

Foreign Policy Revisionism in the Post-WWII Era

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family, my mother, Janet Leigh Gold, my father, Bary Allan Gold, my brother, David Joseph Gold, my late grandparents, Herb and Celeste Shulman, and Leonard and Selma Gold, and my mother's partner, Jerry Gearhart. Thank you for all of your love and support. I could not have done it without you.

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ABSTRACT

It is now almost an empirical law that territory is the most important and fatal issue states fight over. Study after study finds that territorial as opposed to maritime and river claims are more likely to lead to interstate conflict (Hensel et al. 2008, Vasquez 2009). When states choose to engage in conflict by revising the status quo, scholars find that territorial as opposed to policy, regime, and other revisions are the most fatal (Ghosen, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, Senese and Vasquez 2008). However, while territorial conflict is the most fatal, the average number of claims is down significantly since the increases around WWI and the post-WWII, decolonization period (Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017). There is also evidence that territorial revisionism declined in the post-WWII era (Zacher 2001, Holsti 1991) and is declining even more in the post-Cold War. In contrast, according to the Correlates of War, foreign policy disputes are the most common revision type overall and the most common fatal revision type in the post-Cold War era (Palmer et al. 2015). This dissertation explores interstate conflict based on another state's foreign policy, an important, yet understudied phenomenon. Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996, 178) define policy revisions as: "Policy denotes an effort by the revisionist state to change the foreign policy behavior of another state." The first chapter introduces the topic of foreign policy disputes and outlines the dissertation. The second chapter examines the big picture, what foreign policy disputes are and what causes them. In chapter three, I investigate the largest subcategory, interstate conflict over nonstate actors. Chapter four investigates how this new issues type leads to conflict by examining interstate conflict when it occurs through nonstate actors after external support is given. My dissertation contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it explores a new issue space. Interstate conflict increasingly occurs because of secondary, often less fatal issues called foreign policy disputes. Second, it speaks to an increasing way interstate conflict occurs, through third parties. States often engage each other at a low cost using nonstate actors instead of having to face them directly.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

This dissertation investigates a new issue space, a broad, but largely undefined category of interstate conflict called foreign policy disputes, and an emerging way interstate conflict occurs, through nonstate actors. It is now almost an empirical law that territory is the most important and fatal issue states fight over. Study after study finds that territorial as opposed to maritime and river claims are more likely to lead to interstate conflict (Hensel et al. 2008, Vasquez 2009). When states choose to revise the status quo with military force, scholars find that territorial as opposed to policy, regime, and other revisions are the most fatal and most likely to escalate to an interstate war (Ghosen, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, Senese and Vasquez 2008). However, while territorial conflict is the most fatal, the average number of claims is down significantly since the increases around WWI and the post-WWII, decolonization period (Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017). There is also evidence that territorial revisionism declined in the post-WWII era (Zacher 2001, Holsti 1991) and is declining even more in the post-Cold War (Palmer et al. 2015). According to the Correlates of War, after dropping overlapping MIDs, descriptive statistics show that most revisions in total and for each historical period (except 1900-1945) are policy, not territory; and in the post-Cold War, there are more fatal policy revisions (Palmer et al. 2015). Increasingly in the post-World War II era, states enter into conflict where the main issue is not territory. Instead, interstate conflict occurs because of

secondary, often less fatal issues called foreign policy revisions or disputes.

Interstate conflict based on another state's foreign policy is an important phenomenon; yet, scholars do not have a good idea of what foreign policy issues are and how states engage in conflict over them. Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996, 178) define policy revisions as: "Policy denotes an effort by the revisionist state to change the foreign policy behavior of another state." This definition is decidedly vague enough to mean almost anything. In this dissertation, I decompose foreign policy disputes into issues over questions of power, interdependence, and norms. For instance, regarding issues of power, states often engage in conflict over weapons of mass destruction (Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013), nonstate actors (Salehyan 2008b), as well as issues related to rivalry (Dreyer 2010) and balance of power considerations (Mearsheimer 2001, Waltz 1979). The first chapter examines the big picture, what foreign policy issues are, why they matter, and why they occur. The second and third chapters investigate how interstate conflict occurs over the largest subcategory, interstate conflict over nonstate actors. The second first explores why interstate conflict over nonstate actors occurs. The third chapter explores how external support to nonstate actors allows states to engage in interstate conflict indirectly.

Chapter Overview

More specifically, in the first chapter, I detail the specific subcategories of foreign policy issues. I argue that foreign policy issues are an important part of understanding the full breadth of interstate conflict, especially in the post-Cold War era, where most fatal revisionist conflict is policy, not territory. Since policy disputes are secondary and often less fatal, I hypothesize that states engage them when they have the opportunity to do so. During the post-WWII era, I find

that measures of opportunity, including an imbalance of power and contiguity are predictors of foreign policy revisionism, but an imbalance of power does not lead to territorial revisionism. In this chapter, I also decompose foreign policy issues into conflict of power, interdependence, and norms. I decompose the policy issues from 1993-2001 into these and more specific categories, and then test which correlates lead to conflict over them. I find considerable variation in the factors that lead to specific conflict issues. For instance, I find that a power imbalance leads to conflict over issues related to power and norms, but not interdependence; contiguity leads to conflict over power and interdependence, but not norms; and joint democracy only leads to conflict over power and norms.

In the second chapter, I investigate the correlates of the largest category of foreign policy issues, interstate conflict over nonstate actors. An example of this type of conflict is when India and Pakistan mobilized their militaries and subsequently clashed in December 2001 after India accused Pakistan of harboring and supporting two militant organizations that attacked the Indian Parliament. I argue that two kinds of external support, defacto and active, should associate with interstate conflict over nonstate actors. Defacto support occurs when a state does not know a group is operating in its territory; active support occurs when a state consciously gives assistance to a group. I find that both are positive predictors, but active support has a stronger substantive effect on interstate conflict over nonstate actors. I then hypothesize that three factors should associate with interstate conflict over nonstate actors. First, rival states will give external support to nonstate actors as a way to manage their bargaining relationship and doing so will result in low-level interstate conflict over that that support. Second, a power imbalance weak will associate with external support that leads to interstate conflict because weak states are at a

material disadvantage. Lastly, I hypothesize that economic interdependence will associate with interstate conflict because states will choose to engage in interstate conflict that has less reputational costs than other kinds of direct conflict with an adversary. I find support that rivalry and a power imbalance positively leads to conflict, but that economic interdependence does not lead to conflict over nonstate actors.

Lastly, the third chapter explores how external support to nonstate actors allows states to indirectly engage in interstate conflict. I argue that certain kinds of external support in the form of a home base, training, weapons, and logistics, give states the ability to engage in interstate conflict “on the cheap” because it increases the collective action and mobilization capacity of nonstate actors that in turn, engage in terrorism against a shared target state. For example, Sudan’s sanctuary to al-Qaeda in the run-up to 9/11 allowed the group to train threat-free, increasing the likelihood that they were going to successfully engage in terrorism against a shared target state, in this case, the United States. There is an assumption that interstate conflict occurs dyadically, at least it is modeled that way in most empirical models; however, many times it occurs triadically and indirectly. For instance, a state might intervene in a civil war in support of a nonstate actor for the purpose of hurting the group’s rival state. In this chapter, I argue that transnational terrorism occurs because state support increases the nonstate actor’s strength, giving it an increased opportunity to attack a state, normally much stronger than it, across borders. The process of giving external support to a nonstate actor gives states the ability to pursue their foreign policies at a low cost.

Contribution

My goal throughout this dissertation is to explore a new issue space and an emerging way interstate conflict occurs, reflecting two larger trends, especially in the post-Cold War era. First, it speaks to the decline of interstate war and the internationalization of intrastate conflicts (Themnér and Wallenstein 2013). The presence of weak and nondemocratic states alongside organized and aggrieved nonstate actors has resulted in many civil wars (Sambanis 2002); however, interstate conflicts still occurs, but the issues and the way it occurs is changing. We see the decline of territorial revisionism, especially in the post-Cold War era. In its place, states often engage in conflict over secondary, often less fatal issues. In addition, most civil wars have an international dimension. Biased states often intervene in on behalf of a rebel group (Kydd 2003; Svensson 2007). This trend has led some scholars to argue that civil and interstate wars should be studied together and combined in empirical models due to their similarities (Cunningham and Lemke 2013). Second, in the absence of interstate wars, states have learned that giving external support to nonstate actors is a low-cost way of managing their bargaining relationship with another state (Salehyan et al. 2011). Rivals typically support nonstate actors so they do not have to directly engage their adversary (Maoz and San-Akca 2012; Findley et al. 2012). These two larger trends reflect a growing issue space where conflict is fought over secondary, less fatal issues, and a more salient way states choose to engage in conflict, indirectly using nonstate actors.

CHAPTER TWO

FOREIGN POLICY REVISIONISM IN THE POST-WWII ERA

Introduction

On March 20, 2003, the United States and coalition partners invaded Iraq. The stated goals behind the intervention were to prevent or eliminate the use of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, Iraq's support of terrorist organizations, regime change, and to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions. After the ouster of the Baathist regime, Iraq plunged into civil war, dragging its neighbors in. Third parties, states and nonstate actors, intervened in order to support their side or engage in proxy conflicts against a mutual adversary. The Iraq War is one of the central events in the post-Cold War era, but what is curious is that it does not fit the pattern of most interstate conflict. Scholars overwhelmingly find that interstate conflict over territorial issues are the most likely to lead to conflict, the most fatal, and the most likely to escalate to an interstate war (Vasquez 2009). The relationship between territory and conflict has become so robust that some scholars argue that is as close to an empirical law as is possible in a social science (Vasquez 2009). In contrast, the Iraq War was not fought over territory (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013), but a new issue space that scholars house under the larger umbrella of foreign policy issues. In this article, I seek to open up the black box of foreign policy issues and uncover the specific sub-issues involved in this category and then investigate their general correlates.

What are foreign policy issues? Jones et al. (1996) define policy revisions as: “an effort by the revisionist state to change the foreign policy behavior of another state.” The inherent problem with this definition is that it is deliberately vague. Foreign policy is generic enough to perhaps mean almost anything, including issues over territory and a state’s regime. In this chapter I decompose foreign policy issues into three categories: conflict over power, interdependence, and norms. These categories can also be further decomposed into sub-issues. For instance, interstate conflict over power can involve balance of power, maintaining one’s sphere of influence, and conflict over nonstate actors, the most common sub-issue that I focus on in the second and third chapters. Even though scholars have focused on territorial and regime-related issues, foreign policy issues are actually more common and increasingly so in the post-Cold War. Foreign policy militarized interstate disputes (MIDs hereafter) are the most common for every historical period except from 1900 to 1945. In the post-Cold War, where 55% of MIDs are policy, in raw numbers, there are more fatal policy MIDs than there are fatal territorial ones. There is also a growing consensus that they merit investigation. Take this finding from the latest update to the MID dataset. “When a state is identified as revisionist, the most common revision type is policy, as roughly 81% of all revisionist actors sought to change the policy of the other state in the dispute. Furthermore, about 83% of revisionist initiator states were policy revisionists, as opposed to about 15% who were territory revisionists and under 3% who were regime revisionists” Palmer et al. (2015, 232). Scholars find that issues involving refugees, state support for nonstate actors, and weapons of mass destruction (Karlén 2017; Salehyan 2008a; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013) are important causes of interstate conflict. Still, we do not have good explanations for what causes interstate conflict over foreign policy issues and specifically if

the path to conflict is similar to the territorial steps to war. This puzzle informs my research question for this chapter, which is under what conditions do states enter into militarized conflict and escalate to fatal conflict over their foreign policy issues?

The layout of this chapter is as follows: First, I will discuss the issue-based approach to interstate conflict and the increasing recognition of a new issue space involving foreign policy revisions. The second will be a decomposition of foreign policy MIDs from 1993-2001 and a discussion of their importance.¹ In this section, I argue that because foreign policy issues are secondary and less fatal than territorial ones, their causes might be linked to measures of opportunity, whether through power politics in the form of strategic rivalry and power preponderance or forms of interdependence, such as contiguity. I also compare the correlates of foreign policy issues to MIDs in general and the other revision categories. This discussion will lead into a number of theoretical hypotheses about the causes of policy disputes in general and their constituent categories.

Policy disputes can be broken into three main categories where interstate conflict occurs over power, interdependence, or norms. Each category can be further broken down into sub-issues. Since the second and third chapters in this dissertation are restricted to the post-Cold War era, this chapter will allow me to examine a wider sample. The goal is to investigate whether the path to conflict and fatal conflict is the same for policy disputes as they are for territorial ones. In brief, I find that the path to conflict is different for foreign policy issues as opposed to territorial ones. Power preponderance and joint democracy are correlates of the former, but not the latter for the post-WWII era. Regarding the post-Cold War era, when I use conflict over power,

¹ In future work, I will decompose the foreign policy MIDs for the entire post-Cold War era and also for the entire post-WWII era.

interdependence, and norms as the dependent variable, I find that they have different correlates for contiguity, power preponderance, and joint democracy.

Issues in Interstate Conflict

Underlying Conditions, Issues in General, Territory

The modern scholarly study of interstate conflict did not start with the issue-based approach. Instead, most research investigated underlying conditions such as the anarchic system, long cycles, and polarity (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Thompson 1986; Waltz 1979). Realism and its successor neorealism were the dominant paradigms. Realism attributes state behavior to the inherent search for power and security that inevitably flows from the anarchic international system. It views states as the main actors in international politics. States are rational actors that pursue power and security through self-help behavior (Mearsheimer 2001; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979). Defensive realism attributes interstate conflict to the anarchic system and balance of power motivations to maintain security. Security can only be achieved through a balance of power (Waltz 1979). Offensive realism, the other half of the structural school, argues that states primarily seek power and that security can only be achieved through preponderance on power. The search for this preponderance ultimately leads to a tragedy by provoking more conflict (Mearsheimer 2001). In contrast to structural realism, a number of scholars in the realist school point to hierarchical theories between a status quo and revisionist power (Gilpin 1988). In this camp, Organski and Kugler (1980) argue that interstate war occurs when a revisionist power chooses to challenge the status quo power for control over the international system. They argue

that the move towards parity, not a balance of power, is the ultimate cause of conflict.² Despite their contributions, these underlying approaches have flaws that ultimately led to the issue-based approach.

First, realism and its variations are only principally concerned with conflicts among the great or world powers where questions of regional or global hegemony take center stage. Since status quo and revisionist powers fight over the rules and leadership of the international system, secondary powers and their conflicts are not given much thought unless they figure into a great power's behavior. Second, realism neglects the specific issues that led to conflict. Underlying distributions in power might motivate one state to revise or maintain the status quo, but normally states are concerned with a range of issues. Take WWII, for instance, the defining conflict that shaped the global distribution of power in the 20th century. The United States and Japan fought to maintain the integrity of the Japanese empire and maintain its regime's survival, enforce Wilsonian treaty terms, support China as an American ally, and for strategic territory (Holsti 1991). In this chapter, I contend that sub-issues involving power actually have issues such as maintaining one's sphere of influence, balance of power consideration, deterrence, compellence. In other words, it is possible that what are thought of as underlying issues (i.e., the distribution of power, alliance provisions) are actually specific issues involved in foreign policy disputes. Lastly, the issue-based approach incorporates new methods for understanding the causes of interstate conflict that make the realist approach untenable when its theories are falsified (Huth et al. 1993; Valeriano 2009). Some realist scholars seek to generalize and use deductive logic, but their methodology is a mix of historical and large-N case studies. The history of the issue-based

² Realism is of course challenged by liberalism, liberal institutionalism, constructivism, and other grand theories (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Wendt 1992, 1999; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995).

approach coincided with the development of rigorously coded datasets, most notably the Correlates of War (COW hereafter), which identified incidents of dyadic interstate conflict during the behavioral revolution in social science. Scholars first tested hypotheses using panel data and maximum likelihood estimation techniques that showed the probability a specific variable associates with conflict in 1992 and have not looked back (Bremer 1992).

In contrast to grand theory that focuses on underlying causes, the issue-based approach seeks to identify the specific reasons or incompatibilities why states choose to revise the status quo (Diehl 1992; Hensel et al. 2008). Since scholars use the word “issues” to describe both claims and revisions, it is important to distinguish between them. Revisions, which this study investigates, purposefully select on armed conflict. Revisions occur when a state chooses the revise the status quo (Gibler 2016; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Holsti 1991). Claims (or disputes) are independent of conflict, but might lead to it (Hensel et al. 2008; Hensel and Mitchell 2017; Huth and Allee 2002). The main argument for not selecting on armed conflict is that scholars will not identify variation in the issues that are and are not militarized (Hensel and Mitchell, 2016). Admittedly, investigating the specific issues means taking the revisionist MIDs and then identifying their issues. This is sometimes criticized as an inductive process and is not usually the recommended way to proceed if the goal is inference by falsification (King et al. 1994). However, it does not have to be a strictly inductive process. Once the initial coding is finished, it can also be deductive and rigorous as demonstrated by Holsti (1991) and Gibler (2016), one large-N qualitative study and another large-N quantitative study.

What are the issues that states fight for? Most studies identify territory and government/regime as key issues, but there is disagreement about including others. For example, the UCDP dataset

has two incompatibilities, territory and government (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013) while the COW has four, territory, policy, government, and other (Palmer et al. 2015); the ICB Project's typology includes military/security, political/diplomatic, economic/developmental, cultural/status, and other issues (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Brecher et al. 2017); and lastly, the Militarized Compellent Threats (MCT) dataset has five issues types: territory, policy, reparations, leadership, and other (Sechser 2011). The central finding from the issue-based approach literature is that territorial conflict is, on average, the issue more likely to lead to conflict, fatal conflict, and to escalate to an interstate war (Senese and Vasquez 2008; Vasquez 2009). Why is territory the most salient? Most scholars point to the intangible and tangible dimensions of territorial conflict. Humans have a natural need to demarcate their space. Demarcation ultimately leads to identity formation. Intangible aspects of territorial disputes are whether the issues is claimed as a state's homeland, there are identity ties, and if the state has historically exercised sovereignty (Hensel et al. 2008). The issue of territory is principally associated with hardliners and strategic rivalry (Ghatak et al. 2017b). Its salience might even be so important that its resolution is the primary cause of what scholars refer to as the democratic peace (Gibler 2007; Owsiak 2012). There are a number of territorial disputes in the post-Cold War such the dispute over the South China Sea and Russia's annexation of Crimea. However, the number of territorial conflicts has actually declined. In their place, an emerging set of issues is taking its place. In the next section, I show how foreign policy disputes have increased as territorial disputes have decreased.

