The quest : Haywood Hansell and american strategic bombing in World War II

Haywood Shepard Hansell, Jr. emerged in the 1930s as an important player in American air war planning and operations. As a student and teacher at the Air Corps Tactical School Hansell helped develop a strategic air war theory which, unlike that of Giulio Douhet, targeted industrial and military targets rather than civilians. He went on to direct or write significant portions of America's three major air war plans in World War II, AWPD-1, AWPD-42, and the plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive. All three documents were devoted to daylight, precision bombing. Hansell served as the commander of the 1st Bombardment Wing of the Eighth Air Force in early 1943 and thus was instrumental in establishing daylight bombing tactics. Much to his dismay, however, Hansell saw the strategic bombing forces dispersed and directed against targets which were not strategic in nature. In July 1943 Hansell returned to the United States where he took an important position on the staff of General Henry Arnold. Arnold entrusted Hansell with creating a strategic air force which would be controlled from Washington and be devoted to purely strategic targets. Hansell served as the first chief of staff of the Twentieth Air Force and insisted on daylight, precision operations against Japan. In October 1944 Hansell arrived in the Marianas as the commander of the XXI Bomber Command. After initiating daylight operations against Japan he was denied decisive results by difficulties in supply, weather, and the command structure. It is commonly believed that Americans were universally committed to daylight bombing, but Hansell was soon under pressure from Lauris Norstad, the new chief of staff of the Twentieth Air Force, to use incendiary weapons to burn Japan's cities. Hansell resisted Norstad's proposals and thus was dismissed from his command by Arnold. Hansell stands as the single most important exponent of daylight, precision bombing in World War II. In Europe the existing technology and conditions favored American daylight attacks, but over Japan the possibility of firebombing Japanese cities coupled with the American hatred of the Japanese prompted the American leaders to abandon daylight, precision bombing in spite of Hansell's efforts.