(Dis)contentment with the International System: The Relationship between Territorial Dispute Settlement Attempts and UNGA Voting

To what degree do the methods of management for territorial and maritime disputes relate to voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly? In particular, do actions taken by the disputants in managing their disputes exert influence on their fellow disputant’s foreign policy preferences in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) reflective of the nature of these attempts? As territory has been found to be one of the most important driving factors in the conflict between states, understanding the impacts of different settlement methods in the active conveyance of information to other state actors in attempts to settle can provide insight into the general contentment of states with their place in the international system. This potential impact in understanding the degree settlement attempts are reflected in UNGA voting is important, not only to the disputants but also to the wellbeing of the international system as a whole. In this dissertation, I seek to assess the relationship between settlement attempts on territorial and maritime disputes with resulting voting patterns in the UNGA. To do this, I conduct a large-N quantitative analysis to assess general supports for my theory’s hypotheses, followed by the examination of five case studies involving China to determine additional support. I conclude with an overall discussion of my findings and conclude with the next steps in research.