Foreign Policy Issues: What Are They and Why Do They Matter?

Justifying Their Investigation

This section is divided into two parts. First, I justify the study of foreign policy issues. Second, I document what foreign policy issues are and discuss some previous research on individual issues, which will lead to my hypotheses about measures of opportunity that might associate with foreign policy disputes. Foreign policy issues can be decomposed into three subcategories, interstate conflict over power, interdependence and norms. Each category can also be decomposed, which I discuss. But first, I show that the number of foreign policy issues have increased, especially in the post-Cold War era. Then I argue that foreign policy issues are important because they are a salient new issues space and to fully understand interstate conflict, scholars need to also investigate the cases that are more common as opposed to fatal.

If territory is the most salient issue states fight over, why it is important to investigate foreign policy issues? First, while the relationship between territory and conflict is robust (Hensel 2001; Huth and Allee 2002), interstate conflict over other foreign policy issues is by far more common, and increasingly so in the post-Cold War era (Palmer et al. 2015). The decline of interstate war and the internationalization of intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War have coincided with the rise of a new issue space that scholars are beginning to recognize. Foreign policy issues such as providing sanctuary or external support to rebel groups (Salehyan 2008b; Karlén 2017), refugee flows (Salehyan 2008a), ideology and sympathy for ethnic kin (Holsti 1991), cyber security (Valeriano and Maness 2014), weapons of mass destruction (Horowitz and Narang 2014; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013), human rights (Palmer et al. 2015) and issue

accumulation under rivalry (Dreyer 2010) are all likely to lead discord among states. Just because interstate war has declined does not mean that interstate conflict overall has made the same general decline. The number of dyadic disputes has actually increased. These disputes, as will be shown, are mostly lower levels of conflict and most likely to be foreign policy disputes.

In order to document the rise of foreign policy issues, I rely on the four revision types, territory, foreign policy, regime, and other, from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset as compiled by the Correlates of War (Palmer et al. 2015). Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 demonstrate the importance of studying foreign policy MIDs especially as they relate to the decline relative to territorial revisionism. I show the number of revisionist MIDs in each historical period.³ Many MIDs have multiple issues (Dreyer 2010, 2012) and might complicate understanding their distribution across time. To resolve this problem, I dropped the MIDs with multiple issues still resulting in the same general pattern if the MIDs with multiple issues remain. Table 2.1 shows the percentage of different kinds of MIDs across the four historical periods. Figure 2.1 is a visual depiction of Table 1.1. They show that policy MIDs are more common in every historical period except in the first half of the twentieth century (interwar period). In the post-Cold War, policy MIDs are the majority at 55% of the total number of MIDs. In addition, the number of foreign policy MIDs increases in each historical period from 232 in the nineteenth century, to 325 during the interwar period from 1990-1945, to 689 during the Cold War from 1946-1989, and finally to 513 after the Cold War from 1990-2001. Even though the post-Cold War era has a smaller number of policy MIDs than the Cold War era (513 to 689), there are an average of 51.3 policy MIDs in the post-Cold War era and an average of 16.02 in the previous period, a large increase. It is also critical to point out that the number of territorial MIDs, like the foreign policy MIDs,

³ Sometimes scholars decompose the MIDs from 1816 to 1900 and 1901 to 2001. That same general patterns holds.

actually increase in every historical period. The key point here is that foreign policy MIDs are increasing at a much larger rate relative to territorial MIDs. For instance, the change in territorial MIDs from the Cold War era to the post-Cold War era compared to the change in policy MIDs shows this pattern. The average number of territorial MIDs increased from 11.58 to 25.9 while the foreign policy MIDs increased, as just stated, from 16.02 to 51.3. The number of disputes is only one part of the story. The second is their fatality level and whether or not they have been reciprocated.

Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 show the percentage of revisionist MIDs that are fatal for each category. Not surprisingly, territorial MIDs are the most likely to be fatal. Scholars overwhelmingly find that territorial conflict is the most fatal and the most likely to lead to an interstate war (Vasquez 2009). What is also surprising is that just under one-fifth of all foreign policy MIDs are fatal. In the post-Cold War period, more than one-fourth are fatal. On average, policy MIDs are the least fatal of the three categories (as well as the “other” category); however, there are more fatal policy MIDs in terms of the raw sum than the other categories.

The second reason to investigate foreign policy disputes is because it is important to investigate the issues that are not the most conflict-prone to have a fuller picture of the causes of interstate conflict. Territorial conflict might be the most salient, but it is not the entire picture. This process is increasingly common in other IR conflict literatures. For example, terrorism scholars investigate the causes of violence in autocratic regimes despite the vast majority occurring in democracies (Aksoy et al. 2012; Wilson and Piazza 2013). One of the overriding findings in the terrorism literature is that most terrorism is domestic and occurs in democratic states up until the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (Ghatak et al. 2017a). The four terrorism

waves, the anarchist, ethno-nationalist, left wing, and religious waves, largely occurred in democratic states. The importance for studying terrorism in autocracies is that terrorism is a specific type of violence (Phillips 2015) that is used by multiple kinds of rebel groups and is often used alongside other types of violence (one-sided, symmetrical) in the midst of civil wars (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015; Sambanis 2008).

In another example interstate scholars focus on a specific issue, such as maritime (Nemeth et al. 2014) or river disputes (Hensel et al. 2006). Maritime and river disputes are not more likely to be fatal or escalate to an interstate war, but they are a critical part of interstate conflict. It is important to study these non-territorial claims because the way states manage their maritime and river issues might be different than they do with their territorial ones. Territorial disputes are normally associated with power politics, domestic hawks, and strategic rivalry (Vasquez 2009) and it is only under certain conditions that states use more peaceful and legal methods (Huth et al. 2013; Wiegand 2011). In contrast, maritime and river disputes might be more likely to be managed using international institutions. For example, Nemeth et al. (2014) find that two mechanisms exist for peacefully dyadic maritime conflicts, privatization through Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs) and third party international institutions with the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Lastly, civil war scholars examine specific types such as irredentism (Siroky and Hale 2017) or non-ethnic or ideological conflicts (Kalyvas 2001; Sambanis 2001). In each of these examples, scholars have gained valuable insight into the determinants of conflict by investigating the cases that are not the main predictors of the outcome of interest. Researching foreign policy issues will also fill in a gap in the literature.

What Are Foreign Policy Issues?

My investigation of foreign policy issues is based on the COW, MID data. Jones et al. (1996) define policy revisions as: “an effort by the revisionist state to change the foreign policy behavior of another state.” This definition is similar to Sechser’s (2011) definition of policy compellent threats. He states that, “policy changes involve demands to reverse or implement national policies that are unrelated to the possession of disputed territory.” I decompose foreign policy issues into three large subcategories, interstate conflict over power, interdependence, and norms. See Table 2.5 for the results.

My investigation of foreign policy issues is based on the COW, MID data. Jones et al. (1996) define policy revisions as: “an effort by the revisionist state to change the foreign policy behavior of another state.” This definition is similar to Sechser’s (2011) definition of policy compellent threats. He states that, “policy changes involve demands to reverse or implement national policies that are unrelated to the possession of disputed territory.” I decompose foreign policy issues into three large subcategories, interstate conflict over power, interdependence, and norms.

Power

Power is a central concept in international relations. Scholars generally associate power-related theories with military and economic utility; however, in this case, I limit the definition to high politics issues. Power composes a wide range of issues. Interstate conflict can occur over arms races (Colaresi and Thompson 2005; Gibler et al. 2005; Sample 2012; Senese and Vasquez 2008), weapons of mass destruction (Beardsley and Asal 2009; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013),

cyber-security (Valeriano and Maness 2014), nonstate actors (Karlén 2017; Salehyan 2008b), and issues associated with rivalry such as accumulation (Dreyer 2010), balance of power (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979) and maintaining a state's sphere of influence (Organski and Kugler 1980). Most scholars recognize the importance of these issues, but they are normally treated individually. However, one qualification is that while scholars find that they do have an independent effect on the likelihood of interstate conflict in empirical models, theoretically, they occur within, multi-causal processes. It is possible that these issues can also include a territorial dimension, but many occur by themselves. In the post-Cold War era from 1993-2001, I find the most issues over power. What are issues over power? I find that interstate conflict over power include revisionism over (see Figure 2.1) nonstate actors, balance of power/deterrence/containment, force projection, mobilization/increasing readiness, maritime and river disputes, issues over regime change, territorial disputes, preventing conflict, general issues with rivalry, general interstate conflict and conflict over kidnaping and spying, joining a side in a conflict or war/signaling commitment/invoking an alliance provision/protesting aid to an ally, issues revolving weapons of mass destruction, and when a state or ally improves relations with a rival (Palmer et al. 2015). For two major issues, cyber conflict and arms races, I do not find any evidence of revisionist behavior in my sample from 1993-2001 despite, for example, cyber conflict definitely occurring during this period (Valeriano and Maness 2014, 2015); however, because of their prevalence in the post-WWII era (arms races) and in the post-Cold War era (cyber conflict), I discuss their importance. In my discussion of specific issues, I argue that issues associated with power are more likely to be associated with measures of opportunity such as contiguity and power preponderance.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

In the post-Cold War, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has become one of the most salient issues states fight over, perhaps because it defines the reach of status quo powers and their revisionist adversaries. The coercive diplomacy between NATO countries, most prominently the United States, Israel, the Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, and Iran ultimately led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Iran Deal. North and South Korea alongside the United States engage in numerous disputes over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Interstate conflict over WMDs is associated either with the realist approach (Waltz 1979) or with bargaining (Schelling 1980). Originally, the introduction of nuclear weapons was thought to alter the bargaining space by dramatically raising the costs of conflict, especially after their use during WWII. The assumption, then, is that nuclear states have an advantage when they decided to use coercive diplomacy to extract concession from nonnuclear states. Beardsley and Asal (2009) find that nuclear weapons raise the costs of escalation of crises but lower their probability that it will occur and that nuclear states are more likely to succeed during crises. Sechser and Fuhrmann (2013) argue that nuclear weapons are not effective tools for compellence. Compellence works when challengers can credibly seize the item and if that would have few costs to the challenger. Interstate conflict over WMDs can also take many forms. The US and its allies intervened in Iraq in 2003 to prevent the use of WMDs, but in 1997 it threatened Iraq to readmit weapons inspectors (Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013). Conflict over WMDs largely occurs among rivals, Pakistan and India, the Soviet Union and the United States, North Korea and the United States alongside South Korea. In addition, one reason why many

revisionist powers choose to build a nuclear arsenal is to offset the balance of power between them and their rival state.

Arms Races

The Cold War was largely defined by the increasing arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union over their respective nuclear arsenals. Examples of other arms races include Nazi Germany and France, the UK, and the USSR; North-South Korea. Most races occur among rival dyads and are associated with other factors in the steps to war paradigm, including an outside alliance, previous conflict and territorial claims (Sample 2012; Senese and Vasquez 2008). How do arms races lead to conflict? The general argument begins with the assumption that anarchy leads to the security dilemma (Jervis 1978; Waltz 1979). In their attempt to mitigate the effects of anarchy, states seek security through building up their military, an action that leads their adversaries to do the same. Eventually, arms races lead to an increase in external threat perception that results in a hostile spiral (Kydd 2000; Sample 2012). This perception is particularly salient among rivals (Colaresi et al. 2008; Gibler et al. 2005; Sample 2012; Senese and Vasquez 2008).

Balance of Power, Rivalry, and Alliance Provisions

The issues involved in this category are not always so discernable as they are in the other categories, but they largely fall into specific kinds: containment, maintaining a sphere of influence, general deterrence, general compellence, balance of power, force projections, increasing readiness, and joining one side in a conflict or war, sometimes because a state invokes

an offensive or defensive provision in their alliance. Examples of force projections include military exercises and other displays of force by great powers either by themselves or in concert with allies, and exercises by revisionist states as a way to signal their strength and resolve (Fearon 1995). The United States, Great Britain, and France are rivals for many of the revisionist states in this category. Because rivalry is a long process, sometimes it is not always possible to identify the specific issue in a force projection, for example. Furthermore, examples of maintaining a state's sphere of influence normally involve Russian and Chinese satellite states (Frederick et al. 2017).⁴ For instance, China will mobilize off the coast of Taiwan in order to signal its willingness to keep Taiwan as part of mainland China.

Regarding defensive aid, states either signal support to their ally by threatening their ally's adversary or joining their ally in an interstate war after it is attacked. The issue is the legal commitment of the state joining their ally. Alliances form to balance against an external threat or bandwagon onto a stronger power (Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). There are multiple kinds of security provisions or aid; offensive, defensive, neutrality, consultative, and nonaggression. Scholars find that after specific provisions occur, in this case when a state's ally is attacked by a third state, states mostly commit to them (Leeds et al. 2000). Balance of power considerations also play an important roll here. For instance, states also sometimes enter into revisionist behavior because they are protesting when an ally or just another states moves too closely to their enemy. Deterrence or containment are normally the overriding reasons behind revisionist behavior to maintain the status quo in these disputes.

⁴ See the MIDv4 narratives.

Cyber-security

With the advent of the Internet, cyber conflict has changed the way many rivals choose to interact with each other. Cyber conflict is used for offensive, defensive, and nuisance actions and is only limited to a small number of dyads (Valeriano and Maness 2015). Despite multiple methods of cyber conflict, Maness and Valeriano (2016) find that only distributed denial of service (DDoS) is associated with a decrease in cooperative dyadic relations. According to the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset Version 1.1, the rival states involved in cyber conflict are Bangladesh, Canada, China, Estonia, Georgia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, United States, and Vietnam (Valeriano and Maness 2015)

Nonstate Actors

Interstate conflict over nonstate actors is the largest subcategory of foreign policy issues. Two examples. In 1998, the United States threatened Afghanistan to extradite al-Qaeda leaders and in 2001, the United States and Great Britain did so again. In the 1980s, South Africa demanded Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia stop supporting the ANC rebels (Sechser and Fuhrman 2013, 189). What do we know about the causes of interstate conflict over nonstate actors? Scholars focus on two areas of inquiry. The first, and most researched, investigates the causes of external support to nonstate actors. There are two sides, why states choose to give support (the supply side) and why groups decided to accept it (the demand side). States are more likely to give external support to nonstate actors when they are

engaged in a rivalry, because it is a low cost method to manage their bargaining relationship; it involves lower material and reputational costs than an interstate war; the actors might be more legitimate and effective than other domestic groups; and when supporting states are weaker than their adversary; there is fractionalized along ethnic lines; and when the supporting states is less democratic (Findley et al. 2012; Maoz and San-Akca 2012; Salehyan et al. 2011; San Akca 2009; Goldman 2016). This line of reasoning extends to states that are also interdependent. I argue in the second chapter of this dissertation that economic interdependence is also associated with conflict over nonstate actors because it is a low-cost way to manage their bargaining relationship when their economies are so interconnected that symmetrical force will have a higher cost than both states are willing to accept.

The second line of inquiry investigates how different kinds of external support leads to intrastate and interstate conflict. Karlén (2017) argues that external support to nonstate actors during civil war leads to conflict recurrence. External support allows groups to remobilize through safe havens, training, and weapons. Previous support might lead to future support, giving nonstate actors resolve. Different kinds of external support might matter. Highly fungible kinds of support in the form of money and guns are more likely to create uncertainty, which leads to bargaining failure and a decreased likelihood of conflict termination (Sawyer et al. 2015). Lastly, Salehyan (2008b) examines how external support in the form of rebel sanctuaries across the border leads to interstate conflict. He finds that the presence of transnational rebels in neighboring states increases the probability of interstate conflict. There are also substitution effects when the dyad is engaged in a rivalry. Instead of challenging each other directly, conflict occurs through nonstate actors. Salehyan's (2008b) study assumes that the issue in the

militarized dispute that results from one state harboring a rebel group is about the nonstate actors. Still, it is the first study to hypothesize and test a theory where the dependent variable is interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Interdependence

Interdependence also includes a wide range of issues. Each results from the connectedness of the international system. The issues that I found in my decomposition include revisionist behavior over fishing rights, oil rights, trade disputes/embargoes/preferential trade agreements (PTAs)/protectionism, refugees, treatment of a state's co-ethnic population, civil war spillover, civil unrest, and irredentism (Palmer et al. 2015). It needs to be stated that putting individual issues into one category can be challenging. There are some issues, such as civil war spillover, that might not fit neatly into one category and depending upon the context, might be better for a different category. In general, revisionist interstate conflict over issues of interdependence means reacting to the connectedness of states, whether that be through a state's economy, the flow of people, or the spillover of internal dynamics in one states that is affecting another.

Fishing and Oil Rights

Many of the issues in the interdependence category are about the issues of resource, usually fishing rights that occur within maritime disputes. These issues are perhaps a direct consequences of incompatibilities in an economic interdependent international system. For instance, Mitchell and Prins (1999) find that most non-territorial issues between democracies

concern issues surrounding fishing rights. Migratory fishing stocks are considered the most salient aspect of maritime disputes (Hensel et al. 2008; Hensel and Mitchell 2017; Nemeth et al. 2014). Oil rights also occur as part of maritime and territorial disputes.

Financial, Monetary, and Trade Disputes

Regarding financial disputes, one of the common flash points in relations between states in the Global North and Global South is the degree of foreign investment. Financial and trade disputes occur between rival states. For example, Honduras and Columbia have seen low-level conflict over trade disputes, namely the imposing of border taxes and withdrawal preferential trade agreement status, among other issues. In another example, in 1994, the United States took Iraqi boats by force because of suspicion that they were in violation of a United National-imposed trade embargo (Palmer et al. 2015). In 1956, the Sinai War occurred because of territory and commerce/navigation rights. For one disputant, The United Kingdom went to war to enforce treaty terms, for strategic territory, and to prevent regional hegemony (Holsti 1991). Examples of demands for reparations, another kind of interstate conflict over issues of interdependence, include demands by France and Great Britain to Germany after WWI and Japan to China in 1936 (Sechser 2011).

In addition, scholars investigate financial conflicts from the framework of dependency theory. The general argument is that the Global North, through imperialism and colonialism, severely damaged the economic and political institutions of the Global South. Then, after states became independent, neocolonialism occurred in the form of indirect control of many states' economy through multinational corporations. While the Washington Consensus advocates

capitalist policies, specifically austerity, free trade and privatization, states need the opposite since they entered the international system in debt and in need of bail outs and loans (Frieden et al. 2002; Frieden et al. 2015).

