Roberto Mangabeira Unger : drawing some implications from a social theory with a special emphasis on issues in medical ethics

The purpose of this essay was to explore the post-liberal social theory of Roberto Mangaveira Unger and to investigate its applicability to the discipline of medical ethics. Unger claims that he has developed a methodology which serves as a tool not only for the criticism of liberal social theory, but also for the development of a post-liberal theory of society, one which reasserts the tie between philosophy and social theory. As a result, the focus of this study was on his methodology.

The first part of this task was to delineate Unger's methodology. Since he claims that he uses a variation of Weber's typological method, an extended comparison was made between Weber's theory of types and Unger's variation. The major difference between the two methodologies is that Weber's approach is nominalistic with no metaphysical elements, while Unger's approach deliberately re-introduces the metaphysical component. While Unger's approach thus avoids some of the problems of the typological method (i.e., he develops a systematic hierarchy of types), and, like Weber's, invites the use of a cross-disciplinary as well as a cross-cultural approach, it was found that the major problem of the typological method--that this methodology creates unwarranted antitheses and dichotomies--has not been resolved by Unger. This was shown both in his critique of liberalism and in his constructive social theory.

Unger's critique of liberalism was investigated in two areas-ethical theory and legal theory. In examining Unger's discussion of the liberal theories of ethics, it was found that his use of the typological method indeed creates unwarranted dichotomies. His use of the pure types of these theories leaves no basis for the modifications made by other philosophers. This was shown to be especially true in Unger's treatment of deontological ethics where Unger uses Kant but ignores Rawls, whose theory attempts to avoid the very problems in Kant that Unger criticizes in his treatment of the morality of reason.

In Unger's treatment of legal theory, the same methodological problem was apparent. This was pointed out by describing the theories of H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin in relation to Unger's types of legal theories. First of all, as Unger sets up the types of liberal legal theories, it was apparent that neither Hart's nor Dworkin's theories fulfilled the criteria for Unger's pure types. Yet because of Unger's delineation of the pure types, he would be forced to conclude that neither theory is coherent since each attempted to accomodate the very problems to which adherence to the pure type would lead. For example, Dworkin's theory, which is an excellent example of a theory of substantive justice (one of Unger's types), is grounded in principles, and as a result, seems to avoid the pitfalls of other theories of substantive justice which are grounded in values. Yet by grounding his theory in principles, Dworkin falls victim to the antinomy of rules and values in Unger's theory. The problem is exacerbated, Unger claims, by the fact that this type of theory has disasterous consequences for the nature of law. But Dworkin's use of principles seems to avoid those consequences. As a result, the antinomy set up by Unger's criteria for the pure types is unable to accomodate a sophisticated legal theory like Dworkin's and sets up what seems to be unwarranted antitheses as well.

Unger's development of his constructive theory was examined as well. Although he unfolds his theory consistently with his methodology,

it was found that the problems that were present in Unger's critical work, i.e., the creation of unwarranted dichotomies, now appeared when his methodology was used as a tool for applying his ethical theory to issues in medical ethics. Unger's ethic of sympathy was developed for use in the cases of consent and refusal of treatment. Three interwoven strands were delineated in this ethic of sympathy--autonomy, reciprocity and shared values. Yet these strands fragment when one of them becomes the focus of the conflict. Certainly decisions can be made using both the ethic of sympathy and the methodology; but it was found that the decision-making process would be very complex. As a result of continuing methodological problems and of the complexity of the decisionmaking process, the author concluded that, while Unger's theory is promising, he has not yet developed a typological method clearly superior to contemporary methods and theories; nor is his theory capable of either criticizing liberal social theories or constructing a postliberal theory easily applicable to contemporary problems in medical ethics and other areas.