



6-1986

The Concept of the Object Scale and the Assessment of Object Representation

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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Larry F. Brown entitled "The Concept of the Object Scale and the Assessment of Object Representation." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Psychology.

Leonard Handler, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

Anne Mc Intyre, Kenneth Newton, F. Stanley Lusby

Accepted for the Council:


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

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THE CONCEPT OF THE OBJECT SCALE AND THE ASSESSMENT
OF OBJECT REPRESENTATION

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Larry F. Brown

June 1986

To my Father

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks to the members of my doctoral committee, Leonard Handler, Anne McIntyre, F. Stanley Lusby, and Kenneth Newton. Len has helped me in many ways over the course of these past few years. I am especially grateful for his continuing insistence that I trust my ideas and intuitions. Anne not only encouraged my interest in projective assessment, but taught me the value of a disciplined approach to clinical data. While Ken and Stan have not been as closely involved in my graduate training, I thank them both for their interest and encouragement.

I would like to extend special thanks to Howard Lerner, who has provided assistance at every stage of this dissertation. Howard was more than generous with his time, interest, and considerable knowledge of Rorschach assessment. Our discussions invariably left me with an increased grasp of and enthusiasm for the subject at hand.

Cathy Collins, Garry DelConte, Susan Feinberg, Marilyn Graves, and Bruce Seidner labored at the often tedious tasks of test administration and scoring of the data. I appreciate their efforts. Cathy and Garry also suffered with me through the initial phases of this project and throughout supplied moral support.

I thank the staff at both the Psychological Clinic and the Counseling Center for their support of this project. I would also

like to thank Sidney J. Blatt and Edward R. Ryan for permission to include copies of their respective scales as appendices.

My wife, Megan, lived with and tolerated my preoccupation for a very long time. She has been patient and loving, and I am grateful to her.

ABSTRACT

This study examined the Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale, a measure of object representation based on the Rorschach human response. The general aim of the study was to investigate the scale's power as a means of assessing two distinct aspects of object-representational functioning, namely, the internal capacity to relate to others and the cognitive-perceptual complexity and organization of images of self and others.

The Rorschach human responses of 29 subjects drawn from both outpatient clinical and nonclinical populations were scored according to the criteria specified by the Concept of the Object Scale. Independent assessments of the cognitive-perceptual complexity and organization of object representation were also based on Rorschach responses. Criterion ratings of internal capacity for relatedness were obtained by applying the Ryan Quality of Object Relations Scale to Object Relations Technique and Early Memories Test data.

It was found that the developmental level on inaccurately perceived Rorschach human images was predictive of quality of object representation in the sense of internal capacity to relate to others. Developmental level on accurately perceived human responses, by contrast, was not discriminative for this population. These findings, which suggest that the developmental level on inaccurate human responses is the more sensitive barometer of quality of object representation, were, however, interpreted cautiously inasmuch as

there were certain problems with the independent measures of internal relatedness used in the study. In addition, the data indicated that an overall summary score derived from the scale did register the degree of cognitive-perceptual complexity and organization implicit in self-other imagery. It was tentatively concluded that, depending on the specific manner in which it is employed, the Concept of the Object Scale does illuminate both of the dimensions of object representation that were examined.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, issues of whether or how the Rorschach Inkblot Test may contribute to an understanding of the quality of a person's relatedness to others have generated a substantial body of clinical, theoretical, and empirical literature. Investment in these issues has fluctuated according to prevailing interests and theoretical orientations, as has the manner in which they have been conceptualized and addressed. Rorschach (1942) does not seem to have been especially occupied with this problem, nor was Rapaport (Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 1946), whose principal interest was in the elaboration of concepts suggested by psychoanalytic ego-psychology. Schactel (1966), in contrast, a theoretician who espoused an interpersonal theory of personality, directed considerable attention to the question of the Rorschach's ability to illuminate interpersonal relations.

Under the impact of recent developments in psychoanalytic theory, these issues are now being approached with renewed interest and energy (Lerner & Lerner, in press). One observes an increasing number of studies, typically grounded in some variant of object relations theory, which seek to demonstrate the usefulness of the Rorschach as a means of investigating a person's experience of, or capacity for, human relatedness. These studies suggest that the Rorschach provides a singularly rich source of data for the assessment of "object representations," that is, those intrapsychic

structures which inform and mediate one's experience of self and other as well as self-other relationships.

In line with this growing interest, a number of systems or methodologies for using Rorschach data in the assessment of object representation have been proposed. The Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale, developed by Blatt and associates, represents one attempt to assess the nature and quality of object representation by systematically examining the Rorschach human response in particular. Blatt and Lerner (1983a) state the rationale for this program as follows:

Rorschach responses with human content appear to be vivid expressions of important interpersonal relationships and transactions which are internalized by the individual as cognitive structures which continually influence, shape, and color the experiences of subsequent situations and relationships. . . . Impairments in interpersonal relationships and distortions of the concept of the self and of others should be expressed in the structural configuration and content of human responses on the Rorschach (1983a, p. 26).

This focus on Rorschach human imagery is consistent with conventional Rorschach practice and research. That is, Rorschach investigators have traditionally treated human responses as especially important and useful data in the assessment of an individual's relationship proclivities. However, as I will try to show, it has not been adequately demonstrated that the specific manner of analyzing the human response called for by the Concept of the Object Scale does in fact discriminate between levels in the capacity to represent and relate to others. In other words, there is some question as

to whether "impairments in interpersonal functioning and distortions of the concept of the self and others" do indeed register on this particular scale.

The primary aim of the present study, then, is to investigate the assertion that level or quality of object representation is reflected in the structural and content dimensions of the Rorschach human response to which the Concept of the Object Scale attends. More generally, since, as will become apparent below, this scale has been employed in different, and not necessarily consistent, ways, the intention is to more clearly delineate those dimensions of psychological functioning to which it is sensitive.

Preliminary to a description of the study, the concepts of object relations and object representation will be briefly discussed. Next, the literature will be selectively reviewed in order to identify certain issues and controversies involved in the Rorschach assessment of object relations. This section, too, will provide a context for appreciating the distinctive features of the Concept of the Object Scale. Then will follow a discussion of the development and construction of the scale as well as a review and critique of the relevant research. Finally, the methods and results of the present study will be detailed and discussed.

The Rorschach Human Response and the Assessment of Object Relations

Preliminary considerations. The Rorschach human response has traditionally been regarded as an especially rich source of data

for evaluating the nature and quality of an individual's relationships with others. Over the years there has been a substantial research effort in this general area. As Lerner (1975) observed, however, much of this research is marred by a failure to adequately define the specific dimensions of self-other relationships investigated. At the outset, then, it is important to clarify the constructs "object relations" and "object representations."

In accordance with psychoanalytic usage, the term "object" in this discussion denotes the human "object," and "object relations" refers, in general, to human and personal relationships and interactions. At least so far as object relations theory is concerned, however, this is not to say that object relations and interpersonal relations are equivalent terms. Thus, Sullivan (1953), a leading proponent of an interpersonal theory of personality, makes it plain that he is principally occupied with the study of public, and observable, interpersonal processes. Kernberg, one of the most influential contemporary object relations theorists, stresses, in contrast, that psychoanalytic object relations theory is not concerned exclusively or even primarily with interpersonal relations, but rather with "internalized object relations." The focus of this theoretical approach as he defines it is on the "intrapsychic field" (1976, p. 58). Accordingly, the assessment of an individual's object relationships "must include the internal relationships to others, in contrast to a simple observation of . . . interpersonal behavior" (1975, p. 145). Ticho (1978) reiterates this distinction, emphasizing

that one must clearly differentiate between "internal object relations" and "interpersonal relationships in the outside world."

From this point of view, the construct "object relations" subsumes, but is by no means exhaustively defined by, what is ordinarily meant by the term interpersonal relations. The latter implies observable interactions, or more or less overt social behavior. This is what Kernberg seems to mean by "external interpersonal relationships" or what Ticho refers to as "interpersonal relationships in the outside world."

The intrapsychic dimension of object relations to which Kernberg refers has been variously described in terms of internal or inner objects, images, representations, or, more broadly, the representational or internal object world (Blatt, 1974; Fairbairn, 1952; Kernberg, 1975, 1976; Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962; Stierlin, 1977; Sutherland, 1963). In general, reference is being made to intrapsychic structures which arise and develop as a function of the internalization of relationships with significant others (Kernberg, 1976).

Stierlin (1977) has suggested that these intrapsychic structures, which he terms "inner objects," may be viewed as possessing essentially two object-relational functions. In its "gyroscopic function" the inner object operates as a "guidepost" or an "inner anticipatory set" vis-a-vis relationships with others in the external world. That is, the inner object directs and guides one's relationships with objects; one's perceptions of others are in terms of this "inner

psychic schema" or "template." Along similar lines, Sutherland (1963) describes the inner object as functioning "as part of an object-seeking system in which it patterns the perceptual organization" (p. 114). What Stierlin calls the "autonomy-furthering function" of the inner object is of a more strictly intrapsychic nature. From this angle the inner object is, so to speak, an internal "presence." Thus, Stierlin speaks of the individual "relating to some part within"--a process thrown into clear relief in states of schizophrenic disintegration--or being able to fall back on sustaining inner resources. Winnicott (1959) seems to have entertained a similar notion inasmuch as he conceptualized the capacity to be alone as dependent upon "the existence of a good object in the psychic reality of the individual" (p. 32).

Stierlin concludes that "inner objects . . . can be defined both with respect to external objects which they are supposed to represent and with respect to the intrapsychic drama in which they figure as potent forces" (p. 141). Some object relations theorists, e.g., Klein, approach solipsism in their preoccupation with the "intrapsychic drama." In the present study, in contrast, the term inner object, or object representation, refers principally to the "intrapsychic base for . . . relating to external objects" (Stierlin, 1977, p. 140). This emphasis appears to be consistent with Blatt's understanding of object representation. Thus, Blatt and Lerner (1983b) write:

object representation refers to the conscious and unconscious mental schemata--including cognitive, affective, and experiential components--of objects encountered in reality. Beginning as vague, diffuse, variable sensorimotor experiences of pleasure and unpleasure, these schemata gradually expand and develop into differentiated, consistent, relatively realistic representations of the self and the object world . . . (pp.. 194-195).

To summarize, the concept of object relations may be understood as referring to both images of self and other, or object representations, on the one hand, and overt, interpersonal or social behavior, on the other. Object relationships, in a sense, may be viewed from the "inside" or the "outside," that is, in terms of internal, subjective experience or external, more or less readily observable behavior. Clearly these two domains are not entire separable for, after all, judgments about the quality of an individual's internal relationships with others derive, in part, from observations of how that individual actually interacts with others. It must be emphasized, however, that the level or quality of object representation, or the nature of one's internal experience of relationships, may not be directly or immediately a manifest in the interpersonal field (Kernberg, 1975; Ticho, 1978). Thus, the distinction is important and must be borne in mind as one reviews the various Rorschach studies pertaining to the broad area of object relations.

Review of the literature. Most Rorschach investigators would probably agree with the general proposition that Rorschach responses with human content are relevant to the investigation of object

relations as defined above. Inspection of the literature reveals, however, that there is considerable diversity of opinion regarding the specific object-relational implications of these responses.

Turning first to human content responses, with or without movement, the consensus is that these responses indicate interest in, or an orientation towards, others (Exner, 1974; Klopfer, Ainsworth, Klopfer, & Holt, 1954; Phillips & Smith, 1953; Rapaport, Schafer, & Gill, 1946, V. II). The reasoning behind this equation is simply that investment in or involvement with others should find expression in a Rorschach record that is "peopled" (Klopfer et al., 1954). Conversely, an absence of or deemphasis on such precepts indicates estrangement from others. Moreover, whole, fully human precepts are generally considered to reflect a mature or healthy interpersonal orientation, whereas accumulations of quasi-human or human detail responses indicate varying degrees of impairment in one's attitude toward others.

While agreeing that quantity and types of human responses reveal something of the degree and nature of interest in others, Rapaport et al. (1946) advise caution in developing inferences about actual interpersonal relationships on the basis of these data. They argue that a preponderance of human responses may, for example, indicate a preoccupation with others even when actual interpersonal contacts are quite limited or manifestly troubled. "This preoccupation in its pathological setting," they write, "may be the basis for the persistence of human responses even in psychotic conditions

which have cut most of the channels of interpersonal communication or contact" (Rapaport et al., 1946, V. II, pp. 300-301). Conversely, a deemphasis on human content may characterize the record of an individual who, on the surface of things, is quite engaged interpersonally, yet who experiences little real concern with or investment in other people, e.g., the sociopathic personality.

Phillips and Smith (1953) appear more willing to extrapolate from human content data to interpersonal behavior. While allowing, like Rapaport et al., that a preponderance of H responses may or may not reflect actual involvement with others, they assert that a lack of or deemphasis on these responses does indicate tendencies toward social isolation. They suggest, further, that an emphasis on quasi-human or humanoid responses has similar meaning.

Besides the quantity and types of human responses produced, the specific content of the human percept is commonly considered to possess object-relational significance. Given his skepticism of Rorschach content analysis in general, Rapaport (1946) only tentatively allows that the subject's "conception of himself" may be expressed in the content of the human percept. Klopfer et al. (1954) are less restrained in their appraisal of the value of human responses as indices of attitudes toward the self and other people. Similarly, Mayman (1967) proposes that these data reflect representations of self and other, offering a glimpse, in effect, of an individual's "subjective world."

Hertzman and Pearce (1947) attempted to investigate whether "material on the self-picture and the subject's picture of significant people" (p. 413) would indeed be manifest in the content of the human response. To this end, they abstracted all the human responses from the Rorschach records of patients undergoing intensive psychotherapy. Each response was then discussed with the patient's therapist to determine what, if any, "personal meaning" it might have. It was assumed that, because of his intimate acquaintance with the patient, the therapist was in a position to determine whether a given response embodied some aspect of that patient's complex of attitudes toward self and other. The investigators found that a substantial proportion of the human responses did in fact reflect "keenly felt attitudes" towards self and others.

In a similar vein, Krohn (1972) and Krohn and Mayman (1974) investigated the hypothesis that level of object representation is an "enduring dimension of the ego [which] should . . . emerge across a diverse set of the ego's productions" (1974, p. 448), including Rorschach productions. The authors developed an 8-point ordinal scale, the "Object Representation Scale for Dreams" (described in detail in Krohn, 1972), designed to capture the developmental level of an individual's object representations. Scale points range from an experience of the self as fundamentally estranged, and the world as stark, desolate, and essentially without people, to the perception of oneself as actively, empathically involved "in a lively world of fully human objects." This scale was applied to the content

of dream, early memory, and Rorschach records of 24 patients undergoing psychotherapy. Two criterion measures were also employed, namely, therapist and supervisor ratings of level of object representation, and severity of psychopathology as registered on the Luborsky Health-Sickness rating scale.