Refugees

Refugees are normally thought of as a consequence of conflict, but research also suggests that they can be a cause of it as well. Refugee flows in places such as Afghanistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Iraq, and Mozambique can create conflict among neighboring states (Salehyan 2008a). With the increase of weak states and intrastate conflicts, interstate contention sometimes occurs because one state seeks to challenge a nonstate actor and its state host. In 1969, El Salvador and Honduras fought the Football War over a border dispute. Honduras goes to war to prevent population movement, refugees, and to enforce domestic legislation (Holsti 1991)

Norms

Interstate conflict over norms can be a difficult category to pin down. My decomposition found the following categories for the 1993-2001 period: enforcing international law, enforcing or breaking a United Nations resolution, human rights, peacekeeping violence, and protecting civilians (Palmer et al. 2015)

Ideological Liberation

I did not find evidence that the revisionist behavior from 1993 to 2001 included ideological liberation. Holsti (1991) argues that the Cold War and the Vietnam-France, Korean,

and Mozambican War for Independence were based on ideology, what I am putting into the larger category of norms. For instance, he argues that the Vietnamese in Vietnam-France (1946-1954) fought for ideological liberation, national liberation, as well as state creation. In the Korean War (1950-1952), North Korea fought for ideological liberation and national unification and Mozambique for national liberation, state creation and ideological liberation in their war for independence (Holsti 1991).

Human Rights and Enforcing International Law

The Iraq War was fought, in part, for human rights and to enforce United Nations resolutions. The NATO bombing campaign of Yugoslavia in 1998 and 1999 following Yugoslavia's actions in Kosovo was also fought for human rights, to enforce international law, and to prevent violence. Were these the main reasons for NATO's interventions? In many cases in the post-Cold War era, human rights and enforcing international law seem to be a secondary issue in dyadic disputes, but an issue nevertheless.⁵

⁵ In the original draft of this dissertation, I hypothesized that foreign policy issues associate with measure of power, interdependence, and norms. I argued that their use will associate with measures of opportunity, namely rivalry and an interconnected economy (joint contract-intensive economies). In the post-WWII era, but even more so after the Cold War, interstate war has declined. States are increasingly looking for ways to manage their contentious issues in a way that carries the least risk and lowest costs. As previously shown, strategic rivals enter into conflict with each other for issues well-beyond territory and control over a regime; these issues can be extrapolated into the categories of power, interdependence, and norms (Colaresi et al. 2008). In addition, I argued that one feature of the globalized economy, its interconnectedness, is another reason why dyads might experience low-level conflict. Some scholars argue that this is the reason why economic peace variables are better predictors of pacific activity than joint democracy (Mousseau 2016). Regardless, the cost of conquest has shifted (Gartzke 2007). It is no longer viable for states to engage in territorial revisionism if they want to increase their wealth. Russia's annexation of Crimea, for example, resulted in sanctions that hurt its oil export sector. At the same time, contentious issues still exist. If states have an interconnected economy and an incompatibility, they want to engage with the issue, but not to the extent that it hurts their economy (as is more likely in a territorial dispute). Therefore, I contend that in the absences of contentious issues, states will enter into conflict over their "secondary" foreign policy issues because there is a low cost to engaging in them when their economies are interconnected. I ultimately decided to take this argument out because it can be seen as tautological; however, I cite my results in a footnote for future research.

I argue that power preponderance and contiguity are two measures of opportunity that will likely associate with foreign policy disputes. For the former, despite research that points to the movement towards parity leading to conflict, because foreign policy disputes are less fatal issues, their engagement is one way for revisionist states to successfully manage their bargaining relationship with a rival state. Contiguity will associate with a foreign policy dispute because neighboring states are more likely to engage in conflict over less fatal issues (in comparison with non-contiguous states) as they are to engage in conflict over their more fatal, salient issues.

Hypothesis 1: Contiguity is positively associated with the presence of a foreign policy dispute

Hypothesis 2: Joint democracy is negatively associated with the presence of a foreign policy dispute

Hypothesis 3: Preponderance is positively associated with the presence of a foreign policy dispute

Hypothesis 4: Foreign policy disputes are less likely to escalate to fatal conflict than territorial issues.

Research Design, Unit of Analysis, and Estimator

The research design section proceeds as follows: 1) first, I describe the unit of analysis and estimator choice; 2) second, I discuss the dependent and independent variables; 3) lastly, I end with a description of the control variables. I use sample of non-directed dyads for the post-WWII period, 1946-2001 computed using EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000). It is panel data at the state level. The reason for using the Cold War and post Cold War periods is that the steps to

conflict might be a function of the historical period (Senese and Vasquez 2008; Gibler 2016). I test for the entire post-WWII period from 1946-2001 and in robustness checks from 1946-1989 and 2000-2001 for the Cold War and post-Cold War. Since policy MIDs vary widely in their issue sub-issues and each historical period has its own salient issues, at this point without knowing more about policy issues from 1816-1945, it might be a mistake to test for the entire 1816-2001 timeframe.

I use two estimator choices, rare events logistic regression and Heckman selection models. Rare events logistic regressions test theories with a rare binary dependent variable. I use rare events logistic regression to test the probability that structural factors associate with a policy MID and issues of power, interdependence, and norms. Heckman selection models are used to test theories when an a researcher must self-select into a non-random sample. I use a selection model for two reasons, to model the escalation to war and to select into dyads that provide external support. First, selection models are important for modeling the causing interstate wars because they are rare, nonrandom events that, a priori, differ in both observable and unobservable ways from episodes of peace. It might be easier to think of selection effects regarding interstate wars by considering the unit of analysis is the dyad year; dyad years that have interstate wars different in important ways from dyad years that do not have interstate wars. Also, low-level interstate conflict occurs before interstate wars. The main threshold for an interstate war is 1,000 battlefield deaths. Before the threshold of 1,000 deaths can occur, one death has happen. In some empirical models, scholars find that selection effects do not exist and therefore conclude that modeling escalation without selection models will not result in biased estimates (Owsiak 2012). However, most scholars argue that selection effects are critical to

modeling escalation (Reed 2000; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Smith 1996). If structural factors positively associate with a policy MID, I am also interested in whether they are associated with the likelihood of escalation. Scholars widely find that policy MIDs are not as fatal and not as likely to escalate in relation to territorial MIDs (citation), which has led to scholars associating policy MIDs with low levels of conflict. But considering that policy MIDs are a large category with a diverse set of sub-issues, it is possible that some sub-issues might be more likely to escalate to an interstate war.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is a binary indicator for the presence of a policy militarized interstate dispute (MID); 1 equals the presence of a policy MID; 0 otherwise. A policy MID is one of four types of revisionist MIDs in the MIDv4 dataset. As far as I know, this is the first time policy MIDs are operationalized as the dependent variable. The other revision types territory, regime/government, and other. Most studies test territorial or regime MIDs (Senese and Vasquez 2008). The term “militarized interstate dispute” refers to historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state (Jones et al., 1996: 168). The MID dataset, as part of the Correlates of War project, is the foundation for a rigorous, scientific, and probabilistic study of interstate conflict. It is important to note that MIDs are disputes, meaning that they can, and most do, contain multiple incidents of interstate conflict within them. In addition, MIDs are also coded by their highest action and highest hostility level. The hostility level is a hierarchy of interstate conflict, from none, to

threat, display, and the use of force, to interstate war. Highest actions are sub-levels of conflict within each of the hostility categories. For the purpose of this project, I will only be dealing with the hostility levels, not the highest actions. MIDs can either be revisionist or not. Revisionism refers to a situation when one state chooses to revise the status quo of another. “Policy denotes an effort by the revisionist state to change the foreign policy behavior of another state” Jones et al. (1996: 178).

The other dependent variable I will be using comes from my decomposition of the foreign policy MID for an abbreviated time in the post-Cold War era from 1993-2001 (see Figure 2.1). As previously stated, I decomposed the Policy MIDs into many sub-issues, but combined them into three specific categories, revisionist interstate conflict over power, interdependence, and norms. Figure 2.1 shows the specific sub-issues that are included in each category. Decomposing the MIDs and putting them into unique categories is difficult because some can perhaps be put into more than one. For instance, it can be argued that civil war spillover and refugees can fit into interstate conflict over interdependence and norms.⁶

⁶ In a previous version of this chapter, I hypothesized that measure of power, interdependence, and norms, associate with foreign policy issues. I ultimately took these hypotheses out because they can be seen as tautological; however, I cite them here for the purpose of future research. In order to test the effect of structural factors on the likelihood of entering into a foreign policy dispute, I use variables that come from three categories: power, interdependence, and norms. In the first category, power, I use *strategic rivalry* (Colaresi et al. 2008; Thompson 2001). Strategic rivalry measures contention between two states. In order to be considered strategic rivals, official government representatives have to identify a contentious relationship with another state. Another form of rivalry, compiled by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (Klein et al. 2006), measures rivalry by previous militarization. I do not use this measure because in a statistical model, its inclusion would also preclude the use of the dependent variable, another measure of conflict. If two variables measuring the same theoretical concepts are used on the right-hand side and the left-hand side in the same model, it could result in biased estimates. The strategic rivalry variable only measures verbal contention because states. Scholars find that the presence of strategic rivalry is consistent predictor of interstate conflict. Strategic rivalry are more likely to enter into armed conflict, fatal conflict, and given the presence of armed conflict, they are more likely to escalate to an interstate war (Colaresi et al. 2008). This finding is one main reason why strategic rivalry is considered part of other dynamic causal processes that lead to interstate conflict. For example, strategic rivalry is part of the “steps-to-war” thesis, where the issue of territorial revisionism is center-stage and other processes involving territory, such as border settlement (Rider and Owsiak 2015) and the path to negative peace (Owsiak et al. 2017)

Independent Variables

I use standard independent variables that are seen in the interstate conflict literature. First, contiguity comes from the Direct Contiguity Data v3.2 by way of the COW dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002). States that are contiguous to each other have more opportunities to engage in violent conflict (Reed and Chiba 2010; Vasquez 1995). Second, joint democracy comes from the Polity IV dataset. The polity2 variable ranges from -10 to +10. Dyads have to have both states with a minimum score of +6 to be counted as a jointly democratic state (Marshall et al. 2016). Scholars widely find that democratic states are less likely to engage in conflict than nondemocratic dyads

To measure interdependence between states, I generate a variable, *joint contract-intensive economy*. Countries that have contract-intensive economies rely on the enforcement of contracts by credible third parties as opposed to enforcement through familial, tribal, or other affiliations. The main variable used to measure a contract-intensive economy is life insurance contracts because they are made using third party enforcement. Contract-intensive economies are considered positive sum because they lead to mutual benefits between parties. Research on the economic peace finds that dyads with a contract-intensive economy are a more robust predictor of a lower likelihood of conflict than jointly democracy (Mousseau 2000, 2013, 2016). In robustness checks, I use *bilateral trade*, from exports data compiled by the Correlates of War (Barbieri et al. 2009). Bilateral trade is the logged sum of the exports from country A to B plus the exports from country B to A. In order to make sure the variable is on a scale beginning with zero, I add one to the variable to take away the negative numbers inherent with missing and other values in data collection. Bilateral trade is also generally seen as a predictor of pacific international relations behavior. The liberal peace, for example, argues that measure of interdependence, such as economic development and free markets, are better explanations for peaceful interactions between states as opposed to jointly democratic institutions. Gartzke (2007) argues that bilateral trade that a better indicator of dependence between states. Nevertheless, many scholars see bilateral trade as an indicator of interdependence promoting peaceful behavior. Liberals argue that cooperation can occur under anarchy when states extend the shadow of future, by moving from a one-shot game to an iterated one by keeping the same stakes. In other words, if interactions between states occur over a long period of time and the same risks and rewards are maintained, states will be less likely to fear each other's intentions. Bilateral trade is a measure of economic exchange that constitutes absolute gains, not only promoted by domestic actions, but also directed and sometimes controlled by centralized planners. Absolute gains produced by exchanging goods and services can promote peaceful interaction, but it can also lead to dependence. The third category of independent variable is norms. The variable, *s3un*, measures a dyad's shared dyadic preference where -1 indicates there is the least and 1 indicates the most shared preference. Constructivists point to the changing norms in the international system, such as the territorial integrity norm (Zacher 2001) the use and sometimes reliance on international institutions, and the increasing systemic democratization increasing slightly during the Cold War, but dramatically after the Cold War ended when the former Soviet-satellite regimes became independent. The variable measuring shared norms comes from the Bailey et al. (2017) who generated it from roll call voting data in the United Nations General Assembly. There are a number of ways to vote in the General Assembly. States can vote in favor or against a motion, but they can also abstain and be absent. It is possible that being absent is conveying one preference without wanting to overtly reveal it in a public setting. I use the variable that generates the variable among the three category voting data. My expectation is that a shared increase in norms will still lead to a decrease in the probability that a dyad experiences a foreign policy dispute.

(Russett and Oneal 2001). Third, capability ratio for state A comes from the CINC dataset, also from COW (Singer et al. 1972). As previously discussed, power is a central concept in international relations. In general, scholars find that the movement towards parity leads to conflict and preponderance leads to peace; however, that finding has been recently challenged (Gibler 2017). Fourth, the presence of an alliance comes from the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset v4 also by way of the COW dataset (Gibler 2008). Lastly, in order to control for time dependence, peace year polynomials are generated (Carter and Signorino 2010b, 2010a). There are different kinds of alliance provisions, but in general, the presence of one between two states is supposed to reduce the probability that they will engage in conflict (Leeds et al. 2002).

Results

I present results of rare events logistic regression and Heckman selection models investigating the causes of foreign policy disputes for the post-WWII era (1946-2001) and an abbreviated period in the post-Cold War era from 1993-2001. Table 3 compares the correlates of different revision types for the post-WWII era. Table 4 examines the post-Cold War era, where interstate conflict over power, interdependence, and norms are the dependent variables. Table 2.6 (not shown) tests whether foreign policy issues escalate to fatal conflict. My main is to identify their general correlates and see whether the path to a foreign policy dispute is the same for territorial issues.

Table 3, from 1946-2001, shows the correlates for all MIDs, policy MIDs, territory MIDs, and regime MIDs. Contiguity is a significant positive and significant predictor across all

revisions. Joint democracy is consistent negative predictor across all revision types, but is not significant for territorial MIDs, giving evidence to the territorial peace hypothesis. Capability share is only positive for all MIDs and policy MIDs while alliance is not a significant predictor. Scholars usually find that the move toward parity, or when two countries are equal in power, is more likely to associate with dyadic conflict; however, in this case, the move toward a preponderance of dyadic power is more likely to lead to a foreign policy dispute. These results show that the path to conflict in the post-WWII era is different for foreign policy issues than it is for all territorial ones.

Now I turn to the post-Cold War era to see if the same factors that affect the presence of a foreign policy dispute affect specific kinds of foreign policy disputes. As previously noted, there are many kinds of issues under the large banner of foreign policy, but they can be extrapolated into three large categories, interstate conflict over power, interdependence, and norms. Table 4 investigates the causes of foreign policy dispute from 1993-2001 without the variables representing power, interdependence, and norms. I find that contiguity is positively associated conflict over power and interdependence, but is negative and not significant when it comes to conflict over norms, perhaps due to the seemingly intangible and globalized nature of international norms. Joint democracy is again negative and significant, but not so for conflict over interdependence. Given the prominence of the liberal peace, especially in models that show democracy to be not significant when an economic variable is added, this is an interesting finding.⁷ Preponderance is positive and significant for conflict over power and norms, but not conflict over interdependence. Finally, Table 2.6 investigates whether the specific foreign policy issues have a different independent effect when it comes to conflict escalation. Besides using

foreign policy and instead of territorial disputes, the inclusion of the rivalry, contract-intensive economy, and norms variable and a shorter time frame, Table 2.6 (not shown) is a replication of Gibler (2016).⁸ I find that foreign policy disputes are again, not associated with conflict escalation. In short, I find that foreign policy disputes, specifically conflict over power and interdependence, are associated conflict, but are not associated with their escalation to fatal conflict.⁹

Conclusion and Implications

In this chapter, I have argued that foreign policy issues are an important, yet understudied phenomena in the issue-based approach to interstate conflict. Foreign policy disputes are increasing, especially in the post-Cold War era and while they are less likely to be fatal, they are more common than territorial disputes (Palmer et al. 2015). Furthermore, in order to have a fuller picture of interstate conflict, it is important to examine phenomena that do not have the strongest affect on an outcome of interest, similar to ways terrorism scholars study violence in authoritarian regimes (Aksoy et al. 2012; Wilson and Piazza 2013) and interstate schools investigate maritime and river disputes (Hensel et al. 2008; Nemeth et al. 2014).

I decomposed foreign policy issues into three large categories, interstate conflict over power, interdependence, and norms. Power includes issues such as maintaining one's sphere of influence, compellence, deterrence, weapons of mass destruction, and nonstate actors. Examples of interstate conflict over issues of interdependence include financial, monetary, and trade

⁸ I also use a non-directed dyadic sample. Gibler (2016) uses directed dyads.

⁹ I also tested measures of power, interdependence, and norms as the independent variables when foreign policy MID is the dependent variable. The presence of strategic rivalry and the presence of a joint contract-intensive economy are positively associated with a foreign policy dispute while shared norms is negatively associated with a foreign policy dispute. Bilateral trade is also positive in robustness checks.

disputes, refugees, and conflict over fishing and oil rights. Lastly, interstate conflict over norms includes enforcing or breaking international law, human rights, and protecting civilians.

In brief, I found the path to conflict is different for foreign policy issues than they are for territorial ones. While contiguity is a consistent, significant positive predictor of conflict for both revision types, a power imbalance only leads to conflict for foreign policy issues during the post-WWII era. In the post-Cold War era, specific issues matter. A power imbalance, joint democracy, and contiguity only leads to certain kinds of conflict in the post-Cold War era. Lastly, I found that foreign policy disputes are less likely to escalate to fatal conflict in contrast with territorial disputes, echoing findings from Senese and Vasquez (2008).

This implication of this research is opening up a new issue space. With the decline of interstate war, we are seeing a rise in new issues that make up interstate conflict, albeit at a less fatal level. In the absence of fundamental issues and distributions of power whose resolution seeks to decide the state(s) that will govern the international system, as what occurred in the aftermath of WWI and WWII, and as some borders (mainly in the Global North) become settled, states will be more likely to engage in non-territorial and non-regime issues, but at lower fatality levels.

CHAPTER THREE

POWER, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT OVER NONSTATE ACTORS

Introduction

On December 13, 2001, militants from the terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India. The attack resulted in the deaths of the five attackers, eight security personnel, and a gardener (START 2012).¹⁰ In response to the attack, India accused Pakistan of harboring the terrorist groups, initiated a mobilization of its military, and moved it closer to the border. In response to the Indian mobilization, Pakistan also mobilized its military, resulting in heavy fighting on the border between the rival states (Palmer et al. 2015).¹¹ In this militarized interstate dispute (MID, hereafter), the main issue at stake is Pakistan's support for a nonstate actor. The dispute reached the threshold of the use of force and was reciprocated, but it did not escalate to fatal conflict or an interstate war. This example illustrates a growing trend in interstate conflict. Increasingly, revisionist interstate conflict results from a set of issues scholars call foreign policy issues.

Foreign policy issues are distinct from territory and regime disputes, yet scholars do not have a good idea of what they actually are. What are foreign policy issues? Jones et al. (1996) define policy revisions as: "an effort by the revisionist state to change the foreign policy

¹⁰ START (2012) codes this incident as groups being the perpetrator, but in parentheses writes that they are the suspected perpetrators.

¹¹ MIDv4 also codes it as a territorial and an "other" revision dispute, and I further code it as a dispute involving general issues in rivalry; however, the main issue at stake was Pakistan's external support for the terrorist groups.

behavior of another state.” Still, “foreign policy” sounds vague enough to mean almost anything. I argue that foreign policy disputes can be decomposed into three larger categories, revisionist interstate conflict over issues of power, interdependence, and norms. The largest category is a set of issues related to power. Examples include weapons of mass destruction, balance of power considerations and maintaining a state’s sphere of influence, deterrence and compellence, general issues in rivalry, invoking a state’s alliance provisions, and nonstate actors.¹² The largest sub-issue under the category of power, but more importantly, in the overall foreign policy revision type, is interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Three larger points illustrate why the militarized dispute between Pakistan and India is important. First, India and Pakistan are strategic rivals. Rivals are normally associated with issue accumulation. The more contentious issues states have, the more likely they are going to engage in interstate conflict (Dreyer 2010, 2012). For instance, the territorial dispute in Kashmir, nuclear weapons, policy in Afghanistan, and support for nonstate actors are just some of the issues that lead the Pakistani and Indian governments to view the other with suspicion. On top of these contentious issues, previous conflict, including wars, between the two countries has resulted in a heightened security environment on both sides of the border. Rivalry is one of the strongest predictors of armed conflict (Vasquez 2009). Previous research finds that rivalry is a predictor of external support to nonstate actors that target their rivals and that it is a low-cost way to manage one state’s bargaining relationship with its rival (Maoz and San-Akca 2012; Findley et al. 2012). Whether a rivalry is principally concerned about global and strategic or territorial issues (Colaresi et al. 2008), in this article I argue that in the absence of an interstate war during the

¹² Examples of interdependence issues include fishing and oil rights, financial, monetary, and financial disputes, and refugees; examples of interstates conflict because of norms includes enforcing or breaking international law or a United Nations resolution and protecting civilians.

post-Cold War era, rivals will be more likely to give external support to a nonstate actor and engage in interstate conflict over nonstate actors as a low-cost way of managing their bargaining relationship with a rival state, specifically because it is less costly and involves fewer resources.

Second, Pakistan and India face an imbalance of power. The CINC scores from the National Materials Capabilities database show that India has had an average of an 0.84 percent in the share of material capabilities between itself and Pakistan since the end of the Cold War (Singer et al. 1972).¹³ The India-Pakistan dyad is considered an asymmetric rival dyad because of its history of conflict and because the dyad's CINC scores exceeds a three to one ratio (Klein et al. 2006). Most research points to power parity leading to interstate conflict (Organski and Kugler 1980; Vasquez 2009), even among rivals (Vasquez 1996); however, Klein et al. (2006) find that the overwhelming amount of rivalries in their dataset are asymmetrical. While power parity might be a mechanism that leads to fatal conflict and the escalation to war, I argue that power preponderance will lead to interstate conflict over less fatal issues, particularly when external support is present, namely interstate conflict over nonstate actors because it involves lower material costs.

Third, while they are rivals, India and Pakistan have interconnected economies. There was very little bilateral trade between 1966 and 1974, the year after the Second Kashmir War (1965); in some years it was zero. But in 1975, bilateral trade resumed and has continued to the present day despite the Kargil War (1999) and other fatal disputes.¹⁴ The important point is that the dyad is not only a rival, but also interconnected economically. States have largely learned that territorial conquest does not pay and have thus resorted to other strategies to obtain

¹³ The same pattern exists after WWII and between 1993-2001 (Singer et al. 1972).

¹⁴ The dyad also experienced an interstate war from 1993-1999 (Singer et al. 1972).

economic wealth (Gartzke 2007; Simmons 2005). This dynamic is particularly present in the post-Cold War era where most revisionist conflict is over foreign policy disputes as opposed to territorial or regime issues, which are less likely to be fatal. But, grievances among states remain; I argue that economically interdependent states will be more likely to engage in interstate conflict over nonstate actors because it involves lower reputational costs and a lower likelihood of escalation.

This article proceeds as follows. 1) First, I discuss the importance of studying foreign policy disputes, particularly interstate conflict over nonstate actors and its relationship with external support. 2) Second, I argue that rivalry, relative power, and economic interdependence might affect the probability of interstate conflict over nonstate actors through two mechanisms, lower material and reputational costs to the revisionist power. 3) Lastly, I present a research design, results, and conclude with implications for future research and public policy. In brief, I find that strategic rivalry and power preponderance are robust predictors of interstate conflict over nonstate actors in the post-Cold War era. When I use a selection model to select into external support as the first stage and use interstate conflict over nonstate actors as the second stage, rivalry and power preponderance are still positive and significant. I also find that active, defacto, and all kinds of external support (active plus defacto) are positively related to interstate conflict over nonstate actors, but economic interdependence is not in the expected direction.

Foreign Policy Disputes

Perhaps the most robust finding in the conflict processes literature is that interstate conflict over the issue of territory is the most likely to lead to conflict, the most fatal, the most

likely to escalate to an interstate war, and the hardest to resolve (Hensel 2001; Hensel et al. 2008; Huth 1996; Huth and Allee 2002; Vasquez 2009). Therefore, it has been completely logical that most issue-based research on interstate conflict has focused on territory and its relationship with other conflict dynamics, such as rivalry (Vasquez 1996; Rider and Owsiak 2015), dyadic peace (Ghatak et al. 2017; Gibler 2007; Park and James 2015), contiguity (Senese 2005; Vasquez 1995), power (Bell 2016), and conflict resolution (Allee and Huth 2006; Huth et al. 2013), just to name some. However, the curious thing is that while the issue of territory is the most salient, it is actually not the most common. The Correlates of War's (COW, hereafter) MIDv4 dataset has four revision types, territory, foreign policy, regime, and other. In just one example, take this statement from the most recent version of the dataset from 2002-2010. The authors write:

“When a state is identified as revisionist, the most common revision type is policy, as roughly 81% of all revisionist actors sought to change the policy of the other state in the dispute. Furthermore, about 83% of revisionist initiator states were policy revisionists, as opposed to about 15% who were territory revisionists and under 3% who were regime revisionists” Palmer et al. (2015, 232).

Policy MIDs are the largest category in every historical period except from 1900-1945, the interwar period (see Table 1 in chapter one of this dissertation) and fatal policy MIDs are the largest category in the post-Cold War era from 1990-2001.¹⁵ Foreign policy disputes are an important, yet understudied phenomenon. I believe two reasons why this occurs is because most scholars simply do not know what foreign policy issues are and once one does decompose them, it is clear that they involve a wide range of different issues from interstate conflict over power, interdependence, and norms. Examples of issues related to power include nonstate actors,

¹⁵ They are also the largest fatal category during the 1816-1899 period, but that is outside the scope of this article.

weapons of mass destruction, invoking alliance provisions, and rivalry and balance of power considerations. Examples of interdependence issues include interstate conflict over fishing and oil rights, and financial, monetary, and trade disputes. Lastly, issues related to norms include enforcing or breaking international law and protecting civilians. The largest category of foreign policy issues is interstate conflict over nonstate actors. From my decomposition of foreign policy disputes from 1993-2001 from the narratives provided by Palmer et al. (2015), I found that 191 out of 267 or 41.70% of dyad years with a policy MID are associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Interstate Conflict Over Nonstate Actors

Interstate conflict over nonstate actors is the largest category of foreign policy issue-based interstate conflict in the post-Cold War era from 1993-2001 according to my decomposition. I define this category as “an effort by the revisionist state to change the foreign policy behavior of another state regarding its support for a nonstate actor.” This definition is the same as the one for foreign policy disputes, except that it includes mention of nonstate actors and external support (Jones et al. 1996). What does interstate conflict over nonstate actors look like? The literature on this issue is scarce. My aim is that this definition is closest to the dynamic Salehyan (2008) investigates; that is, international conflict that results from one state giving external support to a transnational rebel group. In Salehyan’s (2008) study, he uses all MID to proxy interstate conflict that results from one state giving safe harbor to a rebel group. In other words, this kind of conflict is retaliation for one state’s support to a nonstate actor (Maoz and San-Akca 2012). My definition encompasses all kinds of external support, active, defacto and

unintentional (Byman 2005a, 2005b; Carter and Pant 2017; San-Akca 2016). In this chapter, my goal is to code the MIDs that result from external support.

Still, it is important to contend with one important possibly fatal issue with this definition up front; that interstate conflict over nonstate actors does not meet the threshold for a militarized interstate dispute or should be separated into a different category because it is a “protest-dependent” because they originate from an attack on civilians that a government responds to (Gibler and Little 2017). In Gibler’s (2016) decomposition of territorial issues (territory MIDs), he has a category called “other territory-related issues” that includes fishing rights and the hot pursuit of rebels. He defines the latter as, “cases in which one state’s military crossed the border to pursue rebels; the responding state must be involved in some militarized incident for the issue not to be a protest-only case” (210, 2017). He argues that the hot pursuit of rebels/insurgents is a coordination as opposed to a distributional issue.¹⁶ Distributional territorial issues occur when there is disagreement about the ownership or the status quo. Coordination issues occur when borders are settled, but there is confusion about demarcation and implementation of existing agreements. From 1816-2001, Gibler (2017) finds that 5 disputes (out of 570) and 4 (out of 224) fatal disputes fall into the category of the hot pursuit of rebels, and that the hot pursuit of rebels is positive, but not significant in a selection model to fatal MIDs (201-205, 2017).¹⁷ Furthermore, Gibler and Little (2017) argue that the hot pursuit chases of rebels falls into a category that they call “protest-dependent” MIDs where the dispute originated with an attack on a private citizen

¹⁶ But he also says that the hot pursuit of rebels can occur when borders are settled (204, 2017).

¹⁷ Gibler’s (2017) presentation of the decomposition is at the MID-level. Mine percentages of foreign policy MIDs that occur over nonstate actors is at the nondirected dyad-level.

that one government responded to.¹⁸ Using fatal MID as a corrective, they find that excluding protest-dependent MID has a substantial impact on the effect standard correlates have the probability of conflict. They argue that these protest-dependent cases should be deleted so as to not bias models of interstate conflict. Empirically, in my analysis I make sure I am not coding protest-dependent cases.¹⁹

From looking at the cases Gibler and Little (2017) mark as protest-dependent cases involving the hot pursuit of rebels, it looks like they exclude most disputes that involve external support to one group that ultimately results in some level of interstate conflict. Even so, the hot pursuit of rebels might be the result of a deeper incompatibility over a state's sponsorship of a rebel group. Hot pursuit might mean a precision strike against a group's state sponsor. But even while states sometimes engage nonstate actors in another state's territory briefly across the border, that is nowhere near the extent of the type of conflict in this category. My general finding is that most conflict over nonstate actors results from a military operation against the nonstate actor and/or its state sponsor, and is not a brief dispute where troops fire over the border or chase

¹⁸ Examples of protest-dependent MID include "attacks on civilian shipping interests, attacks on/seizures of fishing vessels and other civilian crafts that violate territorial waters, hot-pursuit chases of rebels across a border, attacks on non-maritime civilian targets, and seizures of non-maritime persons and property" (Gibler and Little 2017, 190). They rightly point out that one exception is made in the MID data (but not the first iteration) where conflict action against private citizens of another state are generally not coded as militarized incidents. Exceptions include seizures (of personnel or material) within the confines of disputed territory, attacks on international shipping, and the pursuit (by air, land or sea) of rebel forces across international boundaries. Further, such incidents are included only when the targeted state responded militarily or protested diplomatically" (Gibler and Little 2017, 190; Jones et al. 1996, 170).

¹⁹ In their appendix, Gibler and Little (2017) give the dyad years where protest-dependent MID should be dropped. I deduce the MID number, check to see if it is a policy MID, and then check to make sure I am not coding protest-dependent cases. I find that MID (4206 and 4208) that are labeled as protest-dependent and in robustness checks I drop them from my analysis. Venezuela (101) and Colombia (100) in 1997 looks like MID 4172; it is coded as an "other" revision. Swaziland (572) and Mozambique (541) in 1994 looks like MID 4169; it is coded as an "other" revision. Turkey (640) and Iraq (645) in 1999 looks like either MID 4206, which is an ongoing MID, or MID 4208. Both are policy MID where Turkey invades Iraq to fight/attack the Kurds (Palmer et al. 2015). Since Iraq is not giving external support to the Kurds, I delete both cases. Uzbekistan (704) and Tajikistan (702) in 1999 looks like MID 4179; it is coded as an "other" revision.

a group beyond the border, but is concentrated by a state's government (the challenger in the state dyad).

There are numerous examples of conflict over nonstate actors. For instance, on August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda attacked the American embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania killing 11 and injuring 85, and the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya killing 224 and injuring 4,000 (START 2012). In response to the attack, the United States launched cruise missiles against Sudan, which was giving sanctuary to al-Qaeda, one of the central ways a one gives external support to a nonstate actors (Byman 2015; Höglbladh et al. 2011; San-Akca 2016). Interstate conflict over nonstate actors can also occur alongside other issues. For instance, the Iraq War was fought for a number of reasons, such as weapons of mass destruction, human rights, and regime change; however, one of the stated reasons by the Bush Administration was the Iraqi government's supposed sponsorship of al-Qaeda (which turned out not to be true) and its funding of reparations to widows of Palestinian suicide bombers. In Africa, Salehyan (2008) gives the example where in "the Great Lakes region of Africa, Rwanda fought a war in Zaire/DR Congo after the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide began to regroup as an insurgent force across the border" (2008, 55) and in Latin America, conflict between Venezuela and Colombia over Colombian counterinsurgency raids in Venezuela (2008, 57).

In another example of a state giving sanctuary plus other kinds active kinds of military and political support, between 1993 and 2001, Israel and Lebanon engaged in hundred of incidents over Lebanon's support for Hezbollah, a terrorist organization that occupies southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is the strongest political and military faction in Lebanon. Its main foreign sponsor is Iran, but it is in Lebanon's southern territory that Hezbollah uses to make

provocations and launch attacks against Israel, to which Israel usually responds. The common theme in these examples is external support. Interstate conflict over nonstate actors is fundamentally about one state's external support of a group that the other state in the dyad is targeted by or is targeting. Most importantly, external support can take many forms. States can give active as well as passive and unintentional forms of external support (San-Akca 2016; Byman 2005a, 2005b; Carter and Pant 2017).

Scholars focus on two areas of inquiry regarding conflict over nonstate actors. The first, and most researched, investigates the causes of external support to nonstate actors. There are two sides, why states choose to give support (the supply side) and why groups decided to accept it (the demand side). Regarding the demand side, rebels that are moderately strong, have a transnational constituency, and who are fighting governments engaged in a rivalry are most likely to receive support. These actors might be more legitimate and effective than other organizations (Salehyan et al. 2011). In general, in terms of the supply side, scholars argue that states give external support for three large reasons, as a way to manage their bargaining relationship with a rival state, because of ideational affinity for the group, and because doing so will benefit a leader domestically (Byman 2005a; Findley et al. 2012; Maoz and San-Akca 2012; San-Akca 2016; Salehyan et al. 2011). Perhaps the most important and widely cited reason for state support is because it is a low cost method to manage a state's bargaining relationship with another state, normally a strategic rival.

Findley et al. (2012) give four direct reasons why interstate rivalries give state support to terrorist groups that resort to violence against their shared target state. First, they argue external support allows rivals to manage their strategic and political costs. There is a much lower cost to

giving external support than engaging in direct military action. Second, states give external support when they are weaker. Third, rivals can use support for a nonstate actor as a bargaining asset that can be withdrawn in a larger negotiation. Fourth, giving external support has domestic politics benefits. For example, Iranian support to Hezbollah, Pakistani support to LeT, Russian support to rebels in Ukraine and might curry favor with more conservative and/or religious constituents. External support might also be based on regime type. Authoritarian states are more likely to give external support than democratic ones (Goldman 2016; San Akca 2009). San Akca (2009) argues that states support non-state actors because of their vulnerability in extracting and mobilizing resources to secure their borders. She finds that measure of external vulnerability; relative strength, a strong supporter, as well as internal vulnerability in the form of ethnic fragmentation are more likely to associate with external support.

Passive or unintentional external support is also an important phenomena (Byman 2005b). Due to their inherent weakness, states are sometimes unable to control when nonstate actors take up sanctuary within their borders, but nonstate actors often use state resources, include the state itself as a home base with tacit, unofficial approval, or without the state knowing. If a state is engaged in a rivalry, the general domestic and security environment might encourage nonstate actors who share the same antagonism against a target state to resort to violence in the absence of direct state sponsorship or control (Findley et al. 2012). Further complicating matters, states might also give external support, but claim otherwise. States might actively misrepresent whether they give are a state sponsor (Bapat et al. 2016). One way this might occur is a state will give information to a target state so as to lessen the impact of military operations in their state against the nonstate actor (Carter 2012).

