Automation of the EA-6B weapon system

The fourth major software release for the EA-6B electronic attack (EA) aircraft failed due to several discrepancies relating to the implementation of additional automation into the weapon system. The propensity for improved performance by the aircraft due to advertised automated capabilities was significantly offset by faults and inadequacies of the automation design as well as human factors deficiencies directly related to the automation. As a result, Air Test and Evaluation Squadron FIVE (VX-5), and its parent command. Operational Test and Evaluation Force, disapproved full fleet introduction of the software until critical deficiencies were corrected. This research is an assessment of the EA-6B weapon system software and the principle aspects of automation with which it relates. Levels of automation and generic design characteristics were derived from non-military applications. Several Navy and Air Force studies pertaining to automation of generic electronic warfare (EW) systems were used to identify critical issues specific to military design and implementation. An analysis of the EA-6B weapon system hardware and software features, including operational test results conducted by VX-5, was used to assess the successes and failures of automation implementation. It was concluded that automation implementation into the EA-6B weapon system was consistent with generic design characteristics of both non-military and military EW systems. The application of the automation and the level of automation were predominantly successful. However, several critical issues relating to the accuracy and adequacy of the automation were found faulty. In addition, several human factors problems were found to be a direct result of the automation implementation. Using the non-military and military studies, recommendations on correcting each of these problems was offered for incorporation into a correction of deficiencies (COD) software release.