Thomas Reid's realism

Reid believed that his major contribution to philosophy was his complete refutation of the theory of ideas, especially as it was stated by Berkeley, Locke, and Hume. The first part of the thesis is an examination of Reid's views regarding the ideal theory; one of the key parts of his refutation of the ideal theory was his refutation of the argument from illusion, which is a common argument used to defend the indirect theory of perception. So in the first chapter, I discuss Reid's answer to the argument from illusion.

After discussing the theory of ideas, I move to a discussion of Reid's own theory of perception. His presentation of his theory is often confusing and sometimes inconsistent, so it is difficult often to come to any solid conclusions about his views. The first subject of importance in Reid's theory is his concept of sensations; he makes a very definite attempt to separate sensation from perception as two distinct and separate acts of mind. This distinction, as we will see, is not always clear, nor is it always even understandable. It does seem clear that Reid wants to advocate some form of direct realism; in other words, when we perceive the world of external objects, we perceive it, generally, just as it really is. The connection between sensation and the perception of the external world is "suggestion." This concept is not clear either, but it seems that Reid thinks of sensations as signs which "suggest" objects to us in the external world.

Following a discussion of sensation and suggestion, I discuss Reid's theory of perception and attempt to come to some conclusion regarding his version of realism. There is quite a bit of disagreement among commentators about Reid's realism. Some feel he advocates both an indirect and a direct theory of perception. After examining his view carefully, however, I have concluded that Reid's theory is definitely one of direct realism.