The second line of inquiry investigates how different kinds of external support leads to intrastate and interstate conflict. Karlén (2017) argues that external support to nonstate actors during civil war leads to conflict recurrence. External support allows groups to remobilize through safe havens, training, and weapons. Also, previous support might lead to future support, giving nonstate actors confidence in their long-term resolve. Different kinds of external support might matter. Highly fungible kinds of support in the form of money and guns are more likely to create uncertainty, which leads to bargaining failure and a decreased likelihood of conflict termination (Sawyer et al. 2015). Lastly, Salehyan (2008) examines how external support in the form of rebel sanctuaries across the border leads to military conflict. He finds that the presence of transnational rebels in neighboring states increases the probability of interstate conflict. There are also substitution effects when the dyad is engaged in a rivalry. Instead of challenging each other directly, conflict occurs through nonstate actors. Salehyan's (2008) study assumes that the issue in the militarized dispute that results from one state harboring a rebel group is about the nonstate actors. Still, it is the first study to hypothesize and test a theory where the dependent variable is interstate conflict over nonstate actors. The aim of this chapter is to continue where Salehyan (2008) leaves off, but for the post-Cold War era. This discussion leads to my first hypotheses regarding the relationship between external support and interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Hypothesis 1a: External support by one state to a nonstate actor in a separate state is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.²⁰

Hypothesis 1b: Defacto external support by one state to a nonstate actor in a separate state is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Hypothesis 1c: Active external support by one state to a nonstate actor in a separate state is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Interdependence and Nonstate Actors

In this section, I argue that economic interdependence might be one kind of opportunity that leads states to engage in interstate conflict over nonstate actors. Interdependence might negatively affect the probability of interstate conflict overall, but when it comes to a specific kind of interstate conflict, it could serve as one kind of opportunity.

Liberal theories of international relations maintain that interdependence has a dampening effect on interstate conflict (Oneal and Russett 1997). The capitalist peace argues that capitalist markets, financial integration, and economic development among neighbors improves dyadic communication by revealing information, reducing risk, and creating mutually beneficial gains (Gartzke 2007). Closely related, the economic peace argument contends that dyads with contract-intensive economies that are positive sum and based on the enforcement of third party contracts are more likely to be at peace because their economic relations offer mutual gains as well (Mousseau 2013). The liberal peace implies that the more interdependent two states are, the less likely they are to see an interstate conflict because it would damage their already mutually

²⁰ State A (e.g., United States) and State B (e.g., Russia) are in a dyad. State B and Group X (e.g., Taliban) are in a dyad. State A and Group X are in a dyad and have an incompatibility. External support from State B to State A's nonstate rival, Group X, is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

beneficial relationship. Dyads do not want to engage in conflict because they understand doing so would disrupt their ability to obtain wealth; in addition, because a shift in international norms has resulted in dyads learning conquest is no longer profitable and there are more peaceful ways of conflict management (Mitchell 2002; Zacher 2001). For example, dyads that have territorial disputes risk jurisdictional and policy uncertainty, which reduces the amount of reciprocal economic transactions at the border (Simmons 2005). In general, scholars find that economic interdependence reduces conflict. There are only a few studies that show the opposite and the evidence is not always convincing (Barbieri and Levy 1999).

However, scholars have not explored how interdependence affects specific types of conflict. Not all interstate conflict occurs directly within the dyad, and specific issues might be more likely when states are interdependent. I argue that the reputational cost mechanism that can further dampen future economic activity is the reason why economically interdependent states might engage in interstate conflict over nonstate actors. A revisionist state might determine that while directly engaging an adversary they are integrated with is risky, doing so through a nonstate group is less risky economically and for their reputation.²¹ Using a nonstate actor to carry out your foreign policy goals might mean less damage to one's reputation. External support gives states plausible deniability. States often lie or misrepresent whether they give external support so their reputation does not suffer (Bapat et al. 2016). For example, in 2001 when India and Pakistan engage in conflict over Pakistan's support for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) after they attacked the Indian Parliament, Pakistan denied that it gave them any external support presumably to save its reputation. Not all dyads that engage in external

²¹ Not all dyads that engage in external support and subsequently interstate conflict over nonstate actors are economically interdependent. Some dyads, such as Israel with Lebanon, Syria, and Iran have little dyadic economic activity. I argue that the more interdependent, the more likely start willing to engage in conflict over nonstate actors.

support are interconnected economically. The desire for lower reputational costs might lead to interdependence as a kind of opportunity that states use to support nonstate actors; resulting in interstate conflict over the issue of nonstate actors.

Hypothesis 2a: Economic interdependence is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors compared to no conflict.

Hypothesis 2b: Selecting into external support, economic interdependence is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors compared to no conflict.

Power and Nonstate Actors

In this section, I argue that two measures of power, strategic rivalry and power preponderance are associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors. My central argument is that state support to nonstate actors involves lower material resources in contrast to symmetrical military force, which is the mechanism that explains the relationship. Engaging in conflict is costly. Rational states are interested in achieving their foreign policy goals while at the same time minimizing the costs in pursuing them. This dynamic affects their strategic calculus to give external support instead of directly confronting their enemy.

First, rivalry is considered one of the strongest correlates of armed conflict (Vasquez 2009). Klein et al. (2006) describe four dimensions of rivalry, spatial consistency or how many states are involved, duration, competition severity, and linked conflict. They distinguish between isolated conflict and rivalry, where there are proto rivalries that are short-term and enduring rivalries that are long-term interactions. In contrast, Colaresi et al. (2008) distinguish between

positional rivalries that are considered about global and strategic issues and spatial rivalries that focus on territorial issues.²² Rivalry is often associated with other contentious issues such as territorial disputes (Rider and Owsiak 2015). Territorial conflict in turn is also associated with a state's desire to achieve a bargaining advantage through its state sponsorship of nonstate actors (Carter and Pant 2017). Strategic rivals are also associated with increased transnational terrorism flows (Findley et al. 2012).

Salehyan (2008) finds substitution effects. Rivals that give external support are less likely to engage in a dispute because the group engages the target on their sponsor's behalf.²³ Similarly, Maoz and San-Akca (2012) also argue that there are substitution effects. They begin with three assumptions; the first is the utility function of rivals, whether they are satisfied with the status quo and think they have the capability to maintain or change it; incomplete information; and a state's satisfaction as a function of the previous dispute's outcome (2012, 722). In general, they argue that states give support when they are dissatisfied, when there is a power imbalance, and when the supporter state believes the target state will not retaliate. However, they find that rivalry leads to state support, and that cooperation between a state and a non-state armed group (NAG) leads to rivalry escalation, and retaliation by the target state (Maoz and San-Akca 2012). My analysis seeks to take Salehyan (2008) and Maoz and San-Akca's (2012) work one step further for a period during the post-Cold War by specifically identifying the dispute that results from state-sponsorship.

²² The key difference between the Klein et al. (2006) definition and operationalization of rivalry and the Thompson (2001) definition the former uses previous conflict as the marker for inclusion while the latter uses perception, namely statements from official government representatives.

²³ Carter and Pant (2017) find a similar result. They find that external support and territorial disputes are both positively associated with a dispute, but the interaction is negatively associated with one, perhaps also suggesting substitution effects.

Second, I argue the power preponderance is associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors. Power preponderance is one reason why states give external support (San Akca 2009), but scholars have not explored how it leads to conflict specifically over nonstate actors. Maoz and San-Akca (2012) find that power parity leads to state support, but they do not model whether it leads to conflict. Most empirical studies find that the move towards parity increases the probability of interstate conflict (Morrow 1989; Organski and Kugler 1980; Vasquez 2009). The power preponderance (or transition) school argues that as states move closer towards parity, the risk of conflict increases. Conflict occurs when a revisionist state unsatisfied with the current distribution of dyadic benefits is capable of challenging the status quo power (Organski and Kugler 1980).²⁴

In contrast, I argue that when it comes to conflict over nonstate actors, the opposite relationship should occur since support to a rebel group and interstate conflict over it is borne in an imbalance of power. Power preponderance might give the revisionist state more opportunity to challenge its rival indirectly when the conflict is over nonstate actors. The mechanism is, again, that lower material resources allows states to give support, which results in conflict of nonstate actors. The power politics literature assumes that conflict will occur directly between states (Vasquez 2009); but, the relationship between power and interstate conflict might change if the issue involves indirect conflict through nonstate actors. The external support literature consistently tells us that states use nonstate actors to increase their bargaining advantage. Giving support to nonstate actors is much cheaper than maintaining a standing army (Carter and Pant 2017). Certain kinds of external support are more costly. In terms of strictly financial costs, it

²⁴ There is also the argument that conflict occurs when the distribution of power does not match the distribution of benefits (Powell 1999).

might be more expensive to give military and intelligence support as opposed to allowing a group to operate within a state's borders. Furthermore, since the most effective actors usually receive support (Salehyan et al. 2011), groups receive aid from multiple states, expanding the number of interveners in a conflict. When multiple states give aid, it is much cheaper to play a part in a conflict.

There are a number of examples regarding power imbalances and a state's support of nonstate actors, leading to conflict. Revisionist actors such as Pakistan, Lebanon, and Iran are all weak relative to their target states. Even though external support is risky (Bapat et al. 2016; Carter 2012), it is less costly resource-wise than other forms of engagement (Salehyan et al. 2011) and reduces the possibility of escalation.²⁵ Furthermore, the issue with power-based theories is that state capabilities and dyadic capability differences are largely fixed across time, but interstate conflict varies (Gibler 2017). Interstate conflict over nonstate actors is one way to reconcile this puzzle. External support is one way to increase the revisionist state's opportunity. The state does not have to mobilize its military. It solely has to give support to a nonstate actors and watch as it engages their shared target. Allowing a nonstate actor to engage a revisionist state's target on its behalf is a cheap way to increase its capabilities (Findley et al. 2012; Maoz and San-Akca 2012). This discussion over rivalry and power preponderance leads to the two following sets of hypotheses.

²⁵ I find that disputes over nonstate actors are not likely to escalate to fatal conflict.

Hypothesis 3a: Strategic rivalry is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Hypothesis 3b: Selecting into external support, strategic rivalry is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Hypothesis 4a: Power imbalance is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Hypothesis 4b: Selecting into external support, power imbalance is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

Research Design, Unit of Analysis, and Estimator

To test my hypotheses, I use a nondirected dyadic dataset computed by Eugene (Bennett and Stam 2000) for the years 1993-2001. The unit of analysis is the dyad year. I use rare events logistic regression and Heckman selection models to test my hypotheses. Logistic regression for a rare binary dependent variable might underestimate the effect an independent variable has on a rare events dependent variable, such as an interstate war (King and Zeng 2001). Normally scholars use the presence of an ongoing MID or the onset of a MID as their dependent variable. I use rare events because my dependent variable is considerably rare compared to the entire MID category. The dependent variable equals one in 0.12% of the cases.

I also use Heckman selection models. A selection model is important for two reasons. First, the dependent variable is a specific kind of interstate conflict, where the issue is nonstate actors; in other words, it is a nonrandom sample. Dyad years where interstate conflict over

nonstate occurs, a priori, differs in important ways from dyad years where interstate conflict over nonstate actors does not occur. Second, and perhaps more importantly, interstate conflict over nonstate actors is correlated with external support. Risking tautology, external support to a nonstate might be the main reason for interstate conflict over nonstate actors. Still, there are many dyad years where external support is present and external support varies widely from access to territory, troops and weapons to training, logistics, intelligence to political and implicit kinds of support (Byman 2005a; Högbladh et al. 2011; Salehyan et al. 2011). The point is that once you select into dyad years where external support is present, there is still wide variation in the interstate relations from peace interactions to conflict. Now I turn to how to code external support.

I use two data sources to measure external support. The main source is from San-Akca's (2016) *Dangerous Companions: Cooperation Between States and Nonstate Armed Groups* (NAGs) dataset. In robustness checks, I use the UCDP External Support Dataset (Högbladh et al. 2011). The main reason for this decision lies in the number of observations as I explain below. External support should be the larger category than interstate conflict over external support to a nonstate actor. There are 191 nondirected dyad years where interstate conflict over nonstate actors occurs. The San-Akca (2016) data has 1,316 nondirected dyad years while the UCDP has 231 from 1993-2001. Even though the UCDP is a larger category (although not by much) compared to the San-Akca (2016) data, a cursory look at the nonstate actors and both external support variables, it is clear that the San-Akca (2016) variable almost always covers the dyad years where conflict over nonstate actors occurs while the UCDP variable does not. Ideally, one would want to construct a dyad where the target state is in a dyad with another state and with a

nonstate actor, and where the nonstate actor is in a second dyad with the challenger state that gives it external support. I was able to do this with the UCDP data, but not with San-Akca's data due to a lack of unique identifiers and others that do not match. Still, I use San-Akca's (2016) triadic data, which already establishes this three-way connection and that has additionally been transformed to directed dyadic data; and I further collapse it into nondirected dyadic data. There are 1,316 nondirected dyad years where external support is present from 1993-2001 according to San-Akca's (2016) data.

Nevertheless, I still use the UCDP External Support dataset variable in one of my tables investigating whether external support leads to conflict over nonstate actors and in selection models as robustness checks. I show how I coded this variable in the Table 3.4. Table 3.4 envisions three dyads from 2000 to 2005. In Step 1, the first and most important dyad, Dyad 1, is between two states, the USA (State A) and Russia (State B). State A is the target and State B is the challenger. The dataset that I use to test my theories uses this dyad as the unit of analysis. There is one observation for the USA-Russia dyad from 1946 to 2001. In Table X, the USA-Russia dyad is present for six observations from 2000-2005. In Step 2, the second dyad, Dyad 2, is between State B, the state challenger and a nonstate actor, Group X, the Taliban. In Dyad 2, the state gives external support to the non-state actor. Table 3.4 shows that Russia gave the Taliban external support from 2000-2005, again all six years. Finally, Step 3 is the third dyad, Dyad 3 between the target state (State A) and the nonstate actor, Group X, the Taliban. UCDP codes whether there is a conflict between a state and a nonstate actor. Table 3.4 shows that from 2002 to 2005 a conflict existed between the USA and Taliban. This is the variable that I use to

select into external support. To summarize, State B is in a dyad with State A where State B, the state challenger, gives external support to a nonstate actor that is in a conflict with State A.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is interstate conflict over nonstate actors. I decomposed the specific issues in the policy MIDs using the narratives provided by the latest update of the MIDv4 dataset (Palmer et al. 2015). From 1993-2001, conflict over nonstate actors is by far the largest category at 41.7% of the foreign policy disputes in terms of dyad years. There are 191 out of 297 dyad years associated with nonstate actors. However, it is still a rare category. From 1993-2001, dyad years associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors is only 0.12% (191) of all nondirected dyad years (158,214). As previously discussed, there is an issue that some incidents are actually protest-dependent cases. I have deleted these four cases in my robustness checks to make sure that they do not bias my results (see footnote nine).

Independent Variable

I use three sets of independent variables, ones related to external support, power, and interdependence. The first set comes from two sources, the San-Akca (2016) and (Högbladh et al. 2011) external support datasets. I primarily use San-Akca's (2016). I use three variables from her dataset, active, defacto, and support, which is the combination of the former two. San-Akca (2016) codes state support (meaning active support) and defacto support in the following way: “(1) Whether there was an observable indication that a given NAG was operating within the borders of other states; i.e. leaders finding safe havens. Fund raising, weapon smuggling etc. (2)

If the government or leadership in a given state was knowingly creating channels to a NAG in question. For example, Egypt was knowingly letting Fedayeen to operate within its borders till the Suez Crisis, after which they extradited them from their territories. (3) In the absence of confirmable information that the government or leadership in a given state was providing support to rebels or creating channels to facilitate their activities, it is assumed to be *de facto* support, i.e. NAGs selecting the states from which to acquire resources to sustain their operations against their targets.” (San-Akca 2016: 14-15 in codebook). All three are binary indicators where one equals the presence of support. My expectation is that all three variables will be positively associated with the outcome of interest. The second set of variable relate to power. I use strategic rivalry. Strategic rivalry is one of the most robust predictors of interstate conflict. It is a binary variable (Colaesi et al. 2008; Thompson 2001). When states see each other as their enemy, they are more likely to engage in direct conflict and support nonstate actors. There also might be substitution effects, where rivals choose to give support to nonstate actors so they will attack their shared rival so the states does not have to (Findley et al. 2012; Salehyan 2008).

The next variable is power preponderance. It comes from the National Materials Capability dataset by way of the Correlates of War project (Singer et al. 1972). This variable is the share of state A’s CINC score. Scholars normally find power parity to associate with interstate conflict, but I believe the opposite, power preponderance will take place for this specific kind of contention because one state is weaker and is more likely to use nonstate actors as a low cost way to manage its bargaining relationship (Findley et al. 2012; San Akca 2009). My expectation is that both strategic rivalry and power preponderance will be positively

associated with the outcome of interest. Lastly, I use the low value for a dyad's contract-intensive economy (Mousseau 2013, 2016).

Control Variables

I use standard controls that are seen in the interstate conflict literature. First, contiguity comes from the Direct Contiguity Data v3.2 by way of the COW dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002). States that are contiguous to each other have more opportunities to engage in violent conflict (Reed and Chiba 2010; Vasquez 1995). Second, joint democracy comes from the Polity IV dataset. The polity2 variable ranges from -10 to +10. Dyads have to have both states with a minimum score of +6 to be counted as a jointly democratic state (Marshall et al. 2016). Scholars widely find that democratic states are less likely to engage in conflict than nondemocratic dyads (Russett and Oneal 2001). Third, the presence of an alliance comes from the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset v4 also by way of the COW dataset (Gibler 2008). There are different kinds of alliance provisions, but in general, the presence of one between two states is supposed to reduce the probability that they will engage in conflict (Leeds et al. 2002). Lastly, in order to control for time dependence, peace year polynomials are generated (Carter and Signorino 2010b, 2010a).

Results

Table 3.1 reports rare events logistic regression models examining the relationship between power preponderance, strategic rivalry, a contract-intensive economy, and interstate conflict over nonstate actors. Models 1-4 show that power preponderance is positively related to

interstate conflict over nonstate actors. When there is a power imbalance, interstate over nonstate actors is likely because revisionist state are more likely to see an advantage by supporting nonstate actors, leading to conflict. Models 2 and 4 show that rivalry is positively related conflict over nonstate actors too. Model 3 shows that my hypothesis on economic interdependence is not supported, as it is negative and significant. Similar to the findings on the economic peace, the low value for a contract-intensive economy is negatively associated with the probability of conflict over nonstate actors. Hypothesis 2a on economic interdependence does not receive support, but hypotheses 3a and 4a regarding rivalry and power preponderance do receive support. I also tested whether contract-intensive economies lead to interstate conflict over nonstate actors as opposed to different kinds of interstate conflict using a multinomial probit model. The hypothesis is that interdependence makes interstate conflict over nonstate actors more likely instead of engaging an adversary directly. I ran a number of models with different controls and I did not find support for this hypothesis; contract-intensive economies is consistently negative and statistically significant.

