Who shall hear them cry : a study of the variations in the state level judicial lobbying strategies of interest groups

This dissertation explores interest group strategy on the state level. It specifically focuses upon the decision to which institutions a group will lobby for favorable policy outcomes. Previous studies have recognized the important role played by interest groups in judicial politics. Lobbying the legislature, however, continues to be the dominant means of influence exercised by interest groups. This study examines the decision by some groups to expand their lobbying repertoire to include a judicial strategy while others do not. Whereas several scholars have examined the success interest groups enjoy when they appeal to the courts, this study centers on why all groups do not use this approach. Three theories of strategy decisions ~ the political disadvantage theory, resources theory, and adaptation theory ~ are explored using a multiple holistic case study approach. Six interest groups are examined as individual cases. Data gathered from public records, accounts in periodicals, interest group publications, and interviews with interest group leaders is used to determine the strategies used by each group. This study finds evidence which supports only one of the three theories, the resource theory. Interest groups which have not achieved their policy goals using the traditional lobbying strategies will appeal to the judiciary if the issue is judicable and they have the additional resources needed.