John Paul Stevens and the dynamics of the criminal process

The primary focus of this work was to systematically analyze the opinions of Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens from selected federal and state criminal procedure cases in order to discover and relate how he has participated in the development of legal standards affecting criminal justice issues, in the context of federalism, as these doctrines have unfolded, have been refined, or have become entrenched by the Court over a fifteen term period (1975-1990). The secondary focus was to search out his judicial philosophy and its underpinnings by means of a review of his public statements and non-opinion writings, as well as of his personal biography and socialization. It was expected that the discovery of Stevens' role orientation would aid in an explanation of his decision-making practices and preferences in the criminal justice context. An anticipated additional benefit would be a record of how Stevens values the personnel and institutions who put into effect and are affected by these decisions as well as of how he comprehends the functions of criminal justice apparatus within public administration and society at large. The overall conclusion is that Stevens' approach is to give equal attention to the real and ideal dimensions of a procedure. He conscientiously addresses the specific facts, issue, and arguments presented for each case, but includes in his reasoning a decision's implications for future practitioner conduct and for the legitimacy of both the administration of justice and the Court. In the cases under review, Stevens tended to apply general principles of law similarly to state and federal cases. In evaluating specific procedures he begins with the basic premises that federal entities arc limited in jurisdiction and function by constitutional design, but that state law and the actions of its personnel and processes should be respected unless they deny constitutional protections. Thus, he welcomed state experimentation and innovation, and criticized premature federal judicial intervention. He is distinct from the more ideological justices because he has chosen to assume the role of a "professional judge," and be restrained by the Court's institutional contraints and traditional reasoning techniques. Individual experiences (family criminal trial, schooling, world events, and personal contacts) could account for his sensitivity to the impact of a decision upon future accused persons (Everyman). Numerous findings reflect the nuances of his approach and responses to specific procedural areas.