Table 3.2 investigates the relationship between external support and interstate conflict over nonstate actors. I test four measure of support, active, defacto, and external support (both active and defacto) from the NAGs dataset (San-Akca 2016) and external support from UCDP (Högbladh et al. 2011). I find that all four are consistent positive indicators of the conflict over nonstate actors. Defacto support has the lowest coefficient value. Support (active plus defacto) has the highest coefficient. Regardless of the type of external support that occurs within a nondirected dyad, support associates with conflict over nonstate actors. Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c on external support all receive support. To the best of my knowledge, this is first time that I

am aware of where external support was used to predict not just MIDs in general, or reciprocal MIDs (Maoz and San-Akca 2012; Salehyan 2008), but specific MIDs over state support of a rebel group.

Lastly, Table 3.3 selects into nondirected dyad years where external support is present in order to predict interstate conflict over nonstate actors.²⁶ I find that when it comes to rivalry and power preponderance, the relationship holds. The perception of dyadic enmity as rivals and an imbalance of power are both positively related to external support and interstate conflict over nonstate actors. This is also the first time I am aware where a selection model is used to measure this relationship, one exception being Carter and Pant's (2017) use of conditional logistic regression in their investigation of territory and external support. In my robustness check where I use the UCDP external support variable (now shown), I do not find evidence that this relationship is robust. The capability ratio is positive, but not significant. Rivalry is positively related to external support, but negatively related to nonstate actors; however, its sign in the second stage seems to be sensitive to the inclusion of different control variables. The low value for a contract-intensive economic also switches direction with the stage. It is negatively associated with external support, but in the second stage, positively related to nonstate actors. The use of San-Akca's (2016) external support variable in Table 3.3 does not lead to the same sensitivity regarding the changing signs of the coefficients as I find in the appendix table (not shown).

I also examine the substantive impact of these variables on the outcome of interest. There were two issues when computing the substantive effects. First, even though the sign of the coefficients and significant levels did not change, the predicted probabilities were sensitive to the

²⁶ The peace year polynomials are the exclusionary restriction.

use of the temporal peace year polynomials. To correct for this, I compute the predicted probabilities without the peace year polynomials and with time dummies instead for the first seven years (Stata gives error signs when including dummies for the last two years saying the matrix has missing values). Second, the use of rare events leads to negative scaled predicted probabilities on the y-axis. The directions are the same as the coefficients, of course, but the scale is below zero. Logit and probit regression models give a positive y-axis scale. Figure 3.1 reports the substantive effect of rivalry on nonstate actors. The presence of strategic rivalry has a higher predicted probability for interstate conflict over nonstate actors than the base category. Figure 3.2 shows a positive marginal change in the level of power preponderance on the probability of interstate conflict over nonstate actors. Figure 3.3 shows the negative relationship I find between a contract-intensive economy and nonstate actors. Lastly, Figure 4 reports a higher predicted probability for external support than in its absence.

Conclusion and Implications

How do measures of power, interdependence, and external support affect the likelihood of interstate conflict over nonstate actors? The issue-based to interstate conflict approach has largely concentrated on territorial issues because they are the most fatal and likely to escalate to an interstate war (Vasquez 2009). In this article, I focus on a different category of issues, foreign policy disputes; but specifically, conflict over nonstate actors. Foreign policy disputes are the largest category in the post-Cold War (Palmer et al. 2015), and interstate conflict over nonstate actors between 1993-2001 is the largest subcategory of foreign policy issues. I find the presence of strategic rivalry, power preponderance, and different kinds of external support all lead to

interstate conflict over nonstate actors. Regarding rivalry and power preponderance, even when I selected into nondirected dyads where external support is present, I find evidence that they positively affect nonstate actors. My hypothesis on economic interdependence was not substantiated, however.

This article contributes to the literature because it is the first time someone has primarily coded and tested hypotheses on interstate conflict where the issues at stake is one state's external support of a nonstate actor, and presented a theory to explain their variation. Scholars have investigated why states give external support to nonstate actors (Salehyan et al. 2011) and how external support can lead to interstate conflict, including reciprocation (Maoz and San-Akca 2012; Salehyan 2008). Scholars have also coded and tested the category of hot pursuit of rebels across the border, what I have argued is a subcategory of interstate conflict over nonstate actors (Gibler 2016; Gibler and Little 2017). But, this is the first time interstate conflict over nonstate actors is coded, theorized, and tested.

Interstate conflict over nonstate actors is a new issue space and it reflects an increasing more prominent way states choose to engage in conflict with another state. A new class of less fatal issues called foreign policy disputes is becoming the main reason why states resort to revisionist behavior, but scholars do not have a good understanding of what exactly these issues are and why they are militarized. In this article, I argue that measure of power should associate with this kind of conflict because they are measure of opportunity that allow states to pursue foreign policy goals without the costs of direct armed conflict. Specifically, engaging in conflict over nonstate actors is attractive because it involves a lower amount resources and reputational costs. Scholars argue that parity is more likely to lead to conflict and that external support is

more likely to occur with preponderance. This chapter reconciles these two findings by focusing on the lower material resources mechanism that is part of the strategic calculation for why states give external support under preponderance. I argued that preponderance might serve as an opportunity for weak revisionist states to challenge their adversary when the issue is nonstate actors, an indirect form of conflict. Gibler (2017) argues that the relationship between power and conflict results from new states entering the international system. He argues that preponderance, not parity, should explain interstate conflict. In contrast, I show how preponderance leads to conflict over a specific issue. I also connect rivalry to external support that leads specifically to conflict over nonstate actors, as opposed to rivalry escalation or general militarized conflict (Maoz and San-Akca 2012; Salehyan 2008).

Lastly, there is a growing trend to view interstate and intrastate conflict as one category (Cunningham and Lemke 2013). States sometimes intervene in a civil war on behalf of a party, whether it is a state or not, when their real target is another state. In the absence of an interstate or interstate war, states give external support because it is an easy way to pursue their foreign policy goals (Maoz and San-Akca 2012). Interstate war is largely absent in the post-Cold War era; however, interstate conflict still occurs. Conflict increasingly occurs through third parties. This article has analyzed one consequence of this dynamic. New research might continue to investigate the consequences of external support and conflict over nonstate actors. Research questions might include how these disputes are settled, why dispute over nonstate actors are less likely to escalate, and what kinds and how of external support give nonstate actors the ability to resort to violence against a shared target state.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERSTATE CONFLICT ON THE CHEAP: EXTERNAL SUPPORT, MOBILIZATION, AND TERRORISM

Introduction

States often look for cost-effective ways to manage their foreign policies. In the post-Cold War era, while there is still interstate conflict, albeit at lower levels (Palmer et al. 2015), states increasingly choose to manage their policies using nonstate actors²⁷. Previous research shows that states often give external support to nonstate actors primarily as a way to manage their bargaining relationship with another state (Maoz and San-Akca 2012). External support is one way to minimize the costs of conflict if the nonstate actor is the one that ultimately uses violence against a shared target state (Carter and Pant 2017). Take the example of Israel and Iran. From 1993-1994, 2001-2003, and 2006-2009, Iran provided Hamas with training, funding, weapons, and materials/logistics.²⁸ In all three periods, Iranian support for Hamas coincided with an increase in terrorist attacks from them against Israel.²⁹ Iran's support to Hamas strengthened it

²⁷ Scholars give a number of names for nonstate groups engaged in political violence: nonstate armed groups, rebels, transnational rebels, terrorist groups/organizations, and nonstate actors. There are important considerations for labeling these groups, such as if the group is engaged in terrorism or other forms of violence (Asal et al. 2012, Phillips 2014, Themnér and Wallensteen 2013). I use the term “nonstate actors” throughout this article to mean a nonstate group that uses terrorist violence.

²⁸ In 1993, according to the UCDP External Support dataset, Iran provided Hamas with training and funding; in 1994, 2001-2002, it provided training and; in 2003, training and funding; in 2006, funding; and from 2007-2009, Iran provided weapons, materials, and funding (Högbladh, Petterson, and Themnér 2011).

²⁹ Hamas also fired rockets and used other kinds of symmetrical military operations against the Israeli military (for example, during the Israeli incursions and subsequent conflict between Hamas and other terrorist organizations against Israel in 2006); however, this paper focuses exclusively on terrorist violence. I use the same definition as most scholars, defining terrorism as violence against civilians by a nonstate actor for political purposes.

and increased its ability to carry out attacks. Reliant on support from outside groups due to the Israeli and Egyptian blockade of Gaza, Iranian aid went to more training, weapons, and greater support to Hamas militants.

Previous research finds that external support is one reason why some terrorist groups are more durable (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008), likely to coalesce and form alliances (Olson Lounsbery 2016, Popovic 2018), and that states intervene on behalf of nonstate actors, especially in civil conflicts, making them more successful (Gent 2008). Research also connects factors such as rivalry and external support to interstate conflict and terrorism (Findley, Piazza, and Young 2012, Maoz and San-Akca 2012), but absent case studies, we still do not have systematic evidence that external support, but more importantly, certain kinds of external support to nonstate actors on average leads to terrorist violence against a target state. Interstate conflict is largely seen as a dyadic process; at least it is modeled that way in most quantitative studies.³⁰ Nevertheless, scholars are increasingly pointing to more dynamic processes, including triadic research designs and network analysis to explain the web of relationships that make up proxy conflicts and new ways interstate conflict occurs (Maoz and San-Akca 2012, San-Akca 2016). External support, proxy conflicts, and some kinds of third party interventions are all names that scholars use for ways interstate conflict occurs through third parties at a lower cost to the supporting state.

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I explore a new issue space, foreign policy disputes, and some of the correlates that associate with their onset. Foreign policy disputes are a larger category than territorial issues (Palmer et al. 2015), and contain issues that can be

³⁰ Dyadic analyses are common perhaps as a result of standardized and now almost universally accepted dyadic datasets such as the Correlates of War and UCDP Armed Conflict Data.

decomposed into conflict over power, interdependence, and norms. The second and third chapters consider how and when this new issue space leads to interstate conflict. The second chapter investigates foreign policy disputes' largest subcategory, interstate conflict over the issue of nonstate actors. Interstate conflict over nonstate actors is important because it represents an increasingly new way conflict occurs between states. I find that strategic rivalry and external support to a group results in conflict between states. In this chapter, I explore another consequences of this new issue space, how interstate conflict occurs "on the cheap" through nonstate actors. States give different kinds of external support to a nonstate actor and the support increases the strength and capacity of the group, allowing it to mobilize against the state supporter's and group's target state.³¹ My research question for this chapter is under what conditions does external support lead to terrorism? I also ask a straightforward question: how should scholars view interstate conflict? I argue that interstate conflict can occur "on the cheap" when external support to a nonstate actor results in their ability to more easily resort to violence against a shared target state. Violence from the nonstate actor allows the supporting state to achieve its objectives, attacking its adversary, while having the ability to deny responsibility for the attack. Using data from UCDP External Support and the Global Terrorism Datasets from 1993-2008, I find that external support in the form of a home base, training, weapons, and logistics to a nonstate actor increases the probability it will engage in terrorism against a target state that is in a conflict with both the nonstate group and the state supporter.

The implication of this research is that when states give support to a nonstate actor it is used to attack their shared adversary, giving the state the ability to pursue its foreign policies at a

³¹ The dependent variable for chapter two is interstate conflict over nonstate actors. The dependent variable for chapter three is terrorism when it comes from a group a target's rival supported.

low cost. This article proceeds as follows: first, I describe how scholars normally view interstate conflict, through an issue-based and dyadic framework; second, I describe how groups can increase their mobilization capacity and then I argue how certain kinds of external support increase the ability of certain nonstate actors to attack a shared target state; third, I describe the research design and present my results; and lastly, I conclude and discuss implications for this study.

Interstate Conflict

Interstate conflict is normally viewed as a dyadic process in most empirical quantitative models of conflict. The “dangerous dyads” and the bargaining model of war are the principal frameworks scholars use to describe interstate conflict; and both usually assume a dyadic process. The dangerous dyads approach identifies the specific factors that either increase or decrease the probability conflict will occur (Bremer 1992). Scholars have made a lot of progress in this domain. For instance, the “steps to war” program finds that contiguity, an outside alliance, previous conflict, and territorial claims are factors that increase the probability that states will engage in conflict (Senese and Vasquez 2008, Vasquez 2009). Contiguity gives states more opportunity to engage in conflict. Contiguous states are more likely to have contentious issues (Reed and Chiba 2010, Senese 2005, Vasquez 1995). Alliances are also associated with conflict. In general, alliance partners are more likely than not to keep their commitments. Defensive aid is considered the highest security commitment a state can make to another (Gibler 2008, Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000). Previous conflict reinforces mutual enmity and predicts future conflict (Vasquez 2009). Territorial issues are the most fatal and most likely to escalate to an interstate

war. Territorial disputes can be divided along intangible and tangible salience measures, which also increase their conflict proneness (Hensel 2001, Hensel and Mitchell 2017, Huth and Allee 2002).³²

The rational choice or bargaining model of war sees the onset of conflict as the result of a bargaining failure. It is a response to neorealist and other rationalist explanations that argue preventive conflict and the security dilemma occur as a result of anarchy (Waltz 1979), that conflict is the result of misperception and miscalculation (Jervis 1976, Blainey 1988), when the expected costs of war outweigh the benefits (Buono de Mesquita 1981), or because conflict is driven by human behavior (Morgenthau 1948). The two most important aspects of the bargaining model are incentives to misrepresent private information and commitment problems.³³

Information problems occur because states have private information about their resolve and power that they purposefully use gain a better result along the bargaining range. In order to maintain credibility and change their adversary's beliefs, states take actions, such as brinksmanship, that result in bargaining failure (Fearon 1995). One way this dynamic occurs between nonstate actors and their external sponsors is that the latter has an incentive to misrepresent its support so the shared target state will either not see their adversary's sponsorship and attack it in response or will attack in ways that do little damage (Bapat et al. 2016, Carter

³² In contrast, the dangerous dyads approach has also led to important findings on the factors that lower the probability of conflict. Perhaps the most influential finding is that while democracies have the same monadic conflict propensity as autocratic states, jointly democratic states, but specifically institutions, are associated with a lower likelihood of conflict. There are normative, structural, and institutional reasons for democratic pacifism (Buono de Mesquita et al. 1999, Maoz and Russett 1993, Russett and Oneal 2001). There are numerous challenges to the democratic peace. Some criticisms emphasize specific theoretical critiques, for example, over territory (Gibler 2007, Owsiak 2012, Ghatak, Gold, and Prins 2017b); the economy (Gartzke 2007, Mousseau 2013); foreign policy and preferences (Farber and Gowa 1997, Gartzke 2000); or the behavior of autocracies (Weeks 2008, Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002). There are also criticisms that demonstrate a flawed logic or insufficient statistical model, such as the argument that the democratic peace implies monadic effects (Prins 2003b, a), the importance of extra-systemic conflicts (Henderson 2002), the democratic reliance on cover action (Spiro 1994), or the failure to control for time (Choi 2011).

³³ The third part is issue incompatibilities (Fearon 1995)

2012). Commitment problems arise when states are unable to commit to a prior agreement. The issue is trust. Bargaining failure and then conflict occurs because states are unable to believe their adversary is willing to commit to a prior agreement, whether it is a peace treaty, the absence of conflict, or another scenario. If one state does commit, a future balance of power might damage its future bargaining position (Fearon 1995).³⁴

Scholars also describe triadic and more complicated indirect processes by which one state chooses to engage another. Realists describe an anarchic international system where states, as the key actors, take actions to preserve their security and increase their power. Regarding the defensive school, Waltz (1979) argues that states ally with other states in order to achieve a balance of power. Alliance partners can help a state balance against another (Walt 1987). During the post-WWII era, in keeping with the domino theory, the United States sought to maintain (instead of transform) the international system first by exaggerating the Soviet threat leading to an overreaction to peripheral threats and second, by acting for “the good of other people” or in other words, by maintaining a system with distinct features (Waltz 1979: 194-204). These actions were designed as a way to deter and confront the Soviet Union. For the offensive school, Mearsheimer (2001) argues that “bloodletting” is one method a state uses to hurt and drain the resources of another. The United States’ strategy in Syria might be an example. The United States early on in the Syrian civil war gave external support to a number of nonstate actors knowing that it would exacerbate and prolong the civil war, particularly draining the resources of Russia, Iran, and Syria, the other main state parties.

³⁴ The mechanism linking commitment problems to bargaining failure can also be preference for a first strike or strategic territory (Fearon 1995).

States can also intervene on behalf of, ally, or give external support to nonstate actors as a way of pursuing their foreign policy. Literature on civil war finds that transnational dimensions are important predictors of conflict onset (Gleditsch 2007) as well as shapers of civil war and the post-conflict period (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Colaresi 2014). Interventions during civil war can occur on behalf of either the government (conflict state) or a rebel group. Interventions in favor of rebels can lead to a higher probability of a rebel victory because it changes the power imbalance between them and the government (Gent 2008). A rebel victory can even be more likely when the intervention makes up for a lack in conventional war fighting ability (Sullivan and Karreth 2015). States intervene in civil wars for different reasons, such as territory, stability, the intervener's other military, economic, or diplomatic interests, ideology, human rights, or the bleed the other parties involved in the dispute (Cooper and Berdal 1993, Pearson 1974, Regan 1996).³⁵

Support to nonstate actors occurs both inside and outside of civil wars. Some scholars argue that interstate and civil conflicts should not be separated (Cunningham and Lemke 2013). States give external support primarily as a way to manage their bargaining relationship with another state. I find in my second chapter that rivalry is a robust predictor of external support. Maoz and San-Akca (2012) argue that states give support when they are dissatisfied, when there is a power imbalance, and when the supporter state believes the target state will not retaliate. They find that rivalry leads to state support, and that cooperation between a state and a non-state armed group (NAG) leads to rivalry escalation, and retaliation by the target state. Substitution effects allow states to pursue their foreign policy at a low cost by giving external support.

