), the People's Party 300,468 votes (34.51%), and the communists 70,056 votes (8.05%).

¹⁶⁵Clark, Calculated Risk, p.471.

¹⁶⁶Clark-Figl Conversation, 8 December 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.677.

¹⁶⁷Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.299.

Austrian people for their association with the Germans."¹⁶⁸ Finally, a number of historians conclude like Clark that the election represented a turning point in Austrian-Soviet relations.¹⁶⁹

Despite the distinct shift in Soviet policy, it should be noted that Clark did not publicly accuse the Soviets of immediately directing their animus toward the United States. Early in December 1945, though privately telling Major Edwin M. J. Kretzmann (G-2 USFA) that he was increasingly pessimistic about the future of American-Soviet relations, Clark publically continued to foster friendly relations with the Soviets.¹⁷⁰ Even privately Clark admitted to Eisenhower that the election results had come "as somewhat of a shock" to Soviet "prestige."¹⁷¹ The Soviets had reacted by demanding the removal of several cabinet members in the newly elected coalition government. Clark claimed that "all the new cabinet members were O.K." and untainted by the Nazi past. But Clark informed Eisenhower that he well understood that the Soviets had to "'save a little face.'"¹⁷² Since international cooperation was so important and Austria needed an official government, Clark told Eisenhower that he was willing to "go along

¹⁶⁸"Austria: Policy and Information Statement," 1 March 1946, p.9, 863.00/3-146 (microfilm).

¹⁶⁹See for example, Cronin, Great Power Politics & the Struggle Over Austria, p.33. The earliest evidence cited by Cronin to support her claim, however, is from March 1946. For the change in Soviet policy towards Austria, see Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.292; Patricia Blythe Eggleston, "The Marshall Plan in Austria: A Study in American Containment of the Soviet Union in the Cold War," University of Alabama dissertation, 1980, pp.29-30; and Stearman, The Soviet Union & the Occupation of Austria, p. 36.

¹⁷⁰Kretzmann, "Four Powers in Three-Quarter Time," p.38.

¹⁷¹Clark to Eisenhower, 13 December 1945, folder 5, box 40, Clark Papers.

¹⁷²Ibid.

with Konev in rejecting two or three" of the Austrians "on general principles."¹⁷³

During this same period, Clark privately reminded Chancellor Designate Figl that four-power unity was in the best interests of Austria. The American general cautioned that though he might appear to be critical of Soviet actions in Austria it was simply in the cause of reviving Austria and not part of a general anti-Soviet policy. Clark claimed that his method of "speaking frankly" to everyone he dealt with had enabled him to develop good relations with Konev.¹⁷⁴ In effect, Clark warned Figl not to attempt to manipulate American-Soviet tensions in Austria. Though Clark was beginning to have great sympathy for the plight of the Austrian people, he remained determined not to be drawn into a conflict with the Soviets.

Most helpful in understanding the gradual evolution of Clark's opinion regarding the Austrian situation is an analysis developed by John Erhardt.¹⁷⁵ Writing in 1946, Erhardt claimed that the implementation of USFA policy in the country went through three distinct phases. First, during the summer and fall of 1945, Clark had adopted the role of a mediator between British and Soviets. Next, after the November elections, Clark had taken up on the same role, but now between the newly elected Austrian government and the Soviet Union. By February and March of 1946, the USFA commander decided that the Soviets were simply attempting to seize control of Austria, along with the Danube, and, as result,

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴"Memorandum of Conversation Between General Mark W. Clark and Ing. Leopold Figl," 8 December 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, pp.675-676.

¹⁷⁵Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.292.

finally adopted an anti-Soviet policy.¹⁷⁶ In short, the Cold War in Austria began in early 1946.

Erhardt's analysis of events in Austria is close to the mark. In February 1946 Clark reported to the Joint Chiefs that the Soviets were effectively stalling Allied attempts to revive an independent Austrian economy over the objections of the other three Allies. For instance, the Soviets had recently seized Austrian properties like the Danube Shipping Company (DDSG) and seemed bent on taking effective control over the Danube from Enns to the Black Sea. Also, the Soviets were attempting to seal their zone from the rest of Austria, only reluctantly granting passes to Western Allied personnel to visit or pass through the Soviet zone in Austria and maintaining border controls within Austria which made trade between zones difficult. Making matters worse for the Austrian economy, the Red Army continued to station some 130,000 soldiers in Austria and paid many of them with Austrian schillings exacted from the Austrian government. As if that were not enough, the Red Army had seized seventy-four large estates in Austria or about 60,000 acres of rich farmland which would be used to feed the Red Army in Austria, not the Austrians.¹⁷⁷

In addition, during late 1945 and early 1946, Clark's attitude toward the fundamental character of Austrian and Soviet peoples also changed remarkably. By April 1946, close contact with the Austrians transformed

¹⁷⁶Conference with Newspapermen, 22 April 1946, folder 4, box 6 Clark papers. Also see Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," p.292 and his, "Mark W. Clark und Die Aprilkrise 1946: Das Erste Jahr des Amerikanischen Hochkommissars in Österreich" in Zeitgeschichte, vol. 13, no.7, April 1986, p.251.

¹⁷⁷Clark to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 February 1946, Clark Diaries, vol. 11, box 66 and FRUS, 1946, vol.V, pp.312-314. Also see Bischof, "Between Responsibility & Rehabilitation," pp.326-327.

his opinion of them. Now, he saw the Austrians as a naturally "friendly" and "not particularly aggressive" people.¹⁷⁸ In fact, their main faults, he thought, were a lack of inclination towards hard work and an inability to make good soldiers. As far as the Nazi influence in Austria that Clark had once warned against, it now appeared to have been generally purged from Austrian society and, to Clark's mind, certainly did not pose a serious threat. As for the common soldiers of the Red Army, in contrast to Eisenhower's view in 1945, Clark in late 1946 believed that them to be "dirty" individuals who simply robbed the hapless Viennese at will.¹⁷⁹

However, throughout 1946 and the beginning of the what can be considered the Cold War in Austria, Clark's basic goals remained essentially the same as in 1945. He had wanted to finish the war against Nazism, complete the rebuilding of Austria, and then make a triumphal return to the United States; but by early 1946, Clark viewed the Soviets as standing squarely in the way of achieving at least two of his three goals. Indeed, a long list of unilateral Soviet actions convinced Clark that the Red Army intended simply to loot Austria as punishment for their aid to Hitler's war effort and their subsequent refusal to support the Communist party. As will be seen in chapter three, the Soviet actions included failing to provide food for Vienna. Also, they took over many formerly German owned businesses and, thereby, crippled the Austrian economy. Most important for American foreign policy, Clark's new-found fear of

¹⁷⁸Bischof, "Mark W. Clark und Die Aprilkrise 1946," p.249.

¹⁷⁹Clark's speech at the National War College, 9 October 1946, folder 6, box 1, Clark Papers.

Communist aggression played a key role in changing Washington's view of the situation in Austria.¹⁸⁰

Conclusion

Though American policy makers in 1946 increasingly viewed with misgiving Soviet actions in Austria and elsewhere, the earlier American view of the Soviet role in Austrian affairs was one of cautious optimism. In June 1945, General Flory's Vienna mission had allowed a brief reconnaissance of the Vienna area, and his report helped pave the way for a quadripartite agreement for Vienna. Flory's subsequent influential report did not dwell upon his difficulties with the Soviets and, as discussed in chapter one, his men had little sympathy for the defeated Viennese, viewing them only as the former enemy.

An examination of the EAC's agreement concerning Austria in the context of its time makes plain that the American view was that future relations between the two Allies in the Central European country would, if anything, improve. To begin with, the agreement presupposed Allied cooperation in Austria and, second, the agreement's "Covering Report" seemed to ensure that even in the details there would be no misunderstandings. The location of an American zone in Vienna, miles from the U.S. zone in Austria in an indefensible position within the Soviet zone, betrayed little fear on the part of the Americans of the Cold War difficulties to come. Also, the only American airfield in the Vienna area, Tulln field, located miles from the U.S. zone in Vienna, demonstrated the confidence in cooperative relations

¹⁸⁰Bischof, "Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation," p.294.

with the Red Army in Austria. Inside Vienna itself, the creation of the international zone in the Innere Stadt by its very existence exhibited a certain faith that a joint occupation of Vienna was not only possible but necessary. Also, it should not be forgotten that both the Joint Chiefs and the State Department agreed to the arrangements in Vienna. Finally, in drawing up the zones for Austria, the Red Army lent credence to the American faith in the Grand Alliance because it had actually retreated from Austrian territory captured during the war.

Certainly, the Soviets had to be treated with caution, but prior to early 1946 the Americans officially viewed them more as fellow allies and not so much as potential enemies. In particular, in July 1945, American commanders in Europe were aware of the Army's remaining duties in the Pacific Theater and great distance from European ports. Cooperation, if not friendly relations, with the Soviet Union were essential from a practical as well as idealistic view. The recently ended war against Hitler had created mind-sets that American military men, even if ordered to do so, would have found difficult to convert overnight. General Clark, and many other American military men, had fought long and hard against the Nazi enemy in Italy. After the war ended, he knew that his mission was now to finish the war against Nazism in Austria by conducting a revolutionary denazification purge of Austrian society. Like the Soviets, he suspiciously viewed many Austrians as German collaborators. His military government command, USFA, by its very nature was an occupation force in what had been until very recently an enemy country. Until late 1946, USFA focused far more on monitoring potential Austrian resistance than any threat from the Soviet Union. The fact that serious resistance

to the Americans never materialized should not obscure a continuing sense of apprehension in the minds of USFA personnel nor USFA policy at the time.

Like other top commanders, Clark rightfully later claimed that he came to Austria with the faith that his peers in the Red Army were fellow Allies who could be counted on to carry out the Allied mission in Austria. Clark did not make this claim only in retrospect. His words and actions at the time represent an American confidence that reason and frank discussion could overcome difficulties between peoples who were essentially alike. As USFA commander and Allied Military Commissioner, Clark time and time again attempted to work with the Red Army commanders as allies. Initially, the American general did so even at the expense of the Anglo-American friendship. When he believed that McCreery played the role of obstructionist in Austrian affairs, Clark firmly opposed him and supported the Soviets. Late in 1945, Clark continued his role as mediator, this time between the Red Army and the Austrian government. In both cases, Clark sought to accommodate as much as possible the desires of the Soviets and continue the Grand Alliance in Austria.

Clark's own published accounts, however, might mislead the unwary reader because he retroactively portrays himself as an early Cold War warrior. Though Clark does indeed become virulently anti-Soviet, he did not arrive at that position overnight, only after months of dealing directly and frequently with the Red Army in Vienna. Part of what undoubtedly frustrated Clark and intensified the political problems in the early months of the occupation in Vienna were the fundamental political differences between the Americans and the Soviets. At the beginning, however, the American effort in Austria was primarily aimed at punishing the

Austrians. As for the Soviets, the USFA promoted cordial relations and attempted to prevent problems from developing between the two allies. Initially, Clark and other Americans in Austria believed that once the two Allied peoples came to know each other better, mutual understanding would naturally develop and all sides would join in redeeming Austria from its Nazi past. Yet for Clark and other Americans in Austria, experience with the Soviets taught him to distrust them.

Chapter III

Hunger & Crime in Vienna, 1945-48: A Plight to be
Endured or a Problem to be Solved?

Introduction

In early 1946 both the State Department's George Kennan and former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill heralded the Cold War. At the same time, divergent American-Soviet responses to the difficult economic conditions found in Vienna contributed to the breakdown of local relations in Vienna. As on the battlefield, the practices of the American and Soviet militaries in occupied Vienna revealed the influence of their respective social and political backgrounds.¹ The Americans brought to Vienna their individualistic entrepreneurial spirit, a tendency towards competitiveness, confidence in social and political progress through education, and idealistic hopes for a better post-war world. By contrast, most Red Army officers retained their traditional and totalitarian practice of placing the group before the individual, a tendency towards caution and even suspicion towards foreigners, centralized political control, grim determination to endure the travails of the world, and desire for revenge against the Austrian people, a people who had greatly contributed to the wartime rape of the Soviet Union.

As American-Soviet relations continued to be played out in the Austrian capital, the differing American and Soviet responses to the circumstances in Vienna revealed

¹For an account of how social and political backgrounds shaped the way Americans fought in World War II which has helped inform this chapter, see Michael D. Doubler, Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1994), especially, pp.5-6.

the deep differences of political culture which separated the two peoples. On the one hand, the Americans approached the difficulties in the city in what was essentially an idealistic and optimistic manner. They believed that hunger, black market activity, and ordinary crime in Vienna were simply a number of social problems which could be individually solved. By contrast, local Red Army officers held to a contrary view which was essentially fatalistic and pessimistic. Controlled by a strict dictatorship and impoverished by war, they believed that the Viennese would simply have to endure the catastrophic travails brought by war and defeat such as hunger, black market activity, and ordinary crime. Indeed, Soviets continued to view the Austrians as a defeated people who had suffered little compared to the Soviet people. Power politics aside, these two incompatible views contributed to the clash between the two Allied powers in Vienna and inevitably slowed the reconstruction of normal life in the city.

Conditions in Vienna, 1945-1948

In November 1945, John Dos Passos traveled across war ravaged Central Europe as a correspondent for Life magazine. Upon reaching Vienna, he declared the Austrian capital to be like "an old musical comedy queen dying in the poorhouse."² Like American military officers stationed in Vienna, he sadly surveyed a city dotted with the white crosses of war dead and noted that once magnificent eighteenth and nineteenth century buildings had been hideously transformed into so many acres of bombed out masonry. With darkness, the American writer found that conditions inside Vienna

²John Dos Passos, Tour of Duty (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946), p.279.

degenerated yet further, causing the city to become like an unlighted Medieval town, full of criminal gangs bent upon robbery and violence.³ He might have added that Vienna seemed to have encountered the Four Horseman of the Apocalypse, as war, famine, pestilence, and death had all left their vicious marks. He might also have noted how now even some of the better dressed Viennese savagely fought each other like animals for casually discarded cigarettes, a form of currency in the city. The American writer left no doubt, however, that Vienna during daylight was a pale shadow of its former self, while at night it became a place where few ventured with safety.⁴

Presented in the more clinical tone of the social sciences, an ever increasing volume of USFA and USACA reports expanded upon Dos Passos' dismal description of Vienna. Clearly, throughout the first several years of the Allied occupation, most of city's people lived a mean existence, weakened both physically and spiritually. Even as many Americans in the United States saw a future filled only with great promise, most Viennese faced a host of day-to-day problems plaguing their city: among other things, malnutrition, poor sanitation, an exploding rat population, shortages of electricity and fuel, a lack of suitable clothing and shelter, streets covered by rubble, a damaged transportation system, an influx of displaced persons, and, finally, the potentially troublesome return of veterans.⁵

³Dos Passos did not exaggerate. For instance, on 13 September 1945 the Arbeiter Zeitung recommended the raising of window shades in order to improve night lighting on city streets, see NA-RG 59, 863.911 R.R./9-1445 (microfilm).

⁴John Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, pp.280 & 282.

⁵Using censorship reports from mail sent home, one USFA intelligence report claimed that the mood among Austrian PWs was "one of pessimism, probably attributable, among other things, to a habit of thinking in terms of war, of racial and national

Adding to the city's woes, disease inevitably followed in the wake of war. When the Americans officially took up their zone in September 1945, public health problems in Vienna ranged from minor outbreaks of dysentery, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid fever, and scarlet fever to major outbreaks of venereal disease and pulmonary tuberculosis. One American report declared that Vienna had a "large reservoir" of both gonorrhea and syphilis, with around two thousand cases reported in October 1945 alone.⁶ Subsequent campaigns against venereal diseases during 1946 proved only mildly effective.⁷ Tuberculosis proved to be an even more dangerous public health menace. In November 1945 Austrian authorities reported to the Americans that there were approximately 26,000 cases of TB, of which more than 8,000 were infectious.⁸ By February 1947, public health officials were unable to contain an increase in the number of tuberculosis cases to over 31,000.⁹

With the city in shambles, the Americans noted that even usually minor health problems caused unusual concern and exemplified the breakdown of basic services, such as supplying soap and warm water, in what had once been a city famous for its social welfare programs. As a result, in December 1945, one Vienna physician recorded thirty-five cases of scabies a day. For those

conflict," see "HQ USFA Intelligence Summary," no. 28, 15 December 1945, p.4, folder 52, box 7, NA-RG 260.

⁶Report of the United States Commissioner, no. 1, November 1945, p.14. According to the above report, in October there were 1,671 cases of Gonorrhea and 312 cases of Syphilis. For a chart tracking the rate of venereal disease in 1946-1947, see Report of the United States Commissioner, no.20, June 1947, p.74.

⁷Report of the United States High Commissioner, no.15, January 1947, p.70. In October 1946, public health authorities reported over 1,900 new cases.

⁸Report of the United States Commissioner, no.1, November 1945, p.14.

⁹Report of the United States Commissioner, no.16, February 1947.

in post-war Vienna who suffered from the skin condition, it could develop into a serious problem since scratching produced infectious boils, especially for those already in weakened health. Unfortunately, Vienna's pharmacists had exhausted their stock of the ingredients necessary to cure the skin disease quickly and those with scabies had to await the arrival of American aid.¹⁰

The outbreak of both minor and major diseases, however, paled in comparison to the specter of famine.¹¹ In an attempt to avert mass starvation in Vienna, the Allies had agreed to introduce a revised ration scale at the first meeting of the Allied Council in September 1945. Three months earlier, when the Red Army solely controlled the city, rations had ranged from 1620 calories per day for a "heavy worker" to as low as 806 calories per day for many other Austrians.¹² Within the first month of Allied occupation, the scale increased to 1550 calories a day for the "normal" Austrian consumer over six years of age.¹³ In Vienna, "normal" consumers comprised roughly half of the city's population.¹⁴ For

¹⁰HQ USFA "Intelligence Summary," no.31, 5 January 1946, p.6, folder 53, box 7, NA-RG 260.

¹¹A Review of Military Government, 1 June 1946, p.7.

¹²"Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers. In May 1945, the ration was even lower, but a special appeal by Karl Renner to Marshal Tolbulkin raised the ration, see Mair, Four-Power Occupation of Austria, p.340. According to the 31 August 1945 issue of the Wiener Zeitung the ration scale was as follows: 833 for normal consumers, 970 for clerical workers, 1,305 for laborers, 1,620 for heavy laborers, see NA-RG 59, 863.61/1-1146 (microfilm).

¹³Allied Commission for Austria, Proceedings of the Allied Council, Minutes, 1st Meeting, 11 September 1945 (microfilm). The ration scale allowed for a minimum daily ration of 2250 calories to "heavy workers" and DPs. Expectant mothers and "very heavy workers" received a minimum allowance of 2850 calories per day along with a milk ration. Other sources give slightly different figures. For example, HQ USFA's "Intelligence Summary," no.15, 15 September 1945 reported that the Allied Commission would increase the food ration to 3,000 calories for "heavy workers," 2,500 for most other workers, 1,750 for clerks, and 1,300 for children under twelve years, folder 51, box 6, NA-RG 260.

¹⁴Military Government Austria, Report of the U.S. High Commissioner, no.16, February 1947, p.85. As of December 1946,

most other residences of Vienna, the food situation was only slightly better.

By March 1946, worldwide food shortages and the refusal of the French and Soviet elements to make agreed-upon contributions to the city's food stocks, produced further hardship. As a result, the Allied Council found itself forced to reduce the official ration scale to 1200 calories for most of the city's population. There it remained for much of the rest of the year.¹⁵ The meagerness of the daily ration becomes apparent once it is remembered that in 1937 Austrians generally consumed around 3,200 calories a day.¹⁶ Adding insult to injury, at various times in 1946 the official food ration in Austria was lower than that found in Germany and the quality of food sent in relief to Vienna often left much to be desired.¹⁷

Making matters worse, the distribution of food in Vienna seldom reflected the official ration scale. For instance, during the course of the bleakest week in

the breakdown of Vienna's population was as follows: "normal" Austrians (44%), workers (24%), clerks (14%), heavy workers (6%) and pregnant and nursing mothers (1%).

¹⁵Allied Commission for Austria, Proceedings of the Allied Council, Minutes, 18th Meeting, 11 March 1946 (microfilm). The new scale granted "heavy workers" an allowance of 2700 calories, "workers" 1850 calories, "clerks" 1450 calories, children under 12 years 1300 calories, and "normal consumers" 1200 calories. In November 1946, Clark forced the return of the ration allowance for most Austrians to 1550 a day, see Report of the United States Commissioner, no.13, November 1946. In 1947, the food situation improved somewhat and the average daily ration for the normal consumer remained above 1500 calories for the year, see "Outline of USFA History: 1 July 1946-30 June 1947," p. 54, folder 9, box 2, NA-RG 260.

¹⁶C. W. Grey to Secretary of State, 11 January 1946, NA-RG 59, 863.61/1-1146 (microfilm). Another American report puts the average calorie intake in 1937 as 2,800 calories. See "The Rehabilitation of Austria 1945-1947" found in Reports of the U.S. Military Government of Austria, 1945-1950, reel #7.

¹⁷Mair, Four-Power Control in Austria, p.342. According to Earl F. Zeimke, the ration level for the U.S. zone, Germany in April 1946 was 1,275 calories, though Gen. Clay reduced the scale to 1,180 calories at the end of May. By the end of the next month, however, Clay raised the ration to 1,330 calories. See Zeimke's The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, pp.436-437.

January 1946 the actual daily "calorie value" of the food rationed for the "normal consumer" in Vienna dipped to a little more than 1100 calories a day, some 450 calories below the official level. Four months later, with the official ration scale now reduced to 1200 calories, many Viennese received a ration which amounted to about 900 calories per day, with the average daily calorie value actually received during the month being 1074.¹⁸ This was the situation even with the arrival of emergency food aid. For the first three months of 1946, the Red Cross fed over 900,000 Viennese with food supplied by the U.S. Army.¹⁹ The next three months saw the Red Cross feeding over one million Viennese, including some 180,000 pregnant women and nursing mothers, along with more than 375,000 children.²⁰

Taking an approach grounded in the social sciences, the Americans meticulously monitored the effects of the food crisis upon the local population. USFA's Internal Affairs Division conducted monthly surveys of the city's population officially known as "street weighing programs." With the exception of a single month, these surveys revealed that during the period from mid-December 1945 to mid-June 1946 most Viennese remained either underweight or suffered from malnutrition, the later being defined as at least 20% below American weight standards.²¹ Though increased food shipments helped improve conditions significantly by the end of 1946, other USFA street weighing programs in 1947

¹⁸A Review of Military Government, 1 June 1946, p.43.

¹⁹Report of the United States Commissioner, no.5, March 1946, p.36.

²⁰Report of the United States Commissioner, no.9, July 1946, p.157. Other relief agencies in Vienna included the following: American Friends Service Committee, National Catholic Welfare Committee, American Joint Distribution Committee, Unitarian Service Committee, American Aid to Austria Committee, Church World Service, World Council of Churches, CIO, CARE, Swedish Relief agencies, Danish Relief agencies, and Swiss Relief agencies.

²¹A Review of Military Government, 1 June 1946, p.42a.

revealed that many remained underweight, and typically around 8% of the city's population suffered from malnourishment.²² During the first year of the occupation, the situation in Vienna became so desperate that American and Austrian authorities removed over 63,000 children from the city and sent them to the surrounding countryside or as far away as Switzerland and Portugal for health and recreational vacations.²³ Such measures failed to help all of Vienna's infants and elderly, leaving infant mortality far above pre-war levels and doubtless contributing to the deaths of many older people.²⁴

The Americans who came to Vienna in 1945 provide first hand accounts concerning the food shortage in the city. In September 1945, Major Herz systematically investigated the living standard of Vienna families for USFA. Being of Austrian-Jewish heritage and receiving his formative education in Vienna, Herz proved to be a unique observer for the Americans.²⁵ Putting his fluent German and knowledge of Vienna to good use, he investigated selected families in the Austrian capital in order to understand better how the city's population had fared since the liberation. In one report, he described what the Austrian authorities allowed a family of three to purchase legally. In this case, a mother and two young children who resided in a lower class tenement within the Soviet zone received a small milk allowance, along with a daily ration which consisted of

²²Report of the United States Commissioner, no.23, September 1947, p.74.

²³Report of the United States Commissioner, no.16, February 1947, p.71.

²⁴See "HQ USFA Intelligence Summary," no.32, 12 January 1945(sic)46, p.8, folder 53, box 7, NA-RG 260 and Report of the United States Commissioner, no.15, January 1947, p.66. Also see Hiscocks, Rebirth, p.83.

