The Origins of German Seapower: Military-Industrial Relationships in the Development of the High Seas Fleet, 1897-1912

The subject of this study is the construction of the German High Seas Fleet at the turn of the century from 1897 to 1912. Specifically, it focuses on the efforts of the Imperial Naval Office (RMA) under the direction of Admiral Tirpitz as State Secretary to coordinate and control fleet construction and the many firms caught up in that program. From the Admiral's appointment to the RMA in 1897 until the Reichstag's budget priorities shifted back to the army in 1912, the fleet was one of the outstanding sources of debate in Germany and among the western powers. Previous historical research has concentrated on political and social ramifications, but has ignored the naval-industrial relationship that was fundamental to the development of the fleet.

My research has shown that in spite of a powerful and well established community of armaments firms, the RMA usually enforced its will on industry through a complex system of checks and restraints. Even in its relationship with the navy's strongest suppliers, among them the Krupp-Dillinger armor plate monopoly, the RMA was able to make headway in quality and price controls to the German navy's long-term advantage.

The dissertation also assesses Admiral Tirpitz's influence on the creation and use of the fleet. His considerable political talent was essential for the passage of the Naval Laws of 1898 and 1900 as well as the supplemental laws of 1906, 1908 and 1912. Yet his devotion to battleship strategy both played into the strength of his main adversary, Great Britain, and restricted his appreciation of new weapons systems like the U-boat. As the director of the RMA, Tirpitz's strategic dogma resulted in a fleet ill-suited for an

actual confrontation with Britain. Thus he was, simultaneously, the political architect of the navy's success in the Reichstag, as well as a major reason for its failure in World War One.