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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Vance R. Sherwood entitled "Identification, Object Constancy, and Identity in Post-Freudian Man." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Psychology.

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IDENTIFICATION, OBJECT CONSTANCY, AND IDENTITY IN  
POST-FREUDIAN MAN

A Dissertation  
Presented for the  
Doctor of Philosophy  
Degree  
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Vance R. Sherwood

August 1984

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to the members of my committee: Ralph Norman, who first showed me the dignity of the truly learned man; John Malone, the best of all the teachers I have known; and Al Burstein, that rarest of administrators, a scholar who can get things done. Chiefly I wish to acknowledge the influence of my chairman, Charles P. Cohen, who ever sees in me possibilities yet invisible to myself and without whose teaching and affection my life would have been so much less rich than it has become.

I want finally to thank my wife, Donna, not only for her patience through my long obsession with this project, but also for having long ago sensed that I could be more than I was.

## ABSTRACT

The Freudian image of Man has been dated by changing times. This image presupposed identification with strong parental figures whose values became the child's own; the resulting psychic structure, the superego, was the guardian of identity, its values measuring what was like- and unlike-me. Since World War II, however, cultural anomie, attacks on tradition, and general uncertainty by parents on how to rear children have made superego-forming identifications virtually unavailable. Object constancy underlies identity in post-Freudian man, and the identification process depends on achieving a stable level of object constancy.

Chapter I reviews the Freudian image of Man and its decline. The rise of a style of life poised for change and uncommitted to values has changed the nature of normalcy and psychopathology. The implications of this style of life for identification and identity are explored. Chapter II reviews the identification concept in Freud and in later psychoanalytic thought. Chapter III looks at the psychoanalytic concept of internalization, exploring its presupposition of a representational world. Criticisms and alternatives, including those of social learning theory and demetapsychologizing efforts within psychoanalysis, are explored. Finally, a phenomenological understanding of internalization is proposed. Chapter IV discusses object constancy, reviewing the literature and then applying the conclusions of the previous chapter to the

concept. The chapter outlines the identification process and argues that object constancy is the prerequisite for identification. Chapter V traces the superego concept in Freud and argues that the concept has suffered dissolution since Freud. The functions assigned to the superego in current literature are more properly those of object constancy.

Post-Freudian man builds his identity on object constancy, which is the illusion that the mother is always available to mirror the child. The illusion that he is always seen gives the child the feeling of being continuously real; this is the basis for identity. This illusion frees the individual for seeing himself from new perspectives (identification). Constancy's absence leaves the individual dependent on being seen by others to feel real and at the same time fearful that his reality can be lost to the other's look.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE POST-FREUDIAN PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

#### I. THE DECLINE OF THE FREUDIAN IMAGE OF MAN

During the first four decades of this century, psychoanalysis developed and codified a new understanding of human nature. Although Freud and his co-workers studied so-called neurotics, a relatively small sample of those living in Western society, they felt that theories born out of their work with this sample deciphered the mysteries of human life in general. Their theory of personality was built on the idea of repression, which Fenichel (1935/1953) called Freud's "great discovery . . . the fact that one part of the personality struggles against another" (p. 363). The part defended against was sexuality; survival instincts and, later, fear of punishment were the defenders. Under the tutelage of "the instinct-frustrating external world," ego's survival instincts were said to turn against id's sexuality, seeking to drive it from awareness or repress it. Through this basic theorem and its corollaries, psychoanalysis not only made sense of several forms of apparent senselessness, particularly hysteria and obsessions, but explained normal development as well.

In Freud's mature theory the agent of repression is the super-ego, which is technically part of the ego but a part which operates autonomously. In classical psychoanalytic thought, the superego

is formed through resolution of the Oedipus complex. The Oedipal-age child stifles unrealistic and incestuous desires for the parent of the opposite sex by identifying with the parent of the same sex (Freud, 1923/1961, pp. 28-39). Identification with this rival parent allows the child to experience incestuous wishes as the rival would and thereby to control his or her Oedipal strivings. This identification is the foundation of the superego. The values and judgments which the child adopts to end the Oedipal struggle endure beyond that struggle as a major structure of the personality.

The first task of the superego is repression of incestuous desires. Using parental values and judgments the superego forces such desires out of conscious awareness. After the Oedipal struggle is ended, the superego continues to keep impulses, wishes, and thoughts which are at odds with parental standards from reaching awareness. Superego is the individual's means of observing himself critically and determining whether wishes and thoughts are consistent with himself (Bollas, 1982). The superego "scans ego activity at all levels . . . supplying approval and disapproval, self-criticism and self-esteem (Cameron, 1963, p. 188). Such activity lends a certain coherence to the personality. Identification with a clear and stable set of parental values which are elaborated through continued exposure to such values gives the child a station for feeling "this is consistent with me; this is not." The result is an early sense of identity; the resolution of the Oedipus complex has properly been called "the nucleus of normal character formation" from the psychoanalytic perspective (Gitelson, 1952).

In Freudian theory, so-called normal character not only entails a personal sense of identity but a social identity as well. The values passed on to the child by identification with the rival parent are the values of society and culture. Freud called the superego "the vehicle of tradition and of all time-resisting judgments of value which may have propagated themselves from generation to generation (Freud, 1933/1961, p. 67). Freud understood such values to be useful defenses against the sexual rivalries and power struggles our primordial ancestors carried on when they lived in clamoring and disorganized tribes. Impulses to continue these rivalries and struggles are presumably part of the phylic heritage of each person still and are communicated in that part of the psyche called the id. The superego represents the mores needed to repress these antisocial tendencies. The repression carried on by superego is in a sense the agent of society's political repressions, seeking to castrate each individual of whatever desires and hopes would render him unfit for community life (Marcuse, 1955). Superego becomes the bearer of tradition, champion of the status quo, and foe of innovation. Identification with the rival parent not only ends the Oedipus complex; it also socializes the child, giving him the normal social character of his culture.

If normal character development is built on successful repression, first of Oedipal wishes and later of other thoughts and wishes inconsistent with traditional values, psychopathology can be understood as an instance of faulty repression. As a healing art,

psychoanalysis was initially addressed to the symptom neuroses. The classical psychoanalytic explanation of these disorders is that wishes and impulses inconsistent with superego values can prove too strong for repression. They may endure in spite of the superego's defense against them and press relentlessly toward awareness. Because the entry of unacceptable feelings into consciousness has a disorganizing effect, the personality strives to vent such feelings in a disguised fashion. The unacceptable wishes enter awareness, but in such a way that they cannot be recognized. This is the neurotic symptom, a compromise between expression and repression. For example, an unacceptable sexual wish could be expressed in acrophobia. The conscious feeling is anxiety that one might fall, but in this case fear of physically falling is a disguised expression of a moral fall. The unacceptable wish reaches consciousness, but it has been coded, as it were, and can be endured without massive disruption of identity or overt violation of traditional social standards.

According to classical psychoanalytic thought such a compromise or symptom would not have been necessary had the superego been strong enough to repress the unacceptable impulse. The explanation for such a circumstance is that neurotics have formed only a partial identification with the rival parent, leaving an inadequate base for superego formation (Fenichel, 1926/1953). This implies that the individual has been unable to surrender the parent of the opposite sex as a sexual object, and this has interfered with his identifying with the rival parent. Consequently the neurotic will have to

surrender in therapy this early sexual preference and his continued rivalry with the parent of the same sex in order to move to forms of love more appropriate to adulthood and in order to repair his psychological defenses. The neurotic's "fixation" at Oedipal level interpersonal relationships has been a roadblock to his maturation, to his ability to love and to work as an adult. In therapy this pattern of object relations also manifests itself as a roadblock. It serves as a "resistance" to therapy and comes to be focused on the patient's relation to the therapist (Freud, 1915b/1961). The patient demands of the therapist behavior typical of his Oedipal-level object relationships--the well known neurotic transference. Analysis of this transference is the hallmark of psychoanalytic therapy.

Freud and later psychoanalysts felt that the patterns of childhood sexual preferences which were revealed in their patients' transferences gave indications of normal development. The normal individual has successfully repressed his childhood sexuality, but the faulty repression of the neurotic allows glimpses of what exactly it was that the normal adult repressed. As such famous phenomena as the Oedipus complex were uncovered, Freud and his co-workers ingeniously searched art, forms of worship, mythology, and literature for derivative expressions of psychological phenomena, as further proof that such things belonged to the nature of man. Practically everywhere they found what they sought. The orthodox psychoanalytic model of superego's repression of sexuality not only explained the symptom neuroses; higher expressions of culture, religion, and even war seemed within its conceptual group.

Freud himself noted a primary exception to the psychoanalytic paradigm. He found that a particular group of patients fail to form a neurotic transference (Freud, 1911/1961). If these patients form a transference at all, it is not in such a way that analysis and interpretation will resolve it. These are the psychotic patients, particularly schizophrenics. For several decades one of the anomalies confronting psychoanalysis was its inability to account for or treat psychosis. Freud (1914/1961, pp. 76-81) once acknowledged the potential theoretical embarrassment of this situation, but apart from Jung there were few who thought this anomaly sufficient to topple Freudian thought.

Another and more far reaching anomaly began to receive attention in the 1950's, however, when it was found that not all patients who are incapable of neurotic, Oedipal-level transference are psychotic. A new category of psychopathology, the so-called borderline conditions, entered the field of study. The borderline states do not seem to represent specific, intrapsychic conflicts within an otherwise stable character structure, as do the neuroses. Rather there seems no solid core to the personality of these patients. The very complaints which bring borderline patients to treatment suggest a certain diffuseness in the individual's sense of himself. These complaints are often quite vague, as if the patient cannot conceive himself clearly enough to isolate where and in what way he hurts. Borderline patients do not typically suffer well defined, isolated symptoms which interfere with their lives; complaints about

their lives in general often bring them to treatment. Complaints of apathy, aimlessness, loneliness, or of not feeling quite real are common. If there are specific symptoms, there are typically several neurotic symptoms at once, and these symptom clusters frequently give rise to new and different symptoms surprisingly quickly. The overall impression is of a deficient sense of self (Wheeler, 1958), often described by the term "identity diffusion" (Erikson, 1956). Such severe identity problems connote pathology established before the Oedipal-ending identification which organizes the personality and undergirds a sense of personal continuity and coherence. Hence these states are termed "preoedipal."

The preoedipal, non-psychotic states present both theoretical and practical difficulties for clinical psychoanalysis, which built its understanding of human nature on work with neurotic patients. Theoretically, for example, the concept of superego in the preoedipal states is problematic. The superego as it is known to orthodox Freudian thought does not seem present in these conditions, and authors have been forced to speak of "superego forerunners" and "archaic and primitive superegos" (Reich, 1954; Kaufman, 1958; Jacobson, 1964; Ticho, 1972). These revised notions of superego do not appear to have the same function and content as the superego which is heir to the Oedipus complex. They do not enable repression, nor are they built on traditional values and standards. They seem to be isolated fragments of interaction with parents, and they have been associated with such widely varying phenomena as inhibition

of self-destructive aggression (Klein, 1932/1975) or the origins of "persecutory-like" guilt feelings and "fantastic, megalomaniac demands for perfection" (Garza Guerrero, 1982b). It is quite difficult nowadays to find a discussion of the superego which is heir to the Oedipal-ending identification with the rival parent; the literature is replete, however, with observations on preoedipal versions of this structure. This amounts to a silent but major revision of structural theory, one which is sufficiently far reaching that the term "structure" frequently no longer refers to the Freudian tri-partite model of the personality (Kernberg, 1975, p. 21).

The practical problems posed by preoedipal patients are even more far reaching than the theoretical difficulties. Psychoanalytic technique is built on the eventual genetic interpretation of the transference. As already noted, however, preoedipal patients fail to form analyzable, Oedipal level transferences. Further, these patients generally lack the frustration tolerance and ability to observe and reflect on experience demanded by classical technique. Many Freudians who have continued to attempt treatment of borderline patients have been forced to make extensive modifications of technique (Eissler, 1953; Rosenfeld, 1958; Kernberg, 1975). These parameters of treatment have made borderline patients more treatable by psychoanalysts, but it is not always clear that the treatment is any longer psychoanalysis.

Classical psychoanalysis has clearly made major concessions to the borderline states. These concessions would not have been

forthcoming had preoedipal states remained simply another interesting anomaly within the Freudian paradigm. Something quite different from this has occurred; the various preoedipal states have fairly replaced the symptom neuroses. In the 1950's authors began to note the disappearance of classically analyzable neuroses (Wheeler, 1958; Reiff, 1963). Among them, Peter Giovacchini (1976, pp. 13-20) reports that during his psychoanalytic training in the early 1950's the patients used as control cases almost always turned out to present preoedipal pathology despite their having been chosen precisely because they seemed to suffer Oedipal-level disorders. In his discussion of this circumstance Giovacchini admits he is now moving toward the opinion that Oedipal-level pathology no longer exists. And in fact in the most recent edition of clinical psychiatry's diagnostic manual (DSM-III), it does not. The symptom neuroses are no longer included in that listing of psychiatric syndromes while the number of "personality disorders" in DSM-III is dramatically increased over DSM-II.

As is noted above psychoanalysis built its image of man from observations of neurotic patients. Its impressive and extensive theories of normal development, explanations of cultural phenomena, and analyses of literature, art, and religion were based on the assumption that the particular deviations of neurotics revealed the motive forces behind normality and, in a broader sense, culture. Now, however, the type of pathology which psychoanalysis found so revealing scarcely seems to exist. This raises questions of whether

the Freudian concept of human nature may not already be dated and whether psychoanalytic confidence in Freudian interpretations of human experience may not have been premature.

## II. THE RISE OF THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH TO LIFE

The psychoanalytic enterprise has not been alone in raising questions over the changing nature of Western humanity. At the same time that psychoanalysis was observing changes in the nature of psychopathology, a number of popular but serious works described the changing character of the American people. Some of these, like David Reisman's The Lonely Crowd, Henry Steele Commager's The American Mind, and William Whyte's The Organization Man, have become familiar classics. These works report and describe what strikes the authors as a recognizable shift in the values, goals, and social style of the American people. The 1950's also saw a flurry of labels which tried to capture the essence of the changes then beginning to be widely seen. The new state of affairs was called the age of anxiety, the age of analysis, the age of despair, and the age of alienation. While none of these labels has endured, they give a sense of how their originators experienced some of what they intuited and observed.

William Earle (1958), writing similarly to the above named writers, observed that for some time Western culture has been viewed as if it were a sick patient in need of diagnosis. He referred to Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and others who found something

to be terribly amiss and who felt they were viewing the final stages in the Western expression of the human spirit. Perhaps what psychoanalysis apprehended as a change in psychopathology and what popular writers experienced as a change in social character is a continuation of trends noted in industrial society as early as the first half of the last century. It appears, however, that these changes and trends only became accessible to the popular imagination and to general observation following World War II.

Margaret Mead (1949) was among those studying post-war cultural and characterological changes in this country. Her contribution to descriptions of those changes may be summarized in her phrase "the situational approach to life." She writes that those reared in the midst of rapid technological change, social and geographical mobility, and conflicts between generations (her summary of twentieth-century American life) may develop an approach to life which takes each situation as a discrete unity, unrelated to other situations and requiring full and rapid adaptation. When one particular situation is left for another (e.g., home for work or the club for church), little is carried over from one context to the next. Each situation is addressed and responded to as if its demands and rules were valid in themselves without reference to broader aims and values. Mead speaks of the "atomization" of experience which results from the situational approach: "Relationships disappear, and experience is broken down into small, discrete bits which may be given temporary meaning in any one of a thousand

patterns but which lack coherent relationship to any one pattern" (p. 30).

Others have regarded the changing scene in terms comparable to Mead's and have noted too the character traits required by the situational approach to life. One of the consistent features in many studies is the description of a loss of personal identity and its replacement by a sort of public self. For example, Herbert Marcuse (1964) has spoken of a "levelling" of experience which has taken place in our time as a result of industrial society's demands upon the individual for conformity. He feels that the individual's capacity to hold personal values in a private reserve is diminished and that thereby the ability to think critically about the quality of the social world is greatly reduced. The "private space" which is generally called "the Self" is overrun by a sense of belonging to the public sphere, leading to loss of depth in one's experience of the world. Depth of feeling, critical thinking, and the Self are replaced by superficial, highly plastic categories of experience which Marcuse calls "one-dimensional man."

Erik Erikson (1946) describes the fragmentation Mead observed and writes that adaptation requires a series of brief or "tenuous commitments" which can be entered into and left quickly behind. As is well known, Erikson is concerned with the difficulties posed by the demand for tenuous commitment for the individual's sense of identity. Another psychoanalyst, Allen Wheelis (1958), studies the relationship between identity and the need to adjust to rapid

change. He observes correctly that there has always been change. No society, and certainly no industrial society, stands still. But, he observes, change has never been so rapid as in this century. We are aware of change while it is happening, and we are aware too of attendant changes in ourselves. Wheelis argues that it is hard to believe in values when everything keeps changing. Yet identity depends on stable values, he writes, and on the sense that what gives life meaning is constant. Hence it is increasingly hard to answer the question "Who am I?" and identity, or a coherent sense of self, becomes a rare commodity.

There are common elements in these descriptions despite the plurality of orientations. Mead the anthropologist, Marcuse the Marxist philosopher, and psychoanalysts Erikson and Wheelis have all apprehended diminished continuity to the individual's experience of himself. There is a certain loss of what might be termed the narrative quality of one's life. Life may today be experienced less as a continuing story than as a series of still shots somewhat arbitrarily grouped together. While this increases the likelihood of the identity problems noted by Erikson and Wheelis and conspicuous in preoedipal psychopathology, such a change may in a sense be socially desirable. When each new situation confronts the individual with demands for full and rapid adaptation, it may be undesirable to carry much that is personal from one event to another. Any set of values or commitments which make a prior claim on behavior will interfere with easy allegiance to the new situation. In the midst

of rapid change, therefore, a life which can be likened to a collection of snapshots may be more comfortable than one which resembles a novel. Wheelis (1958, p. 129) in fact argues that the normal character structure described by classical psychoanalysis, built around identification with clear parental values and cultural traditions, would be maladaptive in a rapidly changing society. The attendant sense of identity would not be flexible enough.

The situational approach to life has apparently led to a different personality organization from that described by Freudian thought, one which seems more vulnerable to preoedipal conditions than to the neuroses charted by classical psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic thought has looked to the family as the social unit most responsible for the shaping of the personality, and it is to the family in its role of child-rearing that we must now turn for further description of the changes so far discussed. We look to the family not only because it has been the sociological unit most amenable to psychological analysis, but also because the principle change in personality has been diminishing influence of the superego, and the child's parents are especially important to this structure of the personality.

### III. IDENTIFICATION AND IDENTITY IN POST-FREUDIAN MAN

In the 1950's child-rearing literature suddenly embraced what had previously been a significant, but minority, opinion that parents ought to be less strict with their children. During that

time studies proliferated showing the wisdom of this point of view. To take an example at random which proves nonetheless representative, Watson (1957) found children brought up "with an extraordinary degree of permissiveness" to rank significantly higher on several desirable personality measures than peers reared with strict parental controls. Watson included a review of the literature in his article and noted "considerable convergence" among studies that more permissive treatment by parents results in greater independence and appropriate aggressiveness in children.

Opinion had gradually been shifting toward more permissive parenting styles since World War I. Wolfenstein (1953) examined the ten issues of the United States Children's Bureau's Infant Care from 1914 to 1951. She found substantial changes in the "official" advice given to parents over these nearly four decades. She noted that advice on how to handle several common problems grew progressively less severe during that time. Masturbation and thumb sucking drew non-repressive parental responses by the 1920's. Strictness in weaning was recommended until 1938. After 1938, however, on all matters Infant Care advised more patience and understanding than in 1914.

It was clearly less acceptable, at least to experts, to have an authoritarian or dogmatic style in the 1950's than it had been in earlier parts of this century and, presumably, in the last. Robert Sears and his co-workers (1957/1962) think this was the result of scientific progress, the result, that is, of submitting

child-rearing practices to the objective and careful eye of psychological research, thus taking this important task out of the hands of folk wisdom and tradition. They note the high status science enjoyed as the result of medical advances in the late nineteenth century. They add, "Solution of problems by rational means replaced reliance on tradition, personal experience, and the self-arrogated wisdom of those who had decision-making power" (p. 549). They note, too, that the "rational problem-solving of science" was accepted slowly, as "wise men" gave up their power grudgingly. Technique supplanted tradition, in effect, a change which was certainly intended to the good, but which may have contained an ironically cruel twist, as we will see.

The ascendancy of the professional experts in child-rearing placed subtle pressures on the average parent. To begin with, there was Rene Spitz's (1945) truly ominous warning that deficiencies in early mothering skills could have "unavoidable and irreparable psychiatric consequences" for the child (p. 73). One still hears young mothers worry aloud that they may have made some fatal error in their attempts to care for their infants, an error which may ruin the child's life in some unforeseen way. Certainly the burgeoning literature in the late 1950's on the "schizophrenogenic mother" did little to ease the minds of those who were beginning to wonder if they had enough expertise to bring up healthy children. A current television advertisement for Parents magazine (August, 1983), for example, says, "Every day a mother has to make important decisions

that affect her baby's life; she has to know what to do." The assumption seems to be that mistakes can and should be avoided in child rearing as in any other field in which technical advice is available. Only relatively recently have theorists begun to raise questions about the undermining of parents' confidence and the potentially woeful effects on children of being brought up by parents who lack faith in themselves (Van den Berg, 1972; Harrison and Delano, 1976).

One might ask why researchers would undertake to examine strict versus permissive parenting styles in the first place. There seems a latent assumption in much of the research that any orientation which is solidly fixed on "traditional" or scientifically unproved values is questionable or that such an approach may be too rigid to be adaptive. Such an assumption seems to reflect the bias of a rapidly changing society that flexibility in the face of change is good. Where rapid change is a way of life, anyone trying to hold fast to tradition may seem at best quaint and at worst irrational. A strict parent could well appear dangerously defensive, while a permissive parent might seem (and feel) better in touch with the requirements of the age. The trend toward permissiveness was not only toward greater freedom; it was first and foremost a trend away from authority and tradition. Permissive parenting can be seen as part of the general cultural orientation toward the situational approach to life, which must disentangle itself from tradition as part of being prepared for each new situation.

The relative demise of multigenerational families and neighborhoods has even further removed parents from access to traditions of child-rearing. Many persons now learn to be mothers and fathers not from their own parents but from experts. Of course the average person does not review psychological research, but the popular press and "how-to" books disseminate professional opinions in bulk form. The recent advent of radio and television talk-show therapists makes professional judgments even more available. In 1957 Sears was able to say that "the rational problem solving of science" had replaced traditional wisdom. This was certainly intended to improve the fate of the young, and there are doubtless aspects of child care which have benefited from psychological research. However, scientific research has not led to the building of new traditions, that is, to consensus which parents follow more or less automatically for no better reason than "that is how we do things around here." When there is a tradition to follow, there is a stable context in which persons can experience their identities as parents. They have the chance to be parents, to exercise an office which places them in an ongoing and predictable scheme of things. In a sense it does not matter whether child-rearing traditions are wise or foolish. It is a benefit to the child to be brought up by people who feel they know what they are doing and who are supported in their parental identities by participation in a tradition (Van den Berg, 1972; Chessick, 1977).

Instead of tradition the "rational problem solving of science" has led to a bewildering series of fads in parenting (Wolfenstein, 1953; Harrison and Delano, 1976; Chessick, 1977). How does a parent use a fad when applying it to his child? The latest advice is not followed spontaneously or naturally, as one behaves when one is confident of one's station. With no tradition to rely on, one "goes by the book." A parent cannot follow the latest advice freely and spontaneously because he has never seen it before last month. The book's instructions are followed as one would follow a recipe when parenting comes to depend on techniques recommended by experts. This turns the parent into an actor, following a script which, even if learned by rote, is still only a script for the parent to play. Between parent and child is the script, and the script is in one sense the real parent. Still, this too can be seen as part of the situational approach to life. Parents confront their tasks as parents willing to adjust to the demands of the situation. They bring few personal opinions and values to the task with them but wait for the situation to tell them what is demanded. In a rapidly changing society this is the assigned role of the technical expert.

This situation leads to the psychological basis for the changes in personality organization and psychopathology discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. The undermining of parental confidence and the substitution of parenting technique for child-rearing traditions make the superego described by classical psychoanalysis increasingly impossible. In the psychoanalytic paradigm

normal character structure follows identification with the rival parent, including parental values and standards. It is this identification which has become problematic. The problem for the child is how to identify with a script, that is, with a parent who must act a role because he lacks both the traditions on which to ground his identity as a parent and the personal values on which to build his own identity. To be sure, something is taken in or "internalized" by the child. But it is an impersonal something: advice, technique, the latest research. It is progressively difficult for the superego to embody the personal values and meanings of the parents.

Wheeler (1958) suggests that what is taken in is simply an image of one's parents as conformers to what is recommended. While this may not appear at first glance to be different from identifying with parents who represent a tradition, it is experienced in quite a different way. Conformity in a small, homogeneous community is not experienced as such, but as adherence to principle, as doing one's duty. When the homogeneous community is replaced by the "global village" where one is constantly poised to expect change, conformity is experienced as merely "going along" and "fitting in" (p. 92). This was the change Reider (1950) noted soon after World War II when he wrote that normality had replaced morality as the criterion of adequate behavior. This change has made the object of identification more impersonal, more difficult to distinguish from the common mass which is conformed to, and therefore the superego lacks a clear,

distinct, and separate image with which to identify. The child's identification with the rival parent is supposed to offer the foundation for personal identity, but such an identification today may return the child to the impersonal cultural mass, leaving at best only a vague sense of how "I" differ from "they."

All of this has weakened the superego, compared to the superego described in Freudian thought (Sanford, 1955). To speak of weakening the superego principally refers to repression, specifically to a lessening of repression. Those who sought changes in child-rearing in the 1950's generally sought a less repressive social world for the growing child. As noted in the first section of this chapter, however, cultural repression is closely tied to psychological repression. As more becomes thinkable in the external world, more is thinkable without guilt in one's inner world because there are fewer figures with whom to identify who represent (through their values) a clear division between what is acceptable and what is not. Dostoevski's statement that "if there is no God everything is permissible" is true psychologically. If there is no strong father with whom to identify or if such a father has been rendered ineffectual by changing times, superego has fewer standards to enforce and there is less intrapsychic repression.

The organization of the personality was considerably altered by the weakening of the superego. If such things could be measured, those who grew up learning to trust their native inclinations and impulses rather than firmly set external (parental) limits would

surely show an enlarged ego and a shrunken superego compared to Freudian man. This decline in repression equips the individual for life in present society. The ego is the personality structure which adjusts to the demands of the external world. A strong superego constrains the ego not to adapt to circumstances which are at odds with those values and traditions with which the individual has identified. The capacity to adapt rapidly and easily is considerably lessened by such a superego. As the superego declines in strength and range of influence, ego is given a freer hand, the individual is more plastic, and the requirements of the situational approach to life are better served.

The price of this increased adaptation has been a diminished sense of personal identity. In order to feel identical with oneself there must be means for feeling different from others, and yet the sense of difference must not be such that one feels isolated or unconnected. The decline of the Oedipal-level superego and the corresponding diminished capacity for repression have been crucial factors both for the loss of identity and in the difficulties in forming satisfying attachments which tend to be associated with identity problems. There are, of course, determinants of identity prior to the Oedipal struggle (Greenacre, 1958; Jacobson, 1964), but the capacity for repression is crucial. Insofar as the growing child lacks repression he lacks also the means for experiencing behaviors, feelings, thoughts, and impulses as alien to himself. Repression allows the child to evaluate the other in terms of, "This

is acceptable to me; this is not." Encounters with the other thereby automatically entail a sense of likeness and/or difference, communicating connectedness or separateness on the basis of whether the child can experience the other's behavior as an option for himself. When the other's behavior is unacceptable to the superego, there is a basis to see clear differences between self and other, giving definition to oneself through contrast to the other. When the other behaves in an acceptable way, there is the further definition to the self which comes from seeing who and what I am like.

In Freudian thought the capacity for repression is built around identification with a parental figure. Such an identification allows a sense of difference from others without losing the feeling of connectedness with the world. Identification allows the individual to feel "I am like this person" (identification) at the same time of being aware "I am unlike this other." This is important, for identity depends both on feelings of likeness and unlikeness. Psychoanalysis is certainly aware of other ways for feeling distinct from others than through identification/repression. Erikson (1968) has noted the phenomenon of negative identity, in which extreme and generally unusual standards are endorsed in order to gain a sense of separateness from a family one otherwise feels would absorb one's identity. The problem with such a means of differentiation is that it leaves no sense of meaningful connection with important others. The self thereby becomes too abstract, and the individual may complain of feeling unreal. The growing child needs the capacity to negate

or feel different from the other without thereby launching himself into estrangement and unreality. Some sameness with others must be felt before such a capacity can be achieved. Psychoanalysis, therefore, has been wise to base repression on identification.

My argument, however, has been that the identification which forms the Oedipal-level superego is increasingly difficult to achieve and perhaps would be maladaptive for the situational approach to life. This raises the question whether there might be other avenues to identity than through formation of the Oedipal-level superego. This is to ask about other modes of identification than with the rival parent at the end of the Oedipal period. The thesis behind this study is that the Oedipal-ending identification spoken of by classical psychoanalysis is a dated concept but that identification is still the means by which identity formation is begun. More specifically, the thesis is that the identifications which ground identity are not heir to the Oedipus complex but to the phenomenon of object constancy. The nature of such identifications is clearly different from the Oedipal-ending identification of classical psychoanalytic thought, except that both serve to organize the personality in important ways. After reviewing the history of the concept of identification in Freud and later psychoanalytic thought, I will turn to re-defining identification so that the nature of that process in post-Freudian man can be more clearly seen.

## CHAPTER II

### SURVEY OF THE CONCEPT OF IDENTIFICATION

#### I. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT

This chapter traces the use of identification in classical psychoanalytic thought. The major part of the chapter focuses on the evolution of the concept in Freud's writings. Freud is not only the author of the psychoanalytic use of identification but his is also the only sustained attention to the concept in the light of new theoretical and clinical discoveries over a long period of time. Later psychoanalytic writers tend either to adopt one feature of Freud's work on identification, using the term in light of that feature to the exclusion of others (Stoke, 1950; Lazowick, 1955), or they use the concept in a loose and general way (see Loewald, 1962, p. 489). There has been surprisingly little effort in psychoanalysis to change or to clarify Freud's use(s) of identification, and therefore a thorough understanding of his work is required to assess the psychoanalytic use of the term.

Freud's references to identification are scattered throughout many books and papers. To my knowledge Freud first used the term in 1900, in The Interpretation of Dreams, in a way that seems descriptive as opposed to explanatory. Here it seems roughly synonymous with imitation or wanting-to-be-like. In the fourth chapter (pp. 149-151) Freud mentions "hysterical identification," a phenomenon

in which one person expresses feelings of commonality with another in the form of symptoms which mirror the other's attributes. Later in the work (pp. 320ff) Freud observes that in dreams identification with another allows the subject to express a truth about himself through his dream of the other. These early references to identification fail to inform our understanding of the term as a specific psychological process or mechanism and appear to predate Freud's deliberate use of identification as an explanatory term or one with precise meaning.

The works in which Freud clearly elaborates identification as a psychological process are "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917/1961), Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921/1961), The Ego and the Id (1923/1961), and New Introductory Lectures (1933/1961). Freud often mentions identification elsewhere, especially in his later writings on the Oedipus complex, but it is these above named works which principally govern the way psychoanalysis has used identification after Freud. Freud's (1914/1961) essay, "On Narcissism," must also be included. Even though the word identification does not appear in this paper, the concept and much of the metapsychology of identification are certainly present.

Freud's definition of identification does remain fairly constant across the years. His first formal definition is offered in Group Psychology. There he writes, "We can only see that identification endeavors to mold a person's own ego after the fashion of the one that has been taken as a model" (p. 106). This definition

parallels the more poetic one given in "Mourning and Melancholia," where Freud writes that "the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be [treated like] the forsaken object" (p. 249). Freud's last extended discussion of identification, in New Introductory Lectures, describes the process as "the assimilation of one ego to another one, as a result of which the first ego behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up into itself" (p. 63). Certain aspects of identification implied by these definitions remain constant in Freud's work. These aspects include a close association between identification and a love relationship with an other serving to correct or escape difficulties in the relationship by substituting an inner change for resolution of an external problem, and finally implying that the change in oneself which is brought about by identification is usually highly significant. Either the very structure of the personality is altered, or the identification is the foundation for serious psychopathology, such as suicidal depression and paranoid ideas of reference. With these definitions and these few characteristics, identification becomes a coherent concept in Freud's writings.

Several factors preclude a broader coherence than this, however, and warn us that even these few writings will not yield up a concise, systematic explanation of identification. The time span of the works warns us not to expect a neatly packaged concept. Nearly two decades pass between "On Narcissism" (1914) and New Introductory Lectures (1933). In 1914 Freud's chief explanatory

categories were topographical and economic. By 1933 an entirely new way of understanding the personality--the structural theory--has been added to the earlier models. Thus "On Narcissism" and "Mourning and Melancholia" explain identification in economic terms, that is, in terms of psychic equilibrium and the vicissitudes of instinctual development. However, The Ego and the Id and New Introductory Lectures focus on the role of identification in forming one of the three psychic structures, the superego. These different models are certainly not mutually exclusive for Freud, and so there is much overlap. At the same time, as alternatives they are not mutually translatable or completely transitive, so it is impossible to find a clear, consistent picture of identification. Additionally, Freud turned to identification both to account for such clinical states as depression and paranoid delusions, and also because theory eventually required such a concept to explain superego development. It is too much to expect that the different demands of the clinical and theoretical contexts will allow strict consistency between their conceptual results, and certainly it is too much to expect this in the early days of a field of study. For all these reasons even the relatively few works from which psychoanalysis draws its concept of identification cannot easily deliver a precise, consistent picture of that process.

One variation in the use of the concept has been along the normality-pathology dimension. Psychoanalytic thought since Freud presents identification as a key mechanism in normal development,

the means by which the Oedipal struggle is successfully ended. Freud himself came to this formulation fairly late. It is 1923 (in The Ego and the Id) before identification and the Oedipus complex are brought together in the way familiar to later psychoanalytic thought. In the earlier years Freud accorded identification some role in normal development, for example, in the formation of the ego ideal (1914/1961) and in beginning the Oedipal struggle (1921/1961), but it chiefly served to explain pathology. Identification was a key process in Freud's explanations of melancholia and paranoid delusions (1917/1961) and was given a role in hysteria (1921/1961). Prior to 1923 its only perceived function in resolving the Oedipus complex was as the means whereby that period could be unsuccessfully ended in homosexuality (1921/1961).

Not only did the function of identification in personality development change considerably over the years, but the motive for identifying with another also underwent revision. Until writing The Ego and the Id the sole reason Freud sees for forming an identification is to create an internal substitute for a lost, external object. Freud never abandons this motive for identification, but a major, new motive is implied in Group Psychology and explicated in The Ego and the Id. This new position presents identification as a type of defense, or as a vehicle for sublimating dangerous impulses. The new position allows the application of identification to superego formation and the resolution of the Oedipus complex.

Because of these many changes, not all of which appear to have been consciously planned and developed, we cannot produce a

systematic picture of Freud's use of identification. We can, however, see an evolution in his thinking on the subject. The following section traces Freud's course along that path. The third and final section of this chapter examines later use of the concept of identification.