²⁵Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p.7.

black bread and dried peas.²⁶ In another case, Herz found that an elderly mother and her daughter who lived in the American zone usually obtained around 5,000 grams of bread a week but, like many in Vienna, did without vegetables, potatoes and meat.²⁷ In the third household Herz investigated, also located inside the American zone, three people, two of whom had belonged to the NSDAP, claimed that several elderly Viennese had died by starvation.²⁸ Though Herz did not accept uncritically the stories of all he interviewed, he knew that conditions in Vienna were desperate and that the Viennese lacked not only adequate food but also necessary vitamins.

Nearly three years later, with the food supply increasing, Herz even more clearly sympathized with the Austrian people and noted in a private letter that conditions in Vienna remained bleak: simply procuring the "bare necessities" took a large of part of the day for most of the population in Vienna. Herz went on to recount some of the "pathetic stories" about the food situation in the city.²⁹ For instance, at a Christmas party, one Viennese family prepared cocoa for the first time in years. In a cruel twist of fate, "as they all bent over the pot, which had a tight-fitting lid, it suddenly exploded into their excited and curious faces," sending ten to the hospital. In another case, Herz noted that the city authorities granted a special lemon ration as a Christmas present to those over 69 years of age, an act that spoke "volumes" about the food situation in the city.³⁰

²⁶Ibid., p.42.

²⁷Ibid., p.44.

²⁸Ibid., p.45.

²⁹Reinhold Wagnleitner, ed., "Observations on a City in Distress: A Private Letter from Vienna by U.S. Diplomat Martin F. Herz, May 1948," Austrian History Yearbook, vol. XXIV (1993), p.195.

³⁰Ibid., p.197.

In 1945, other Americans who arrived also remembered Vienna's food shortage in vivid detail. Lt. Col. Samouce recalled that after the arrival from Salzburg of the first American relief trains in Vienna, most Austrian men were too ill-fed or elderly to be of much assistance in unloading the food. Indeed, a significant percentage of what had been the city's male population either languished in prisoner of war camps, or had died on the battlefield.³¹ Of the poorly fed men who remained in the city, it sometimes took eight to perform the work of a single healthy American soldier.³² Major Edwin M. J. Kretzmann, an Army intelligence officer who served as General Clark's interpreter and personal liaison officer to the Austrian government, recollected seeing the weakened Viennese slowly walking the streets of their city in a trance-like state.³³ The newly arrived Americans had to take care to give the underfed Viennese ample time to cross streets and intersections.³⁴ Others were less concerned; one American soldier described in a letter home how Red Army truck drivers deliberately tried to run down Viennese in the streets of the city.³⁵ As for the Austrians and food, he wrote that the local people were "hurting for

³¹Even a year after the war's end, women comprised over 60% of the city's population. In the age group consisting of twenty to thirty-nine year olds, 73% were female. Only in the age group eleven years and younger did the number of males slightly outnumber females, see A Review of Military Government, 1 June 1946, p.42. For a population analysis in December 1946 see Military Government Austria, Report of the U.S. High Commissioner, February 1947, no.16, p.85.

³²Samouce, "I do Understand the Russians."

³³Edwin M. J. Kretzmann, "Four Powers in Three-Quarter Time: Tales of the Austrian Occupation, Vienna, 1945-1948," unpublished memoir, p.17.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵According to the VAC's Provost Marshal's office, during 1946 about two-thirds of all hit-and-run drivers in Vienna were driving Red Army vehicles. See "Crime in Austria Since the War," Karl L. Rankin to Secretary of State, 7 March 1947, NA-RG 59, 863.108/3-747 (microfilm).

food" and would "pay quite a high price for garbage."³⁶ As a result of seeing such sights, many Americans began to develop a new and more sympathetic view towards the Viennese and found it incomprehensible that the Soviets would fail to feel the same way.

The Politics of Feeding Vienna

Yet even prior to the arrival of the Western Allies in the city, the issue of supplying Vienna had provoked Allied disagreement. In late July 1945, Red Army-controlled Radio Vienna formally had thanked the Soviet Union for a shipment of food known as the "Stalin Bounty."³⁷ In addition, Red Army Lt. General Blagodatov had received special praise from Radio Vienna for ensuring the arrival of badly needed foodstuffs. Later, however, the British discovered that the Soviets were demanding payment for Stalin's "gift" and, in effect, selling food to the impoverished Austrians.³⁸ As already mentioned in chapter two, the British had initially suspected that the Soviets, upon turning over the Western Bezirke, would leave the Western Allies without an adequate supply of food. At Potsdam, Churchill had made a point of securing a promise from Stalin that the Red Army would continue to feed the people of Vienna

³⁶Robert J. Calhoun, 42nd Division, 232nd Infantry Regiment, 3 September 1945, Letter Home, Robert J. Calhoun Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Penn. (hereafter Calhoun Papers).

³⁷"PID, Austria: Weekly Background Notes: No.8," 2 August 1945. FO-PRO 1007/340. According to HQ 15th Army Group's "Intelligence Summary," no.3, Karl Renner requested that Stalin help supply Vienna. On 24 May 1945, Stalin promised to send the city 45,000 tons of grain, 4,000 tons of meat, 3,700 tons of sugar, 1,000 tons of fat, 1,800 tons of salt, and 325 tons of coffee substitute. See the report of 12 June 1945, pp.10-11 found in RG-59, 863.00/6-1445, (microfilm).

³⁸"PID, Austria: Weekly Background Notes: No.10," 15 August 1945. FO-PRO 1007/340.

until the Western Allies could firmly establish themselves in their zones.³⁹

Representing the United States, General Clark had his own reservations concerning the supplying of Vienna and initially resisted taking up a zone in the city until a system for feeding the people of Vienna had been mutually agreed upon by all the Allies. In July 1945, Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther had reported to Clark that talks with the Soviets concerning the food problem in Vienna were especially tedious.⁴⁰ A short time later, on 22 August 1945, Clark may have even come to a private agreement with Konev at Baden that the ration scale would be maintained at 1550 calories.⁴¹ In any case, the Allies did agree to raise the ration in September 1945. Once in the Austrian capital, however, they found themselves giving in to revived Soviet demands that the Western Allies bring in supplies to help feed their zones in the city.⁴²

Also, after Clark arrived in Vienna he learned that Marshal Konev had made a personnel gift of some 50,000 tons of potatoes; a gift which received great attention and praise in the Red Army-sponsored Austrian press.⁴³ Suspecting that more than a simple humanitarian impulse moved the Soviet marshal, Clark ordered Major Kretzmann to determine "'where the Russians got them God-damned potatoes.'"⁴⁴ Kretzmann soon discovered that they originated from Austrian stocks and farms in Lower

³⁹Mair, Four-Power Control in Austria, p.340.

⁴⁰Gruenther to Clark, 20 July 1945, folder 2, box 40, Clark Papers.

⁴¹Brig. Gen. Ralph H. Tate to Zheltov, 14 January 1945, POLAD, Correspondence Between the Soviet Element & the U.S. Forces in Austria, 1946, box 1, Record Group 84, U.S. National Archives (hereafter NA-RG 84).

⁴²Cox, "The Allied Commission and the Creation of the Second Austrian Republic," p.177.

⁴³Reported in Österreichische Zeitung, see NA-RG 59, 863.9111 RR/9-3045 (microfilm).

⁴⁴Edwin M. J. Kretzmann, "Four Powers in Three-Quarter Time," p.19.

Austria. Alarmed by the Soviet practice of taking Austrian food and then charging the Austrian provisional government for it, Clark made a point to pass the information on to the newly established, American-sponsored, Austrian newspaper, Wiener Kurier.⁴⁵

In his memoir, Kretzmann claims that the resulting public embarrassment for the Soviet Union halted the practice of taking food from Austrian farms. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets halted the practice, because the food problem remained unsolved in the city and later shipments of food arrived in the city from Soviet sources in Austria.⁴⁶ Also, despite earlier assurances that the Red Army would not live off the land, by January 1946, Clark became so disgruntled over the Soviet food policy in Austria that he even threatened to stop pooling American food stocks with those of the other Allies and to feed only the American zone in Vienna.⁴⁷

To a great extent, the food shortage in Vienna came as a result of external difficulties. Since the demise of the Dual Monarchy and prior to the 1938 Anschluss, Austria had not been agriculturally self-sufficient and

⁴⁵According to Mair, the Allies permitted the following Austrian newspapers to publish during the initial occupation period: Österreichische Zeitung (Soviet element), Österreichische Volksstimme (Communist party), Sport-Tagblatt (Communist party), Arbeiter-Zeitung (Socialist party), Das Kleine Volksblatt (People's party), Wiener Zeitung (official), Neues Österreich (non-party), British Morning News (British element), Weltpresse (British element), Welt am Abend (French element), Welt am Montag (French element), and Wiener Kurier (U.S. element), see his Four-Power Control in Austria, p.336.

⁴⁶Edwin M. J. Kretzmann, "Four Powers in Three-Quarter Time," p.19. In a draft radiogram to the JCS dated 19 November 1945, advocated giving "full publicity" that the "Russians alone are responsible" for the food problem in Austria, see folder 5, box 40, Clark Papers.

⁴⁷Tate to Zheltov, 14 January 1945, POLAD, Correspondence Between the Soviet Element & the U.S. Forces in Austria, 1946, box 1, NA-RG 84. Herz goes so far as to argue that the Soviets in Austria were essentially after "'capitalist profit'" not political expansion, see Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p.14.

had relied upon the Danubian Basin in Eastern Europe to sustain a quarter of its population.⁴⁸ Naturally, the Second World War brought to Austria and Eastern Europe sweeping social changes, disrupting traditional communications and transportation networks. Also, during the fighting, the Red Army had removed livestock, farm machinery, and normal farm surpluses.⁴⁹

After the war, the lack of consumer goods discouraged Austrian farmers from producing for the legal market, while the Austrian government proved inept at collecting foodstuffs from the countryside. Part of the problem was a lack of political will. For instance, in June 1946, a "behind the scenes" political feud erupted between Josef Kraus, the Austrian minister of agriculture (ÖVP), and Otto Sagmeister, the minister of food, (SPÖ). It seems that Kraus represented Austrian agrarian interests who viewed the food shortage as a "golden opportunity to make money . . . by holding back deliveries" and lacked the political will to force Austrian farmers to turn over their crops.⁵⁰

A great part of the difficulty in restoring Austria's traditional agricultural supply, however, came as a direct result of the Red Army's presence in Austria and Eastern Europe. Following the war, Stalin lacked the means to feed his large and at times unruly military from internal sources. With the Soviet Union ravaged by war, suffering from famine, and desiring revenge, the Soviet Generalissimo seized whatever wealth he could from Austria and Eastern Europe. Without doubt, the

⁴⁸"Memorandum by Mr. Emile Despres, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, and by Mr. Henry P. Leverich of the Division of Central European Affairs to Assistant Secretary Clayton," 10 September 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.586.

⁴⁹For an account of war damage to Austrian agriculture, see Clark to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 September 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.601.

⁵⁰"HQ USFA Intelligence Summary," no.56, 29 June 1946, p.1, folder 55, box 7, NA-RG 260.

Soviets, and to a lesser extent the French, had a policy of "pasturing out" their military in Austria.⁵¹ By early 1946, Soviets were even laying claim to farmland in Austria, including some 40,000 hectares of the Esterhazy estates in Burgenland.⁵² Such a policy could have no other effect than to retard revival of Austrian agriculture and hamper food importation.

In discussing the food problem privately, the Soviets claimed that the basic disparity between the United States and Soviet Union in terms of agricultural resources made it difficult for Americans to understand the Soviet predicament. As several Red Army officers furtively told their American counterparts in the summer of 1946, the Soviet Union lacked the resources to do other than live off the land in Austria. Conceding that the United States had generously supplied Austria with food as well as other forms of aid, the Soviet officers made an analogy to illustrate their view of the situation; America was "a man with a full stomach" while the Soviet Union was "a man with an empty stomach." The Americans, they thought, could never truly understand the difficulties of a "hungry man."⁵³ At times, the Red Army officers were correct. Even though many American soldiers and officers came to Vienna viewing the Soviets as fellow allies, as time passed, there was a tendency to forget what the Soviets had endured during the war. As one Soviet officer angrily told a startled British interpreter after a session of the Allied Council in which the Austrian government requested food aid, his country had seen Ukrainian children with "stomachs

⁵¹"Memorandum by Mr. Emile Despres, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, and by Mr. Henry P. Leverich of the Division of Central European Affairs to Assistant Secretary Clayton," 10 September 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.587.

⁵²"Part III, USACA History-1946, Vol III," p.781, folder 257, box 33, NA-RG 260.

⁵³Erhardt to Secretary of State, 31 July 1946, "General Report on Austria," NA-RG 59, 863.00/7-3146 (microfilm).

swollen like balloons from starvation" and the women and children of Leningrad fleeing across frozen lakes to escape a famine which took the lives of nearly a million people. By comparison, the Soviet officer believed that Austrians had little to complain about.⁵⁴

The Black Market in Vienna & Austria

Obviously a shortage of food brought about a concurrent evil: an illegal trade in food. The underground economy or black market naturally thrived in Vienna and proved particularly lucrative to the more enterprising, as well as irresistible to the thousands desperate for food and other goods. For many Austrians, if one was to live through the difficult post-war winters, little choice remained but to barter or sell valued possessions and purchase food from often disreputable individuals at highly inflated prices.⁵⁵ In short, while a few made obscene profits, the average Viennese participated in the black market simply to survive, thus inadvertently perpetuating a cycle which undermined efforts to reorganize an orderly economy.

In September 1945, USFA's G-2 conducted investigations concerning conditions in Vienna, part of which focused upon the city's food situation. In doing so, USFA's intelligence officers discovered the ease with which a black market developed in the Austrian capital. In this case, bread baked from American-supplied white flour was often more valuable to exchange than to eat because its supposed superior taste made it a luxury item. Only those of substantial means could afford black market butter and the other generally unobtainable supplements which were necessary to make

⁵⁴Williams, White Among Reds, p.88.

⁵⁵Reinhold Wagnleitner, "Observations on a City in Distress," p.197.

white bread as filling and nutritional as traditional black bread.⁵⁶ As a result, a barter system rapidly developed between those Viennese living in the American zone, who acquired the bread legally, and wealthier residents in other districts the city.⁵⁷ Later, barter arrangements of this type proved so destructive to Vienna's economic revival that steps were taken to ban them.⁵⁸ Also, USFA's G-2 learned that some in the Austrian capital behaved as if the city were Paris in 1871. With traditional meats generally unobtainable even on the black market, a number of Vienna's butchers began to eye family pets with increased interest. Sadly, their actions left the city with far fewer cats.⁵⁹

An examination of American sources, derived from reports issued by the Austrian Ministry of Interior, indicates that the vast majority of individuals involved in black market activities were Austrian citizens.⁶⁰ A tendency developed among many Austrians, however, to place a great deal of blame for the black market upon foreigners, whether Allied soldiers, DP's, or other outsiders. Certainly in some cases non-Austrians played a key roles in the underground economy and took part in a large number of offenses. Even members of the International Red Cross involved themselves in a scheme to deliver uncensored mail between the American Zone in Austria and Vienna.⁶¹ Yet among the Austrians themselves, much shifting of blame took place. For instance, Austrian authorities in Salzburg accused

⁵⁶"Intelligence Bulletin, no.5, 071500 September 1945," folder 59, box 8, NA-RG 260.

⁵⁷"Intelligence Bulletin, no.7, 101200 September 1945," folder 59, box 8, NA-RG 260.

⁵⁸See NA-RG 59, 863.911R.R./10-2245 (microfilm).

⁵⁹"Intelligence Bulletin, no.8, 111200 September 1945," folder 59, box 8, NA-RG 260.

⁶⁰For example, see "Statistics on Crimes in Austria," 8 November 1946, NA-RG 59, 863.108/11-846 (microfilm).

⁶¹"HQ USFA Intelligence Summary," no.13, 1 September 1945, p.4, folder 51, box 6, NA-RG 260.

Austrians from Vienna of handling the bulk of the black market trade in Salzburg.⁶² In another example, the Austrian police officials reported that foreign nationals were behind "an extremely high percentage" of the black market activity in Austria, but that same report also broadly hinted that Austrian farmers, court officials, government functionaries and merchants played important parts as well.⁶³

When the Western Allies first arrived in Vienna, black market operations took place in public. Romola Nijinsky, wife of the famous Russian dancer Vaslav Nijinsky who had come to Vienna with the Red Army, aptly likened the black market in Vienna to a "World's Fair" full of "gesticulating, shouting people." She remembered that the Resselpark, near the Karlskirche, teemed with military men from each of the Allied nations. They stood elbow to elbow with Austrians and Balkan DP's exchanging a variety of goods, including "expensive jewelry, heirlooms of great families, masterpieces looted from museums, flashlights, foods, dresses, . . . American cigarettes, drugs, and wrist watches--and more wrist watches."⁶⁴ According to one American estimate, the black market in Vienna was a million dollar a day business; in just one of the city's three major black market centers some 5,000 people gathered daily.⁶⁵

Once established in their respective zones, the Western military authorities attempted to curtail the black market as part of an overall effort to restore order. First, they--along with Austrian police--

⁶²Report of the United States Commissioner, March 1946, no. 5, p.57.

⁶³"HQ USFA Intelligence Summary," no.65, 31 August 1946, pp.12-13, folder 56, box 7, NA-RG 260.

⁶⁴Romola Nijinsky, The Last Years of Nijinsky (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1952), p.190.

⁶⁵"Allied Police Raid Vienna Black Market," 3 October 1945, Yarborough Papers.

established road blocks which confiscated "excess quantities of food" from individuals entering the city. Next, they conducted raids on known black market centers.⁶⁶ For example, in October 1945, American MPs, along with their French and Austrian counterparts, staged a raid on the now infamous Naschmarkt in the French zone. During the course of the raid, the Americans arrested several dealers. They also made two unsettling observations; Red Army personnel were the only Allied soldiers present and a Soviet patrol on the scene had stood idly by while black market activities took place.⁶⁷ In later raids on black market centers in the Western zones, the indifference of Red Army soldiers would again be noted with consternation, and increasingly the role of the Soviets seemed to be a key part of the overall black market problem.⁶⁸

Despite significant Western efforts, the general effectiveness of early Allied black market raids remains questionable. Undoubtedly, the usual lack of Soviet participation in the Allied anti-black market campaign undercut it. Also, the Allies had great difficulty in coordinating raids and maintaining security with so many different organizations involved. Obviously frustrated by the Allied ineffectiveness, the American provost marshal in Vienna went so far as to go "on record as opposing large-scale international raids on black market areas" because "we have presented a ludicrous picture to

⁶⁶"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 September-31 October 1945," 15 November 1945, p.17, folder 184, box 21, NA-RG 260.

⁶⁷"Allied Police Raid Vienna Black Market," 3 October 1945, Yarborough Papers.

⁶⁸"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 April-31 May 1946," 10 June 1946, p.33, folder 190, box 21, NA-RG 260.

the public due to the confusion that occurs when four powers attempt a large raid."⁶⁹

Initially, even with consistent effort, the black market in the American zone proved difficult to curtail. As one January 1946 report put it, everything from "bad schnapps to a toy train" exchanged hands in broad daylight in front of one of the USFA post exchanges. On a daily basis, between ten to thirty Viennese gathered at this particular PX with suitcases laden down with an assortment of goods. According to one Viennese black marketer, Austrians usually avoided approaching Americans directly for fear of provoking an angry reaction. Instead, the normal method of conducting business was to follow a GI as he left the post exchange and solicit business from him only if he looked back. Occasionally, however, a bold black marketeer might simply accost Americans at random in the hopes quickly of obtaining cigarettes and chocolate. Often, both parties found such exchanges satisfactory. After trading a carton of American cigarettes for a black lace panties, one American sergeant said, "I always wanted to see my wife in a pair of these things."⁷⁰

Ultimately, the Americans successfully suppressed blatant black market activity within the American zone, driving the black market either underground or into other parts of the city. First, in December 1945, those taking part in black market activities suffered a severe blow because of the introduction of a new Austrian schilling, a move insisted upon by the Western powers.⁷¹ With a smaller number of the new schillings in circulation, prices declined further, and it became yet

⁶⁹"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 28 February 1946-31 March," 10 April 1946, p.27, folder 189, box 21, NA-RG 260.

⁷⁰Arthur Noyes Report, 13 January [1946?], folder 1, box 41, Clark Papers.

⁷¹For a discussion of the currency conversion, see Bischof, "Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation," pp.259-268.

more difficult to conduct illegal business operations, especially for Red Army soldiers who had large sums of the old currency. At the Naschmarkt, dealers reverted to a barter system but found few who were willing to trade.⁷² Also aiding in the suppression of the black market, the American Criminal Investigative Division (CID) cracked criminal rings dealing in penicillin and American currency.⁷³ Yet, despite early success, the Vienna Area Command remained convinced that black market centers would quickly reemerge in the American zone if there was any relaxation of pressure against it.⁷⁴

Americans in Vienna were not blameless when it came to the black market and, without doubt many took part in the illegal trade. Historians Whitnah and Erickson cite Dr. Eleanor Dulles, a member of the U.S. Economic Division, as claiming that, with only two other exceptions beside herself, every American working for the U.S. Embassy was "deeply involved in the black market."⁷⁵ Perhaps the most notorious example along these lines concerned Americans and the Austro-American Club. Many in Vienna, of differing political stripes and nationalities, believed that the club's restaurant operated in flagrant violation of the ration scale and price control laws. Also, the club's membership included "an unusually large number of outright black marketeers." Ostensibly an organization created to foster social contacts between the Austrian elite and American businessman, even the club's Austrian president

⁷²"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 November-31 December 1945," 10 January 1946, p.33, folder 186, box 21, NA-RG 260.

⁷³"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 31 January-28 February 1946," 10 March 1946, pp.24 & 26, folder 188, box 21, NA-RG 260.

⁷⁴"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 1 November-30 November 1946," 20 December 1946, p.36, folder 196, box 22, NA-RG 260.

⁷⁵Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.230.

confessed that some black market activity "discreetly" took place within his organization. Unlike Austrian members, the American Army officers and members of the U.S. Legation who joined the club had the expensive membership fee waived. Perhaps in some cases unwittingly, they then provided a shield for the Austrians selling food on the black market, as it would be embarrassing to the Austrian police if they raided the establishment and happened to arrest important Americans.⁷⁶

Like the Americans in USFA, some in the Red Army engaged in the black market in order to make fantastic profits. Most Soviet dealings on the black market, however, took place more openly and, unlike American black market activity, had tacit approval from higher authority.⁷⁷ For many in the Red Army, duty in Austria offered the first and perhaps last opportunity to gain access to what must have seemed to be the wondrous wealth of Central Europe. During the June 1945 Vienna mission, General Flory's party had noticed that the Soviets unofficially conducted black market operations in Vienna. Red Army soldiers brought in food from the countryside in cars and exchanged it for valuables such as clothing, jewelry, and watches.⁷⁸

Also, Red Army officers engaged in the flourishing underground penicillin trade in order to survive both politically and physically. According to an account given to USFA's G-2 by the Red Army deserter Ivan Ivanovitch, the Soviets had a considerable problem with venereal disease among their troops following the war.

⁷⁶Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, pp.223-224. Though the club remained open, at least one high-ranking American officer withdrew his membership after the "adverse publicity."

⁷⁷See for instance, "HQ VAC, Report on Operations in Vienna 30 April-31 May 1946," 10 June 1946, p.32, folder 202, box 22, NA-RG 260.

⁷⁸"Special Report of the Vienna Mission," 15 June 1945, Flory Papers.

Soviet authorities responded by introducing thorough medical examinations for soldiers and officers prior to their return home in the hope of thereby preventing the spread of venereal disease back to the Soviet Union. For those discovered with VD, the price was high: they received orders to remain in Central Europe for treatment, they forfeited their pay, and they received a black mark on their record which might later cause great harm. To avoid detection, many infected Red Army officers saved their pay for months and secretly sought private treatment from Austrian doctors which ensured that the demand for illegal penicillin was high.⁷⁹

From first-hand experience, the same Soviet deserter explained to his American interrogators how the black market typically operated for those serving in the Red Army. Prior to deserting, his commanding officer had frequently sent him into Vienna in order to barter and buy goods. This officer had had no difficulty in securing authorization for such trips, due in part to his influence as the regimental political officer. Ivan Ivanovitch also noted that Red Army line commanders, from the company commander on up, had an orderly who usually made black market deals in Vienna for his particular officer. In his own case, his commander had generously shared with him a portion of the liquor, meat, and vegetables obtained on the black market.⁸⁰

⁷⁹"HQ USFA (G-2), Special Weekly Report," no.37, 18 July 1947, pp.B43-B44, box 108, NA-RG 338. Born in 1924 to Johann Stefan in Dresdan, Germany, Ivanovitch originally was a German citizen named Hans Stefan. Seeking employment, Ivanovitch's father had secured a position as a factory technician in Ukraine during the late 1920's and moved his family to the Soviet Union. Later, Johann Stefan successfully sought Soviet citizenship for his entire family.

