The role of foreign policy doctrine in the decision making process for U.S. military intervention in Latin America, 1960-1994

In the post World War II era, attention has focussed on the decision-making process leading to U.S. military intervention in other states. Many factors of domestic and international politics have been examined as part of this inquiry. One area that has not been widely considered is how foreign policy doctrine, characterized as the operational definition of a country's national interest, differs in content and effect from other statements of foreign policy in the decision to intervene militarily in various parts of the world.

The dissertation looks at major doctrines of American foreign policy that relate directly to this aspect: Monroe Doctrine, Johnson Doctrine, and Reagan Doctrine. It also considers the 1989 military intervention in Panama by the Bush administration, which occurred without a fully developed doctrine in place. A case study research design is utilized to assess the role that these foreign policy doctrines had in three decisions of U.S. military intervention in Latin America since 1960. The research question considered is how does the concept and application of a foreign policy doctrine as an operational definition of national interest differ in content and effect from other official statements, particularly with respect to the use of military force as an element of American foreign policy in Latin America.

This study has important implications for current decision makers as well as for gaining a better understanding of the actions of earlier American administrations regarding foreign military intervention. The Clinton administration has put forth several statements in this area in an effort to present a foreign policy based on a clear set of principles of a coherent and workable strategy. This attempt to forge a Clinton Doctrine illustrates the timeliness and significance of this issue as a subject for inquiry.