## II. THE CONCEPT OF IDENTIFICATION IN FREUD

Freud's (1914/1961) first extended discussion of identification is in "On Narcissism," where he describes the development of the "ego ideal" and "conscience." Plainly forerunners of the later concept of superego, ego ideal and conscience are given functions of self observation, self criticism, regulation of self esteem, and repression. Although not using the word identification, Freud clearly describes that process, saying that ego ideal and conscience develop as "an embodiment, first, of parental criticism, and subsequently that of society" (p. 95). This "embodiment" is based on the individual's interactions with his parents. Fear of parental punishment or fear of losing the parents' love leads the child to establish parental standards as an ego ideal (p. 102). The Introductory Lectures (Freud, 1916-17/1961) remove any doubt that identification is the process being discussed. In lecture XXVI Freud summarizes his views on identification; he describes the ego ideal in the same terms as "On Narcissism" and then writes that it is formed "from an identification" with parents, educators, and other important figures (p. 429). Therefore "On Narcissism" establishes

the role of identification in superego formation and repression, important positions which Freud never abandoned, although nearly a decade passes before he develops them further or relates them to the Oedipus complex.

"On Narcissism" (Freud, 1914/1961) also describes two types of interpersonal relationship, or object choice, both of which prove important to Freud's later treatment of identification. One of these, anaclitic object choice, was well known to Freud from early in his work. An anaclitic, or attachment, type (Anlehnungstypus) relationship is based on the child's dependency, or "leaning," on his mother and father. An individual makes an anaclitic object choice when he seeks a relationship (even distantly) modelled on need satisfaction, dependency, and nurture. Freud writes that "those persons who have to do with the feeding, care, and protection of the child become his earliest sexual objects" and remain models for later object ties (p. 87). Consequently, a person may love "according to the anaclitic type: the woman who feeds him, the man who protects him, and the succession of substitutes who take their place" (p. 90). Freud eventually proposes anaclitic object choice as the basis for the girl's Oedipal identification with her mother and thereby gives it an important role in his mature understanding of identification.

Freud's analysis of the perversions and homosexuality and his study of the Schreber case revealed an additional and quite different sort of object tie from the anaclitic type. The new mode

of object choice was labelled "narcissistic." Narcissistic love takes one's own ego rather than primary caretakers as the model for later love objects. The narcissist loves those who will mirror back to him his own loveliness, or he may choose someone who reminds him of himself in some way. In either case the narcissist's aim is to invest his own ego with libido, not the other person. Freud considered schizophrenia the most extreme form of narcissism. The megalomania of the schizophrenic reflects his withdrawal of emotional energy from others and subsequent reinvestment in his own ego. The concept of narcissistic love leads to Freud's metapsychology of identification, used for the first time in "Mourning and Melancholia."

"Mourning and Melancholia" (Freud 1917/1961) contains Freud's first explicit discussion of identification. The work compares normal mourning following the loss of a loved one with its pathological variant, depression or melancholia. The principal difference between the two processes proves to be a dramatic fall of self esteem in depression: "In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself" (p. 246). While it appears to the outside observer that the depressive has suffered loss of a person, the patient himself insists the loss is within him. He says he has lost his value and purpose, and he insists he is of no worth. It appears that such a deflated feeling results from one part of the ego's having set itself against another part and having unleashed withering criticism against it. The conscience,

or "the critical agency" has set itself against the rest of the ego (p. 247). The observer notices that the reproaches conscience hurls against the rest of the personality resemble what the depressed person might wish to say to the person he has lost. It appears that the lost object has been taken into the ego in some way, there to receive the sadistic rebukes the individual will not or cannot issue interpersonally. Freud refers to this as "an identification of the ego with the abandoned object" (p. 249).

At first glance "On Narcissism" and "Mourning and Melancholia" have little to do with one another. The former describes identification as the vehicle for formation of the ego ideal and conscience, while the latter refers to the role of identification in a pathological process. The only similarity appears to be a rather broad one, namely that in both cases persons in the external world come to be part of the personality. This hardly seems sufficient for saying that the two works are related or for further defining identification in any specific way. Where identification has been used in such a global sense, it has (justly) drawn the rebuke that "it can hardly mean anything very precise" or be a term worth retaining (Sanford, 1955, p. 107).

In fact the commonality between "On Narcissism" and "Mourning and Melancholia" rests on the earlier paper's description of the narcissistic object choice and the metapsychology Freud was forced to develop to account for it. Anaclitic love had been quite understandable from the standpoint of the earliest versions of libido

theory, which postulates two distinct classes of instinct. These are libido, originating in the id, and the self preservative instincts, originating in the ego. According to libido theory both classes of instinct seek the same activity in the earliest stages of life (Freud, 1914/1961, p. 87). For example, sucking satisfies both libidinal and ego instinctual (survival) needs. Only later do the two types of instinct seek different objects, and the first libidinal object will be the mother whose ministrations continue to satisfy the ego instincts, but who comes to be loved as a separate object, quite apart from her caretaking activities for the infant. This is the anaclitic love mentioned above, and it marks the beginning of separate courses of development thereafter followed by the two types of instinct. Freud's understanding of personality until the 1914 paper on narcissism depended upon eventual conflict between these separate courses of development and the necessity that ego instincts repress or otherwise inhibit the course of libido. This was the foundation for repression, that "one part of the personality struggles against another" (Fenichel, 1935/1953, p. 363).

Anaclitic object choice fits easily into early libido theory, but narcissistic love poses serious problems. In libido theory instincts are classified according to source, aim, and object. We noted that early in life libido and survival instincts, although coming from different sources, seek the same activities; that is, their aims correspond. Similarly their objects correspond; the mother is the object of libido and ego instincts for the infant.

When the course of development followed by libido separates from the course followed by the ego instincts, the two classes of instinct should each seek different objects--if libido theory is correct. The conflict between libido and ego instincts which libido theory postulates depends on this. Narcissistic love, however, implies that libido continues to operate directly in the ego, and this raises the question whether there are actually two classes of instinct after all (Bibring, 1941; Fenichel, 1926/1933; Sulloway, 1979). Freud (1914/1961, pp. 76-81) himself raises this question in "On Narcissism" and in an extended discussion admits his uncertainty whether libido theory will continue to make sense in light of narcissism.

We should not underestimate how vexing this problem was for Freud. The extent to which he wrestled with it in order to preserve a conflict model of personality is shown in his discussion of the same question in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920/1961), written six years after "On Narcissism." There Freud admits that the phenomenon of narcissistic object choice implies that his critics may have been "right from the first [to suspect] that psycho-analysis makes sexuality the explanation of everything" and that Jung may have been correct in assuming only one drive instead of two (p. 52). Freud eventually solves his problem with the idea of a death instinct, thereby restoring the dual drive theory and saving the earlier, conflict model of personality.

"On Narcissism" (Freud, 1914/1961), however, seeks to preserve the separateness of libido and the ego instincts in a different

way. There Freud explains the narcissistic object tie as a regression to the original undifferentiated stage in which infant and mother are not experienced as separate by the child. He gives the name "primary narcissism" to this stage, and he explains subsequent narcissistic phenomena as secondary events, a return to this original position of libido. In Freud's words:

We say that a human being has originally two sexual objects: himself and the woman who nurses him, and in doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone, which may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his object choice. (p. 88)

Hence secondary narcissism does indicate libido operating directly in the ego, but Freud claims it is more a distortion of an early, natural stage of libidinal organization than an appropriate development of libido.

In most persons the characteristics suggesting overweening, infantile narcissism have vanished. The schizophrenic's megalomania seems so bizarre because it is an abnormal display of the primary narcissism most persons have converted into love for others, or object love. There are, however, some phenomena in normal adults which imply to Freud that not all self love has been converted into object love. The grandiose hopes which most parents have for their children, for example, seem to Freud a revival of the parents' own grandiosity which is then displaced onto "His Majesty, the Baby." Similarly the lover's overestimation of his beloved is "doubtless derived from the child's original narcissism and thus corresponds to a transference of that narcissism to the sexual object" (Freud,

1914/1961, p. 88). Freud concluded from these evidences of everyday narcissism that the ego must keep some of its primary narcissistic energies and that ego would feel deflated or depleted if all such energies were lost to object love. Ego cannot, however, invest too much love in itself, or some narcissistic disorder is inevitable. Freud arrived at the idea that a healthy balance is needed between egoism and object love. "A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love" (p. 85). The question then becomes how the normal adult keeps his egoism or self love from interfering with object love.

Repression gives Freud the clue to answer this question. Unacceptable impulses are repressed if they come into conflict with "the self respect of the ego." As we have already seen, such self respect is measured against an "ideal" which has been set up in the ego, and whatever conflicts with the ego ideal is repressed. The ego ideal is heir to primary narcissism: "This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego" (Freud, 1914/1961, p. 94). The original object of libido--the ego--has been changed, and the ego ideal has taken its place. The identification which forms the ego ideal is, therefore, a narcissistic cathexis. That is, libido is not invested in the external world, but it is given to some portion of the ego, in this case the ego ideal.

Freud's conclusion that libido could be reinvested in the ego allowed him to account for the process of identification in melancholia. The similarity between "On Narcissism" and "Mourning and Melancholia" is not that both consider identification to be the inclusion of an external object in the personality, but that both explain this inclusion in terms of narcissism. Freud reasoned that the object tie which leads to depression must have been a narcissistic object tie which readily regresses to narcissism when difficulties arise in the relationship. The libido withdrawn from the object is not directed towards other persons or new love objects; it is withdrawn into the ego (a narcissistic cathexis), which is then itself changed to resemble the lost object. This "narcissistic identification" with the lost object takes the place of the actual relationship. It is "a regression from one type of object-choice to original narcissism" (Freud, 1917/1961, p. 249). This is an important characteristic of identification for Freud, that it is a (narcissistic) substitute for object choice, or a process by which a lost object can be replaced.

This consideration gives Freud the basis for his first classification of identifications. Freud realizes that not every identification is as sweeping as that which leads to depression. Some identifications seem partial, in that some cathexis of the external object is retained. Further, partial identifications are apparently based on instinctual aims which are shared with an other, rather than on the other's resembling the ego. Finally, partial

identifications do not seem to regress to primary narcissism and are therefore not so primitive developmentally. On all these grounds it seems inappropriate to Freud to categorize partial with narcissistic identifications. Instead he revives the term he had used loosely in The Interpretation of Dreams and labels these partial identifications as "hysterical" (Freud, 1917/1961, p. 250). "Narcissistic identifications," by contrast, involve full relinquishing of object cathexis and the investment of all of the libido thus liberated into the ego which in turn becomes like the lost object. Hysterical identifications can be seen in transference neuroses, while narcissistic identifications are observed in the more primitive mental states, such as melancholia and schizophrenia (Freud, 1916-17/1961, pp. 427-429).

This classification is not particularly useful in itself, but it points the way to an important issue. It is not useful because it fails to account for the very identification it most needs to explain, that which forms the ego ideal or superego. The ego ideal is not formed because of common instinctual aims with the parents, and so the identification which forms the ego ideal can not be considered hysterical. Yet the parents are hardly abandoned as love objects by the child, and so the ego ideal does not seem to result from narcissistic identifications either. Although Freud (1924/1961) clearly considers the ego ideal or superego to involve narcissistic identifications, he never tries to clear up this contradiction, and he simply drops the classification after 1917. This early

classification suggests, however, a different issue which is of continued importance in Freud's understanding of identification. It suggests that identification can be related developmental levels. Thereby the phenomenon can be understood in terms of the characteristics of a stage of libidinal organization.

Since identification involves at least some withdrawal of libido from objects and consequent reinvestment in the ego, it seems linked to the earliest stage of libidinal organization, that is, to the narcissistic or oral stage. Writing in 1921 in Group Psychology, Freud for the first time explicitly applies characteristics of the oral stage of development to identification. He notes that identification "behaves like a derivative of the first, oral phase of the organization of the libido" (p. 105). The chief similarity is to oral incorporation, to the infant's desire to take into himself his sources of pleasure and the persons to whom he feels attached. There is, however, a deep ambivalence implied in oral incorporation. The object which is lovingly incorporated is at the same time annihilated. It ceases to exist in its own right and is thereby destroyed.

Freud first describes the relationship between primary narcissism and oral incorporation in 1915, in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," which develops ideas presented the previous year in "On Narcissism." Freud repeats his basic thesis from the latter paper that libido is fully invested in the ego at the beginning of mental life and adds that the external world is a matter of

indifference at such a time: "In so far as the ego is auto-erotic, it has no need of the external world" (1915a/1961, p. 135). Freud goes on to propose that any portions of the outside world which feel pleasurable to the infant are "introjected" or "absorbed by the ego into itself" and therefore are not experienced as external. To be loved equals being "inside me" for the infant, and loved objects are not accorded an existence in their own right (p. 138). Freud observes that since oral incorporation takes place at the stage of life when affection and annihilation amount to the same thing, any part of the emotional life dependent on incorporation will be highly ambivalent.

In this line of thought the infantile ego's mental incorporation of persons associated with pleasure is the prototypical identification. Later psychoanalytic thought has come to refer to the infantile desire for oral incorporation of an object as "primary identification." Taking an object into oneself in this manner is "the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person" (Freud, 1921/1961, p. 105). Freud argues that to some extent every later identification is a regression to oral incorporation. Identification is therefore an inadequate basis for a mature relationship with an other, for it always contains some denial of the other person's autonomy and right to a separate existence. It is, however, a natural basis for dealing with the loss of an other, precisely because it entails regression to such a denial--hence its role in melancholia, for example.

Freud's exposition of the relation between identification and primary narcissism has yielded three important points. First, all identifications involve some degree of regression to the earliest, oral incorporative form of relating to others (primary identification). Secondly, because of these oral components, identification carries deep ambivalence toward the object of the identification. Finally, because of the narcissistic nature of identification it can substitute for a lost object tie, investing in the ego the love which was originally given to the object. In Group Psychology Freud (1921/1961) brings these points together to propose identification as a crucial mechanism in different aspects of the Oedipal struggle.

Freud (p. 105) observes that long before the Oedipal conflict actually begins the little boy identifies with his father. This helps to reinforce the boy's anaclitic love for his mother. Such a tie with the mother would exist anyway, of course, but the child's identification with his father presumably encourages him further to love the mother, as does the father. According to Freud the Oedipal period begins when the boy notices for the first time that his father stands in the way of fully loving his mother. The ambivalence at the bottom of every identification allows the boy's identification with his father to take on hostile intent; the boy decides to replace his father, and this begins the Oedipal struggle. Thus one role for identification is in the preparation for the Oedipus complex.

Although Group Psychology relates identification to the origins of the Oedipal period, that work does not assign identification

a part in the successful resolution of the Oedipal struggle. Since today we are most familiar with identification as the process by which the Oedipal period is successfully concluded, this may seem curious. In fact the terms in which Freud considered identification in Group Psychology made it impossible to arrive in that work at his mature position. Although Freud had discussed types of identification which did not necessarily follow object loss--for example, in the formation of the ego ideal, in beginning the Oedipus complex, and in hysterical identification--his basic conception of identification at the time was as a substitute for a lost love relationship. Freud (1921/1961) says of identification that "in a regressive way it becomes a substitute for a libidinal object-tie, as it were by means of introjection of the object into the ego" (pp. 107-108). This is the basis for identification which Freud discovered in "Mourning and Melancholia," and to which he returned repeatedly as the surest example of identification.

An identification which replaces a lost or disappointing relationship with an other cannot serve the successful resolution of the Oedipus complex. The parent of the opposite sex is lost to the child as a love object, but the parent of the same sex is identified with. Freud (1923/1961, pp. 32-34) himself notes this contradiction in The Ego and the Id and tries to resolve it by saying that the child's bisexuality actually forces some identification with both parents at the end of the Oedipal stage. While such an idea may account for the boy's identifying with his mother in a

successful resolution to his Oedipal fixation on her, it still offers no explanation for the child's identifying with his father whom he has not lost. If the primary motive for identification is to provide a compensation for a lost love relationship, then this mechanism can principally define only an unsuccessful resolution to Oedipal struggles. It can only show how the child identifies with the parent he cannot have and must give up, a sort of identification which would result in homosexuality. In Group Psychology Freud (1921/1961, pp. 108-109) follows precisely this logic and offers identification as a mechanism by which the Oedipus complex may be unhappily resolved. If a man cannot give up his sexual preference for his mother and exchange her for an appropriate substitute, he may decide instead to exchange his loving her for identifying with her. Such a man will then look for love objects to take the place of his own ego, so he can lavish on others the love and affection which he desired from his mother. Freud suggests that "this is a frequent process" and plays the chief role in most cases of male homosexuality.

Group Psychology actually contains the basis for a different motive for identification than as the replacement for a lost object tie. Freud seems not to have recognized its applicability at first to the resolution of the Oedipus complex. In fact the process he describes is hidden in a brief discussion (pp. 103-104) of the libidinal tie which exists between members of a group. Freud observes that in groups individuals are able to surrender at least briefly

their selfish interests for the interests of the larger unit. Since the only limit on selfishness is object love, there must be some form of object love which obtains in the group, or else such a surrender of selfish desire would not be possible. Generally object love follows the development of libido, and there are appropriate sexual aims and objects for each libidinal organization. The libidinal tie in groups is not sexual, however, and so there must exist processes which divert libido from its sexual aim. Freud offers the "so-called identifications" as one such process which results in desexualized libidinal ties. As such, identification has the properties of what later psychoanalytic writers refer to as a defense mechanism and can be conceived as one means by which unacceptable and dangerous impulses can be brought under control of the ego. Freud does not explicitly consider identification as a defense in Group Psychology, however, only as a means by which groups are held together.

Freud begins to describe identification as a defensive process in a series of writings from 1923-1925 on the resolution of the Oedipus complex. These are the works in which he introduces his structural theory and sets forth the role of the superego. The first of these, The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1923/1961), includes some aspects of identification with which we are familiar from earlier writings, including the unity of object cathexis and identification during the oral phase (primary identification) and the role of identification as a substitute for lost object ties. The Ego

and the Id includes, however, some important new points on the defensive function of identification. Freud writes that in identification the ego takes on the traits of the lost love object and "offers itself" to the id as a substitute. If the id accepts this substitute the consequent conversion of object libido to narcissistic libido has in effect sublimated the original id impulse. The object of instinctual energy has been changed from an external object to the ego, and since the id cannot have a sexual aim toward the ego, the aim of the instinct is changed as well as the object. The instinct has thereby been desexualized, or sublimated. Freud offers the possibility that identification may in fact be the "universal road to sublimation" (p. 30). This defensive function of identification becomes the motive behind the boy's identification with his father which ends the Oedipal struggle.

The Ego and the Id reiterates the observation made in Group Psychology that the boy identifies with his father long before the Oedipal period. This early identification is not a substitute for a lost object tie, but is a consequence of the original unity of identification and love in the oral phase. We have seen that the ambivalence of such early identifications allows hostile feelings to form toward the father, who obstructs the child's love for his mother. Freud notes that hostility toward the rival parent cannot be satisfied, however, and is experienced as quite dangerous because of castration fear. As long as the original instinctual object (the mother) is maintained and the original instinctual aim (sexual

union with the mother) pursued, the boy must fear his father's retaliation. Freud argues that the boy's identification with the father is a sublimation of genital strivings toward the mother and of hostile feelings toward the father, thereby bringing these dangerous impulses under control. This explanation underlies Freud's mature position on identification, and it is first put forth in The Ego and the Id in 1923, "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" in 1924, and "Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes" in 1925.

Freud (1924/1961) writes that the boy's fear of castration, or the castration complex, is not necessarily aroused by a parent's threat to cut off his genitals, though parents may make such threats near the Oedipal period to control masturbation and genital exploration. The sight of the girl's genitals with her conspicuous lack of a penis is the event which actually brings castration fear. This sight intensifies the boy's guilty fear of retaliation of the hostile feelings he harbors toward his father: "With this the loss of his own penis becomes imaginable and the threat of castration takes its deferred effect" (p. 176). The heightening of castration fear makes Oedipal desire for the mother increasingly untenable as there seems no way to satisfy genital aspirations. If the boy gives up his mother he will have to abandon hope for sexual union with her, but if he perseveres his father will cut off his penis, and then he will not be able to have intercourse with his mother either. According to Freud the boy's best course is to preserve his penis by surrendering genital love for his mother.

In Freud's mature position identification with the father replaces genital love for the mother. Freud's initial wording in "Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" (1924/1961) obscures the real motive for this identification. He writes, "The object-cathexes are given up and replaced by identifications" (p. 176). This formula repeats the early position that identification is a substitute for lost object ties. We have already seen that this formula cannot be applied to the resolution of the Oedipal period, since the parent who is identified with is not the parent who is given up as a love object. Freud goes on, however, to describe the defensive purposes of the identification, calling it a "sublimation" which diverts libido from its aim by transforming hostile impulses toward the father into "impulses of affection" (p. 176). The father who was the obstacle to his son's wishes has been "erected within" the psyche through identification and has now become an internal obstacle to incestuous wishes (Freud, 1923/1961, p. 34). This is the nucleus of the superego, which retains the character of the father, his values, his severity, and of course his incest taboo. With this the Oedipus complex is destroyed (Freud, 1925b/1961, p. 257; 1933/1961, p. 6), and latency (so named because sexuality recedes into the background of development) is begun.

The chief motive for the identification which ends the Oedipal period is mastery of castration fear, not the replacement of a lost object. The father, who was perceived as a threat to the boy's narcissistic regard for his penis, becomes part of the personality,

as it were. By virtue of this incorporation he is no longer an external threat to the child, since the child has become like him. Anna Freud (1946) later gave the name "identification with the aggressor" to this process, and it is one of the two chief motives in Freudian thought for the Oedipal identification with the rival parent.

Anaclitic object choice is the second such motive, although Freud did not apply it at first to the Oedipal struggle. Freud initially did not consider the possibility that the Oedipus complex and its resolution could be different for boys and girls. As late as 1923 he regarded the girl's Oedipal struggles as "precisely analogous" to the boy's (Freud, 1923/1961, p. 32). Therefore he did not need to propose different resolutions to the struggle for each sex, and fear of retaliation by the parent of the same sex sufficed to explain the Oedipal conclusion for boys and girls alike.

In "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" Freud (1924/1961) emphasized for the first time different courses of psychological development for each sex. After reviewing the boy's castration fear and its influence in identification with the father, Freud observes that castration fear can hardly be a strong motive for the girl. Freud believes the girl has a castration complex but that it is quite different from the boy's; it stems from believing that she once had a penis and has already been castrated. Since the girl cannot fear castration in such circumstances, this cannot be her motive for superego formation. Freud writes that the girl's

superego results from "upbringing and intimidation from outside which threatens her with loss of love" (p. 178). Unfortunately, Freud does not develop this intriguing statement in this paper but turns immediately to a different theme, the girl's desire for a baby from her father as a replacement for her lost penis. Freud states that the girl seems to surrender her Oedipal desire to bear her father's child simply because "the wish is not fulfilled" (p. 179). One is left with more questions than answers at this point, and so apparently is Freud, for he quickly notes that this explanation is "unsatisfactory, incomplete, and vague." The implication of the discussion is that superego formation and the resolution of the Oedipus complex are separate issues for the girl, the former coming from need to be approved of and the latter from simple disillusionment.

Having established the superego as the third important psychic structure along with the ego and the id, Freud must seek a fuller explanation of its development in the girl. It appears that the Oedipus complex will not fully serve as its vehicle. Identification with the aggressor is the boy's motive for identifying with his father, but a different motive will be needed in the case of the girl. Freud (1923/1961) had linked the identification which forms the superego with "building up what is called [the ego's] 'character'" (p. 28). He notes that the woman's character is typically different from the man's, saying that women show less sense of justice than do men and that their judgment is more influenced by emotion than

is the case with men (Freud, 1925b/1961, p. 258). According to Freud women do not generally show the punitive, severe superego which results from identification with someone who is perceived as a physical threat. The feminine superego retains an affectionate quality which is unlike that of the male. This leads Freud to conclude that the girl's superego is more modelled on preoedipal than Oedipal interaction with her mother. Further, the Oedipal disillusionment is the cause of the girl's identifying with her mother, but the actual content of her superego identification is laid down before the Oedipal period.

This position is set forth in The New Introductory Lectures, where Freud (1933/1961) suggests that the woman's superego identification with her mother is in two strata. The first level is the preoedipal girl's anaclitic attachment to the mother who cares for her. In the preoedipal period the girl forms affectionate identifications with her mother. These can readily be observed in doll play, where the girl imitates her mother, while the doll stands for the girl herself. The second level is the identification which leads into the Oedipal period. The girl ceases to identify with her mother qua her own caregiver and begins to identify with her mother qua her father's wife. Freud says that at this point in doll play the girl still imitates her mother with the doll, but the doll no longer represents herself, but the baby she wants from her father (p. 128). This initiates the Oedipal rivalry with her mother whom she wishes to replace as her father's wife. This much is roughly parallel

to the boy's progress to rivalry with his father, but here the two courses of development must part. The boy's experiences with his father during the Oedipal period are the basis for the content of his superego. The boy experiences the father as an aggressor who may mutilate him through castration. According to Freud it is this father with whom he identifies, and his superego takes on comparable severity. The girl lacks an analogous experience with her mother. She does not fear physical attack or mutilation. As Freud (1926/1961) notes, "we can hardly speak with propriety of castration anxiety where castration has already taken place" (p. 123). Whatever image of her mother the girl uses for identification, it cannot be the aggressive and threatening parent with whom the boy identifies because such a parent does not exist for the girl during the Oedipal period.

Freud's position is that the girl has two images of her mother which she may use for identification, or the two strata mentioned above. The image of mother as father's wife proves unsatisfactory for a continuing identification because the girl never receives from her father the baby which this identification promises. Freud believes that she must resort to her preoedipal image of her mother for identification. Thus the content of the girl's identification with her mother at the end of the Oedipal period is actually preoedipal. Indeed the girl's motive for forming such an identification also predates the Oedipus complex, for it is the anaclitic object tie left over from infancy. While the boy would fear castration if he continued the Oedipal rivalry, the girl would fear loss of

love. Freud concludes that the girl identifies with the mother in order to end Oedipal rivalry with her, thereby to preserve the anaclitic relationship with her mother.

Such a motive for identification causes the process to serve a defensive function, as with the boy. In setting forth his mature theory of anxiety in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, Freud (1926/1961, Chap. 8) proposes that loss of the mother's love during the Oedipal period "reminds" the girl (through a series of unconscious associations) of what loss of the mother would have meant during infancy, namely, loss of the one who kept physical needs from overwhelming the baby with their terrible tensions and demands. Freud says that this in turn reminds the girl of the overwhelming tension and stimulation of birth, which was the original loss of the mother. Now the Oedipal aged girl finds that the prospect of losing her mother's love awakens deep anxieties reminiscent of birth and of infantile terrors. Insofar as libidinal cathexis of the father as a sexual object is the occasion for such anxieties, the girl finds her instinctual desires too threatening. She sublimates sexual love for her father, therefore, much as the boy. Freud concludes that she identifies with the mother she formerly sought to replace, thereby defending against loss of this anaclitic object tie and its anxiety-arousing associations.

Although the child forms identifications before those which end the Oedipal struggle, those formed at this time have particular importance. The identification with the rival parent is the nucleus

of a new psychic structure, the superego. Freud (1923/1961, p. 32) writes that such an identification "consolidates" or "fixes" the child's "character." Freud is not specific about what he means by this, but in different places he discusses three aspects of the superego identification which seem relevant. First, the superego, by repressing sexual desires for the parent of the opposite sex, has marked off some things as the rival parent's prerogatives which the child cannot have (pp. 34-36). This means that emotional-generational boundaries have been formed between parents and child. In turn this gives the child a clearer sense of differentiation from the parents, and consequently a sharper sense of me and not-me. Presumably the parents have exercised their obligation to decide the appropriateness of the child's desires throughout early life and not just in the Oedipal period. However, the obstacle which the father posed to his son's incestuous wishes has not remained an externally imposed limit. It has been set up within the personality, as it were, and continues to set limits on the child through the automatic censorship of thoughts and wishes. Therefore the second aspect of superego's consolidation of character is that structure's ability "to stand apart from [his] ego and to master it" (p. 48). The individual's mature defenses against the undue intrusion of emotional conflict into daily functioning are built on this internal mastery, which is called repression. Superego's repression of impulses which are at variance with its injunctions and commands lends coherence to the personality. In the same way

that generational boundaries were formed by the parents' assumption of the right to decide which prerogatives were theirs alone and which were also the child's, repression means that there are internal boundaries between what is like-me and unlike-me, contributing to an inner sense of me and not-me.

The third aspect of superego's role in consolidating character is that the child's superego is not modelled after the parents' egos, but after their superegos. Freud (1933/1961) writes that parents typically follow the dictates of their own superegos in bringing up their children.

Whatever terms their ego may be on with their super-ego, in the education of the child they are severe and exacting. They have forgotten the difficulties of their own childhood and are glad to be able to identify themselves fully at last with their own parents, who subjected them to such severe restraints. (p. 67)

The parents' behavior toward the child may not be typical of their general behavior therefore, and the child may not have the chance to see the ways his parents have begun to make subtle (or not so subtle) changes in the values first given him by the parents. Rather the child will see the original values themselves, just as his parents saw only their own parents' superegos rather than their general behavior. The superego thereby becomes "the vehicle of tradition and of all time-resisting judgments of value which may have propagated themselves in this manner from generation to generation" (p. 67). The past continues in the superego's ideals and values, and in this way the tradition of the people and nation are

passed along in such a way that they are not readily amenable to change. While the generational boundaries and internal boundaries mentioned above help to consolidate character through giving a sense of me and not-me, superego also connects the child to a larger group, his family first and also the still larger groups of nation and forefathers.

Superego formation is the vehicle by which the child firms up and takes into himself a sense of differentiation from others and also a sense of being connected with others. Although Freud did not describe the process as identity formation, this is the term which later psychoanalytic thinkers use to describe this consolidation of character. Freud (1933/1961, p. 64) argues that this bedrock of identity remains relatively fixed, except for some contributions by later authority figures such as educators. When the child is able to perceive his parents more realistically, he may form new identifications with them, but these influence his ego, not his superego. Superego remains built on the earliest parental images. The child's earliest sense of who he is remains grounded in the identifications which end the Oedipus complex.

### III. THE CONCEPT OF IDENTIFICATION AFTER FREUD

As the preceding section shows Freud did not produce a concept of identification which, like Minerva, was full grown at birth. Rather his work gives an evolution of that category. Freud himself seems not to have been aware of these continuing changes and usually

speaks as though identification were a monolithic concept. He uses the one word to cover such diverse events as: a process leading to depression; the infant's fused relation to the mother; the avenue to normal superego development; and an explanation of hysterical imitation. The concept remains one of those working terms which is seldom reflected upon systematically and is developed only enough to support accounts of larger and theoretically more urgent phenomena. Freud's frequent but fairly brief discussions of identification certainly contain material for a clearer and more coherent concept, but it is a fact that Freud did not produce one. Freud's understanding of identification resembles a house to which the owner has added many rooms and outbuildings over the years, each in a rather different architecture and all of it seemingly connected by accident.

Psychoanalysis since Freud has generally used identification after the manner of The Ego and the Id, to describe the process of normal superego formation. Since Freud never clarified the relation between this later use of identification and his earlier references to it, the boundaries and content of the concept have remained vague. Loewald (1962) refers to the "somewhat loose fashion" in which identification is usually used "in accordance with general psychoanalytic parlance" (p. 489). Certainly many writers have not been content with the lack of precision surrounding the term. As early as the 1930's Fuchs (1937) found it necessary to clarify the relationship between introjection and identification, since the two

terms had come to be used interchangeably. A few years later Knight (1940) complained that identification was used in more different ways than any other psychoanalytic concept. In 1955 Sanford suggested virtually abandoning the term except for several specific pathological processes observable in the course of psychoanalysis. Sanford based this radical proposal on the undisciplined use of the category since Freud, the continued confusion between introjection and identification, and the (then) recent attacks on the psychoanalytic version of identification by learning theorists (Tolman, 1943; Mowrer, 1953). Several such attacks had taken place before Sanford wrote, and they have continued. These attacks by learning theorists took advantage of the confused status of identification within psychoanalysis and proposed to give the concept more specific, verifiable content. From within the mainstream of psychoanalysis Roy Schafer (1976) has made efforts similar to those of the learning theorists. All of these critiques presuppose and try to remedy the absence of systematic precision in the psychoanalytic concept of identification.

A further complication in the use of identification since Freud has been the relative lack of development in the metapsychology of identification. Freud called for such development in 1923, and Fenichel (1926/1953) noted the continuing need a few years later. Despite Bronfenbrenner's statement in 1960 that "the theories have grown all out of proportion to the facts" (p. 38), there has actually been little new in the metapsychology of identification since

The Ego and the Id. Thus this concept has had little room for creative development. Hampered by lack of clear definition in Freud, used in a loose, perhaps nebulous manner after him, and without sufficient metapsychological foundation, identification has been poorly situated for significant elaboration.

Fenichel makes the only sustained attempt both to provide systematic precision and a metapsychological foundation for identification. In a series of papers written during Freud's lifetime Fenichel (1925/1953, 1926/1953, 1931/1953, 1934/1953) produces a concept of identification intensely faithful to Freud and, perhaps for that reason, a concept which finally offers rather little more than Freud's. Fenichel's talent for synthesis and systematization allows him to avoid the problems which later writers have noted with the concept of identification, for instance, its frequent confusion with introjection. Ironically, even though he avoids such common later difficulties, he does not avoid Freud's earliest problem in trying to classify identifications. As we will see Fenichel cannot find a metapsychology which accounts for the identification which forms the mature superego.

Fenichel (1926/1953) distinguishes two chief classes of identification, primary and regressive. Primary identification is a phenomenon appropriate to the late oral or biting stage of libidinal organization. According to Fenichel the ego is beginning to distinguish inner from outer reality by the late oral stage, in contrast to the earlier tendency of the "pleasure ego" to regard

any source of satisfaction as "me." Even though the ego in the late oral stage can partially differentiate inner from outer and may therefore recognize a need satisfying or pleasure giving object as properly belonging to the outside world, "yet still the attempt is made to incorporate it into the ego. This endeavor constitutes primary identification" (p. 103). The concept of primary identification corresponds to Freud's (1921/1961) description of the primitive identifications which are "the earliest expression of an emotional tie" and which behave "like a derivative of the first, oral phase of organization of the libido" (p. 105). Like Freud, Fenichel emphasizes the ambivalence of such identifications, due to the natural confusion between love and destruction which obtains during the oral phase. Unlike Freud, Fenichel places primary identification in the period when the infant begins to distinguish self from other, rather than in the earlier, fused mother-child matrix.

Fenichel says that all subsequent identifications attempt to incorporate an object into the ego. Since this entails a return to the oral incorporative mode of experience, all subsequent identifications can be called regressive. Fenichel (1926/1953, pp. 105-107) draws on Freud's (1917/1961, pp. 160-161) early attempt to classify identifications in "Mourning and Melancholia" to subdivide regressive identifications into two types, total and partial, roughly corresponding to Freud's narcissistic and hysterical identifications. Total identification is the less frequent event and is defined by two characteristics. First the instinctual aim is for total

incorporation of the object, which denies the object's separate existence and returns the individual to narcissistic object relations. All love is withdrawn from the object and given to the ego instead. Secondly the instinct involved is a primitive one, oral sadism. The individual is not operating at a mature level of psychic organization which simply makes use of a primitive (oral) mechanism. Libido is actually organized at the late oral level, and the individual's interpersonal style suffers many limitations as a result of the burden of such primitive needs. Fenichel describes total identification as a phenomenon found only in schizophrenia, melancholia, and in the superego formation of normal persons.