⁸⁰Ibid. The Georgian defector Ilya Dzhirkvelov recalled that high-ranking Soviet officers often acquired property by having their troops loot occupied territory during and after the war. They regarded this stolen property as payment "for services performed on the battlefield," see his Secret Servant: My Life With the KGB & the Soviet Elite (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p.30.

Despite orders from Stalin dating from the beginning of the occupation banning illegal economic activities, Soviet large-scale involvement in the black market took place throughout the 1940's. When the Allies first arrived in the city, the Soviets temporarily detained two American newspaper reporters who had snapped pictures of high-ranking Red Army officers engaging in black market activities. Instrumental in averting what might have developed into a nasty incident between the Americans and Soviets was the interpreter Lt. Leon Markus. Asked to help win the release of the reporters, Markus telephoned his Soviet opposite and, after a conversation in Yiddish, the Soviets freed the two reporters minus their film.⁸¹ Later, the Soviets imported food for the sole purpose of selling it on the black market.⁸² By 1948, the Soviets went so far as to open one of their commissaries in Wieden, the fourth Bezirk, to all comers and, until forced to close by a riot, sold food to the Austrians at black market prices. The Soviets also established a lucrative black market trade in American cigarettes.⁸³ During the next year, a heretofore secret Soviet black market scheme selling Austrian newsprint came to light.⁸⁴

⁸¹Lt. Leon Markus, Interview in Pinehurst, NC on 16 May 1994, Center for the Study of War & Society, University of Tennessee. Also see Masha Williams, White Among Reds, p.10.

⁸²HQ USFA, Strategic Survey of Austria, October 1947, section B, p.5, NA-RG 59, 863.50/11-647 (microfilm).

⁸³See NA-RG 59, 863.00/4-2148 (microfilm).

⁸⁴Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p.231.

Street Crime in Vienna

In addition to black market offenses, Austria and its capital endured an explosion in most other types of crime in the years following the German surrender. In the first months of the occupation, the presence of sometimes heavily armed gangs made the crime situation especially difficult to control. Though in 1946 the Americans successfully restored order within their zone, the city's overall crime rate gradually but not consistently decreased. Crime remained a problem which continuously plagued many other parts of the city. For instance, the last four months of the year still saw over three dozen murders, some sixty rapes, and more than one hundred armed robberies in Vienna.⁸⁵ Even worse, from August through December 1946, in the country as a whole, there were nearly two hundred and fifty murders and attempted murders, which compared to a figure of only two hundred and thirty-six for the entire period 1935-1938. By earlier Austrian standards, post-war crime proved extraordinary.⁸⁶

Along with the frustrations produced by a lack of food, fuel, and the black market, post-war chaos contributed to a trend towards lawlessness in Austria. Vice-Chancellor Adolf Schärff pointed out to American authorities that economic and political insecurity left many Austrians in a state of despair, which drove some into criminal activity.⁸⁷ Certainly for many Austrians, the war had brought dislocation and a weakening of faith

⁸⁵See "Statistics on Crimes in Austria," 8 November 1946, Erhardt to Secretary of State, NA-RG 59, 863.108/11-846 (microfilm).

⁸⁶"Crime in Austria Since the War," 7 March 1947, Rankin to Secretary of State, NA-RG 59, 863.108/3-747 (microfilm). Also see Bader, Austria Between East & West, p.78.

⁸⁷"HQ USFA Intelligence Summary," no.32, 12 January 1945(sic46), p.8, folder 53, box 7, NA-RG 260.

in traditional legal authorities. The same was true to an even greater extent for thousands of DP's, a great number of whom had suffered mightily during the war. Without a permanent home, they populated both Austria's countryside and cities, tending to live by their "wits without much regard for law."⁸⁸

In addition, among Austria's youth there was "a post-war tendency to run wild."⁸⁹ According to one Austrian police official interviewed by the Americans, Austrian youth between the ages of seventeen and twenty were responsible for the bulk of the crime in Vienna. With their fathers in the field and their mothers working in war industries, these youths often had grown up without parental discipline. Now, in many cases, they were fatherless and had mothers who were completely preoccupied with procuring the necessities for everyday life.⁹⁰ Confirming the police official's report, the Arbeiter Zeitung reported that juveniles had played a role in three fourths of the ordinary criminal cases currently before American military courts. One Austrian teacher estimated that one in six of her female students were prostitutes and many of her male students engaged in high stakes gambling.⁹¹ During a single month period, the American Provost Marshal's office in Vienna reported that cases involving juveniles jumped from twenty-six to fifty-six.⁹² In one dramatic episode, a group of thirty juveniles stole the ration supply from the American 242nd Infantry in Vienna.⁹³ Yet the complaint against the young could go to ridiculous extremes such as when

⁸⁸"Crime in Austria Since the War," 7 March 1947, Karl L. Rankin to Secretary of State, NA-RG 59, 863.108/3-747 (microfilm).

⁸⁹"HQ USFA Intelligence Summary," no.32, 12 January 1945(sic46), p.7, folder 53, box 7, NA-RG 260.

⁹⁰Ibid., p.8.

⁹¹See NA-RG 59, 863.9111 R.R./11-545, (microfilm).

⁹²"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 31 January-28 February 1946," 10 March 1946, p.27, folder 188, box 21, NA-RG 260.

⁹³Ibid., p.24.

on two occasions Radio Vienna had denounced Austrian youths for taking up what the Kleine Volksblatt had declared a morally disgraceful dance known as the jitterbug.⁹⁴

American Crime & Indiscipline in Vienna

The sometimes brutal behavior of Allied occupation troops added to the problem of criminality in Vienna, and American soldiers played their part. With many American GI's anxious to return home after the war, there was a post-combat decline in troop discipline, even to the point of a minor demobilization riot in Vienna during early 1946.⁹⁵ By summer, the arrival of raw replacement troops worsened the discipline problem for the USFA. One Army report characterized over half of the newly arrived American soldiers in Austria as below the normal in intelligence, capability of absorbing instruction, and ability to become leaders. Many of the new men had received little in the way of stateside training and lacked a sense of why they were in Austria. Some were even illiterate, and every unit seemed to have a number of "'wise guys'" who were a source of difficulty. As in Germany, a significant number of the new soldiers stubbornly refused to become professionals, having sloppy habits of dress and being overly impressed by "fancy gadgets." According to the report, problems with drunkenness, vandalism, rowdy behavior and indifference to discipline naturally followed. As an illustration, the report pointed to a seventeen year old "moron" who arrived in Austria after having been convicted of rape in the United States,

⁹⁴PID Background Note, Austria: Weekly Background Notes: no.12 30 August 1945, PRO-FO 1007/340.

⁹⁵Bert Marvin Sharp, "'Bring the Boys Home': Demobilization of the United States Armed Forces After World War II," Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1977, p.202.

whereupon he committed rape again.⁹⁶ Certainly, many if not most of the Americans conducted themselves appropriately in Vienna, but a number failed to represent their country well.

The reports of the Polizeidirektion Wien Polizeikommissariat Innere Stadt (Police Directorate Vienna, Police H.Q., City Center) also shed light on some of the typical criminal acts committed by Americans, in this case in the city's international zone. During the summer and fall 1947 the Vienna police in Bezirk I reported to USFA that cases which involved Americans included drunkenness, robbery, and problems with prostitutes. In one instance, two American soldiers forced their way into the Eden-Bar after hours. Upon encountering a policeman, one of the two Americans chased and overpowered him.⁹⁷ A few weeks later, another American soldier attempted to force an Austrian woman into a taxi and, when unable to do so, pushed her through a glass shop window. Fortunately, she suffered only minor injury.⁹⁸ Not long after this incident, an inter-racial brawl broke out between several American soldiers in the infamous striptease club Casino Oriental.⁹⁹ Finally, on Christmas night 1947, a group of drunken American and British soldiers gathered with candles in front of the Bristol Hotel and sang two

⁹⁶"Replacements," [July 1946], folder 4, box 41, Clark Papers.

⁹⁷Sicherheitswache Abteilung Innere Stadt, Police Ill-treated By American Soldier, 6 July 1947, folder: Public Safety, Actions of the Allies in Bezirk I, 1947, box 118, NA-RG 338.

⁹⁸Sicherheitswache Abteilung Innere Stadt, Woman Passenger Pushed Into Shop Window, 29 July 1947, folder: Public Safety, Actions of the Allies in Bezirk I, 1947, box 118, NA-RG 338.

⁹⁹Sicherheitswache Abteilung Innere Stadt, Intervention of the Inter-Allied Patrol in the Casino Oriental, 2 August 1947, folder: Public Safety, Actions of the Allies in Bezirk I, 1947, box 118, NA-RG 338.

famous Nazi songs and several Christmas carols in German and English, disturbing and dismaying the Viennese.¹⁰⁰

During the tense spring and summer 1948, the British also tracked American crimes and lack of discipline in the Innere Stadt. Though reluctant to comment adversely, the British clearly believed that American misbehavior in Vienna had reached such a low point that something must be done. During the first twelve days of June 1948 the British noted six cases involving drunk American soldiers, one of which saw an American soldier naked and drunk in the Radetzkystrasse. Also, the British noted that ten assaults by Americans upon Austrians took place during the same time period, including two made upon members of the Vienna police force and several others upon Austrian women.¹⁰¹ During the rest of June and into July, the Vienna Sicherheitswache (uniformed police) in Bezirk I reported to the British that brawls between Americans soldiers and Austrians, including one at the Wintergarten between four Americans and four Austrian women, along with one Austrian man.¹⁰² On several other occasions American soldiers refused to pay taxi fares and assaulted their drivers.¹⁰³ By contrast, British soldiers were better behaved, an exception being when a number of British soldiers rejected their bill at the Gausthaus Stelzer by pouring wine on the establishment's piano.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰Sicherheitswache Abteilung Innere Stadt, 25 December 1947, American and British Soldiers Singing Nazi Songs, folder: Special Police Reports Bezirk I, Sept-Dec 1947, box 118, NA-RG 338.

¹⁰¹p. H. Bricknell, PSO II, Bezirk I, Interallied Civil Affairs Public Safety Office British Section to SPSO HQ Vienna Area, 12 June 1948, PRO-FO 1020/2958.

¹⁰²Sicherheitswache Abteilung Innere Stadt, 2 July 1948, PRO-FO 1020/2958.

¹⁰³Sicherheitswache Abteilung Innere Stadt, 22 June & 5 July 1948, PRO-FO 1020/2958.

¹⁰⁴Report of Sicherheitswache Abteilung Innere Stadt, 30 June 1948, PRO-FO 1020/2958.

In hopes of preventing such incidents, USFA from the beginning of the occupation attempted to maintain troop discipline and prevent American soldiers from falling victim to the "pitfalls of lax morals" found in war-ravaged Austria. To do so, USFA approached American rowdyism as a social problem, restricting Americans from certain nightclubs, encouraging the Austrians to report crimes committed by Americans, and, most significant, attempting to divert troops with "wholesome entertainment." In early 1946, USFA established a number of rest camps which offered outdoor activities such as swimming, boating, and skiing outside Vienna in the American zone. To go along with this, USFA instituted a policy of granting leave time. Above all, USFA attempted to impress upon soldiers their responsibility to insure that the peace, which had been won at such a costly sacrifice, would not to be replaced by "factors leading to another war."¹⁰⁵

Early on, Col. William P. Yarborough did his part to help improve troop behavior in Vienna by adopting an educational approach. To do so, Yarborough created a number of highly effective informational booklets for American soldiers, booklets which even an illiterate soldier could understand. In a series of cartoon panels drawn by the Czech artist Anton Marek, Yarborough reminded American soldiers that they had not come to Europe on summer vacation but to take part in the most difficult task of rebuilding "new cities and new citizens" out of the ruins of war-torn Europe. Every member of the armed forces in Austria was in a sense an ambassador for the United States, since most ordinary Austrians had had little contact with Americans prior to the arrival of USFA in their country.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵"Outline of USFA History: 1 July 1946-30 June 1947," p. 22, folder 9, box 2, NA-RG 260.

¹⁰⁶For examples of both Yarborough's original sketches and Marek's drawings, see the Yarborough Papers.

A number of cartoons brought home the message that American soldiers in Austria were often on public display. For instance, one panel asked what impression a GI was making upon civilians. Its caption read, "DO YOU LOOK LIKE A BUM?" The picture portrayed a slouching slovenly American GI with uncombed hair, a pulled back garrison cap, unbuttoned jacket, loosely worn tie, and sagging pants. Most important, the same panel featured Austrian civilians staring at the GI with great dismay. This panel was in contrast to the one immediately below which featured a confident, clean shaven, smartly dressed, and generally well groomed soldier, obviously admired by several Austrians, including two attractive women. Another panel made much the same point and featured the questions, "Are you lonely? Have you got mental B.O.?" Again the booklet made a contrast between a well groomed happy GI with two girlfriends and a sloppy dejected GI standing alone in the middle of a dance hall. Yarborough's booklet went on to present a number of "easy" steps to improve appearance, including shining shoes, running a "quick comb through the spinach on top of your noggin," and creasing pants.¹⁰⁷

Other cartoons reminded the American soldiers of the recently hard-fought war. These panels featured Europeans giving American troops a warm welcome and asked if American GI's remembered first arriving on the continent and being greeted as liberators. The next panel showed several laughing American soldiers obliviously racing down a road in a jeep, waving bottles of wine, and fondling an Austrian woman. As they did so, frightened Austrian adults, children, cats, and dogs all scampered out of the way. The caption warned that, "You guys all know that if things like this go on in our zone of occupation, and IF, God forbid, we should ever

¹⁰⁷Yarborough Papers.

have to use force again" then "We may get THIS instead of the wine, kisses, and flowers!" "THIS" featured nearly a dozen enraged Austrians throwing tomatoes and other objects at unhappy and surprised American soldiers. Yet another panel appealed to the soldier's patriotism and reminded Americans that Nazi propaganda had claimed that American troops acted like drunken lawless cowboys. To do so now would let down "Uncle Sam" and the people back home.¹⁰⁸

A second booklet, entitled "Before You take that Civilian Car Read this booklet and See Whether or not You Still Need It," reminded Americans that they were in Austria to help rebuild the country. The first panel showed a long line of Austrian cars and trucks, all of which had American drivers. Then, the soldiers were reminded that without vehicles, Austrian workers lacked the ambition to work, the young carried wood on their backs, doctors bicycled to visit patients, and even the dead and injured had to be transported on horse drawn carts. The story continued with the ghost of hunger overlooking a distressed Austrian family, barred from an ample supply of food in the countryside by a barrier marked "NO VEHICLES." The booklet concluded with a dramatic scene featuring a frail Austrian family looking hopefully toward a bright sun and an American flag.¹⁰⁹ Unlike in the summer of 1945, the Austrians were now clearly no longer enemies but victims of Nazism who needed outside protection.

Along with the educational and patriotic approach found in his booklets, Col. Yarborough also focused upon reimposing strict troop discipline by redoubling efforts to arrest soldiers who broke the law. For instance, when the provost marshal's office noticed a marked increase in incidents such as smashing windows and

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

molesting civilians by American soldiers in the Währing Bezirk, the Austrian police chief for that Bezirk received orders to promptly report all such incidents. Also, American unit commanders in Vienna received orders to "'buck up' the discipline of their men" and were told to inform their troops that "anyone apprehended for such violations will be dealt with severely."¹¹⁰ If an American soldier committed a minor offense but remained unknown, the Special Investigative Section (SIS) made an investigation to track down the "perpetrator."¹¹¹

To help matters further, the Provost Marshal's office also encouraged close working contact between American police agencies and the Austrian police. Though the relationship between the American and Austrian police agencies was not without difficulty in the Allied-shared Inner City zone, within the American zone relations were generally good. This can be seen in the success of joint American-Austrian police operations. For instance, the VAC's SIS staged a raid with the Austrian police of the Hotel Alserbach in Bezirk 9, a suspected house of prostitution. The raid netted eleven soldiers and twelve prostitutes, along with the hotel's owner and manager.¹¹²

Unfortunately, like most of USFA, the VAC's Provost Marshal's office lacked an adequate number of trained personnel to do its job as effectively as it wished. For instance, from September 1945 to June 1946, with usually a little more than a dozen agents, the CID

¹¹⁰"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 28 February-31 March 1946," 10 April 1946, p.23, folder 189, box 21, NA-RG 260.

¹¹¹"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 June-31 July 1946," 10 August 1946, p.27, folder 192, box 21, NA-RG 260.

¹¹²"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 28 February-31 March 1946," 10 April 1946, p.23, folder 189, & 31 January-28 February 1946, 10 March, p.24, folder 188, box 21, NA-RG 260.

investigated over a thousand cases.¹¹³ During the first five months of the occupation, the CID also saw a complete turn-over of its agents due to re-deployment.¹¹⁴ By the end of May 1946, the average case load for its agents was eight to ten offenses per investigator, which was double the normal number. According to the Provost Marshal, such heavy case loads imposed a severe strain on each investigator "since he must work eighteen to twenty hours a day, seven days a week without respite time to complete the cases assigned to him." The provost marshal concluded by warning that his men were too drained of energy to continue containing crime in the city.¹¹⁵

Soviet Crime & Indiscipline in Vienna

Though USFA had difficulties in maintaining troop discipline and American soldiers were at times unruly, the conduct of the Red Army in Allied occupied Vienna was far worse and even at times uncontrollable. Criminal behavior chronically plagued its ranks, with damaging political consequences for both Soviet-Allied relations and Soviet-Austrian relations in the city. With the exception of the Communist controlled press, American, British and Austrian sources universally agreed that Red Army personnel were responsible for the great majority of crimes committed by Allied soldiers in

¹¹³"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 31 May-30 June 1946," 10 July 1946, p.29, folder 191, & "HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 31 January-28 February 1946," 10 March 1946, p.24, folder 188, box 21, NA-RG 260.

¹¹⁴"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 28 February-31 March 1946," 10 April 1946, p.22, folder 189, box 21, NA-RG 260.

¹¹⁵"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 31 May-30 June 1946," 10 July 1946, p.29, folder 191, box 21, NA-RG 260.

the city.¹¹⁶ Further, many of these offenses were rape, robbery, and murder while those committed by the Western Allies were usually more along the lines of vandalism and public drunkenness.¹¹⁷ This pattern might, however, be somewhat offset by the larger number of Soviet troops who unofficially had access to Vienna. It remains difficult to determine what the percentage of Soviet forces in the city engaged in criminal behavior due to the shifting numbers of troops in the city.

According to the Austrian Ministry of Internal Affairs, during the last three months of 1946 Red Army soldiers were responsible for at least one hundred and forty robberies and twenty-six rapes in Vienna. Even this high number of crimes, however, failed to take into account crimes unreported by Austrian police chiefs in the Soviet zone. Also, the Soviets were not directly blamed for eight murders committed by "unknown" persons, often an Austrian euphemism for Red Army soldiers. By comparison, the same time period saw only one murder and five cases of robbery which involved Americans. In 1946, the crimes committed by Red Army personnel included the following: the rape of two young Austrian women along with the murder of one of them, the robbery of an entire group of Austrians on a city streetcar, the rape of a woman at six o'clock in the evening on the Schwarzenbergplatz within sight of the Allied Commission building. In the latter case, unarmed Austrian police arrived upon the scene only to be driven away by armed Soviet soldiers.¹¹⁸ In addition, robberies by Soviet

¹¹⁶Crime Figures, 6 February 1947, folder: Public Safety 1947, box 119, NA-RG 338.

¹¹⁷"Crime in Austria Since the War," Rankin to Secretary of State, 7 March 1947, 863.108/3-747 (microfilm).

¹¹⁸Ibid.

soldiers and civilians speaking Russian became such a menace that many Austrians feared to go out at night.¹¹⁹

The deserter Ivanovitch gave some insight into the motivation for such excesses and why Soviet authorities did little about them. Inadequate pay often led the Red Army men to theft or robbery in order to purchase goods like alcohol. Soviet marauders often took livestock from Austrian farms at night in order to sell them to farmers in the morning. In some cases they even sold the stolen animals back to their rightful owners to obtain schnapps or gin.¹²⁰ Also, though Red Army officers "led a merry life in Austria," the average Soviet soldier lacked clubs, dances, or any other officially sponsored entertainment. Finally, though fraternization with Austrian women was supposedly forbidden, Red Army officers often set a poor example for their men. For instance, Ivanovitch remembered one company commander even "dragged a civilian female in to the barracks within earshot of the men, long after taps." The men then heard their commander swearing in Russian amid audible protests from the woman. Once the Red army officer had "accomplished his purpose," and when she continued resisting, "he accused her of defying Soviet Authority and of being hostile to the liberating Red Army." For their part, Red Army soldiers simply followed suit. In barracks, a number of soldiers told stories describing how they had "invaded an apartment, shot the owner, lined up his for wife and then shot her when they were finished."¹²¹

In private conversations with the Americans or the British, Red Army officers would sometimes acknowledge

¹¹⁹"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 1 February-28 February 1947," 20 March 1947, p.54, folder 199, box 22, NA-RG 260.

¹²⁰"HQ USFA (G-2), Special Weekly Report," no.37, 18 July 1947, p. B-46., box 108, NA-RG 338.

¹²¹Ibid., p. B-43.

that some of their men were a rather rough lot and difficult to control. For instance, after hearing the British give an account of Soviet drunkenness and random shooting in the streets of Vienna, one Red Army officer simply laughed and said, "They're peasants. . . sick and tired of the war and the sacrifices required of them." Besides, he continued, the brutalities committed by Soviet soldiers in Vienna paled by comparison to those committed by the Germans and Austrians in the Soviet Union.¹²²

What is more, on occasion, the actions of Soviet officers and soldiers indicated that the Soviet chain of command worked very poorly and, in some ways, made it difficult to control the average Red Army soldier. For instance, early in the occupation, when the American provost marshal demanded that Soviet soldiers cease carrying their weapons into the American zone, his Soviet counterpart reluctantly confessed that the Red Army authorities in Vienna had little control over the matter. He explained that a Soviet soldier could not normally be parted from his weapon. Despite Red Army check points established to prevent soldiers from entering Vienna, many Soviet soldiers simply evaded the check points when coming into the city and then into the American zone.¹²³ As for signs which might warn soldiers away, many in the Red Army simply could not read them.¹²⁴

Three more examples also give a sense of the Red Army's lack of complete control over the movement of its men. During a cold winter night, a Soviet soldier forced his way into a British MP post only to promptly then calmly bed down on the floor for the evening. Like many in the Red Army, he had been left to his own

¹²²Masha Williams, White Among Reds, p.4.

¹²³Yarborough Papers.

¹²⁴Masha Williams, White Among Reds, p.20.

devices to find lodging for the night.¹²⁵ In another strange instance, a Red Army officer traveled to Vienna from Hungary simply to ask the British thirty questions about life in Great Britain.¹²⁶ In a third example, while driving along the Kärntner-Ring, Soviet General Lebedenko happened to witness a Red Army soldier snatching a pistol from an Austrian policeman. The Soviet general reacted by personally alighting from his car, seizing, slapping, and carrying off the offending Red Army soldier. Though the British reported that Lebedenko reminded them of American General Patton, certainly such a dramatic action by a high ranking American officer would have been extraordinary.¹²⁷ All these cases illustrated the rather haphazard nature of the Red Army.

In addition, the problem of desertion plagued the ranks of the Red Army, particularly in 1946-1948. Valentina Rogulskaia, a Soviet commissary employee who sought refuge in the West, informed USFA's G-2 that she had seen several Red Army officers on the streets of Vienna who had traded their uniforms for civilian clothes and now ran black market businesses in Vienna's American and British Bezirke.¹²⁸ Early on, a British report put the number of Red Army deserters who were living in the city at 10,000.¹²⁹ One British military government officer, a town major stationed in Vienna,

¹²⁵Ibid., p.99.

¹²⁶Ibid., p.133.

¹²⁷9 May 1946, PRO-FO 1020/2916.

¹²⁸HQ USFA (G-2), Special Weekly Report, no.7, 3 December 1946, p. 27, box 106, NA-RG 338.