The investigators found that, overall, the various projective measures of object representation correlated positively with one another, and with criterion judgements of level of object representation and psychopathology. Closer inspection of the data indicated, however, that the Rorschach scores were more highly correlated with severity of psychopathology than with criterion ratings of object representation. While acknowledging that the Rorschach's relative insensitivity to the object representation dimension may have been partially due to the fact that the scale used was originally designed for application to dream content, Krohn and Mayman concluded that "the Rorschach seems to tap general level of psychopathology better than level of object representation" (1974, p. 464).

Urist (1973) designed a study more specifically addressed to the question of the Rorschach's ability to measure various dimensions of object relations. Stating that the concept of object relations refers, not simply to "the degree of impairment suffered by an individual in the interpersonal sphere" (p. 118), but primarily to the internal object world, he sought to investigate what he termed the "integrity" of self and other representations. The integrity

of an object representation, that is, the degree to which it possesses "enduring, stable, internally consistent definition" (p. 30) could, he proposed, be inferred from certain content and formal properties of responses portraying individual figures and relationships between figures. To what degree do the figures depicted convey a sense of aliveness and vitality, or wholeness and intactness? Are relationships between figures of a mutual, reciprocal nature that allows for the preservation of individual autonomy, or is one figure overpowered or enveloped by another? Further, are there formal indices of loss of boundaries or fluidity associated with the percept, e.g., contaminatory tendencies? Urist developed rating scales to capture these various aspects of the integrity of the response, and predicted that "independent ratings from other sources, assessing patients' world of internal objects with respect to integrity, would correlate highly with their scores on the Rorschach scales" (p. 43).

Urist included both inpatients and outpatients in his study, hoping thereby to obtain a sample in which varying degrees of health or impairment in the capacity to relate to others would be represented. The 40 subjects were administered a Rorschach, modified Thematic Apperception Test, and an autobiographical task designed to elicit descriptions of significant others. The Rorschach records were scored according to the scales described above, and comparable scales, assessing (1) richness and complexity, (2) mutuality and autonomy, (3) differentiation, and (4) aliveness of the figures portrayed,

were applied to the TAT and autobiographical data. Finally, ward staff and therapists were asked to rate the patients on developmental level of object relations using similar scales.

The author found that these several independent measures of object relations were positively correlated with one another, tending to confirm the prediction that an individual's internal, representational world would be "mapped into his percepts on the Rorschach." Subsequent investigations provide additional support for this finding. Using a modified version of one of the scales from the 1973 study, the "Mutuality of Autonomy Scale" (MAS), Urist (1977) examined level of object representation in a group of adult inpatients. He found that scores derived from Rorschach and autobiographical productions were consistent with ratings made by ward staff familiar with the actual object relations of the subjects. Similar results were obtained when the MAS was applied to Rorschach, clinical record, and therapy data of inpatient and outpatient adolescents (Urist & Shill, 1982).

Taken as a whole, Urist's studies clearly suggest that when analyzed in the manner called for by these integrity measures, and especially the Mutuality of Autonomy Scale, Rorschach content does yield a valid picture of the level of an individual's object relations. It must be underscored that Urist's intent has been to illuminate an aspect of intrapsychic functioning, namely, experience of self and other, and that he has not been interested in interpersonal or social behavior as such. A recent investigation, however, did

attempt to demonstrate a relationship between level of object representation as registered on the Mutuality of Autonomy Scale and readily observable dimensions of social behavior. Using a sample of non-patient latency children, Ryan, Avery, and Grolnick (1985) hypothesized that "MAS scores would be directly related to teachers' ratings of social and interpersonal behavior within the classroom" (p. 7). They found that, indeed, those children ranked by the teachers as highest with regard to overall social adjustment and working well with others, also displayed more mature object representations as measured by the MAS.

Before going any further, a comment about the Hertzman and Pearce, Krohn and Mayman, and Urist studies is in order. In general, all were concerned with the question of whether an individual's Rorschach imagery would bear the imprint of his self and other representations. However, while Hertzman and Pearce restricted their analyses to human images, the other investigators broadened their data base by including animal and inanimate content. In other words, although they attached particular importance to human percepts, Mayman, Krohn, and Urist treated non-human images as data relevant to the elaboration of an individual's representational world. This approach is consistent with clinical practice, as exemplified by Schafer (1967), and points to certain shortcomings of methods of analysis which do not take non-human content into account. That is, such scales exclude a potentially rich source of data, and may in fact leave one with precious little material inasmuch as some

records are characterized by a paucity or total absence of human content (Smith, 1980).

One must differentiate between responses with human content and Human Movement responses. Most M responses involve human content, but many human content responses are not associated with movement. Although it has been suggested that the interpretive meaning is the same whether or not a whole, human percept entails movement (King, 1958), and therefore that the M scoring may be redundant, the consensus is that M responses are, as Mayman puts it, "easily the richest, most revealing, consistently most interesting responses which occur in the Rorschach test" (1977, p. 230).

Among its various meanings, M is commonly assumed to relate to empathy. Defining empathy as the capacity to accept or identify with others, Klopfer et al. (1954), for example, assert that the perception of M "implies an ability to see one's world as peopled and consequently to feel empathy with others" (p. 254). Insofar as such empathic capacity is the hallmark of mature relatedness to others, M production also indicates a "capacity for good object relations." As to why M responses in particular should bear this relationship to empathy, Schachtel (1966) has suggested that the attribution of life or vitality to the figure perceived entails a momentary identification with that figure. In formulating such a response it is as if the subject "were for a moment and to some extent inside the figure" (1966, p. 71). The production of a Human Movement response, then, implies a capacity for that kind of

identificatory activity which is a sine qua non for grasping or sharing the experience of another person.

Numerous investigations, as reviewed by Lerner (1975) among others, have attempted to examine empirically this proposed link between M and empathy. Some studies offer support for the relationship, while others do not. One difficulty with such investigations, it has often been pointed out, is that empathy has been variously, and not necessarily consistently, defined. Moreover, the construct is of sufficient subtlety and complexity as to defy efforts to assess it. Developing criterion measures, in other words, is no easy or straightforward task.

Furthermore, while empathy implies identification, and can be conceptually related to the M response a la Schachtel, this is also the case for other, less laudable psychological processes. Mayman (1967, 1977) notes, for example, that certain forms of narcissistic identification with others may be mistaken for genuine empathy. Along similar lines, Urist (1976) reminds us that psychotic fusion or borderline projective identification represent types of identification, yet neither are healthy modes of relating to others.

These considerations suggest that the mere appearance of an M response in a record does not, in and of itself, herald that mature level of object-relatedness where empathy becomes possible. Therefore, the assumption, apparently not uncommon either in research or clinical practice, that a large number of M responses signifies a capacity for empathy, constitutes something of an oversimplification. There

are additional dimensions of the response which must also be attended to in arriving at this determination. Klopfer et al. (1954) suggest that whether M is associated with human detail, quasi-human, or animal content is of interpretive significance. Further, the form level of the response is an especially crucial dimension. Several whole, fully human M percepts which are yet perceptually inaccurate, far from implying a capacity for empathic contact, would, on the contrary, indicate a tendency to distort or misperceive others altogether (Urist, 1976; Weiner, 1966). Inattention to this dimension of response accuracy mars certain measures which purport to assess capacity for empathic object relations, e.g., the Pruitt and Spilka "Empathy-Object Relationship Scale" (1975).

The presence of several M of good form level involving whole, fully human figures would tend, then, to indicate a capacity for empathy, while an absence of, or production of partial, distorted, and inaccurate Human Movement responses would reflect an impairment in this capacity. This, in any case, is the general rule. As Urist (1976) points out, some patients who are hardly empathic, notably paranoid schizophrenics, may in fact produce responses which, in another personality setting, would lead one to infer capacity for empathy. Thus, he cautions that at times one must look beyond the M response in assessing the quality of object-relatedness to which an individual is disposed.

Like the human response more generally, the content of M responses has been treated as reflective of specific self and other

images. Schachtel (1966) has carefully and sensitively analyzed the manner in which these responses may mirror aspects of an individual's "attitudes and strivings" vis a vis self and others. Although it has been proposed that M responses express more significant, formative, or affectively-charged attitudes toward self and other than do static human responses, in general analyses aiming at elucidation of the representational world tend to treat H and M responses as essentially equivalent.

As regards the content of M responses and overt, interpersonal behavior, finally, there is sharp disagreement among Rorschach systematizers. On the one hand, Klopfer et al. (1954), stating what is apparently the dominant position on this issue, assert that "no movement responses can be interpreted as being necessarily analogous to observable behavior" (p. 381; see also Beck & Molish, 1967; Schachtel, 1966). Piotrowski (1979) on the other hand, claims that these responses reflect an individual's conception of his "role in life," that is, the "posture" characteristically assumed in "interhuman relationships" or "psychosocial situations." As such, M "determine external conduct directly and indirectly but always materially and, therefore, are accessible to direct observation in external motor behavior" (1979, p. 141). In support of his position, he cites research demonstrating that subjects who depict preponderantly passive, nonassertive human activity on the Rorschach are also likely to exhibit compliant interpersonal behavior, while the converse is true for subjects producing assertive M. In contrast

to Klopfer and others, then, Piotrowski argues that M responses predict overt interpersonal behavior.

This sampling of the literature makes it abundantly clear, to begin with, that in according object-relational meaning to human responses Blatt and his associates are firmly grounded in Rorschach interpretive tradition. It is equally clear that there is hardly a consensus as regards the specific object-relational referents of the human response. In particular, investigators part company over the issue of whether such responses refer to overt interpersonal behavior, or less readily accessible, subjective, or intrapsychic aspects of one's relatedness to others.

This question is an instance of a larger issue, namely, whether Rorschach assessment aims at elucidating psychological structure and subjective experience, on the one hand, or generating statements about overt behavior, on the other (Ainsworth, 1966; Blatt, 1975; Weiner, 1972). The position taken in the present investigation is that the Rorschach is principally suited to the former task, and therefore that, with regard to object relations, the aim, as Urist (1981) puts it, is to assess "the internal basis for an individual's capacity to experience human relatedness" (1981, p. 821). In the terms of this discussion, Rorschach human responses reflect directly on the nature and quality of object representation, while the link between these responses and overt interpersonal behavior is less direct or immediate. This is not to say that the human response is entirely unrelated to interpersonal behavior.

Indeed, certain of the above cited studies indicate that such a relationship does obtain. The point is simply that, inasmuch as the Rorschach in essence provides a sample of cognitive and perceptual activity (Weiner, 1972), it seems most reasonable to assume that human responses express fantasies, attitudes, concepts, and perceptions. This position, as we shall see, is consistent with Blatt's in that the latter views the Concept of the Object Scale primarily as a means of assessing object representations.

The final issue that warrants some discussion pertains to the relationship between Human Movement responses in particular and certain aspects of cognitive functioning. Beginning with Rorschach himself, the Human Movement response has been regarded as multiply determined. Apart from its object-relational meanings, M has been related to capacity for delay, time sense or orientation, fantasy, creativity, and cognitive complexity and intelligence (Dana, 1968; Lerner, 1975; Mayman, 1977). With regard to cognitive functioning in particular, it is widely accepted that M is reduced where organic impairment is present (Mayman, 1977), and that the frequency of such responses is positively correlated with IQ (Dana, 1968; Exner, 1974). Thus, the research suggests that, especially where low intelligence or organic impairment figure into the picture, one must be cautious in attaching object-relational meaning to the quantity or quality of Human Movement responses appearing in a record.

More generally, inasmuch as the Rorschach calls for verbal descriptions or productions, verbal facility certainly conditions

the nature of the final response. In developing inferences about the quality of a subject's object relations on the basis of these verbal productions, one must, therefore, consider the impact of this factor. Here some cautionary comments offered by Urist (1981) are worth quoting. He writes that:

a consistently flat or hollow description of people would obviously mean something different coming from an individual with an IQ of 70 than from someone with an IQ of 100 or 130 . . . [one must determine] whether one is observing an interference in the capacity to experience other people or an interference in the capacity to describe that experience (1981, p. 831).

Review of the Research on the Concept of the Object Scale

Development of the scale. In an early study, Blatt and Ritzler (1974) examined the hypothesis that the pattern of ego-dysfunctions characteristic of schizophrenia bears a relationship to what they termed "boundary disturbances." While it was not the primary intent of this study to focus on the construct object representation, certain of its findings are relevant to an understanding of Blatt's subsequent efforts to investigate the "concept of the object" by means of an analysis of the human response on the Rorschach.

According to Blatt and Ritzler, the manifold disruptions in cognitive functioning that one observes in schizophrenia, as well as the difficulties the schizophrenic patient has in preserving identity in the context of interpersonal relations, may be understood as deriving from a basic failure in the development and maintenance of "boundary differentiations" (cf. Blatt & Wild, 1976). Basing

their conceptualization of boundaries on both developmental psychology and psychoanalytic theory, they stated that such differentiations

include the initial capacity to differentiate between independent objects including self-nonself and later to differentiate between the actual object and the mental representation and verbal signifier used to designate the object--a differentiation between inside and outside (Blatt & Ritzler, 1974, pp. 371-372).

The authors suggested that types and degrees of disturbance in the maintenance of such differentiations are reflected in certain traditional Rorschach scores. The contamination response reflects the most severe type of boundary disruption. In such a response discrete percepts are fused, reflecting an impairment in the capacity to maintain boundaries between independent objects. The confabulation response, in which an initially accurate percept is obscured or even lost as extensive and unrealistic personal elaborations and associations ensue, indicates difficulties in maintaining the distinction between reality and fantasy, or external perception and internal reaction to that perception. Finally, a less severe form of boundary disturbance is expressed in the fabulized combination response, in which, while retaining their separateness and not being extensively elaborated in highly personalized fashion, independent percepts are yet placed in some unrealistic or illogical relationship simply by virtue of spatial contiguity.

Blatt and Ritzler hypothesized that degree of boundary disturbance would be related to adequacy and quality of various cognitive functions, capacity for interpersonal relations, and

response to treatment. More broadly, they hypothesized that severity of psychopathology would be related to level of boundary articulation, with psychotic patients evidencing more extreme signs of disrupted boundaries. To test these hypotheses, they examined psychological test and clinical data previously collected on two groups of psychiatric patients, namely (1) the 217 patients studied by Rapaport and associates at the Menninger Foundation (Rapaport et al., 1946) and (2) 450 inpatients hospitalized at the Yale Psychiatric Institute. From the Menninger sample they derived five groups of ten patients each, with inclusion in a given group determined by level of boundary disturbance displayed on the Rorschach. The five groups were as follows: three groups of patients manifesting either (1) contamination, (2) confabulation, or (3) fabulized combination responses, as well as combined (4) contamination-confabulation and (5) confabulation-fabulized combination groups. To these five groups they added a sixth group which consisted of patients who produced no such boundary disturbance responses but who did present combination responses, that is, responses in which discrete images are appropriately and meaningfully integrated. The Yale group was similarly categorized.