Partial identifications are quite common, in contrast to total. As the term implies, partial identifications involve only some withdrawal of libido from the object and subsequent reinvestment in the ego. This means that the object remains a real, external figure for the subject and that the other's right to exist separately is not denied. Such an acknowledgement of the object's separateness would not be possible if libido were fixated at the oral level, and so partial identifications imply genital libidinal organization. In the language of psychoanalysis, libido has "flowed backward" from the genital to the oral level in that some incorporation of the object is sought (an oral aim). The individual has not totally regressed to oral forms of experiencing the world, however, and his object relations remain more mature. Fenichel believes that partial identifications are found in homosexuality, hysterical

symptom formations, normal grief, and the superego formation of neurotics. Although Fenichel is faithful to Freud's concept of hysterical identification in most of what he says about partial identification, he does depart in one respect; he gives partial identification some role in character formation.

Fenichel's classification of identification brings greater order to the subject than it enjoys in Freud. Fenichel has made surprisingly few changes to achieve that order, and so his schema remains quite close to Freud's in content. By remaining so close, however, Fenichel imports into his exposition the very problem which makes Freud's early attempt at classification irrelevant. Fenichel himself notes the problem, saying it is a "state of affairs which is not understood as yet" (p. 106). He refers to the problem of superego formation following dissolution of the Oedipus complex. The identification involved is certainly a total one in normal development, and Fenichel has argued that a partial identification in superego formation leads to neurosis. Yet there is no total regression to orality in normal superego formation, for the parents continue to be experienced as separate persons whom the child continues to love. Fenichel is unable to account for the contradiction of a total identification which lacks the "total regression to narcissism and orality." This is the same contradiction found in Freud's early classification; the identification forming the ego ideal is narcissistic in that classification but does not involve abandoning the parents as love objects, as a narcissistic identification should.

Fenichel has kept Freud's problem by keeping his early metapsychology. In "Mourning and Melancholia" and Group Psychology Freud accounts for identification as a regression to oral, narcissistic ways of experiencing the world which replace a disappointing love object with an internal alteration. While these features are not missing from later discussions of identification, they are largely superseded by descriptions of identification as a defense mechanism. In The Ego and the Id and The New Introductory Lectures Freud views identification as a means whereby dangerous impulses toward external objects could be neutralized and sublimated. He therefore offers two bases for metapsychology: identification as regression to primary identification, and identification as a means of altering unacceptable instinctual aims. The two bases are rather different, for the first is a retreat from object relations, while the second is designed to preserve object relations.

Fenichel is aware of Freud's use of identification as a defense. He begins his article, "Identification," with an extended discussion of the defensive purposes of the process, describing with some care how both the aim and the object of an instinct are altered through identification. Although there is nothing new in his discussion compared to Freud's, Fenichel is characteristically more systematic and deliberate. In light of this attention to detail it is surprising that when Fenichel ends his description of identification as a means whereby instinct is desexualized, he turns immediately to its regressive features, seemingly without recognizing

that he has changed to a new category whose implications are radically different.

When identification is understood as a regression to orality or to primary identification, it is understood as a retreat from an interpersonal world which has frustrated the individual's attempts to love and be loved. Love is withdrawn from the disappointing other and reinvested in oneself. In the process both self and other appear changed (to the individual forming the identification). The other, who was unsatisfying and undependable as a separate person, is denied the right to exist separately. Thereby he is relieved of the power to disappoint. He becomes part of the self, a magical alternative to the real world and its potential frustrations. The advantage of this arrangement is that there is now an outlet for the instinctual energy which the real other would not or could not satisfy. This energy is given to the new self-object unity. Need satisfaction or instinctual gratification is gained, but at the cost of abandoning object relations for narcissism. This precludes the possibility of mature or lasting interpersonal relationships, for the individual has regressed to extremely immature ways of relating to others. Need satisfaction has replaced love for others, a state of things which is appropriate for the first eight months of life but becomes increasingly problematic after that.

When identification is seen as a defense, the picture is quite changed. One function of a defense is to prevent the inappropriate intrusion of instinctual needs into interpersonal relations.

If libidinal pressures are not neutralized to some extent they threaten to dominate every object tie with the demand that the other satisfy my needs. The successful defense against such pressure converts sexual energy into neutral energy which can then be used as affection, for example, and can thereby sustain mature love or friendship (cf. Nunberg, 1955, pp. 307-310). One of the principal aims of the psychoanalytic therapies is to further the individual along just this road, enabling him to replace need satisfaction with interpersonal relations. Identification is one of the processes Freud was able to describe which contribute to this goal in normal development by desexualizing libido. In this role, therefore, identification is quite different from when it is considered as a regression to primary identification.

Freud and Fenichel are unaware that they are discussing two, quite different phenomena under the same name. Their classifications falter because neither can explain the identification which ends the Oedipal period, since that identification does not retreat from object relationships to narcissism but allows the child to continue being connected to the parents. Because the Oedipal-ending identification establishes or cements the child's "character," Freud and Fenichel wish to call it "narcissistic" and "total" respectively, thereby linking it to the identifications observed in depression and megalomania which likewise dominate the personality, at least during the course of those illnesses. The metapsychology of "On Narcissism," developed in "Mourning and Melancholia" and Group

Psychology, gives no basis for understanding an identification which allows object relations to continue to grow. By continuing to apply this metapsychology to superego formation Freud and Fenichel are forced to include the Oedipal-ending identification as an anomaly in their schemas. This problem of classification would not obtain if it were recognized that the metapsychology of "On Narcissism" does not apply to superego formation. The metapsychology suggested by The Ego and the Id, where identification is seen in part as a defensive process, supersedes "On Narcissism" and suggests that a more adequate classification would distinguish regressive from defensive identifications. So long as identification is defined as a substitute for an object tie, this more adequate classification cannot be made.

Although later writers have not addressed this specific issue, there have been several relevant attempts to remedy problems with the concept of identification, beginning with a series of discussions on the utility of the concept of primary identification. The first such discussion is found in an address given in 1937 by S. H. Fuchs before the British Psycho-Analytical Society of London. The lecture, lengthened and published under the title "On Introjection," attempts to untangle some of the confusion between introjection and identification, a confusion Fuchs reports to be well advanced at the time he writes. Fuchs essentially proposes that introjection be used to represent the psychic process of taking an external object into the personality, and that identification be used to describe

the result of such a process--a suggestion later endorsed by Lazowick (1955) and Greenson (1954a). In the course of making his argument Fuchs proposes other clarifications, one of which is pertinent to distinguishing identification qua regression to orality from identification qua defense. Fuchs suggests deleting the term primary identification. He notes that most authors describe early life "as chaotic in the sense of a complete indistinctness of what becomes later on world and body, ego and non-ego, inside and outside" (p. 287). He reasons that if this accurately depicts the state of affairs in early life it makes no sense to speak of any type of identification, for there is no ego to be altered nor is there a perceived world of objects to identify with. Fuchs concludes,

It would be more correct to speak of the early stage of complete indistinctness of ego and outside world and to consider the gradual differentiation into ego and external world. This would render the term (primary identification) unnecessary. (p. 293)

Writing some years after Fuchs, Michael Balint (1968) makes virtually the same argument in the course of criticizing the concept of primary narcissism. Balint argues that if identification is used in any ordinary sense in the term primary identification, it signifies a "change in the ego under the influence of some external object . . . which was previously intensely cathected" (p. 62). Intense cathexis implies sufficient differentiation between self and other that loving the self is not the same thing as loving the other. Consequently "there cannot be any primary identification. All identifications must be per definitionem secondary to some object or environment cathexis."

In light of the arguments by Fuchs and Balint it is worth noting some developments in the concept of primary identification since Freud's death. The concept does not always today refer to a disposition of the oral stage infant, as it did for Freud and Fenichel, but in some authors it describes the ante-natal state. "Primary identification characterizes the infant in the womb," writes Guntrip (1961, p. 301) following Fairbairn (1952). The intent behind making primary identification ante-natal is to equate it with complete fusion with the mother and to date it at a time when there can be no question of differentiation. Thus Fairbairn defines primary identification as "the cathexis of an object which has not been differentiated from himself by the cathecting subject" (p. 145). Even those authors who continue to date primary identification in early postnatal life now tend to emphasize fusion. Cameron (1963, pp. 224-225), for example, in his definition refers to "the experience of unity" with the mother at a time when there is no sense of being different from her. Such an emphasis serves well to preserve the character of secondary identifications as substitutes for lost objects. If primary identification is fusion with the mother, then secondary identifications regress to complete denial of the object's separateness (as in Freud) and in such a way replace disturbed or disappointing interpersonal relationships. This preserves Freud's earliest definition of identification as a substitute for lost object ties.

The arguments of Fuchs and Balint raise important questions about this state of affairs. In primary identification the word

identification seems synonymous with fusion and appears not only to offer nothing beyond the latter concept but to carry unnecessary terminological confusion. Commenting on Fairbairn's definition of primary identification Winnicott and Kahn (1953) observe that "if an object is not differentiated it cannot operate as an object" (p. 332). This does not deny the impact of object relations in early life; it denies that objects are experienced as such. If this is so, nothing is gained by using a term which implies a sense of differentiation between self and other. One need not identify with that which is already felt to be part of the self. There can be no identification prior to differentiation, for there can be no feeling of identity with another unless there is also the possibility of feeling different. The same argument applies to Cameron's phrase, "the experience of unity." This phrase cannot refer to an undifferentiated state; the experience of unity can only be defined by the possibility of experiencing separateness as well. The infant is united, and only a third party looking on has the distance to speak of the presumed experience. Psychoanalysis already has the term fusion to describe the prenatal and early postnatal relationship of infant to mother. Primary identification seems unnecessary as well as misleading.

If the concept of primary identification is dropped the aim of secondary identifications can be reconsidered. So long as there is a primary form of identification which defines later identifications as subtypes, the later ones must run true to type, so to speak.

Secondary identifications must serve a return to unity with the other because they are regressions to primary identification. If the concept of primary identification is dropped, later identifications can be rethought on their own and new motives for identification may be uncovered. Perhaps some such identifications will appear to be attempts at fusion which substitute for an unsatisfying state of affairs in the external world. But other, more significant motives for identification may also be uncovered.

This leads us to another attempt at clarifying the concept of identification which is relevant to Freud's and Fenichel's failure to distinguish regressive from defensive identifications. As noted above, regressive identification flees interpersonal relations, while defensive identification safeguards such relations. Edith Jacobson (1954, 1964) who has written more on the metapsychology of identification than anyone since Fenichel, discusses this issue in her attempt to describe a continuum of identifications from primitive, magical types to superego identifications. Although she does not refer to Fuchs or Balint as influences on her thinking, Jacobson (1964) also avoids the term primary identification because she does not want to link early identifications with "the primary state of union with the mother" (p. 39n). Jacobson regards very early fantasies of union with the mother (from age three months on) as the "foundation" of all later modes of identification. She does not, however, seek to define later identifications as regressive repetitions of fusion wishes. Rather she defines a progressive series in which

the nature and aim of identification are appropriate to the level of ego development. Her work implies that identification is not a single mechanism or process but that there are identifications corresponding to many levels of personality organization.

Jacobson is consequently in position to observe the differences between what we have called regressive and defensive identifications. She (1964, p. 45) notes Freud's failure to comment on the "characteristic and highly significant differences" between narcissistic or regressive identifications and later ego and superego identifications. Early, primitive identifications are "magical," based on fantasies of becoming the longed-for object. They do not lead to attempts to become like the other person in reality; early identifications refer to fantasy unions rather than realistic changes, and any actual imitation of the other serves purely as a magic symbol of the desired merger in Jacobson's view (1954, pp. 242-243). By contrast later ego and superego identifications are realistic in that they result in long-term changes in the personality which justify the subject's feeling like the love object. Instead of the primitive desire for oneness with the object, later identifications express the desire to be like the other. According to Jacobson (1964, p. 45), these later identifications aid the psychological growth of the individual, giving him appropriate social behaviors, standards by which to judge himself, and other necessary tools of adaptation.

The functions of later identifications lead Jacobson to an important conclusion. In her (1954) words, "a simple statement,

such as that ego and superego identifications replace the lost sexual object, is not comprehensive and precise enough [because] the object relations of the child profit greatly from the building up of ego and superego identifications" (p. 244). In contrast to the classical Freudian position that identification is a substitute for a lost object, Jacobson argues that after early infancy identification matures object relations. The most important service identification provides in this regard is supporting neutralization of drives through replacing sexual aims with affectionate ones. Jacobson is clearly referring to what we have called defensive identifications, and she takes the step Freud and Fenichel did not by distinguishing it from narcissistic or fusion-fantasy identifications. Having divorced herself from the position that primary identification is the prototype of all identifications, she is able to appreciate differences which for Freud and Fenichel were anomalous. This allows her to reach an important position which was only partially available to Freud: Jacobson realizes that identification is not necessarily a retreat from the interpersonal world; later ego and superego identifications are tools whereby the personality develops, matures, and increases competence in the world.

Finally, Paul Schilder's work contains a treatment of identification which is relevant to Freud's and Fenichel's classifications. Writing some years before Jacobson, Schilder (1950) reached an understanding of identification which corrects difficulties in Freud's treatment of that concept and which

anticipates Jacobson and current uses of identification. Although Schilder agrees with Freud that identification, if total, replaces object ties, he does not consider this to be its primary function, and he denies that identification is the earliest form of object tie. Interest in another precedes identification, according to Schilder, and therefore there is some emotional tie which predates identification (pp. 253-254). Consequently, for Schilder identification cannot be the return to a primary self-mother unity which it is for Freud. Another motive for identification must be found.

Schilder's approach to the question of motivation begins from a different point than Freud's. At the risk of drawing too neat a contrast we might say that Freud begins with the internal world while Schilder begins with the external. The flavor of Schilder's work is to remind the reader that mother and infant, or father and Oedipal son, do not live by themselves, playing parts in two or three character plays. The various dyads and triads exist within families and the families are within communities and the larger social and physical worlds. Schilder writes, "In identification the individual identifies himself with persons in his actual or imagined surroundings" (p. 251). It is not simply the mother (or father) with whom the child identifies, but a parent who is in the world with the child. The aim is not merely to become like the parent; it is to become like the parent in those surroundings, in the child's world. The world is the context of life, the arena of action. With this recognition, "We have reached the final

problem of identification. What type of action is based on identification?" (p. 253). The motive for identification is to extend the scope of our ability to take action in the world. What we identify with "can only be the action of another person towards the world . . . . Identification thus becomes . . . merely a method by which we become better able to act in the world" (p. 256).

While Schilder's and Jacobson's work are very different overall, they have arrived at similar points on the matter of identification. For both identification is a means by which the growing individual elaborates his competencies, or, to take liberties with one of Heidegger's phrases, becomes at home in the world. In orthodox Freudian thought it is easy to lose sight of the larger world by focusing too narrowly on the intriguing vicissitudes of instinctual development and seeing only those interpersonal relationships which are immediately affected by instinct. Schilder and Jacobson take steps toward a more comprehensive focus. They call attention to the growing child's struggle to master the world and adapt to its situations. Schilder is quite correct to note that "taking another object into one's self" is itself an action "towards the outside world" (p. 256). It implies a willingness to unite with part of the world in the interest of addressing, organizing, and conquering still more of it. Certainly the opposite response is possible; the child might choose to push away the objects nearest him (e.g., Greenson, 1954b). This would be not only an entirely different response to his parents, but it would also imply a completely contrary view of the world itself.

By seeing that there are identifications which are not regressive, Schilder and Jacobson continue the line of thought actually begun in The Ego and the Id, that identification can serve to adapt the individual to the world. This point of view is seriously obscured as long as infant-mother fusion (primary identification) is considered the prototypical identification. Fuchs, Balint, Jacobson, and Schilder all refuse this position, and as we have seen the latter two authors relate identification to what could be termed ego building, the elaboration of competencies needed to adjust to and master the world. The metapsychology of "On Narcissism" is still useful, as Jacobson (1954) shows, to understand psychotic identifications and some phenomena of early life. But the identification which forms the mature superego as well as later ego identifications, must be considered from the viewpoint of Freud's defensive identifications rather than regressive ones.

It might be objected that the concept of defense is not adequate to describe Jacobson's and Schilder's uses of identification. While Jacobson believes a major function of post-infancy identifications is neutralization of drive energy, it is questionable whether Jacobson's reference to neutralization is a crucial part of her position. The thrust of her discussion is that later identifications build up the individual's personal and social competence and make mature object relations possible. Orthodox Freudians will certainly regard such neutralization an important part of these developments, but the category of defense may seem too narrow to

encompass such far-reaching processes. Further the concept of defense appears inappropriate to describe Schilder's use of identification, where nothing is being defended against.

In Freudian thought, however, defense against instinctual pressures is not so narrow a concept as it might appear. Defense is not limited to events related to pathology. Rather defense is the means by which all human learning takes place, the motivation for every accommodation to and assimilation of reality. As Robert White (1960) put it, drive theory answers the problem of how people learn with, "We learn what helps us to reduce drives" (p. 101). The influence of ego psychology has obscured this aspect of defense in Freudian thought. Emphasis on the ego as the organ of adaptation has caused the ego's role in learning and adjustment to be separated conceptually from its role in defense. Functions which Freudian thought regarded as by-products of defense are now often conceived to be innate capabilities. This limiting of the scope of defense under the influence of ego psychology should not prevent our seeing that Freud's defensive identifications carry similar intent to Jacobson's and Schilder's conceptions of identification. In all three cases identifications are one means by which the individual addresses in an organized and increasingly competent manner the larger world.

The school of thought which comes closest to elaborating this view of identification, albeit not under the rubric of defensive identification, is ego psychology, a school with which Jacobson

is often identified. Hartmann (1958) in particular paid attention to identification and other processes related to what he calls "internalization." In his concern to replace the anthropomorphisms of Freudian thought with a formalized language Hartmann conceptualizes psychological phenomena in broadly biological and evolutionary terms. He feels it is a function of phylogenesis that higher organisms show progressive independence from the environment. A principal feature of such independence is that behaviors which were originally (i.e., phyletically lower) reactions in the external world are displaced into "the interior of the organism," where they take such forms as thinking, superego regulation of impulse, or imagining the consequences of an act. This process of interiorization is called internalization by Hartmann (p. 40), and identification is one of its forms.

In identification what is internalized is neither a discrete behavior nor a particular mental image of the other. According to Hartmann (1958) something more comprehensive becomes part of the organism. The other's overall style, general approach, and techniques for addressing the problems of adaptation are internalized. Rapaport (1951) and Schafer (1968) make the same point: Through identification a whole system of behaviors and strategies becomes one's own, increasing dramatically the individual's range of competence. As with the other processes of internalization, identification thereby makes the individual less dependent on the world and at the same time more capable in it (Hartmann, 1958, p. 59).

In a late work with Lowenstein, Hartmann (1964) restates the principles of internalization in terms of the metapsychology of the 1960's. Hartmann and Lowenstein emphasize the role of parent-child interactions in promoting internalization of the regulatory processes at first given in the interaction itself. Interestingly, however, even when describing the place of early parent-child interactions Hartmann and Lowenstein do not ground identification regressively in such interaction. Although it would be an easy step to describe identification as an attempt to return to the comfort of the early relationship with the parent, the theoretical stance of ego psychology takes Hartmann and Lowenstein in a different direction. They do not explicitly describe a progressive series of identifications as does Jacobson, but they imply such a series, saying that identifications formed before self and other are fully differentiated "are not quite the same as those on a higher level" (p. 156). Like Jacobson, therefore, they suggest that identification is not a unitary phenomenon and that it means something different at each level of ego development. In contrast to Jacobson, Hartmann and Lowenstein do not address the problem of the metapsychology of identification. Even though their implied series of identifications is plainly at variance with Fenichel's position, they accept without critical comment "the familiar distinction of 'total' and 'partial' identifications" (p. 154).

We have so far described developments in the psychoanalytic concept of identification covering a time span of about forty years,

from Fenichel's 1926 paper, "Identification," to Jacobson's and Hartmann and Lowenstein's 1964 writings. Early in this section we observed that there were many voices of discontent from the 1930's on, each protesting the lack of discipline in the use of this concept. These protests were readily accepted since the absence of clarity and lack of progress in the metapsychology of identification were obvious enough. We have seen, however, that even in the absence of a self-conscious and deliberate attempt across psychoanalysis to shape or refine identification, there have been small contributions which, when added up, amount to a de facto development of the concept.

The principal development, and one with many implications, is the separation we have described of defensive from regressive identifications. This development diminishes the importance of Freud's early investigations into identification and makes more important his later writings on the subject. Freud's early investigations were written from a purely economic perspective. As we saw, Freud's conflict model of personality was seriously threatened by the phenomenon of pathological narcissism, and Freud's understanding of identification as regression to a normal stage of primary narcissism was designed to protect libido theory. When the restoration of dual drive theory in 1920 no longer made narcissism such a threat, identification could be seen from new theoretical perspectives. In 1923, in The Ego and the Id, Freud gives identification a prominent place in structural theory, developing

identification for the first time as a defensive process. In defending against dangerous instinctual strivings towards the parents during the Oedipal period, identification sublimates instinctual energy, which then comes to be at the disposal of the ego rather than a force with which ego must struggle. As we have seen, by the mid-1960's a number of contributions had further separated identification from its early, regressive roots; ego psychology illustrates the tendency to expand the concept of identification first set forth in The Ego and the Id.

The Ego and the Id makes the further point that identification leads to new psychic structure, the superego. By the 1960's the role of identification in building so-called psychic structure had begun to outweigh all other features of the concept. Ironically, the original structural function of identification--to end Oedipal rivalry and establish the superego--receives very little attention after the mid-1960's. The apparent lack of interest in the classical superego is dramatically illustrated by a current review of the superego concept by Garza Guerrero (1982a, 1982b). When Garza Guerrero discusses the "Oedipally derived superego," most of the works to which he refers were published before 1965. Garza Guerrero only finds a 1968 panel discussion on "Aspects of Culture in Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice" (Jackson, 1968) and a 1974 article celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of The Ego and the Id (Tabak de Bianchedi, 1974) to support his discussion. By the mid-1960's both the superego and identification

are increasingly conceptualized in terms of preoedipal development. Therefore even though the role of identification in forming psychic structure comes from The Ego and the Id, current thinking travels in a different direction from that work to pursue that theme, a direction which eventually raises the question whether there actually is a concept of identification in psychoanalytic thought today.

Over the past twenty years identification has become part of a language developed to describe the progressive building up, elaboration, and/or unfolding of psychological functions--usually reified in psychoanalytic thought by the term "psychic structure." Identifications are seen as building blocks of the personality, as one means by which interaction with important others leaves continuing impressions on the personality which, in turn, serve to organize behavior. Kernberg's (1976) use of identification is typical. He labels the process "a mechanism of growth of the psychic apparatus" by which "role aspects of interpersonal interaction" become part of the personality core (p. 30). According to Kernberg an identification is built on a cluster of memories of someone playing a clear, interpersonal role. An identification is formed when the child learns the role for himself and begins to imitate the other's behavior. For example memories of the mother's caring for the child may lead the child to imitate with dolls the mother's behavior. The important thing in this imitation is not the actual behavior which is learned but the interaction with the mother through which it is learned. Kernberg believes that definite

images of self and mother interacting are established in memory around these behaviors and that these images are landmarks, as it were, by which the child conceives himself and interprets the world. Although Kernberg uses the word "roles" his emphasis is not that of ego psychology, on mastery of the larger world, but on development of an internal world. The "role aspects of interpersonal interaction" do not concern Kernberg nearly so much as the "structural derivatives" of role-governed mother-child interaction.

In current psychoanalytic thought identification is not the only term which describes the building blocks of the personality. The terms incorporation, introjection, and internalization are used in the same way. Although a given author may try to distinguish between these four terms in his own writings, there is no consensus on how they should be used. Giovacchini (1963, 1967), for example, uses "introject" to describe the very process Kernberg calls identification, and Paula Heimann (1942) uses internalization in the same way. Further, even those authors who try to give separate meanings to those terms do not appear overly concerned to keep them straight after giving their definitions. Kernberg (1976, pp. 23-35), for example, distinguishes three levels of internalization, which he calls introjection, identification, and ego identity. But he seldom uses these categories after defining them, using instead the term "identification system" to stand for any or all of the three. Finally, the Kleinians appear to use incorporation, introjection, identification, and internalization interchangeably.

I cannot locate an effort within the Kleinian school to give separate meanings to these terms.

The pervasive lack of distinction between the words used to represent the building up of psychic structure suggests that there is no discrete concept of identification today. The potentially specific categories of introjection and identification are increasingly blurred together in the service of the broader and more nebulous concepts of internalization and incorporation. Certainly, internalization and incorporation are not recent notions; they are as old in psychoanalysis as Freud's writings. Certainly too the absence of precision in using categories such as identification is nothing new. We have noted this circumstance in Freud's writings and those of his students. What makes current confusion at least appear to be greater is the virtual absence from current literature of the identification which forms the superego at the end of the Oedipal period. This was the one instance of identification in classical psychoanalysis which had reasonably definite content and referents. Its absence today leaves no example of identification which is able to govern other uses. Consequently there are no obvious standards to which authors can refer to distinguish identification from related terms. With no means to restrict the content of the concept, identification easily takes on increasingly broad meanings--hence its virtual synonymy today with internalization.

The argument put forth in the first chapter was that certain features of twentieth-century life have led to the virtual

disappearance of the personality organization which Freudian psychology mistakenly described as human nature. Thus the argument here is that the Oedipal-ending identification of classical psychoanalysis is not simply neglected but that it is no longer available for study. As Freud (1923/1961) described this identification, its importance was that the resulting psychic structure--the superego--"consolidates" or "fixes" the child's "character" (p. 32). Our discussion earlier in this chapter listed three characteristics of such a consolidation: the creation of generational boundaries, the firming of an inner sense of me and not-me, and the binding of the individual to the traditions of his culture. These characteristics provided the necessary, dual poles between which identity can be formed, namely, the ability to feel different from others without feeling altogether unconnected. In a sense we might say that these identity-related features were the heritage of the classical concept of this identification.

Ego psychology's emphasis on learning, through identification, strategies and schemas necessary for mastering the social world was applied to this heritage by such thinkers as Erikson (1968, pp. 115-121) and White (1960). Each has pointed out the way in which the conclusion of the Oedipal period propels the individual into a larger frame of reference, pointing him eventually into the world of work and broader social roles. Erikson relates this specifically to the formation of identity.

Does the personality organization allowed by the "situational approach to life" have a similar parent-child interaction which

may be said to "consolidate" the personality? Freudian man was organized in a decisive way by taking into himself features of the same-sex parent. Since these features then became the child's own, the term identification seemed highly appropriate. The question is whether post-Freudian man likewise experiences a decisive identification with a parent. As argued in the first chapter, the situational approach to life proscribes taking into oneself parental values and traditional standards which might fund the subjective sense of continuity which is part of what we mean by identity. Yet we may find some different feature of parent-child interaction which may be said to be at the core of post-Freudian man's identity.

Before such an identification can be discussed it is important to rethink the concept of internalization. As it is presently understood the idea of internalization will not support the exploration just proposed. Investigation of internalization is important if only because identification is, in the current literature, lost in the amorphous, larger notion of internalization. Beyond this, however, the epistemology which underlies psychoanalytic use of concepts of internalization seriously interferes with the task of applying this old concept to post-Freudian man. The next chapter will explore the concept of internalization in order to find new perspectives for thinking through the problem of identification.

## CHAPTER III

### INTERNALIZATION AND THE CONCEPT OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL WORLD: PROBLEMS AND ALTERNATIVES

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Psychoanalysis has followed nearly all branches of modern psychology in assuming, first, an external, objective world, secondly, an internal, subjective representation of that world, and third, that the representational world is the actual stuff of experience. This third assumption is that while the outer world stimulates us through sensation, we manage organized experience through the mental representations built up following previous sensations. Relatively little attention has been given to explicating this assumption, which is nonetheless clearly implicit in such psychoanalytic notions as the introjection of external objects or the projection of inner realities onto the external world. Such an assumption has not required explication because it is widely shared and seldom challenged. Versions of this theory are very old, being found, for instance, in the pre-Socratics Democritus and Epicurus. Little is really changed in its modern forms, such as the information-processing model of knowledge put forward by some contemporary neurophysiologists. Greek atomism and information-processing theory assume that the world is not meaningful as encountered by the senses and requires translation into inner

representations to become intelligible. According to the Greeks, an external thing gives off its material shape, which fits the shape of innate mental images in the mind and which in turn allow the thing to be recognized. According to information-processing theory (Palombo, 1978, pp. 37-38), an external object triggers a sequence of neural (cerebral) events which is correlated with sensation of that particular object, and this sequence represents the thing itself, allowing perception. In neither case is the external thing meaningful except through the mediation of its mental representatives.

The psychoanalytic language of internalization readily lends itself to this model of mind. Just as present day neurophysiologists have tried to prepare a physiological map of an individual's experiences by charting the brain activity accompanying various types of stimulation, so the current clinical trend in psychoanalytic thinking is to chart the individual's psychological functioning by describing his representational world. For example, Phillipson (1955) states that "the inner world of object relations determines in a fundamental way" an individual's relationships with actual, externally existing persons. Similarly, Stolorow, Atwood, and Ross (1978) report that a patient's representational world--especially representations of self and others--"unconsciously organize a patient's subjective experiences in general and structure the analytic transference in particular" (p. 247). Internalized object representations are a guide to how and why the world is perceived as it is, then, and describing the representational world is equivalent to making sense of behavior. It is not new, of course, to

recognize the importance of internalized object relations. Sixty years ago Freud (1923/1961) described the ego as "a precipitate of abandoned object cathexis" (p. 29), and Hartmann (1964) took developing levels of object relations into account as part of his understanding of ego development. Current theory takes the importance of internalized object relations to extremes Freud and Hartmann did not, however, both in offering the representational world as a replacement for traditional metapsychology and in taking such a world as both the necessary and sufficient guide for clinical practice (Stolorow, 1978; Stolorow, et al., 1978; Horner, 1979, pp. 3-6).

Consequently, the psychoanalytic patient often seems to live in the external world as a side effect of his inner world. After very early childhood, his representational world certainly seems to have more influence on him than anything occurring in "reality." Most of the important psychological processes are accordingly described as intrapsychic happenings. Identification, for example, has been understood since Freud as an event taking place in the internal world, an event such that representations of others somehow merge with the ego, altering the personality. If this accurately describes identification, then whatever we could observe in the patient's behavior or whatever he might relate verbally cannot be taken with the same seriousness with which we must take his internalized object representations. Representations lie behind behavior and speech as a sort of psychic Ding an sich behind merely outer

appearances. Indeed, it is not too much to say, "we assume that the clinical theory of psychoanalysis is principally concerned with the representational world of the individual person" (Stolorow, et al., 1978, p. 247).

Current emphasis on the representational world has been offered as a conceptual advance for psychoanalytic theory. There has been a recent trend within psychoanalysis to move away from psychic entities, forces, anthropomorphisms, and causality, and toward the study of meanings (Basch, 1973; Schafer, 1973; Gill, 1976). Lawrence Friedman (1980), who reviews this trend, notes critically the attractiveness of mental representations as the vehicle for such theoretical revision. Because the internalized object representation "signifies a coherent object of desire . . . it subtly combines force and meaning" (p. 216). Representations therefore bring the best of both worlds by organizing mental activity in the same way as Freudian mental entities and forces but without overt reference to them. Accordingly, Stolorow, et al. (1978) contrast "metapsychological entities, forces, and energies" with "the representational structures which unconsciously organize a patient's (and therapist's) experiences" (p. 255) and advocate the representational world as a de-metapsychologized basis for clinical practice.

The argument I will make in this chapter, however, is that representational theory is no advance over traditional Freudian metapsychology. The representational world does not explain behavior

but merely begs the question, leading to an endless regress. When it is argued that a patient sees his therapist in such and such a way because his object representations lead him to do so, less is said than if we simply described how the patient sees his therapist, for the questions then arise of how he is led to experience his representations in this way and of who it is who actually experiences these representations. These questions lead in turn to the query of whether the patient's representations are "in" the patient--that is, whether self and object representations actually belong to the patient in some private way--or whether they are not in fact the products of the therapist's sensitive reflections on the patient's behavior and verbal productions. Object relations theory and ego psychology refer to internalized objects as the building blocks of psychic structure and say that this is the way they are "in" the patient. This answer, however, merely reifies as "in" the patient what the therapist has observed interpersonally, a reification which is surely no different in essence than the mental entities over which representational theory was supposed to be an advance. A more adequate understanding of representations is that they are types of experience available to the individual and that they signify a range of actions consistent with such experience.

The first step in making this critique of the language of internalization is to review the concept of the representational world in psychoanalysis and to note the objections which can be advanced against it. We will then review various alternatives

which have been proposed, with particular emphasis first on social learning theory and secondly on recent de-metapsychologizing efforts within psychoanalysis. Finally, the concept of internalization will be re-examined from a phenomenological perspective. Somewhat paradoxically, the overall thrust of this chapter will be to define internalization in such a way that phenomena which psychoanalytic thinking has described as building up an inner world are redefined as placing the individual in the outer world of action, a reinterpretation which, it will be argued, is consistent with the findings of ego psychology.

## II. THE REPRESENTATIONAL WORLD IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT

In Freud's writings, the word for representation is Vorstellung, variously translated as "idea," "image," "presentation," and "mental representation." Freud seems to have used Vorstellung in a manner consistent with conventional philosophical usage, that is, to signify the image in consciousness of something in the external world which is at the time absent to perception (Schimck, 1975). Representations originate in perception, which for Freud is the simple registration of a thing or event in consciousness through the senses. Purely passive for Freud, perception does not imply any bias or distortion, nor even necessarily memory which is a separate mental system from perception (Freud, 1900/1961, p. 538n). Perception itself is a brief, accurate reflection of sensible reality. Each perception, however, in spite of its briefness and integrity, is

in fact recorded in a memory trace, and it is this which Freud calls Vorstellung. Since all mental representations are originally perceptions, they are initially accurate copies or "repetitions" of perceptions: "Thus originally the mere existence of a presentation (Vorstellung) was a guarantee of the reality of what was presented" (Freud, 1925a/1961, p. 237).

Without the influence of instinctual pressure, memory would continue to be an exact copy of the external world (Freud, 1940/1961, pp. 195-204). Object representations draw instinctual energies, however, and become associated with gratification or frustration. This leads to a number of changes in the representational world. Originally an accurate copy of reality, the memory trace comes to represent a drive and is distorted by the individual's instinctual needs. The earliest example of such a distortion is the infant's well-known hallucinatory wish fulfillment. Other distortions occur when, for example, defense blocks direct drive discharge, and energy is displaced onto object representations other than those associated with direct drive discharge, so that energy can be expressed in a disguised or substitute form. In short, the various psychological processes Freud describes actually take place in the inner world of mental representations rather than in the external world.

Fenichel (1926/1953) adopts a very similar position. According to Fenichel perceptions leave "mnemic ideas" in the mind, apparently a different one for each perception. Actual objects, of course, assume different attitudes and forms and can be observed in different contexts. In order to recognize the same object in

spite of its changing appearances, the memory traces left by perception are organized into unities which integrate a given object's manifold attributes into coherent wholes. These integrated memory traces are the "endopsychic representatives of the object" (p. 98). We know any given object by referring perception to object representations, recognizing the perceived object by its similarity to its representation.