¹²⁹"Visit of Lt-Col. Johnson to Vienna," 13 & 14 October 1945, from Brig. Gen. Palmer, Commander Vienna Area, PRO-War Office 170/4188. In Berlin a similar problem existed. Richard Brett-Smith, who served as a British officer in the initial Allied occupation of Berlin believed that between 1945 and 1946 there were "at least 10,000 [Red Army] deserters at large in Berlin, most of whom were in the process of 'going native,' and running criminal black market gangs." See his, Berlin '45: The Grey City (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p.162.

believed that the number was higher, claiming that there were between 10,000 and 20,000 Red Army deserters in and around the Austrian capital.¹³⁰ For their part, the Soviets officially refused to acknowledge having a problem with desertion, though one Red Army lieutenant privately told American authorities that more than 14,000 men had deserted from the Red Army in Austria and Hungary during the first four months of 1947 alone.¹³¹

Yet nowhere is the Red Army's failure to maintain discipline and the general Soviet feeling towards the Austrians more clear than in an example from the British files. In late August 1945, Soviet border guards stopped a young Austrian couple and their female traveling companion as they journeyed from Vienna to the Soviet-British frontier. Despite showing special Soviet passes, the Austrians found the Red Army soldiers unimpressed. The Red Army soldier in charge simply told them in broken German, "No good, even if you bring a paper from Stalin it will not be sufficient." Then, a number of Soviet soldiers ordered the two women into a nearby wood where each was raped several times by ten men.¹³²

Yet non-Soviets were not the only victims of Red Army crime. One report by the VAC noted that Soviet criminals had recently robbed a Soviet civilian. Indeed, they took most of the hapless man's belongings, including his coat and pants, leaving him in a Vienna street attired only in his underwear.¹³³ For Soviet citizens, an explosion of crime took place not only in Vienna and the Soviet zone in Austria, but inside the

¹³⁰Town Major R. P. F. Prior, 3 September 1945, PRO-FO 1020/2916.

¹³¹"HQ USFA (G-2), Special Weekly Report," no.27, May 1947, p. 6, box 106, NA-RG 338. Also see Masha Williams, White Among Reds, p.114.

¹³²Statements taken by British Military Government (HQ Vienna), 31 August 1945, PRO-FO 1020/3107.

¹³³"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 1 February-28 February 1947," 20 March 1947, p.54, folder 199, box 22, NA-RG 260.

Soviet Union as well. At home a wave of what authorities called gangsterism created a general atmosphere of lawlessness which doubtlessly had its effect upon the Red Army in and around Vienna.¹³⁴

Though he had allowed a slight degree of freedom during the "Great Patriotic War," after the war ended, Stalin quickly moved to re-institute tight control over the Red Army. The main reason behind his action was political. According to one report, Stalin replaced Marshal Tolbulkin with Konev as the chief commander in Austria because of the excesses of Red Army troops.¹³⁵ Fear of a military coup, however, could not be far from the Soviet leader's mind. Moreover, Stalin instituted a general purge of the Red Army officer corps following the war, the primary goal being to reinstitute order and strict controls over the Red Army. In addition, Soviet authorities treated many Red Army soldiers upon returning home as politically suspect and tainted by Western influences.¹³⁶ One Red Army deserter recalled his duty as one of the guard crew on a troop train from Vienna to Gorki, Russia. Along with his fellow guards, his job was to see that none of the 1500 discharged men left the train to search for alcohol, women, or to escape returning home. After reaching the Ukraine, the train stopped for three days while a heavily armed force of border guards and dogs inspected the train, examining the discharge papers and possessions of each discharged soldier. These guards then confiscated photographs of European cities, post cards, and books.¹³⁷

¹³⁴For example, in Moscow after the war crime was such a serious problem that even Soviet State Security officers received arms for personal protection, see Peter Deriabin & Frank Gibney, The Secret World (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959) p.104..

¹³⁵Erhardt to director of the Office of European Affairs, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p.568.

¹³⁶Keyes to WDGID, 20 September 1947, NA-RG 59, 863.00/9-2047 (microfilm).

¹³⁷"HQ USFA (G-2), Special Weekly Report," no.23, 10 April 1947, pp.6-7, box 106, NA-RG 388. In the late 1940's, Soviet

As for soldiers who committed crimes in Vienna, the Red Army's version of military justice sometimes could be both exceedingly swift and harsh. One American USFA veteran recalls seeing Red Army soldiers in Vienna struggling to keep themselves awake for their twelve or even twenty-four hour duty periods "because if they left their post or fell asleep the punishment was quite prompt and to the point, they just executed them." The same veteran noted that execution could be carried out at the battalion level and occasionally even lower. In one instance, he recalls a story concerning a Soviet jeep which collided with an American jeep. According to the story, "the Russian officer got out and looked at the damage, [to] his vehicle and ours, and went over and shot his driver." Then he "came back to our officer" and "said, 'OK, I think they're both at fault, I shot my driver, you shoot yours.'"¹³⁸ Whether literally true or not, the veteran's story illustrates the new American view of the Soviets and their way of dealing with discipline problems.

The Viennese Police

Given the violence in Vienna and the power of the Allies, the Austrian police in Vienna proved to be ineffectual when it came to suppressing and solving crime in the city. Not only did the Viennese find the crime rate high but foreign observers warned that resistance to robbery often resulted in death, and

border guards were part of Glavnoye Upravleniye Pogranichnykh Voisk (GUPVO) or The Main Directorate of Border Troops. This force was not under the control of the Red Army, see Deriabin & Gibney, The Secret World, p.94.

¹³⁸Col. Carlyle P. Woelfer, Interview 8/18/93, Center for the Study of War & Society, University of Tennessee.

arrests were few.¹³⁹ Given the adverse conditions, in 1947 Karl L. Rankin, U.S. Counselor of Legation, even expressed surprise that the crime rate throughout Austria was not much higher and attributed what order that existed not to the Austrian police but to the "fundamentally peaceable and easy-going character of the Austrians and their lack of aggressiveness."¹⁴⁰ For their part, years of low morale among the members of the underfed and underpaid Vienna police made clear that they recognized the extreme difficulty of their task in a war-torn city occupied by four powers.¹⁴¹

Beginning in 1945, a host of problems beset the Vienna police. Immediately prior to the Soviet attack on the city, German authorities had withdrawn Vienna's police and fire brigade, both of which had traditionally maintained law and order in the city. After the city's liberation, no force existed which would dare to restrain either the excesses of some within the Red Army or, for that matter, Austrian civilians. Seizing the opportunity, in April 1945 Austrian Communists under Rudolf Hautmann had established control over Vienna's police Bezirke, had begun systematic denazification program, and had created a new force with those who claimed affiliation to the KPO.¹⁴²

As a result, even prior to the overwhelming defeat of the Communist party in the November 1945 elections, a

¹³⁹"Public Safety in Vienna," Inspector-General Controller P.S. Branch, Internal Affairs Division, n.d. [probably December 1945], PRO-FO 1020/3120.

¹⁴⁰"Crime in Austria Since the War," Rankin to Secretary of State, 7 March 1947, NA-RG 59, 863.108/3-747 (microfilm).

¹⁴¹This is a point made consistently in the operations reports of the Vienna Area Command.

¹⁴²Bader, Austria Between East & West, pp.78-79 & "Memorandum of a Conversation Between Clark & Renner," 29 September 1945, FRUS, EAC, vol. III, p. 614. According to one American report, the Vienna police had been "denazified completely" and an entirely new force had been built from the bottom-up in 1945. See "United States Allied Commission for Austria History, Part II," folder 252, NA-RG 260.

bitter struggle erupted between the Communists in the Vienna police and more conservative elements within the Austrian Ministry of Interior. On the one hand, Dr. Heinrich Duermayer, the new Communist director of the Staatspolizei (STAPO or secret police), accused his Austrian political enemies of "ultra-conservatism, stodginess and lack of enthusiasm" in matters such as denazification. They replied by accusing him of "having more zeal than method, of Gestapo tactics, of carelessness in documentation of arrests and of embarking on a purge that has little relation to the goal of building a politically healthy community." It is worth noting that at the time, USFA's G-2 did not automatically take an anti-Communist stand. Instead, the report declared that "The truth undoubtedly lies somewhere between these two contentions" by Duermayer and his enemies.¹⁴³

With the November elections and the emerging Cold War, Duermayer might be seen as simply a threat to American interests. More importantly, however, he was a threat to the Austrian Socialists, particularly the new head of the ministry of interior, Oskar Helmer. The result was that Helmer instituted yet another purge of the Vienna police, which in 1945 alone saw the dismissal or resignation of over 5,000 Communist members of the force.¹⁴⁴ Also, though now on the defensive, Communists within the Vienna police increasingly attacked their arch-enemies, the Socialists. At times, Communist Bezirke police chiefs proved unhelpful to the Western Allies, particularly during the disturbances of May 1947. Yet, as Lt. Leon Markus has pointed out, even the Communists within the police were of limited reliability

¹⁴³"HQ USFA, Intelligence Summary, no.15," 15 September 1945, folder 51, box 6, NA-RG 260.

¹⁴⁴Bader, Austria Between East & West, p.86.

in Soviet eyes since they or their families had suffered during the Red Army's initial entry into the city.¹⁴⁵

Making matters most difficult in Vienna, from the beginning of the occupation the Allies had greatly limited the authority of the Austrian police and restricted their use of weapons. The defeat of the Communist party in the November 1945 elections caused the Soviets to postpone discussion of the issue of extending the authority of the Austrian police, along with the question of arming the police and increasingly viewing the Austrians in general as an unredeemable people. Indeed, in February 1946, the Soviets demanded that the generally poorly armed police surrender what automatic weapons they controlled. After discussing the matter for several months at various levels of the Allied Control Commission, the Allies finally agreed in April 1946 that the Austrian police could be armed with specially marked revolvers. Each weapon was to have forty rounds of ammunition, although only two rounds could be carried at any one time. Even more important, however, throughout the occupation period the Soviets consistently refused to grant the Austrian police legal jurisdiction over any Allied soldier and the right to fire in self-defense.¹⁴⁶

With the Vienna police unable effectively to maintain basic order in the city, clearly the more politically sensitive task of dealing with ground level incidents between Allied soldiers was well beyond their depth. As already mentioned, on a number of occasions the Vienna police suffered at the hands of Allied soldiers. One report in January 1946 described these

¹⁴⁵Lt. Leon Markus, Interview.

¹⁴⁶"Review and Status of the Question of Arming and Equipping the Austrian Police and Gendarmerie in Austria," 28 December 1948, box 118, NA-RG 338.

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attacks as "frequent."¹⁴⁷ As a result, the Vienna police "adopted a hands-off" approach when incidents involving Allied military personnel took place because of the "possibility of physical violence."¹⁴⁸ Only in October 1947 did the Americans permit the Austrian police to detain Army personnel in two circumstances: first, when the military police were not immediately available to arrest an offender and, second, "when the offense involved death or grievous bodily harm or serious damage to, or theft of, property."¹⁴⁹ In cases which involved Red Army personnel, however, the Vienna Police by themselves remained nearly powerless throughout the occupation period to prevent crimes, leaving to the Americans and the Soviets the task of devising their own system for handling soldier-to-soldier violence in the city.

Conclusion

With Vienna facing the grim prospect of starvation, an uncontrolled black market, and rampant crime, the Americans and Soviets each had differing visions about what fate should befall the city and its people. An examination of the American-Soviet responses to these difficulties serves as a reminder of the vastly differing ways in which the two Allies looked at the world. For instance, American military men saw the threat of starvation in Vienna as a social problem. Therefore, USFA wanted to revive the Austrian agricultural sector and find a means for Austria to import food from neighboring countries. On the other

¹⁴⁷"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 November-31 December 1945," 10 January 1946, p.35, folder 186, box 21, NA-RG 260.

¹⁴⁸Report of the United States Commissioner, no.6, April 1946, p.193

¹⁴⁹"Report of the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria: Final Report," 1 October 1950 (microfilm), p.158.

hand, the Red Army viewed the lack of food in Vienna as a travail that the city's people would simply have to endure. Recalling battles such as Leningrad and Stalingrad, most Soviets could have little sympathy for the Viennese. Certainly with famine and terrible conditions at home, Stalin's initial food aid to Austria seemed kind, yet, of necessity, required payment by the new Austrian government. Also, the "hungry" Soviets knew that they would never be able to feed Austrians. Indeed, in Soviet eyes the Austrians were still regarded as untrustworthy enemies and fair game for agricultural exploitation.

Like the problem of feeding Austria, the Americans viewed the problem of the black market as a social ill that with proper management could be contained and ultimately cured, hence the many American attempts to both monitor and suppress the black market. Though Americans in USFA took part, they did so illegally and primarily for profit. By contrast, the Soviets unofficially viewed the black market as simply a way of obtaining the necessities of life. From the top down, the Red Army took part in economic activities which for them were only technically illegal. In this manner, Western goods that were not produced in the Soviet Union came into the hands of Red Army officers and soldiers. By the late 1940's, the black market even became an unofficial way for the Soviet government to obtain foreign currency. Most remarkable, some Red Army officers decided to set themselves up as black market businessmen in the city. In doing so, however, they merely followed standard business practice in the Soviet sphere.

Differing conceptions of crime and punishment also became apparent in Vienna. Again, USFA approached crime in the city as a problem to be solved through proper management. First, when its own soldiers caused

difficulties, the Americans employed an educational approach which by its very nature carried with it the assumption of human rationality and changeability. Then, measures to maintain troop discipline were devised, the key being proper military organization and management. For their part, the Soviets had less control over the actions of the men in the Red Army. This is most clearly illustrated by the thousands of deserters who roamed the streets of Vienna and the lack of regard shown to the Austrian civilian population. As for punishment, the Red Army was often simple and harsh. Basically, those arrested for a crime were guilty until proven innocent, and little thought was given to educating the Soviet soldier.

Finally, with Vienna enduring a crime wave, the Americans and Soviets differed on what was to be done. As part of the American attempt to manage crime, the Americans advocated arming the Austrian police and extending their authority in the city. Such measures met with Soviet opposition because they would inevitably entail Soviet soldiers being arrested by the Austrian police, representatives of a people that had recently been at war with the Soviets. By failing to vote Communist in November 1945, the Austrians had shown themselves beyond redemption in the eyes of the Soviets. In the Soviet view, the arming of the Austrian police would produce little good and potentially much danger. For the Americans, only by rearming the Austrian police could the Austrians have an orderly society which was necessary to destroy the Nazi legacy. Though far from the only problem between East and West, such drastic differences in world-views were almost certain to produce discord among Allied officers in Vienna and contribute to American-Soviet tensions in the city.

Chapter IV

In the World of the Third Man: The Two Faces of Ground Level American-Soviet Relations in Vienna, 1945-48

Introduction

While American-Soviet relations deteriorated elsewhere during the late 1940's, American correspondents and American diplomats stationed in Vienna generally reported that the jointly occupied Austrian capital was successfully escaping the worst of the emerging East-West conflict. In particular, correspondents noted that the city's famous and unique International Patrols had had a long successful record of cooperation. Unlike any other American-Soviet effort, the patrols continued to function with positive results, preventing many minor American-Soviet incidents from becoming the basis for international misunderstandings. Even during the tense period of the Berlin blockade, several observers remained hopeful that the chill in American-Soviet relations might not completely pervade the political atmosphere in Vienna. Sensational headlines regarding Vienna were not splashed across the front pages of American newspapers and diplomatic reports from the Austrian capital to the Secretary of State remained far from alarmist in tone.

Certainly the political atmosphere in Austria differed considerably from that found in next door Germany and, as a result, American-Soviet relations in Austria were less tension-filled. In June 1948, the Soviet commander in Austria even took the unheard of step of proposing that his American counterpart work closely with him to completely suppress incidents between their troops in Vienna. More significant,

Vienna escaped the trials of an all-out Soviet blockade. Some contemporary correspondents and later historians attributed the lack of headline-grabbing conflict between Americans and Soviets in Vienna to the unique agreement reached by the Allies in July 1945, an agreement which had spelled out clearly matters such as Allied transit rights to the city, an agreement which the Allies had neglected to reach for Berlin. American and British diplomats at the time, however, took the view of Realpolitik, claiming the Soviets had little to gain and much to risk by taking an action such as instituting an all-out blockade of Vienna. Still, both correspondents and diplomats agreed that relative to Berlin, Vienna was an exception to the general rule of American-Soviet tension. As for incidents between Western and Soviet soldiers in the city, if mentioned at all, they were simply regrettable minor irritations.

Yet in adopting what might be termed a cautiously optimistic viewpoint concerning diplomatic relations between the Americans and Soviets in Vienna, these observers failed to see the situation in the same light as most American military personnel who served in the city. For the American military, beneath the usually calm surface American-Soviet relations in Vienna were extremely tense and sometimes deadly. From the beginning, the Americans found that the Soviet members of the International Patrols carried with them a different set of assumptions, a world-view which regarded foreigners with deep suspicion. As a result, what appeared to the Americans as simple functional tasks might be perceived by the Soviets as subversive propaganda. Also, as early as January 1946, an American military policeman on Vienna's Mozart Express had fired upon several Soviet officers, killing one. Later that same year, British and Soviet soldiers in the city came to blows. It was with good reason, therefore, that

American General Mark W. Clark feared that long festering troop-level tension might spark open conflict between American and Soviet personnel in the city. A Communist demonstration of May 1947, which barely preceded the rise of a Communist government in neighboring Hungary, marked yet another the rise of Cold War tension in the city. In the fall of that same year, prior to the 1948 Prague Coup and the beginning of the Berlin Blockade, American intelligence reports increasingly warned of a Communist Putsch attempt or a Soviet blockade. By 1948, the International Patrols failed to always operate smoothly, and Soviet members on several occasions refused to aid their Western counterparts during violent conflicts with Soviet personnel.

Most significant, Vienna's Western zones were themselves a source of American-Soviet tension, serving as an island haven in the midst of the Soviet Zone in Austria, allowing thousands of Red Army deserters, Eastern-bloc nationals, and anti-Soviet Austrians to escape Stalin's grip. In 1948, Soviet abductions of such people reached such a level that they provoked an espionage war which saw the American Counter-Intelligence Corps in Vienna tardily introducing a series of counter measures. This secret, and for Americans in the city not-so-secret, war was in direct contrast to the general American view of American-Soviet relations in Vienna and not only laid bare the differences between the two powers, but represented a usually hidden aspect of American-Soviet relations in the city. It was in such an environment of kidnappings and killings that the American military view of the Soviet was further hardened. For the Americans in Vienna, daily contact with the Soviets and the practices of the Soviet secret police produced not better

understanding, as had once been hoped, but a reaction of distaste and distrust.

The Inter-Allied Patrols, 1945-47

By most accounts, especially during their early years of operations, the unique Inter-Allied patrols of Vienna symbolized a rare example of post-war cooperation between the Allies.¹ The creation of American Col. William P. Yarborough, the patrols were established to solve the basic police problems which were all too frequently occurring in occupied and war-torn Vienna. Correspondent John Gunther reported in the late 1940s that there had never been any incident of consequence between members of the patrols.² At the close of 1948, U.S. News & World Report claimed that American, British, French, and Soviet soldiers were patrolling the "heart of the city as comrades in arms."³ The State Department's Martin F. Herz admitted to a few isolated incidents between members of the patrol but noted that the patrols themselves continued to "operate satisfactorily."⁴ In the eyes of the press and the State Department, the Allied patrols had proved to be a great success and remained so even during the time of the Berlin Blockade.

The need for an Allied military police force became starkly apparent to Yarborough even before the official creation of the American zone in the city. Yarborough later recalled that he had barely set up his

¹Deputy and later commandant of the American Sector of Berlin, Brig. Gen. Frank Howley mentioned that due to incidents between American and Soviet troops the Allies briefly had operated joint Allied patrols for Berlin's trouble spots during 1945, see his Berlin Command (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1950), p. 72.

²John Gunther, Behind the Curtain, p. 292.

³"Where the Soviets Co-operate," U.S. News & World Report, p. 28.

⁴Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p. 317.

headquarters in Vienna's Auersperg Palais in late July 1945 when he found himself staring down at the bloody corpse of a Red Army soldier in what would soon become the American zone. One of his experienced Criminal Investigative Division (CID) agents immediately pointed out to him that the man had been drunk and robbed before being murdered. The CID agent also warned Yarborough that the guilty would most likely escape justice, since any local Viennese witnesses surely would remain silent concerning the entire incident.⁵

When news of the dead soldier reached Soviet headquarters in Vienna, however, Yarborough found that furious Red Army officers were anything but silent as he now faced a barrage of angry complaints and protests. Yarborough remembered that his angry Soviet opposite numbers accused him of "everything but the murder itself." According to the Soviets, the soon-to-be established American zone was unsafe and something had better be done in short order to improve matters. As a consequence, Yarborough, and other American officers in Vienna, realized that a joint occupation with the Soviets would be a difficult business, especially when the Soviets took advantage of the Allied agreement which permitted Allied soldiers to travel freely about the city of Vienna.⁶

In addition, Yarborough immediately faced several daily difficulties which directly concerned the safety of American forces. For one, American soldiers were at times the victims of robbery in the crime-ridden Soviet zone. When this occurred, it became Yarborough's turn to take his own protests to the Soviet command. Even more worrisome, Yarborough faced the problem of how to handle firmly but tactfully the growing number of

⁵Yarborough Papers.

⁶Ibid.

instances in which Soviet soldiers engaged in criminal activities in the American zone, ranging from taking part in black market deals to illegally carrying machine-guns.⁷ In the American view, making the restoration of law and order even more difficult was a Soviet "do nothing" policy in the city prior to the official establishment of Allied responsibility in Vienna on 1 September 1945.⁸

A subsequent historical report from USFA's Liaison Section best sums up the general difficulties facing not only that USFA section but also those facing Yarborough in dealing with the Soviets during the period 1945-1946. The report noted that individual Red Army officers "were pleasant and willing to cooperate" but the rigid Soviet system produced an "enormous wall of red tape" which prevented Soviet officers from making a decision prior to official approval. Added to this was the fact that individual Red Army officers had very little authority delegated to them, and that they avoided contact with members of the other three Powers while not on duty. On the American side, even in the liaison section, to say nothing of Yarborough's provost marshal's office, there was a lack of "good U.S. personnel who speak Russian and English adequately enough to represent the USA on the highest level of efficiency."⁹

It was under such trying circumstances that Yarborough hit upon the idea of combining Allied police efforts in a joint patrol system which in turn led to

⁷A careful reading of American reports made in 1946 suggests that serious problems arose between American and Soviet soldiers in 1945. See for instance, "HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 April-31 May 1946," 10 June 1946, p. 30, folder 190, box 21, NA-RG 260.

⁸"United States Allied Commission for Austria History, Part II," p.7, folder 252, box 31, NA-RG 260.

⁹HQ USFA, Liaison Section, "Historical Report of Operation For the Period From 1 April 1946 to 30 November 1946," folder 171, box 19, NA-RG 260.

the establishment of the famous Inter-Allied or International Patrols, more popularly know as the "four men in the jeep." In setting up the patrols, Yarborough hoped to accomplish a number of specific goals. First, he sought a means to overcome the language barrier which had already been a source of difficulties between Allied soldiers. Even more important, he wanted the patrols to circulate throughout Vienna, eliminating jurisdictional barriers which allowed many of Vienna's criminal population to elude capture by simply moving from one Allied zone to another.¹⁰ Of greatest importance, Yarborough desired to foster improved ground level relations by having a police body on hand which could immediately deal with criminal acts and other incidents involving Allied soldiers.¹¹ With typical American innovation, Yarborough saw a problem and, unlike the other Allied provost marshals, set about finding what he regarded as a simple but effective solution.

Perhaps best exemplifying the early American approach to the Soviets in the summer of 1945, Yarborough clearly believed that he could convince the Soviets through rational discussion that something had to be done to improve matters throughout the city. After the British and French agreed to send military police to join the International Patrol, Yarborough simply walked over to the Soviet Kommandatura and broached the matter with Gen. Blagodatov. Yarborough remembered that the Soviet city commander initially

¹⁰In the Vienna Inter-Allied Command (VIAC) Commander's Conference of 19 October 1945, the Allies agreed that "no arrests or searches either in criminal or security cases would be made by agents of the Allied Powers outside their respective zones without the knowledge and consent of the power occupying the zone," see PRO-FO 1007/90. According to the VIAC's protocol #66 of 24 October 1946, all Allied soldiers arrested for crimes had to be promptly turned over to their own headquarters, see PRO-FO 1020/893/133C.