Since this was an essentially archival study, the investigators were constrained in their selection of dependent variables by the nature of the available data. For the Menninger sample these data were as follows: clinical diagnoses, various Rorschach percentages, summary scores and ratios, and the results of the Wechsler-Bellvue,

Babcock and Object Sorting tests. For the Yale sample, the data were the Wechsler results, the various Rorschach scores, diagnoses, nurse summaries of patient behavior during the course of hospitalization, and discharge summaries. As the complete test protocols of the Yale patients were available, Blatt and Ritzler also analyzed human responses on the Rorschach with the aim of investigating the relationship between boundary disturbance and distortions of human representations.

Results were supportive of the investigators' hypotheses. Since our main interest is in the findings bearing on the issue of object representations and interpersonal relations, other findings will be only briefly summarized. Analysis of subtest patterns on the Wechsler, as well as performance on the Object Sorting test, revealed a significantly greater degree of cognitive impairment among patients in the contamination and contamination-confabulation groups. Similarly, patients with greater boundary disturbance evidenced more disrupted ego-functioning as attested by various Rorschach measures, e.g., diminished F% and F+%, lower P%, and M:C ratios with lopsided emphasis on color. In the Yale group, patients with relatively intact boundaries were almost without exception judged to be improved at discharge, while this was not the case for patients with more disrupted boundaries. Generally, patients displaying less differentiated boundaries were significantly more likely to be clinically diagnosed as psychotic.

Turning now to the data pertaining to object representations and interpersonal relations, Blatt and Ritzler (1974) organized

the Rorschach human responses of the 50 Yale patients in the following manner. Responses were scored as intact or disrupted. The former group was restricted to accurately perceived human responses (M+,H+, Hd+). Responses were considered disrupted either by virtue of being inaccurate (M-,H-, Hd-), or because they were "distorted." While the authors did not explicitly define a distorted response, it would appear that they were referring to responses that (1) are less than fully human or quasi-human ("devil," "man from outer space"); or (2) blend or fuse animal and human characteristics ("a fish playing bingo"); or (3) blend human and inanimate features ("Pinnochio," "bust of George Washington"). It was expected that these distorted responses would occur most frequently among patients at the more pathological end of the boundary disturbance continuum.

Blatt and Ritzler found that, while there was no significant difference between groups on the mean number of intact human responses, patients with greater boundary disturbance showed a higher number of disrupted responses. Further analysis disclosed that these patients tended to produce distorted human responses, particularly human-inanimate blends. It was also found that the more disturbed patients were less likely to be affectively engaged with others on the ward, and tended to have longer hospitalizations with less successful outcomes. Summarizing their various findings, the authors stated:

The groups with greater boundary disturbance also had less involvement in the hospital, were significantly less responsive to therapeutic intervention, and had more disrupted representations of human figures. It seems consistent that groups with more distorted human

representations should also be less responsive to the therapeutic process and less involved with other patients and hospital staff. Impairment in the representation of objects seems to reflect important limitations of the capacity to establish meaningful object relations (Blatz & Ritzler, 1974, p. 379).

Blatt and Ritzler thus inferred that the distorted human responses produced by these severely disturbed patients reflected an impaired capacity to internally represent others, and that this impairment, in turn, underlay their manifest difficulties in interpersonal relations. Blatt has stated elsewhere (Blatt & Lerner, 1983b) that the findings of this study stimulated the systematic scrutiny of the Rorschach human response which eventuated in the Concept of the Object Scale. That is, these findings, in conjunction with the already existing and substantial body of research, clinical, and theoretical literature, suggested that "the human response on the Rorschach is a valuable way of assessing an individual's concept of the object" (Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, & Glick, 1976b, p. 365). To avoid confusion, it should be noted here that Blatt generally uses the terms "concept of the object" and "object representation" interchangeably, and that, broadly speaking, he is referring to the constituent elements of the "representational world" (Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962) or "internal object world" (Fairbairn, 1952) which structures and organizes one's experience of self and others.

The Developmental Analysis of the Concept of the Object Scale (Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, & Glick, 1976a; the scale is reproduced in Appendix A), calls for a systematic analysis of Rorschach responses

with human content. Its focus is directed to the structural or formal properties of the response. In contrast to other measures of object representation, Blatt and his colleagues chose to deemphasize content or theme, their rationale being, in part, that structural dimensions "are less vulnerable to conscious distortion and the impact of the situational context" (Blatt & Lerner, 1983b, p. 212). Beyond this, the scale represents an attempt to apply Werner's (1948) developmental principles of differentiation, articulation, and integration to the analysis of the human response. Accordingly, it was constructed so as to register such formal dimensions of the response as its complexity, richness, definition, accuracy, cohesiveness, and the degree to which it is integrated into a meaningful context.

The scale requires that one score all human responses as either perceptually accurate ($F+$ or $F\pm$) or inaccurate ($F-$ or $F\bar{+}$) using the Rapaport form level system. Responses are then scored in terms of the categories of differentiation, articulation, and integration.

Differentiation is defined as the nature or type of human response. Thus, a response may be (1) whole and clearly human or H ("a man"); (2) whole but quasi-human or (H) ("a martian"); (3) part of a human figure or Hd ("a foot"); or (4) part of a quasi-human figure or (Hd) ("angel's wing").

Articulation, defined as the degree to which the human figure is elaborated by detailing various of its attributes, is categorized according to whether functional (sex, age, role, specific identity)

or perceptual (size, clothing, physical structure, posture, hairstyle) details are specified. Responses may range from those which are unidimensional and inarticulated ("a man, there are his feet and hands"), to those which are rich and multidimensional ("Charles DeGaulle, attired in a cloak and kepi. He seems so huge, looming over the crowd").

Integration, a more complex category, refers to the manner in which the figure is integrated into a context of action as well as interaction with others. A response receives a score in this category only if it involves a figure engaged in human activity, that is, integration scorings may only be assigned to Human Movement responses. The category is divided into four subcategories: (1) the type of motivation of action described (intentional, reactive, or unmotivated); (2) the quality and degree of integration between object and action (fused, incongruent, nonspecific, and congruent); (3) the nature of the interaction with others (active-passive, active-reactive, or active-active); and (4) the content of the interaction between figures (malevolent or benevolent). This category directs attention to such issues as whether the human figure portrayed is engaged in solitary activity or mutual and reciprocal interaction with others, whether such interactions have a negative or positive valence, or whether the activity is appropriate to the figure described. It thus allows for a detailed analysis of Human Movement responses.

Each of the three categories of the response is viewed as lying on a developmental continuum, with the various subcategories

representing points on the continuum. By assigning numerical weights to each subcategory a developmental index based on a weighted sum can be computed for each overall category (Blatt & Berman, 1984; see Appendix B). For example, the full human response reflects the most developed level of differentiation. Accordingly, such a response receives the highest weight, followed, respectively, by full quasi-human, human detail, and quasi-human detail, responses.

The data which the scale yields may be summarized in a number of ways. At the finest level of analysis, one can simply tabulate frequencies for the constituent types of response (e.g., H, perceptual articulation, etc.) on both accurate and inaccurate responses. A less sensitive method of summarizing the data is to compute developmental indices, based on the system of weights described above, for the categories of differentiation and articulation as well as the four subcategories comprising the integration category. Such indices can be computed for both accurate and inaccurate responses, leaving one with 12 summary scores. At the next level of analysis, one can use overall developmental indices for the differentiation, articulation, and integration categories on both accurate and inaccurate responses--a total of six summary scores. Another method is to simply obtain two overall developmental indices, one for accurate and the other for inaccurate responses. Finally, at the most global level, one overall developmental index is computed for all responses, without regard for response accuracy. For clinical purposes, of course, one can employ the scale in a more qualitative

manner, attending to dimensions of the response which are less readily amenable to quantification (Blatt & Lerner, 1983a; Lerner, 1983).

Studies utilizing the scale. Using this scale, Blatt et al. (1976b) conducted several studies by way of investigating both the development of the concept of the object and its impairment in psychopathology. In the first study, the investigators analyzed the Rorschach protocols of 37 normal subjects who had been tested at four different junctures over a 20-year period. Their expectation was that, developmentally, one would observe increasing levels of differentiation, articulation, and integration.

Although numbers were not reported, inaccurately perceived human responses were infrequent among these normal subjects. With respect to differentiation on accurately perceived responses, there was a significant increase with age in the quantity of full human responses. There was also an increase in the elaboration of both perceptual and functional characteristics of the human figures. In terms of integration, there was an increase in the degree to which action was fully integrated and congruent with the object, and a decline in the number of responses without activity. There was also an increased number of interactions described as benevolent.

In the second study, the investigators re-analyzed the Rorschach protocols of the Yale sample used in the above-described study of boundary disturbance (Blatt & Ritzler, 1974). The human responses of the five groups of patients were compared to determine whether there was a relationship between the quality of such responses and severity

of boundary disturbance. Given that in this sample there was a large number of inaccurately perceived human responses, separate analyses were conducted for accurate and inaccurate responses.

There were no differences between groups so far as the accurately perceived responses were concerned. The more seriously disturbed patients, however, produced more inaccurately perceived responses, and showed a greater degree of functional articulation on such responses than did the less disturbed patients. The action of the inaccurately perceived human figures was also more frequently unmotivated and nonspecific, and interactions were more often accorded a clear emotional valence (either malevolent or benevolent) as well as tending to be of an active-passive or active-reactive nature. By and large, then, in the articulation and integration categories, the more severely disturbed patients tended to obtain higher developmental levels on these inaccurately perceived responses.

In the final study, the investigators compared the responses of the normal subjects at age 17-18 with the responses of the psychiatric inpatients. Comparisons of the response means for the various subcategories revealed that, in terms of differentiation, patients produced more inaccurate full human responses. Patients had more responses with specification of perceptual detail than did normals on both accurate and inaccurate responses, and more functional articulation on inaccurately perceived responses. Within the area of integration, patients' inaccurate responses were more often inert, and both accurately and inaccurately perceived human

figures were more frequently seen in unmotivated activity. There were many incongruent actions on accurate responses, while developmentally higher nonspecific actions were more often produced by patients on both accurate and inaccurate responses. Patients' portrayals of interactions between figures tended to be malevolent and of an active-passive nature on accurately perceived responses, which interactions on the inaccurately perceived responses tended to be benevolent and active-reactive.

Summarizing their findings, the authors stated that

patients consistently gave a significantly greater number of human responses at lower developmental levels (e.g., quasi-human, distorted, unmotivated, incongruent, non-specific, malevolent, and passive) than did normals on accurately perceived responses and a significantly greater number of developmentally more advanced human responses (e.g., full human, functionally articulated, benevolent, and reactive) than did normals on inaccurately perceived responses (p. 370).

This general pattern held when developmental indices were computed for each subject. Thus, the average developmental level of the normal subjects on accurate responses was higher than that of the patients in the categories of differentiation, integration of object and action, and both nature and content of the interaction, while the difference between the two groups was reversed on the inaccurate responses.

In addition to the predicted findings of an increase in higher level human responses from preadolescence to adulthood, and the greater frequency of impaired responses among the more seriously

disturbed patients, Blatt et al. found, then, that patients' most developmentally advanced percepts occurred on their inaccurate responses. Examination of these responses revealed that the content was almost invariably positively toned, grandiose, mythical, such as images of Napoleon, a fairy princess, or a knight. These rich, well-organized images, which seemed internally determined and elaborated with little regard for external reality, stood in marked contrast to the more unidimensional, less well organized, and predominantly malevolently-toned accurate percepts. As a possible explanation of this finding, the investigators suggested that when the severely disturbed patient maintains contact with conventional reality, he "functions at a developmentally lower level and perceives and experiences the world as distorted, malevolent, and destructive" (p. 371). By contrast, when absorbed in his essentially autistic constructions or fantasies, he is able to function at a more organized level and experiences the world as benevolent.

Although the patient sample for this study does not appear to have been constituted exclusively by clinically psychotic or schizophrenic patients (Blatt & Ritzler, 1974), in the discussion section of their paper the authors began, for the first time, to refer to the "psychotic" rather than the "seriously disturbed" patient. There is, in other words, some ambiguity about the type of patient or diagnostic category to which the authors' findings apply. In any case, in a subsequent paper Blatt, Schimek, and Brenneis (1980) elaborated further on the implications of these

findings for understanding the psychotic experience in particular. They stated that the data indicated that psychosis entails an experience of consensual reality as chaotic, barren, and destructive. In the face of this experience, the psychotic patient withdraws into a private, unrealistic fantasy world. He immerses himself in "idyllic" fantasies, fantasies which are, however, well-structured, highly articulated, integrated and stable. He thereby discovers the comfort, peace, ardor, and predictability so lacking in his experience of reality.

Ritzler, Zambianco, Harder, and Kashey (1980) sought to replicate and further explore this conclusion that psychotics manifest a distinctive impairment in the concept of the object on the Rorschach. Specifically, their intent was to determine whether all psychotics would display the type of impaired capacity for object representation demonstrated by Blatt independent of specific diagnostic subtype or level of premorbid adaptation. Accordingly, they designed a study which allowed not only for comparisons between psychotics and nonpsychotics, but also between schizophrenic and nonschizophrenic psychotics, paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics, and psychotics with good or poor premorbid adjustment.

Subjects for the study were drawn from a group of 18-55 year old psychiatric inpatients. Eighty-five patients were diagnosed according to the criteria of the DSM-III, with the following diagnostic categories being used: paranoid schizophrenia, nonparanoid schizophrenia, affective psychosis, and nonpsychotic disorder.

Subjects were required to meet minimal intelligence inclusion criteria, and those patients diagnosed as psychotic were administered the Phillips Premorbid Adjustment Scale (Phillips, 1953).

The comparative analysis of the human responses of the psychotics (n=67) and nonpsychotics (n=18) yielded results which essentially replicated the major findings of Blatt et al. (1976b). Ritzler et al. (1980) found that psychotics demonstrated higher developmental levels of differentiation on inaccurate responses than the nonpsychotics, although the differences were not so pronounced as in the Blatt study. Consistent with the Blatt findings, psychotics in this study also manifested higher levels of articulation and integration on their inaccurate responses. Of particular note is the fact that findings with respect to the emotional tone of the interaction depicted exactly replicated those of the Blatt study. Thus, psychotics showed "a greater number of malevolent interactions on accurately perceived responses and a greater number of benevolent interactions on inaccurately perceived responses" (1980, p. 52).

With regard to other comparisons between diagnostic groups, it was found that, while nonschizophrenic (depressive or manic-depressive) psychotics displayed less advanced developmental levels on inaccurate responses than their schizophrenic counterparts, their inaccurate responses were more elaborated and organized than those of the nonpsychotic subjects. Thus, as a group the psychotic patients in this study manifested the "psychotic concept of the object"

illuminated by Blatt et al. (1976b), although there was a quantitative difference in this regard between psychotic subtypes. Finally, the only clear difference between paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics was that the latter gave more inaccurately perceived human responses.