As with Freud, psychological activities involve the mental representation of an object rather than the actual, external object. For example, love of another takes place in this sequence: An object is perceived, memory traces are laid down, and an endopsychic representation is formed; the faculty of judgment recognizes the object as a potential source of instinctual gratification, and the object representation is cathected by the id. Identification, too, is a "vicissitude of the object representative." The ego is altered by the endopsychic image of another person, becoming like the image. "The ego has taken over the form, the cathexis, and the function of the object representative" (p. 99). Although we act toward the external object, love, identification, defensive operations, and other psychological processes do not address the external object but its inner image.

Freud and Fenichel have presented a copy theory of knowledge, or as Schimek (1975) terms it, "the principle of 'immaculate perception'" (p. 173). Fenichel does depart somewhat from such a position in an early article whose insights do not seem to have been well

integrated into his theory of perception as a whole. In "Psychoanalysis and Metaphysics" Fenichel (1923/1953) argues that there is some bias to perception due to the influence of the Pleasure Principle and that Freud's formulation of the Pleasure Principle is a Copernican revolution in perceptual theory similar to Kant's. Kant showed that experience depends not only on the perceived object but also on the perceiving subject. Freud showed that in addition to the Kantian categories which organize experience all perception is altered and organized by our wishes. Perception can never be fully divorced from the Pleasure Principle; that is, we do not see things exactly as they are but as we want them to be. Even the strictest and most rigid, scientific observations, says Fenichel (p. 19), will not be purely the "Truth" but will also be a wish.

As noted, Fenichel considers this a Kantian position, presumably because things as they are in themselves are not accessible to perception but suffer distortion from the a priori influence of the Pleasure Principle. The parallel with Kant is not so great as Fenichel believes, since Kant's a priori categories enabled perception while the Pleasure Principle obscures what would otherwise be accurate perception. Further, Fenichel is neither enough bothered by the distortions caused by the Pleasure Principle, nor serious enough about the solipsism to which he several times comes very close (e.g., p. 11), to explain his references to "reality-testing." How can one test what is automatically distorted under even stringent conditions is unclear. Therefore, although Fenichel comes near

to a more sophisticated theory of perception than Freud's, he does not seem to have thought it through nor to have integrated it with his understanding of such ego functions as reality testing. In general it seems best to group his theory of knowledge with Freud's as a copy theory.

The clearest exposition of the theory of knowledge found in Freud and widely used in psychoanalysis is that of Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962). These authors deliver the classical copy theory of knowledge and offer a detailed discussion of how such processes as identification presuppose a representational theory of knowledge, which for them is identical with a copy theory. That Sandler and Rosenblatt's exposition may be taken as an accurate statement of the psychoanalytic point of view is shown by the truly remarkable number of references in the literature to their article, almost none of which offer criticism or disagreement, and the vast majority of which reference Sandler and Rosenblatt's position as the basis on which the referencing author is proceeding. Based on its popularity and on the virtual absence of critical comment, one must assume that Sandler and Rosenblatt's article amounts to a consensus view in the psychoanalytic camp.

According to Sandler and Rosenblatt, perception is not possible without development "in the ego" of a network of "representations of external reality" (p. 131). Representations are the means by which the manifold sensations triggered by the external world's contact with sensory organs are organized into meaningful

patterns. Without these mental representations of "outside" reality, the external world could not be known or acted upon, since "The representational world provides the material for the ego's perceptual structuring of sensory impulses, for imagination and fantasy, for direct and modified action, for language and symbols, and for trial action in thought" (p. 136).

The various psychological processes with which the analyst is concerned can be conceptualized, according to Sandler and Rosenblatt (p. 132), in terms of changes of the images within the representational world. These authors compare the representational world to "a stage set within a theatre." The actors on the stage are the individual's images of others and of himself as well (p. 134). Mixing their metaphors, Sandler and Rosenblatt (p. 135) state that self and object representations assume a different "shape" from moment to moment, so, for example, an unconscious, angry wish will shape one's self-image as attacking the representation of an other. Presumably, other psychological activities similarly shape representations, so that, for instance, a projected angry wish would shape an object representation as attacking one's self image.

Changes in cathexis of object representations define some processes of internalization, including introjection and identification. Sandler and Rosenblatt say that the usual psychoanalytic definition of introjection as the taking of an external object into the ego is too imprecise, since all of external reality is in a sense taken into the ego's representational world. They suggest

that introjection refers to cathecting an object representation in such a way that it is "felt to have all the authority and power of the real parents (or other external figures)" (p. 138). Similarly, identification refers to alterations in the self representation so that it comes to resemble the object representation with which it is identified (p. 137). These definitions of introjection and identification as changes in the representational world are consistent with Freud and Fenichel, who also placed psychological events in the representational world rather than in the external world.

Sandler and Rosenblatt's presentation raises many questions, the most important of which is why a representational world which duplicates the external world is needed. Sandler and Rosenblatt's answer begins with a distinction between sensation and perception and with the assumption that sensory contact with the world is meaningless unless translated through representations into perception. Sandler and Rosenblatt refer to "our knowledge that perception of objects in the external world cannot take place without the development of . . . representations of external reality"; representations are used "to perceive sensations arising from various sources, to organize and structure them in a meaningful way" (p. 131). When sensations and perception are distinguished in this way, a subtle assumption which governs discussion is that sensation is the more real or true of the two terms. A corollary of this assumption is that the external world is a derivative reality,

secondary to the way mind interprets sensation. Thomas Reid, the eighteenth century philosopher credited with authoring the distinction between sensation and perception, defined sensation as the activity of our sense organs as such activity impinges on consciousness. He defined perception as a way of presenting the products of sensation as though they were out-there, in the external world, rather than "in" sensation. One of the persistent questions confronting psychology since Reid has been how perception accomplishes this feat. After all, what is experienced is certainly not out-there if the activity of the sensory organs is the raw content of experience. Sandler and Rosenblatt would presumably argue that though we behave as though objects of perception were out-there, they are "in" a representational world instead.

Such a position rests on the curious and persistent tendency in psychology to deny the final validity of psychological phenomena and base them instead in physiology. The distinction between sensation and perception is not psychological but biological. It is true that nineteenth century Structuralism tried psychologically to describe sensations independent of perception, but the barren yield of this effort suggests its artificiality. In fact we do not experience sensations. The only means whereby sensation can be isolated from perception is through highly technical, specialized forms of observation, most of which rely on measurement of physical processes. Sensation, therefore, appears to be a highly abstract category, the result of sophisticated measurement techniques and

the artifact of modern science. On this basis it seems appropriate to question the assumption that sensation is more real than perception. For life-as-it-is-lived, perception is real, and there is no question whether objects are out-there.

If perception is not an inferior category to sensation which requires explanation, it is unclear that the concept of a representational world is needed. Perception itself refers us to the external world, and an internal repetition of that world appears redundant. Ernst Cassirer once remarked that a copy of the world is useless: If we encounter the world as it is we need no copy, and if we do not encounter the world as it is we can make no copy. Further, the argument that we cannot directly interpret the world without reference to inner copies simply begs the question. Sandler and Rosenblatt describe the representational world as a stage which ego watches, thereby "knowing" the world. But the question arises how ego is able to perceive the representational world if it cannot perceive the outer world. How is it that the representational world needs no translation and can be directly perceived? On the same logic by which we determined there must be a representational world, we would have to argue for representations of the representational world, ad infinitum. Therefore the representational world is a redundancy leading to an infinite regress. Sandler and Rosenblatt try to take us to an inner world, but there is no obvious reason why the inner world should be preferred to the world given in perception.

The concept of a representational world is not helpful in accounting for perception. Is it more useful in describing so-called psychic structure, object relations, or other elements of psychological functioning of interest to the clinician? In fact as used by Sandler and Rosenblatt the representational world is a distraction from understanding the very processes of internalization it was supposed to explain. Sandler and Rosenblatt (p. 137) define identification as the altering of the self representation to resemble an object representation. This definition leaves no means by which identification can be distinguished from self deception or from psychotic delusions about oneself. The belief that one is Napoleon, for instance, meets this criterion for identification, a situation which leaves identification vague and overly inclusive. This seems an unnecessary problem and one which arises only because the concept of a representational world converts actions which already make sense in the external world into internal processes which are at best redundant and at worst too inclusive to be meaningful. Further, Sandler and Rosenblatt define introjection as "the vesting of certain object representations with a special status, so that these are felt to have all the authority and power of the real parents" (p. 138). But this raises the question of how "real" authority can become internalized. The concept of the representational world dictates that a representation of the external parent's authority is associated with images of the parents, not their "real" authority. But this representation of the parents' authority must

be part of the parental images to begin with, or else these images would not be representative of the external parents. Therefore Sandler and Rosenblatt's definition of introjection is not distinguishable from simple perception of the parents.

Sandler and Rosenblatt (p. 136) say that their descriptions of identification and introjection are "relatively simple" and that they avoid "certain theoretical difficulties." They do not specify what theoretical difficulties are avoided, and so it is hard to know what they feel has been gained. It is clear, however, that they have been too simple in their definitions. They need many more gradations and distinctions--for example, between the sort of identification which forms the delusion that one is Napoleon and that with a parent which leads to realistic and adaptive new behaviors. One might argue that it is unfair to expect a comprehensive position from a single article, and so Sandler and Rosenblatt ought not be faulted for being too simple. The question, though, is not whether they should have been more comprehensive, but whether their position would have allowed them to be so. In the case of identification we have seen that Sandler and Rosenblatt failed to provide conceptual boundaries between psychotic and adaptive processes. The usual boundaries would be drawn, first, by distinguishing behavior which makes public sense from that which makes (at best) purely private sense. Sandler and Rosenblatt are in no position to make even this very rough distinction, because all of the activities which for most persons take place in public

reality are for them private events. Perception, for example, is not my act of seeing something out-there, but my ego's act of seeing something in-there, on an inner stage (to use their metaphor) which only appears to be out-there. The basic act of perception, therefore, is a confusion between inner and outer. If such confusion is the basis for normal experience, how can psychosis be contrasted with it? Sandler and Rosenblatt could presumably define psychotic delusion as the "shaping" of an object or self representation in such a way that it appears differently on the inner stage than it appears in external reality. But this would be a useless definition, since we do not perceive the person in external reality but only on an inner stage. It is far from clear, therefore, that Sandler and Rosenblatt's position would tolerate more precise and subtle definitions and categories, since there is some question whether they can even distinguish psychotic from realistic conclusions.

The concept of the representational world as Sandler and Rosenblatt describe it assumes a qualitative difference between inner and outer realities. The problems we have discussed stem from their having located all of psychology in inner reality and left no obvious means of intercourse between the two worlds. This in turn brings us to the final problem in Sandler and Rosenblatt's position, namely, how to account for action. Once it is assumed that inner and outer are different types of reality, the only way the two can be related is for each to represent the other. If the inner world contains representations of external reality, external

reality in turn is the arena for action, and action must be seen as a representation of the inner world. If "the inner world of object relations determines in a fundamental way" the subject's behavior toward actual persons (Phillipson, 1955), then the therapist reads backwards, so to speak, from behavior to infer the patient's inner world. The assumption is that behavior is the emissary or representative of the "real" person.

The first question to arise is how an inner reality, which is distinct in every way from external reality, causes something in the external world. It seems a metabasis eis allos genos to claim such influence. Sandler and Rosenblatt attribute action or behavior to the ego. They describe (p. 136) the representational world as comparable to "a radar or television screen" which provides meaningful information upon which action can be based. Ego uses this information for all its functions, including "direct and modified action." Yet ego is not directly in contact with the world. Ego contacts the world through the perceptual system. As we have seen perception is a mediated reality, derived from sensation through reference to the representational world. The question arises, therefore, how ego, which is not directly in contact with the world, causes events in it.

The traditional solution to this problem has been to reduce inner and outer reality to some common, third term, usually physiological. For example if the representational world is conceived to be in the brain, then since the brain is a physical

reality, there is no logical problem in moving from the representational world to external reality. A recent, thorough argument to this effect is made by Hadley (1983), who assumes that the brain is the "common denominator" between representation and the external world and who tries to show "how representations are constructed in the matrix of neural activity" (p. 16). Hadley describes the close correlations noted by many researchers between patterns of neural activity and specific behaviors and concludes that these neural patterns "offer us an observable level of organization of brain function which approximates the level of which we speak when we talk of human psychological function" (p. 27). With this it seems the "bridge" is in place, that the psychological realities known as mental representations are actually neural, physical events. Yet just prior to this conclusion Hadley has made a curious statement which bears notice. Referring to the integration of neurological structures which takes place around age seven, she says, "With this newly developed capacity at its disposal, the brain can select which of several representational systems will be put into action or reach consciousness" (p. 27, emphasis added). We are not prepared for this sudden introduction of volition on the part of a physical organ, and the original problem quickly returns: The representational system may well be a physical, neural reality, but that seems to have explained nothing by itself. Some agency must still be imported to explain the activity of this physical reality, and "the-brain-selects" merely suggests a trans-physical agency which governs

the brain. The original question still obtains. How does this trans-physical reality affect the external world and, for that matter, the brain?

This problem arises in the first place only because action is not assumed to be valid in itself, but is taken to represent an inner agency, whether the ego, "self," or a network of internalized object relations. Yet the assumption of such an inner agency explains nothing anyway. If behavior in the outer world is explained by reference to an inner agency, how is the behavior of the inner agency to be explained? This is the same endless regress encountered in our discussion of perception; it is not enough to say that ego "reads" the representational world and decides to act. We must now account for ego's "decision," and it seems that ego may need an ego of its own and so forth. The multiplicity of internal agents described by Klein and the plethora of egos defined by Fairbairn and Guntrip seem an inevitable consequence if inner agents continue to be looked to as the explanation of behavior, for each inner agent will presuppose yet another as its explanation.

The notion of a representational world as described by Freud and Fenichel and elaborated by Sandler and Rosenblatt is not a useful concept. Psychological phenomena cannot be explained through reference to such a world, and therefore internalization and, more specifically, identification cannot be grasped through the traditional understanding of self and object representations. Since Freud, other accounts of internalization have been proposed which

do not rest on the copy theory of knowledge. The most important of such accounts are those of social learning theory and those of recent, de-metapsychologizing efforts within psychoanalysis. The former attempts to define internalization without reference to any internal world. The latter seeks to refine what it takes to be the gold of psychoanalysis, namely the study of meanings, from the dross of mental entities and forces, arriving at a new understanding of internalization. Social learning theory and recent trends in psychoanalysis will each be studied on our way to arriving at an understanding of internalization after the spirit of phenomenological psychology.

### III. SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY ALTERNATIVES

Behaviorism in general would find congenial the preceding critique of the concept of the representational world. Behaviorists have eschewed explanations which attribute causality to hidden, non-observable entities or which suggest in any way that observable phenomena merely represent more "real," albeit unseen, agents. Events are assumed accounted for when they can be subsumed under lawful (i.e., statistically predictable) relations or stated in terms of probability of occurrence. Skinner has been the most stringent representative of this point of view. He has complained that behavior is seldom studied on its own terms but is too often taken as an expression of an underlying psychic system. He writes (1961), "Inner entities or events do not 'cause' behavior, nor does

behavior 'express' them" (p. 48). Skinner (1956, pp. 77-82) has applied this point of view in his several critiques of psychoanalysis. He objects that Freud failed to take behavior seriously; in examining the origins of behavior, for example, Freud defined learning not as changes in behavior but as the creation of wishes, feelings, and ideas which might subsequently be expressed in behavior. Consequently, says Skinner, Freud did not study the only scientifically meaningful subject matter he had--action or behavior. Rather he developed a method of observation which systematically mistakes behaviors such as feeling and thinking for inner, causal entities and practically ignores public behaviors altogether except as a manifestation of inner forces.

The original thrust of social learning theory was to apply the perspective of learning theory or behaviorism to the complexities of socialization. With a few, recent exceptions the language has been that of one or another of the behaviorist schools. As with behaviorism in general, explanation is not sought in unseen agencies which lie behind what is observable but in the discovery of lawful, orderly relations between social behavior and events in the environment. Miller and Dollard's (1941) early work, Social Learning and Imitation, illustrates the application of learning theory. They use the four concepts of drive, cue, response, and reward to explain social learning. A "drive" is any strong stimulus which incites the organism to action. A "cue" is any stimulus which directs or orders this action. The "response" or resulting action

is the behavior pattern to which the individual is directed by the cue, and the future occurrence of this behavior pattern is made more probable when a response is followed by a reward, or some agent reducing the initial drive. Dollard and Miller (1950, p. 34n) describe their theory as a stimulus-response model of social learning.

One of the striking things about social behavior is the extent to which it is shared across groups and appears to result from copying, imitation, or modeling. This feature of socialization, that it reflects imitation, has been a focus of most learning theory accounts. Many learning theorists have either related imitation in a general way to the psychoanalytic concept of identification, or have simply appropriated identification after dismissing the psychoanalytic use of the word. For example, E. C. Tolman (1943) laments the association between psychoanalysis and the word identification and thinks his own use reflects a consensus "by most psychologists and sociologists." His own use covers three related processes, including an individual's adherence to a group model, acceptance of a cause, and the process of copying (i.e., taking as a pattern or model) some older, envied, or admired individual. Tolman's treatment is typical in refusing psychoanalytic concepts and in making the referents of identification more observable and objective.

Given the importance of copying or modeling, social learning theorists have tried to explain its efficacy. Miller and Dollard's (1941) idea of "matched-dependency behavior" is one of the earliest accounts. They suggest that an individual who does not know the

cues leading to a reward in a given situation may by chance copy the action of another person who does. When both are rewarded, the probability is increased that the first person will imitate the other individual in the future. In this way imitation itself is learned. Miller and Dollard think that identification may be a specific type of imitation. They write, "It is possible that a more detailed analysis would show that the mechanisms involved in copying are also involved in that aspect of character, or superego, formation which the Freudians have described as 'identification'" (p. 164). In a later work these authors (1950, pp. 92-93) argue that identification may be furthered by the degree to which the model is loved or has prestige, since these variables will make imitation more rewarding. If a parent is loved or prestigious, imitation of the parent can become a drive in itself through secondary reinforcement.

Robert Sears (1957), another of the early social learning theorists, used Hull's concept of secondary or acquired drive to give a more comprehensive treatment of identification. According to Sears, identification is "a secondary motivational system" for which imitation-of-the-parent is the "goal response." This motive short-cuts the usual training process in that a general set of wanting-to-be-like is reinforced rather than specific acts. This in turn leads to the acquisition of specific behaviors. In this way many of a parent's psychological characteristics are "incorporated" without specific rewards for each acquisition.

Sears (pp. 154-155) gives an account of how imitation of the mother can become a goal response. Since the infant does not at first discriminate between self and mother, her actions will appear to be part of his own action patterns. If a need arises in the mother's absence, the child can therefore try to perform the need-satisfying behavior himself, since the action seems part of his own repertoire. To the extent that he is successful the imitation of the mother is rewarded, leading to a general set of wanting-to-be-like-mother.

Miller and Dollard and Sears have applied elements of learning theory to large units of behavior. They set for themselves the task of accounting for what Freud's concept of identification was intended to explain, namely, the individual's "character," or enduring and characteristic patterns of behavior and the apparent similarity between the individual's character and that of his parents. Consequently, these social learning theorists have not sought to explain how discrete behaviors are acquired; they seek to explain the acquisition and retention of a large class of behaviors, namely, acting-like-another-person, especially one's parents. Miller and Dollard's and Sear's accounts have largely avoided relying on the sorts of inner forces for which learning theorists have criticized psychoanalysis, and have sought instead to make verifiable statements on the acquisition and retention of imitative behaviors. Sears' use of "motive" would surely be objectionable to Skinner, and so presumably would be Miller and Dollard's concept of "drive." But whether or not these authors

approximate the stringency of Skinner's behaviorism, they certainly offer behaviorist alternatives to psychoanalytic metapsychology. Their challenge is that they appear able to handle the phenomena of character formation without reference to a hidden, representational world.

Albert Bandura has applied social learning theory to the topic of identification in a different way than Miller and Dollard or Sears, and his work presents similar yet different problems for psychoanalytic theory. First, Bandura (1964, pp. 218-219) denies the utility of distinguishing between the acquisition of "character" (general patterns of behavior) and the acquisition of simple or discrete actions. Miller and Dollard and also Sears met Freudian thought on its own ground by trying to account for more than simple units of learning and by treating as the subject matter of identification the enduring system of behaviors called "personality" or "character." For them, identification was a special case of imitation, one which implied what psychoanalysts would call character. Bandura, however, considers all imitative acts as equal, whether they are complex or simple. Therefore he makes no distinction between identification, imitation, copying, modeling, or role-taking. If a simple act of imitation can be accounted for, there is no reason to believe that a more complex sequence will require a different explanation just because it is more complex. This simplifies the subject matter. All that Bandura feels an obligation to account for is the phenomenon of matching, that is, the duplication by one

person of a model's behavior. He feels that if he accounts for this, he has dealt with the subject of character as well.

Bandura's second deviation from Miller and Dollard and from Sears is his denial of the overriding importance given to parents as models of their children's behavior and values. Miller and Dollard and Sears accepted the Freudian emphasis on the parents as the chief templates for the child's character. Writing somewhat later than these authors, Bandura (1964) notes that rapid change, the demise of traditional values, and the mobility of teenagers combine to make peers, electronic media, and large businesses to be the dispensers of value and the arbiters of appropriate behavior rather than parents. Bandura sees parental influence on behavior as steadily declining after early childhood. He writes,

Identification should therefore be viewed as a continuous process involving multiple modeling, rather than a phenomenon that primarily occurs in relationship to parents during early childhood, producing enduring and pervasive changes in personality characteristics.  
(p. 249)

Finally Bandura offers a different account of the "mechanisms" by which identification works. Bandura has consistently downplayed the role of reinforcement in identification. His position is that reinforcement explains control of previously learned behaviors, but it does not govern the acquisition of new behavior through observation (Bandura, 1965). Most new behavior, argues Bandura, is not "shaped" through differential reinforcement, successive approximation, or trial and error. It is vicariously learned through

observation of a model. Bandura (1964, pp. 233-250) has investigated a number of variables which make a subject more likely to imitate a model. For example, high status models induce imitation more often than low status ones; models who are rewarded are more often imitated than those punished or ignored; and models are more likely to be copied if the subject is told he will be rewarded for doing so later.

Recently Bandura has attempted to go beyond his early investigations into the efficacy of modeling and imitation. He has emphasized what he calls "internal representational processes which mediate subsequent behavioral reproduction," or "the cognitive" elements in learning (Bandura, 1964, p. 220). There are three such processes, which Bandura calls "attentional processes," "retentional processes," and "motoric reproduction" skills. As Bandura spells them out, these "representational processes" seem to be no more than the ability to pay attention, remember, and coordinate behavior with what is remembered. Bandura has sought to make much of these processes in recent publications and has adopted the language of information-processing theory to explain himself. He refers (1977), for example, to "a central processor of efficacy information" and places emphasis on the individual's capacity for "coding, symbols, and memory representation."

Curiously, with his recent "cognitive" approach Bandura appears to have wandered back into the camp from which social learning theory was trying to escape. Bandura (1971) endorses the

behavioristic programme "to eschew spurious inner causes" (p. 2), but he seems to believe such causes only exist within psychoanalytic theory. Not only is his "central processor of efficacy information" the same order construct as the psychoanalytic ego or instinct, but Bandura has clearly endorsed the concept of the representational world--albeit a sophisticated sounding version--and so his recent work is subject to the same criticisms that were raised in the previous section. It seems best to ignore this aspect of Bandura's work and consider instead his treatment of identification under the rubric of modeling.

Psychoanalytic writers have responded to the challenges of social learning theory with defenses and challenges of their own. As we will see, however, many psychoanalytic responses do not address, but merely reflect, the basic difference between psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Psychoanalysis emphasizes intrapsychic consequences of identification and views with decidedly less interest the behavioral ramifications of identification, while social learning theory by definition disregards intrapsychic consequences and emphasizes the behavioral component. This is the starting point for the debate between psychoanalysis and behaviorism, but psychoanalytic authors tend to regard it as a criticism of learning theory. For example, Meissner (1973) suggests it is a point on which learning theories "can also be questioned" (p. 794). In fact it is not; it is simply a description of the point in question, not a legitimate objection. Psychoanalysis must defend the necessity, or at

least the desirability, of endorsing an intrapsychic world in order to meet the behaviorist critique.

Meissner makes a much more pertinent statement of the issue when he speaks of "the larger question of the extent to which observational evidences or operational definitions can substitute for psychoanalytic concepts" (p. 794). (Also see Meissner, 1966.) This question appears to govern Rapaport's (1960) criticism that social learning theory ignores the structure-making aspects of socialization. Rapaport conceives adaptation to social realities to result in fairly stationary psychic apparatuses which carry out mental functions and processes. Such structures eventually perform automatically functions at first learned consciously and laboriously. These structures do not extinguish over time but persist regardless of subsequent reinforcement or its absence. Rapaport believes that the incredible complexities of actual life call for a notion such as psychic structure to account for continuing and persistent patterns of adaptation. He argues that the concepts of learning theory are too simple to deal with real life, although they may be adequate for the highly artificial world of the laboratory. The simple, automatic connections assumed by learning theory are actually abbreviations and abstractions of complex psychic structures. Learning theory only has one working concept, in Rapaport's opinion, namely, habit. He feels that far richer concepts are required to do justice to human life outside the laboratory and that the operational approach cannot provide such concepts.

Gewirtz (1964) has provided a social learning theory account of identification which removes some of the force of Rapaport's argument. Gewirtz proposes a continuum which ranges from behavioral imitation through identification. In this schema imitation is behavior which simply matches a model's behavior; generalized imitation--the next step--is the copying of diverse responses by a model across different situations and in the absence of direct reinforcement. Identification is defined as a type of generalized imitation which refers to assuming the "abstract psychological characteristics of a model [including] motives, attitudes, values, roles, or affective states, rather than specific behaviors patterns" (Gewirtz and Stingle, 1968, p. 375). The enduring abilities which Rapaport calls psychic structures seem encompassed by Gewirtz's contention that characteristic problem solving strategies and other psychological traits demonstrated by a model may themselves be adopted in identification through the mechanism of generalized imitation. The complex functions which Rapaport argued could not be explained in learning theory terms thereby seem accounted for without postulating an inner world or psychic structure.

Meissner (1973) observes that Gewirtz has simply assumed what he needs to prove: "The presumption, however, is that [general behavioral dispositions] can be adequately defined and considered in terms of specific and observable behaviors. The argument presented presumes what it needs to prove in this regard" (p. 801). Meissner argues that what psychoanalysts mean by identification

cannot be adequately defined in operational terms. He proposes that identification implies an "internal structural modification within the ego--a basic change in the structure of the personality" (p. 801). He observes that even the most complex skills which can be learned--e.g., playing a Bach prelude--do not approximate this feature of identification.

Meissner (p. 806) continues his argument by explicating the difference between what he terms the "inner" world and the "internal" world. The former is the sphere of learning while the latter is the sphere of personality. Both the inner and the internal world contain "structure," or relatively permanent, automatized functions, but the nature of the structures in each sphere is different. The inner world "regulates the organism's orientation to the external world," and it is clear Meissner means by inner world what Sandler and Rosenblatt mean by the representational world. Meissner includes Lewin's field theory and Tolman's cognitive maps as instances of the inner, representational world. The inner world, then, orients and guides the individual's physical maneuvering through the external world. Learning and all that learning theory implies belong to the inner, representational world.

The internal world encompasses the id, ego, and superego, and attendant processes such as the defenses. This internal world is the domain of identity, self, or personality, and it governs the individual's overarching attitudes and intentions toward the world. Identification is specifically related to the internal

world, while learning is not. Meissner (p. 809) concludes that the identification discussed by learning theorists is not equivalent to the identifications discussed by psychoanalysts. Meissner goes on to criticize psychoanalytic theorists, such as Hartmann, for failing to distinguish the inner from the internal and therefore for being unable to separate simple perception from introjection (the same criticism made above of Sandler and Rosenblatt).

In brief Meissner's position is that identification should not be understood in terms of mental representations, since such representations are the domain of learning, not internalization. While this conclusion is an advance within psychoanalytic thinking about identification, it is hardly a legitimate criticism of social learning theory, for it, like Gewirtz's position, assumes what it needs to prove. As a type of behaviorism, social learning theory questions the validity of constructs which represent hidden, non-observable causal entities or realms. The internal world of id, ego, and superego and also the inner world in which Meissner locates learning are both instances of such constructs. Explaining either identification or learning in terms of them is hardly likely to be convincing to a learning theorist. The necessity of such constructs must be defended, but for the most part Meissner has simply presumed their necessity.

Meissner is much stronger when he attacks learning theory than when he defends psychoanalytic concepts. Using Krebs's (1970) arguments in his review of the literature on altruism, Meissner

makes a series of objections to learning theory accounts of identification. The first objection is that social learning theorists have not demonstrated that the behaviors which are induced in experiments can be generalized to situations other than those in which they were first elicited. This is an important question, since psychoanalytic theorists argue that identification in their sense necessarily entails enduring and general dispositions characterized by slow rates of change and by occurrence in many situations. Meissner (p. 797) claims that no social learning study has established more than situation-specific behavioral tendencies as the result of imitation. Meissner also objects that learning theorists have not explained the efficacy of modeling: "The explanatory power of concepts of 'modeling' or 'imitation' requires the elucidation of the reasons why models produce imitative behavior" (p. 796). Finally, Meissner follows Cowan and his co-workers in suggesting that modeling effects should be viewed as a kind of Asch effect in which subjects merely conform to the model but do not take away any lasting dispositions.

The criticisms of Rapaport, Meissner, Krebs, and Cowan, et al. seem to be aimed at Bandura's and Gewirtz's modeling paradigms more than Miller and Dollard's and Sear's reinforcement models. In one sense the reinforcement models resemble modeling theory in that they define identification as a general disposition to be-like-the-other or take the other for a model, but we have already noted that there are differences between modeling and

reinforcement approaches to identification. Some critique is needed of reinforcement paradigms beyond the above critique of modeling paradigms. Further, reinforcement models are not subject to Meissner's complaint that the efficacy of modeling has not been explained, since reinforcement is precisely the explanation for how imitation is learned as an acquired drive.

Interestingly, Bandura (1964) makes the most stringent critique of the reinforcement approach. While he believes that the frequency with which behavior occurs is partly regulated by whether it is reinforced, he argues that actual learning of social behaviors takes place vicariously through observation. He says it would be hard to conceive a socialization process which depended on shaping through selective reinforcement without the guidance provided by models. Bandura notes that many socially needed behaviors, such as driving a car, involve potential danger; if learning were dependent on reinforcement rather than observation of a model, "most people would never survive the socialization process" (p. 213). Of course Miller and Dollard and Sears do not endorse an operant paradigm, in which every discrete behavior must be reinforced. Their models demonstrate how large units of behavior can be acquired, and so there is no question really of reinforcing each new act. Their argument is that reinforcement leads to a generalized disposition to copy an other. Bandura (pp. 235-236) however, notes research in which such generalized dispositions extinguished quickly after subjects were no longer reinforced for copying large subclasses of behavior.

He argues that such rapid extinction would not have been possible if imitation of an other could become a secondary drive through reinforcement. Bandura gives alternative explanations of generalized imitation, suggesting that such imitation can be accounted for by the concept of discrimination:

When a few unrewarded modeled responses are randomly embedded in a large number that are consistently reinforced, the two sets of modeling responses cannot be easily distinguished and are therefore likely to be performed with similar frequency. (p. 236)

Consequently, what appears in the laboratory to be generalized imitation is merely an instance of operant learning in which the subject has failed to discriminate reinforced from non-reinforced actions. Bandura's position is that modeling is not an acquired drive and that it occurs without reinforcement.

In addition to Bandura's objections to Miller and Dollard's and Sears's explanation of identification is an acquired drive, there is a clinical phenomenon which does not seem well explained by the reinforcement paradigm. Several writers have noted that children often identify with parents who provide very little reward for their doing so. Greenson (1954b), for example, discusses four cases in which patients identified with "a hated parental figure." One of the principal factors leading to identification was "frustration and deprivation" on the part of the parent toward the child. In these cases it is hard to understand what rewards obtained to the child for copying the parent. Sears (1957, p. 155), in fact, had argued explicitly that a frustrating parent would not enable

identification precisely because there would be insufficient reinforcement and because a non-gratifying mother's actions would not be perceived as part of the child's own action patterns. Stoke (1950) also presents cases which contradict the reinforcement paradigm. He distinguishes between emotional and behavioral identification, noting that the two need not always occur together. In the cases he reviews, frustrating and punitive parents did not produce children who emotionally identified with them, but their children did imitate them behaviorally, often without wanting to do so or even being aware that they did so. This finding is particularly troublesome for a reinforcement approach, since it is especially unlikely that harsh and rejecting parents would reward their children for behaving in punitive ways and since their children's failure to establish an emotional identification suggests that the parents did not reinforce the child's sense of being-like-the-parent. These clinical findings join with Bandura's criticism to make reinforcement approaches to identification appear at least as problem-ridden as psychoanalytic theory.

What of the criticisms outlined above of Bandura's and Gewirtz's modeling paradigms? Do they amount to a refutation of the claim that social learning takes place through observation and through modeling effects? In a sense, the objections of Meissner and others cannot refute the modeling paradigm, especially as presented by Bandura. The reason they cannot is that the point of the argument is not the nature of identification but a description

of human life in our time. The real question is: Who has apprehended twentieth century man and woman more accurately? Meissner is entirely correct to say that social learning theory concerns the inner world but not the internal world. Bandura has not described processes of internalization (in Meissner's sense); he has described a type of human life which does not internalize, but which, in the language of our first chapter, is situationally determined. Bandura describes an extreme (almost parodied) version of the situational approach to life. In such a life as he describes nothing is taken into the personality in a decisive way. That is, nothing is internalized. Parental influence wanes after very early childhood, and each succeeding time of life is built around learning how to imitate those nearby. In Bandura's psychology there is no enduring core of sameness which we might term identity. Life is an endless series of imitations of those who are the designated models.

What must strike the psychoanalytically trained observer is how plastic human life seems to Bandura. The closest concept in psychoanalytic literature is Helene Deutsch's (1942) "as if" personality, the person who appears to be a normal, whole individual until one gets to know him; then it becomes clear that the person is void of honest and spontaneous affect, conviction, or individual values. The "as if" personality simply behaves as if he were a family man, or as if he were a pillar of the church, or as if he were a dedicated employee. But there is little personal investment in any of this, and such individuals are essentially actors (cf.

Zilboorg, 1941). Clinical psychology has viewed this personality style as pathological, but Bandura describes plastic man as the norm. This difference cannot be accounted for by deciding whose view of identification is better. It is a question of the image of human life, and the difference between Bandura and psychoanalysis is very great on this point.

Behaviorism in general and social learning theory in particular offer alternatives to the psychoanalytic concept of the representational world. Social learning theorists describe identification without reference to hidden, causal entities. We have seen, however, that psychoanalysis can raise questions whether social learning theory concepts are rich enough, generalizable enough, or inclusive enough to describe enduring personality patterns. We have also seen that the plasticity assumed by modeling theorists leads to a view of human life which is radically different from that of psychoanalysis. Bandura's image of man may, ironically, offer psychoanalysis much justification for insisting on concepts of internalization (in Meissner's sense). The psychoanalytic conclusion to be drawn from Bandura's work is that it is impossible to describe human life without reference to processes of internalization and still offer an adequate account of the enduring, puzzling persistence of personality styles, attachments, and certain types of self-defeating behaviors known as repetition compulsions. Trying to avoid reference to an internal world in which such events endure will necessarily distort the understanding of human life by giving

us no way to explain the persistent sameness of an individual across the years. The result will be at best a truncated and superficial account of life, and at worst the result will be Bandura's confusion between severe character pathology and health. The question now becomes whether there is an explanation and description of so-called internalization processes which avoid the criticisms made above against the concept of the representational world without achieving the errors of social learning theory.