¹¹Yarborough Papers.

cooly "neither agreed nor disagreed" to support the scheme. As days passed and the unruly behavior of Red Army soldiers continued, an increasingly frustrated but persistent Yarborough repeatedly returned to the Soviet Kommandatura where he "patiently pointed out to any official who would listen, the advantage to be gained from an International Patrol operating from a Combined Police Headquarters."¹²

Within a few days, the Soviets agreed to participate in the International Patrols though exactly why remains unclear. One American news correspondent later claimed that by directly approaching Soviet officers on the scene rather than sending his proposal for joint patrols through higher channels, Yarborough had been able to avoid much bureaucratic delay and, thereby, convinced the Soviets to approve the patrols.¹³ Undoubtedly Yarborough's close proximity to his Soviet counterparts proved extremely helpful, but it was unlikely that Soviet officers in Vienna would take such a step without approval from superiors much higher up the chain-of-command. Indeed, the delay probably indicates that the Soviets were awaiting approval. Another but somewhat less plausible explanation came from Yarborough's fellow officer, Col. Wellington Alexander Samouce. Samouce claimed that Yarborough's plan for the International Patrols won approval because it was "so logical in its initial presentation that . . . the Soviet Commander could find no loophole for objection."¹⁴

¹²Ibid. Without naming a source, correspondent Joseph Wechsberg claimed that the Soviet provost marshal in Vienna did agree with the plan for an Allied patrol but could not act without approval from higher authority, see "A Reporter in Vienna: Cameron, Lewis, Laborde, and Gorodnistov," The New Yorker 24 (6 March 1948), p.56.

¹³Joseph Wechsberg, "A Reporter in Vienna: Cameron, Lewis, Laborde, and Gordnistov," The New Yorker, p.56.

¹⁴Samouce, "I Do Understand the Russians."

More likely, the Soviets saw the advantage of the patrols for reasons of internal security. For instance, the patrols might serve as an effective means to control Western soldiers in the Soviet zone as well as to keep a better watch over their own soldiers in Vienna.¹⁵ Perhaps also much of the early American success of winning over the Soviets can be credited to the personal efforts of Yarborough. Many of his subordinates would credit Yarborough with tact, intelligence, and excellent judgement on such matters.¹⁶ Whatever the reasons from the Soviet viewpoint, Blagodatov eventually gave his consent on 28 July 1945 to the American scheme and a contingent of Red Army police arrived to take up duty at the Auersperg Palais much to the elation of the American provost marshal.¹⁷

In terms of composition and authority, each of the International Patrols consisted of four military police, one from each of the Allied Powers, with the authority to circulate freely throughout the entire city and, if necessary, arrest Allied personnel. In an incident involving an American and a Soviet soldier, the American and Soviet MPs took charge of the matter. The British and French members of the patrol would only involve themselves if the other patrolmen requested assistance in subduing one or more of the offending parties. After an arrest, technically the International Patrol

¹⁵In the case of the Allied patrols in Berlin, Howely claimed that even after the patrols became unnecessary "we had trouble getting the Russians to recognize this fact, because they liked to keep their units over in our sector." He noted that the Soviets "always had five or ten times the number of men required, apparently observing what our troops were doing" in Berlin, see Howely's Berlin Command, p.72.

¹⁶Lt. Leon Markus Interview. Also see, Lt. Harold Steele (CID) Interview, 7 August 1994, Center for the Study of War & Society, University of Tennessee.

¹⁷According to the 22 August 1955 issue of Stars & Stripes, International Patrols composed of American, British, and Soviet military police began operations on 5 August 1945. The French did not actually send men to join the patrols until September 1945.

immediately turned their prisoner over to the headquarters of his nationality for eventual punishment.¹⁸ In some cases, practical considerations dictated that an individual arrested by the patrol might be taken to either the nearest Bezirk Kommandatura or the International Patrol Headquarters, whichever was closest and from there transferred to the correct headquarters. This usually occurred if a patrol lacked a radio and was without interpreters. As one American general later noted, especially on dark rainy nights in Vienna the only way that the patrolmen could "make heads or tails out most incidents" was to first drive to the local Bezirk station.¹⁹

During their first two years of existence, the International Patrols generally increased both in number and in operational scope. Beginning in early August 1945, a couple of patrols circulated throughout the city from 1300 to 2400 hours.²⁰ Only in the French Bezirk did the patrols have any difficulties, with the French military authorities often times reluctant to cooperate with the Americans.²¹ Later, in June 1946, four patrols moved about the city from 1300 to 1730 hours while another four patrols did the same from 1730 to 0130 hours.²² The additional patrols came not a moment too

¹⁸Samouce, "I Do Understand the Russians."

¹⁹VIAC Commander's Conference #110, Appendix D, 13 February 1948, PRO-FO 1007/93.

²⁰Blagodatov's order approving the patrols can be found in his, "Regime in Vienna in Connection with the Entry of Allied Troops," July 28, 1945, PRO-FO 1020/2916. For an report concerning the early operations of the patrols see, "HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 September-31 October 1945," 15 November 1945, p.18, folder 184, box 21, NA-RG 260.

²¹Lt. Leon Markus, Interview.

²²"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 31 May-30 June 1946," 10 July 1946, p.28, folder 191, box 21, NA-RG 260. Also see Karl Fischer, Die Vier im Jeep: Die Besatzungszeit in Wien 1945-1955 in Wiener Geschichtsblätter (Beiheft 1) 1985, p.3.

soon; the British had already noted that the patrols sometimes failed to respond quickly and adequately.²³ During the next month, perhaps in response to ground level difficulties between Allied soldiers, the Allies again increased the number of the patrols. In each of the Allied zones, three shifts of four patrols each operated between 1300 and 0700 hours. Kept in reserve and for patrolling the International zone were two additional patrols, one for the time period 1300 to 2200 hours and another for the time period 2200 to 0700 hours.²⁴ By the end of 1946, the Allies had removed two patrols operating between 0100 and 0700²⁵ but established an additional stand-by patrol, thereby giving the entire city complete coverage, day and night.²⁶

In theory each of the four powers provided an equal number of vehicles for the patrols. In most cases, however, the Americans and British were the only ones to do so during the patrol's early years of operation.²⁷ Indeed, by June 1946, the few French and Soviet vehicles which had been given over to the patrols for use had proven to be mechanically unsafe. Furthermore, several of the Soviet and French patrolmen were incompetent when

²³Captain P. H. Bricknell, Public Safety Officer, 26 March 1946, PRO-FO 1020/2916/134.

²⁴"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 June-31 July 1946," 10 August 1946, p.27, folder 192, box 21, NA-RG 260.

²⁵"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 31 July-31 August 1946," 10 September 1946, p.27, folder 193, box 21, NA-RG 260.

²⁶"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 September-31 October 1946," 10 November 1946, p.36, folder 195, box 22, NA-RG 260.

²⁷In 1950, the Americans continued to provide for the patrols, see HQ Command USFA, "Historical Report of Operations in Vienna," July-September 1950, p.104, box 26, NA-RG 407. On this same matter see Joseph Wechsberg, "A Reporter in Vienna: Cameron, Lewis, Laborde, and Gordnistov," The New Yorker 24 (March 1948), p.56.

placed in the driver's seat.²⁸ As a result, the Americans took on the responsibility of providing radio-equipped 1/4 ton trucks, along with the fuel, and all the drivers for the International Patrols.²⁹ Later in October 1946, the patrols received fifteen American 3/4 ton command-and-reconnaissance cars which replaced the older vehicles.³⁰

Despite success in winning Soviet approval for the patrols, the initial state of relations between the patrol members was less than ideal and in August 1945 Col. Yarborough had to be extremely patient in his dealings with the Soviets.³¹ Whatever lingering spirit of Allied friendship remained, it failed to completely transcend basic political differences. For instance, even the seemingly simple matter of feeding the patrols proved to be an unexpectedly "explosive" misunderstanding which demonstrated to the Americans on a practical level Soviet paranoia and prickliness in matters of national prestige. Yarborough had reserved a part of the American military police's mess facilities in the Stiftskaserne for the Allied patrolmen: believing that "off-duty contact among the various national elements of the Patrols was desirable and would promote understanding" and doubtlessly realizing that it was too cumbersome for each member of the patrol to

²⁸"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 31 May-30 June 1946," 10 July 1946, p.28, folder 191, box 21, NA-RG 260.

²⁹Manfried Rauchensteiner, "Die Wiener Interalliierte Kommandantur, 1945-1955," p.418. According to the 22 August 1955 issue of Stars & Stripes, the Allies replaced the trucks in December 1951 with Chevrolet sedans and "cream-colored" Soviet "Pobeyeda sedans." Rauchensteiner dates the use of American sedans to March 1953.

³⁰"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 September-31 October 1946," 10 November 1946, p.36, folder 195, box 22, NA-RG 260.

³¹"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 November-31 December," 10 January 1946, p.32, folder 186, box 21, NA-RG 260.

visit his own mess hall. At the American mess, all the members of the patrols might partake in basic rations. Yet when the Soviet military police first entered the Stiftskaserne, a brief survey of "the white bread, roast beef, mashed potatoes, gravy, coffee, and pie" was enough to arouse Soviet hostility and suspicion and cause them to turn "as one man" and march out.³²

Upon hearing of the conduct of the Soviet military police, Yarborough was first furious, then thoroughly mystified, and finally determined to discover the reason behind the Soviet rejection of the American rations. Yarborough had good reason to be confused. Like many Americans in Vienna, he realized what poor fare Red Army soldiers troops received from their own mess. In order to clear the matter up, Yarborough arranged a face-to-face meeting with the Soviet provost marshal and demanded an explanation for what he considered the "impolite, unsoldierly and unreasonable" behavior of the new Soviet members of the patrol. The Soviet officer promised to look into the matter. Several days later during a second meeting, the Soviet provost marshal informed Yarborough that the Red Army MPs had believed that they would be required to pay for what they were sure was a very costly meal. Lacking money to pay, these men had simply pretended to dislike the American rations. Also, the Soviet soldiers wrongly suspected that the American food was being used as part of a propaganda ploy and that the patrol's rations were hardly typical. According to the Red Army officer, the men now regretted rejecting the meal but at the time had seen no alternative course of action. Most interesting, during the explanation, Yarborough's Soviet counterpart

³²Yarborough Papers.

privately confessed to him that, "I tell you this because you have been fair and impartial with us."³³

Taken aback and even saddened by the explanation, Yarborough reassured the Soviet officer concerning American intentions and urged him to help clear up the misunderstanding. Careful to avoid damaging Soviet pride, Yarborough then told his opposite that all the members of the International Patrols had earned the food served at the Stiftskaserne by their work in maintaining order in the city. In this way Yarborough convinced the reluctant Soviets to join the rest of the patrol at the American mess, helping them to save face and allowing a greater degree of contact between all the Allied patrolmen. For their part, the Red Army patrolmen "emerged as the most voracious trenchermen our cooks had ever seen."³⁴ As for Yarborough, looking back, he noted that this was one of the experiences which convinced him in 1945 that "the Soviet mind operates on a wave length which can with patience and persistence be reached."³⁵

Despite a number of additional early problems such as the failure of the Soviets to report regularly for duty and the poor quality of some of the first Russian military police to join the patrols, by late 1945 relations between the patrolmen had greatly improved, and the patrols were working together fairly

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid. By contrast, just over five years later, after the Allies moved the International Patrol headquarters from the Auersperg Palais to the Palace of Justice, each of the wartime powers agreed to assign a restroom from their respective section in the Palace of Justice for the exclusive use of their patrolmen. See, "Command Report, H.Q. Vienna Military Post," October-December 1950, p. 132, box 26, NA-RG 407.

³⁵Yarborough Papers. In late July 1945, The New York Times quoted USFA Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Lewis, Yarborough's superior officer, as saying, "We have gotten along very well thus far with the Russians . . . Their methods take longer than ours, but their results are satisfactory." 30 July 1945.

harmoniously.³⁶ Even though language difficulties continued, the multi-national military police generally were able to at least make themselves understood by using broken German or thorough the use of interpreters. As had been expected, most of the incidents which the patrols handled involved disorderly Soviet soldiers. Fortunately, these were usually taken care of effectively, thereby achieving one of Yarborough's goals.³⁷ Other work for the patrolmen ran the gamut, including everything from reporting Allied soldiers who frequented Austrian prostitutes to assisting in the apprehension of Austrians and Hungarians masquerading as Soviet soldiers.³⁸

Yet by late 1946 and early 1947 several exceptions to the pattern of cooperation foreshadowed future difficulties. As a significant example, the patrols failed to present a united front during a left-wing demonstration which disrupted student elections at the University of Vienna in November 1946. At the university, located on the "Ring" and thus in the International Zone, tension had built for more than a year between the city's Communists and the institution's right-wing students.³⁹ When a group of perhaps over a thousand industrial workers, along with a handful of

³⁶Samouce, "I Do Understand the Russians." For instance, the patrol successfully helped handle an incident where two drunken Soviet officers had fired upon British soldiers, see PRO-FO 1020/2916/42 27 Sept. 1945. It also should be noted that some Americans in Vienna believed that the improvement came after Soviets choose handpicked Red Army officers for the patrols.

³⁷"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 30 April-31 May 1946," 10 June 1946, p.30, folder 190, box 21, NA-RG 260.

³⁸Joseph Wechsberg, "A Reporter in Vienna: Cameron, Lewis, Laborde, and Gordnistov," The New Yorker 24 (March 1948), p.59 and HQ Vienna Area Command, Col. [formerly Brig. Gen.] T. E. Lewis, 1 July 1946, "Russian Incidents in the Vienna Area During the Period 300800B June to 010800B July 1946," folder 4, box 41, Clark Papers.

³⁹"Report of Operations of USFA," October-December 1946, p.23, folder 14, box 2, NA-RG 260.

Communist university students, marched on the institution flying red flags, the university's rector anxiously appealed to Gen. Clark for protection. Since the university bordered the American sector, Clark ordered that a small number of American military police, along with the International Patrol be sent to monitor the demonstration, and, if necessary, help secure the university against attack.⁴⁰

According to Col. Samouce, the Soviet members of patrols refused to obey Clark's order and deserted their comrades upon arriving at the university. Samouce's account neglects to mention, however, that the Soviet military police had grounds for doing so since the university itself stood in the International zone, which that month was under the command of the French. Technically, therefore, French commanders had the responsibility for maintaining order in the Bezirk I and for command of the International Patrols, not the Americans. In the months to come, the Soviets would bitterly complain about the American orders to the International Patrol but they continued to participate in them.⁴¹

Fortunately, the nearly riotous affair produced little more than a few dozen injuries and a great deal of loud noise.⁴² The Americans believed themselves more

⁴⁰For a discussion of denazification at the University of Vienna which touches upon the 1946 demonstration see, John Haag's "Denazification in Austrian Universities, 1945-1955," a paper presented at the Southern Historical Association's meeting in 1992. Also see the November 1946 USFA, Intelligence Summaries 77 & 78 found in folder 56, box 7, NA-RG 260.

⁴¹Samouce, "I Do Understand the Russians." Samouce incorrectly dates the incident as occurring in December 1946, a month the Soviets were in charge of the First District.

⁴²One report when so far as to refer to the November demonstration a "minor disturbance," see "HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 1 November-30 November 1946," 20 December 1946, p.32, folder 196, box 22. Another report, however, classified the university demonstration as "what might be regarded as a major incident," see "Report of

than justified in taking such drastic action because the outcome might have been far different had the American and Allied military police failed to arrive upon the scene. The Austrian police had shown scant enthusiasm for containing the demonstration.⁴³ Indeed, some of the left-leaning police had even sided with the demonstrators. Once the patrols arrived, American military police discovered several Communist students attempting to set a fire in the basement of a university building.⁴⁴ In a more humorous vein, after one of the more boisterous demonstrators tried to scale the university's balustrade, a husky American MP grabbed the offending Austrian and "dropped him gently into the shrubbery below saying, 'You talk too much'" much to the amusement of the entire crowd.⁴⁵ Not long afterward, the demonstration came to a less than glorious end as the marchers simply melted away.

Over a month later, in early January 1947, personnel relations between members of the patrol deteriorated to the point where Soviet Major General Travnikov, the deputy commander of the Soviet zone, wrote two letters of protest to Yarborough. According to Travnikov, American MPs had on a number of occasions ignored requests of their Soviet opposites, thereby not only demonstrating a contempt for their fellow Soviet patrolmen but failing to support the Soviet members of the patrol in police situations. Yet compared to what would come in 1948, these incidents between the patrolmen remained extremely minor and the Travnikov letter still retained a friendly tone, mentioning that

Operations of USFA," October-December 1946, p.23, folder 14, box 2, NA-RG 260.

⁴³Military Government Austria, Report of the U.S. High Commissioner, no. 13, November 1946, p. 200.

⁴⁴Samouce, "I Do Understand the Russians."

⁴⁵Kretzmann, "Four Powers in Three-Quarter Time," p.31.

the patrols had hitherto worked with "good comradeship" and had promoted "mutual understanding."⁴⁶

Despite such problems, American reports from the period remained optimistic concerning the work of the Inter-Allied patrol. In March 1947, one Vienna Area Command (VAC) report praised the patrol's overall performance and noted that the multi-national military police force was doing a "bang up job."⁴⁷ Several months later, another VAC report was even more emphatic and claimed that the patrol was "one of the most colorful of our military operations in Vienna" and proved "that the soldiers of the four occupying powers" could "work together in the closest of cooperation to further our common cause and interests." In addition to helping maintain order, the patrols served as reminder "not only to the Viennese population, but to each and every soldier of the Allied forces in Vienna that the Allied forces do have a unity of purpose in their occupational aims."⁴⁸ Obviously, from the American viewpoint in early 1947, the patrols were greatly successfully and continued to serve a valuable function in the city.

To understand fully the meaning of these optimistic American reports, however, the successes of the patrols have to be placed within the context of overall American-Soviet relations in the city. What remained not so apparent was that the patrols increasingly stood out against a backdrop of poor troop-level relations between Soviet and American troops in the city. By early 1947, both American and Soviet soldiers needed constant

⁴⁶Major General Travnikov to Yarborough, 7 January 1947 & 9 January 1947, Yarborough Papers.

⁴⁷"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 1 February-28 February 1947," 20 March 1947, p.55, folder 199, box 22, NA-RG 260.

⁴⁸"HQ VAC, Report of Operations of Vienna Area Command in Austria, 1 April-30 April," 20 May 1947, p.51, folder 201, box 22, NA-RG 260.

reminding that they had once been allies. For the Americans, the patrols were a hopeful reminder of better days and better relations with the Soviets in Vienna and increasingly represented an exception to the rule.

Enforcing Transit Rights, 1946

In stark contrast to the generally good early relations in the Inter-Allied patrols, other early forms of ground-level contact between American and Soviet soldiers could be far less cordial and illustrated the need for having an International Patrol.⁴⁹ For instance, shortly after the establishment of the American zone in Vienna, soldiers in Red Army uniforms began to steal goods from American freight and passenger trains traveling between Vienna and Linz. Most dramatically, in November and December 1945, the Soviets managed to hijack entire Vienna bound train cars loaded with American relief supplies.⁵⁰ In December 1945, the Soviets went so far as to stop on several occasions a passenger train with General Clark and his entourage on board. Worse, during one of the train's forced stops, a Red Army soldier removed baggage belonging to two members of the general's party.⁵¹ Doubtless enraged by having his own train robbed and tiring of previous Soviet hijackings, Clark reacted by warning Marshal

⁴⁹A number of minor incidents between American and Red Army soldiers took place in Vienna in October 1945, see Konev to Clark, 28 January 1946, 1946, box 1, POLAD, Correspondence Between the Soviet & U.S. Element in Austria, NA-RG 84.

⁵⁰Major Gen. Donald W. Brann to Zheltov, 17 December, 1946, box 1, POLAD, Correspondence Between the Soviet & U.S. Element in Austria, NA-RG 84.

⁵¹Brig. Gen. Ralph W. Tate to Zheltov, 9 January 1946, 1946, box 1, POLAD, Correspondence Between the Soviet & U.S. Element in Austria, NA-RG 84.

Konev that armed American guards would secure American trains traveling through the Soviet zone.⁵²

With tensions rising, in the first month of 1946, a serious incident occurred on a special American passenger train, known as the Mozart Express, which traveled between the American zone in Austria and Vienna. Explanations of what happened on board the Mozart remain somewhat murky; at the time, the incident caused considerable tension between Clark and Konev just as American-Soviet relations in Austria were beginning to decline in general. According to the Soviets, darkness prevented at least four Red Army men in St. Pölten, some 40 miles west of Vienna in the Soviet Zone, from reading signs which warned them not to board the American Vienna-bound train. Soon afterwards, T/Sgt. Shirley B. Dixon, 735th Railway Operating Battalion, discovered the Soviet officers in the train's dining car and ordered them to disembark. Unable to understand English, the men may have interpreted Dixon's order to mean that they should move from one car to the next. Of course, Dixon's lack of Russian did little to help matters. According to a Soviet account, the officers went to an adjoining car.⁵³ Clark claimed in his book Calculated Risk that the Soviet officers actually got off the train and only to board it again as it began to depart.⁵⁴ Whichever was the case, within a short time the Red Army officers encountered Dixon for a second time, whereupon he again asked the Soviets to leave the train.

Quickly, the situation got out of hand. Clark claimed that one of the Soviet officers, a Captain

⁵²Clark, Calculated Risk, p.471.

⁵³Konev to Clark, 28 January 1946, 1946, box 1, POLAD, Correspondence Between the Soviet & U.S. Element in Austria, NA-RG 84.

⁵⁴Clark, Calculated Risk, p.471.

Klementiev, threateningly drew his pistol and placed it against Dixon's head. In reply, Konev asserted that the Soviet officer pulled his pistol only after Dixon had insulted his honor and returned it to his holster as soon as Dixon "cut short his indecent behavior."⁵⁵ It is clear that the Soviet captain put away his gun. According to Konev, the American, who had the only lantern, then took advantage of the darkness to draw his own gun. Witnesses on the train differed on whether or not Dixon actually drew his gun.⁵⁶ In any case, Dixon ordered the Red Army officers into one of the train's vestibules, where they encountered a Red Army enlisted man. Here, Dixon demanded that all the Soviets jump off the moving train. At this point, Klementiev reached either for his gun or for the pull-cord to stop the train and Dixon responded by firing his weapon, killing the Soviet captain. Then, even before Klementiev had hit the train floor, Dixon shot and wounded a Soviet lieutenant who had also made a sudden movement. A third Soviet officer decided it best to jump from the train.⁵⁷

Shortly thereafter Clark promised an irate Marshal Konev that he would see that justice was done. Accustomed to Soviet justice, Konev assumed that Clark would automatically severely punish the American MP. USFA did place Dixon on trial for murdering Klementiev and wounding the Soviet lieutenant. In February 1946, however, a military court ruled that Dixon had acted in self-defense, because he had had reasonable cause to fear for his own life. During the next few months, Konev wrote numerous letters of protest to Clark, insisting

⁵⁵Konev to Clark, 28 January 1946, 1946, box 1, POLAD, Correspondence Between the Soviet & U.S. Element in Austria, NA-RG 84.

⁵⁶The New York Times, 23 January 1946.

⁵⁷Konev to Clark, 28 January 1946, 1946, box 1, POLAD, Correspondence Between the Soviet & U.S. Element in Austria, NA-RG 84.

that Dixon be punished for the murder of a Soviet officer.⁵⁸ For his part, Clark hoped to avoid further difficulties and tried to keep the matter as quiet as possible, going so far as to order that USFA issue no statement on the matter.⁵⁹ To Konev, Clark defended the court's decision, pointing out that regardless of the military court's verdict he lacked the authority under American military law to overturn it.⁶⁰

The Dixon incident demonstrated to all concerned how easily matters could get out of hand. To use Col. Yarborough's words, the Americans and Soviets were simply not on the same "wavelength." Only a great deal of time and patience could bring about greater cooperation between the two militaries. Unfortunately, the Soviets had failed to take Clark's early warnings seriously or had misread them. The actions of Soviet soldiers and officers regarding American trains indicated that they believed a train bound for Vienna was simply a convenient ride to the city. For his part, Clark now had little patience with the Soviets or their way of doing business. The Mozart was part of a vital link and inviolable link between the American Zone and Vienna. In Clark's view, Dixon's action taught the Soviets an important and much needed lesson, not to illegally board American trains. Yet the example of an

⁵⁸Konev to Clark, 27 March 1946, folder 2, box 41, Clark Papers.