Turning now to the results of the comparison between good premorbid and poor premorbid psychotics, a word is first in order about the means by which this distinction was made. As mentioned above, the scale which the investigators used in determining whether premorbid social adjustment was more or less satisfactory was the Phillips Premorbid Adjustment Scale (Phillips, 1953). Developed as a method for assessing prognosis among psychotic patients, the scale roughly quantifies premorbid capacity for interpersonal relatedness along five interrelated dimensions: (1) recent sexual adjustment; (2) social aspects of sexual life in adolescence and immediately beyond; (3) social aspects of recent sexual life; (4) history of personal relations; and (5) recent premorbid adjustment in personal relations. The scale looks at whether the patient has been stably involved in a heterosexual relationship, or has displayed no interest in such relationships; whether attachments to others have been enduring or transient; degree of gregariousness or social isolation, and so forth. Numerical values are assigned according to the patient's position on these various continua, with 0 representing the highest level of adjustment and 6 the lowest within a given category. The scale was constructed such that a value of

3 in any category discriminated between psychotics with good and poor prognoses.

Subjects in the Ritzler study were rated as having a poor premorbid history if their total score was 16 or greater. Using this as the cutoff, 30 of the psychotic patients were categorized as having a good social history, while 37 were judged as having a poor social history. As no further details about the two groups were reported, one does not know how extreme the differences were with respect to quality of premorbid social functioning. In any event, the results of the comparative analysis were, as the authors put it, "meager," with the data merely suggestive of a trend among good premorbids to perceive more intentional action and more congruent object-action integration. The findings, then, did not point to a clear relationship between prepsychotic social adaptation and the level of object representation as assessed by the Blatt scale.

Spear (1978; see also Spear, 1980) extended the scope of these studies in an exploration of differences in capacity for object representation between "three distinct clinical diagnostic categories within the broad spectrum of borderline and schizophrenic disorders" (1978, p. 7). The diagnostic categories selected for investigation were obsessive/paranoid and hysterical/impulsive personality disorders, and nonparanoid/undifferentiated schizophrenic disorder. The obsessive/paranoid category subsumed more traditional diagnoses such as paranoid or narcissistic personality; subjects characterized by affective and cognitive constriction, hyperalertness, rigidity

and independence were included in this group. Inclusion in the hysterical/impulsive borderline category was determined by the presence of such features as intense emotionality, impulsivity, and dependence on others. The nonparanoid/undifferentiated schizophrenic group, finally, displayed the type of gross personality distortion, withdrawal, and cognitive disarray characteristic of hebephrenic, simple or disorganized schizophrenia. Suggesting that object representations possess structural/formal and affective/thematic dimensions, and that an examination of both of these components has important diagnostic and therapeutic implications, Spear applied Blatt's structural and Krohn's (Krohn & Mayman, 1974) content-oriented object representation scales to Rorschach and dream protocols of subjects in these diagnostic categories.

Subjects for the study were 55 inpatients from a long-term psychiatric hospital, all products of upper middle- to upper-class economic backgrounds. Based on the diagnostic criteria Spear had specified, raters categorized the subjects as obsessive/paranoid, hysterical/impulsive, or nonparanoid/undifferentiated schizophrenic. Each Rorschach human response was assigned a summary score for overall developmental level, and a mean score for each subject was obtained. Comparisons between diagnostic groups were on the basis of group means. Unlike the above-described studies (Blatt et al., 1976b; Ritzler et al., 1980), Spear neither computed separate scores for accurate and inaccurate human responses, nor developmental indices for the major scoring categories.

Spear predicted that, in view of his highly differentiated and "objective" manner of perceiving and relating to the world, the obsessive/paranoid would demonstrate more elevated scores on an essentially structural/formal measure such as the Blatt scale than the cognitively diffuse, over-affective hysteric/impulsive borderline. He expected, moreover, that the undifferentiated schizophrenic would score lowest on this measure. Comparing group means on overall developmental level he found that there was no significant difference between the two borderline groups. In fact, while the difference was statistically non-significant, the hysterical/impulsive group mean was actually higher than that of the obsessive/paranoids. As expected, the schizophrenics scored significantly lower than both of the borderline groups. Thus, the Blatt scale applied to Rorschach data was able to differentiate between nonparanoid schizophrenics and borderlines, but not between borderline subtypes.

Before leaving this study, some further comments are in order concerning Spear's rationale for predicting that obsessive/paranoid borderlines would attain the highest scores on the Blatt scale. Spear described such a patient as one who "presents a cognitively controlled and differentiated view of his relations with others, but has a very limited capacity for affective experience or expression" (1978, p. 62). He hypothesized that, consistent with this mode of experiencing others, the human responses of the obsessive/paranoid would be distinguished by a comparatively more

pronounced emphasis on formal, structural elements; hence, a higher overall developmental score would be expected. In other words, Spear seems to have assumed that an elevated summary score would reflect a characteristic manner of construing and relating to others, namely, a "cognitive" rather than an "affective" mode. More broadly, he viewed the score as related to "style" of psychological functioning à la Shapiro (1965). In any case, and as noted above, the results did not confirm Spear's hypothesis in that the hysterical/impulsive group--patients who experience "a broad and often-times overwhelming range of emotional responses in interpersonal transactions but display a weak structural capacity to modulate [this] experience" (p. 62)--actually obtained a higher, albeit statistically nonsignificant, mean on the Blatt scale.

Lerner and St. Peter (1984a; see also 1984b) included two outpatient comparison groups in their investigation of patterns of object representation among neurotics, borderlines, and schizophrenics. Their expectation was that neurotics would exhibit developmentally more advanced object representations on the Rorschach than either borderlines or schizophrenics, with the latter group manifesting most severe impairment in the concept of the object. In addition to testing this hypothesis, the investigators sought to clarify the boundaries of the borderline domain by examining object representational differences between borderline subtypes (inpatients and outpatients).

Subjects in this study were patients whose Rorschachs had been obtained for two previous investigations of defensive structure (Lerner & Lerner, 1980; Lerner, Sugarman, & Gaughran, 1981). The neurotic and outpatient borderline samples were drawn from a private clinic population (Lerner & Lerner, 1980). Clinical, i.e., non-test, psychoanalytically-based diagnoses were used in forming the neurotic and outpatient borderline groups, although the authors did not report specific diagnostic criteria. The inpatient borderline and schizophrenic subjects were derived from a population of adolescent and young adult patients who had been hospitalized at the Yale Psychiatric Institute (Lerner, Sugarman, & Gaughran, 1981). Patients were predominantly white, middle- to upper-class. The schizophrenic group was selected according to Spitzer's Research Diagnostic Criteria, while the borderline sample was selected using DSM-III criteria. Patients who met DSM-III criteria for either schizotypal or borderline personality disorders were included in the borderline group as both disorders seem to actually fall within the borderline domain.

Developmental indices were computed for the differentiation, articulation and integration categories on both accurate and inaccurate responses, and mean frequencies were calculated for each of the four diagnostic groups. Comparisons between groups were performed as follows: (1) neurotics versus schizophrenics, (2) outpatient borderlines versus schizophrenics, (3) inpatient borderlines versus schizophrenics, (4) outpatient borderlines versus inpatient borderlines, (5) neurotics versus inpatient borderlines, and (6) neurotics versus outpatient borderlines.

Lerner and St. Peter found that, overall, schizophrenics produced fewer human responses, both accurate and inaccurate, than any of the other groups. They interpreted this finding as consistent with the Freudian view of schizophrenia as an essentially narcissistic disorder involving withdrawal from the object world and intense self-absorption. Inspection of the perceptually accurate responses revealed that schizophrenic patients also displayed the lowest developmental levels for differentiation, articulation, and integration. Differences in this regard were most pronounced between schizophrenics and neurotics, and least between schizophrenics and inpatient borderlines. The most significant difference between outpatient borderlines and neurotics, diagnostic groups which are not always distinguishable, was that the neurotics produced more accurate, fully human figures (H & Hd). In general, then, analysis of the accurate responses demonstrated, as expected, a clear relationship between quantity and quality of such responses and severity of psychopathology.

On inaccurate responses inpatient borderlines evidenced the highest developmental levels, followed by schizophrenics, outpatient borderlines, and neurotics, respectively. This finding stands in contrast to the results obtained by both Blatt et al. (1976b) and Ritzler et al. (1980) to the effect that schizophrenics--more broadly, psychotics--are distinguished by higher developmental levels on inaccurate responses. Lerner and St. Peter were led to conclude, then, that "high developmental levels for inaccurate responses typify

severe borderline, as opposed to psychotic, psychopathology" (1984a, p. 89).

The investigators found, in addition, that the inpatient borderlines were almost without exception the only patients to portray inaccurately perceived human interaction as malevolent. Indeed, by comparison with the schizophrenics, inpatient borderlines produced significantly more malevolent content on both accurate and inaccurate responses. Lerner and St. Peter suggested that this preponderance of malevolent interactions may reflect a crucial difference between these two diagnostic groups. That is, unlike schizophrenics, inpatient borderlines seem unable to

withdraw from a reality experience of danger and malevolency into an unrealistic, idyllic fantasy world of benevolent objects . . . even when absorbed in unrealistic, regressive fantasy elaboration they are unable to distance or withdraw from bad objects. This finding offers additional empirical support to findings suggested by several authors [which] clearly illustrate the enormous difficulty these patients experience in managing aggression within interpersonal relationships (Lerner & St. Peter, 1984a, p. 89).

As noted above, one of the authors' principal aims was to illuminate characteristics that distinguish between inpatient and outpatient borderlines. When these two groups were compared it emerged that a key discriminating feature of the outpatient borderlines was their tendency to perceive accurate quasi-human responses, while inpatient borderlines characteristically produced higher levels of differentiation and articulation, as well as more malevolent content, on inaccurate responses. Lerner and St. Peter

interpreted these findings as indicative of a greater ability among outpatient borderlines to maintain reality contact by defensively distorting, and intrapsychically distancing themselves from, their objects; hence, the quasi-human figures which were yet perceptually accurate and benevolent. Inpatient borderlines, in contrast, seem unable to take recourse to such defensive distancing, as a result of which their reality testing falters, and they are exposed to the aforementioned malevolent constructions of others.

Like Spear (1978) and Ritzler et al. (1980), Johnson (1980) examined the relationship between paranoid pathology and object representation. He hypothesized that, by comparison with nonparanoid schizophrenics, paranoid schizophrenics would manifest more developmentally advanced object representations (or as he preferred to put it, "self-other representations"). Specifically, he proposed that the representations of paranoid schizophrenics would be characterized by (1) higher levels of internal organization, i.e., complexity, articulation, and integration, (2) more clearly, even rigidly, demarcated boundaries, and (3) reduced manifestations of malevolent, drive-dominated, quasi-human content. In accordance with his developmental perspective, he suggested, further, that normals would display even higher levels on these structural and content dimensions.

The normal subjects for the study were volunteers from an undergraduate psychology course. The schizophrenic sample, which was drawn from a long-term inpatient unit, was subdivided into three

groups, namely, paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics, and an "intermediate" group constituted by patients manifesting paranoid pathology but not of sufficient severity to warrant a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. These diagnostic distinctions were made by applying a symptom checklist to detailed case history data. Intelligence estimates for both schizophrenic and normal subjects were obtained by using the combined scores of the Information and Similarities subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Johnson examined other characteristics of the two groups as well, including, for the schizophrenics, premorbid adjustment as measured by the Phillips Scale (Phillips, 1953).

Self-other representations were assessed by means of the Rorschach and a role playing test devised by the author. The latter test, which Johnson viewed as a projective measure, has two parts. In Role Test 1 the subject is required to enact five pre-selected social roles, while in Role Test 2 the task is to "enact a scene between three beings." The first test therefore is more structured, with no explicit demand that interpersonal or interactional situations be portrayed. While less structured, Role Test 2 requires that one depict various characters in relation to one another. Johnson suggested that a careful analysis of an individual's behavior in these "improvisational role-playing situations" might be an especially fruitful means of assessing self-other representations. He reasoned that since the test

requires the enactment of characters in interpersonal situations, it elicits these representations directly . . . and . . . because it involves physicalization as well as verbal behavior, information not included in other measures (e.g., Rorschach) is made available (1980, p. 21).

The design of this study allowed, then, for observing the relationship between two independent measures of object representation.

Rorschach and Role Playing Test protocols of the normal and schizophrenic subjects were scored using several scales thought to register the variables of interest, i.e., internal organization, intactness of boundaries, and content of object representations. These scales included certain categories of the Blatt scale (accuracy of the response, integration, articulation, and some of the differentiation scores), which were used as indices of internal organization and content of the representations. These various measures were applied to the Rorschach data, while comparable categories were devised for application to the Role Playing Test data.

Johnson found that there were no differences across groups with respect to the total number of human responses on the Rorschach. Similarly, Rorschach indices of integration failed to discriminate between the two groups. The interaction subcategory of integration did, however, correlate positively with premorbid adjustment as assessed by the Phillips scale. Articulation measures only partially succeeded in differentiating between groups and, contrary to expectation, paranoid schizophrenics evidenced the lowest

developmental levels in this category. Finally, and unexpectedly, normals produced more quasi-human responses than did patients. Overall, at least with respect to Rorschach indices of internal organization and content of self-other representations, the predicted developmental progression from nonparanoid schizophrenics to normals did not emerge.

Since Johnson's study employed two projective techniques for eliciting self-other representations, it is of interest to compare results on these measures. It was found that only among normals were there significant correlations involving the category of integration. Specifically, the perception of accurate human forms on the Rorschach correlated with "Role Accuracy" on the Role Playing Test, and perception of congruent object/action integration on the Rorschach correlated with the corresponding category on the role playing tasks.

With respect to articulation, there was a moderate degree of correlation for the schizophrenics. Finally, content measures were completely unrelated. It seems fair to conclude, then, that the study demonstrated only minimal across-test consistency in the internal organization and content of object representations.

In an investigation of response to object loss among adolescent and young adult psychiatric inpatients, Fibel (1979) explored the hypothesis that "one's predominating level of object representation mediates the relationship between loss and separation and the developmental stage of the reaction to it" (p. 5). She conceptualized

the "management of distress" provoked by object loss along a developmental continuum, and specified seven distinct stages in the capacity to bear loss. Each of the various stages or levels on this continuum is distinguished by a characteristic definition of the absent object as well as specific behavioral, cognitive, affective, and defensive features. Accordingly, less advanced stages of distress management entail an image of the object as essentially need-gratifying and interchangeable with other objects; affective reactions of rage and helplessness ensue when it is unavailable. By contrast, at more advanced stages the object is perceived as constant, unique, and a source of love and approval; its loss is reacted to with guilt or sadness. Similarly, as development proceeds the handling of distress through denial and action is supplanted by more ideational maneuvers and defenses. Fibel hypothesized that there would be a significant positive relationship between mode of distress management thus defined and level of object representation as measured by the Blatt scale.

Subjects for this study were 32 inpatients undergoing treatment at the Yale Psychiatric Institute. Rorschach protocols were scored on the categories of differentiation articulation, and integration, but without regard to the dimension of form level. Stage of distress management was assessed by using both self-report and observational data, the latter gleaned from nursing progress notes. The assessments were conducted by raters who applied a "Distress Management Scale" based on Fibel's developmental model to these two sets of data.