#### IV. RECENT PSYCHOANALYTIC ALTERNATIVES AND A PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOLUTION

In the preceding section we reviewed Meissner's (1973) attempt to separate the inner, or representational, world from the internal world of psychic structure. Meissner's formulations did not reflect any particular dissatisfaction with the concept of the representational world but instead followed his effort to distinguish the abiding structure of the personality from less permanent and more plastic cognitive functions. Meissner in fact continues to endorse the representational world as conceived by Sandler and Rosenblatt, although he makes that world irrelevant for discussions of identification or internalization. Meissner's only change is to define processes of internalization almost entirely in the structural language of ego psychology. The question which arises is whether descriptions of internalization as structure escape the sorts of objections raised in Section II to the representational world.

Meissner writes primarily from the standpoint of ego psychology. In Chapter II we noted Hartmann's attempt to revise the language of Freudian metapsychology, relieving it of Freud's anthropomorphisms and visiting upon it a more rigorously scientific conceptual framework. Hartmann (1958) uses the language of biology, particularly evolutionary theory to accomplish this aim. He writes that phylic development gradually leads to the organism's independence from the environment as behaviors which early in phylogenesis are responses to the world become transferred to the organism's self-regulatory repertoire. Eventually the press of the external world is no longer required to trigger these responses; they are performed autonomously. Hartmann (p. 40) terms this progressive independence "internalization," and he lists "the development of thinking, of the superego, [and] of the mastery of internal danger before it becomes external" as instances of internalization. Although he makes significant revisions, Meissner stands in this tradition when he defines the processes of internalization.

Rapaport (1967, pp. 696-697) was the first to observe that too much is encompassed in Hartmann's definition of internalization, and Rapaport makes what is for Meissner a crucial point. Rapaport observes that Hartmann's use of internalization includes such phenomena as memory, conceiving the consequences of a planned act, defensive operations, and identification. Rapaport objects that this is too broad a range of phenomena to be conceptually meaningful, and he proposes that processes which enrich or alter the structure

of the ego, such as defense or identification, be separated from other, more purely cognitive functions. Meissner (1973) uses Rapaport's observation as his point of departure, arguing that only events affecting the structure of the self, or personality, are internalizations proper. Hence, his objection to social learning theory, noted in the previous section, is that learning differs from internalization in that the latter is "structuralizing."

As Meissner uses it, the term "structure" refers to "forming, organizing, and integrating parts into a coherent pattern, which serves to maintain persistent order" (p. 811) or "a coherent pattern or ordering of parts into an integral and functional unit" (p. 812). When an external object is taken into the personality in such a way that it becomes "a center of functional organization, possessing its own relative autonomy in the economy of psychic functions," it is internalized in Meissner's (1971) sense. The internalization becomes part of a quasi-permanent psychic apparatus which channels behaviors into patterns characteristic of the individual. Identifications are the most stationary of the forms of internalization; they contribute to structures which are the most resistant to decay or extinction (Meissner, 1972).

Meissner deliberately avoids reference to the representational world when discussing internalization, and he can do this because he has already defined representation as qualitatively distinct from internalization. His (1972, pp. 243-245) work contains one of the few critical analyses of Sandler and Rosenblatt's ideas to

be found in the literature, although as we have already noted his critique does not imply disagreement with the copy theory of knowledge, but with Sandler and Rosenblatt's confusion between representational and structuralizing processes. Meissner explicitly defines identification and the other processes of internalization without reference to a representational world except to note that internalization may eventually find representation in the self-image. His work therefore appears to escape the critique presented in Section II of this chapter against the concept of the representational world.

The questions which remain, however, are those of exactly what is "structured" in psychic structure and in what sense structure is "internal." Both "structure" and "internal" are spatial metaphors, and insofar as they were adopted by ego psychology to replace anthropomorphisms with scientific language they must be considered to fail. Spatial language subtly retains the primitive (and unscientific) fantasy that thinking and feeling happen in some private space inside our bodies. Alix Strachey (1941) developed this point in an important but little noticed article. Strachey observed that the word "internal" has three separate meanings which are routinely confused in psychoanalysis. According to Strachey "internal" can describe functions of the mind (e.g., perceiving or thinking), creations of the imagination (in this sense "internal" is synonymous with "fictitious"), or fantasies about what is happening inside the body. Strachey argues that psychoanalysis uses

"internal" to refer to all of these phenomena interchangeably and that this confusion cannot be accounted for by mere verbal ambiguity. Rather, says Strachey, this confusion reflects the analyst's own unconscious fantasies about what happens inside his or her body and the sense of mystery, power, and fascination such fantasies awaken. Strachey essentially accuses psychoanalytic writers of having insufficiently analyzed their own fantasy lives, a circumstance of which the confused use of "internal" is a "symptom."

More recently Roy Schafer (1976) has developed this argument. Originally a leading theorist within ego psychology, Schafer has largely parted ways with that school in his attempt to provide an "action language" for psychoanalysis, ironically, with the Hartmann-like motive of providing greater conceptual clarity and less anthropomorphizing in psychoanalytic language. Like Strachey, Schafer (p. 177) decides that the only meaningful referents of internalization concepts are fantasies of bodily incorporation. This, of course, is not at all what most authors mean when they use terms associated with internalization. Stripped of spatial metaphors, the various internalization concepts simply refer to classes of behavior or actions. For example, identification means that one has changed one's ideas about oneself and one's public behavior after aspects of real or imaginary models (pp. 161-162). Or for another example, psychic structure means that certain events or behaviors are characterized by stability, slow rates of change, and "resistiveness" to regression. To speak of identification or

a structure merely assigns an event a place within these respective classes of action. Schafer argues that nothing is gained by adding a spatial metaphor to these classes of action and that it is too easy to slip into "concreteness of thought" when spatial terms are introduced.

Further, Schafer criticizes the use of concepts such as "autonomous functions," "central functions," and "adaptation," which is the language of ego psychology and, more particularly, Meissner. Schafer (p. 110) argues that though these terms sound impersonal and scientific, they are almost always used anthropomorphically, for they are used as though they were "independent, symbol utilizing minds," or little persons within the person. There seems always more direction, volition, and choice within the operations of these "functions" or in the influence of "adaptation" than these concepts can tolerate, writes Schafer. An "I" or active agent is never fully postulated and openly admitted to, but personal agency is sneaked into the mental apparatus somehow. Schafer observes that in clinical practice analysts do not think anthropomorphically; the whole person of the patient is implied in clinical practice. Certainly, the analyst does not regard himself as a result of forces or as the interplay of functions. Patient and analyst are experienced as agents in clinical work, and Schafer argues that this is how theory should regard them as well. More specifically, functions, structures, and other psychic events or entities ought not be regarded as "acting on the person" but as "actions of a person" (p. 153). The

"new language" Schafer has in mind for psychoanalysis is a gerundizing language.

Schafer's arguments demonstrate the extent to which Meissner is open to some of the objections directed above at Sandler and Rosenblatt. In Meissner's schema, as in Sandler and Rosenblatt's, action is not taken seriously in itself but is regarded as the expression of inner, hidden forces, in this case, psychic structure. Schafer's (p. 102) point concerning the hidden "mover of the mental apparatus" seems pertinent: Although Meissner's language sounds impersonal enough, the psychic structure to which he refers appears to behave like a volitional agent. The problem becomes how we account for their (the structures') actions. If the continuity of the personality is accounted for by referring to psychic structures which are characterized by slow rates of change, then the problem is merely displaced to the "inside" of the personality. The original problem Meissner put to learning theory was how to account for the fact that certain styles and traits are characteristic of an individual for long periods of time, that certain styles and traits are characterized by slow rates of change. If Meissner's own answer is that personality is dependent on psychic structure, the problem simply becomes how psychic structure manages to stay relatively constant over periods of time, and it seems that psychic structure may require its own psychic structure, and so on ad infinitum. This endless regress is unavoidable if the structure is taken to refer to something "behind" or "responsible" for the individual's actions.

Therefore, although Meissner has avoided grounding internalization in the precarious notion of a representational world, he encounters some of the same problems as if he had. The reason for this is that when "internal" is taken to refer to a hidden, ineffable, but deducible world behind phenomena, there is an inevitable duplication of worlds and agents, one of which is discernible and the other of which is the product of inference. This duplication solves nothing and only displaces problems which occur to us from our observations of phenomena into an invisible, inferred realm where they (the problems) still await solutions.

One alternative to conceiving activity as resting on structure is to regard action itself as structured. Donald Moss (1978), for example, argues that structure is not an internal event but the way in which related actions are organized. Psychic structure would simply mean the way in which various private, personal, or subjective activities are organized and imply one another. Superego, for instance, would be such a structure in that the activities of self criticism, self observation, and regulation of guilt feelings can be seen as related to one another in any given individual and part of a characteristic pattern. To the extent that these activities do not appear to be random actions, but show order and pattern, they form a structure. Yet it is not psyche that is structured; it is these activities.

This appears to be the sense in which the "psychoanalytic phenomenology" of Robert Stolorow and his co-workers uses the word

"representation." Although Meissner confined representation to cognitive processes, Stolorow and his colleagues have written extensively of self and object representations "which unconsciously organize a patient's subjective experiences in general and structure the analytic transference relationship in particular" (Stolorow, et al., 1978, p. 247). Stolorow develops this position in the context of a self-conscious attempt to separate himself from the concept of an inner world of psychic entities and forces. His work represents and must be seen in the context of a recent trend within psychoanalysis to separate analytic concepts from the traditional Freudian metapsychology. During the last decade writers such as Merton Gill (1976) and George Klein (1976) have attempted to distinguish metapsychology from clinical practice in psychoanalysis. In general these attempts view metapsychology as the outgrowth of efforts to locate psychological events at the physiological level of explanation. These authors argue that the consequence has been a plethora of impersonal, quasi-scientific forces and entities to which causality is attributed after the natural science model. Such forces and entities lend a scientific aura to analytic theory and tend to be treated as objectively real. By contrast, clinical practice is said to deal primarily with the study of personal meanings as these are embedded in each individual's history. Klein especially argues that the clinical enterprise requires no metapsychological support. Clinical constructs by themselves form a sufficient psychology for unlocking the meanings and intentionality within the patient's

productions. The gain from purging psychoanalysis of its traditional metapsychology is a purified psychology, free of mechanistic reifications.

Stolorow and his co-workers place themselves within this enterprise. They argue against "metapsychological entities, forces, and energies" and in favor of explanation through object representations (Stolorow, et al., 1978, p. 255). By "representational world" they mean "the structure of a person's subjective world . . . the repetitive themes and leitmotifs which dominate his life" (Stolorow & Atwood, 1979, p. 43). Stolorow seeks out patterns in the other's experience of the world, and he assumes that experience is always organized around a "set of nuclear concerns" which direct and limit the ways in which the individual encounters the world and himself. The work of the analyst is to discern the patterns of experience unique to the patient (that is, to discern his self and object representations) and decipher the unconscious functions served by the "representational configurations" built up during the patient's life (Stolorow, 1978).

The work of Stolorow and his fellow psychoanalytic phenomenologists appears to retain much of the useful content of Meissner's approach without the awkward "mover of the mental apparatus" which Meissner's concept of psychic structure implies. Stolorow seems to use "structure" much as Moss suggests, as reliably patterned action rather than an internal entity. Stolorow certainly wants to give the impression this is how psychoanalytic phenomenology

uses "structure" and "representation." The writings of Stolorow and his colleagues are replete with declarations that their work makes no assumptions about the existence of impersonal, causal entities. They self-consciously try to ally themselves with the revisions of Klein, Gill, and Schafer and clearly view their work as both psychoanalytic and also free of the sorts of objections which can be raised against the traditional concept of a representational world. If this is so their work is the foundation for a new formulation of internalization.

Unfortunately, it is not clear that psychoanalytic phenomenology's use of the term "representation" can survive close scrutiny. Stolorow and Atwood (1979) claim that representations are pre-reflective (they form "a pre-reflective" backdrop for experience) and thus can be viewed as naturally occurring structures of experience. They hope this distinguishes representations from Freudian psychology's forces and entities which they regard as artificially imposed abstractions and reifications. Stolorow and his colleagues have made an interesting maneuver in distinguishing their version of representation from Freudian metapsychology. In Freudian thought, unconscious mental representations combine both force (energy) and meaning. The representation of an other who is associated with instinctual satisfaction becomes heavily invested with instinctual energy (cathected) and thereby takes on meaning. Stolorow evacuates the representation of this energy but retains the meaning. Yet Stolorow smuggles an equivalent to energy back into the personality.

Although representations have no energy and therefore are not motivational factors, Stolorow posits a mental apparatus which sounds very much like a product of traditional metapsychology. He (1978) refers to "developmental tasks" and "the various conscious and unconscious functions (for example, wish fulfilling, self-guiding and self-punishing, adaptive, restitutive-reparative and defensive functions)" (p. 315). As Friedman (1980, p. 224n) notes, Stolorow is asking us to believe that an "unconscious function" is not an impersonal, motivational force and that a self-guidance function is not an anthropomorphic entity. In fact, of course, they are. By referring to these tasks and functions only in passing and concentrating on representations, Stolorow obscures his taking away with one hand what he has just given with the other. He wants to separate motivation or force or energy from representations, thus improving on Freudian metapsychology by finding a naturally occurring, pre-reflective structure. It turns out that within the personality there are still functions which certainly resemble motivational forces and which govern representations and relate them to one another. All Stolorow and his co-workers have done is to split force or energy off from the Freudian concept of representation, claim that representation is now a purged and de-metapsychologized category, and then import force or energy back into the personality through developmental tasks, et al. Theirs is an artificial enterprise; words have been changed, but the underlying conceptions have not.

What remains is to reverse Stolorow's original error and acknowledge that self and object representations are not pre-reflective organizers of experience. They are in fact very much the products of reflection, namely, the analyst's reflection on his patient (Freud, 1940/1961, pp. 196-197; Schimek, 1975, p. 176; Friedman, 1980, pp. 220-221). The patient's self and object representations are not "inside" him, nor are they strictly speaking private to him. They are "in" the gaze of the other who encounters the patient and reflects on his experience of the patient, finally conceiving the representations of self and other which interaction with the patient implies. Of course, a third party, such as a therapist, is not absolutely necessary. Any individual can, with varying degrees of success, reflect on himself and infer his self and object representations. But even when an actual third person is not involved, this is the result of taking a third person stance toward oneself. Therefore the self and object representations are never pre-reflective, naturally occurring categories; they are products of reflection, whether one's own or an other's. To the extent they are products of one's own reflection they are conscious representations; to the extent an other must see them for us they are unconscious.

If self and object representations and personality structure are products of reflection, then their empirical referents must be action. Action, after all, is what we observe in an other, whether such action is gross, public behavior, verbal reports and

other expressions of thoughts and feelings, or the apparent action of an other on us as disclosed in our own feelings. We have no warrant for presuming structure or representations behind action, that is, in a qualitatively different, inaccessible realm which is merely represented in action. As Moss (1978) and Schafer (1976) argue, action is structured; it is not an expression of structure. There is no inner or internal realm apart from the world in which we act. When we describe a patient's so-called internal world, we describe his action or, better, our inferences based on his action.

Perhaps such a conclusion is unsatisfying, however, and seems a bit thin. Schafer (1976) observes that redefining internalization in terms of classes of actions will make many clinicians "feel that something essential in the way of empirical reference has been lost" (p. 155). He is quite correct. His own definition of identification (that ideas about oneself and public behavior have been altered after a real or imaginary model) is indistinguishable from a learning theory definition. Meissner (1973) and Rapaport (1960) had objected that learning theory concepts were not rich enough to give a good account of what we actually find in human life, and they would surely make the same objection against Schafer's version of an "action language" for psychoanalysis. It appears to say little more than that we often resemble those around us. Surely we had wanted to say more than that.

What had we wanted to say? In psychoanalysis, no matter how impersonal (and "scientific") the language, internalization

has been used to indicate that the world is given to us through other persons. We do not come into life with a ready knowledge of how to make sense of the world and act in it. Internalization means that how we experience and act in the world is influenced in desperately significant ways by our dealings with important others. Relationships with parents, other family, and perhaps also with a therapist reveal ourselves and the world to us, opening and closing dimensions of experience and action. When an external object does this for us, we speak of internalizing the object, and we mean by this that the other has interacted with us in such a way that some possibilities of action and experience are created for us (and that other possibilities are thereby closed off).

Ironically, then, internalization does not build up an inner, ineffably private world but possibilities for action in the world. This is actually the content of what we called Freud's defensive identification, as discussed in Chapter II, and it is the conclusion ego psychology reached, even though this school's language of functions and structures tends to hide that aspect of its thought. In Chapter II we reviewed ego psychology's use of identification as the most faithful development of Freud's defensive identification. We noted Hartmann's (1958) point that an other's overall style and general approach to the world are adopted in internalization. We saw that Rapaport (1951) and also Schafer (1968) made the same point, that a whole system of behaviors and strategies become one's own in identification, increasing dramatically one's range of adaptive

behavior. Finally we observed that Jacobson (1954) changed Freud's metapsychology of identification on just this point. She argued that identification is not a regression from the social world but a means of expanding competence with others. In sum ego psychology's contributions to the concepts of internalization and identification have ultimately referred to the external world and to the individual's actions, even though the terms used have emphasized the elaboration of internal reality and have attributed causality to internal reality.

Strictly speaking, the internal world is not qualitatively different from the external world. They are the same reality, as there is no human reality which is not in the world. When we speak of internalized objects or internalized object relations we do not refer to causal agents which lie behind behavior and experience. We refer to our third person estimates of the types of experiences and actions possible for an individual. A closer analysis of some of the terms associated with the so-called internal world reveals this. For example, "self image" is typically used in an abstract way, seemingly referring to a context-less representation of oneself. We cannot, however, image ourselves in the abstract or apart from specific contexts. In the first place, we imagine our bodies whenever we image ourselves, and in the second place bodies are never fully at rest nor are they ever divorced from physical reality. Bodies are always in some sort of motion, acting, and in relation to someone or something else. When we image ourselves, therefore, we conceive ourselves acting and located in some context. Instead

of referring to an internal reality, self image discloses potential relations with the world.

We have reached the following conclusions concerning internalization. First, there is no internal, subjective reality which is divorced from the world in which we act by lying behind it as a causal agent. The language of internalization refers primarily to action and to the other ways we experience the world. Secondly, the internal world is intersubjective. That is, the various internal entities, such as representations, psychic structures, and internalized objects, "exist" in the gaze of the other, not in an unmediated, hidden, subjective sphere. Third, internalization refers to the truth that the world and ourselves are given to us through other persons. Any given individual could conceivably experience the world in a seemingly inexhaustible number of ways. Shades and gradations of action and feeling make the world virtually infinite in its possibilities. Such possibilities of experience and action are not timeless and abstract, however. They are thoroughly historical. That is, they become possibilities pro me through involvement with an other who makes them so and in contexts which allow them to be so. Whenever an other behaves with me so as to make new possibilities pro me, internalization of the other occurs.

Two further points fully distinguish this position from social learning theory. First we can now answer more directly the question of how internalization differs from imitation or copying.

Rapaport (1960) and Meissner (1973) came close to this distinction when they defined structure as an enduring feature of personality, characterized by slow rates of change. By locating internalization in an internal world, however, they obscured the intersubjective nature of the process. Reference to the role of the other is needed to make an adequate distinction between internalization and imitation. Rapaport and Meissner are correct to point to the endurance of what is internalized, but the key point is whether the other's presence is needed in order for the possibility to be pro me. So long as the other is required for the possibility to be an option for me, imitation or copying of the other is involved. When the possibility retains its promevity even when the other is not present, internalization has occurred, and it is this circumstance which allows the possibility to be enduring and slow to change.

The second, and crucial, difference between this position and that of social learning theory is their respective attitudes toward the first person experience which is made possible by internalization. From the behaviorist perspective, first person experience seems to be a special case of the third person. For example, Daryl Bem (1972) in his attempts to account for cognitive dissonance phenomena within a behaviorist framework, offers two postulates concerning the relation between first and third person experience. He argues, first, that we come to know our own attitudes, feelings, and other "internal" states "partially by inferring them from observations of [our] own overt behavior"

(p. 10). He says, secondly, that when "internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the individual is functionally in the same position as an outside observer." The thrust of Bem's argument is that we have no privileged relationship with ourselves that is different in kind from another's relation to us. Skinner (1953) has made a similar argument, saying that there is no difference in kind between public and private behaviors. What differences there are amount to the latter's not being directly observable and, thus, harder to reinforce differentially. It is, however, the same process of differential reinforcement which builds up our repertoires both of private and public behaviors. Thus Skinner defines the self as a verbal representation for "a functionally unified system of responses" (p. 185). From this point of view, first person experience appears to be the third person perspective applied to private (i.e., directly unobservable) behavior.

This may at first appear compatible with the position being developed in this chapter, but it is not. Bem and Skinner have failed to make an important distinction in their analyses; namely, they have not distinguished between "private" and "first person." "Private" simply means unobservable to the other; it is adequately defined by its unavailability to the other. But "first person" is not exhausted by reference to whether it is observable by an other. When I say, "I am angry," I generally mean something different from, "You can deduce that I am angry" or even "I deduce that I am angry." Bem and Skinner are in no position to note the

difference. Instead, they are in an embarrassing logical difficulty: When I observe myself and deduce that I am angry, who is it that deduces it? Is there another, unmentioned "I" who deduces that I deduced it, and another ad infinitum? This is especially embarrassing to Skinner's position, since he has argued against the concept of the representational world on the grounds that it leads to just such a regress. Yet if Skinner cannot distinguish fact (third person) from experience (first person), he cannot avoid the very same problem.

Internalization means that potential actions and experiences have become part of the unmediated intentionality which we call first person experience. This is what Schafer (1976) is trying to say when he writes that clinical practice views the patient as an agent and not as the result of impersonal forces. (Schafer fails to emphasize this point, and so he appears to present a position no different from learning theory.) Without internalization of the possibilities occasioned by interaction with significant others, the individual remains stimulus bound or bound to behaviors suggested by those nearby. In either case we say he has no identity or no mind of his own. The question which now arises and which leads us to the next chapter is that of what sort of internalization leads to having a mind of one's own and what makes such an internalization possible.

CHAPTER IV  
OBJECT CONSTANCY AND IDENTIFICATION

I. INTRODUCTION

My argument in Chapter I was that the Freudian image of man has been dated by changing times. In particular the Freudian emphasis on consolidation of personality through resolving Oedipal conflicts no longer seems accurate. In Freudian thought the identification with the same sex parent which concludes this developmental stage is supposed to lay down a core of values which subsequently governs what enters awareness (the repressive barrier). Repression thereby becomes the gatekeeper of identity, for it instantly negotiates a sense of me and not-me, keeping only what is "me" in mind and thus providing an abiding sense of sameness. In Chapter I I argued that such an identification is no longer possible. I proposed that the personality of post-Freudian man is consolidated in a different type of identification process, which it is the task of this study to define.

In this Chapter, I will argue that the personality organization of post-Freudian man is consolidated around the phenomenon of object constancy. The argument is that object constancy is the means whereby a sense of self is created, through which the individual gains the potential for separate identity and a sense of his own continuous reality.

After making this argument I will relate the concept of object constancy to identification. Chapter II traced the development of what we called Freud's defensive identification. In this Chapter, I will argue that all such identifications (as opposed to transient identifications and imitations) presuppose object constancy and can proceed no further toward internalization than the individual has progressed toward object constancy. Seen from this point of view, object constancy appears as the prototypical identification and as the identification which serves the same organizing functions which the Oedipal-ending identification served for Freudian man.

The steps in making this argument are as follows. First, the development of the concept of object constancy will be reviewed. Secondly, object constancy will be redefined in light of Chapter III's conclusions on the meaning of internalization. Finally the relation between object constancy and identification will be discussed.

## II. SURVEY OF THE CONCEPT OF OBJECT CONSTANCY

Hartmann (1952/1964) introduced the term "object constancy" in his paper for the 1951 Holland Symposium on The Mutual Influences in the Development of Ego and Id. Hartmann addressed his paper, in part, to the interrelation between ego development and object relations. Referring apparently to Spitz's and to Durfee and Wolff's studies of maternal rejection, Hartmann noted (and lamented) the tendency to assume simple, unilinear causality between object

relations and ego functions, such that good mothering causes good development while maternal deprivation leads to pathology. Hartmann argued that matters are more complex, and in keeping with the theme of the Symposium, he proposed that the same, objective mother has quite different impact on the child when she is an object of the id versus when she is an object of the ego. Hartmann's way of saying this is that there is considerable difference between the need-satisfying object which exists for the child only when need is felt and later "object constancy." Although he does not explicate the latter term it appears from context that Hartmann uses "constant" to indicate that the object constantly exists (in some sense) for the child even when it is not needed for instinct management.

In a later paper Hartmann (1953/1964) presents a more formal position. In "Contribution to the Metapsychology of Schizophrenia" he suggests that there are two stages of object relations. The first is that of need satisfaction; the second, that of object constancy. In this paper and in several later papers Hartmann (1955/1964, 1956/1964) distinguishes the two stages on the basis of the type of energy involved in object cathexis. So long as un-neutralized energy forms the cathexis, the object can exist only for need satisfaction. Attachment can endure beyond instances of need only after neutralized energy is available for cathexis. Therefore sublimation plays a role in forming constant objects, and some development of ego functions is necessary before the child can move away from primary narcissism, or need-satisfying object relations.

Although Hartmann coined the term object constancy, his ideas on the subject are essentially present in Rene Spitz's 1950 paper, "Relevancy of Direct Infant Observation." Spitz there argues that two developments take place in the third quarter of the first year of life which change the character of the child's object relations. First, narcissistic energy becomes free for object cathexis, and, secondly, "perception has become truly objective" (p. 70). By this last remark Spitz means that objects (animate and inanimate) are defined by their attributes rather than by their need-satisfying functions. Thus, objects are no longer interchangeable; they are distinct and unique. The most important consequence of this is that "object libidinal relations have become possible" since "love is not possible as long as objects are interchangeable." Spitz regards eight-month stranger anxiety as proof of the infant's discrimination of its love object from all other persons.

Spitz's later writings remove any doubt that "object libidinal relations" is equivalent to object constancy. In 1966 Spitz describes the infant's growing ability in the second and third quarters of life to distinguish (perceptually) I from not-I, and he says that this allows memory to develop. Growing memory in turn leads to a "stable, consistent memory image of his mother. Hartmann (1952) refers to this as the establishment of object constancy" (p. 137). As Spitz explains it, this means that the child can now recognize the mother who frustrates to be the same mother who satisfies, whereas previously the baby could only experience the good

and bad aspects of his mother separately. Curiously, Spitz appears to regard this achievement as more a feat of maturing perceptual capacities than a task of emotional development.

Like Spitz, Willie Hoffer and Anna Freud discuss the phenomenon of object constancy in the early 1950's without using the term. Hoffer (1952) and Anna Freud (1952) each contributed papers to the Holland Symposium, and their papers briefly refer to the transition from need-satisfying object relations to love of the object itself. Hoffer proposes that at first the mother is part of the milieu interne of the infant, serving need satisfaction and tension release much as the baby's own body serves these processes, and that the mother at this stage is not accorded any separate existence from his internal milieu. Maturation joins with the mother's attentions to build up "the inner world of the infant" in memory. When the inner world is thus enriched with memories of the mother, "The step to the psychological object, which comes into existence irrespective of its physical presence or absence, has been taken" (p. 36). By "psychological object" Hoffer apparently means what academic psychology calls object permanence. He says that this achievement allows the mother to become "an ego's object," which is cathected with (narcissistic) libido originally invested in the child's body. Such an object is separated in the child's experience from private emotions and excitements and from his own body-self.

Anna Freud (1952) likewise posits two steps in object relations. In the first stage the infant is consumed by his needs and

demands objects solely for their ability to satisfy need. At this point objects are interchangeable as long as the form of need satisfaction remains constant. Between five and twenty-four months, however, the object itself becomes important to the child irrespective of its need-satisfying functions, and increasingly lengthy separations from the object are required for the child to surrender its longing for the loved object and seek satisfactions from interchangeable sources. With age the child gains the "ability to retain libidinal cathexis to absent love objects during separations of increasing lengths" (p. 44).

In a later work Anna Freud (1965) offers a fuller exposition of her 1951 ideas. She contrasts the egocentricity of need satisfaction with object constancy. The need-satisfying object is not perceived as having an existence of its own but is experienced solely within the framework of the child's wishes and needs. Accordingly, what happens "in or to the object is understood from the aspect of satisfaction or frustration of these wishes" (p. 58). In this context the object's absence can only be understood as rejection and desertion. Anna Freud regards this anaclitic, or need-fulfilling, relationship to be contingent on the urgency of the child's needs and drives. With satisfaction or the removal of urgency, cathexis is withdrawn. The principal change which object constancy brings is that a "positive, inner image of the object" is "maintained irrespective of either satisfactions or dissatisfactions" (p. 65). Therefore, prior to object constancy, attachment is withdrawn when

the object fails to satisfy or when need no longer exists. By contrast, "What we mean by object constancy is the child's capacity to keep up object cathexis irrespective of frustration or satisfaction" (Arlow, Freud, Lampl-de Groot, & Beres, 1968, p. 506).

As we see, Hartmann, Spitz, Hoffer, and Anna Freud all describe a two-stage sequence in object relations: need satisfaction followed by object constancy. These writers seem in substantial agreement on the characteristics of the first stage. Need-satisfying object relations implies that the other is not accorded objective existence in the mind of the subject, or that the other's objective existence is a matter of indifference. What matters for the subject is the periodic tension of instinctual need and repeated experiences of tension reduction. Within this private cycle, it is not the other who is cathected but the other's function of reducing tensions caused by unmet instinctual needs. Any other will do, so long as this function is carried out, and therefore others are interchangeable for the individual consumed by instinctual tensions. At this level of object relations, there is no abiding attachment; attachment is withdrawn if the other proves unsatisfying or when tension is no longer felt. From the standpoint of our study of identification, it seems unlikely that any but the most primitive, regressive identifications could be formed at this time, since there is, strictly speaking, no one with whom to identify.

There seems little to add to these early writers' descriptions of this type of object relation except to suggest a change of terms.

Hartmann's programme for ego psychology was, in part, to translate psychoanalytic concepts into a rigorous, scientific language. From the standpoint of this goal it may seem advisable to use what is essentially a biological term--need satisfaction--to describe a mode of interpersonal relating. The infant, however, does not experience need satisfaction. Rather, according to the logic of these early writers, satisfaction is precisely the absence of any experience of an objectively existing other. What the infant experiences is tension reduction, and the other's importance for the infant is that he is the means whereby tension is reduced. It is psychologically more accurate therefore to describe this stage of object relations as the tension-reducing stage. Further, this term better captures the corresponding style of object relations in the adult. Edgumbe and Burgner (1972, pp. 308-312) observe that after infancy very few persons require an other to feed or clean them, and yet certain patterns of adult interaction still seem to be need-satisfying types of object relations. When clinicians say that an adult patient is at the need-satisfying stage, they generally mean that others primarily serve for this person a function of tension reduction, not that others are required to satisfy early instinctual needs. Therefore the term "tension-reducing object relations" better captures both the infant's experience and also the relation between infantile experience and some adult interpersonal interactions, than the term "need-satisfying object relations."

The early writers on object constancy fail to give a thorough description of the second stage in object relations, that of constancy. There are two principal problems in their descriptions. The first problem is the relation between the achievement of object constancy and the achievement of the cognitive capacity for imagining or remembering an object in its absence or in the absence of stimuli directly associated with it (object permanence). Early writers fail to distinguish between the emotional capacity for object constancy and the cognitive capacity for object permanence, or they ascribe object constancy to the child at a time in life when the ability to keep an absent object in mind appears to be a cognitive impossibility. The second problem is that there must be more than two stages before object constancy is achieved. There must be at least one intermediary stage during which the child is deeply attached to one special figure (and therefore objects are no longer interchangeable) and yet during which the child's panic when that person is replaced by a stranger shows that the loved figure is not felt to be constantly available. This intermediary stage, represented by the well known eight-month stranger anxiety, eventually gives way to a time when the child is comfortable even when the love object is absent, and this subsequent stage seems better described by the term object constancy.

Hartmann was sensitive to the danger of confusing libidinal object constancy with cognitive object permanence. In the paper in which he coins the term object constancy, he (1952/1964, p. 173)

notes its difference from "object formation" in general psychology and discusses the relation between the two again in his (1953/1964) "Contribution to the Metapsychology of Schizophrenia." Hartmann himself does not seem clear on their relationship, even if he is clear that the two concepts are different. In his earlier paper he suggests that the cognitive construction of the object--that is, the capacity to experience objects as separate from one's perception and actions--probably cannot be gained apart from developing object relations. He (1952/1965) writes that object permanence "is partly traceable to the element of constancy in what we describe as libidinal or aggressive object cathexis" (p. 173). That is, "things" come to be recognized as objectively existing in the process of forming constant relationships. In his (1953/1965) later paper, however, he describes object permanence as "an ego contribution to the development of object relations" (p. 188). Hartmann does not resolve his ambiguity. In his 1956 paper, "On the Reality Principle," he simply mentions (p. 255) that ego functions (including, presumably, object permanence) and the constitution of object constancy are both involved in the move away from primary narcissism, or the stage of need-satisfying object relations.

Spitz does not consistently seem aware that there is the danger of confusing object constancy with object permanence. As noted in the discussion of Spitz earlier in this section, he seems to regard object constancy as an achievement of memory and perception. He (1966) refers to constancy as the building of a "stable,

consistent memory image of the mother," and he describes constancy as "a landmark in his (the baby's) perceptual sphere" (p. 137).

It appears that Spitz refers to object permanence here, to the child's construction of an image of the mother built on her objective attributes rather than object constancy. Frosch (1966) shows the same problem when he describes "the formation of an object representation which remains constant across time and changing spatial contexts. When this characterizes the object representation, there is object constancy" (p. 350). Although Frosch quickly notes that "the psychoanalytic concept of object constancy is not to be confused with the concept of the 'stable object' in academic psychology" (pp. 350-351), his definition suffers just this confusion.

Anna Freud takes some pains to keep object constancy conceptually distinct from object permanence. She (Arlow et al., 1968) objects to those who approach constancy from the point of view of general psychology: "They define object constancy as the child's capacity to keep an inner image of the object in the absence of the object in the external world. I have never used the concept in that sense" (p. 506). She goes on to say that the "capacity to retain an inner image comes before object constancy" (p. 507). Anna Freud, then, corrects both Hartmann's indecision and Spitz's and Frosch's confused terminology. She considers object permanence and object constancy as separate processes, and she endorses the achievement of permanence prior to the capacity for constancy in order for the object to become an object for the ego rather than the id.

In resolving these problems, however, Anna Freud raises new ones. She appears to locate both object permanence and object constancy in the first year of life, since she says object constancy starts as early as five months and since she agrees with Spitz that objects become objects for the ego in the first year of life. This is considerably earlier than Piaget (1954; Flavell, 1977) was able to establish object permanence. Piaget's experiments did not demonstrate object permanence prior to about eighteen months of age. His ingenious experiments involved hiding objects from infants and toddlers behind one or more screens with some objects being moved behind a screen while the child watches and other movements taking place outside the child's vision. Just before eight months of age, infants do not seem to realize that the object continues to exist behind a screen even when they watch it being hidden there. This "out of sight--out of mind" mentality yields to the child's being able to search for the object behind one screen and, eventually, in the middle of the second year of life, being able to search for a missing object in several places, even when the toddler has not seen the object being hidden. Piaget interprets these findings to mean that at first objects are not accorded existence independent of action involving the object or, later, direct perception of the object. It is a year and a half before the child can conceive that the object continues to exist when it is out of sight and when there are no clues or stimuli to suggest its continued existence. This final stage, or the attribution of objective existence to the object is termed object permanence by Piaget.

