Supreme Court Evaluation of Federal Agency Actions

Interactions between the federal courts and agencies are an important but often overlooked part of the policy process. This study is an attempt to explore this area of the law by examining how the U.S. Supreme Court evaluates the actions taken by federal agencies. From a practical standpoint, such evaluation has a real impact on the means available to agencies and the outcomes they bring about. Normatively, how the Court does (or does not) go about holding agencies accountable to rules and procedures created by elected officials and the agencies themselves has serious implications for notions of democratic control of government in an increasingly administration-driven age. After reviewing the relevant scholarly literature and case law, the author identifies and describes a novel body of cases unified by their administrative nature. Examining these cases using the integrated model of Supreme Court decision making developed by Pacelle, Curry, and Marshal, the author finds support for the idea that the identified body of cases is both coherent and distinct from the full set of Supreme Court cases. Using a novel analytical model, support is found for the importance of agency rulemaking in agencies receiving deference from the Court. Additionally, legal factors are found to strongly influence outcomes in the identified set of cases.