A critique of Tractarian semantics

This is a critique of the principal claims made within Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It traces the development of his thought from the time he dictated the pre-Tractarian "Notes on Logic" to Russell up until about 1932 when he began work on the Philosophical Grammar. The influence exercised upon him by Frege, Russell and Moore are considered at length. Chapter one examines Moore's relational theory of judgment which Wittgenstein apparently accepted upon his arrival at Cambridge in 1911. From Moore Wittgenstein would inherit one of the fundamental metaphysical theses of the Tractatus, namely, that the world consists of facts rather than things. Wittgenstein's attempt to overcome the relational theory's inability to account for falsehood, negation, and the possibility of truly ascribing false beliefs to others would herald some of the principal theses of Tractarian semantics: that propositional signs must exhibit bipolarity, that a distinction must be drawn between Sinn and Bedeutung, and that a distinction holds between what can be said and what can only be shown. Chapter Two examines how these theses are sharpened by considering the influence of Frege and the manner in which Wittgenstein disposes of Russell's Paradox. considerable attention is given to the issue of whether Frege is to be interpreted as a semantic Platonist. It is argued that he is not, and that Tractarian semantics shores up the problematic features of Frege's philosophy which make it susceptible to the paradox. From Frege Wittgenstein derives the idea that all representation requires a structured medium. The chapter concludes by considering how this entails the falsehood of semantic Platonism. Chapter Three studies Wittgenstein's argument for logical atomism and gives it a favorable assessment. The influence of Russell's conception of logical analysis is considered. The chapter concludes by showing the way Wittgenstein's thesis that there must be simple subsistent objects depends upon the truth of his Grundgedanke, i.e., the claim that the logical constants are not referring terms. Chapter Four examines the argument for the Grundgedanke, and defends it against criticism based upon phenomenological considerations for objectifying negativity. It is demonstrated that Wittgenstein's view entails that a distinction must be drawn between propositions possessing sense and those that are senseless but no less a part of our language. Chapter Five examines Wittgenstein's claim that the essence of a proposition consists in a propositional sign's projective relation to the world, and it considers the Tractarian analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions. It is argued that the analysis of these sorts of sentences forms the principal problem with the Tractatus. The chapter includes a discussion of why the Color Exclusion Problem need not be considered problematic for the author of the Tractatus, and it defends the realistic interpretation given of the Tractatus throughout the dissertation against criticisms arising from a consideration of Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism.