Single-Party Autocracies, Sanctions, and Conflict Mediation

Single-party autocracies are the most common type of autocracy in the world, yet research into this regime-type remains incomplete. In Autocracies as Mediators in Conflicts (Honig, 2022), evidence indicated that single-party autocracies are statistically more likely to offer to mediate third-party internationalized military conflicts when subjected to economic sanctions than other types of autocracies (military juntas, personalist dictatorships, and both dynastic and non-dynastic monarchies), suggesting a sensitivity to domestic and global public opinion akin to democracies. This aligns with research indicating that single-party autocracies are more like democracies than other types of autocratic regimes (Weeks, 2014). This article builds off these findings by examining the likelihood of offers of conflict mediation by single-party autocracies both before economic sanctions as well as afterwards. Utilizing a quantitative analysis, it finds statistically significant evidence that single-party autocracies are at a much greater likelihood to offer to mediate these conflicts when being subjected to economic sanctions than they would be otherwise. This aligns with the theory that single-party autocracies care about public opinion both domestically and internationally in a similar way as democracies.