Findings pertaining to the relationship between both self-reported and observed stage of distress management and level of Rorschach object representation generally confirmed Fibel's expectations. Subjects judged to handle object loss at more advanced stages also displayed higher levels of object representation. Correlations were obtained for each of the three categories of the Blatt measure (differentiation, articulation, integration), with differentiation consistently showing the strongest, most significant relationship to level of distress management. Thus, a preponderance of Rorschach human responses tending to be whole and fully human best discriminated between those subjects rated high on capacity to weather object loss and those rated low.

While it was not her explicit aim to investigate the relationship between independently assessed quality of object relations and level of object representation as registered on the Blatt scale, Fibel's study is germane to this issue. Inasmuch as level of distress management was partially defined by reference to an object-relational dimension, her findings suggest that there is a positive correlation between stage of object relations--inferred from both self-report and observational data--and the level of Rorschach object representation. Thus, subjects whose object relations were principally organized around the gratification of need, and who lacked a stable and enduring sense of the other, tended to display a less advanced level of object representation. Conversely, individuals whose relationships were of a "whole-object" nature,

that is, who experienced the other as noninterchangeable and possessing constancy and existence independent of one's need, tended to show a higher level of object representation.

In a 1984 study, Blatt, Berman, Bloom-Feshback, Sugarman, Wilber, and Kleber sought to illuminate the nature and degree of pathology associated with opiate addiction. The experimental group was constituted by 99 opiate addicted individuals seeking treatment at a drug dependence unit. Subjects were predominantly single, white males from lower economic backgrounds. The Rorschach was administered to 76 of the subjects in this group, and the Blatt scale as well as several other measures were applied to the protocols. There were two comparison groups on the Rorschach measures: 29 CETA applicants matched as a group with the opiate addicts, and "24 seriously disturbed young adult borderline and psychotic patients recently admitted to an open, long-term residential treatment facility" (p. 160). Two summary scores for the Concept of the Object Scale were employed in this study, namely, the developmental level of accurately perceived responses and the developmental level of inaccurately perceived responses. The former score was interpreted as "indicating the capacity for investment in satisfactory interpersonal relationships," while the latter was seen as "an indication of the tendency to become invested in autistic fantasies rather than realistic relationships" (1984, p. 160).

There were no significant differences on the object representation variable between the addicts and the CETA applicants. However,

while differences were nonsignificant between the addicts and psychiatric inpatients on the developmental level of inaccurately perceived human responses, the addicts did manifest a significantly lower level on accurate responses than did the patients. Blatt et al.'s interpretation of this finding was that, by comparison with borderline and psychotic patients, opiate addicts "have significantly greater impairment in their capacity to establish meaningful and satisfactory interpersonal relationships" (p. 161). The authors concluded that, blocked in their ability to derive gratification from interpersonal relationships, these addicts "have selected an isolated mode for achieving the satisfactions and pleasures most people seek in intimate personal relationships" (p. 163).

In a Rorschach investigation of various dimensions of the psychological functioning of anorectic patients, Sugarman, Quinlan, and Devenis (1982) also used the Blatt scale to assess quality of object representation. Twelve anorectic inpatients, all females whose hospitalizations had been precipitated by the severe eating disturbance, were compared to 15 inpatients who did not suffer from anorexia nervosa. Like Spear (1978), the investigators used a summary score which did not distinguish between accurate and inaccurate human responses. When the two groups were compared with respect to overall developmental level of object representation no significant differences emerged. Accordingly, the authors tentatively concluded that "the essential issue for the anorectic is not one of representing human interactions" (1982, p. 459).

The final study to be reviewed (Schwager & Spear, 1981) employed a test-retest format by way of assessing patterns of personality change following long-term, psychoanalytically oriented treatment. Subjects for this study were eight hospitalized schizophrenics who, after a substantial period of intensive treatment, were clinically judged to have improved. Patients were divided equally between two distinct clinical groups, paranoid and nonparanoid-undifferentiated schizophrenics. Test protocols which had been obtained at admission and prior to discharge were analyzed using a number of measures, including the Blatt scale. As in Spear's earlier study (1978), a mean developmental score for each subject was computed. Pre- and post-treatment object representation means for each of the diagnostic groups were then compared.

The investigators found that, for the paranoid schizophrenics, the post-treatment mean was significantly lower than the pre-treatment mean. In other words, the overall developmental level of object representation for the paranoid group decreased substantially. By contrast, the data indicated a significant increase in level of object representation among the nonparanoid-undifferentiated schizophrenics.

While respective directions of change were precisely the opposite, Schwager and Spear interpreted the data as suggestive of positive changes for both groups. On the one hand, the decrease in level of "cognitive-structural differentiation" in the human percepts of the paranoid group was seen as consistent with a diminution in

the defensive "overdifferentiation" characteristic of such patients. That is, the shift, it was suggested, could be related to a reduction of paranoid construction and vigilance and, concomitantly, an "increased openness and flexibility about revealing previously hidden interpersonal conflict" (1981, p. 534). On the other hand, the increased levels of differentiation, articulation, and integration on the human responses of the nonparanoid-undifferentiated schizophrenics were seen as reflecting a newfound capacity for organized and realistic percepts of others. In effect, while the paranoids seemed to "loosen up" and undergo some measure of constructive regression or disorganization, the nonparanoids moved in the direction of higher levels of organization.

Summary and Critique of the Research

Taken as a whole, these studies indicate that the interscorer reliability of the Concept of the Object Scale is quite good, with agreement between raters generally above 80%. Because different investigators have not uniformly reported specific reliability estimates for the various scoring categories and subcategories, it is difficult to identify where scoring disagreements have most commonly arisen. Given its relative complexity, one would anticipate lower interscorer reliability on the integration category; most studies, however, have reported relatively high reliabilities for this category. Blatt et al. (1984a) found, for example, that the lowest reliability estimate for any scoring category was .86. Certain studies (Ritzler et al., 1980; Johnson, 1980) have reported

estimates of around .75 for the articulation category, but this too is not a consistent finding. Finally, and as one would expect, reliability for the differentiation category appears to be uniformly high, i.e., .90 or better.

Subjects have been predominantly late adolescent and young adult Caucasians. Blatt et al.'s longitudinal study (1976a) did include preadolescents, and some of Fibel's (1979) subjects were mid-adolescents. It appears that, generally speaking, males and females have been equally represented, although Sugarman et al.'s investigation (1982) involved only female subjects. Most subjects have been patients, with only three of the studies utilizing normal or non-patient samples (Blatt et al., 1976b, 1984; Johnson, 1980). Of the patients, moreover, the majority have been drawn from inpatient populations. Thus, every study reviewed had at least one inpatient comparison group, and five exclusively investigated inpatients. By contrast, not one study addressed itself solely to an outpatient population. One wonders, then, how successful the scale would be in discriminating between a range of outpatient groups. While Lerner and St. Peter (1984a) addressed this issue to some degree, it was not a major focus of their study.

Besides being generally restricted to inpatients, the research has relied heavily on one group of inpatients in particular, namely, those undergoing long-term treatment at the Yale Psychiatric Institute (YPI). It would appear that fully seven of the nine studies involved at least some YPI patients, with only Ritzler et al. (1980)

and perhaps Schwager and Spear (1981) conducting their research elsewhere. Most of the inpatients in these studies, in other words, have been products of the upper middle- to upper-socioeconomic classes, and hence presumably have had considerable advantage culturally and educationally. One suspects that, on the whole, they have also tended to be of above-average intelligence, an expectation confirmed to some degree by Johnson (1980), who estimated the mean IQ for his schizophrenic YPI subjects as 118.

One must have some reservations, then, about generalizations based on such a restricted subject sample. A more serious reservation might apply to studies that compared these YPI patients to subjects drawn from significantly different populations. Consider, for example, Blatt et al.'s study of opiate addicts (1984a). On the basis of their lower developmental levels on accurate responses, it was concluded that the opiate addicts manifested greater impairment in the capacity for intimate and meaningful interpersonal relations than did a group of borderline and psychotic inpatients. The opiate addicts were typically products of a lower socioeconomic milieu, and most had a high school education or less. The only information provided regarding the inpatients was that they had been "recently admitted to an open, long-term residential treatment facility." Although the investigators did not say as much, keeping in mind the pronounced reliance of the Blatt research group on subjects drawn from Yale Psychiatric Institute, one has to wonder if these inpatients were in fact YPI patients. If this was the

case, then in all likelihood Blatt's comparison groups were markedly dissimilar with respect to socioeconomic and cultural background, and, most importantly, intelligence. This, in turn, would throw the authors' conclusion in question, given the well-substantiated correlation between intelligence and both the frequency and adequacy of Human Movement responses on the Rorschach (Exner, 1974). The observed difference between groups on the Blatt scale, in other words, may have been due to an intelligence factor rather than, or in addition to, object-relational capacity.

Whether or not YPI patients were used in this particular study, the failure to explicitly allow for the potential confounding influence of intelligence constitutes a methodological shortcoming. Along these lines, Blatt et al.'s initial study with the scale (1976b) comparing normals and inpatients also neglected to report such demographic data. This has been less of an issue with the bulk of the other studies cited, for in most cases some effort has been made to insure comparability between groups, including comparability on the variable of intelligence.

Additionally, there has been considerable variability in the manner in which investigators have organized and summarized their data. To some degree, this makes comparisons between certain of the studies problematic. Blatt et al. (1976a) and Ritzler et al. (1980) reported group means for responses in the various scoring categories on both accurate and inaccurate responses; comparisons between groups were made on the basis of response frequencies for

each discrete category. While they too computed such mean frequencies for both accurate and inaccurate responses, Lerner and St. Peter (1984a) reported indices of developmental levels, based on the previously described system of weights, for differentiation, articulation and the four subcategories of the integration dimension. Their method of summarizing the data thus allows for comparison on discrete scores as well as developmental levels on each of the major scoring categories. Fibel's (1979) comparisons were made on the basis of developmental indices for each of the three main scoring categories; she did not develop separate scores for accurate and inaccurate responses. Finally, Spear (1978) and Sugarman et al. (1982) used only the overall developmental index, a less sensitive, global summary score which reflects neither differences between accurate and inaccurate responses, nor the respective contributions of the major scoring categories.

Not only have researchers not employed a uniform method for summarizing their data, but they have also assigned different, and not necessarily compatible, interpretations to summary scores obtained. In their research, Blatt and associates (1976b; 1984a) make it quite clear that the meaning of high developmental levels--and hence elevated summary scores--varies according to whether one is referring to accurate or inaccurate responses. The response accuracy dimension is of crucial interpretive importance since a high developmental level on accurate responses would reflect a capacity for mature and realistic object relatedness, while a similar

finding on inaccurate responses would indicate a distortion in this capacity (Blatt et al., 1984a). Yet Sugarman et al. (1982) ignored this distinction and concluded that, because their overall developmental index--an index, it should be stressed, computed on the basis of all human responses regardless of form level--was not significantly different from a control group, anorectic patients did not manifest any noteworthy disturbance in their ability to internally represent others. Thus, the logic of their interpretation is not consistent with the aforementioned interpretive principles articulated by Blatt and his associates.

Another difference in interpretation of scale findings begins to emerge if one compares the research of Spear (1978) and Schwager and Spear (1981), on the one hand, to that of Blatt et al. (1984a) on the other. Blatt clearly suggests that the scale tells one something about an individual's internal capacity to relate to others. That is, from this point of view, the scale addresses the "quality" of object-relational functioning in the sense of whether it is, roughly speaking, more or less "good" or "bad." Spear and Schwager, in contrast, seem to use the scale as a means of investigating mode, style, or manner of experiencing and relating to others. Here the focus is not so much whether one is disposed to more or less effective, meaningful, or appropriate relationships with others, but rather the distinctive "stylistic" characteristics of object relations independent of "quality" thus defined. Accordingly, Spear (1978) expected a higher developmental level

for obsessive/paranoid borderlines than for hysterical/impulsive borderlines not because the former were presumed to possess better capacity for relating to others than the latter--in fact, the literature would suggest that just the opposite is the case (Kernberg, 1975; Sugarman, 1979)--but because their style of representing others is decidedly more "cognitive." Similarly, Schwager and Spear (1981) could treat the post-treatment decline in the paranoid schizophrenic's overall developmental level as a positive sign of reduced defensive "overdifferentiation" rather than, more ominously, as an indicator of a deteriorating capacity to relate to others.

It would appear, then, that for Spear and Schwager elevated developmental level summary scores reflect the prominence of a type of cognitive-perceptual, more generally a characterological style (Shapiro, 1965), whereas for Blatt score elevations bear on the issue of internal capacity to relate to others. In other words, these respective investigators seem to entertain divergent assumptions about the principal intent of the Concept of the Object Scale, or what it is that the scale measures. If this distinction is valid, then Spear and Schwager emphasize the sensitivity of the scale to a general cognitive-perceptual rather than a specific object-relational factor. At the very least, their studies suggest that, inasmuch as high levels of cognitive-perceptual complexity may characterize the object representations of individuals with marked deficiencies in the capacity to relate to others, these two factors must be distinguished conceptually.

By far the majority of the studies cited have principally addressed themselves to the relationship between severity or type of psychopathology on the one hand, and the structure and content of the human response, on the other. That is, most investigators have selected level of pathology as the independent variable, with the quality of the human response as registered on the Blatt scale the dependent variable. Differences between diagnostic groups have then served as the basis for inferences about differential impairments in the capacity to internally represent others. Many of these investigations, further, have focused on patterns of object representation among hospitalized schizophrenics or psychotics in particular. Since this is the case, and because the findings on the "psychotic concept of the object" are especially interesting, some brief comments are in order.

Much has been made of the fact that the results of Blatt et al.'s initial study of the concept of the object in psychosis (1976b) were essentially replicated in a subsequent investigation (Ritzler et al., 1980). For example, Ritzler et al. stated:

Similar results were obtained by different investigators using comparable methods to assess similar subjects. This constitutes a replication seldom reported in studies of psychosis and projective techniques (1980, p. 53).

The findings, moreover, make good sense conceptually, are by and large consistent with psychoanalytic theories of schizophrenia, and have important implications for the psychotherapy of schizophrenia (Blatt et al., 1980). However, it will be recalled that Lerner

and St. Peter (1984a; see above, pp. 40-44) found that inpatient borderlines obtained significantly higher developmental levels on inaccurate responses than did psychotics. Hence, they concluded that highest developmental levels on inaccurate responses typified "severe borderline, as opposed to psychotic, psychopathology" (p. 87). What is one to make of these apparently contradictory findings?

In the first place, and as has been previously suggested, Blatt et al. (1976b) were not especially precise about specifying the diagnostic group to which their findings applied. In subsequent publications (Blatt et al., 1980; Blatt & Lerner, 1983b), in fact this patient group is variously referred to as "psychotic," "schizophrenic," or "schizophrenic and borderline." In other words, it looks as if Blatt included patients in the psychotic group that Lerner and St. Peter classified as "severe," i.e., inpatient, borderline. Ritzler et al., on the other hand, apparently had no borderline patients in their comparison groups.