⁵⁹USFA Message, 12 March 1946, folder 4, box 43, Clark Papers. Two days after Dixon's acquittal, the Soviets held up the Mozart ostensibly to search for Austrians who had illegally boarded the train, see Tate to Morozov, 21 March 1946, box 1, NA-RG 84. Someone made at least two covert attempts to delay the Mozart. First, on 20 March 1946, a piece of rail exploded out from under the train as it proceeded west from Tulln. On 5 April 1946, an explosion probably meant for the Mozart damaged an empty Soviet freight train at a point between Traismauer and Herzogenburg. The Mozart had been unexpectedly delayed, having to take on water, see Tate to Zheltov, 10 April 1946, box 1, NA-RG 84.

⁶⁰Konev to Clark, 6 April 1946, folder 2, box 41, Clark Papers.

American MP shooting an Allied officer hardly foreshadowed good relations among Allied soldiers in Vienna. Certainly, Clark had given the green light use force against Soviet soldiers who committed illegal acts.

Reaction to the Hietzing Incident, June 1946

The most significant early example of ground-level conflict between the Allied soldiers inside the city of Vienna occurred near the Hietzinger Bridge in June 1946. Though the incident involved British and Soviet soldiers, it provoked American fears that a similar incident would likely occur between American and Soviet troops and illustrated the depth of dislike which had developed between Western and Soviet soldiers in Vienna. Though the influence of drink and competition for the affections of Austrian women all played roles in provoking the incident, it should be remembered that there were not any comparable incidents which occurred between Western forces stationed in Vienna. Certainly, there had been cases of fights between Americans and other Allied personnel and all the other Allies resented the wealth of American GIs. Still, compared to fights between the Soviet and the Western Allied soldiers, only small-scale brawls occurred between the Americans and other Western Allied soldiers.

The worst part of the Hietzing incident occurred on the evening of 16 June. At that time, a British soldier mounted the bandstand at a dance-hall frequented by British troops and announced to a crowd of between four and five hundred of his fellows that Red Army soldiers were in the area spoiling for a fight. With the memory of previous troubles with Soviet soldiers fresh in their minds, the British soldiers in the dance hall responded by rushing outside, taking along glasses, broken

bottles, and web belts. Making for the nearby Hietzing Bridge, gangs of British soldiers attacked any Red Army soldier or officer that they encountered, including a Soviet major who was showing his wife the town and a lone Soviet lieutenant. In both cases, "These two Russian officers had given no cause whatsoever for these attacks upon them." Shortly thereafter, the Soviet lieutenant died of stab wounds.⁶¹

Unfortunately, the International Patrol failed to play a role in helping to quell the disturbance, and British military police on the scene proved partisan. The Communist Österreichische Zeitung went so far as to later claim that it was a British military policeman who had mounted the bandstand and told the men at the dance-hall that, "Outside the Russians are lying in ambush for the English, whoever wants to go out should go out right now."⁶² Even the Anglo-Soviet report acknowledged that the British MPs who eventually restored order were one-sided and lost "the opportunity to arrest the obvious aggressors and other British soldiers who had taken part in the affray."⁶³

The Hietzing affair was not a minor matter that somehow got out of hand; this incident was indicative of a more dangerous problem: the increasing likelihood of a low level conflict breaking out between Allied soldiers stationed in Vienna. Gen. Clark claimed that the possibility of such an incident occurring between American and Soviet troops was one of his greatest fears while serving in Vienna. In particular, Clark worried "that some Saturday night . . . one hell of a brawl"

⁶¹"The Joint Report of the Anglo-Soviet Commission," 18 July 1946, PRO-FO 1020/3482.

⁶²Österreichische Zeitung, 17 September 1946, FO-PRO 1020/3482.

⁶³In November 1946, four British soldiers were sentenced for their parts in the Hietzing incident, one of whom received the death penalty, commuted to life in prison.

might erupt between American and Soviet troops. After all, his soldiers had had "many, many shooting frays" with Soviet troops in the city.⁶⁴ If such a brawl ever occurred or if someone shot the wrong person, Clark warned that he was unsure where it would all end.

As if to confirm Clark's worst fears, immediately after the Hietzing incident, American Brigadier General Ralph W. Tate received a troubling telephone message from Soviet Major Gen. Tsinev. Though Tsinev began by first apologizing for recent misbehavior of Soviet soldiers and even thanked the American general for help in apprehending a Soviet deserter, he went on to protest against the ill-treatment of a number of Soviet soldiers and officers by the American military police. In particular, Tsinev noted that one Soviet lieutenant was now in the hospital due to the actions of the American MPs.⁶⁵

Wishing both to prevent an incident like the one in Hietzing from occurring between American and Soviet troops and to restrain any possibly overzealous American MPs, Clark promptly reacted by informing Kourasov that he had given all his senior officers strict instructions to do everything possible to prevent incidents between American and Allied soldiers. Also, Clark promised to send Kourasov a report every forty-eight hours of the cases which involved Soviet soldiers who committed crimes in the American zone and requested that Kourasov do the same for incidents which involved Americans in Soviet zone. Clark concluded his letter to Kourasov by

⁶⁴Clark's speech at the National War College, 9 October 1946, folder 6, box 1, Clark Papers. For an example, see Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, p.288.

⁶⁵"Telephone Message to Brigadier General Tate," 24 June 1946, folder 4, box 41, Clark Papers.

saying, "Please be assured of my firm intent to prevent further incidents between our troops."⁶⁶

Unfortunately, within days of Clark's letter to Kourasov, several American MPs mortally wounded a man wearing a tattered Red Army uniform. According to military police reports, the supposed Red Army soldier had first caused himself to be noticed by drunkenly roaming the streets of the American Neubau Bezirk, pointing his American-made pistol at several Austrian women and American soldiers. Such action inevitably caused a considerable stir and brought out the American MPs. Mindful of orders to avoid unnecessary violence, the MPs who initially arrived upon the scene kept their weapons holstered. Only after the man had fired his weapon did the Americans reply with eight shots of their own.⁶⁷

Immediately after the shooting, Clark attempted to limit the damage that the incident might cause to American-Soviet relations in the city. First, he expressed his regret to Kourasov and promised a thorough investigation of the matter. In addition, Clark listed a number of contributing factors to the incident which included a reminder that Soviet soldiers were not permitted to carry arms in the American zone and that the dead man had threatened the lives of several Austrian civilians. Finally, Clark reaffirmed his desire for good ground-level relations in the city.⁶⁸

Fortunately for American-Soviet relations in the city, the Soviets refused even to acknowledge the dead

⁶⁶Clark to Kourasov, 29 June 1946, folder 4, box 41, Clark Papers.

⁶⁷See "Russian Incidents in the Vienna Area During Period 0600 4 July to 0600 5 July 1946," 5 July 1946 and Clark to Kourasov, 5 July 1946, folder 4, box 41, Clark Papers. Though an American major summoned the International Patrol, apparently they arrived upon the scene too late to be of help.

⁶⁸Clark to Kourasov, 5 July 1946, folder 4, box 41, Clark Papers.

man as one of their own. Instead, Kourasov responded to Clark's missive by saying that the dead man's clothing and "numerous tattoos" revealed him not as a soldier of the Red Army but the member of a criminal gang and, therefore, a displaced person who most likely had been a follower of the turncoat Russian Gen. Andrei A. Vlasov or some other "morally decayed element."⁶⁹ Kourasov was probably not far from the mark. The man in question might well have been a Soviet criminal and his tattoos were a good indication that this was the case.⁷⁰ Moreover, thousands of former Soviet soldiers lived in Vienna with neither the permission of their commanders nor even under their control.

Vienna in the Red Sea, 1946

In October 1946, General Clark traveled to the United States and there brought home to an American audience the everyday difficulties he faced overseeing an American zone in Vienna surrounded by Soviet controlled territory. First, he noted that American forces in Vienna were dependent for their supplies on a Soviet operated railroad line, a Soviet maintained road, and on a narrow ten kilometers wide air corridor.⁷¹ Every American telephone cable passed through the Soviet Zone, thus subjecting American cables to interference

⁶⁹Kurasov to Clark, 25 July 1946, folder 5, box 41, Clark Papers.

⁷⁰For an account of the elaborate "tattoo art" in contemporary Russian prisons and the meaning of individual tattoos in the criminal world see "Telltale Tattoos in Russian Prisons," Natural History 102 (November 1993) pp.50-59.

⁷¹Clark's speech at the National War College, 9 October 1946, folder 6, box 1, Clark Papers. In the American flight corridor between Linz and Tulln there had been numerous minor incidents throughout 1946. Some of the more serious occurred in April when Soviet fighters fired upon American transport planes which had strayed outside the corridor, see "Part III, USACA History-1946, vol. I," pp. 40-41, folder 255, box 32, NA-RG 260.

and making the Americans in Vienna dependent upon the Soviets for essential communications. For these reasons, and in marked contrast to his latter published writings, Clark rightly claimed that his position in Austria was such that he could not challenge the Soviets in Austria. Clark knew that if he tried to pressure the Soviets on many matters, the "first thing they did was to stop our road, or to interfere with our trains, or to deny me the privilege of sending out the essential maintenance crews to maintain some telephone lines."⁷²

An even more difficult situation for the Americans in Vienna, however, proved to be access to Tulln Field, located outside Vienna in the Soviet Zone. According to a July 1945 Allied agreement, the Americans were to have unrestricted freedom of movement to Tulln from Vienna. Though such an agreement had never been reached for Berlin, the Vienna agreement was not without its weakness. It failed to spell out which road would be used by the Americans to travel to the airbase.⁷³ In May 1946, the Soviets closed the shorter river road to Tulln Field, forcing the American personnel to take a far longer route to the airbase. The Soviets claimed that the road was already too congested with Red Army and Austrian traffic and that additional traffic would only lead to accidents.⁷⁴ Apparently, the Soviets later briefly reopened the road to the American military only

⁷²Clark's speech at the National War College, 9 October 1946, folder 6, box 1, Clark Papers.

⁷³Former OSS Agent, Charles W. Thayer went so far as to claim that Gen. Clark had "flatly rejected the 'gentlemen's' agreement' approach" adopted by the Americans regarding access to Berlin and demanded a specific written agreement concerning American access to Vienna. As can be seen by this example, it was not specific enough, see his The Unquiet Germans (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p.164.

⁷⁴"USFA Report: Outline for the Second Quarter 1946, April-June," p. 143, folder 6, box 1, NA-RG 260.

to close it again in August or early September 1946 to March 1947.⁷⁵

After Clark's departure from Austria, on three separate occasions--in April 1948, September 1948, and in November 1949--the Soviets briefly cut all American access to Tulln. Though these incidents lasted only about a day each, they were nevertheless blatant violations of the Allied agreement concerning American access to Tulln. Most significant, these incidents illustrated not only the weakness of the American position in Vienna but the problems of attempting to pressure the Soviets in Austria.⁷⁶

Workers' Demonstration, May 1947

In addition to Clark's experiences, the unfolding of political events in Vienna and elsewhere provided the American military with concrete evidence that the Soviets had dark designs on Austria. In early May 1947, Austrian Communists organized a workers' protest march, which ultimately may have swelled to some 10,000-12,000 participants. During the course of the march, thousands of workers filled Vienna's streets demanding the ouster of the current "Hunger Government" and the abolition of its "Nazi income taxes."⁷⁷ Though failing to garner the

⁷⁵"Air Situation in the Russian Sphere," p. 3, folder 50, box 6, NA-RG 260 and "USFA Report of Operations for First Quarter 1947," p.114, folder 15, box 2, NA-RG 260.

⁷⁶"Report of the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria: Final Report," 1 October 1950, p.183 (microfilm).

⁷⁷According to some press reports, the crowd only numbered between 5,000 to 6,000 people. See the 7 May 1947 edition of the Red Army's Österreichische Zeitung and Stearman's The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p.109. Erhardt reported that about 4,000 to 5,000 Communists took part with 1,000 non-Communist supporters, see Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p. 149. Reports by Vienna police officials to the Allies, however, made use of a much higher number, claiming that over 10,000 people took part. It should be noted that one of the police officials to make use of the higher number was the Communist chief of police in

sustained support of the majority of Vienna's working class, the Communists had picked an opportune time to strike; the preceding winter had been severe, Vienna had yet to recover from the war and the city's proletariat continually suffered as a result of low pay, limited food rations, high taxes and shortages of fuel and electricity. Also, the wartime Allies had recently failed to conclude a treaty which would grant Austria its independence. Historian Audrey Kurth Cronin went so far as to call the 5 May disturbance a Communist Putsch attempt.⁷⁸ Such a characterization would be an exaggeration; nevertheless, the afternoon appearance of thousands of angry workers in the Innere Stadt before the thinly defended Federal Chancellory and, later, trade union offices was clearly a source of grave concern for the American and British forces in Vienna, as well as for the Austrian government.

Making the situation even more dangerous, many impatient or disgruntled Austrians in the city sympathized with the demonstrators, believing it high time for a drastic change. Having sufficiently recovered from the shock of military defeat and having had ample opportunity to grow dissatisfied with the burdensome and seemingly never ending Allied occupation, the Viennese were increasingly resentful of the current state of affairs. One report of Viennese public opinion noted that some in the city believed that the

Bezirk I, Kurt A. Frisch, see his "Report on the Demonstration Made by Vienna Factory Workers on 5 May 1947" found in file: "Public Safety Weekly Police Reports Bezirk I", box 118, NA-RG 338. Also found in the same record group are two reports from Dr. Arthur Klauser which place the number of demonstrators at 10,000 and above, see his 8 May 1947 report concerning the demonstration by Klauser, file "Demonstrations 1947," box 119, and "Oral Report on May 5th, 1947, Demonstration in Vienna, By Dr. Klauser I. Police President of Vienna" found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviet Element Since 1 May 1947."

⁷⁸Cronin, Great Power Politics & the Struggle Over Austria, p. 51.

demonstrators should have marched on Allied headquarters and not the Federal Chancellory.⁷⁹

Faced with a large and potentially unruly crowd during May, the Austrian government immediately panicked and called for Western support against the worker's demonstration and the demonstration's Soviet backers. The Minister of Interior sent an urgent appeal to the Americans and Allied Council for help in maintaining order in Vienna. He based this appeal upon a January 1947 decision made by the Vienna Inter-Allied Command (VIAC) which stated that Allied troops would aid the Vienna police during any crisis which the Vienna police could not master.⁸⁰

Reacting to the Austrian appeal, the American commander, who had responsibility for the First District that month, hastily called an extraordinary meeting of the Vienna Inter-Allied Command. Immediately, the Allied commanders were at odds with one another. Both Soviet Lt. Gen. Lebedenko and French Brig. Gen. W. Joppé rejected the Austrian request for aid, claiming that the Vienna police had over four thousand men in reserve and that such a force could certainly contain the demonstration. Also, Lebedenko denounced the Austrian government's request as an attempt to produce a clash between Allied military police and the civilian population. Unlike the earlier November 1946 demonstration at the University of Vienna, the Americans refused to act unilaterally.⁸¹ With the support of the British, the U.S. representative nevertheless pressed

⁷⁹Polizeidirektion Wien Polizeikoat Innere Stadt to Interallied Military Government 1st Bezirk American Section, "General Opinion of the Austrians in Bezirk I Regarding the Political Situation, 12 May 1947, file "Public Safety Weekly Police Reports Bezirk I, box 118, NA-RG 338.

⁸⁰See Klauser's report of 8 May 1947, file "Demonstrations 1947," box 119, NA-RG 338.

⁸¹Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p. 202.

his fellow commanders to use Allied forces to relieve the besieged Federal Chancellory. At that moment, however, news arrived that the demonstration had come to an end.⁸²

Clearly, the entire affair pleased no one. Cronin cites British sources as claiming that the Soviets called off the supposed Putsch when faced with determined American resistance.⁸³ At a later meeting of the VIAC commanders, the Soviet and the French commanders demanded that the Allies censure the Vienna Police President for failing to keep the Allies adequately informed concerning the demonstration and appealing to the Allies without sufficient reason. Even the Americans and British were none too pleased with the Austrian handling of the demonstration. The Americans noted that the situation did not require Allied intervention. The British, however, added that the Allies should permit the Austrians to strengthen the Vienna police, since the Vienna police were not even allowed carry truncheons and sabres.⁸⁴

Other political events soon further worsened Allied relations in Vienna. Within a few weeks of the workers' demonstration, the Soviets forced Hungarian Premier Ferenc Nagy of that country's Smallholders Party from power. The rise of the Communist Party in Hungary was significant not only because the country bordered Austria but because the Austrians had had close ties to Hungary for centuries. Almost immediately thereafter, in early June, secret talks took place between Austrian

⁸²See "Extra-Ordinary Session of the Inter-Allied City Command," 5 May 1947, box 119, NA-RG 338.

⁸³Cronin, Great Power Politics & the Struggle Over Austria, p. 52.

⁸⁴In the January 1947 the Allies failed to reach an agreement concerning the Austrian police's use of truncheons, pistols, rifles, and sabers. See, "Review and Status of the Question of Arming and Equipping the Austrian Police and Gendarmerie in Austria," 28 December 1948, box 119, NA-RG 338.

Chancellor Figl and a leading Austrian Communist, Ernst Fischer. In these talks, Fischer warned Figl that Austria would never rid itself of Soviet occupation forces if the Austrian government remained within the Western orbit.⁸⁵ Once news of the Figl-Fischer conversation leaked to the public, and though Figl denied making any secret agreement with Fischer, many in Vienna reacted with alarm about the future orientation of the Austrian government.

Fears of a Putsch in Vienna, 1947

During the month of the Figl-Fischer meeting, the pages of American intelligence reports in Austria contained "rumors and predictions" of a new Putsch attempt, as well as, "demonstrations, riots, mass arrests, Soviet seizures of Austrian industries and outright war between East and West in August." When none of the above occurred, new and sometimes even fantastic reports surfaced which predicted "with worse forebodings" trouble for the end of September. In particular, French intelligence sources predicted that Austria would soon fall victim to Soviet aggression. Foreign Minister Georges Bidault informed the French Cabinet that the Soviets had a plan for ejecting the Americans from Vienna. According to Bidault, the Soviets would use Austria's decision to accept Marshall Plan aid as a pretext to violate the Control Agreements for Austria.⁸⁶

Although most American intelligence reports forecasting the Soviets ending the quadripartite

⁸⁵Stearmann, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, pp. 109-110.

⁸⁶Francis T. Williamson to Dort, "Intelligence Reports-- Austria," 16 September 1947, 863.00/9-1947 (microfilm). Also see Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, pp. 231-233.

occupation of Austria came from French sources, the Austrians made dire predictions concerning the weeks ahead and a Yugoslav source claimed to know of a plot against the Austrian government. The Austrian People's party warned of a Putsch involving 40,000 Communist agents, half of whom would be armed. Austrian Minister Dr. Peter Krauland worried that the Austrian government had failed to take proper precautions against possible disturbances. At this same time, a source in the Yugoslav secret police reported to the Americans of plan by his government to invade Carinthia and then help the Soviets in overthrowing the Austrian government in Vienna.⁸⁷

In evaluating these dire reports of impending trouble in Austria, the Americans remained cautiously hopeful about the immediate future but alert for any signs of a Soviet plot to overthrow the Austrian government. Lt. Col. James H. Critchfield, USFA Intelligence Chief in a report sent to Washington by the State Department's Francis T. Williamson, noted that he failed to confirm from local sources several specific French reports of Soviet moves against Vienna. Critchfield also pointed out that any action by the Soviets to partition Austria would violate the European Advisory Commission's 4 July 1945 agreement concerning Austria. Though conceding that the Soviets could demand that American forces withdraw from Vienna and return to the status quo which had existed at the close of the war, a move in this direction would necessitate the Soviets returning to American forces portions of Upper Austria north of the Danube and a portion of Lower Austria as well as portions of Styria to the British. Yet the Americans did not discount the likelihood of a

⁸⁷Francis T. Williamson to Dort, "Intelligence Reports--Austria," 16 September 1947, 863.00/9-1947 (microfilm).

spontaneous uprising by the Austrians due to the poor social and economic conditions in Vienna. Indeed, if such unrest occurred, American intelligence feared that it would be violent.⁸⁸

As the year 1947 neared its end, the American diplomats and military were intensely distrustful of the Soviets. Gone were the days when Americans like Yarborough could get on the same wavelength with the Soviets. One American report characterized the Soviet attitude in Austria during the past two years as: "suspicious, truculent, highly obstructionist, and minutely controlled." The report went on to add that though there were isolated instances of recent cooperation with the Soviets, these had concerned unimportant decisions or low level relationships. Soviet policy toward Austria remained the same, "highly obstructionist."⁸⁹

Events outside Austria in early 1948 further fostered American fears and distrust of the Soviets in Vienna. A coup in nearby Prague produced a Communist government in Czechoslovakia and caused great consternation not only in Washington but in Vienna as well. In occupied Germany, Allied negotiations had failed to produce an agreement concerning the future of that once powerful European state. Seeking to revive Germany, the Americans extended Marshall aid to Germany and joined with the other Western European states to support the formation of a West German state. The formation of West Germany involved instituting a new currency in occupied Germany's Western Zones. In June, the Soviets responded to Western currency reform efforts in Germany by introducing their own currency in their

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Cable to Secretary of State, 8 November 1947, 863.00/11-847 (microfilm).

zone and by cutting Berlin off from the West.⁹⁰ For many in Vienna, the blockade of Berlin seemed all too likely to be duplicated in the Austrian capital. Like Berlin, Vienna was in the midst of the Soviet zone, far from the Western Zones in Austria; the city prepared for the worst.

A Reason for Hope? 1948

Yet no blockade of Vienna ever occurred.⁹¹ In the eyes of the American press the fact that Vienna escaped enduring a blockade set it apart from other areas of Cold War conflict. Writing for The Saturday Evening Post, Ernest O. Hauser claimed that Soviet-American relations were better in the Austrian capital than anywhere else in the world. Though conceding that among many in the city there was an "ever-present fear" that the relations might change overnight, Hauser maintained that American occupation authorities anxiously hoped that the positive side of the Vienna situation would be made known to the outside world. One American officer even told Hauser that the people back home should not think that American troops in Vienna were in danger of being "loaded on cattle trains bound for Siberia."⁹²

At the end of 1948, a number of similar stories appeared in leading American publications. In his November "Letter From Vienna" for The New Yorker, Andy

⁹⁰John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretative History, 2nd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p.191. The exact cause for the Berlin Blockade remains open to debate, see Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p.488.

⁹¹The Soviets might, however, closely inspect American personnel traveling between the American Zone and Vienna. As late as 1954, the Soviets hampered the movement of traffic in and out of Vienna during a nearly week long search for two defectors, see Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds: Soviet Postwar Defectors (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), p.85.

⁹²"Vienna Isn't Berlin--Yet," The Saturday Evening Post, p.27.

Logan reported that, despite minor problems, in Austria's capital international relations had a "distinctly cousinly air about them."⁹³ Edward Crankshaw, British journalist and a former member of the Foreign Office, claimed that in Vienna there was "no hysteria, and no question at all of being overawed by the proximity of the Soviet Army."⁹⁴ The next month, U.S. News & World Report presented an article written from much the same point of view. This article claimed that Cold War disputes in Berlin had not been duplicated in Vienna. Also, the Austrian capital had not been subjected to a blockade; there had been no air lift, nor was there any "visible threat of war."⁹⁵

During the tense days immediately prior to the Berlin blockade, however, American diplomats and military men had remained uncertain about Vienna's ultimate fate. In early April 1948, the Soviets attempted to institute new travel restrictions upon American personnel traveling outside Vienna to American controlled Tulln airfield.⁹⁶ By July 1948, the Berlin Blockade was in full force, but American diplomats in Vienna were able to report to Washington that a similar blockade in Vienna seemed unlikely. Though a Soviet note concerning Berlin referred twice to Vienna and international agreements concerning Austria, thus linking Austria and Germany in justifying the Soviet blockade of Berlin, a number of factors prevented a

⁹³"Letter From Vienna," The New Yorker (20 November 1948), p.76.

⁹⁴"The Russian Game as It is Played in Austria," The New York Times Magazine (8 November 1948), p.13.

⁹⁵"Where the Soviets Co-Operate," U.S News & World Report (10 December 1948), pp. 28-29.

⁹⁶See High Commissioner in Austria (Keyes) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 April 1948 & Erhardt to Secretary of State, 15 May 1948 in Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers 1948, vol. II Germany & Austria (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), (hereafter FRUS, 1948), pp. 1419 & 1421.