Libidinal object constancy seems to presuppose elements of cognitive object permanence (Arlow et al., 1968; Beres, 1970; Burgner & Edgcumbe, 1972). If the child is able to maintain an attachment to the mother even when the mother is absent or unsatisfying, there must be some capacity to conceive of a mother who continues to exist when she is out of sight and who has other positive attributes even when she is unsatisfying. Hence the child must be able to attribute objectivity to the mother, at least, before he achieves object constancy. Yet if Piaget could not establish the achievement of object permanence prior to eighteen months on the average, what sense can be made of the position that object constancy is established in the first year of life?

Many psychoanalytic writers, especially those heavily influenced by Spitz, have either failed to see the problem or have tried a forced reconciliation between their positions and Piaget's data. In his 1950 paper, as we have seen, Spitz writes that by the third quarter of the first year, "perception has become truly objective" (p. 70). Spitz does not appear aware that he contradicts Piaget's work at this point, nor does Escalona (1953), who, writing at about the same time, agrees with Spitz that eight-month stranger anxiety shows the child's ability to cathect a mental image of the mother in the absence of instinctual need. The problem is apparently clearer in 1965, however, when Spitz's book, The First Year of Life, carries an appendix by his collaborator, W. Geoffrey Coblener, entitled, "The Geneva School of Genetic Psychology and Psychoanalysis."

In his appendix Coblener drastically reinterprets Piaget's data in order to conclude that object permanence is actually achieved by eleven months. While this still leaves a three-month gap between eight-month stranger anxiety and object permanence, Piaget himself had agreed that stable mental representations of the mother may appear in advance of those of inanimate objects, because she is more "interesting" to the child. In order to arrive at this acceptable, three-month gap, however, Coblener forces his interpretation of Piaget, and subsequent literature of this subject bears no evidence this reinterpretation has been convincing to others. Decarie (1965) also tries to force a reconciliation with Piaget's data. She compares the timetables for libidinal object constancy and cognitive object permanence, using her own scale for increasing the former and Piaget's studies for increasing the latter. In her study she places object constancy at twelve months, and in order to reconcile this finding with Piaget, she reinterprets Piaget's data to place object permanence at fifteen months of age. In his otherwise complimentary introduction to Decarie's book, Piaget himself reiterates his conviction that object permanence should be expected in the middle of the second year.

Later writers on object constancy have tended to show more respect for Piaget's timetable and have accordingly adjusted their understanding of when object constancy is possible. As we shall see the result has been a different concept of object constancy altogether, one which leads to the problems of identity formation

and personality consolidation. Mahler and her co-workers (Mahler, 1965; Mahler & Furer, 1968; Mahler, Pine & Bergman, 1975; McDevitt, 1971, 1975) say that it cannot be much prior to the third year when the child begins to show object constancy. On the surface these authors' definitions of object constancy are not obviously different from earlier definitions. For example, McDevitt (1971, p. 213) defines constancy as the child's ability to maintain cathexis of the maternal image whether the child feels frustrated or satisfied. And according to Mahler and Furer (1968), "By object constancy we mean that the maternal image has become intrapsychically available to the child in the same way as the actual mother had been libidinally available--for sustenance, comfort, and love" (p. 222). What is new here is the Piagetian way in which these authors use the idea of a mental representation of the mother. As spelled out by Fraiberg (1969) the child may be able to form a mental image of the mother in the first year of life, but the image cannot be stable or permanent at that point. It will take more time for the child to be capable of a reliable, always available image of an absent object. Using Piaget's concepts of "recognition memory" and "evocative memory," Fraiberg writes that late in the first year of life the child is capable of producing a mental representation of an absent object if prodded by some clue or stimulus directly associated with the object. Such a clue or stimulus enables the child to "recognize" the absent object and bring it to mind as long as memory is supported by the clue or stimulus (recognition memory). With the withdrawal

of such a stimulus, though, the image of the absent object fades and cannot be evoked again without an associated stimulus. By contrast, "Evocative memory is the production of a mental image that has relative autonomy from the stimuli of exteroceptive experience and the stimuli of drives and need states" (p. 45). She notes that those who locate object constancy in the first year of life must refer to recognition memory of the mother when they say the child cathects a mental representation of the mother in her absence. That is, under the stimuli of need states, an image of the mother is recalled which comforts the child in the mother's absence. Fraiberg notes that constancy which rests on evocative memory is of a different sort from that which rests on recognition memory. When the child can evoke a representation of a caring mother regardless of the status of need, the mother is constantly available indeed. Since evocative memory is a characteristic of object permanence (That is, it presupposes a permanent, "objective" object.), this latter type of constancy cannot be available much before eighteen months.

Fraiberg's observation that recognition memory and evocative memory mark two rather distinct forms of mental representation implies a continuum along which object constancy develops, corresponding to the child's level of mental representation. Indeed, the idea that object constancy is not a stage-specific achievement but a continuing process which takes place by degree distinguishes later from early theorizing on the subject. McDevitt (1975) writes

that constancy is a continuing sequence, and he describes observations of toddlers' reactions to their mother's leaving the room which imply a constancy continuum from a very fragile memory of the absent mother between nine months to a firm and durable mental representation by the end of the third year. Similarly, Mahler et al. (1975) emphasize constancy as a continuous, progressing sequence. They refer to the object constancy even of the three-year-old as a "still rather fluid and reversible achievement" (p. 112). Because the mother's image is so often buffeted by anger and other strong feelings, it is not as stable as other permanent objects and therefore is influenced by each advance (or failure to advance) in the child's ability to tolerate frustration, modulate drives, and endure anxiety. Burgner and Edgcumbe (1972, p. 328) propose that the term object constancy be replaced with the phrase "capacity for constant relationships" in order to emphasize the character of continuing development.

Kaplan (1972) extends the constancy continuum into adolescence. She notes that those who locate object constancy in the first year generally refer to the infant's growing ability to cathect an object rather than a "need-object state." She further notes that this is quite different from the three-year-old's "capacity to maintain cathexis (in the absence of the mothering person) without the need to split hostile and loving feelings" (p. 330). In turn both are dissimilar to the latency-age child's growing capacity for empathy, or grasping the needs of others, which presupposes a much more

discriminating mental image of the object. Finally, the adolescent's loosening of ties to the parental images of childhood allows constant relations with new objects. Each new level of object constancy parallels the changing levels of cognition, memory, affect management, and all other facets of development.

Kaplan's point of view is extended in a recent thorough article by Melito (1983) which analyzes the type of object constancy possible at each level of cognitive development as described by Piaget. Melito argues that the child lacks the cognitive capacity to put experiences of painful separation in the context of memories of maternal satisfaction before four to seven years of age. Prior to that time the child is too egocentric to take such a viewpoint. Melito further argues that only with the adolescent's capacity to use supraordinate concepts can the disparate images of the mother actually be integrated into a "whole object." Prior to this time, disparate images may be coordinated to some degree, but a picture of another's full personality is impossible.

We can see that object constancy means something different in the writings of those who came after Hartmann, Hoffer, Spitz, and Anna Freud than in the works of these early authors. Later writers tend to adhere closely to Piagetian conceptions of cognitive development. Accordingly, they think through the problem of object constancy according to types or levels of cognitive organization which in turn inform what sort of mental representation is possible. There appear to be types of constancy appropriate to fairly early

and primitive cognitive organizations and still other types appropriate to the most complex organizations. The early idea of two stages in object relations (need satisfaction and object constancy) cannot be maintained in light of these considerations. It does seem appropriate to speak of an initial period of tension-reducing object relations. Edgumbe and Burgner (1972) review the literature on this subject and suggest that the crucial features of this stage are that there is no preference for a specific object until near the end of this period, that mental representations of the tension-reducing object are based primarily on memories of needs being met, and that once need is satisfied, the object image is "de-invested" and not recathected until new tension is felt.

The tension-reducing stage gives way to a period of attachment to one specific person, generally between seven and nine months. McDevitt (1975, pp. 718-719) describes the behavior of one eight-month-old, Donna, who had just learned to stand upright but who was unable to continue standing when her mother left the room. Donna would sit down in her mother's absence and look occasionally at the door through which her mother had left. McDevitt notes the similarity of this behavior to the infant who, during Piaget's Stage IV of sensorimotor intelligence, is able to search behind one screen for an object he has seen hidden there. He speaks of an apparent recognition memory of the mother at this time, suggesting thereby a rudimental mental representation of the mother which is available to the infant when a clue or stimulus guides the memory

but which is too fragile to be evoked without such a clue to provide continuing support. The child's relationship to the mother is constant in the sense that the person of the mother herself is cathected rather than her mothering functions. Yet the relationship is not truly constant, for the mother's image is not available to the child constantly, and thereby the child cannot constantly feel that the mother is present in some sense.

McDevitt (pp. 723-725) reports a different type of relationship which becomes available during Mahler's "Practicing" subphase of separation-individuation, between ten and sixteen months. He notes that Donna's passive helplessness at eight months was later replaced by activities through which she mastered her mother's absence. At fourteen months, for example, Donna prepared herself for her mother's expected absence by looking at herself in a mirror and saying, "Bye-bye." At fifteen months she would look at herself in a mirror and say, "Mama," when her mother was gone. McDevitt believes these actions show a higher level of representation of the mother, one based on evocative memory of her rather than on sensory contact or clues associated with the mother. He makes the observation that by eighteen months the child "seems to maintain an 'illusion' that his mother is with him or nearby whenever he chooses to move away from her" (p. 727).

While the eighteen-month-old's steady attachment to the mother plus the apparent availability of a stable mental representation of her is enough to argue for the achievement of object

constancy, McDevitt (p. 731) follows Mahler and her colleagues in suggesting that constancy is still fragile. Mahler et al. (1975, pp. 109f) point to the child's renewed periodic distresses at the mother's absence between eighteen and thirty months. They conclude that the stress of becoming more independent of the mother during this time is enough to raise questions in the child's mind (as it were) of whether mother is still available. Hence the earliest that one finds object constancy maintained for long is between two and three years or after the child has begun to resolve his ambivalence over becoming separate from the mother. The psychological criterion Mahler and McDevitt use is that the child has a mental representation of the mother which endures and is available for comfort even in the face of hostile feelings and separation anxieties. The empirical reference for concluding the presence of such a representation is simple: Ability to leave the mother comfortably is taken as evidence of object constancy (Mahler, 1965, p. 167).

Mahler and McDevitt have placed object constancy in an entirely different context than, for example, Spitz and others who locate this phenomenon in the first year of life. While early writers tend to define constancy in terms of the young child's ability to establish a close attachment to the mother, Mahler places it in the context of the child's separation from the mother and therefore in the context of establishing a separate identity. As is well known, Mahler painstakingly describes "the psychological birth of the human infant," tracing four subphases of a "separation-

individuation" process which begins at about six months and ends around thirty-six months. Object constancy, as a reliable phenomenon, is located, according to McDevitt and to Mahler and her co-workers, in the last subphase, spanning roughly the third year of life. Two different but related developments are apparent to these authors at this stage of development: Separation from the mother proceeds in concert with the establishment of individuality. That is, the child's growing acceptance that he and mother are physically and emotionally different corresponds to a growing sense of individuality. Mahler et al. (1975, p. 118) speak of a "unified self-image" which begins to inform the child about who he is and how he behaves, now that he and mother are different. In the literature this is called "self constancy," and, as we will see, self constancy and identity formation are close correlates of object constancy.

I am persuaded by Mahler's line of reasoning that object constancy ought not be accorded the child prior to the fourth subphase of separation-individuation. This makes the achievement of some rudimentary, yet clearly recognizable separate individuality to be the context in which object constancy must be understood. There are, to be sure, other levels of object relations which will follow and therefore other levels of object constancy which can be identified, for instance, in the adolescent. But the three-year-old's ability to leave the mother comfortably is a striking event and signals a qualitative change from earlier object relations. When object constancy is placed in the first year of life, the

observed phenomenon is the infant's attachment to the mother such that he agonizes over her absence even when he feels no instinctual need. That is, the child struggles with the question of how to survive his mother's leaving him. But it is quite a different question with which the child struggles between eighteen and thirty-six months, namely, the question of whether it is all right for the child to leave the mother. The growing development of self constancy means that the child does not need the mother as he once did; possessed of an increasingly integrated view of himself, he does not require as much of the definition she originally provided. As we will see, the child's discovery of his growing autonomy reminds him that his mother is not always available. Until he is able to pursue his individual identity (self constancy) without overwhelming anxiety over separateness from his mother, object constancy cannot be said to be firmly rooted.

Before this aspect of object constancy can be clearly seen, however, and related to the question of identification, the problem of what it means to keep a comforting mental representation of the mother must be explored in light of the previous chapter's conclusions on the meaning of internalized object representations.

### III. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW OF OBJECT CONSTANCY

As noted in the previous section recent writers on object constancy have (justifiably) paid close attention to Piaget's analysis of cognitive development. In particular these authors

have been guided by the concept of levels of mental representation in the child's developing capacity to imagine the mother. They have sought evidence that the child's representation of the mother acknowledged her objectivity or permanence, the assumption being that she could not be an emotionally constant object until she became a cognitively permanent object. Mahler and those influenced by her work have especially taken care to define object constancy in terms of the availability of a stable and whole maternal mental representation. Unfortunately, this concern with levels of cognitive organization has not always allowed authors to be clear that internalization of the mother is the key issue in object constancy. Rather, it has often seemed that authors believe the child's capacity to imagine the mother at a sophisticated level of representation is equivalent to object constancy. The two issues are, of course, interrelated, but the key question is internalization.

In Chapter III I reviewed Meissner's (1973) distinction between "inner" and "internal." He proposes that cognitive functions--including the level at which thinking, memory, and representation are organized--belong to the inner world, while abiding personality characteristics (what he terms "psychic structure") belong to the internal world. This distinction should be borne in mind with respect to object constancy. We need to know what aspects of the mother-child relationship have been internalized and what sort of internalization deserves to be called object constancy.

According to the conclusions of the previous chapter, internalization refers to the possible ways an individual may experience and act in the world. Further, internalization occurs through interaction with significant others, as relationships make different possibilities to become possibilities pro me. Object constancy, regarded under the rubric of internalization of the mother, therefore gives the child possible ways of experiencing and acting in the world, and the task here must be to define what possibilities are made pro me for the child who achieves object constancy.

The difference between elaborating an inner world and building an internal world must now be more sharply defined. Cognitive object permanence is generally discussed in terms of levels of mental representation of objects. Permanence is usually defined as the child's ability to construct a mental image of an object which accords the object an existence apart from the child's behavior toward it. Actually, the process should be conceived in the opposite direction. It is not a mental world (for example, Sandler and Rosenblatt's representational world) which is elaborated with the construction of permanent objects, but the external world. Object permanence is the discovery that the world continues beyond the child's perception of it, that the world continues even when it is not perceived. This is a "realistic" discovery by the child. The spatial world does continue beyond perception, and such spatial extension can be assumed, depended upon, and tested over and over. There is no conceivable, ordinary circumstance such that physical

space will be discontinuous or have gaps in it. Objects which are out of sensory contact do not cease to exist in space, and the landscape continues beyond the horizon.

The cognitive status of the constant mother is quite different. Object constancy does not presuppose that the mother, like a favored toy, continues to exist when out of sight, but that the child continues to be mothered when the mother is out of sight. Only in childhood autism is the mother's continued existence no different for the child than that of an inanimate object. The mother's continued existence in object constancy is precisely her continuation as the mother. Her care and enjoyment of the child are felt to continue even when she is out of sight, and this enables the child to continue to organize his experience and feelings in the same way he can when she is actively attending to him. This is not, however, a "realistic" feeling. A toy truly exists when it is out of sight, but a mother is not reliable in the same way. Even a very devoted mother often fails in caring for her child, certainly is not always thinking of him, and sometimes is so angry with the child she cannot meet his needs effectively. A child who convinces himself of the continued existence of his toys is not deceived. But a child who assumes his care and enjoyment by the mother and experiences the world in light of this assumption has formed an illusion. There are many gaps in maternal devotion.

Indeed, during the tension-reducing stage the gaps in maternal devotion are in one sense as important as the mother's

success in reducing tension. If the infant's needs were always responded to before tension could be felt the result would be an impoverishment of experience. The infant would remain embedded in satiation with (at best) only the very vaguest sense of inside and outside or even of pleasure-unpleasure. Such a state of affairs is essentially that which obtains prior to birth, and if it were to continue after birth it would mark a catastrophic developmental failure. Fortunately for the neonate, even the most compulsively devoted mother cannot usually interdict need before tension is felt, and so after birth there begins a lifelong cycle of rising tension from unmet need followed by satisfaction and tension reduction.

Schachtel (1959) believes this experience of the alternating rise and fall of tension probably plays the chief role in effecting an awareness in the infant that his body is different from the mother who satisfies his needs. Although the experience of unmet need can eventually become one of overwhelming tension in which the infant's world fragments and disintegrates, the ordinary mother usually (or often enough) meets need before this occurs, and her ministrations prevent the child's being overwhelmed with his tensions. When it is thus kept manageable by the mother's care, tension lifts the child out of the embeddedness of satisfaction and introduces gradations into awareness. As tension mounts, the child becomes figural to himself or dimly notices himself in (or as) this growing excitement. As the mother's care reduces tension a corresponding gradation is added, namely the sense of "out there." In the first

months these are only the roughest approximations of what adults would mean by self and object awareness, but the first glimmerings of these ideas are certainly born in the difference between intra-uterine and extrauterine existence. In the former there was no "there," while outside the womb the infant daily finds, as Schachtel puts words to the infant's feelings, "'There is something out there which has to happen, which has to come, to make me feel good" (p. 255).

The impact of extrauterine life forces the infant rapidly to begin to notice the external world. The behavior of the young infant shows this. Around a month the infant shows definite signs of attention to the outside world. By one month the infant shows a sense of the direction from which lights and noises come, and although he may not be able to focus his gaze he begins to stare in a certain direction rather than vaguely staring at nothing in particular. By two months (and perhaps much earlier in some babies) he can focus on objects and track them visually. These very early behaviors show the child's growing ability to take notice of what is out there and to distinguish external objects from proximal events. When the infant focuses visually and tracks a moving object, he shows remarkable development of the cognitive capacity to pay attention, or to focus and direct his attention.

These early forms of what Schachtel would call focal attention signify the seeds of the ability to construct and interpret a reality which is separate from purely private impressions of comfort-discomfort.

Part of any such process is the move from proximal to distal perception, or to use Schachtel's (pp. 81-165) terms, from reliance on "autocentric" to "allocentric" perception. This in itself is a quantum leap in ability to experience the world out there. One of the chief characteristics of proximal modes of perception (proprioception, taste, smell, touch) is that they tend to yield information about the subject rather than the stimulus--for example, that the subject feels pleasure or pain, or that he is attracted or repelled by the stimulus. Further, such information tends to be global and imprecise. By contrast distal perception, chiefly sight and sound, generally communicates information about the stimulus rather than the experiencing subject, and such information is potentially more detailed and differentiated than that available in proximal forms of perception. Until the infant begins to pay attention to things out there he must depend on proximal perception and thus primarily receives information about his own subjective sense of comfort-discomfort. Reliance on distal perception offers the possibility of an infinitely more detailed, rich, and complex world. The tensions which are an inevitable part of extrauterine life and imperfect maternal care prompt the infant to become aware of the outside world and thus allow the discovery and interpretation of a reality which transcends purely subjective, global impressions of well being or its absence.

As I have described it so far, the infant's journey through the tension-reducing stage of object relations is one of discovering

the outside world. While there is no question of object permanence in the first six to eight months of life, during this time the child nonetheless makes great strides toward the discovery and construction of a reality which transcends proximal contact. Thus far the paths to object permanence and object constancy coincide, but the discovery of the mother in this outside world causes the roads to divide into increasingly separate, albeit interacting, lines of development (Bell, 1970).

Although it is not possible in actuality to determine exactly where object permanence and object constancy begin to travel different lines of development, for theoretical purposes it can be marked as the point at which the mother's face becomes the object of focal attention (or a rudimentary form of it). At some point in the early months of life most mothers have a sense that, "My baby recognizes me!" This sense is built on the baby's clearly focusing on the mother's face when she comes near, in contrast to earlier, more random, and less focused scanning of her face. Southwood (1973), who has studied this phenomenon, believes the presumed "recognition" is actually the baby's allowing the mother to establish herself as a separate and distinct object of perception. The baby's ability to do this is so dramatic that it awakens in the mother a heightened sense of personalized interaction with her infant. The change is important for the infant as well. What the infant suddenly discovers in his mother's face and, to a lesser extent, in the faces of other frequent caretakers such as the father, is

pretty much: himself! Southwood (p. 238) observes that while she is in the baby's visual focus the mother's facial expressions "always contain some imitation of the baby's own facial conformations," so that the mother becomes an echo or mirror of her infant. Winnicott (1967) says simply that, "the precursor of the mirror is the mother's face" (p. 26). He explains that a baby looking into his mother's face sees essentially himself, because what the mother looks like is directly related to what she sees in the baby's face.

Winnicott goes on to say that in this early mirroring process the mother gives back to the baby his own self (cf. Spitz & Wolf, 1946; Mahler & Furer, 1968). It is unclear from the context how technically Winnicott uses "self" here, but what he says certainly holds a truth: that what is in here suddenly becomes visible in a way it was not when proximal perception was the child's sole means of information. The mother's reflection of the child is not just another thing in the steadily enlarging world of out there. Rather, her reflection of the infant combines proximal cues with distal perception; proprioceptive feedback from the child's own facial movements and sounds are seen and heard out there in the mother's facial movements and matching sounds. When proximal cues are thus matched in distal perception, the possibility arises for the first time of not merely feeling comfortable or uncomfortable, but of seeing that I feel comfortable or uncomfortable.

When the baby begins to become visible to himself in the mother's face, distal perception has begun to yield quite a different sort of information about the external world than that which leads to object permanence. When the baby focuses attention on the mother's mirroring face, what he finds out there is what was first in here. An epistemological quandry, to follow Bach's (1980) suggestion, is opened up for the child, namely, how in here can also be out there. Psychologically this is the problem of objective self awareness, or how I who am subjectively aware can also be that of which I am aware, or how I can become my own object. In the gradual emergence of this state of mind (objective self awareness) I come to be the keeper of my own reality in large measure. This is dramatically different from the achievement of object permanence, which is the discovery that I am not the keeper of the objective reality of things.

At first, however, the baby's reality is kept by the mother. Nothing about himself is real for the child until it is seen for him by the mother. I take this to be Kohut's (1977, p. 100) meaning when he writes that the "nuclear self" is laid down in the mother's repeated empathic responsiveness to the child's innate potentialities. Kohut observes that the newborn's mother and other caretakers over and over respond to certain of the infant's potentials, while they tend to neglect or even actively thwart others. Southwood (1973, p. 238) too points out the selectivity of the mother's responses, noting that mothers tend to imitate a frown only briefly,

quickly changing to a smile. Kohut refers to the empathic matrix in which the mother intuits the child's feelings, tensions, and needs as "a process that lays down a person's self" (p. 100). He observes that the baby's environment tends to relate to the infant as though he were already a functioning self, that is, "a center of initiative and a recipient of impressions" (p. 99). Although we must assume, says Kohut, that the baby is not yet such a self, the fact that he is treated as such implies the expectations with which he is greeted. When innate potentialities and the mother's expectations converge, there is the origin of "the infant's primal, rudimentary self." Presumably, what the mother cannot perceive in her infant will be excluded from the infant's self awareness as well. What is felt in here must be mirrored out there to become part of the baby's gradually forming sense of his own reality.

This process is begun during the tension-reducing stage of object relations. Repeatedly the infant is lifted out of the embeddedness of satisfaction by rising tension, which is contained within acceptable limits by the mother's ministrations. When he is thus lifted from embeddedness, the infant may be said truly to "ex-ist," to stand outside of himself, or to become figural to his consciousness before sinking back into satisfaction. As this happens his reflection out there in his mother's face promises further gradations of ex-istence. He may stand outside himself not only in the sense of moving out of embeddedness, but in the sense of finding himself out there, in the world. His mother's mirroring gaze is that which makes him real in the world.

If this is so, the stranger anxiety which marks the end of the tension-reducing stage can be seen in a new light. It is generally accepted that stranger anxiety shows that persons are no longer interchangeable for the baby; he is especially attached to one person, whose absence leaves him upset. There is less agreement on what causes the anxiety. Fraiberg's (1969, p. 24) arguments on the difference between recognition and evocative memory make Spitz's (1957, p. 54) position (that the child evokes memories of the mother's face and is upset at not seeing her) untenable. Fraiberg's own position, that the child expects to see a familiar face (even though he cannot evoke it in its absence) and is anxious when the expectation is disconfirmed, seems uninformative and requires that we postulate a curious mental set in the infant to the effect that "the next person I see will be familiar." There are no other evidences of the existence of such a set, however, and it is unparsimonious to propose one just for this instance. Therefore there is no easy way to make sense of the idea that the absence of the mother's face is the object of stranger anxiety.

Neither can the stranger's face be the cause of stranger anxiety. In the early stage of what Piaget (1954) terms sensorimotor intelligence there is no discrete, independently existent object for the infant. There are only objects associated with the infant's motoric sequences. This means that a stranger's face can have no significance in and of itself for the child. There would have to be some prior motoric sequence associated with the sight of the

face in order for the stranger to mean anything specific for the child. Therefore the stranger is not the object of stranger anxiety.

In fact the baby's stranger anxiety does not have a specific object, as would anxieties appropriate to more developmentally advanced states of mind. Kohut (1977, p. 102) speaks of the vaguely defined fear of the dissolution of the self, and I think this is closer to the child's stranger anxiety. The baby experiences a disruption in what could be called a primitive sense of self feeling when the mother's gaze is replaced with a stranger's. The child experiences a sudden break in the rudimentary sense of continuity he feels while in his mother's gaze. This dissolution or break is evidenced as stranger anxiety and signifies that the child fails to find his familiar self in the stranger's face. What the stranger reflects back is a new image, and the infant seems to experience this different reflection as an alien self threatening him with an alien world. This alien "me" apparently raises the question for the child of what happened to me, since the absence of the mother who sees him means the absence of the familiar me as well.

Freud (1920, pp. 14-16) implies this idea in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where he gives the story of a toddler who repeatedly occupied himself with a game of throwing-away and finding small objects. Freud identifies this as a game of disappearance and return, apparently associated with his mother's leaving him and coming back home. Freud reports that one day this boy discovered his reflection in a long, but not full-length, mirror and spent

a great part of several hours' separation from his mother making his own image appear and disappear by standing before the mirror and crouching down below it. When his mother returned home, the child greeted her with the words, "Baby gone!" Freud suggests the whole sequence was an effort to master anxiety over separation from the mother with repetitions of the danger situation. R. D. Laing (1960, pp. 124-128) observes that if Freud's hypothesis is correct then the fear of disappearing oneself is closely related to the fear of the mother's disappearance. Laing argues that the mother is not merely an object for the child to see, but she is someone who in turn sees the child. This particular child apparently concluded that if he was not out there, reflected in his mother's eyes, he was objectively gone altogether. That is, the little boy identified himself with the fantasy of the one who saw him. Thus, the mother's unavailability meant the child's own reality was correspondingly absent, apparently for the lack of someone to see him.

Stranger anxiety therefore signals a new problem with which the child must cope. If the child is defined through his mother's presence, he also begins to experience in a dramatic way the effects of her leaving. McDevitt (1975, pp. 718-719) reports observations of an eight-month-old, Donna, who had just learned to stand upright. When Donna's mother left the room, however, Donna could not maintain the upright posture. She did not sit down so much as she deflated into a sitting position as her mother disappeared. Donna showed by her behavior the marked impact of her mother's absence.

The child's problem is whether a sense of continued existence out there can be maintained or whether such a sense remains contingent on the comings and goings of the one who sees him. (Flemming, 1975, reports an adult patient who, apparently struggling with the same set of issues, said, "I need you with me to know how I feel about myself," p. 754.)

Many of Mahler's and McDevitt's case studies report that about the same time stranger anxiety is noted, the child begins to take interest in his reflection in the mirror. Children do not show the ability to recognize their images as their own until quite a bit later, around eighteen months, but fascination with the mirror is nonetheless present by around eight months. Bach (1977) has noted the jubilation the eight-month-old shows while playing before the mirror, and he believes the child's excitement comes from the joining of proximal cues with distal perception: "More concretely, the infant, faced with the mirror, discovers that he can act and thereby influence that which he sees at a distance . . . thus proximal cues are connected with distal perception" (p. 214). Bach regards this as the foundation of objective self awareness, but we have described the same process beginning much earlier, when the young infant focuses attention on his mother's mirroring face and finds proprioceptive feedback reflected in distal perception. The eight-month-old's discovery of the mirror reproduces this experience precisely at the time when stranger anxiety shows how much a problem the mother's leaving has become. Thus, while the

baby does not appear to recognize himself in the mirror, it may well be that the mirror (through reproducing his mother's mirroring) allows him to form the fantasy of continuing to be seen by the mother. The behavior of Donna, the eight-month-old described by McDevitt (1975), supports such a hypothesis. Early in her second year she used the mirror to manage her mother's leaving, preparing for an expected absence by saying, "Bye-bye," to her reflection in the mirror and saying, "Mama," to her reflected image when her mother was absent. The mirror seemingly replaced the mother after a fashion and allowed Donna to retain the feeling of being seen by an important other, even when that other was absent.

Between eight and eighteen months the child works to establish the illusion that he is continuously seen by the mother. The mother's ability to leave the child forces him to do this, for at eight months, when the mother leaves, she takes with her the child's ability to feel connected to the world and continuously real. I believe this is what Lacan (1977) refers to when he speaks of the six- to eighteen-month-old child's vulnerability to feelings of powerlessness and fragmentation. Lacan maintains that the child first sees in the physical figures of his parents and later in his mirror image an integrity and wholeness he can only vaguely imagine for himself. Lacan takes early behavioral imitations of the parents to indicate that the child is excited by the unified image of the other and jubilantly claims the other's integrity for himself through mimicry. If it is correct that nothing about the child is real

for him until it is seen by the mother, then the child cannot fully claim physical integrity until his own has been made visible to him through his mother's mirroring function and he is able to sustain the fantasy of her continued mirroring of his image in her absence. Prior to that time the mother's absences are experienced as fragmenting, or as disruptive to the fragile sense of continuity. The child comes to manage the mother's absence through developing the illusion that the mother who sees him is always available.

When this illusion is firmly rooted, the process of object constancy is firmly established. The process is one of internalizing the mother's gaze--using "internalize" in the sense of the conclusions reached in Chapter III. The internalization sequence begins with an action initially done by an other. At first the other's actual presence is necessary for the action to be possible pro me. Gradually, however, my continuing interaction with the other leads me sometimes to perform the action in his absence. When the action is available to me regardless of the other's presence or absence, then it is internalized. Generally at this point persons will show that an action is truly theirs by creating their own twists and unique changes in the behavior originally copied from the other. In the case of object constancy, the mother's act of seeing the child in such a way that he feels real is what is internalized.

McDevitt (1975, p. 731) writes that by eighteen months there is usually evidence the child has formed a fairly stable mental representation of the mother which serves some of her functions

in her absence. McDevitt points to Donna's use of the mirror early in her second year as evidence that she was then developing such a representation. What McDevitt is describing, I think, is the toddler's growing ability to feel comfortable in the mother's absence. When he speaks of a stable maternal representation, he is actually pointing to the average eighteen-month-old's ability to behave with an apparent security and freedom which earlier required the mother's presence. In keeping with the understanding of internalization presented in Chapter III, I would translate McDevitt's classical language to say that for the child of eighteen months the fantasied presence of an other who sees him can often replace the actual, physical presence. Thereby he can retain feeling defined or real without the other who originally made this possible.

Several other factors govern the eighteen-month-old's ability to do this. A chief factor is the growing influence of the father in the toddler's life (Abelin, 1975; Mahler et al., 1975, pp. 77, 91). At a time when the toddler must know if he can feel real without the mother, the father offers this experience. Here he finds he can be seen and responded to in such a way that what he feels in here is congruent with the other's response out there and that this can happen without the mother. Thus he finds that his reality in the world can continue in the mother's absence. It is important that the toddler discover this, for it allows him to be angry with his mother when she frustrates him without fearing his entire reality is in jeopardy. When the father is a significant

figure, the toddler knows his reality is not only out there in the mother, and so he can experience with some safety the rages appropriate to this time of life.

A second factor is the child's growing cognitive capacity to take himself for his own object. Eighteen months is not only the time by which most toddlers show increasing comfort in their mother's absence, but it is also the time children begin to use their names for their mirror images. To name his reflection, the child must realize that what he feels in here from proprioceptive feedback is also what he sees out there, and he must realize that this feedback corresponds to the image his parents see when they use his name. This cognitive development contributes to object constancy if there has so far been the convergence of which Kohut (1977, p. 99) spoke between the child's own potentialities and the parental mirroring response. In such a case it is not only proprioceptive feedback which corresponds to the reflected image and to the name but also the complex of feelings, excitements, and ambitions the child experiences. When the child therefore takes himself for his object, it is an integrative process, and he sees the unified image to which Lacan (1977) refers. It is this integrity which allows the child to feel real. If the parents have thwarted important segments of the child's feelings, however, the growing cognitive capacity forces him to dissociate, fragment, or split his physical image from important aspects of what he feels. In the first case the child moves toward that state of mind known

as objective self awareness, but in the latter case he moves toward the state of mind better defined as painful self consciousness.

The child of about eighteen months uses his name in different ways. Not only does he name himself in the mirror, but he will announce upon entering a room, for instance, "Johnny's here." In referring to himself from this third-person perspective he is imitating the parental use of his name. In terms of the conclusions reached in Chapter III this imitation is a necessary part of the process of internalizing the mother's gaze. As the child begins to take over for himself the role of seeing himself, he also begins to have the sense of his own reality in his keeping. The child who names himself without having to deny massive segments of his feelings does not leave himself in an other's gaze so much as he takes himself (as an object that can be seen and known) with him. To the extent the child can do this he has reversed the situation which obtained at eight months, when he suffered disruption in his sense of his reality in the mother's absence. When the normal child can "see" himself in his mother's absence, her leaving need not devastate him.

The child's growing autonomy, however, brings new problems. At around eighteen months the senior toddler appears to experience a dramatic renewal in his sense of being painfully separate from his mother, which is in sharp contrast to his gradually growing comfort with her absence between twelve and eighteen months. (This marks the beginning of Mahler's well known rapprochement subphase

of separation-individuation.) Even though the child now has the power emotionally to leave the mother (through his growing autonomy), this reminds him that his mother is not always available on demand; it seems that the child must initially experience his growing maturity as abandonment by the mother. This rapprochement crisis shows how fragile the illusion of the mother's constant availability is at eighteen months. The child still needs the mother's frequent physical presence to support his fantasy of being continuously seen by her. Since her presence is yet needed for the child consistently to do for himself what the mother has done, internalization (as described in Chapter III) is not completed. As internalization proceeds, the child needs the mother's company less and less to bolster his sense of being visible. When the child consistently behaves as though his mother were always available, he has internalized her mirroring function and has thereby achieved object constancy.