Apart from this confusion created by a failure to clearly identify the patient population in question, comparison between these studies is complicated by the fact that the respective investigators did not use the same diagnostic criteria. Blatt's categorization of patients as more or less seriously disturbed was based on Rorschach indices of thought disorder or boundary disruption, while Ritzler used DSM-III criteria, and Lerner and St. Peter employed both DSM-III and Spitzer Research Diagnostic Criteria. It is not

immediately apparent, therefore, whether one is in fact "comparing apples and oranges." Indeed, in a paper detailing methodological pitfalls in Rorschach validity research, Blatt (1975) discussed just this kind of problem. It is suggested, then, that although promising, the findings pertaining to object representation among psychotic and borderline patients need further elaboration in studies which are especially attentive to issues of diagnostic criteria and the comparability of differently constituted diagnostic groups.

Turning, finally, to the relationship between the Blatt scale and independent assessments of object relations, certain of the findings of Fibel, Johnson, and Ritzler et al. are directly relevant; it remains now to make some closing comments on these results.

Fibel (1979) found that stages of distress management in reaction to object loss correlated positively with level of object representation as measured by the Blatt scale. Since her stages included an object-relational dimension, these findings lend some support to the contention that the scale is sensitive to actual differences in how one experiences and relates to others. However, it must be remembered that it was not Fibel's primary intention to assess level of object relations per se, and that her stages were defined by reference to a number of dimensions of psychological functioning. In other words, and insofar as these different dimensions can be clearly distinguished from one another, one does not know to what degree the observed correlation had to do, for example, with defensive or more broadly cognitive rather than specifically object representational factors.

Johnson's study (1980) revealed that, at least among normals, there was some relationship between the Blatt object representation measure and independent assessments of self-other experience derived from a role-playing task. In addition, he found a positive correlation between the Concept of the Object Scale integration category and premorbid social functioning among schizophrenics. Ritzler et al.'s study (1980), by contrast, failed to demonstrate any relationship between the Blatt object representation measure and quality of social or interpersonal functioning.

In summary, it is apparent that these primarily diagnosis-related studies lend considerable support of an indirect nature to the assertion that the Concept of the Object Scale taps level of object representation. The research demonstrates that the quality of the human response as measured by the scale is broadly consistent with diagnostic category. Inasmuch as one would expect the actual level of object representation to vary with severity of psychopathology or diagnostic category, then the assertion that the scale reflects level of object representation is supported by these studies. In addition, certain studies which employed independent measures of object representation or interpersonal functioning offer limited data more directly supportive of this claim.

However, the research heretofore has not taken as its primary focus the relationship between the Concept of the Object Scale and independent measures of object representation. In other words, this relationship has not been directly or systematically

investigated. Moreover, inspection of the research involving the scale discloses that it has been (1) largely restricted to inpatients, (2) often insufficiently attentive to the potential confounding influence of intelligence, and (3) inconsistent with respect to both the use and interpretation of summary scores. Although principally concerned with the relationship between the Concept of the Object Scale and other measure of object representation, the present study will also attempt to address these issues.

Statement of the Problem and Hypotheses

The Concept of the Object Scale developed by Blatt and associates offers a means of assessing certain aspects of object-relational functioning through a systematic analysis of the Rorschach human response. Specifically, the scale addresses itself to the construct "object representation," or, more broadly, the "representational world." Other investigators, employing different scales and techniques, have elucidated object representational capacity through the analysis of human responses as well as other Rorschach variables. However, the claim that the Concept of the Object Scale illuminates this dimension of psychological functioning requires further examination.

The principal intent of the present investigation, then, is to examine the relationship between quality or level of object representation as assessed by the Concept of the Object Scale and independent measures of object representation. If the scale is sensitive to level of object representation, then one would expect

that it would yield findings consistent with those derived from independent measures of the variable in question. In accordance with Blatt's recommendations, high developmental levels on human responses of good form quality will be treated as indicative of higher level object representation, while high developmental levels on human responses of poor form quality will be viewed as reflective of lower level object representation. Thus, the primary hypotheses of the study may be stated as follows:

1. Developmental level on accurately perceived human responses will be positively correlated with independent assessments of level of object representation.
2. Developmental level on inaccurately perceived human responses will be negatively correlated with independent assessments of level of object representation.

As a secondary aim, the study will explore certain usages of the scale which appear to deviate from its intent. As previously discussed, the scale has been treated by some investigators not as a means of evaluating level of object representation in the sense of internal capacity to relate to others, but, rather, solely as a measure of the cognitive-perceptual complexity and organization of object representations. It is implied, more generally, that the scale registers characteristic cognitive-perceptual style. Accordingly, from this point of view lower developmental levels on the scale reflect cognitive-perceptual diffuseness and fluidity, while higher developmental levels indicate a more complex and

articulated cognitive-perceptual style. Investigators applying the scale in this fashion compute an overall summary score for developmental level that ignores the form level distinction, and treat this score as an index of cognitive-perceptual complexity and articulation. Other researchers, finally, treat this identical summary score as an index of level of object representation.

It is not clear that either of these treatments of the overall summary score represents a valid application of the scale. Thus, the study's secondary hypotheses may be stated as follows:

3. If, as certain investigators assert, an overall summary score computed on the basis of both accurate and inaccurate responses reflects the cognitive-perceptual complexity of object representation, then this summary score should positively correlate with independent assessments of cognitive-perceptual complexity.
4. If, as other investigators assert, an overall summary score computed on the basis of both accurate and inaccurate responses reflects level of object representation, then this summary score should positively correlate with independent assessments of level of object representation.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects for the study were sought from outpatient clinical and nonclinical settings. It was hoped that by drawing from both patient and nonpatient populations individuals presenting severe to moderate degrees of object-relational impairment, as well as those evidencing more mature or healthy relatedness, would be included in the sample. The intent was to obtain 30 subjects, as this represents a sample comparable in size to those used in a number of studies with similar or identical measures and procedures (Fibel, 1979; Krohn & Mayman, 1974; Ryan & Bell, 1984; Sugarman, Quinlan, & Devenis, 1982). In contrast to previous research using the Blatt scale, no inpatient subjects were included in the study.

The clinical settings used were The University of Tennessee Psychological Clinic and the university-operated Student Counseling Services Center. The former, which offers low-cost psychological treatment to both students and nonstudents, is run by the Psychology Department and staffed by trainees in the department's doctoral program in clinical psychology. The primary treatment modality is long-term, psychodynamically-oriented psychotherapy. While including some psychotic patients, the population served is mainly constituted by individuals suffering from borderline and neurotic disorders. The Student Counseling Center, which provides an array

of clinical and counseling services for students at the university, emphasizes more time-limited treatment interventions. Moreover, it appears to serve a larger number of individuals suffering from transient, situational disturbances than does the clinic.

Nonpatient subjects were recruited from two upper-level undergraduate courses in the Psychology Department, namely, theories of personality and group processes. While most of the students enrolled in these courses were juniors or seniors, there were also a few graduate students from various programs. It should be noted here that these subjects are referred to as "nonpatient" inasmuch as they were not recruited in a clinical setting; no effort was made to screen them for psychopathology or "patienthood."

Procedures for obtaining a pool of prospective subjects were as follows: Announcements of the research project were posted in the waiting rooms of both the Psychological Clinic and the Counseling Center. The announcement described the study as pertaining to "the different ways people experience and relate to one another." It was explained that subjects would be required to take a number of psychological tests, and that a portion of the testing process would be recorded on videotape. Participation, for which subjects would be paid \$10.00, was restricted to individuals 18 years of age or older. An essentially identical announcement was made by the principal investigator to the two psychology classes. Interested individuals were instructed to leave their name and phone number with the clinic or center receptionist.

The principal investigator contacted respondents by phone and briefly elaborated the aims and requirements of the research project. An initial appointment was then scheduled.

Thirty-two subjects were evaluated between August and December, 1985, with 29 meeting the inclusion criterion (described below). Most of these subjects (20) were recruited through either the Psychological Clinic or the Counseling Center. The research sample, then, was largely derived from an outpatient clinical population. Demographic characteristics for the sample are presented in Table 1. Briefly, subjects tended to be unmarried, Caucasian females in their early to late twenties, who were of above average intelligence and had had several years of undergraduate education.

Design of the Study

The study, which was correlational in nature, called for analyses of the relationships between various summary scores derived from the Concept of the Object Scale and independent measures of both object representation and cognitive-perceptual organization. The independent measures of level of object representation were obtained by applying a scale developed by Ryan (Ryan & Bell, 1984) to Early Memories and Object Relations Technique data. Degree of cognitive-perceptual organization was measured by applying Becker's (1956) Genetic Level scoring system to Rorschach data. In addition, verbal intelligence was assessed using the Vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R). These various data bases and measures, as well as the specific scores on which analyses were conducted, will be described below.

TABLE 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

Demographic Characteristics	No. of Subjects
Gender	
Female	20
Male	9
Race	
Caucasian	28
Black	1
Age (in years)	
Mean	24.52
S.D.	4.28
Vocabulary Scaled Score	
Mean	12.06
S.D.	2.02
Marital Status	
Single	22
Married	4
Divorced	3
Educational Level	
Some graduate training	8
Some undergraduate training	20
High school graduate	1
Mean number of years post high school education	3.24
S.D.	1.59

Procedure

During the initial appointment with the principal investigator, subjects were given an opportunity to ask questions about the research. Each subject read and signed a consent form (Appendices F and G) which consisted of a description of the study and the nature of the subject's participation. The consent form emphasized that the research was in no way related to the psychological services subjects might be receiving (in the case of patients) or a subject's coursework (in the case of students). Subjects were informed of their right to discontinue participation at any point without deleterious effect on either treatment or class standing. Interested subjects were told that they would be provided with a brief description of the findings of the study (Appendix H).

The principal investigator then administered the Vocabulary subtest of the WAIS-R, the Object Relations Technique, and the Early Memories Test, in that order. Following the administration of these procedures, which typically took one and one-half to two hours, a second appointment was scheduled. During this session, which usually occurred within one week of the initial appointment, the Rorschach was administered. All Rorschachs were administered by an advanced graduate student in clinical psychology who was unaware of the study's hypotheses. This Rorschach session was recorded on videotape, although the data were not used in the present study.

Once all the data on a given subject had been collected the Vocabulary subtest was scored. The Rorschach, Object Relations

Technique, and early memory protocols of subjects meeting the inclusion criterion were then coded and typed.

Each scale was applied to its respective data base by a pair of raters. Only the principal investigator rated more than one data base. After raters had reached acceptable levels of reliability in practice sessions, one rater independently scored half the protocols on a given scale, while the other scored the protocols for the entire sample.

The Object Relations Technique data were rated on the Ryan scale by the principal investigator and a doctoral level clinical psychologist. The early memory data were scored by a doctoral level clinical psychologist and an advanced graduate student in clinical psychology. The Rorschachs were scored on both the Blatt and Becker measures by an advanced graduate student in clinical psychology and the principal investigator.

Measures

Rorschach test, Concept of the Object Scale. Administration of the Rorschach test followed the procedure developed by Rapaport (Rapaport et al., 1946, V. II; Allison, Blatt, & Zimet, 1968). Administration in the Rapaport system departs most significantly from other Rorschach systems insofar as inquiry is conducted after presentation of each card, with the card out of the subject's sight. This method of administration was used because it is the one recommended and employed by Blatt and his associates (Blatt & Lerner,

1983a). Scoring for form level of the human percepts was in accordance with Mayman's form level table (Mayman & Appelbaum, 1975).

The Concept of the Object Scale has already been described in detail. The scale itself and the system of numerical weights employed in this study appear in Appendices A and B, respectively. In order to examine the hypotheses under consideration, several methods of summarizing the data were used, as follows: (1) mean developmental level for accurate human responses (COS+), (2) mean developmental level for inaccurate human responses (COS-), and (3) mean developmental level for all human responses irrespective of form quality (COS total). Scores for each human response were obtained by using the system of weights described in Appendix B. COS+ was calculated by adding all of the scores for accurate human percepts and dividing by the total number of such responses. COS- and COS total were calculated in a similar manner, using number of inaccurate responses and the total number of human responses, respectively, as the divisor. Each of the three summary scores could range from 1 to 27.

Early Memories Test, Ryan Object Relations Scale. Mayman (1963; 1968), who has done much to introduce and systematize the analysis of early memories as a projective technique, suggested that "the thematic analysis of a patient's early memories [is] one of the most useful sources of information about his relationship predispositions--his capacity for forming object-relationships . . ." (Mayman, 1968, pp. 307-308). Using the aforementioned Object

Representation Scale for Dreams, Krohn and Mayman (1974) found that assessment of level of object representation derived from early memories correlated positively with independent, nonprojective judgments of level of object representation. This scale is a version of a measure developed by Ryan (Ryan & Bell, 1984) which itself has shown considerable promise as a measure of object representation. In an investigation of the capacity to enter into a psychotherapeutic alliance Ryan and Cicchetti (1985) found that level of object representation as measured by the Ryan Object Relations Scale was the best single predictor of the quality of the alliance in the initial psychotherapy interview. That is, quality of relatedness, as inferred from behavior in the interview, was positively correlated with level of object representation on the scale. A study of change over the course of long-term psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy (Ryan & Bell, 1984) also yielded findings which suggest that the scale is sensitive to shifts in level of object representation.

The Ryan Object Relations Scale (Ryan & Bell, 1984; the scale is reproduced in Appendix C) describes a continuum in level of object representation, ranging from a psychotic level of representation, at the one extreme, to an essentially healthy level at the other. The scale directs attention to a number of aspects of the portrayal of self and other contained in the early memory narrative. These include the quality of self-other relatedness depicted, the realism, depth and complexity of the description, and the prevailing affective tone.

The scale is comprised of 20 example-anchored "stops" which are organized into four broad categories, each of which contains five graded levels. Category A (Levels 1-5) describes psychotic or borderline psychotic patterns of object representation. At this level, the object world is construed as chaotic, nightmarish, bizarre, and predominantly malevolent. Category B (Levels 6-10) describes a narcissistic or depressive mode of relatedness in which the self is portrayed as self-absorbed and profoundly estranged from others, or yearning for objects in a bleak, peopleless world. In Category C (Levels 11-15), which is viewed as describing an essentially neurotic level of relatedness, others are portrayed as present and engaged with the self. However, object relationships are yet depicted in infantile and egocentric terms. Category D (Levels 16-20), finally, describes relationships that are increasingly real, complex, interactive, and reciprocal.

A memory is thus assigned a score ranging from 1 to 20, with a score of 1 representing the most disturbed level of object representation. In the present study the scale was applied to only one early memory, namely, the earliest memory (EM). Ryan and Bell (1984) found that by comparison with early memories of specific people, e.g., mother or father, the earliest memory seemed to yield the best single measure of level of object representation. They suggested that this was the case because the task of narrating the earliest memory entails minimal cues or demands. That is, the earliest memory, according to Ryan and Bell, "allows the purest projective process" (1984, p. 214).