Soviet move against the Austrian capital. Unlike Germany, Austria was not worth the risk. Moreover, unlike the Soviet Zone in Germany, the Austrian Soviet Zone was not viable as a puppet state. Finally, unlike Germany, Austria had an internationally recognized single government. In order to drive the Western Allies from Vienna, the Soviets would have to partition Austria. Such a move would require that the Soviet Union seize administrative control of the Soviet Zone in Austria from the Austrian government, violating the a number of international agreements. This would have disastrous repercussions for Soviet policy in Germany and would make an Allied agreement concerning Austria impossible. Furthermore, diplomatic reports pointed to the "almost total absence of local indications" that the Soviets planned such a move.⁹⁷

Lt. General Geoffrey Keyes, who replaced Clark in 1947 as USFA C-in-C and American High Commissioner in Austria, remained more cautious than American diplomats, saying it was always possible that a Vienna blockade might develop. For the moment, however, he too claimed that the "likelihood of a Soviet blockade of Vienna cannot be estimated from the current situation" and there were "no indications of Soviet intentions to institute a blockade" or even any serious disagreements in the Allied Council which might bring one on.⁹⁸

⁹⁷Erhardt to Secretary of State, 20 July 1948, FRUS, 1948, pp. 1428-1429. According to Erhardt, the Soviets might use as pretexts for a blockade one or more of the following allegations: the Marshall Plan agreement with Austria violated the Allied control agreement for Austria and contravened Allied agreements separating Austria from Germany, anti-Soviet "warmongering" and military preparations among DP's in Western Austria, and Western espionage activities, see his telegram to Secretary of State, 20 July 1948, FRUS, 1948, p. 1432 & Wagenleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p.431.

⁹⁸High Commissioner in Austria (Keyes) to Secretary of State, 20 July 1948, FRUS, 1948, p.1431.

Yet for the Americans in Vienna there was no escaping the fear that Vienna came close to suffering a blockade in April 1948. A later American report went so far as to claim that the indications were "at least to some extent" present that indicated that Moscow wanted a blockade of Vienna.⁹⁹ Naturally, at the time USFA developed a plan to deal with emergencies such as a Communist inspired Austrian coup or a Soviet blockade. Under a "Protective Security Plan," USFA was, in the event of a crisis, to begin constructing an emergency airstrip for C-47 transport plans inside the American zone in Vienna, completing it in about two weeks. In addition, USFA had a highly secret scheme to unilaterally arm over 6,000 of the Viennese police and gendarmerie stationed in the First District and U.S. zone. If members of the Austrian government came into danger, the American CIC plainclothesmen were to whisk them away to Tulln field and, then by air, to the U.S. Zone in Austria.¹⁰⁰ Without doubt, however, all knew that Vienna could not withstand a sustained Soviet blockade if one ever occurred.

By October 1948, American diplomats doubted that it would be to the advantage of the Soviets to institute a blockade. Again it was pointed out that such a move would only bring about a firm Western response and include "far-reaching breaches of international commitments," including the rejection of an Austrian government which had been recognized by the Soviets for over three years. If the Soviets imposed restrictions on Western ground and train traffic between the Western

⁹⁹"Report of the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria: Final Report," 1 October 1950 (microfilm), p.274.

¹⁰⁰"Subject: Visit to Vienna, 4-6 July 1948," R. W. P. [Col. R. W. Porter, Jr.], Xeroxed report housed at the Marshall Library, Lexington, Va. Original report found in the Plans & Operations Division, NA-RG 319, box 66. American unit commanders in Vienna and all Austrians, with the exception of Chancellor Figl, had "no knowledge of the plan" to arm the police.

Zones and Vienna, such an action would have little effect upon the city itself. Unlike 1946, the Western Allies no longer directly supplied the civilian population Vienna. Instead, the task of bringing food to the city was in the hands of Austrian authorities. Though the Soviets could easily halt supplies to the city, since Austrian food shipments were subject to Soviet licensing, they would then be forced to provide for Vienna's people themselves. Given Soviet difficulties in providing food for their own troops in Austria, such a turn of events was unlikely.¹⁰¹

The British developed the best single analysis of the reasons why Vienna escaped a Soviet blockade, recognizing essential differences between the situations in Austria and Germany. Since, Austria had a central government and Germany did not, the Allied Council in Austria exercised only limited control over Austrian affairs--unlike the Allied Council in Germany. Again, unlike Germany, the zonal boundaries in Austria had ceased to have much direct effect upon the Austrians themselves. Economically, eastern Austria would soon become a "liability," while politically, "a 'rump' German-speaking population of some 3-4 millions would be very difficult to integrate into the Soviet orbit, and Vienna itself in such a context would probably be an embarrassment." Besides, from a military standpoint, the Red Army would gain nothing new and "so long as Soviet policy requires the retention of troops in Austria, it probably suits them far better to keep things fluid" in the country.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p. 524.

¹⁰²Michael [Fowler Cullis ?] to N. J. A. Cheetham, 7 February 1950, PRO-FO 371/84921. For a similar but less detailed explanation see, Erhardt to Acting Secretary of State, 10 January 1949, Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers 1949, vol. III Council of Foreign Ministers: Germany & Austria (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 1259.

Decline of the International Patrols, 1948

A closer examination of the operations of the International Patrols revealed that even this symbol of Allied cooperation failed to escape the tensions of the Cold War. In late January 1948, the patrol became involved in a serious incident which ultimately led to a weapon being drawn by one of the Soviets. Several months later, on two separate occasions, the patrols were once again harassed by Soviet soldiers in Vienna. Most significantly, the causes of each of these incidents were minor misunderstandings. The Americans reacted with outrage, pointing out that these actions violated previous VIAC agreements. The Soviets responded by claiming that the Western Allies consistently ignored the desires of Soviet patrolmen while on duty. Most important, these incidents demonstrated how minor squabbles within the patrols could no longer be solved through patient negotiation.

The January incident came about after an American military police patrol encountered several armed Soviet soldiers with three prisoners illegally traveling through the American zone in Vienna. Upon seeing the Americans, one of the prisoners shouted in English, "Help me!" Thinking that the captured men might be Americans and knowing that armed Soviet soldiers were not permitted in the American zone, the American MPs attempted to investigate only to find themselves looking down the barrels of Soviet pistols. Then, the Soviets and their prisoners boarded a street car and fled into the nearby French zone. The Americans responded by

quickly giving chase, soon cornering the Soviets inside the French zone.¹⁰³

Fortunately, before anyone fired a shot, an International Patrol arrived upon the scene. The International Patrolmen managed to convince two of the Soviet guards along with their prisoners to accompany them. Then, the American driver of the patrol headed towards the International Patrol Headquarters, as instructed by a radio message. Unfortunately, while doing so, one of the detained Soviet soldiers drew his pistol and placed its muzzle to the American MP's head, instructing him to proceed to the Soviet Central Kommandatura. Upon seeing this, the British member of the patrol drew his own pistol and ordered the Soviet soldier to reholster his gun. As might be imagined, the sight of an International Patrol with a Soviet soldier pointing a gun to the American driver's head while having a gun pointed towards his own head presented a most unusual public spectacle. In the end, the Soviet soldier decided to put away his gun and the patrol continued on to the Auersperg Palais. Most significant, during the entire incident the Soviet member of the International Patrol failed in his duty to give or offer any assistance to his fellow patrolmen.¹⁰⁴

After arrival at the International Police Headquarters, much heated discussion took place between the Americans and the Soviets. Initially, the Soviets and their three prisoners refused even to dismount from the patrol car. Next, two Soviet officers from the Soviet Central Kommandatura appeared and demanded that the Soviet soldiers and their prisoners be permitted to

¹⁰³Col. B. F. Hurless to commanding general, Vienna Area, 9 February 1948, "Appendix "E" to Protocol of VIAC Commanders' Conference no. 108" found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

depart immediately with them. Then, both Col. B. F. Hurless, who had replaced Col. Yarborough as American provost marshal in 1947, and his commander arrived and, after some thirty minutes of debate, one of the Soviet officers from the Kommandatura reluctantly ordered his countrymen and their prisoners to enter into the International Guard Room. Once in the guardroom, the prisoners "identified themselves as being prisoners of the Soviet forces." At this point, the frustrated Americans simply turned the prisoners over the Soviets and the dispute came to an end for the moment.¹⁰⁵

The incident set off a flurry of angry letters between the American and Soviet commanders in the city. In the view of the Soviet provost marshal, the Americans lacked a legitimate reason for halting the Soviet soldiers and their prisoners. He accused the Americans of attempting to forcibly and unjustly seize Soviet citizens and noted that his men had only acted to prevent this from happening. As for the failure of the Soviet member of the patrol to assist his fellow patrolmen, the Soviet provost marshal defended his subordinate. He claimed that the Western members of the patrol had ignored the Soviet patrolmen's energetic demands that the patrol proceed to the Soviet Kommandatura. Also, according to the Soviet officer, once the entire party arrived at the International Patrol Headquarters, the Americans had reinforced their guard in order to intimidate the Soviets. Finally, he darkly added that American MPs merely carried out the plots of their headquarters.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Major Krupka to Col. B. F. Hurless, 28 January 1948, "Appendix "E" to Protocol of VIAC Commanders' Conference no. 108" found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

The Americans response was of an even angrier tone. The American provost marshal noted that the Soviets had failed to cooperate with the other Allies throughout the entire incident and that he could not "stand idly by" while his own men were "humiliated and their lives endangered by the idiotic and barbarous tactics" of Soviet soldiers. The American officer went on to threaten that "that a repetition of incidents . . . wherein members of the Soviet forces resort to drawing of arms will on the next occasion result in the American military police taking equal arbitrary action."¹⁰⁷

The American threat brought a brief but indignant response from Guard Col. Ivanov, Commander of the Soviet zone to the American city commander. Ivanov protested that Hurless had written a letter which had insulted the soldiers of the Red Army. He noted that his provost marshal had simply refused to accept the American letter and promptly returned it. The Soviet guard colonel went on to demand an apology from Col. Hurless for what he termed insulting behavior.¹⁰⁸

The American provost marshal, however, had the firm support of his commander, Brig. General Alexander Oscar Gorder. Gorder responded to Ivanov by reminding him that armed Soviet soldiers might travel through the American zone only with prior approval, to do otherwise was a violation of a July 1946 VIAC agreement concerning the possession of firearms in Vienna. Gorder claimed that had the Soviets simply requested his permission to transport their prisoners through the American zone, he

¹⁰⁷Hurless to Krupka, 28 January 1948, "Appendix 'E' to Protocol of VIAC Commanders' Conference no. 108" found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

¹⁰⁸Guard Col. Ivanov to Brig. Gen. Alexander O. Gorder, 3 February 1948, "Appredix 'E' to Protocol of VIAC Commanders' Conference no. 108," found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

would have granted it and provided every assistance that he could. Only "A mere timely telephone call beforehand" would have prevented the entire situation. An obviously frustrated Gorder ended his letter by noting that "it was only by the grace of God that no one was killed."¹⁰⁹

Five months later, another minor incident sparked a conflict within the patrol which nearly led to bloodshed. In the early morning hours of 21 June 1948, a drunken Austrian civilian named Nanseck entered a British Military Police barrack in the First District, causing a disturbance. In his conversations with the British, Nanseck claimed to be an employee of the American element in Vienna but refused to produce any documents to support his claim. Despite throwing the Austrian out once, the British were unable to rid themselves of Nanseck, so they summoned the International Patrol.¹¹⁰

Upon the patrol's arrival, a ten minute discussion took place between the British and the American member of the patrol. Ultimately, Nanseck produced documents showing that he did indeed work for the Americans. As an Austrian who worked for the Americans, Nanseck should have been taken to the American headquarters, and the American member of the patrol began to do so. According to the Soviets, however, the American member of the patrol failed to inform the Soviet member of the patrol what was going on. At the time, the Soviet MP demanded that Nanseck be taken to the Soviet Kommandatura, since the Austrian lived in the Soviet zone in Vienna.

¹⁰⁹Gorder to Ivanov, 4 February 1948, "Appredix 'E' to Protocol of VIAC Commanders' Conference no. 108," found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

¹¹⁰"Protocol no.117 VIAC Commanders' Extraordinary Conference," 21 June 1948, found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

According to the French member of the patrol, as the patrol car passed Soviet headquarters, the Soviet patrolmen again demanded that the American turn Nanseck over to Soviet authorities and attempted to reach for the brake. The American stopped and tried to discuss the matter with his increasingly excited partner. Failing to persuade the Soviet patrolmen in the matter, the American restarted the car. At that point, the Soviet MP responded by shouting for help, attempting to draw his weapon, and throwing himself at the American, only to be restrained by the French and British patrolmen. At that moment, a Red Army officer emerged from the Kommandatura backed up by a sentry. Then, with the Soviet sentry and patrolmen pointing their weapons at the rest of the patrol, all were forced to enter Soviet headquarters with their hands in the air.¹¹¹

Though the patrol was held only briefly and the Austrian released the next day, the incident set off a debate among Allied military commanders in Vienna concerning the work of the International Patrol. Soviet Commander Major Gen. Abakumov noted that the incident was simply one of a long series of similar incidents caused by the American MPs who ignored their Soviet counterparts. He went on to cite seven such incidents which had occurred in the past year. Even more interestingly, he claimed that the patrols were serving the city poorly, spending most of their time in cafes and motoring between barracks in order to exchange goods like cognac and boots.¹¹²

With recriminations flying, the Western Allies insisted that under no circumstances was a member of the

¹¹¹"Protocol no.117 VIAC Commanders' Extraordinary Conference," 21 June 1948, found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

¹¹²Ibid.

International Patrol to draw a gun on one of his comrades. The Soviet commander responded that he did not advocate the use of arms against other members of the Patrol, but he demanded that the Soviet patrolmen be respected. After all, the Soviet MP was representing a people who had "shed much blood in the struggle against Nazi Germany, the common foe."¹¹³

In early July, yet another incident occurred between American and Soviet members of the patrol, this one resulting in the "capture" of the International Patrol by Soviet forces. The incident began with three Americans transporting an American prisoner to the Stiftskaserne in a jeep. At the prisoner's request, the Americans went to pick up clothes for the prisoner from a friend, thereby inadvertently entering the Soviet zone. Shortly after, the International Patrol arrived and began escorting the straying Americans to the American Provost Marshal's office. While enroute, however, the Soviet patrolmen requested that the patrol stop while he made a telephone call. Ten minutes later, the Soviet patrolmen failed to return but three Soviet jeeps appeared surrounding the patrol. The Soviets then forced the International Patrol and the Americans to the district headquarters, where they were all held for an hour before being allowed to depart.¹¹⁴

Given the state of relations in the International Patrols in 1948, Col. Hurless clearly put more than a brave face on the situation when he told a reporter that relations among the Allied patrolmen were good. He claimed that the Americans and the Soviets may "swear a little and argue a little, just as I would with [my] neighbors back home in Nebraska," but "everything

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴"Tab 18, 'Capture' IP and U.S. vehicle in 4th Bezirsk," found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

usually ends well."¹¹⁵ The American MPs under Hurless were more realistic. As one put it, he "usually" got on fine with British members of the patrol and, after a few weeks with the French and Soviet MPs. Unfortunately, "those Russkies" could be "so stubborn" and once they got "an idea into their heads, you can't change their minds."¹¹⁶ Significantly, during the month in which Wechsberg's article appeared, Hurless reported to his superior that the International Patrol had been prevented from handling an incident in which a Soviet sentry shot an American soldier in front of the Soviet occupied Grand Hotel in the First District. Upon arriving on the scene, Red Army soldiers had detained the patrol at bayonet point and forced the surrender of an Austrian woman involved in the incident.¹¹⁷

With relations within the patrols less than cordial, relations between American and Soviet soldiers operating outside the patrols reached an even lower level. In violation of the VIAC Commanders' Protocol 1, between May 1947 and September 1948, the Soviets on fifteen occasions arrested American personnel simply for being in the Soviet zone in Vienna.¹¹⁸ Between June 1947 and October 1948, Soviet soldiers again violated an Allied agreement, this time by wearing or using arms and even heavy weapons in U.S. zone or in the First District while the Americans were in command. These incidents ranged from transporting anti-tank guns through the

¹¹⁵Joseph Wechsberg, "A Reporter in Vienna: Cameron, Lewis, Laborde, and Gordnistov," The New Yorker 24 (March 1948), p.57.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Col. B. F. Hurless to Commanding General, H.Q. Command, "Shooting of American," 10 March 1948, found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

¹¹⁸"Tab 4, Unauthorized Arrest of U.S. Personnel Merely for Being in Soviet Bezirkes," found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

American zone or docking gunboats in the American zone to assaulting American soldiers using small arms--in two instances resulting in the deaths of Americans.¹¹⁹

The Soviet Kidnapping Campaign, 1948

By far the most dangerous source of ground-level tension in Vienna which dramatically demonstrated the difficulties between the Americans and Soviets in the city came as a result of a Soviet policy of clandestine arrest, or as it came to be seen in the West, kidnapping. Since entering the city in April 1945, Soviet authorities, often operating through the Communists in the Viennese police, had arrested Eastern European Displaced Persons (DPs) and selected Germans and Austrians. In doing so, the Soviets had usually focused upon those individuals who had fought against the Red Army and, in the case of Eastern Europeans, those who had been captured by German forces or had been born within the post-1938 borders of the Soviet Union. Also, the Soviets were particularly interested in Germans and Austrians who had served as military intelligence officers specializing in Soviet affairs. With the decline of the Communist element in the Vienna Police and the rise of East-West tension in 1948, the Soviets began almost daily to abduct individuals suspected of working for Western intelligence agencies, as well as individuals who refused to cooperate with the Soviet secret police, or Austrian officials who had somehow displeased Soviet occupation authorities.

An accurate total of the victims of Soviet kidnapping remains difficult to determine. Martin F.

¹¹⁹"Tab 6, Unauthorized Wearing or Use of Arms By Soviets in U.S. Zone (or in 1st Bezirk When the U.S. was in the Chair)," found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

Herz reported to the State Department that between 1946 and 1948 the Soviets apprehended between 450 and 800 persons.¹²⁰ Another American report derived from the files of the Office of Deputy G-2 USFA attributed fifty abductions in 1948 to the direct actions of Soviet authorities like the NKVD. From the beginning of 1948 to July 1950 the Soviet kidnapped directly or used the Austrian police to seize 946 individuals, of which a little over half won fairly quick release but the rest suffered an unknown fate.¹²¹ A later account claimed that over 1,800 men, women, and children had been abducted by the Soviets and were "never seen again."¹²² Whatever the exact number of victims, inevitably, American and Soviet agents clashed as a result of such Soviet clandestine operations in the city.

An early Soviet effort to make arrests in the Western zones of Vienna ran into surprisingly little opposition and demonstrates how difficult it is to determine the number of people arrested by the Soviets. In January 1946, the Soviets began a full-scale campaign to round-up Latvians, Poles, and Yugoslavs in Vienna. Apparently, the Western Allies were caught off-guard, perhaps even inadvertently agreeing to the Soviet scheme. At the end of a January meeting between the Allied city commanders, the Soviet commander concluded his remarks to his colleagues by thanking them for their cooperation in arresting what he called Red Army

¹²⁰Erhardt to Secretary of State, "Background Papers on Current Austrian Situation," 14 October 1948, "Soviet Kidnapping," 19 August 1948, 863.00/10-1448 (microfilm).

¹²¹"Report of the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria: Final Report," 1 October 1950 (microfilm), p.161. It should be noted that Austrian historian Manfred Rauchensteiner cites the above report to support his brief reference to Soviet kidnappings in Vienna, see his Der Sonderfall, p.391.

¹²²"Vienna's Crimson Shadows," Collier's Magazine (10 June 1950), p.13. In 1952, John MacCormac put the number at "nearly 2,000," see "The 'Third Man' Theme Echoes in Vienna," The New York Times Magazine (17 August 1952), p.10.

deserters. As the British commander Verney put it, the Western commanders "were all a bit mystified by this, but assumed that the International Patrol had done something which we did not know."¹²³ The next day, British Lt. Col. N. A. S. Lytton-Milbanke warned Verney that the Soviets were arresting Eastern Europeans in all the Western zones, to which the British commander replied, "Perhaps that is what General L[ebedenko] meant yesterday--I suppose I may have given [him] the impression that I agreed to something he said."¹²⁴ As a result of such arrests, an unknown number of Eastern Europeans ended up being deported to the Soviet Union.

Despite vigorous protests after the fact by the British, the Soviets continued their clandestine activities which the Western Allies remained unable to prevent. A short time later, Col. Gordon-Smith, who replaced Verney, noted that Soviet interference in the British districts in Vienna continued, and he could "offer no guarantee that anyone wanted by the Russians will not be abducted and possibly disappear for good without a trace."¹²⁵ Even the Red Army in Vienna was at times powerless to do much. Though the British were extremely skeptical, Gen. Travnikov correctly told them in early 1946 that the Soviet secret police operated according to its own rules and "none of us really know what they do" or what became of those persons who fell into secret police custody.¹²⁶ Herz later speculated that the Soviets may have believed that they were

¹²³Verney, 15 January 1946, PRO-FO 1020/2916/81.

¹²⁴Lt. Col. N. A. S. Lytton-Milbanke, 12 January 1946, PRO-FO 1020/2916/76.

¹²⁵Col. Gordon-Smith to Political Division, 14 March 1946, PRO-FO 1020/2916/133. As for the American zone, the situation appears to have been similar to that found in the British, see Brig. Gen. H. E. Dager's letter complaint to Dr. Arthur Klauser, "Repatriation of Non-Austrians," 5 February 1947, file: Police Reports 1947, box 119, NA-RG 338.

¹²⁶Lt. Col. N. A. S. Lytton-Milbanke to Deputy Commander, 1 March 1946, PRO-FO 1020/2916/124.

operating with great restraint in Vienna since arbitrary arrest and disappearance were even more commonplace in the Soviet Union.¹²⁷

In early 1948, the most numerous and blatant Soviet moves against civilians took place. A number of examples serve to illustrate the situation. To begin with, the Soviets attempt to seize an Estonian named Sinaida Kao. The Kao incident ultimately produced "considerable bad feeling" between the American and Soviet headquarters in Vienna.¹²⁸ According to her own account, Kao had lost her husband to the Soviet authorities during the first Soviet occupation of her native land. In 1943, she had briefly studied medicine in Berlin only to return to German-occupied Estonia the following year. After the Soviets retook Estonia, Kao had fled with her six year old daughter to Vienna. With the fall of Vienna to the Red Army, Kao received orders from the Soviets to report for repatriation. She was able to escape returning to Estonia by using a series of excuses: she wished to continue her studies, her daughter was too ill with TB to travel. In the end, however, the Soviet Kommandatura insisted that she report for deportation to the Soviet Union, an order she escaped a second time only by agreeing to serve as a cashier in a Soviet operated mess in Vienna.¹²⁹

At the end of January 1948, the Soviets closed the mess and for a third time Kao faced the prospect of repatriation. In addition, the Soviets discovered that she had become engaged to an Austrian. Rejecting pleas that her Austrian fiancée be allowed to accompany her to

¹²⁷Erhardt to Secretary of State, "Background Papers on Current Austrian Situation," 14 October 1948, "Soviet Kidnapping," 19 August 1948, 863.00/10-1448 (microfilm).

¹²⁸Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p.402.

¹²⁹"Kao, Sinaida, Interrogation and Disposition," 13 February 1948, CIC document obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOI).

the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities demanded that Kao immediately prepare to return to Estonia. Under guard, the Soviets permitted Kao to return briefly to her home in the First District to pack her belongings and collect her child, at which time she managed to slip her fiancée a note asking him to alert one of the other Allied powers in the city of her plight. He, in turn, immediately rushed to see the American provost marshal who had command of the First District that month.¹³⁰

Doubtlessly tiring of the incessant Soviet kidnappings in the city, the Americans reacted by ordering two MP patrols to Kao's residence. Upon arrival in Kao's apartment, the MPs encountered a Soviet soldier who had been guarding Kao. After a brief struggle which involved the Soviet soldier attempting twice to draw concealed pistols, the Americans clubbed the soldier on the head and placed the stunned man in one of their jeeps. Then, the Soviet soldier along with Kao and her daughter were taken into American custody.¹³¹ According to the Soviets, the soldier in question had requested that the MPs call upon the International Patrol.¹³² Whether this was true or not, the International Patrol played no part in the incident.