³⁵ Regan (1996) argues that when an intervener's motivation is to drain the resources of the other parties, the goal is to stop violence in a way that's favorable to the intervener and for stability.

Salehyan (2008) finds that a home base for transnational rebel groups is positively associated with military conflict between states; but when states are strategic rivals and the target state provides a home base, military conflict between the two states is less likely owing to the idea that the nonstate actor is the one attacking the target state so its state supporter does not have to.³⁶ Findley, Piazza, and Young (2012) find that the presence of a rivalry is associated with an increase in transnational terrorism incidents. They argue that rivals give external support as a way to manage their bargaining relationship, resulting in more transnational attacks against their adversary.

External Support, Mobilization, and Transnational Terrorism

In this section, I review the factors that lead groups to mobilize and then I argue how certain kinds of external support lead to an increased mobilization capacity for nonstate actors, which ultimately increases the probability that they will successfully resort to violence against a shared target state. Every nonstate group that chooses to resort to violence against a state faces a collective action problem (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Transnational groups that attack across state boundaries face an even harder version of this problem. Nonstate actors are almost always weaker than their adversary (Crenshaw 1981). To be successful, a group has to find a way to recruit members, train and keep them, provide weapons, and execute attacks or otherwise bargain with the state to achieve its political goals. Groups have multiple roles (Victoroff 2005), which is why larger groups with more human capital are more likely to be

³⁶ He finds that rivalry and an external base are by themselves both positively (and directly) related to conflict (confirming other research on rivalry). It is the interaction between rivalry and an external base that is negatively related to conflict. The implication is that the interaction demonstrates that conflict occurs through the nonstate actor as opposed to between the two states.

successful (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, Jones and Libicki 2008). These tasks can be difficult because nonstate groups do not have the same legitimacy accorded to governments so they have to maintain their group while avoiding state sanction, usually from multiple states at once.

Scholars give several reasons why groups are able to increase their mobilization capacity

First, states institutions might provide an openness for groups to operate. State weakness, for instance, might associate with an increased opportunity to mobilize. If groups operate in a weak state or if they face ineffective security organizations, they will have an easier time evading them (Lai 2007, Piazza 2008). During civil wars, groups will be able to mobilize in the countryside and evade weak central governments (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The state's institutions might also facilitate violence. Most domestic terrorism occurs in democratic states (Chenoweth 2013). Democracies might facilitate terrorism because they place a lower cost on violence, they have restrained executives that are unable to crack down on groups, or they have a free media that incentivizes attacks (Ghatak, Gold, and Prins 2017a, Hoffman 2006, Li 2005). Similarly, autocratic and democratic states might have gridlocked or ineffective institutions, or perhaps none at all, which leads groups to violence after deciding peaceful methods will be ineffective (Findley and Young 2011, Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012, Wilson and Piazza 2013).

Second, the organizational structure matters. Decentralized organizations are more resistant to counter-terrorism efforts because arresting an individual or cell will have a smaller impact on the group's ability to operate (Kilberg 2012). In addition, strong leaders might increase a group's ability to keep itself together. Leaders help solve coordination, principal-agent problems, and time inconsistency problems. They rally individuals, encourage them to stay and take part in the group, and build trust in themselves and the group so members will stay through

hardships (Thompson 2014). Thompson (2014: 108) argues that different leadership archetypes matter. Charismatic leaders govern through personal loyalty; traditional leaders by tradition or custom; and rational legal archetype leaders through the legal institutional constraints given to them by their position. Different psychological characteristics might also be important. Victoroff (2005) decomposes leaders into idealists, messianic, ethnic or religious animus-driven, and entrepreneur psychological leadership categories.

Third, ideology might also increase the ability to mobilize. On average, attacks by Islamist groups lead to more fatalities than attacks by groups of other ideological motivations (Piazza 2009), but groups that are religious and ethno-nationalist groups are associated with the most fatalities (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Durability is another way to measure a group's ability to mobilize. Jones and Libicki (2008) find that religious groups are more durable, but not more successful. Related to a group's ideology is the kind of tactics a group uses. Scholars find that suicide attacks associate with groups that are more durable because it is a measure of their internal determination and it leads to external support, but it has untended effects because it also increases a target state's resolve (Acosta 2013)

Lastly, while the institutional structure of the state, a group's organization, and ideology matter in assisting it to carry out attacks, I argue that external support in the form of home base, training, weapons, and logistics are the key variable that increase the ability of nonstate actors to increase their ability to mobilize. I break this discussion into two parts, home bases and then training, weapons, and logistics. First, home bases give groups the ability to recruit, train, and plan attacks without having to worry about government interference. Weak states or institutions might allow groups to operate in their own country (Piazza 2008), but they still face crackdowns

from their home government. They still face credible threats because they are seen as illegitimate; however, a home base in another states gives groups cover from a state that is recognized by the international community, making it harder for states to attack it. If a state does attack a group in a host state without the host's permission it risks costs associated with violating international law (Carter 2012)

Fifty-five percent of rebels use an external base (Salehyan 2007, 2008). The Taliban's sponsorship of al-Qaeda with a home base allowed it to train and prepare for September 11th. Even though the cost for the attack was under a million dollars, having a home base gave al-Qaeda the ability to plan and train as well as the opportunity to tie together different insurgent groups (Byman 2015). Greece and Syria give the PKK a home base, which it uses to launch attacks on Turkey. Syria has also given Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad a home base to operate out of, which they have used to build their organizations and attack Israel (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011). A home base lowers the operating costs of a group's operations by shielding them from sanctions by their target state. If a state has a refugee population that is present across borders, is weak, or is faced with a rival, it might be more likely to give a home base to a nonstate actor (Salehyan 2007). Scholars generally decompose external support into two categories, when states knowingly and actively allow groups to operate within their borders and when they give defacto (or passive support) by looking away or in stances when they do not know a group is operating in their borders (Byman 2005a, b). My argument is based on active support, not on instances when states allow nonstate actors to operate out of a permissive or passive weakness.

Furthermore, a home base means a group is likely to have more access to money and state institutions. Hamas uses the Qatari banking system. Hezbollah uses the Iranian one. If a group has access to institutions it can work towards building a more positive reputation and legitimacy. Reputation building (positive and negative) associates with a larger number of members, recruits, and groups that are more durable (Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu 2016). Many nonstate actors, in and outside of civil wars, choose to take part in some form of de jure or de facto governance to create a constituency and establish itself for the long term (Wiegand 2009). Hezbollah and Hamas's transformation into governing bodies cemented their strength over rival groups in southern Lebanon and Gaza. Also, groups are more likely to have access to financial flows that go unimpeded if they have some access to state institutions. Money, whether it comes from lootable resources, a group's economy, crime, or external support, is critical to a group's success. Money can go towards buying weapons, salaries, and training. Also, it can be used towards cultural considerations. Islamist organizations use money to pay the bride price for individuals that cannot afford it, allowing them to get married, a sought after social status (Hudson and Matfess 2017). In sum, a home base gives a nonstate actor an increased ability to mobilize, which I argue leads to an increased probability they will successfully attack the target state. This discussion leads to my first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: External support in the form of a *home base* by one state to a nonstate actor in a separate target state is positively associated with transnational terrorism against the target state.³⁷³⁸

Besides a home base, training, weapons, and logistics help groups obtain the skills they need and provides them with a plan to engage in attacks. As previously discussed, nonstate actors have a collective action problem. The difficulty in recruiting and keeping individuals is further compounded by the need to obtain the necessary skills and training needed to resort to violence (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Success requires planning, training, materials, and individuals willing to engage in the attack. This is why groups have different roles for individuals so that they can carry out the supporting functions it needs to be successful (Perliger, Koehler-Derrick, and Pedahzur 2016, Victoroff 2005). Roles are not distributed evenly across group members. Perliger, Koehler-Derrick, and Pedahzur (2016) find that roles vary by socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic status might even correlate with educational status and thus skills. Because terrorism is a form of urban warfare carried out by a small group of individuals acting on behalf of a larger population (Crenshaw 1981), the need for human capital leads groups to self-select individuals that are more educated that have the skills they need (Bueno De Mesquita 2005). If a group loses individuals that are needed for a certain role, it can have an adverse affect on its ability to carry out attacks. For example, Wilner (2010) investigates

³⁷ State A (e.g., United States) and State B (e.g., Russia) are in a dyad. State B and Group X (e.g., Taliban) are in a dyad. State A and Group X are in a dyad and have an incompatibility. External support from State B to State A's nonstate rival, Group X, is positively associated with interstate conflict over nonstate actors.

³⁸ Terrorism is a specific type of violence. In keeping with other scholars, I define terrorism as violence perpetuated by a nonstate actor against civilians or noncombatants for a political cause (Hoffman 2006). In this chapter, I focus on terrorism because it is a specific type of violence. My argument refers to situations where interstate conflict occurs through nonstate actors both inside and outside of civil wars. Violence that falls outside the definition used above (e.g., violence against combatants) is mostly relevant for civil wars and is outside the scope of this chapter.

the short-term success and sophistication of Taliban attacks in 2007 and 2008 before and after four leaders were killed in targeted killings. The leaders that were killed were responsible for planning and coordinating the attacks. He finds that the overall amount of violence goes up, but not for suicide attacks, the Taliban's preferred attack type and the most sophisticated they use. But more importantly, he finds that the success and sophistication of Taliban attacks decreased (as a raw number and as a percentage) after targeted killings. The implication of Wilner's (2010) study is that a certain skill level is needed to plan a successful attack and once that human capital is no longer present, the likelihood of success decreases.

Furthermore, if a nonstate actor is going to attack another state across borders, there is an increased difficulty in successfully carrying it out. For this reason (and others), many groups look for help. One way this occurs is through alliances with other groups (Acosta 2013, Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Phillips (2014) argues that sharing and aggregating resources leads to collaborating on facilitating attacks, more recruits and money, and a stronger organizational structure against internal problems and external threats giving the network a stronger ability to pressure the state. Cooperation fills in the human capital void that groups need to be successful. Many left wing and religious groups (the third and fourth wave of terrorism) received training by like-minded groups. The Palestinian Liberation Organization helped train other transnational groups in hijacking and other tactics (Rapoport 2004). Al-Qaeda during the 1990s in Afghanistan was a hub for other insurgent movements by giving them safe harbor, training, and material support (Byman 2015).

In contrast, I argue that when groups receive these same resources, training, weapons, and logistics by states, it comes at a greater marginal impact on their ability to carry out attacks.

Nonstate actors use terrorism and guerilla tactics against the state because they are weaker (Chenoweth 2013, Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). State support closes this gap by giving nonstate actors the resources they need to be more effective (Gent 2008). External support from states might have more of an impact on their success because states have more resources, military expertise, and more information about how to engage in violence. Even if the international community sanctions a state sponsor, it still has an easier time accessing weapons than most nonstate actors. States are also more likely to have professional military units that can give a higher-level quality of training. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard's training of Hezbollah, for instance, to use missiles and build defense structures, has narrowed the imbalance of power between it and Israel. External support is a powerful tool to increase the strength of a rebel group. While the findings on civil war intervention is decidedly mixed, scholars do find that third party intervention can lead rebel groups to coalesce (Olson Lounsbery 2016) and that external support increases the probability that rebels will form alliances (Popovic 2018). External support during civil wars can give rebels the material capabilities they need to fight more effectively against the state, increasing the chance of a rebel victory (Gent 2008, Sullivan and Karreth 2015). This discussion leads to my next hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2: External support in the form of *training* from one state to a nonstate actor in a separate target state is positively associated with transnational terrorism against the target state

Hypothesis 3: External support in the form of *weapons* by one state to a nonstate actor in a separate target state is positively associated with transnational terrorism against the target state

Hypothesis 4: External support in the form of *logistics* by one state to a nonstate actor in a separate target state is positively associated with transnational terrorism against the target state

Research Design, Estimator, and Dependent Variable

In order to test my hypotheses, I create a state-year directed dyadic dataset from 1993-2008. Previous dyadic studies with a state support variable do not distinguish the specific triadic connection between external support from State A to a nonstate actor that then attacks State B, which is in a conflict with the nonstate actor and State A; most importantly, making sure the same nonstate actor that receives external support is also attacking the shared target state, State B in the example above. I use the UCDP External Support dataset as my base external support data because it codes triads that are in an UCDP-coded conflict (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011). Future studies might examine external support triads outside of a conflict. To code terrorism against the target state, I take the following steps. First, because the External Support dataset is triadic, it has three dyads; 1) State A to State B; 2) State A to the nonstate actor; and 3) State B to the nonstate actors. State A in this example is the target state. In other words, it is the state that is in an UCDP-coded conflict with the two other actors, State B and the nonstate actor. Take the example of Israel-Iran-Hezbollah. Israel is State A, Iran is State B, and Hezbollah is the nonstate actor. Israel is in a conflict (or has an incompatibility) with Iran and Hezbollah. State B to the nonstate actor is the external support dyad, in this case Iran to Hezbollah.

Second, I need to code the dependent variable, *transnational terrorism* incidents from the nonstate actor to State A; for example, from Hezbollah to Iran. In this iteration, I obtain the count, but for my empirical models I use a binary indicator for the presence of transnational

terrorism because with all dyads, external support to a nonstate actor resulting in terrorism against a target state is rare. Previous scholars use binary indicators of terrorism when the event is rare (Gelpi and Avdan 2018). Most terrorism scholars differentiate between domestic and transnational terrorism because there is an assumption they have different causes (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibullov 2011). Domestic terrorism is largely a function of homegrown processes, such as discrimination, the lack of political opportunity, and an openness, whether through democratic institutions or ineffective coercive organizations, that provides individuals and groups the ability to successfully attack their government (Choi 2010, Choi and Piazza 2014, Crenshaw 1981, Eyerman 1998, Piazza 2012, Schmid 1992). In contrast, scholars explain transnational terrorism flows by describing the strategic interaction between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, cooperative or conflictual behavior between states, state-sponsorship, and third (left-wing) and fourth wave (religious) transnational groups with global agendas (Enders and Sandler 1999, 2000, Rapoport 2004, Byman 2005a, Conrad and Walsh 2014, Findley, Piazza, and Young 2012, Plümper and Neumayer 2010, Boutton 2014).

Third, I identify the number of transnational incidents from the nonstate actor to State A (e.g., Hezbollah to Israel). I rely on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). I check all three GTD criteria and delete the “doubt terrorism” cases, the procedure consistent with most empirical studies. GTD does not give a unique ID for the groups. The difficulty with group-level data is that groups often have different names, spellings, translations to English, and groups often change names for different reasons. The difficulty is that most groups in the UCDP External Support dataset have multiple names (UCDP only uses one name, of course), but more importantly for coding reasons, UCDP groups often have a different name or spelling than the

same GTD-coded group. I use the TORG dataset to reconcile these differences. TORG records the names of Minorities at Risk (MAR)-, UCDP-, and GTD-coded groups (Asal, Cousins, and Gleditsch 2015). I individually code the groups that were the recipient of external support and then match them to the name used by GTD. The UCDP dataset is at the triadic year level. Within the UCDP triad year dataset, some state dyads (State A to State B or Israel to Iran) have multiple nonstate actors between them. For instance, Iran gives external support to Hezbollah and Hamas, where both nonstate groups are in a conflict with Israel in the same year. When collapsing the triad to a directed dyad, I count the number of transnational incidents for the directed dyad year. For example, if Iran gave support to two groups in the same year that both attacked Israel, the Israel-Iran dyad will show the total number of incidents from the two groups. Lastly, I merge the terrorism data into a directed dyadic dataset from 1993-2008 and replace missing values with a zero. Perhaps most critically, this dependent variable is not the number of total transnational terrorism incidents from one country to another. Previous studies that claim to explain state support use the total number of incidents (Enders and Sandler 1999, Findley, Piazza, and Young 2012, Carter and Pant 2017). Instead, it is solely the number of transnational incidents that come from groups that also receive external support in the same year.

This procedure might be problematic for two main reasons. First, because it does not connect whether the external support is used to affect the number of incidents. A state might give support to a set of nonstate actors and a different set of nonstate actors might be the ones using terrorism. It is important to connect the independent variable to the outcome of interest. Few studies of state support are able to do this. In an exception, Asal, Conrad, and White (2014) show that Middle Eastern ethno-political groups that receive support are more likely to engage in

transnational terrorism. Second, my dependent variable is a subset of transnational terrorism incidents. Transnational terrorism, as previously briefly discussed, is mainly a consequence of the Cold War, conflictual and cooperation interstate relations, and the left wing and religious terrorism waves (Byman 2005a, Enders and Sandler 1999, 2000, Findley, Piazza, and Young 2012, Rapoport 2004). State support is a critical part of explaining transnational terrorism flows, but state-sponsorship is declining (Byman 2008, Enders and Sandler 2000), and perhaps more importantly, we do not have good evidence that external support is a wide-ranging phenomenon that explain transnational terrorism. Specifically, data collection efforts show that external support does not occur in the majority of cases – meaning groups, incidents, and dyad years – where terrorism is used. For example, the ITERATE dataset on transnational terrorism shows that out of 12,294 incidents, only 168 (or 1.37%) have evidence of state-sponsorship (ITERATE; Gold and Ghatak, n.f.). Data on groups that engage in political violence show that a minority of them receive any state support (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, Carter 2012, Phillips 2015). This might occur because groups share the ideological preferences and decision to use violence as a state that could, but is not, a sponsor (e.g., some Irish, Palestinian, and Pakistani nonstate actors), but not the same method, timing, or strategy (Gold and Ghatak, n.f.). This chapter seeks to explain and accurately test the (minority of) situations where state sponsorship goes to a nonstate actor that in turn is used to engage in transnational terrorism.

I use rare events logistic regression with errors clustered on the dyad as the primary estimator for the empirical models (King and Zeng 2001). The dependent variable is only present 143 or 0.02% of the time. In robustness checks, I use the Sartori selection model (Sartori 2003). I use the Sartori because it operates without assuming the need for an exclusionary restriction

variable. The Heckman selection model needs an exclusionary restriction variable that predicts the selection, but not the outcome stage; plus, the Heckman can be sensitive to the restriction. The Sartori uses the same variables to predict the selection and outcome stage.

Independent Variables

I use four independent variables, each describing a different kind of external support to nonstate actors. All four are binary indicators that come from the UCDP External Support dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011). They are external support in the form of a home base, weapons, materials/logistics, and training/expertise.