Object constancy is the illusion that the mother is constantly available in her mirroring function. This illusion corresponds to the internalization of the mother's gaze in which the child feels real. The consequence of object constancy is that the child is potentially always visible to himself. That is, he can define and identify himself, or relate to himself as his own object. The category of linear Time thereby becomes an important determinant of the child's experience (cf. Mahler et al., 1975, p. 116). The infant embedded in satisfaction lives a momentary existence,

experiencing instants of urgent tension surrounded by the timelessness of satiation. As the child's reality becomes out there in the mother's mirroring presence, the child grows into an interpersonal reality in which being an other's object gives definition to proximal perceptions of the tensions and excitements in here. What is felt in here is seen out there in the mother's mirroring face and gives continuing reality to what was a momentary experience. It does this because finding oneself out there exposes feelings which are only vaguely and globally sensed in proximal or autocentric perception to the differentiations and gradations which are possible in distal or allocentric perception. Finding oneself in distal perception is thereby a taking distance from the urgency of instinctual tensions by beginning to define (in the mother's face) what has urgency from what has not (cf. Kohut, 1977, pp. 86-89) and by providing a wealth of information on what is in here even when what is felt is not the urgency of instinctual tension. This plants in the child the seeds of finding that he continues even when he is not subject to the rise of instinctual tension.

Such continuity depends on the availability of a perspective from which the child continues to be seen, or the illusion that the mother is constantly available to see the child. In turn such continuity implies a kind of transcendence such that the self is not absorbed into or exhausted by any given experience, no matter how intense the feelings accompanying it. The availability of another perspective means that other determinants of the self are

potentially available apart from whatever is the content of any given moment of experience. This sense of transcending any particular experience is the feeling of being continuously real and may be called self constancy. Mahler especially has emphasized the dual themes of separation-individuation, the one corresponding to object constancy and the other to self constancy. The two imply one another, as the availability of the mother always to see the child presupposes that the child is always potentially available to be seen (Rinsley, 1982, p. 154).

The achievement of self and object constancy is the foundation for two states of consciousness which are necessary for normal adulthood, namely self absorption and objective self awareness. By self absorption I mean a simple state of consciousness with no awareness of oneself. Sartre (1956, pp. 9-17) has described such a state of mind as "pre-reflective cogito," and Federn (1952, pp. 212-240) has used "medial self awareness" for the same thing. This is essentially a time of self forgetfulness with no sense that one is potentially an object. I believe Winnicott (1967) refers to self absorption when he speaks of having "a self into which to retreat for relaxation" (p. 32). The necessary recreation of forgetting oneself is possible only after attaining object constancy. Without the assurance of a perspective from which I am continuously visible, self absorption is not relaxing but threatens the subject finally with loss of the world, grandiosity, and manic elation.

Objective self awareness, by contrast, is self consciousness. This is Sartre's (1956, pp. 211-236) "reflective cogito" and Federn's (1952, pp. 212-140) "reflective ego feelings." If self absorption is the sense of being a "who," then objective self awareness is the sense of being a "what" based on external perspectives. One cannot comfortably become an object without having achieved self constancy. Without the faith that I am continuous with myself and thereby transcend any given instant of experience, objective self awareness threatens to turn me into the other's object altogether, leading in its extreme forms to intense and painful self consciousness, shame, and depersonalization. While such experiences as shame occur as part of normal life, there needs to be the sense that something of myself survives, or is more than such times, or else they become fragmenting occurrences.

The mother's mirroring function is the earliest basis for objective self awareness as she combines proximal cues with distal perception and thereby makes the child visible to himself out there, as an object. This mirroring function, or the child's visibility, is internalized by the child and corresponds to his progress toward and achievement of object constancy, or the illusion of the mother's continuous availability to see the child. If what the mother and later the father empathically "see" is what the child himself experiences in proximal perception, the child feels real by being seen. In such a case the mother, as Winnicott says, gives back to the child his own self. Then the internalized maternal gaze

guarantees the child's continuous reality, or the phenomenon of self constancy. This is the basis for a healthy self absorption in which the individual does not surrender his reality in the world when he forgets it, because it remains linked to an ongoing point of view which can be reclaimed by the child himself.

Adult life requires a certain fluidity between these opposite states of mind, such that either can give way to the other when needed. Mahler (1979) writes,

For the more or less normal adult, the experience of being both "in" and at the same time basically separate from the world "out there" is one of the givens of life that is taken for granted. Consciousness of self and absorption without awareness of self are the two poles between which we move with varying degrees of ease. (p. 131)

Sheldon Bach (1980) has linked this achievement with the foundations of identity. He writes of "creating that psychic space we call the 'self,' within which our multiple subjective and objective perspectives are paradoxically conceived of as transformations of the same invariant ongoing person" (p. 185).

Bach is correct to introduce the subject of identity or selfhood at this point. It is here that the different personality organization of post-Freudian from Freudian man is most apparent. I argue above that the child's constant visibility to himself through the (eventually internalized) gaze of the mother enables linear Time to become a determinant of experience. In turn this allows a sense of continuity with oneself, or self constancy. Of course the experience of one's own continuity is an illusion (similar to

that of object constancy). The child is changing very rapidly, and the threads of similarity between the infant and the three-year-old are thin indeed. Yet it is not the actual content of the self that is important but the sense that from some stable perspective, whatever is in here is always potentially visible and yet also uniquely the child's own. Since the child continuously carries with him the perspective from which he is visible, he is not exhausted by the look of the other. He has another gaze, as it were, which transcends interaction with others, and thus he is always before and beyond any particular instant of experience. As we will see in the next chapter this safeguards against devastating shame and painful self consciousness on the one hand and narcissistic self absorption on the other.

The experience of being seen, first by the mother and later by the internalized mother, lends the coherence to the personality which the Oedipal-ending identification lent Freudian man. The coherence which is achieved in each case is quite different, however. The Oedipal-ending identification coalesces the personality through establishing a sharp difference between what is like-me and what is unlike-me. The corresponding psychic agency, the superego, maintains that coherence by censorship of wishes at odds with what is like-me. The very opposite, however, is the case with object constancy, where the precise content of what is in here is not the important thing, but the fact that the child is always potentially visible to himself.

A more complete exposition of the way object (and self) constancy function to organize the personality as did the superego of Freudian man must be left to the final chapter. Before such a discussion can take place, we must establish the relationship between object constancy and identification.

#### IV. THE NATURE OF THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS

The task in this final section is to relate object constancy to identification and to define the identification process. Chapter II reviews the development in Freud's work of two different concepts of identification, regressive and defensive. Freud regarded all identifications as essentially regressive in nature, that is, a return to primary narcissism replacing an object tie. We have reviewed objections to the concept of primary narcissism and subsequent questions about using identification in this context. These questions lead to a sharp distinction between regressive and defensive identifications. Our review of the literature since Freud suggests that identification has been used primarily in the sense of Freud's defensive identification, or identifications which enable adaptation to the larger world and which further relations with other persons.

Chapter IV deals with the concept of internalization, eventually defining that process as the means whereby individuals claim, through interactions with others, new and abiding means of experiencing and acting in the world. Since this is also the character of (defensive) identification, identification can be regarded as a type of internalization.

The word "identification" is misleading, for it implies feeling identical with another person. While this element is part of the process, identification generally means that an individual comes to feel better defined when he identifies with another, not that he returns to an undifferentiated state vis-à-vis the other. If identification primarily means feeling identical with the other, then of course we are only talking about Freud's regressive identification which replaces object love with fantasies of fusion with the loved one. Chapter II establishes that identification, as it is usually used in psychoanalytic thought, does not replace love but enables and builds upon it. That is, far from returning the individual to undifferentiated fusion, identification delivers him into the larger world with new options for experience and action. The question, then, is how I can feel identical with another and yet at the same time maintain a relation with him and expand my competence in the world.

The answer to this question is that in identification there is a sequence of stages, occurring more or less rapidly, which corresponds to the child's progress from early object relations to object constancy. Moreover, the individual can travel no further along this identificatory sequence than he has traveled to object constancy. From this point of view object constancy is the prototypical identification.

The first stage is that in which the other becomes my mirror. The first stage is therefore narcissistic, though not the primary

narcissism Freud believed. It is the (secondary) narcissism of self-objects, in which the other remains separate after a fashion; the other stays out-there, but he stays out-there as the source of my image of myself. The important thing about a mirror (either a psychological or physical mirror) is that there is a persistent confusion over what part of the reflection is me and what part is the mirror. No mirror gives pure, objective, rarified reflection. There is always something of the mirror's own bias, its own distortions of what it reflects. Yet when I look in the mirror, I take the distorted image to be myself. I manage to see myself as though I were the mirror. It is the same in identification. If an other is willing to reflect back an image of myself to me, then I am in the position to take this other, this out-there, as my image. This confusion between what is me and what is the mirror becomes the basis of identification.

One might object to this point of view that it is unnecessary for the other to reflect back an image of me because I identify with what I see in him, not what he sees in me. If this were entirely true, however, we would be able to identify with whomever we wished, in which case Bandura and Gewirtz would supply the definitive perspectives on identification. We know, for example, that many adolescents wish to be like popular peers and try to emulate their behavior. We also know that such attempts at imitation do not result in abiding, core characteristics of personality but are easily disrupted by embarrassment, peer pressure,

or alternate models. More than an appealing image of another person is needed for identification. What psychoanalysis means by identification is contingent upon a meaningful relationship with the object of the identification. In such a relationship, the other's dealings with me will imply an image of me which I can scarcely help but see. This will be true even if the other does not deliberately try to reflect back an image of me.

What the other reflects back must in large part have been discovered in me. It is important for the parent to reflect back the child's own experience and not simply the parental desires and fantasies about the child. It is not too much to say that parents must be able temporarily to identify with the child (or empathize with him). Accordingly, an important part of every child's identification with the parent is the parent's prior identification or empathy with the child. Without this empathy the child does not experience convergence between the in here of proximal cues and what is reflected in distal perception. What is in here either remains unseen, or it becomes mis-seen. In the first case the child's feelings continue to be vaguely sensed, but they lack definition and clarity. The child has no way to take distance from such feelings or to make them the object of consciousness. Feelings which remain unseen have the character of what psychoanalytic thought has called an id impulse pressing for expression. That is, they cannot be integrated under ego controls. In the second case the parents mirror inaccurately to the child, and what he (vaguely)

senses in proximal perception gains definition as something other than what it is. This amounts to a tacit demand by the parents that the child surrender a segment of his developing feelings and potentials to their preference that he feel differently than he actually does. The result is deep-seated rage and loss of a sense of initiative (Kohut, 1977, pp. 93-111). The child must remain uncertain whether he can be endured as he is, a doubt which is the embryo of a false self organization (Laing, 1960, pp. 100-112). Gruen (1968) has effectively described how this causes the identification process to miscarry and become the basis instead for a false compliance which replaces autonomous initiative.

It is important for the parents to see the child accurately. On the one hand they must see even what they do not wish to see. On the other hand they must also see more than what is there when they see what they do not wish. If they dwell on the negative features of the child, they discard his potential for being more than these and thus interfere with the child's ability to become a whole person; for what is primarily made visible to him by the parents is a negative fragment of himself. By contrast the parents' courage to see the whole child accurately gives the child a feeling he can be contained and that his feelings (especially sadism and devouring neediness) do not isolate him. Whenever the parents and, later, important others, are willing to see the whole child, which includes what is visible and what is potential, the child feels a congruence between in here and out there, much as the infant finds

proprioceptive feedback matched in distal perception in his mother's mirroring face. Such congruence prepares the way for identification by making the other person the objective locus of something felt in here. Thereby the other becomes the source of an image of myself.

In addition to seeing me as I am, the other also reflects back something different from what I am. The other is not a true mirror any more than any particular real mirror is the definitive, only, and accurate visual image of me. What Lichtenstein (1964) writes of the mother's mirroring of her infant is true in identification: "What is dimly emerging in this mirror is . . . the outlines of the child's own image as reflected by the mother's unconscious needs with regard to the child" (p. 53). Lichtenstein goes on to note that each individual has at his disposal a virtually infinite number of behaviors. Those which are actually "seen" by an other and mirrored back are "chosen," as it were, by the other's own unconscious needs. Thus the mirroring which begins each identification is contingent upon the attributes of the other as these influence his capacity to see what is there. Lacan (1977), writing of the toddler, says that the mirror and the mirroring other reflect a power and integrity the child cannot yet experience as his own but to which he is attracted. What Lichtenstein and Lacan describe is the act of creating an image of the other rather than purely reflecting one. In the reflection there is a tension between what indeed seems to be me and what seems to be not-me. The tension makes me visible to myself as the difference between what I am and

what I seem to be in light of the other's attributes. The other's attributes thereby become possibilities pro me. The creatively reflected image, while accurate in some ways, has the character of a possibility in others. I identify with the other so as to continue the image of myself which was created by my interaction with his needs, desires, and other attributes. By identifying with his needs and desires and with the behaviors associated with them, I am trying to retain the presence of the one who saw me as he did and therefore to preserve myself as I felt myself to be in his eyes.

The mirroring or narcissistic stage of the identificatory process gives way to the stage of imitation. The child imitates the parents at first exclusively in their presence but gradually comes to act as they do by himself or with other children. It would be wrong to view these imitations as simple practicing. They serve such a function, but this is not their primary intent. They have the same status as the role an actor plays for an audience, except that the child is on his way to becoming both actor and audience. The child is acting the part of the one who sees him in such a way that a new image of himself (the one given in the mirroring stage) is a possibility for him. He needs the other to watch him at first, but as he plays being the other he becomes capable of watching himself, as it were. As he acts like the parent, he becomes capable of watching himself as did and does the parent. He coordinates both perspectives, the one who sees and the one who is seen, in one self. We say that he has internalized the parent's behavior

when he no longer needs the parent's presence to watch his imitation.

I believe the child gradually frees himself of requiring the parents' physical presence by substituting their fantasied presence. Young children can often be heard engaged in an imaginary dialogue with their parents as they do by themselves actions once performed jointly. This fantasied presence of an other serves to provide the child with the audience which makes the new image of himself (given in the mirroring stage) a possibility. The same process is seen in therapy when patients report having solved a problem through imaging what the therapist would say about it. In both cases the individual's sphere of action is enlarged without the physical presence of a model, yet using a fantasied presence.

The final stage in the identificatory process is that in which actions first seen in an other are appropriately produced not only in the other's absence but also without reminding the subject of the person he imitates. So long as the model is required even in an imaginary form, the individual shows he is not yet his own audience. He needs the other's (real or fantasied) presence to feel genuine and real in the behavior he imitates. This implies the reversibility of the process and shows that internalization is incomplete. The identificatory sequence is accomplished when the child (or adult) has in his own keeping the power to feel real while behaving as did his model. This stage corresponds to the "metabolizing" or depersonalizing of introjects as discussed in

classical psychoanalytic theory (Blanco, 1941; Bychowski, 1956; Kernberg, 1976, pp. 19-54).

When identification is complete, I can be for myself the one whose gaze elicits the possibilities originally created for me by the other. Whatever characteristics in the other created the original tension between myself and how he saw me have become my characteristics. In acting like the other I recover the feeling I had about myself and the world while I was with him, and in the process a wide range of behaviors, attitudes, and all else we mean by attributes are added to my options. When identification is complete, of course, I do not feel that I am acting like the other. Since I have taken the other's point of view as one of my own, I feel that I am behaving like myself. The other's point of view has become part of the multiple self-perceptions I hold.

The capacity to take the other's point of view for oneself is precisely the capacity gained through object constancy, or rather, the capacity to take multiple perspectives on oneself is begun with object constancy. Object constancy is the achievement of being able to see myself as did the mother, that is, to see myself in such a way that I feel real and continuous. Without such a capacity, identification cannot be completed. Identification requires producing an other's characteristics in the other's absence, that is, without an audience. If object constancy is not achieved the individual cannot be his own audience; he cannot conceive himself as really there to see and be seen and thereby give reality to his

imitation of the other. The other's physical presence or fantasied presence continues to be needed, and the identificatory process bogs down at the second stage.

In some cases the identificatory process may not be able to proceed past the first stage in the absence of object constancy. When the sense of one's own reality is quite tenuous, anything about the other may threaten to overwhelm the very shaky sense of self and must be defended against, as with Greenson's (1954b) patients who labored against identification. In this case how an other sees the individual may be experienced as an intrusion, and the individual becomes immobilized in painful self consciousness.

This discussion of the identification process and its relation to object constancy takes us to the final chapter. The task there will be to define the continuing organizing functions of object constancy as a type of functioning analogous to the superego functioning of Freudian man. In the course of making such a definition, a fuller discussion will be offered of the consequences of failing to establish object constancy. The overall objective of the final chapter will be to relate the so-called preoedipal pathologies to the failure of object constancy and to identify how the achievement of object constancy enables maintenance of identity while creating meaningful relations with others.

## CHAPTER V

### THE GUARDIANS OF IDENTITY IN FREUDIAN AND POST-FREUDIAN MAN: SUPEREGO AND OBJECT CONSTANCY

#### I. INTRODUCTION

This final chapter returns to the theme of the first chapter and to the central thesis of this study, the decline of the superego and the problem of identity in post-Freudian man. In the first chapter I argued that the Oedipal-ending identification which forms the autonomous superego is increasingly difficult to achieve and, consequently, that many of the superego functions which serve identity are absent in contemporary Western man. I argued further that a different sort of identification coheres the personality of post-Freudian man, and in Chapter IV I pointed to object constancy as such an identification. This is not to say that object constancy is necessarily a new phenomenon. Although Freud and the early Freudians do not seem to have known this phenomenon, this may simply indicate that constancy was not a particularly noticeable problem in the early parts of this century and that it has become visible by virtue of its becoming problematic as the years progressed and as society changed.

In this chapter I will argue that organizing functions similar to those of the autonomous superego can be seen in object constancy. This is not to imply, however, that the sense of continuity and

coherence accomplished by constancy is identical to that accomplished by the autonomous superego. As we will see, the superego of Freudian man internalized the standards and values of the individual's culture and social class. These values were a base for identity; through them a sense of what was like-me could automatically be distinguished from what was unlike-me. A conflict model of personality accurately describes such an organization. The individual's problems must stem from entertaining wishes which are in conflict with traditional values. Likewise, "health" must come from successfully repressing such wishes. In this organization of personality, identity entails feeling continuously connected with a much larger unit than the individual himself or his family. Identity means connectedness with the large "we" of culture and history. As outlined in Chapter I, such a personality organization is well suited to a stable society but is ill equipped for change.

The continuity which can be built on object constancy is quite different from that built on the internalization of traditional values. The "we" of whom the individual feels he is a part extends no further than his own family, for continuity does not depend on loyalty to tradition but simply on being seen by the parents. Thus the individual is continuous with himself only, not with the race or with his culture--a circumstance which would probably appear psychopathic to Freudian thought. More "degrees of freedom" result, however. Strictly speaking, there is very little that is of necessity not-me; whatever can be seen is potentially a familiar

part of me. What is experienced as not-me is experienced thus simply because it has thus far been invisible to me, not because it conflicts with values which govern "like-me" or "unlike-me." In a sense, then, the individual can adjust to almost anything, a prominent characteristic of the "situational approach to life." Clinically, this means that pathology rests relatively little on conflict; rather it rests on the vicissitudes of "being seen."

Later in this chapter I will argue that many of the features of preoedipal pathologies can be studied under the rubric of being seen by others. A metapsychology based on the Freudian image of man is not capable of grasping this aspect of the preoedipal states, however. The Freudian conflict model of personality implies the continued importance of superego functioning even in the preoedipal states. Indeed, the clinical prominence of preoedipal conditions has led to increased attention on the pregenital superego as, in part, an explanation of these states. I will argue that current attention to the preoedipal superego is largely misplaced. The superego concept in Freudian thought is actually very different from the superego concept which is applied to preoedipal development. In my view, what is usually discussed as the preoedipal superego, or as superego forerunners, is a nexus of issues which better fits under the rubric of object constancy.

The course of the argument is as follows. First, I will briefly review the superego concept in Freud in order to mark its characteristic functions and features. Secondly, I will discuss

the fate of the superego concept after Freud with particular attention to superego forerunners in object relations theory. Finally, I will discuss pathological variants of that normal process through which being seen by the mirroring parents leads the child to feel continuously visible to himself and, thus, assured of his own reality. The course of this argument will demonstrate the way in which object (and self) constancy enrich and deepen the personality in the ways usually attributed to superego forerunners and how the failure of object (and self) constancy predisposes the individual to pathological states of mind typical of the preoedipal states.

## II. THE SUPEREGO CONCEPT IN FREUD

There is no disagreement on Freud's first use of the term "superego." He introduced the word in 1923 in The Ego and the Id, where superego is one of the three major structures of the personality, formed through the resolution of the Oedipus complex. The antecedents of the concept are harder to isolate; it appears that fragments of the superego concept surfaced long before 1923. Some writers (Sandler, 1960; Hammerman, 1965) find the origins of the concept in Freud's use of conscience in "On Narcissism," written in 1914. Others (Goodman, 1965) locate the first full discussion of the superego idea in Totem and Taboo in 1913. Furer's fine review of the literature in 1972 and Garza Guerrero's (1981a) more recent review both discover elements of what we today would call superego functions in some of Freud's very earliest works. In brief, facets

of the superego concept are scattered throughout more than a quarter of a century's writing.

Freud and Breuer's (1893-1895/1961) Studies on Hysteria presents the idea of censorship of unwanted thoughts. Pathogenic ideas are said to be put out of awareness because they awaken feelings of "shame, of self-reproach, and the feeling of being harmed" (p. 269). Such censorship and repression are attributed to dispositions on the part of the ego rather than to any special agency beyond it. Totem and Taboo (Freud, 1913/1961) treats the origins of conscience at length for the first time. This work begins to consolidate Freud's previous speculations on repression, censorship of thoughts, and the source of unconscious guilt in a form which later becomes the superego concept. Ambivalence toward the father is there described as the root of conscience. The primal horde's hatred and affection for the father figure provide a phylogenetic basis for the civilized individual's Oedipal conflict, in turn leading to repression of the hostile current and the achievement of an autonomous and fully internalized moral conscience. This theme foreshadows both Freud's eventual decision to ground superego in the child's resolution of the Oedipal struggle and his description of identification as an expression of ambivalence toward a love object.

"On Narcissim" (Freud, 1914/1961) further describes conscience as a "special psychical agency" which watches the ego and measures it against an ego ideal (p. 95). The ego ideal is there seen as

the repository of the narcissistic perfection of childhood which must be surrendered before the child can invest affection in others. The individual's ego ideal becomes "the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood, in which he was his own ideal" (p. 94). Conscience represents "the critical influence of [the child's] parents" who admonish and correct. Freud assigns conscience the functions of self-observation, censorship of dreams, regulation of memory, and time sense. The interplay of conscience and the ego ideal regulates self esteem and lies behind such pathological phenomena as the sense of inferiority and narcissistic types of object choice.

"Some Character Types Met with in Psychoanalytic Work" (Freud, 1916/1961) and "Mourning and Melancholia" (Freud, 1917/1961) further treat the functioning of conscience. All of the "character types" discussed in the former paper hold in common the pathological functioning of conscience, and melancholia is traced in part to the work of "the critical activity of the ego" (p. 249). The most important feature of this "critical activity" as regards the later superego concept is Freud's description of it as independent of other aspects of ego functioning so that it resembles what the later metapsychology would regard as a separate, autonomous psychic structure.

In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1921/1961), the ego ideal is given an expanded role over its limited functions in "On Narcissism," and conscience is subsumed under the

ego ideal. Freud lists the functions of ego ideal as "self-observation, the moral conscience, the censorship of dreams and the chief influence in repression" (p. 110). Although he later abandons the idea, the ego ideal is also assigned the task of reality testing; in The Ego and the Id this role is given back to the ego (p. 28n). Hence such feelings as inferiority and guilt become attributed to tensions between ego and ego ideal, and other, related pathological phenomena, such as mania, are seen as the result of a fusion between the ego and its ideal. Of particular importance for the later superego concept is Group Psychology's speculations that the ego ideal is formed through identification and that it plays a role in the Oedipus complex, albeit only in the early stages of that conflict and not in its resolution. The major role of the ego ideal in psychic life plainly foreshadows its transformation into a major organizer of the personality in Freud's later structural model.

Freud's inability to explain resistances during analysis and the phenomenon of an unconscious sense of guilt using purely topographic concepts led him to postulate his structural theory in 1923 in The Ego and the Id. The result was the mature superego concept, or superego as a mental structure which exercises an influence in the personality commensurate with the influence of id and ego. In The Ego and the Id Freud uses superego and ego ideal as synonymous terms; for example, Chapter III is titled "The Ego and the Super-Ego (Ego Ideal)." Although it is not universally

agreed that the ego ideal in The Ego and the Id carries the same meaning as that of "On Narcissism" (e.g., Rosenfeld, 1962; Sandler, Holder, and Dare, 1972; Holder, 1982), there is consensus that after 1923 ego ideal and superego are roughly interchangeable concepts, except where the ego ideal is listed as one constituent part of the superego (Goodman, 1965; Hammerman, 1965; Garza Guerrero, 1981a). Certainly most of the functions which Group Psychology assigned to the ego ideal appear as superego functions in The Ego and the Id and thereafter.

Freud (1923/1961) describes three roots of the superego. The first is the child's pregenital identifications with his parents. These early attachments and identifications appear to contribute to an ideal image of what the child ought to be like and contribute to the beginnings of the Oedipal struggle, in which the child tries to be like his father by loving his mother. Thus far, this is the same line of thought found in Group Psychology. The new theme introduced in The Ego and the Id (and the second root of the superego) is that superego is "the heir of the Oedipus Complex" (p. 36). If pregenital identifications have led the child into the Oedipal conflict, another, more decisive identification ends it. The child identifies with the father's standards, as it were, erecting prohibitions to the effect: "'You may not be like him (like your father)--that is, you may not do all that he does; some things are his prerogative'" (p. 34). This identification halts Oedipal rivalry and at the same time brings the superego into existence

as a separate structure, according to Freud, even though there are preoedipal foundations. The third root of the superego lies in biology. Freud proposes that the superego erects an idealized image of the very parents toward whom we are predisposed biologically to feel "the most powerful impulses and the most important libidinal vicissitudes of the id" (p. 36). Freud argues that this process safeguards man's continued dependency on his parents and thus contributes to the survival of the species.

From a purely intrapsychic point of view Freud's postulates of pregenital and Oedipal identifications as foundations of the superego are the most important features of The Ego and the Id. The biological root of the superego is taken up again, however, in Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud, 1930/1961) and becomes the underpinning of what we might call the socializing superego, or superego as the means whereby people are fitted for life in a culture. In Civilization and Its Discontents the superego is society's chief tool for controlling man's innate aggression which poses such a threat to social life. In sum Freud argues that aggression is mastered through guilt, which cannot be an ego function, since much of what brings guilt might well prove pleasureable to the ego. Guilt originates in an external conflict: Certain behaviors threaten the child with loss of love and protection or with punishment from those on whom he depends. As long as this conflict is external, conscience proper is not established, and Freud thinks it more appropriate to speak of a prestage of conscience. When the external

authority is internalized, however, we can speak of an autonomous superego. Then the child's sense of being watched and threatened with rejection by the parents becomes the ego's perception of being watched and threatened with guilt by the superego. Presumably the ego's sense of being watched by the superego is largely unconscious and not identical with what is later called the observing function of the ego. In The New Introductory Lectures (Freud, 1933/1961), however, Freud assigns self observation to the superego, as he had earlier attributed this capacity to conscience and the ego ideal.

Civilization and Its Discontents raises several important issues. First, it describes the internalization of an interpersonal, conflict-ridden relationship and shows how such a process builds up the inner life. Second, in this work Freud describes a conflict based on aggressive impulses rather than on the libidinal wishes which had generally been the occasion for superego formation in his earlier works. Thus, and third, it becomes clearer that the superego is the vehicle of those moralities which allow persons to live together in communities. That is, superego serves a cultural or political function which transcends its intrapsychic purposes. The purpose of civilization is to compromise the individual's instinctually determined actions; the superego represents the interests of society in this process and is in fact the vehicle for perpetuating social values. In Freud's (1933/1961) words, the superego

becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the time-resisting judgments of value which have propagated themselves in this manner from generation to generation . . . . The past, the tradition of the race and of the people, lives on in the ideologies of the superego. (p. 67)

The writings we have reviewed contribute to the classical picture of the superego. In the classical picture, this portion of the personality has some preoedipal foundation, but as an independent structure it is the result of the Oedipus complex, being at one and the same time the means for its resolution and the consequence of that resolution. The appearance of superego out of the Oedipal conflict can seem so dramatic and instantaneous in Freud's writings and those of his successors that Ernst Ticho (1972) once wrote: "Sometimes in analytic literature it seems as if the superego at the end of the oedipal period suddenly appears, like Athena springing fully from Zeus' skull fully armed" (p. 219). Further, the content of the superego includes the parents' own superego injunctions and commands, their personal qualities, and the "tastes and standards of the social class in which they lived, and the innate dispositions and traditions of the race from which they sprang" (Freud, 1940/1961, p. 206). In these last respects superego is the means by which we take on social identities and become part of an ongoing cultural process.

The list of functions attributed to the superego and its conceptual forerunners is vast and complex. Many such functions, for example reality testing, eventually were assigned to other parts

of the mind. However, a core of functions which Freud reliably assigned to the superego can be described. This core includes self observation and self criticism, the moral conscience, inhibition of aggression, ideals to which the individual feels loyal, resolution of the Oedipus complex, and, finally, the socialization of the child, or the establishment of the values and traditions of the child's culture and social class. Because of these diverse functions, Freud related the superego to a number of psychopathologies, including depression, paranoid feelings of being watched, narcissistic object choice in adulthood, and mania.

### III. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SUPEREGO CONCEPT AFTER FREUD

Those who followed Freud did not neglect the superego concept. It has received considerable attention over the years. Indeed, as Furer (1972, p. 25) notes, "a vigorous discussion" on the superego began in the mid-1920's, long before Freud's last words on the subject. All of the major schools, from ego psychology to the Kleinians, have written extensively on the topic. It is not possible to ignore, however, that what current literature refers to as "superego" bears little resemblance to Freud's superego concept. Two of the major features of the concept, its Oedipal origins and its political-cultural nature, have virtually disappeared from the literature.

In 1960 Sandler wrote a much-quoted article in which he observed an "apparent conceptual dissolution of the superego"

(p. 130). He made his observation because of seeming confusion among therapists at the Hampstead Clinic on how to identify and classify material under the superego category in The Hampstead Index. Sandler also spoke of "the lack of theoretical precision" in distinguishing superego from ego and "the confusion which still exists among psychoanalysts in regard to the mechanisms of superego formation" (p. 130). Sandler proposed that the difficulties he was then recording were the consequence of two developments, namely the advances of ego psychology, which had gradually absorbed superego functions into the sphere of the ego, and the growth of child analysis, which had led to attention on superego forerunners to the neglect of the autonomous superego (also see Stein, 1966).

Sandler eventually defended the integrity of the superego concept, saying its apparent conceptual dissolution was indeed only apparent, the result of microscopic examinations which lost sight of the larger structure. I believe Sandler was wrong in this conclusion and that there has been a silent but major revision of metapsychology to the effect that Freud's superego concept is no longer viable nor, for that matter, often used. That concept has been replaced with a medley of preoedipal, developmental themes which are loosely labeled "superego forerunners" or "precursors" but which lack any apparent logic for the label. My thesis, to be developed below, is that object constancy is the developmental phenomenon which organizes personality in a way comparable to how Freud observed the superego to function in earlier generations.

Historically Sandler was surely correct to note the erosion of the superego concept by the advances of ego psychology. He does not seem to have wondered how such a thing was possible, however. If one major psychic structure can absorb the tasks of another, then there may be no remarkable necessity to the tasks originally assigned to that other structure. This in itself implies a somewhat arbitrary division of mental functions. That Sandler did not draw such an inference ought not obscure it here. That the ego concept can drain off tasks given to the superego in classical theory means that the conceptual distinction between them was weak to begin with. Unless subsequent events have done something to clarify their distinction, the superego concept may be outdated. (Bieber, 1972, uses a very similar line of reasoning to conclude that structural theory is largely anachronistic today.)

Arlow (1982) has recently observed that the twenty years since Sandler wrote have "aggravated" the difficulties Sandler observed. Arlow writes that current theoretical concern with narcissistic and self disorders has precluded attention for a "relatively late-developing agency of the mind" such as the Oedipal-level superego. He writes (p. 230) that primitive, idealized images of self and other are the psychological phenomena now receiving the attention formerly offered the superego and its higher order identifications. One of Arlow's conclusions (p. 240) is that superego formation may be a continuing process through many stages of development, early and late, and that the Oedipal period may not play a predominant role.

Alex Holder (1982) goes even further than Arlow in attacking the classical position that the superego becomes an autonomous mental structure with resolution of the Oedipus complex. He not only proposes superego functioning prior to the Oedipal period but suggests that a fully autonomous superego is possible with little or no contribution from the Oedipal period. He writes, "Some of the clinical material obtained from child analyses suggests that the superego in its final form is not invariably the heir to the Oedipus complex but may become fully structuralized independently of the fate of that complex" (p. 271). It seems that Sandler was indeed justified in identifying child analysis as one source of the dissolution of the superego concept.

The subject of pregenital superego was not entirely neglected even in Freud's lifetime. For example, Ernest Jones (1926) and Sandor Ferenczi (1925) explored anal elements in superego formation in the mid-1920's. Melanie Klein's work had consistently emphasized pregenital influences in superego formation. Such writers as Annie Reich (1954), Edith Jacobson (1964), and Rene Spitz (1958) all explored superego precursors, forerunners, or "primordia" in the 1950's. Although these and other writers contributed to a growing literature on preoedipal roots of the superego, until the mid-1960's there were strong and authoritative voices within the traditionalist camp who consistently returned attention to the Oedipal superego. They reminded us that preoedipal impressions of the parents are not a personality structure in the classical sense and therefore

are always to be distinguished from the superego proper. Among such writers, Sandler (1960, pp. 152-153) referred to preoedipal experiences as "a sort of undergraduate superego," while the autonomous superego rests on the Oedipal resolution. Likewise, Hartmann and Lowenstein (1962) observed that it was not enough to find evidence in the pregenital period that drive expression is inhibited by the child's early experiences with his parents. They argued that the ego itself has sufficient defensive inhibitory tendencies to account for early instinctual inhibitions without postulating a primitive superego. They concluded, "It seems preferable to reserve the term superego, as Freud did, to that momentous step in structuralization which is linked with the resolution of the conflicts of the Oedipal phase" (p. 43). Thus, while there has always been interest in pregenital influences, this interest until recently was ordered by a metapsychology in which all roads led to the Oedipus complex as the decisive crucible of personality formation.

It is different today. Now those who call attention to the Oedipus complex do so from a quite changed position from that of Sandler or Hartmann and Lowenstein. In the intervening twenty years an unspoken consensus appears to have formed that our insights about preoedipal life hold in themselves the keys to most of the pathologies seen clinically today. Those who now wish to write on the autonomous superego and the Oedipus complex feel called on to offer arguments on why these themes might be useful (e.g., Laufer, 1982;

Modell, 1981), an unheard-of circumstance earlier. One sees in the English-language literature (Lebovici, 1982; Laufer, 1982; Moder, 1981; Garza Guerrero, 1981b) the same list of authors who have influenced psychoanalysis toward the preoedipal period as a sufficient explanation of pathology. Klein is frequently mentioned, as are Kohut, Fairbairn, Jacobson, Winnicott, Mahler, and Kernberg. Whatever these authors' varied intentions with regard to the classical metapsychology, they are widely perceived as having by-passed it in the course of illuminating primitive mental states.