The Americans and Soviets quickly embarked on another war of words. The Soviets demanded that the Americans return Kao and punish the Americans who injured the Soviet soldier. They noted that Allied agreements required that all Soviet employees taken into custody by another power must be returned to Soviet

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹Hurless to Commanding General VAC, 9 February 1948, found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

¹³²"Statement by the Soviet Commander," Appendix "G" to Protocol of VIAC Commanders' Conference No. 108, 12 February 1948, found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

hands.¹³³ Later, the Soviets claimed that Kao had criminal charges against her.¹³⁴ In addition, the Soviets claimed to have just forcibly returned two American deserters to American authorities.¹³⁵ The Americans, however, retained Kao, noting that she had been discharged from Soviet employment and, that as an Estonian, she was not eligible for forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union.¹³⁶

During the first three weeks of June 1948, the Cold War in Vienna had heated considerably, preventing the Americans from repeating the success of the Kao case. Two separate incidents appeared to the American military "most spectacular kidnappings" in the city. Most menacingly, the Soviets seemed to be turning their attentions to the American CIC in Vienna.¹³⁷

In the first case, the Soviets "manhandled" and held an American CIC agent without food for over twenty-four hours for inadvertently straying into the Soviet zone of Vienna. The man in question was freed without his personal papers after about an hour and a half drive south of Vienna.¹³⁸

Shortly thereafter, another CIC agent used force to protect a civilian CIC employee during a Soviet abduction attempt in the First District. In the middle of the struggle, the British MP arrived, arresting a Soviet agent and the CIC agent. With the CIC employee

¹³³Ibid.

¹³⁴Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria, p. 316.

¹³⁵"Statement by the Soviet Commander," Appendix "G" to Protocol of VIAC Commanders' Conference No. 108, 12 February 1948, found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

¹³⁶"Kao, Sinaida, Interrogation and Disposition," 13 February 1948.

¹³⁷Ian Sayer & Douglas Botting, America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps (New York: Franklin Watts, 1989), p. 358.

¹³⁸History of the 430th CIC Detachment, xeroxed copy in author's possession.

making an escape, the two agents ended up under British guard in an Austrian jail. Twenty minutes later, however, the Soviets sent in an armed detachment and forcibly removed both prisoners from British custody. For the next sixteen hours, the Americans and British frantically negotiated with the Soviets for the release of the CIC agent. Fortunately, the Soviet agent had inadvertently left his papers with the British, and these were traded for the American agent. As for the agent, he had been continually beaten during his interrogation.¹³⁹

Less than two weeks later, the Soviets struck again, this time at the heart of the Austrian anti-kidnapping effort. They did so by abducting Kriminaloberinspektor Anton Marek, announcing several days later that he had been arrested for anti-Soviet espionage activities. Accounts differ as to how the Soviets seized Marek; one source went so far as to claim that he was seized on a Viennese street, while another reported that Marek had an appointment with a Red Army officer.¹⁴⁰ Marek clearly had made enemies both with the Soviets and with Communist members of the Vienna Police. The latter had reported to the Soviets concerning the work of Marek. Marek apparently sealed his own fate after refusing a Soviet major's demand that the Austrian Police turn over all the results of a current investigation concerning kidnapping in the city.¹⁴¹ Despite repeated American protests in 1948 and 1949, Marek, a man who had spent seven years at Dachau for

¹³⁹Ibid and "Tab 15, Cass Case," found in "General Matters of Disagreement with the Soviets since 1 May 1947," file misc., box 118, NA-RG 338.

¹⁴⁰See "Vienna's Crimson Shadows," Collier's Magazine (10 June 1950), p.13 and Hauser's "Vienna Isn't Berlin--Yet," in the Saturday Evening Review (13 November 1948) p.156.

¹⁴¹"Marek, Anton, Summary of Information," 12 July 1948, CIC document obtained through the FOI Act.

anti-Nazi activities, would spend seven more years in a Soviet prison.¹⁴²

The reaction in Vienna to the Marek abduction and the manhandling of CIC agents was electric. Many informants who worked for the CIC demanded "larger sums of money" because of "the increasingly hazardous risks involved" with their work. The CIC concluded that recent Soviet action against it indicated that the "Soviets were becoming bolder and more aggressive in their activities and were becoming increasingly open in their tactics."¹⁴³ As for the Viennese police, it faced an almost complete collapse of morale after Marek's arrest.

For a time, it looked as if a full-scale covert war would break out between the Soviet secret police and the American CIC in Vienna. Then, just as the Berlin blockade was tightening, Kurasov approached his American counterpart, Lt. Gen. Keyes and asked that him for help in eliminating all incidents between their men.¹⁴⁴ The Soviet action impressed the well-known correspondents John Gunther and Ernest O. Hauser. John MacCormac of The New York Times reported that this verbal agreement came at Kurasov's initiative on 11 June 1948, after a less than cordial meeting of the Allied Council.¹⁴⁵ According to the American newspaperman, Kurasov wished to avoid repeating incidents such as one which had just occurred between Soviet agents and the American CIC.

¹⁴²Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p.66.

¹⁴³"History of the Office of the Director of Intelligence For the Period April-June, 1948," folder: 46, box 6, NA-RG 260.

¹⁴⁴Gunther, Behind the Curtain, p.294. Ernest O. Hauser mistakenly claimed that the agreement came on 28 May 1948 after an Allied Council meeting. John MacCormac reported in The New York Times that the agreement came on 11 June after an Allied Council meeting.

¹⁴⁵"Russian Move to Curb Austrian Press On Charge of Warmongering is Defeated," 11 June 1948 The New York Times.

One can only speculate that the Soviets did not want the covert war in Vienna to escalate into a major war over Austria.

In general, the Americans in Austria remained skeptical concerning the chances for success of the new informal agreement with the Soviets. Though newspapermen might hail it as exception to the rule of American-Soviet antagonism, the Americans in the city did not believe it to be so. In a later report, the American military concluded that despite a subsequent decline in incidents with the Soviets, "no noticeable change in the Soviet attitude, nor evidence of further co-operation by Soviet members of the International Patrol." The report noted a decrease in aggressiveness on the part of the Soviets toward the CIC and its employees but attributed this to the temporary removal of many Soviet agents from the city to take part in large-scale military maneuvers in the countryside.¹⁴⁶

As the year concluded, more kidnappings occurred, including one which ended in the murder of American ECA official, Irving Ross.¹⁴⁷ The events surrounding the late October 1948 murder of Ross remain more than mysterious. Apparently, Ross had had either black market dealings with the Soviets or was engaged in some covert action against them. What can be said for sure, however, is that the Ross murder put the Americans in the city on the defensive. Most interesting, is the fact that, though there were private protests, nothing

¹⁴⁶"USFA Report of Operations, July-September 1948," p.30, folder 26, box 3, NA-RG 260 and "Report of Operations, Office of the Director of Intelligence, July-September 1948," p.1, folder 42, box 5, NA-RG 260.

¹⁴⁷Whitnah & Erickson, The American Occupation of Austria, p. 206. It should be noted that Whitnah & Erickson incorrectly name Ross as an EAC (European Advisory Commission) member rather than an member of the ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration). Also see Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p.117.

publicly was done in retaliation for the murder of an American. According to The New York Times, the Americans in Austria failed to retaliate for the Soviet murder of Ross due to a policy of, "Don't Let's start anything here or Vienna may be like Berlin."¹⁴⁸ Given the weak position of the Americans in Vienna, this was an accurate assessment of the situation.

With Vienna now the center of a covert war between East and West, the Americans in the city believed themselves to be increasingly threatened and, contrary to the usually cautiously optimistic reports of the press, worried that Vienna would soon be the next Soviet target. With quadripartite relations breaking down in Germany, the international spotlight naturally focused on Berlin, but Vienna was also a part of the Cold War. Again for the Americans in the Austrian capital, examples of Soviet agents attempting to abduct women with sick children and Austrian policemen who had served time in a Nazi concentration camp revealed the darkness of the Soviet system. Without doubt the events of 1948 insured that the undeclared war between the Americans and Soviets in Vienna remained at times anything but cold.

Conclusion

From the beginning of the Allied occupation of Vienna, American-Soviet relations in the city can be likened to a sea whose calm surface belies increasingly turbulent undercurrents. A close examination of the early operations of the International Patrol reveals not only a unique example of successful American-Soviet cooperation, but the ripples of later difficulties. These difficulties can be discovered in examining the

¹⁴⁸The New York Times, 7 December 1948.

early problems which developed between Col. Yarborough, the American originator of the patrols, and the Soviets in the city. One source of initial tension developed as a result of what appeared to the Americans as a simple act of efficiently feeding the patrols. For the Soviets, however, this move was fraught with deep ideological significance. Food to the Soviet soldiers who were never adequately nourished by their own military system was charged with political power. The Americans who seemed to have so much of it must, the Soviets thought, be flourishing it in order to promote capitalism. Fearing an American trap, they had initially refused to have anything to do with the American feeding scheme. To the Americans, food was merely food, with no ideological meaning. Significantly, such problems came for Yarborough prior to the breakdown of relations between Clark and Konev in early 1946.

To the American mind, the actions of the Soviet patrolmen who refused basic military rations were nearly incomprehensible. When the Soviets finally privately admitted to Yarborough that this action had taken place partly out of political fear and partly out of impoverishment, the American could only respond with amazement. Clearly, at this point the Americans could hardly be accused of waging an ideological crusade against the Soviets or Communism in Austria. Rather, to the Americans, the Soviets were a people who came out of such a different political and cultural background as to almost defy conventional understanding. For a time, Yarborough believed that he could reach a kind of understanding with the Soviets and went to extraordinary lengths to accommodate them, yet the gulf between the American and Soviet peoples was simply too great to be bridged by one individual.

As 1946 neared its conclusion, American and Soviet political interests sharply split. Soviet support of the Communists and American support of the Austrian government inevitably brought about a clash in Vienna. At the University of Vienna, a Communist demonstration threatened to disrupt student elections and, to Clark, threatened order in the city and American zone. The International Patrols aided American efforts to suppress the demonstration but in the course of doing so broke the unity of the patrols. The Soviet members were clearly under orders to support American efforts, but Allied cooperation collapsed as Soviet members of the patrol refused to take part in any action against Austrian Communists. The Communist demonstration at the University of Vienna was significant for three reasons: first, it was clear that should significant political problems arise between the Allies the patrols would be under American command and not Soviet; second, the Soviets would not take part; and third, it again demonstrated that American forces, although this time acting from political motives contrary to Soviet ones, were attempting to contain Soviet Communism in order to promote freedom of choice in political matters.

Looking beyond the International Patrols, which represented the most successful example of American-Soviet cooperation, other forms of early Allied troop level contact could be bloody, even causing the deaths of Red Army personnel in 1946. All of this left Clark facing the threat of an unauthorized, undeclared, and unwanted war breaking out in the city. Such unfortunate incidents might be dismissed as minor, yet they illustrated the potential for violence and showed an important concern that the American command and ordinary soldiers increasingly had in Vienna. The Americans came to believe that the Soviets failed to play by the same rules as the other Allies. To the Americans, the

problem of hijackings of American trains between Vienna and the American Zone in Austria and the unauthorized boarding of trains were all indications that the Soviets were untrustworthy. The Americans increasingly suspected that the Soviets were attempting to put pressure on a vital link to the U.S. Zone in Austria. As a result, Clark ordered his men to make use of whatever means necessary to repel such Soviet moves against one of the American lifelines to the outside world.

Within the city, however, Clark feared that relations between common American and Soviet soldiers had declined to the point that his own men might take matters too far. He had only to look at the riotous Hietzing incident in which perhaps hundreds of British soldiers had beaten to death a Soviet officer and injured numerous other Soviet personnel in order to see this danger. In reaction to Hietzing, Clark issued strict orders to Yarborough that all such incidents with the Soviets in the city must be avoided. Even so, American MPs soon killed a drunken Soviet soldier who had threatened civilians in the city. Only incredible good fortune (the decision of the Soviet authorities to claim that this man was not a member of the Red Army) prevented this incident from becoming a bigger source of trouble.

Naturally, as relations between Moscow and Washington deteriorated between late 1946 and early 1948, so did Allied relations in Austria. Increasingly, the American military authorities recognized their weak position in Vienna, surrounded as they were by the Soviet Zone in Austria. With Tulln Field inside the Soviet Zone and American communications cables traveling through the Soviet Zone, the Americans knew that Vienna could not withstand a sustained Soviet blockade. After a troublesome demonstration against the American-

supported Austrian government in May 1947 and the Communist seizure of power in Hungary, the Americans began to focus on reports of impending trouble with the Soviets, from rumors of a coming blockade of Vienna to tales of a possible overthrow of the Austrian government. The fact that the Soviets choose not to institute a blockade does nothing to obscure the perception of a threat at the time.

In contrast to the reports of correspondents of the day, by the beginning of 1948, American-Soviet relations had declined to a low point. Though the American-Soviet conflict in Vienna was far less dramatic than in neighboring Berlin, for the Americans in the city it remained very real. Although the International Patrol continued to police the city, it became an increasingly hollow symbol of Allied cooperation. As a result, from the viewpoint of the Americans in Vienna, the situation there was anything but tolerable. They were on what can only be termed the front lines not only of the Cold War war but at times of a hot war. On the streets of the city, relations with the Soviets were unpredictable, and several Americans would be killed or wounded at the hands of men wearing Red Army uniforms.

With the decline of American-Soviet relations, a covert war gradually emerged in the city, thus demonstrating that despite appearances to the contrary Vienna represented a potential trouble-spot in American-Soviet relations. The Americans found the Soviet policy of kidnapping Austrians off the streets of the city unacceptable. Inevitably, American military intelligence agents became involved, thus beginning not simply a war of words but one of bullets. For Americans in the city, this war revealed an often hidden aspect of the Soviet system by allowing them to peer under the iron curtain, and as a result, they became front line soldiers a Cold War army of occupation.

Conclusion

Reflecting on the American experience in the Austrian capital, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles recalled in 1957 that "about the only one of the early postwar agreements" with the Soviets which had "worked reasonably well" was the agreement governing the four-power occupation of Vienna.¹ Since soon after the war the Allies had come to a detailed written understanding, the four powers had been able to maintain tolerable relations in most matters concerning the city. Dulles could well have continued by pointing out that Vienna had never suffered from a Berlin-style blockade and that the city could boast of the internationally famous "four men in a jeep," unique examples of continued Allied cooperation even during the Berlin Blockade and Korean War.

Austria had escaped partition and, on the whole, American-Soviet political tensions in the country remained muted, especially compared to neighboring Germany. In the Allied Council in Austria, the Soviet member never walked out on his Western colleagues and, when disagreements arose in the council, the members were able to agree to disagree and move on to other business. Most significantly, the State Treaty of 1955 had created a neutral Austria. Though it had taken a decade, and the Soviets received concessions from the Austrians, it represented a peaceful solution to at least one source of postwar difficulty between the superpowers. After the treaty's signing, some in the West even held out the hope that the American-Soviet experience in that Central European country might reduce international tensions or perhaps serve as a model for future superpower cooperation.

¹Stearman, Soviet Union & the Occupation of Austria, p.32.

Yet despite what was on the international level a remarkable special exception to the rules of the Cold War, at the ground-level Allied relations in Vienna had rapidly deteriorated after the Second World War, placing Vienna on the front line of a Cold War which occasionally turned bloody. In the Austrian capital, the American military had had a rare opportunity to maintain sustained contact with members of the Red Army. Though certainly the development of superpower tensions played a large role in creating the American view of the Soviets, daily contact with the Soviets in a city surrounded by the Soviet Zone brought home particular difficulties, showing the Americans with special vividness the political and social differences between the two peoples, differences which sometimes caused violence. In this manner, the Vienna experience at the ground-level, in contrast to the international level, provided empirical evidence for emerging American anti-Communism and helped to shape the views of military men from General Mark Clark to the common American soldier in Austria.

Without doubt, the Americans who first entered the Austrian capital in June 1945 with the Vienna mission arrived in the city with a world-view shaped by the war against Hitler. Accordingly, these Americans saw the Austrians as defeated enemies, naturally treating them with suspicion. By contrast, the Americans viewed the Soviets as a people who had suffered mightily under the Germans, served as fellow soldiers against the Germans, and were official American Allies. If Americans harbored private misgivings in 1945 concerning the Soviets, these sentiments remained suppressed in favor of the hope that the two powers would create a better and more peaceful world after a devastating world war. With this hope in mind, the report of the Vienna Mission can be placed into proper historical context and the

American attitude in June 1945 towards the Red Army's mass rape of Viennese women can be more fully understood. In 1945, the Americans found difficult to believe the horrific actions of the Red Army in Vienna. After all, to American ears, these Austrian stories sounded like Nazi propaganda.

Though by early 1946 General Mark Clark increasingly viewed the Soviets as having dark designs upon Austria and moved to towards a policy of containment, the earlier Vienna mission had contributed to the American decision to take up an indefensible zone and airfield in Vienna. Again, historical context must be remembered. In July 1945, the Americans recognized that the war with Japan was yet to be won and retained confidence that the Soviets could be trusted in Vienna if all sides agreed upon the details of an Allied agreement for the city's occupation. It must also be remembered that the Americans came to Austria as an invading Army and remained in the country as an occupation force. Consequently, the initial focus of USFA was against the remnants of Nazism and fascism in Austria, not Communism. This can be see in the G-2's extensive efforts at denazification, rather than counter espionage against the Soviets or Austrian Communists. Only in late 1946 did Army intelligence begin to redirect its focus toward Soviet actions in Austria.

As for the American commanding general in Austria, General Clark had come to Austria after fighting the Germans in Italy. Like most other American generals, Clark had not initially harbored the Soviets any particular ill-will. Yet after his time in Austria, Clark claimed that he had been an early opponent of the Soviets in Austria while at the same time attempting to cooperate with the Soviets. An examination of the evidence from the period reveals that Clark had attempted to accommodate the Soviets, mistakenly

believing that he could win them over with frankness. His primary interest in 1945 was to come home as rapidly as possible, and he opposed those forces which he saw as standing in the way of his goal. Continuing his wartime Anglophobia, in August 1945 Clark first briefly saw the British in the obstructionist role in Austria and even sided with the Soviets in demanding the immediate creation of an Allied Council for Austria. Even as late as November 1945, Clark attempted to find ways to placate the Soviets in Austria by agreeing to the removal of Austrian government officials in order to allow the Soviets to "save face." In the end, however, Clark could truthfully say that experience had taught him that the Soviets operated according to a different set of standards.

With Vienna ravaged by war, the Allies in the occupied city initially faced a host of critical problems, not the least of which were how to feed the city's near-starving population, suppress the rampant black market, and combat the wave of crime committed by Austrians, foreigners, and Allied soldiers. For the Americans, the problems that faced Vienna could be overcome through Allied cooperation and a rational problem solving approach. By contrast, the Soviets saw the problems facing Vienna as something the Viennese would simply have to endure. Also, the Soviets believed that the Viennese had not suffered the way many in U.S.S.R. had under the Nazi occupation. Most significantly, while the Americans saw the occupation of Vienna as a time for expressing a kind of idealism by rebuilding Austria after the war, the Soviets saw the occupation as a time to take revenge upon a people who had greatly aided the German war effort.

For each of the three problems facing the city, the opposing American-Soviet approaches illustrated differing world-views which contributed to the rise of

tensions in Vienna. In the case of food, the Americans fostered the revival of Austrian agricultural production and hoped for the importation of food from Eastern Europe. Coming from a country which had mostly escaped wartime food shortages, the Americans lacked a clear understanding of the food shortages found in the Soviet Union, a fact of life the Soviets only reluctantly and privately admitted existed. As for the black market, the Americans attempted to monitor and suppress its activities. Certainly many Americans in Austria took part in the black market, but they did so in violation of military regulations. In contrast, Soviet military men from generals to common soldiers used the black market to obtain not only luxury goods but the necessities of life. The most dramatic disparities between these two occupying forces, however, remained their views of crime and punishment. The Americans approached the crime situation in Vienna as a social problem which could be overcome given the proper environment, education, and a revived Viennese police. In practice, the Soviets saw criminal activity as a travail to be endured, and certainly the Soviets refused to allow the Austrian police to arrest Red Army soldiers. When it came to dealing with criminals within their own ranks, the Red Army's justice was both swift and drastic, holding out little in the way of rehabilitation.

Between 1945 and 1948, sustained soldier-to-soldier contact within the context of the emerging Cold War produced mutual suspicion and even violence between Americans and Soviets on the streets of Vienna. Beneath the usually calm, contact between the soldiers of these two nations became more and more tense. Certainly the cautiously optimistic view of American-Soviet relations presented by American reporters in Vienna was more than hopeful. From the perspective of those Americans who

served in Vienna, relations with the Soviets proved increasingly problematic. Even in 1945 and early 1946, there were difficulties on American trains bound to Vienna, leading to shootings and ultimately the death of a Red Army officer. In June 1946, drunken British soldiers rioted and attacked Red Army soldiers. Conditions soon grew so tense at the ground level that General Clark had to issue strict orders to his own men to avoid confrontations with the Soviets. Even within Vienna, the International Patrols' relations declined, especially after the November 1946 disturbance at the University of Vienna. By 1947 not only was the international situation in general worsening, but a hunger demonstration in Vienna sparked hot debate between the former allies. Finally, in late 1947 and early 1948, the Americans feared a drastic move against Vienna by the Soviets. In retrospect, such fears may seem like Cold War paranoia, but for Americans in Vienna the threat was real. Also, the Soviets increasingly kidnapped civilians off the streets of Vienna. Soviet covert actions against what appeared to the Americans as innocent women and old men inevitably produced clashes between the American CIC and the Soviets in the city.

Under such conditions, the Americans found that their Soviet counterparts in Vienna had been shaped by an alien political system which produced two contradictory results: on the one hand, the Soviets insisted upon a high degree of regimentation, while on the other hand, they allowed for a remarkable laxity in discipline and indulgence in black market activity. As the Soviets resisted what the Americans took to be rational attempts to revive Austrian economic and political life, the latter increasingly saw themselves as having a special mission: to rid Austria not only of Nazism, but now also from the threat of Communist

dictatorship. As a result, by 1948, the Army in Vienna became a reluctant cold war army of occupation.

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
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
Appendix

ROUTES OF PENETRATION, ALLIED ARMIES, AUSTRIA




AUSTRIA





- | | |
|----|------------------|
| 1 | Innere Stadt |
| 2 | Leopoldstadt |
| 3 | Landstrasse |
| 4 | Wieden |
| 5 | Margarethen |
| 6 | Mariahilf |
| 7 | Neubau |
| 8 | Josephstadt |
| 9 | Alsergrund |
| 10 | Favoriten |
| 11 | Simmering |
| 12 | Meidling |
| 13 | Hietzing |
| 14 | Penzing |
| 15 | Fünfhaus |
| 16 | Ottakring |
| 17 | Hernals |
| 18 | Währing |
| 19 | Döbling |
| 20 | Brigittenau |
| 21 | Florisdorf |
| 22 | Gross-Enzersdorf |
| 23 | Schwechat |
| 24 | Mödling |
| 25 | Liesing |
| 26 | Klosterneuburg |


RATION-BREAKDOWN FOR VIENNA AS OF MAY 1946




APPROXIMATE CONSUMPTION BY AGE AND OCCUPATION GROUPS

0-3 YEARS - 1000 CAL.
 3-6 YEARS - 1200 CAL.
 6-12 YEARS - 1350 CAL.
 BASIC - 1200 CAL.
 EMPLOYEES - BASIC + 240 CAL.
 WORKERS - BASIC + 800 CAL.
 HEAVY WORKERS & NURSING
 & PREGNANT MOTHERS - BASIC + 1500 CAL.


POPULATION ANALYSIS



POPULATION BY SEX




CALORIE VALUE OF THE WEEKLY FOOD RATION FOR VIENNA





NOTE: Sugar issued first ration week of each calendar month during January, February and March, and for the week beginning April 21, April 28, May 12, and May 26, causing a peak in these weeks.


CALORIE VALUE OF THE WEEKLY FOOD RATION FOR VIENNA



UMGEBUNG VON WIEN







VITA

Ralph W. Brown III was born in Riverhead, N.Y. on 7 November 1963. In 1968, his family moved to Tazewell County, Va. There he lived until 1973, when his family again moved, this time to Campbell County, Va. Here, he attended Brookville High School. In 1982, he entered James Madison University, where he later received a Bachelors of Arts in 1986 and a Masters of Arts in 1988. In August 1988, he accepted a three-year graduate teaching assistantship offered to him by the University of Tennessee's Department of History. In 1991, he married Paula Wood. In May 1995 he received a Ph.D. in History from the University of Tennessee. Currently, he serves as an Instructor of History at Pellissippi State Technical Community College in Knoxville, Tenn.