Control Variables

I use standard controls that are seen in the interstate conflict literature. First, contiguity comes from the Direct Contiguity Data v3.2 by way of the COW dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002). States that are contiguous to each other have more opportunities to engage in violent conflict (Reed and Chiba 2010, Vasquez 1995). Second, joint democracy comes from the Polity IV dataset. The polity2 variable ranges from -10 to +10. Dyads have to have both states with a minimum score of +6 to be counted as a jointly democratic state (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). Scholars widely find that democratic states are less likely to engage in conflict than nondemocratic dyads (Russett and Oneal 2001). The third variable is power preponderance. It comes from the National Materials Capability dataset by way of the COW (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). This variable is the share of state A's CINC score. Fourth, the presence of an alliance comes from the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset v4 also by way of

the COW dataset (Gibler 2008). There are different kinds of alliance provisions, but in general, the presence of one between two states is supposed to reduce the probability that they will engage in conflict (Leeds et al. 2002). Lastly, in order to control for time dependence, peace year polynomials are generated (Carter and Signorino 2010b, a).

Results

The results of rare events logistic regression estimating the effect different kind of external support have on the likelihood of transnational terrorism against a shared target state are presented in Table 1. Table 1 has four models each investigating a different kind of external support, territory (home base), weapons, materials/logistics, and training. All four variables are statistically significant and in the expected direction. The presence of a home base is positively associated with transnational terrorism from a nonstate actor a shared target state. In addition, if states give external support in the form of weapons, materials/logistics, and training, the nonstate actors that receive those resources are more likely to engage in terrorism against the shared target state. The presence of a home base has the highest coefficient. Regarding the control variables, while joint democracy is negative in every model, it is not consistently statistically significant. Regime type does not matter when aggrieved nonstate actors receive external support. Contiguity is positive and statistically significant across all models. If states are neighbors, more opportunities exist for transnational groups to engage in terrorism across borders. The presence of an alliance and capability ratio do not have a consistent or statistically significant impact on transnational terrorism.

Table 2 shows the results of Sartori selection models for all four independent variables, external support in the form of territory, weapons, materials/logistics, and training. The Sartori operates without the assumption of an exclusionary restriction variable. The selection stage is the presence of any external support; the outcome stage is the presence of transnational terrorism. Again, in every case, each variable is positive and statistically significant. The presence of a home base has the highest coefficient. Figure 1 shows the substantive impact of territory (a home base) on transnational terrorism by nonstate actors. It shows that the presence of a home base is associated with a higher likelihood of transnational terrorism than no home base. The other variables, weapons, materials/logistics, and training all have the same pattern where the presence of the variable has a higher likelihood of terrorism, but they are not statistically different than each other in more extreme ways than in figure one. In sum, we can conclude that certain kinds of external support to nonstate actors from 1993-2008 are positively associated with terrorism committed by them against a shared target state, but in terms of the substantive impact of the support, the effect is negligible.

Conclusion

How does external support to nonstate actors lead to interstate conflict? Interstate conflict is normally seen as a dyadic process. A dispute occurs between two states. One state attacks another. The original attack might be reciprocated or not. The dispute can be fatal and it can escalate to an interstate war. Revisionist interstate conflict normally occurs due to one of three large issue categories, over disputed territory, a state's regime, or their other foreign policy issues; examples include their weapons of mass destruction program, support to a nonstate actor, or an issue related to interdependence, such as refugees and trade disputes. In addition to the issue at stake, third parties might also join in; alliance partners and other states might join the conflict for different reasons. But, interstate conflict does not only occur between two states. Dyads often give external to nonstate groups as a cost-effective way to pursue their foreign policies.

In this article, I argued that interstate conflict can occur "on the cheap" through nonstate actors. I argued that external support is one way for groups to solve the collective action problem and mobilize against the state, which increases the probability that they will successfully execute terrorist attacks against the target state that is in the same conflict as their supporter. I built on studies linking the reasons for external support and how a group increases its strength by arguing that certain kinds of active external support increase a group's collective action and mobilization capacity, increasing the probability they will resort to violence against a shared target state. Specifically, I found that external support in the form of a home base, training, weapons, and logistics increases the probability that the nonstate actors will execute a terrorist attack against a shared target state.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation has been to investigate a new issue space called foreign policy disputes and to explore an emerging way interstate conflict occurs through nonstate actors. These two topics reflect two larger trends, 1) the decline of interstate war (Palmer et al. 2015) and internationalization of civil conflicts (Cunningham and Lemke 2013); and 2) the choice by states to manage their adversarial relationships with other states by using nonstate actors (Byman 2005; Maoz and San-Akca 2012). There are two big takeaways from this dissertation. First, foreign policy issues matter because they are more common, more fatal in the post-Cold War era, but more importantly, because their path to conflict for the post-WWII era is not the same as it is for territorial issues. In addition, sub-issues matter. As Gibler (2016) has shown, different sub-territorial issues are more likely to lead to conflict. I find the same thing for foreign policy issues. Issues related to power, interdependence, and norms have different correlates. Second, the decision to manage one's foreign policy using nonstate actors is not only preferential because it occurs at a low cost, but it coincides with the rise of a new issue space. Put simply, this dissertation provides some evidence that emerging foreign policy issues are increasingly managed indirectly using nonstate actors.

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APPENDIX

Table 2.1 Revisionist MIDs After Dropping Overlapping Ones

Period	Terr	Terr Perc	Policy	Policy Perc	Regime	Regime Perc
1816-1899	132	32%	232	57%	20	5%
1990-1945	389	50%	325	42%	56	7%
1946-1989	498	34%	689	47%	263	18%
1990-2001	259	28%	513	55%	71	8%
Total	1,278	36%	1,759	49%	410	11%

Table 2.2 Fatal Revisionist MIDs After Dropping Overlapping Ones

Period	Terr Fat	Terr Fat Perc	Policy Fat	Policy Fat Perc	Reg Fat	Reg Fat Perc
1816-1899	41	31%	50	22%	10	50%
1990-1945	232	60%	62	19%	5	9%
1946-1989	237	48%	80	12%	119	45%
1990-2001	126	49%	142	28%	14	20%
Total	636	50%	334	19%	148	36%

Table 2.3. Correlates of Revisionist MIDs, 1946-2001

	(1) MID	(2) Policy MID	(3) Territory MID
Contiguity	3.673 ^{***} (0.129)	2.997 ^{***} (0.153)	3.390 ^{***} (0.215)
Joint Democracy	-0.491 ^{***} (0.130)	-0.500 ^{***} (0.146)	-0.527 [*] (0.287)
Cap. Share (State A)	0.380 ^{**} (0.154)	0.696 ^{***} (0.189)	-0.034 (0.278)
Alliance	-0.140 (0.134)	-0.189 (0.178)	0.121 (0.229)
Peace Years	-0.187 ^{***} (0.015)	-0.216 ^{***} (0.021)	-0.535 ^{***} (0.043)
Peace Years 2	0.003 ^{***} (0.000)	0.004 ^{***} (0.001)	0.017 ^{***} (0.002)
Peace Years 3	-0.000 ^{***} (0.000)	-0.000 ^{***} (0.000)	-0.000 ^{***} (0.000)
Constant	-5.422 ^{***} (0.137)	-5.396 ^{***} (0.161)	-5.081 ^{***} (0.204)
Observations	433432	433432	433432

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.4 Types of Foreign Policy Disputes, 1993-2001

	(1) DV=Power	(2) DV=Interdep.	(3) DV=Norms
Contiguity	2.678*** (0.249)	4.052*** (0.547)	-0.004 (0.594)
Joint Democracy	-0.575*** (0.193)	0.488 (0.384)	-2.070*** (0.525)
Cap. Share (State A)	0.734** (0.313)	-0.177 (0.737)	2.200*** (0.854)
Alliance	-0.313 (0.276)	0.399 (0.477)	-0.388 (0.591)
Peace Years	-0.291*** (0.075)	-0.248*** (0.067)	-1.345*** (0.211)
Peace Years 2	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.049*** (0.009)
Peace Years 3	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Constant	-4.237*** (0.323)	-7.740*** (0.587)	-4.068*** (0.710)
Observations	99383	99383	99383

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.5 Specific Issues in Foreign Policy Disputes, 1993-2001

Power

Nonstate actors

Balance of power/deterrence/containment, maintain sphere of influence
force projection

Mobilization/increase readiness, prevent future conflict

Maritime dispute, river dispute

Regime/restore ruler

Territorial dispute

Rivalry, general

Interstate conflict, general/spying/kidnapping/threaten conflict

Join side in conflict/join side in war/signal defense commitment/
alliance provision/protest aid to ally

WMDs, general/WMD inspections/NPT withdrawal threat

State (not ally) improve relations with rival/ally improve relations with rival

Interdependence

Fishing rights

Oil rights/seized pipeline

Trade dispute/embargo/PTA/protectionism

Refugees

Treatment of co-ethnic population

Civil war spillover

Civil unrest

Irredentism

Norms

Enforce international law

Enforce/break UN resolution

Human rights

Peacekeeping violence

Protect civilians




Figure 2.1 Number of Revisionist MIDs by Period After Dropping Overlapping MIDs




Figure 2.2 Number of Fatal Revisionist MIDs by Period After Dropping Overlapping MIDs

Table 3.1 Rivalry, Interdep, and Interstate Conflict Over Nonstate Actors (1993-2001)

	(1) Base	(2) Power	(3) Interdep.	(4) Full
Rivalry _{t-1}		1.165 ^{***} (0.429)		0.876 ^{**} (0.412)
Contr. Econ. _{t-1}			-0.971 ^{***} (0.131)	-0.877 ^{***} (0.127)
Contiguity	2.788 ^{***} (0.272)	2.536 ^{***} (0.292)	2.827 ^{***} (0.271)	2.641 ^{***} (0.291)
Joint Democracy	-0.150 (0.244)	0.022 (0.259)	0.591 ^{**} (0.259)	0.653 ^{**} (0.268)
Cap. Share (State A)	0.847 ^{***} (0.317)	0.932 ^{***} (0.324)	0.963 ^{***} (0.323)	1.005 ^{***} (0.323)
Alliance	-1.312 ^{***} (0.485)	-1.539 ^{***} (0.554)	-1.554 ^{***} (0.510)	-1.745 ^{***} (0.579)
Peace Years	-0.519 ^{***} (0.061)	-0.489 ^{***} (0.062)	-0.545 ^{***} (0.063)	-0.522 ^{***} (0.063)
Peace Years ²	0.016 ^{***} (0.002)	0.015 ^{***} (0.002)	0.017 ^{***} (0.003)	0.016 ^{***} (0.002)
Peace Years ³	-0.000 ^{***} (0.000)	-0.000 ^{***} (0.000)	-0.000 ^{***} (0.000)	-0.000 ^{***} (0.000)
Constant	-4.959 ^{***} (0.295)	-5.147 ^{***} (0.309)	-3.083 ^{***} (0.368)	-3.380 ^{***} (0.389)
Observations	99383	99383	99291	99291

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.2 External Support and Interstate Conflict Over Nonstate Actors (1993-2001)

	(1) Active	(2) Defacto	(3) NGA Sup	(4) UCDP Sup
Type of Ext Support	1.945*** (0.437)	1.223*** (0.395)	2.262*** (0.307)	2.727*** (0.367)
Contiguity	2.515*** (0.304)	2.634*** (0.276)	2.112*** (0.304)	2.170*** (0.318)
Joint Democracy	0.027 (0.246)	-0.051 (0.247)	0.268 (0.245)	0.175 (0.263)
Cap. Share (State A)	0.842*** (0.301)	0.913*** (0.330)	0.893*** (0.317)	0.881*** (0.334)
Alliance	-1.452*** (0.456)	-1.413*** (0.500)	-1.548*** (0.463)	-1.457** (0.618)
Peace Years	-0.492*** (0.062)	-0.503*** (0.061)	-0.464*** (0.060)	-0.445*** (0.060)
Peace Years ²	0.015*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)
Peace Years ³	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Constant	-5.097*** (0.291)	-5.077*** (0.314)	-5.312*** (0.315)	-5.300*** (0.310)
Observations	99383	99383	99383	99383

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.3 External Support, Rivalry, Interdep, and Nonstate Actors (1993-2001)

	(1) Base	(2) Power	(3) Interdep.
Stage 2: Nonstate Act			
Rivalry _{t-1}		0.979 ^{***} (0.138)	
Contr. Econ. _{t-1}			-0.206 [*] (0.113)
Contiguity	1.899 ^{***} (0.185)	1.690 ^{***} (0.155)	-0.014 (0.857)
Joint Democracy	-0.606 ^{**} (0.239)	-0.490 ^{**} (0.208)	0.165 (0.254)
Cap. Share (State A)	1.016 ^{***} (0.288)	1.052 ^{***} (0.229)	0.440 (0.488)
Alliance	-0.419 [*] (0.233)	-0.352 ^{**} (0.159)	-0.576 ^{***} (0.219)
Constant	-4.435 ^{***} (0.212)	-4.534 ^{***} (0.214)	0.921 (1.617)
Stage 1: Ext Support			
Rivalry _{t-1}		1.039 ^{***} (0.074)	
Contr. Econ. _{t-1}			0.026 ^{**} (0.011)
Contiguity	1.244 ^{***} (0.035)	1.135 ^{***} (0.037)	1.222 ^{***} (0.037)
Joint Democracy	-0.321 ^{***} (0.034)	-0.290 ^{***} (0.034)	-0.359 ^{***} (0.038)
Cap. Share (State A)	0.315 ^{***} (0.037)	0.330 ^{***} (0.038)	0.304 ^{***} (0.038)
Alliance	0.185 ^{***} (0.040)	0.175 ^{***} (0.040)	0.191 ^{***} (0.040)
Constant	-2.582 ^{***} (0.043)	-2.676 ^{***} (0.041)	-2.564 ^{***} (0.053)
N (Selected)	1166	1166	1165
N (Non-Selected)	98217	98217	98126
LR Chi2	0.624	4.487	0.667
LR Chi2 P-Value	0.430	0.034	0.414

Standard errors in parentheses. Peace years not shown.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.4 Steps in Coding External Support

Step One			
Year	StateA	StateB	Dyad1: StateA-StateB
2000	USA	Russia	USA-Russia
2001	USA	Russia	USA-Russia
2002	USA	Russia	USA-Russia
2003	USA	Russia	USA-Russia
2004	USA	Russia	USA-Russia
2005	USA	Russia	USA-Russia
Step Two			
Year	GroupX	Dyad2: StateB-GroupX	Dyad: StateB-GroupX Ext Support
2000	Taliban	Russia-Taliban	1
2001	Taliban	Russia-Taliban	1
2002	Taliban	Russia-Taliban	1
2003	Taliban	Russia-Taliban	1
2004	Taliban	Russia-Taliban	1
2005	Taliban	Russia-Taliban	1
Step Three			
Year	Dyad3: StateA-GroupX	Dyad3: StateA-GroupX Conflict	
2000	USA-Taliban	0	
2001	USA-Taliban	0	
2002	USA-Taliban	1	
2003	USA-Taliban	1	
2004	USA-Taliban	1	
2005	USA-Taliban	1	




Figure 3.1 Strategic Rivalry and Interstate Conflict Over Nonstate Actors, 1993-2001




Figure 3.2 Power Preponderance and Interstate Conflict Over Nonstate Actors, 1993-2001




Figure 3.3 Interdependence and Interstate Conflict Over Nonstate Actors, 1993-2001




Figure 3.4 External Support and Interstate Conflict Over Nonstate Actors, 1993-2001

Table 4.1 External Support and Transnational Terrorism, 1993-2008

	(1) Territory	(2) Weapons	(3) Materials	(4) Training
External Support	5.765*** (0.718)	4.954*** (1.024)	3.605*** (0.880)	3.583*** (0.993)
Contiguity	2.978*** (0.643)	3.280*** (0.771)	3.867*** (0.519)	3.946*** (0.503)
Joint Democracy	-1.468** (0.729)	-0.875 (1.058)	-1.243 (1.045)	-1.379 (1.028)
Capability Share	0.064 (0.593)	-0.866 (0.751)	-0.556 (0.601)	-0.377 (0.576)
Alliance	0.268 (0.565)	0.423 (0.757)	-0.045 (0.631)	-0.187 (0.616)
Peace Years	-0.101 (0.122)	-0.173 (0.152)	-0.286** (0.139)	-0.279* (0.145)
Peace Years 2	0.003 (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)	0.010* (0.006)
Peace Years 3	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	-8.276*** (0.522)	-7.651*** (0.577)	-7.165*** (0.464)	-7.243*** (0.522)
Observations	198766	198766	198766	198766

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4.2 External Support and Terrorism, Sartori Selection Models, 1993-2008

	(1) Territory	(2) Weapons	(3) Materials	(4) Training
Selection =				
External Support				
External Support	7.855 (131.212)	10.451 (163.027)	9.136 (159.446)	9.331 (82.694)
Contiguity	1.254*** (0.066)	1.589*** (0.106)	1.597*** (0.076)	1.771*** (0.086)
Joint Democracy	-0.572*** (0.111)	-0.252** (0.104)	-0.359*** (0.091)	-0.517*** (0.102)
Capability Share	0.264*** (0.090)	-0.260** (0.125)	-0.066 (0.099)	-0.100 (0.104)
Alliance	-0.112 (0.087)	-0.025 (0.095)	-0.110 (0.080)	-0.197** (0.083)
Peace Years	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.027*** (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.003)
Constant	-3.423*** (0.077)	-3.364*** (0.112)	-3.346*** (0.085)	-3.380*** (0.094)
Outcome =				
Terrorism				
External Support	2.877*** (0.157)	1.864*** (0.162)	1.933*** (0.177)	1.287*** (0.224)
Contiguity	0.824*** (0.117)	-0.391 (0.407)	0.571** (0.264)	-1.741*** (0.416)
Joint Democracy	-0.734*** (0.235)	-0.502*** (0.175)	-0.767*** (0.176)	-0.788*** (0.185)
Capability Share	0.026 (0.144)	-0.616*** (0.232)	-0.595*** (0.183)	-0.528*** (0.182)
Alliance	-0.035 (0.127)	0.082 (0.139)	-0.018 (0.114)	-0.015 (0.137)
Peace Years	-0.006** (0.003)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.005)
Constant	-3.472*** (0.117)	-1.608*** (0.431)	-2.431*** (0.292)	-0.013 (0.446)
Observations	198766	198766	198766	198766

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$



Figure 4.1 Territory (Home Base) and Transnational Terrorism, 1993-2008

VITA

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