Previous reports (Ryan & Bell, 1984; Ryan & Cicchetti, 1985) have shown that raters can be trained to apply this scale with acceptable levels of inter-rater agreement. Thus, previously reported reliabilities range from .80 to .86.

The earliest memory was elicited in the manner recommended by Mayman (as described in Krohn, 1972). That is, the instructions were to think back as far as possible and try to recall the earliest memory of a specific incident. Outstanding details were inquired about, and the subject was asked to clarify what was "noticed" about people appearing in the memory. Finally, feelings accompanying the report of the memory, as well as feelings at the time the event recounted actually occurred, were sought.

Object Relations Technique, Ryan Object Relations Scale. The Object Relations Technique (ORT) is a projective instrument developed by Phillipson (1955) which is conceptually grounded in British object relations theory as elaborated by Fairbairn and Klein. The ORT was specifically designed as a procedure for elucidating the "inner world of object relations" and, as such, seemed ideally suited for the task of obtaining an independent assessment of level of object representation. Phillipson (1955) reports that the technique has proved quite useful in the exploration of object relations, and has yielded findings consistent with independent, clinical judgments. It must be acknowledged, however, that the procedure has apparently not been extensively researched and therefore both its reliability and validity are open to question. In the present study it was

assumed that, in these respects, the technique is comparable to the projective device after which it was modeled, namely, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) (Holt, 1978; Stein, 1978).

In construction and format the test is similar to the TAT. It consists of 13 pictures of people in one-, two-, and three-person, as well as group, situations. As in the TAT, there is a blank card. The 12 cards with personal or interpersonal content are organized into three "series". Series 1 human figures are in vague silhouette, with few or no clearly discernible features. Series 2 figures, in dark silhouette and drawn in such a fashion as to emphasize outline and contrast, are stark but much more clearly identifiable as human figures. Series 3 figures are the most realistic and detailed, and, unlike the other series, are drawn with color. The cards thus vary in degree of ambiguity or indefiniteness ("reality content") and "warmth" (emotional context).

Given their ambiguity the ORT cards call for considerable organizational, interpretive activity, and hence it was thought that the stories produced by a subject would highlight the idiosyncratic imprint of his subjective, representational world. Indeed, the ORT was chosen over the more familiar TAT in large part because the latter is less ambiguous and thus seemed more likely to invite conventional, stereotyped stories which would fail to reveal the more distinctive features of a subject's representational world (Krohn, 1972).

Although it has apparently not been used in conjunction with

projective data other than early memories (Ryan, personal communication, 1985), Ryan assumes that the Object Relations Scale is applicable to other projective productions. For this reason, and in order to facilitate comparisons between early memory and ORT findings, the Ryan Object Relations Scale was selected to rate level of object representation as manifest in the ORT stories.

A pilot study revealed a number of problems with using the scale in this fashion. Certain of the levels on the continuum appeared to have limited applicability to ORT data, e.g., level B-3, which is defined by investment in things ("transitional objects") rather than people. Some ORT stories, for example those describing a type of devaluing, narcissistic mode of relatedness, were not readily scorable in terms of the categories specified. Others were difficult to rate insofar as they were characterized by a certain depth or complexity of self-other description, yet they also evidenced a relatively low level of relatedness. Furthermore, due to the fact that most of the situations depicted on the ORT cards are interpersonal in nature, references to relationships with others could not always be accorded the same significance as is the case when the task is to report a memory. It was also found that making reliable discriminations between stories in the upper neurotic ranges was especially problematic. For these reasons, and more generally because the Ryan scale calls for very fine distinctions, preliminary inter-rater reliability trials yielded poor results.

Some of these difficulties were alleviated when the scale was

modified by collapsing certain of the levels together. The scale was thereby reduced to 11 levels (see Appendix D). It was thought that this modification did not violate the scale's integrity, while at the same time it allowed raters to make more reliable discriminations between ORT stories. In addition, one level was expanded or elaborated in order to better accommodate the type of narcissistic relatedness referred to above. Finally, sample ORT stories exemplifying the levels were provided to guide the raters in their judgments (Appendix E).

Subjects produced a story for each of 12 ORT cards, with the blank card being omitted. Each story was assigned a rating on the Object Relations Scale, with a score of 1 indicating the lowest, and 11 the highest level of object representation. A mean score for the ORT level of object representation was then calculated.

Since the Ryan scale has not been previously used with the Object Relations Technique, there is no inter-rater reliability data available. However, one may extrapolate from studies using similar scales with comparable data bases in order to arrive at some expected range of reliabilities. Using a 7-point object representation scale with a modified TAT procedure, Urist (1973) found that raters reached 81% agreement within 1 scale point. As noted above, Ryan's raters achieved comparable reliabilities with early memories (Ryan & Bell, 1984; Ryan & Cicchetti, 1985). Krohn (1972), using the 8-point Object Representation Scale for Dreams, obtained inter-rater agreement within 1 scale point of 83%

and 74% for dreams and early memories, respectively.

Administration of the Object Relations Technique generally conformed to Phillipson's (1955) guidelines. That is, the subject was asked to tell a story involving a description of "what might be going on in the situation, what the people might be concerned with, what they are doing, and what might happen next" (1955, p. 33). Like the TAT, subjects were also specifically asked to describe what led up to the situation, and what the people were "thinking and feeling". Vague or ambiguous content was actively inquired about, and subjects were pressed to comply with test instructions.

Rorschach test, Becker Genetic Level Scoring System. Becker's (1956) genetic level scoring system represents a modification of a system originally developed by Friedman (1952, 1953). The Friedman system addresses itself to structural aspects of cognitive-perceptual functioning as manifest in a subject's Rorschach responses. Based on Werner's (1948) proposal that cognitive development proceeds in the direction of increasing differentiation and integration, the system aims to evaluate the genetic level of cognitive-perceptual functioning implicit in these responses. Genetically lower functioning is characterized by syncreticism, indefiniteness, diffuseness, lability, and rigidity, while genetically higher cognitions and perceptions are discrete, articulated, definite, integrated, and flexible.

Using only location scores, the Friedman scale thus categorizes

Rorschach percepts as either genetically low or mature. For example, an amorphous whole response (Card I--"black paint"), reflecting primitive globality and diffuseness, is developmentally low, while an integrated whole response (Card II--"two men at a bar toasting each other"), reflecting analytic and integrative activity that is reality attuned, is developmentally mature. Becker's (1956) contribution was to organize the Friedman categories on a 6-level continuum, ranging from the most primitive (1) to the most mature (6), and to assign each percept a corresponding weight. Using this system, the sum of weights for a protocol can be divided by the total number of responses to arrive at an overall summary score reflecting developmental level of cognitive-perceptual functioning.

In the present study two summary scores for this measure were employed. A score summarizing all responses without human content was computed (GL-nonH), as was a score reflecting genetic level of cognitive-perceptual functioning on human responses (GL-H). The former score was obtained by summing weights for nonhuman responses and dividing this sum by the total number of such responses. The same procedure was used with human responses, with the divisor being the total number of such percepts. Thus, either summary score could range from 1 to 6. These particular summary scores were used in order to provide measures of general level of cognitive-perceptual functioning, on the one hand, and level of cognitive-perceptual organization of representations of people, on the other.

Studies utilizing the Friedman system, including Becker's modification of the system, have consistently demonstrated its validity (Goldfried, Stricker, & Weiner, 1971). It appears, in fact, to be perhaps the most solidly validated of the many scales developed for use with the Rorschach. Inter-scorer reliability for the scale is also quite high, with most studies reporting reliabilities of .90 or better (Goldfried et al., 1971).

Vocabulary Subtest, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised.

This subtest was administered to all prospective subjects. Subjects scoring below 9 scaled points were excluded from the study. The reasons for using this as an inclusion criterion were twofold. First, in view of the well-substantiated impact of intelligence on the production of Human Movement responses, it was necessary to rule out below-average intelligence as a factor. Second, since the research tasks called for verbal descriptions and stories in response to projective stimuli, it was important to minimize the potentially confounding influence of low verbal facility. The Vocabulary subtest was selected as a screening device because, of all the WAIS-R subtests, it is generally regarded as providing the best single estimate of intelligence, and it measures verbal intelligence specifically. The subtest was administered according to standard instructions.

Reliabilities

Inter-rater reliabilities were determined by computing percent agreement. Results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Adequate levels

TABLE 2

Inter-rater Reliabilities on the Early Memory, ORT, and Becker Measures

	Percent Exact Agreement and Agreement Within 1 Scale Point	Exact Agreement
Early Memory	.86	.43
ORT	.77	.53
Friedman Scale	--	.82

TABLE 3

Inter-rater Reliabilities on the Concept of the Object Scale

	Percent Exact Agreement
Differentiation	.94
Total Articulation	.70
Perceptual Articulation	.68
Functional Articulation	.73
Total Integration	.84
Motivation of Action	.87
Integration of Object and Action	.78
Nature of Interaction	.80
Content of Interaction	.86
Total for Seven Categories	.79
Selection of scorable responses	.87
Form Level	.89

of reliability were obtained for both the Early Memory and Friedman measures, although the level of reliability on the latter was somewhat low by comparison to previously published findings (Goldfried et al., 1971). Extent of agreement between raters applying the Ryan Object Relations Scale to ORT stories compares favorably to results obtained by other investigators using similar scales and data bases (e.g., Krohn, 1972; Urist, 1973). It should be noted, too, that previous studies have employed 7 or 8 point scales, while the scale used in the present study was comprised of 11 distinct "stops."

With respect to the Concept of the Object Scale, it was found that no subject produced less than three scorable responses. Inter-rater agreement on the selection of scorable responses was comparable to the result obtained by Spear (1978). The mean number of scorable responses was 8.62, and the standard deviation was 4.57. Inspection of the reliabilities presented in Table 3 indicates that the articulation category in general, and perceptual articulation in particular, were most problematic. Nevertheless, the pattern of reliabilities obtained for the various categories compares favorably with previously reported findings (Johnson, 1980; Lerner & St. Peter, 1984a; Ritzler, Zambianco, Harder, & Kashey, 1980; Spear, 1978). In addition, inter-rater agreement on the form level of the human percept, an especially important dimension of the response, is easily acceptable.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Preliminary Analyses

Since independent measures of level of object representation were derived from both the earliest memory and the ORT stories, the relationship between the findings yielded by these respective procedures was examined. Although no formal hypothesis was stated, it was anticipated that the measures would be positively correlated with one another. Accordingly, the relationship between the EM rating and the ORT mean score was assessed by computing the Pearson correlation coefficient. It was found that, contrary to expectation, these two ratings for level of object representation were unrelated ($r=.060$).

The mean score on the earliest memory was 12.48 (S.D.=2.75), and the mean for the ORT was 7.17 (S.D.=1.20). In other words, both measures yielded a mean level of object representation in the lower neurotic range. However, while 82% of the early memory ratings were in the neurotic range or above, only 62% of the ORT ratings were in this range.

Because it has been suggested that measures of object representation that rely on verbal productions may not be "pure" inasmuch as verbal facility or general intelligence exercise a confounding influence (Urist, 1981), the relationship between the Vocabulary score and the earliest memory and ORT scores were examined.

Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for Vocabulary scores with both the EM and ORT scores. While there was merely a trend towards a significant negative correlation between the Vocabulary score and the ORT score ($r=.35$; $p<.10$), there was a significant negative correlation between the Vocabulary score and the earliest memory rating ($r=-.402$; $p<.05$).

Analyses were also conducted to assess the relationships between various demographic factors and the three Concept of the Object Scale summary scores. Correlation coefficients were computed for (1) COS+, (2) COS-, and (3) COS total, respectively, with four demographic variables, namely, gender, age, educational level, and Vocabulary score. Results are presented in Table 4.

The only significant relationship that emerges is between the Vocabulary score and the COS total score. The mean developmental level for all human responses, regardless of form level, was positively related to the aspect of intelligence tapped by the Vocabulary subtest. The data also indicated a trend towards a significant negative correlation between educational level and the mean developmental level for inaccurate responses.

Test of the Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive correlation between developmental level on accurate responses and independently derived level of object representation. That is, it was expected that the mean developmental level for human responses of good form

TABLE 4

Correlations Among Concept of the Object Scale Scores and Demographic Factors--
Point-biserial and Pearson Coefficients

	Mean Developmental Level for Accurate Responses (COS+)	Mean Developmental Level for Inaccurate Responses (COS-)	Mean Developmental Level for All Responses (COS Total)
Gender ^a	-.087	.074	.024
Age (in years)	.099	-.200	.223
Educational Level (in years)	.133	-.365*	.179
Vocabulary Scaled Score	.211	.069	.434**

^a Male=1; Female=0

*p<.10

**p<.02

quality would correlate positively with the earliest memory and ORT ratings of level of object representation. Pearson correlation coefficient were computed for the COS+ score with both the earliest memory rating and the ORT mean score. Results are presented in Table 5.

Neither the earliest memory nor the ORT rating were related to COS+. Thus, the data do not support the prediction of a positive correlation between developmental level on accurately perceived human responses and independent ratings of level of object representation. It would appear that developmental level on human percepts of good form does not discriminate between differences in object-representational capacity.

Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis predicted a negative correlation between developmental level on inaccurate responses and independently derived level of object representation. That is, it was expected that the mean developmental level for human responses of poor form quality would correlate negatively with the earliest memory and ORT ratings of level of object representation. Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for the COS- score with both the earliest memory rating and the ORT mean score. Results are presented in Table 5.

The data do not indicate any relationship between COS- and the earliest memory score. However, there is a significant negative correlation between COS- and the ORT mean score.

TABLE 5

Correlations Among Measures of Object Representation and Cognitive-perceptual Functioning

Concept of the Object Scale	Early Memory Score (EM)	ORT Mean Score	Genetic Level on Non- human Responses (GL-NonH)	Genetic Level on Human Responses (GL-H)
Mean Developmental Level for all Human Responses (COS total)	-.207	-.065	.241	.565*
Mean Developmental Level on Accurate Responses (COS+)	-.058	.065	N/A	N/A
Mean Developmental Level on Inaccurate Responses (COS-)	.275	-.522*	N/A	N/A

*p<.01

These findings offer support of a limited nature for Hypothesis 2 inasmuch as a significant correlation in the predicted direction was obtained between the developmental level on responses of poor form quality and the ORT measure of level of object representation. The data, then, provide some support for the assertion that the developmental level on inaccurately perceived human responses reflects level of object representation.

Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis was developed in order to examine the proposal made by certain investigators that an overall summary score derived from the Concept of the Object Scale reflects aspects of cognitive-perceptual functioning. Specifically, it was predicted that an overall summary score computed on the basis of both accurate and inaccurate responses would be positively correlated with independent measures of cognitive-perceptual complexity. Stated in operational terms, it was expected that the Concept of the Object Scale mean developmental level for all human responses (COS total) would be positively correlated with the Becker mean genetic level score for human responses (GL-H). Similarly, it was expected that the COS total score would be positively correlated with the Becker mean genetic level score for nonhuman responses (GL-nonH). Pearson correlation coefficients for these various relationships were computed. Results are presented in Table 5.

