Considerations on committee independence : the committee on banking, finance, and urban affairs of the United States House of Representatives in the 1980s

Three schools of thought have emerged among scholars of legislative committees within the last generation or so to explain the policy-making activity of legislative committees. Each school assumes that legislative committees are powerful influencers of policy but regards them as agents working on behalf of certain principals. One school sees committees as agents of the whole legislature, or parent chamber. The second regards committees as agents of political parties organized within the legislature. The third and largest school holds that congressional committees and their members labor as agents of outside interests. Committees that are agents of outside interests are referred to as "independent" committees. The thesis of this dissertation is that legislative committees operate independently of both their parent chambers and their party caucuses. This notion is examined through an investigation of the activities of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives (BFUAC) from 1981 through 1990. The theory of committee independence is discussed. Five indicators of committee independence are developed and examined within two theoretical frames. Four of the indicators are tested within the principal-agent frame: committee self-selection, district characteristics, ideological differences with the House as a whole, and partisan differences. Weak to moderate support for the independence theory is found. The fifth indicator, control of legislation, is tested within what is referred to as the policy-process frame. Two case studies are presented. In the first case, support for BFUAC as an independent committee is found. The second case disputes the thesis.