In a recent, two-part article Garza Guerrero (1981a, 1982b) attempts to consolidate much of current theorizing on pregenital development and to integrate it with the superego concept. His work can serve here as a convenient way to focus on the problems inherent in applying a concept from classical structural theory to recent early developmental study. Garza Guerrero relies very heavily on Kernberg's (1976) outline of the progressive growth of psychic structure. He views Kernberg's work as especially seminal and uses such adjectives as "fundamental," "valuable," "comprehensive," "painstaking," and "thorough" to describe it. Garza Guerrero is appreciative of this work because he believes Kernberg successfully integrates the ideas of many of the above-named authors and pulls together contributions from several disparate schools. Garza Guerrero himself attempts to point out the correspondence with those authors as he traces the development of the preoedipal superego.

Garza Guerrero (1981b) faithfully reproduces Kernberg's outline of how early object relations gradually structure the personality. Kernberg (1976) describes four stages of early object relations. He begins with a primary, undifferentiated states, or "normal autism." During this time the infant is described as essentially out of touch with the world around him. The second stage is that of symbiotic fusion with the mother. In this stage self and other are not experienced separately; rather, "undifferentiated self-object representations" are built up. Two series of such representations unfold, one series dominated by libidinal energies and the other by aggressive energies, or "good" and "bad" self-object representations. In the third stage self representations begin to be separated from object representations, though the good and bad series remain distinct and unintegrated. The final part of this stage, or fourth stage, entails the successful integration of the good and bad series of representations, so that between eighteen and thirty-six months the child comes to experience himself and others as whole persons, that is as both good and bad rather than all one or the other.

As Garza Guerrero (1981b) discusses Kernberg's ideas on the first two stages, blending in contributions from Klein and others, he occasionally mentions that this or that feature of development is a "prerequisite for later . . . structures such as the superego" (p. 516) or that "it is out of these primitive, projective mechanisms that the earliest superego structures (i.e., sadistic superego

forerunners) derive" (p. 517). The question which immediately springs to mind when one reads these remarks is why the superego concept is being brought into the discussion. No justification for using the term is attempted, and it is unclear what superego functions are being referred to. This somewhat superficial use of the term arouses the suspicion that the early part of the argument amounts to no more than saying, "The child must develop some before we can talk about the superego."

When Garza Guerrero (1981b) turns to Kernberg's final stage, that of integrating good with bad self and object representations, he begins to make an explicit argument to justify use of the superego concept. The crux of his argument is as follows:

Thus an integrated self concept [is prerequisite] for the child's gradual realization that his primitive rage, i.e., his "badness," is expressed toward the same "mothering object" whom he loves and depends upon. This awareness brings about a concern over the potential to hurt, damage or destroy the loved object and also evolves a "depressive-like guilt." (p. 521)

Garza Guerrero is describing the well known "depressive position" (Klein, 1935/1975, 1940/1975; Winnicott, 1954/1975), as acknowledged by Kernberg (1976). Apparently it is the capacity for concern and guilt which justifies the use of the superego concept to cover this process. Guilt is indeed one of the affects Freud attributed to superego functioning, and control of aggression is one of the classical superego functions (see also Rosenfeld, 1962). But is it the same superego concept as that found in Freudian thought?

Garza Guerrero and the authors he follows arrive at the capacity for guilt and control of aggression without two of the essential features of the Freudian superego. There is no role for the Oedipus complex since the "depressive position" Garza Guerrero describes is achieved years prior to the Oedipal stage of psychosexual development. Further, the superego thus achieved is not the vehicle of cultural norms and traditions which the Freudian superego is made to be--nor can it be such a vehicle, for the parental superegos are not introjected. The superego of which Garza Guerrero, Kernberg, and Klein speak results from a private, intrapsychic war between instinctual hate and love as these affects color perception and subjective experience. While Freud's superego concept was psychological, cultural, and political, the preoedipal superego is entirely psychological. If classical concepts are to be adduced to account for the concern and guilt of the depressive position, the concept of ego functions seems quite sufficient to encompass the formation, working-over, and elaboration of aggressively and libidinally governed self and object images into this capacity for whole object relations. This speaks to two points I raised earlier. If, as Sandler (1960) observed, ego psychology gradually attributed to the ego many of the tasks Freudian thought assigned to the superego, this implies a weak conceptual distinction between them to begin with and suggests a less than obvious rationale for continuing to distinguish the ego from the superego. Secondly, there seems to have been a major revision in metapsychology to the effect that

Freud's notion of the superego is not the one presently found in the literature. While there may be no decisive objections to using the word "superego" to describe the phenomena of whole object relations and the depressive position, we ought to be clear that we are not referring to the psychic structure described in The Ego and the Id.

What are we referring to? In Chapter III I argued that there is no inner sphere which duplicates the external world and, further, that the processes and events which psychoanalytic thought attributes to such a sphere are interpersonal happenings. The nature of these interpersonal events is such that they lead the individual to acquire an ever-enlarging repertoire of behaviors and modes of experience in the external world. Consequently the integration of "good" and "bad" self and object representations is not an ineffably private event which summarizes and duplicates aspects of "real" relationships. Rather, if we say that an individual comes to whole object relations, we mean he becomes capable of experiencing himself and those in his life in a comprehensive way. He sees that those about him and he himself are both loving and frustrating, that they are less than ideal but more than chronically disappointing, sometimes rewarding and sometimes punitive but not entirely one or the other.

The individual who achieves this is better prepared to experience persons as they actually are in the world. That is, he has discovered a more realistic way of experiencing people than perceiving them in all-or-none fragments of love or rage. This

achievement is bound to increase the sense that can be made of oneself and others and also to expand the range of emotional behaviors which are available. Winnicott (1954/1975), Klein (1925/1975), and Segal (1964) have all addressed this issue. They argue that whole object relations brings the capacity for concern or rath, the ability to hope for reparation after conflict, and other signs of a deepening or enrichment of one's self. Segal (1964), for example, writes that the child who achieves whole object relations "discovers his own psychic reality. The infant becomes aware of himself and of his objects as separate from himself. He becomes aware of his own impulses and phantasies, and begins to distinguish between phantasy and external reality" (p. 73). Such benefits mark the depressive position and whole object relations as major organizers of the personality through which an important gradient of consciousness enters the picture: the child becomes aware of himself.

Here again we touch base with the classical superego concept, or with a hotly debated issue in the superego concept, the capacity for self-observation. As we saw, this was one of the functions Freud often attributed to the superego. In The New Introductory Lectures, Freud (1933/1961) asks how it is possible that ego, which is "in its very essence a subject," can "be made into an object" (p. 58). He answers that "the separation of the observing agency from the rest of the ego might be a regular feature of the ego's structure" (p. 59), and he justifies on that account his choice of the term "super-ego" for his agency. Other psychoanalytic

writers have wrestled with the question of whether self observation should be regarded as an ego or superego function. In 1929 Alexander said that the superego, once it is formed, takes over the task of "inner perception," acting by perceiving and inhibiting actions that are ego dystonic. Nunberg (1955) concurs with this opinion and adds that thereby the superego plays a major role in reality testing. Isakower (1939) likewise believes that self observation is "undoubtedly" a superego function. Spitz (1958) comes close to this position by attributing the function of judgment to the superego. In his 1960 article Sandler comments that self observation is one of the original superego tasks which has resisted absorption by the ego concept. Stein (1966) aggressively defends self observation as a superego task, although he notes the weight of opinion on the other side of the debate. In a panel discussion (Goodman, 1965) Lowenstein refers to this question as typical of the problem of defining the relation between ego and superego, and he seems to say that both structures share in self observation. In the same discussion Stein notes this as an important but unsettled question, and Beres frankly argues that it is an unanswerable one. As Stein observes there, if self observation is an ego function, how can ego observe itself? But if it is a superego function, we come very close to attributing perception to the superego.

The failure of consensus on this point suggests that the debate over whether self observation belongs to the ego or superego has taken the wrong approach. I propose that what is being debated

is actually the capacity for shifts in the individual's state of mind. What Segal (1964), for example, describes when she says, "the infant becomes aware of himself," is objective self awareness. In the previous chapter I suggested that this state of mind has its origins in the baby's ability to focus attention on the mother's mirroring face and that it becomes a possibility pro me through object constancy. Consequently my argument here is that the deepening and enrichment of the personality and the organization which follows whole object relations are likewise associated with object constancy. The integration of good and bad self and object images does not occur de novo as an intrapsychic act. Kernberg, Klein, and others tend to speak as though this were a mysterious event which simply happens in some but not in others, and the only condition to which they can consistently point in explaining its failure or success is the accumulation of both love- and hate-dominated memories. Actually the chief condition for the integration of object representations is the internalization (in Chapter III's sense) of the gaze of an other who sees that I myself (like others) am both loving and hateful. This is part of the convergence between the child's innate potentialities and the mother's mirroring expectations of which Kohut (1977, p. 100) writes, a convergence in which the parents have the courage to see for the child what is actually there to be seen. The internalization of such a gaze is a chief part of object constancy and of all subsequent identifications, as I argued in the previous chapter. It is therefore no accident

that many writers have associated object constancy with the integration (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 110) or at least coordination (Melito, 1983) of good and bad representations. When the child internalizes the mirroring gaze of an other who sees the child (and others) in their emotional completeness, the child becomes capable of objective self awareness as Segal has described. My intention is to emphasize that self observation cannot be separated from object constancy. I wish to emphasize further that much of what recent literature describes as the development of superego forerunners should likewise be subsumed under the rubric of object constancy.

#### IV. THE NEED TO BE SEEN AND THE FEAR OF BEING SEEN IN THE ABSENCE OF OBJECT CONSTANCY

Self observation is one of the consequences of object constancy which furthers the organization of the personality. It is to be contrasted with times of self absorption, or absorption in what one is doing without that psychological distance which allows for the consciousness-of-oneself-doing. In the preceding chapter I described these two states of mind as the poles between which "normal" consciousness travels more or less fluidly without either's becoming generally problematic. In the preoedipal pathologies, failure to attain such fluidity is a characteristic problem. In this section I will use a phenomenological analysis of this failure to demonstrate the importance of object constancy as a major organizer of the normal personality.

One of the major consequences of failure to reach a fairly stable level of object constancy is that the sense of my own reality (which comes through the illusion that the mother is constantly available to mirror me) is in someone else's keeping. Unable to "see" myself, I am overly dependent on how others see me, or even on the mere fact that others see me, in order to feel real. Of course the reality which comes from the other's gaze cannot be a comfortable one, for it is in essence not-me. Since my own reality is quite tenuous at best, the other's gaze threatens me finally as something before which I am completely transparent and powerless or by which I am robbed of my identity. Thus, not being looked at brings a sense of unreality (depersonalization), while being looked at is experienced as immobilization and penetration by an overpowering alien reality. As Laing (1960) describes such an individual:

He needs other people to experience himself as a real live person because he has never been convinced from within himself that he was alive. This, however, implies a trust in the benign quality of the other person's apprehension of him which is not always present . . . . Quite often, in fact, the balance swings right over so that the individual feels that his greatest risk is to be the object of another person's awareness. (p. 117)

Thus the individual both fears and needs the look of the other. This fear and need become the poles between which the individual lives, as now one and then the other pole is more prominent in his dealings with others. I will describe the vicissitudes of each pole in turn and relate these issues to the preoedipal pathologies.

### The Fear of Being Seen

It belongs to virtually every human life to become aware of itself as visible to an other. This is a normal developmental phenomenon, first noticeable in the second year of life. Amsterdam and Levitt (1980) have summarized recent research which indicates not only that toddlers typically recognize their mirror images around eighteen months, but also that there is an affective response to this recognition. "Silly or coy" behavior which is clearly recognizable to an observer as an embarrassed self consciousness accompanies recognition of the mirror image. It appears that the source of the affective response is the child's discovery that he can be an other's object; Amsterdam and Greenberg (1977) found that toddlers were more self conscious when openly admired by a live stranger than when exposed to their own simultaneous video images. Thus, what the child seems embarrassed over is finding himself out there, as an object for the other.

It is noteworthy that the parents' gaze does not generally cause embarrassment for the child. Rather it is the discovery of one's image in the mirror and, even more, the gaze of a stranger which does this. The reason is that the parents' gaze is a familiar one and causes no disruption in the child's sense of continuity. The mirror image at first and the stranger's glance, however, are different and alien. A different and alien self is suddenly out there, and this is precisely the problem with becoming an other's object: The one whom the other sees when he looks at me may not

to the "me" I know. When the other sees "another me," I am faced with being someone (and living in a world) that is strange to me. Something analogous to this occurs in eight-month stranger anxiety, as described in the preceding chapter. For the eight-month-old the alien self reflected in the stranger's face is frightening. The eighteen-month-old is not frightened so much as he is just thrown off balance, a consequence of his having some illusions of his mother's abiding presence which kept him and the world from ever seeming completely alien, even in a stranger's face.

If the child has not been able to create the illusion of the mother's continuous availability in her mirroring function, or if the individual reaches adulthood without this illusion, the gaze of the other remains what it was for the eight-month-old, the revelation of an alien, estranged self and world. In such a case there can be no sense of continuous connectedness with others. Other persons reflect a me I do not recognize. Relating to them may be possible on the surface, but I feel a gap between us. The gap is the break in my continuity with myself which I experience when the other sees me.

From a psychological point of view the other's look would not be so threatening had a stable level of object (and self) constancy been achieved. The other's gaze is consistently troublesome only when I cannot experience myself as an invariant, ongoing, and unique process (self constancy) integrating multiple perspectives on myself (object constancy and later identifications). When there

is no option of integrating the other's perspective through the identificatory processes which are made possible through object constancy, being seen (that is, becoming caught in the other's perspective on me) dominates and disrupts my state of mind.

This domination is experienced as dangerous. The other remains a center of initiative, intention, and meaning, but I do not. Rather, I feel captured by the other, that is, reduced to the level of his object and caught up in the web of his meanings. Among modern authors Sartre (1956) has best described the problems inherent in the other's look, and he suggests a provocative scenario which illustrates (pp. 347-349). He asks me to imagine that for reasons of curiosity, jealousy, or vice I have knelt down to look through a key-hole into a room. While doing this I am completely absorbed in what I see, thoroughly concentrated in the scene through the key-hole. But suddenly I hear footsteps behind me, and I realize that someone has caught me in this compromising situation. My absorption in the scene immediately disappears, replaced by a painful self consciousness. I cease being the subject of this experience, and I am turned into the other's object, living at the end of his look. Sartre says that my own meanings "decompose" under the other's gaze. The only possibilities left to me are those defined by the presence of the other (e.g., the possibility of flight). In sum the other's look has robbed me of my autonomous self. I feel endangered by this. The danger is loss of my fragile sense of self, for "all of a sudden I am conscious of myself as escaping

myself . . . I am for myself only as a pure reference to the other" (p. 349).

In its most extreme form being seen by an other can obliterate the self. For example, a schizophrenic individual may feel completely transparent to the other's gaze and may fully expect others to be able to read his mind or know his secrets. In this case the individual has no firm sense of himself as subject, that is, as a center of initiative and autonomy. He rapidly loses any sense of himself as subject when looked at. This extreme situation, while not representative of any normal developmental stage, is roughly analogous to the infant's stranger anxiety, in which the infant is anxious at the alien me reflected by the stranger's look. When the sense of self is very shaky, the other evokes similar anxiety, for such an individual cannot preserve any of himself in the face of the other's look and therefore seems completely to become the other's object, suffering a state of severe depersonalization.

Most individuals will not feel so utterly transparent to the other as many schizophrenics, but being seen is a continual problem for persons lacking a firm sense of object and self constancy. Characteristic affects accompany being seen which illustrate both the fear of the other's look and how individuals may try to handle this fear. These affects include shame, defensive pride, and arrogant pride, to be discussed in turn.

Shame is a pervasive affect in persons lacking a stable level of object and self constancy. In brief, shame is a response to

feeling that I am fraudulent and that this has been seen by the other. This is a consequence of not having been seen by the parents as a whole person. When the parents fail to accept in their mirroring gaze all that they see in the child, but accept and mirror only a part of his potential, they communicate to the child that there is something about him which creates an unbridgeable gap between them. The child himself can not see clearly what is this unacceptable part; it remains only vaguely sensed and is felt to be dangerous to his connectedness with others. The child then feels that he must present only the acceptable part of himself to others and that he must hide the rest from himself and others. The child then experiences himself as a deceiver, who can be connected with others only by maintaining this deceit.

When such an individual enters into a relationship with someone whose gaze ratifies the part of himself that is acceptable, he is bound to feel both comfortable and uneasy. On the one hand he is comfortable with the other's ratification that he is acceptable, but on the other hand he is uneasy with the sense that there is something about him which he has kept from the other and which, if it were seen, would destroy his connection with the other. He cannot clearly see even for himself what is unacceptable, since this has remained unmirrored by the parents; what he can see is that he is fraudulent, for he knows only that there is more about him which the other must not see.

Shame is the experience that my fraudulence is discovered, or that my knowledge of this fraudulence is shared by the other. When the other is felt to see me as the deceiver I have felt myself to be, the acceptable me which once was ratified by his gaze is lost. I have no conviction that a relationship can survive my "treachery," since early connectedness with the parents could not survive when the unacceptable entered that relationship. Yet I am dependent on the other for mirroring or ratifying my acceptable self; so the loss of my familiar self threatens loss of connectedness with him also. Thus I am caught in a dilemma: If I flee the other's gaze I do not know whether there is anyone else to ratify my familiar self; but if I continue in the other's gaze I fear he may never see the familiar me again, and so I will remain forever fixed as this alien self.

Persons who feel ashamed often say they feel they have lost their integrity. This is not an accurate description of their predicament, for it was not integrity they had to lose. They had only a partial and unintegrated view of themselves to begin with, namely, the part of themselves which the mirroring parents found acceptable. It is this they lost when they lost their feeling of connectedness with the other. In its place is a dreadful sense of exposure as the estranged, fraudulent persons they always suspected themselves to be. Writing on the story of the Fall in Genesis, Bonhoeffer (1955, p. 20) comments that Adam and Eve's shame at their nakedness was the experience of estrangement from their primal unity with

their origin. (Psychologically this estrangement is disconnectedness with the mirroring gaze of the parents.) Of course Adam and Eve were naked before the Fall, so nakedness per se was not the problem. Rather, they had become fraudulent toward God through their disobedience. Only when God saw them (that is, only when they felt that God knew of their fraudulence) was nakedness shameful to them. Clothing was an effort to become invisible to God, to halt the devastating effect of their exposure.

This theological truth has its psychological parallels. The sense of fraudulence to which persons lacking object constancy are predisposed stems from the feeling that there are unacceptable parts of themselves which they are hiding from view. Very often this part of themselves is their potential for autonomous initiative. Where autonomy was unacceptable to the mirroring parents, the child was visible to himself only in his dependency, only in his role as the other's object. The other is allowed to be a center of initiative, but the self can feel acceptable only in dependency on this other. Therefore any explicit attempt to influence or act upon the other would mean exposure as a fraud, as someone who had cherished and kept hidden an unacceptable part of himself. Such an individual may try to influence a mirroring other without acknowledging that he (the individual) is acting as a subject. The individual tries to keep his status of being the other's object, even though he is actually claiming an autonomous position.

In such a case the other's definition of me must be overtly welcomed, since the acceptable me is precisely the me who remains dependent on him for definition. Thus I may openly admire the other for his definition of me. My admiration is an attempt to influence the other; I seek to make him grateful to me for my admiration. Although I do not try to affect him in any way that would make visible my initiative toward him, I may secretly salvage a sense of pride in myself as a center of initiative. Since my secret pride in influencing him is a defense against being found out as someone who yet harbors hope of autonomy, Sartre's (1956, pp. 386-387) concept of defensive pride (fierité) seems an appropriate term for this solution to the fear of being seen.

As an effort to influence the other without removing him from his status of being the subject for whom I am object, defensive pride can often be seen in the context of psychotherapy. For example a patient who has been defined by his therapist through some interpretation may confer boundless admiration and appreciation on the therapist for his clinical acumen. This would be an attempt to influence the therapist (and salvage pride for doing so) without the patient's ever explicitly asserting himself (which would make the patient leave the dependent role). Lebovici (1982) has written that this is one subtle means by which the patient avoids therapy, particularly when the patient suffers preoedipal difficulties but is in treatment with an analyst focusing on the Oedipus complex. The patient's admiration for the therapist becomes the justification

for his remaining in the dependent role, but it is a lie. The patient is dependent only on the surface. At a deeper level he has "bootlegged" a sense of pride for being able to influence the other with his admiration. As Sartre (1956, p. 387) notes, to influence the other by my admiration for his definition of me is to become a subject who has ceased to be defined by the other. Klass and Offenkrantz (1976) believe that defensive pride is a frequently unrecognized phenomenon hiding within many "mirroring transferences" (Kohut, 1971), such that the patient consciously experiences the mirroring therapist as an autonomous other but secretly feels that the therapist's mirroring is being caused and controlled by the patient. They observe that when the patient becomes aware of such secret feelings (perhaps occasioned by paying his bill), he will tend to withdraw from the therapist for becoming the patient's object.

The internal contradiction within defensive pride raises the possibility of overtly arrogant pride, which entails explicitly making the other to be my object. If the problem with the other is that he remains a center of meanings and relations different from my own and therefore that he disrupts my world with his alien relations and meanings, I can stop this disruption by regarding the other as purely my own object with no particular emotional impact on me. Then the other's meanings, his view of me, and his way of organizing the world are all made inconsequential, for he is merely another thing in my system of meanings and relations.

Clinically this is the phenomenon of narcissistic coldness and aloofness. In such a state of mind the individual tries to be entirely subject so as to avoid the contingencies of being the other's object. The self is accordingly inflated, and the state of mind becomes one of intense self absorption, sustained by an arrogance which keeps others at the level of things. Sartre (1956) describes this "indifference towards others" as a "sort of factual solipsism; others are those forms which pass by in the street, those magic objects which are capable of acting at a distance and upon which I can act by means of determined conduct. I scarcely notice them; I act as if I were alone in the world" (p. 495). Sartre adds, "this state of blindness can be maintained for a long time . . . there are men who die without--save for brief and terrifying flashes of illumination--ever having suspected what the Other is" (p. 496).

While some persons can maintain this stance, most people attempting indifference towards others find it proves an unstable position and doomed to failure (Sartre, 1956; Kernberg, 1975, pp. 310-311). The problem with regarding the other purely as my object is that it implies I can become his object. As Sartre puts it, "'Being-seen-by-the-other' is the truth of 'seeing-the-other'" (p. 345). There are very few lives which can escape acknowledging the impact of how others see one; eventually the other's opinion makes itself felt, a truth of which Shakespeare's Coriolanus and Camus' The Stranger are literary studies.

Thus we come back to the original problem for individuals lacking a firm sense of object constancy. There is no dependable solution to the fear of being seen by the other. The preconstancy individual remains exquisitely vulnerable to becoming the other's object and thereby predisposed to shame. As pointed out above, however, fear of becoming the other's object is only one dimension of the vicious circle in which preconstancy individuals find themselves. Such individuals also need the other's look in order to feel real, and it is to this need to be seen that we now turn.

#### The Need to Be Seen

The individual lacking object constancy has access to three solutions whereby he can use the other to feel real. These are, first, intense self consciousness, secondly, hyperreflection, and, third, becoming an extension of the other's reality. All three solutions have in common that the individual retains his status as an object for the other and refuses the status of subject, that is, the status of being a center of initiative and autonomy. Each of these solutions will be discussed in turn.

Intense self consciousness is a state of mind in which the individual imagines that he is an object for others far more often than in fact he is. Such individuals feel painfully visible to others even when it is highly unlikely anyone has notice of them. The other's look is not actually on these individuals, yet they experience the world as though they were always the object of

scrutiny. At first glance their complaints appear to be direct expressions of a fear of being seen, and indeed they are often fearful of this. But when we observe that they consistently imagine they are seen even when they are almost certainly not being looked at, we see that it is their own intention to be an other's object. They fantasize the other's gaze in order for the imaginary other to provide an image of themselves and a reality in which they can live.

This intense self consciousness is actually an advance over passively being transfixed by the other's look. It discloses some autonomous initiative or intention toward the other (to be the other's object) rather than remaining a complete surrender of possibilities to the other. Intense self consciousness is not experienced, however, as an autonomous intention. Therefore it has the character of pretense, which contributes to the self conscious individual's sense of fraudulence. The pretense is of a sort which Laing (1961) calls "elusion," or "a relation in which one pretends oneself away from one's original self; then pretends oneself back from this pretense so as to appear to have arrived back at the starting point" (p. 45). The "original self" in this case is the intent to be the other's object. The first pretense is that I do not wish to be visible to the other. The second pretense is that the other's gaze captures and defines me even so. Thereby I arrive back at the starting point: The other has become my audience, for whom I am forced to play roles and by whom I am therefore defined. This is a process which is especially typical of schizoid individuals.

Hyperreflection is the use of constant self scrutiny, or reflection, to feel real. Reflection is "the process by which consciousness (or the self) tries to adopt an external point of view toward itself" (Klass & Offenkrantz, 1976, p. 549). By separating myself from my activities through reflection, I highlight myself (make myself figural) against a background composed of my actions and the objects of experience. Thereby I am visible to myself, and some part of me is constantly differentiated from moments of spontaneity (or self absorption) and also from the world, both of which threaten to swallow my identity. Hyperreflection must be maintained, though, or unreality replaces the feeling of definition. This is illustrated by Dooley's (1941) patient, who said,

I forgot myself at the Ice Carnival the other night. I was so absorbed in looking at it that I forgot what time it was and who and where I was. When I suddenly realized I hadn't been thinking about myself I was frightened to death. The unreality feeling came.  
(p. 17)

Hyperreflection may appear an advance over fantasizing an other's gaze to feel real (intense self consciousness), since it looks like a way of having one's own reality in one's keeping. This form of having one's own reality is clearly different from self constancy, however, since constancy enables comfortable self absorption, or forgetting oneself without fear of losing oneself, while this is just what the hyperreflective individual cannot do. It is also questionable whether continual self scrutiny is an advance over intense self consciousness. Like the self conscious

person, the hyperreflective individual is aware of himself only as an object. He makes himself figural in his mind qua object but assigns his capacity for spontaneous initiative and action to the background against which he is figural. Thus he has fragmented himself. He never is a motivation, or an intention, nor can he be his actions. He keeps a third person stance toward himself: He knows that this or that must be his intent, and he knows he performed certain actions, but he is never present to his actions and he never really feels these were his intentions. They may as well have been the intentions of someone else, for this is his identity; he has made himself to be someone else for himself. (At the end of Chapter III I objected that this was the view of human life implicit in behaviorism's overvaluation of the third-person stance and its inattention to the priority of first-person experience. The hyperreflective individual likewise suffers from inattention, as it were, to first-person experience.)

The pretense involved in intense self consciousness and the fragmentation implied by hyperreflection lead to the final position possible for individuals caught in the dilemma of needing yet dreading to be known by others. This position is to become an extension of the other's reality. In a sense this is ingenious. The chief problem with the other's look is that it reflected a me belonging to the other and therefore a not-me by whom my familiarity with myself was threatened. But if I belong to the other, his gaze reveals me rather than not-me. By becoming an extension of the

other's reality, the me reflected by his reality can be gladly received because his gaze is no longer alien.

Klass and Offenkrantz (1976) point to Sartre's novels for statements of this particular stance (though they do not sufficiently distinguish it from other varieties of being seen). Indeed, in The Reprieve (Sartre, 1960), several passages depict becoming an extension of the other's reality. A particularly clear one occurs in the letter which an educated but ineffectual man, burdened by intellectualizing rumination and an inability to take decisive action, writes to a friend:

I know at last that I am. I adapt for my own use, and to your disgust, your prophet's foolish wicked words: "I think, therefore I am," which used to trouble me so sorely, for the more I thought the less I seemed to be; and I say, "I am seen, therefore I am." I no longer bear the responsibility of my turbid and disintegrating self; he who sees me causes me to be; I am as he sees me. (p. 315)

The key phrase is, "I need no longer bear the responsibility." The attempt to become a center of initiative and autonomy, or to achieve self constancy, is given up. Further, the possibility of objective self awareness is lost, for there is no means whereby one can take multiple perspectives on oneself. Instead, a kind of immediacy through the other is sought, a state of self absorption which does not threaten the sense of one's own reality because that reality is safely given to an other.

This position finds its origin in inadequate mirroring by the parents. There was not that convergence of which Kohut (1977) speaks between the child's potentials and the appreciative parental

response. In this case what was not seen in the child was his capacity for autonomous functioning. If the parents cannot see and appreciate this aspect of the child, it remains unseen and only vaguely felt by the child as well. Consequently, when he embarks on an independent action, he loses sight of himself, as it were, and feels unreal. The child experiences this as abandonment by the parent, even though strictly speaking the child is the one who began to move away through his autonomy. The child's autonomy reminds him that the parent is not always available, and until the illusion that the parents are always available to see the child is firmly rooted, his autonomy delivers him into fears of abandonment. But of course this illusion cannot be established because there is no one the child can internalize who sees the whole child, that is, the child who is capable of independence.

The solution we are discussing to this situation is the surrender of one's autonomy through establishing a relationship in which "I need no longer take the responsibility." In a sense this amounts to an insistence that the other always be a free, independent subject and that I always be his object. In psychological terms the other is asked to be an idealized object whose being is special and powerful enough to carry both of our existences. Sartre's (1964) Nausea illustrates this particularly well. The "hero," Roquentin, becomes disillusioned with a marquis, M. de Rollebon, on whom he had been preparing an historical study. He laments:

M. de Rollebon was my partner; he needed me in order to exist and I needed him so as not to feel my existence. I furnished the raw material I had to re-sell, which I didn't know what to do with: existence, my existence. His part was to have an imposing appearance. He stood in front of me, took up my life to lay bare his own to me. I did not notice that I existed any more, I no longer existed in myself, but in him. (p. 98)

Roquentin becomes disillusioned upon discovering that the marquis took part in an assassination plot, disguised as a midwife. This ludicrous disguise shatters the idealized image and leaves Roquentin in a process of psychological disintegration which reaches psychotic dimensions, so great was the need for the other to "have an imposing appearance."

Not only must the other be special, but it is also important that I not be merely one object among many for him. I seek to be a special sort of object, but here the other's independence poses a serious problem. I want the other to be free and autonomous, in order that he have the stature qua subject to see me, his object. And yet I seek to bind his freedom so as to allow me to become an extension of his reality. I cannot believe that anything about me causes him to regard me as special, for that would mean becoming a center of acting upon others. In such an event the other would become my object, and he would thereby lose the power to see me. Therefore it must not be anything about me which leads him to find me a special object. He must do it autonomously, and I can only see myself as the occasion rather than the cause. Only in this way can I remain purely an object. On the other hand, I seek to

be the limit of the other's freedom and therefore not just any object. Sartre (1956) speaks of "the object in which the other's freedom consents to lose itself, the object in which the Other consents to find his being and his raison d'etre" (p. 479). This is the sort of object I seek to be in order "no longer to take responsibility."

In place of the illusion that the parent is always available in his or her mirroring function (object constancy), a different illusion has been created, that an other has godlike qualities, and I am a unique and special part of him. This is essentially the "idealizing transference" described by Kohut (1971) and is characteristic of what most authors (although not Kohut) would call borderline personality organization. It has the "merit" of avoiding the disturbing quality which the other's gaze holds for the other solutions described in this section, but it is not more stable than these solutions. For example, if the other person also wants to be loved, he implicitly demands that he too be allowed to be an object, and this is an intolerable demand for the borderline, for it is felt as the demand that he become a center of meanings and intentions. Further, it is difficult for the other to keep up the illusion of being godlike, or of having "an imposing appearance." Even if he is willing to try, he must in part assume the stance of "indifference to others" described above, which, as we saw, is difficult to maintain. Finally, the individual's autonomous strivings may well have been unseen by the parents, and so remain

only vaguely felt. But there are such strivings in most persons, even if they are only vaguely felt. In the preceding chapter I observed that unseen potentials retain the character of what classical theory would call id impulses pressing toward awareness. Although an individual may for a time be comfortable being an extension of the other, clinicians know that frequently such persons come to feel trapped, as their own strivings for initiative strain for expression. All of these factors make the "borderline" solution no more stable and no less troublesome than those other positions described above.

I have sought in this section to detail the ways in which the origins of the "superego function" of self observation lie in the child's experience of being seen. I have outlined how the other's gaze is problematic for the individual lacking object and self constancy. As the internalized mirroring gaze of the parents, object constancy provides a transcendence whereby the individual is always before and beyond instants of being seen. He is thus never entirely the other's look, and his self cannot be robbed from him when he is the other's object. His individual reality (self constancy) remains a possibility for him always. Thereby the gaze of others can become bases for further identifications which add to the multiple perspectives he takes on himself. The individual lacking object constancy lacks too the transcendence he needs to avoid being swallowed by instants of being seen. The absence of self constancy, though, means he is dependent on being seen for feeling real.

Hence the vicious circle in which preconstancy individuals find themselves: They deeply desire to be known, and this is at the same time dangerous.

#### V. CONSTANCY AS THE ORGANIZER OF THE "NORMAL" PERSONALITY

In recent years there have been attempts to chart the preoedipal pathologies developmentally. For instance Horner (1979) and Rinsley (1982, pp. 153-169) use the vicissitudes of unfolding object relations to establish a precise developmental point at which schizoid, narcissistic, and borderline pathologies arise. Such authors attempt to incorporate classical structural theory into their frameworks, using preoedipal variants of later structures, including the superego, to account for aspects of preoedipal pathological functioning.

My approach varies from such a thoroughgoing developmental approach. I do not view primitive mental states as phenomena which are lawfully related to a universal developmental sequence. Clinicians are familiar with the problems of diagnosing the preoedipal conditions, for each patient at different times can present facets of several paradigms, and one seldom sees a patient who clearly represents a distinct diagnostic category. This circumstance is hard to explain if the preoedipal states are lawfully related to failures at different developmental points. It is possible, however, to conceive of the preoedipal conditions as existential solutions to the interpersonal problems of finding

oneself in the world with other persons. As solutions these conditions are inherently unsatisfactory, but more adequate positions, which would allow the individual to enlarge the scope of his experiences and actions towards others, rest on object and self constancy.

Although it is possible to regard constancy as a developmental event, or as a series of levels of such events, constancy too has the character of an existential solution. Through the illusion of constancy one is in position to come to terms with the problems and possibilities others pose. This is the means whereby one is freed from domination by need and fear of the other's look and put in the position of being able to use others to expand competence in the world through later identifications. As such, this gives the individual much more adaptive flexibility than remains for those who cannot establish a stable level of constancy.

This perception clarifies how object constancy (and its implication of self constancy) is a major organizer of the "normal" personality of our time. I have outlined how organizing functions served by the superego in Freudian man find analogies in object constancy and the later identifications built on constancy. These functions include capacity for guilt and control of aggression (associated with internalizing the gaze of the parent who sees the "whole" child) and the capacity for self observation (based on the achievement of an objective self awareness which oscillates with self absorption without either's threatening identity).

Finally, pathological phenomena, which classical psychoanalytic thought attributes to superego pathology or its preoedipal fore-runners, can be seen to be miscarriages of constancy. These phenomena include devastating shame, the feeling of being critically watched or observed by others, and narcissistic indifference to others which leads to treating persons as things. I described at the beginning of this chapter how the continuity which rests on constancy differs from that which underwrites the identity built on the autonomous superego, and so the functions of constancy are not identical, but only analogous, to the functions of the superego. Nevertheless these analogies from both normal and pathological development support the thesis that the Oedipal-ending identification of Freudian man has been replaced by object constancy as the guardian of identity in our time.

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