Lessons learned from the developmental testing of the EA-6B night vision device integration program

During the Kosovo conflict of 1999, EA-6B Prowler fleet commanders experienced the limitations of operating the only Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) platform that was incompatible with Night Vision Imaging Systems (NVIS) and decided as a result that all EA-6B Prowlers must be made NVIS compatible. So keenly did local fleet commanders feel the need for these conversions, they actually considered utilizing Night Vision Goggles without adequately modifying their aircraft. Though this fortunately did not occur, the Department of Defense took unprecedented steps to make EA-6B's NVIS- compatible in the fiscal year 2000 (FY 2000) and these conversions became a priority for the Program Manager of EA-6Bs.

In October 1999 the Department of Defense gave the EA-6B Program Manager directions to make all EA-6BS NVIS-compatible and to do so as fast as possible. The entire designing, testing, and fielding of the system would normally have taken three to five years with standard acquisition guidelines. However, this NVIS acquisition program was granted permission to employ the rarely used Abbreviated Acquisition Process in an attempt to field the system in six months. The system was actually fielded in approximately fourteen months. Though, by bureaucratic standards, this constituted a huge success, it proved a failure for fleet aviators. What was promised for six months actually took over a year.

This thesis will discuss the programmatic and technical shortfalls experienced in this program. Based on an analysis of this material, the author will make recommendations as to how NVIS modifications to future platforms may be made in a more timely fashion.