There was no relationship between the COS total score and the GL-nonH score. However, the COS total score was positively correlated with the GL-H score. These data offer only partial support for

the hypothesis. Thus, the overall summary score derived from the Blatt scale does show the predicted relationship to an independent measure of the level of cognitive-perceptual complexity implicit in Rorschach representations of humans. However, the Concept of the Object Scale score bears no relationship to a measure of general level or style of cognitive-perceptual functioning.

Hypothesis 4 This hypothesis sought to test the assertion that the Concept of the Object Scale overall summary score measures level of object representation. It was predicted that this overall summary score for developmental level computed on the basis of both accurate and inaccurate responses would positively correlate with independent measures of level of object representation. Operationally, a positive correlation was expected between the COS total score and both the earliest memory and ORT scores. Pearson correlation coefficients for these relationships were computed. Results are presented in Table 5.

Neither the ORT mean score nor the earliest memory score were significantly related to the COS total score. Thus, the data do not support the prediction that a summary score computed without regard to the form level of the percept measures levels of object representation.

Additional Analyses

Additional analyses were performed in order to clarify and elaborate certain of the findings. In view of the fact that the

Vocabulary score bore some relationship to both the earliest memory and ORT ratings, as well as the COS total score, partial correlation coefficients were computed with the variability due to this factor controlled. In other words, it was necessary to test for the effect of intelligence on the correlations found. Results are presented in Table 6.

Results of partialing out the effects of intelligence revealed correlation coefficients which, for all practical purposes, were indistinguishable from those for the uncontrolled data. Accordingly, major conclusions remain unchanged. It is the case that, with intelligence controlled for, the relationship between the earliest memory score and the mean developmental level on inaccurate responses is stronger. Specifically, the data indicate a trend towards a positive correlation. This correlation fails, however, to reach statistical significance.

The finding that the COS- score was negatively correlated with the ORT rating of level of object representation also merited further examination. It was suspected, to begin with, that a higher developmental level on inaccurate responses might reflect, or be related to, a generalized impairment in the capacity to accurately perceive or "test" reality. Accordingly, the relationship between the extended F+%, a Rorschach summary score which is conventionally treated as an index of the ego function of reality testing, and the COS- score was examined. A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed and indicated no significant relationship between the two factors ($r = -.166$).

TABLE 6

First-order Partial Correlations for Measures of Object
Representation and Cognitive-perceptual Functioning
Controlling for Variability due to Intelligence

Concept of the Object Scale	Early Memory Score (EM)	ORT Mean Score	Genetic Level on Non- human Respknses (GL-NonH)	Genetic Level on Human Responses (GL-H)
Mean Developmental Level for all Human Responses (COS total)	-.04	.103	.136	.573**
Mean Developmental Level on Accurate Responses (COS+)	.03	.152	N/A	N/A
Mean Developmental Level on Inaccurate Responses (COS-)	.331*	-.533*	N/A	N/A

*p<.10

**p<.01

The question also arose as to whether the Rorschach index of adequacy of reality testing might predict independently assessed level of object representation. If this were the case, then one could argue that the Blatt scale is, in a sense, a redundant measure. A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed between the extended F+% and the ORT rating of level of object representation. The coefficient obtained was not statistically significant ($r=.104$). The relationship between COS- and the ORT rating was then examined with the factor of general capacity for reality testing partialled out. The correlation coefficient obtained ($r=-.515$) is virtually identical to the zero-order correlation coefficient.

It would appear not only that developmental level on inaccurate human responses is independent of overall capacity for reality testing, but that the former is related to independently assessed level of object representation while the latter is not. These data would suggest that the Blatt measure does tap a specifically object-representational factor, and that it does not simply reflect a more general quality of ego functioning.

Summary of Major Findings

It was hypothesized that Concept of the Object Scale developmental levels for both accurately and inaccurately perceived human images would predict independently assessed level of object representation. The data did not support the prediction as regards the accurate human responses. Moreover, the predicted relationship between developmental level on inaccurate responses and independent measures

of level of object representation was supported only by the findings pertaining to the ORT measure of object representation. In addition, it was found that the overall summary score derived from the Concept of the Object Scale was positively related to an independent measure of the cognitive-perceptual complexity of human representations. It was not, however, related to general style of cognitive-perceptual functioning. This same overall summary score was not related to level of object representation. Finally, these principal conclusions remained unchanged when the potential confounding effect of intelligence was eliminated.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The primary intent of this study was to examine the claim that analyzed in the manner specified by the Concept of the Object Scale, Rorschach human imagery illuminates the level of or capacity for object representation. It was reasoned that, if this is the case, then the scale should correlate with independent judgments of level of object representation. As it turned out, however, the independent ratings of level of object representation derived from early memory and Object Relations Technique data were themselves unrelated. This finding will be taken as the point of departure for the discussion which follows.

The fact that early memory ratings were not positively correlated with ORT ratings raises questions about the validity of the ORT measure of level of object representation in particular. While it has not seen wide usage as a measure of object representation, the Ryan Object Relations Scale as applied to early memories has, after all, been used in previous studies, whereas the ORT measure has not. Moreover, the available data provide some support for the assertion that, when categorized in the manner called for by Ryan's scale, early memories do yield a valid estimate of level of object representation. The same, of course, cannot be said for the ORT measure. A finding of a positive correlation between these instruments would have further attested to the validity of the early

memory measure, while at the same time affording support of an essentially preliminary nature for the procedure used with the ORT. As it is, since the untested ORT measure must be regarded as the weaker of the measures, the finding of no relationship would seem to compel rejection of any claim that this particular procedure is a valid means of assessing level of object representation.

It can also be argued that, notwithstanding its lack of validity data, to simply dismiss the ORT measure as invalid is premature. The procedure does possess a certain "face validity" as a measure of object representation inasmuch as it essentially entails rating the quality of descriptions of people and their interactions with other people. To suggest that such ratings bear no relationship to how an individual actually perceives or experiences others seems, on the face of it, to be unreasonable. Of course it is not acceptable to claim validity for a measure simply because it seems likely, or is reasonable to suppose, that it measures what it purports to or appears to measure. What is being suggested, rather, is only that considerations of "face validity" do not seem to be entirely beside the point.

It must be remembered, too, that the psychological assessment of object representation is by no means a well-established and extensively researched area of inquiry. There are no widely accepted or firmly validated procedures or scales for assessing object representation, nor does the construct lend itself to ready measurement. Even a scale such as Ryan has fashioned has seen limited

use. In many respects, then, the field is yet in a preliminary, exploratory state. In view of this, and keeping in mind the considerations detailed above, it seems unreasonable to simply reject the ORT findings. Rather, it would seem more appropriate to use these data as the basis for tentative inferences which would then require further examination and more definitive validation.

A word is also in order regarding the rating of object representation derived from the early memory. It will be recalled that the early memory measure employed in this study involved rating only one memory, specifically, the earliest memory. This tactic was adopted because the research of Ryan and his colleagues (Ryan & Bell, 1984; Ryan & Gich Cicchetti, 1985) indicated that the earliest memory yields the "purest" or least contaminated picture of a subject's internal object world. The procedure promised to allow a subject maximal freedom to "project" his representational world. However, in retrospect it may have been an error to obtain a single earliest memory as one was then left with a severely limited sampling of a subject's repertoire of self and other representations. Similar concerns, in fact, prompted Krohn (1972), in his study of dreams and object representation, to obtain several dreams from each subject. He then was in a better position to observe the range of self and other representations implicit in a subject's dreams, and could more confidently arrive at a determination of the most characteristic level of object representation.

It may be, in other words, that collecting only one memory is a procedure of questionable reliability. It is entirely possible,

for example, that the single memory elicited may have reflected the upper end of a subject's range of representational possibilities. This, of course, would mean that the rating obtained did not express the "true" state of affairs regarding level of object representation. Collecting several earliest memories, in the manner previously described, would go some distance towards addressing this issue. With benefit of hindsight, then, obtaining a number of earliest memories would probably have afforded a more adequate sample of object-representational functioning.

With regard to the question of the Concept of the Object Scale's ability to discriminate between levels in the capacity to internally represent others, the findings clearly underscored the importance of the form quality dimension of the human response. The data showed, to begin with, that a summary score for developmental level which does not take form quality into account is not predictive of level of object representation. This is not an especially surprising, and certainly not a novel, finding, given that the form level of the human response has traditionally been accorded particular interpretive significance in the assessment of object relations. Furthermore, it is consistent with Blatt's assertion that the form quality distinction is crucial.

What is of special interest is that the findings suggest that, while developmental levels on poorly perceived human responses do discriminate between object representational capacities, developmental levels on accurate responses do not do so. With respect to the

former finding, it emerged that subjects who tended to produce more fully differentiated, articulated, and integrated inaccurately perceived human images also manifested greater disturbance in their ORT portrayals of self and other. Conversely, subjects judged to possess greater internal capacity for mature, flexible, and realistic relatedness tended to produce fewer such human responses. By contrast, differences in level of internal relatedness, as evident in the ORT stories, were not reflected in the developmental level on well-perceived human responses.

It should be emphasized, moreover, that overall adequacy of reality testing did not account for the discriminative ability of the inaccurate human responses. This is important, for it suggests that the Blatt measure reflects an object-representational factor specifically, rather than a more general aspect of ego-functioning. Indeed, the data suggest that a relatively firm hold on reality does not necessarily imply a correspondingly well-developed internal capacity to relate to others. Conversely, a relatively high level of object representation might occur in the context of an inconsistent ability to accurately assess reality.

As to why the inaccurate human images were discriminating, while accurate percepts did not predict level of object representation, a resolution begins to suggest itself if one recalls certain findings obtained by Blatt and his colleagues. In their original study, Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, and Glick (1976b) discovered that the comparison groups of psychiatric inpatients could not be differentiated

on the basis of developmental levels on accurate responses. The more severely disturbed of these patients were, however, distinguished by a proclivity for elevated developmental levels on inaccurate responses. When these patients as a group were compared with normals, they continued to display significantly higher developmental levels on the poor responses. Moreover, there were significant differences with respect to accurate responses, with the patients' well-perceived human percepts consistently at lower developmental levels than those of the normals. Along similar lines, Lerner and St. Peter (1984a) found that differences on accurate responses were most pronounced between the schizophrenic and neurotic comparison groups.

These findings suggest that it is when comparison groups are grossly dissimilar with respect to degree of psychopathology, and, by implication, quality of object-representational functioning, that differences on accurate responses become pronounced and discriminating. Thus, psychiatric inpatients can be differentiated on this basis from normals as can schizophrenics from neurotics, yet this is not the case when different groups of psychiatric inpatients are compared. In other words, differences between groups must be fairly extreme before they will be reflected in the summary score for accurate responses. By contrast, differences on inaccurate responses appear to be telling even where comparison groups are not so grossly dissimilar.

Considered in this light, the results of the present study become more readily interpretable. Subjects in the study were not,

in fact, widely dissimilar. All were outpatients or nonpatients who were likely functioning in the upper-borderline to neurotic or normal ranges. This, of course, can only be stated as a probability, as neither diagnoses nor psychiatric histories were obtained. Here it might be noted that it was the impression of the principal investigator, shared by the assistant who administered the Rorschachs, that only one patient was functioning at a psychotic or near psychotic level. Moreover, the mean level of object representation as assessed by both the early memory and the ORT was, according to Ryan's scale, in the lower neurotic range. In view of the relatively limited range of psychopathology displayed by this sample, then, it makes sense that, while inaccurate responses were discriminating, accurate responses were not. One assumes that differences on the accurate responses would have begun to emerge had more severely disturbed inpatient subjects also been included in the sample.

The present findings, taken in conjunction with the results of other investigators, suggest that the developmental level on inaccurate responses may be a more sensitive barometer of level of object representation than is the developmental level of accurate responses. It would appear that it is typically the more seriously disturbed patient, particularly the schizophrenic patient, who displays significant impairment on well-perceived responses. Hence, one may speculate that, other things being equal, it is generally in the presence of distortions in the capacity to relate to others

which are extreme and pervasive that the developmental level of human images of good form begins to deteriorate. One might expect, for example, a reduction in or a corruption of popular percepts, which contribute substantially to the overall score on accurate responses. In the absence of such pervasively disruptive pathology, conversely, impairment in the capacity to represent others tends to become manifest primarily in intrusive and unrealistic human percepts.

The results of the study also provided some support for the view of Spear (1978) and others whose interest has had to do not so much with the internal capacity to relate to others as with the cognitive-perceptual complexity of object representation. Inasmuch as the criterion measure for cognitive-perceptual complexity employed in this study--the Friedman measure--is well validated, and since the correlation between this measure and the overall summary score was reasonably high, the confirmation of this use of the summary score might be viewed as the strongest finding of this study. It is true that because the Blatt and Friedman measures were both applied to Rorschach human responses the relationship may, to some degree, be confounded. Nevertheless, it would appear that there is some justification for using the overall summary score as an index of the degree of cognitive-perceptual complexity and organization implicit in one's views or images of others. Thus, an elevated summary score would indicate differentiated and organized object representations, whereas a low score would suggest more diffuse

and poorly organized images of others. In short, the score seems to serve, as Spear has proposed, as an index of the degree to which representations of others are more or less "cognitive" or "affective."

This result may further illuminate certain of the results obtained by Fibel (1979). As previously discussed, she found that scores for the three major scoring categories of the Blatt scale (differentiation, articulation and integration) were positively correlated with mode of managing object loss, the latter defined in part by reference to an object-relational dimension. It has been suggested (Blatt & Lerner, 1983b) that this finding indicates the sensitivity of the Concept of the Object Scale to quality of interpersonal relations. Examination of the data, in light of the findings of the present study, suggests an alternate explanation.

There is no indication that Fibel figured form level into her summary scores. Furthermore, while she did not use the overall summary score examined in this study, she did employ the constituent categories which contribute to that score. In effect, then, she was using the same type of score as did Spear (1978). Moreover, it is quite clear that, notwithstanding its object-relational thrust, mode of managing object loss was defined in large part by reference to an action-ideation continuum. That is, Fibel's scale possessed a significant cognitive component insofar as it was designed to register mode of "processing" and reacting to distress provoked by object loss. Subjects scoring low on management of object loss tended to favor action as a means of handling distress, while those

scoring high employed more ideational coping mechanisms. Accordingly, the correlation obtained may be interpreted as indicative of a relationship between the Blatt measure and this action-ideation continuum, with elevated scores on the former reflecting a preference for an ideational mode of handling loss. This interpretation, in turn, would be entirely consistent with the findings obtained in the present investigation regarding the meaning of the overall summary score.

If this analysis of Fibel's findings is correct, then it only serves to underscore the importance of clearly distinguishing between the cognitive-perceptual level of object representation, on the one hand, and actual internal capacity for relatedness, on the other. As I have attempted to emphasize throughout this study, researchers using the Concept of the Object Scale have at times failed to maintain this important distinction, a failure which has resulted in some confusion as to what it is that is being measured.

While not a focus of the present study, it would be of interest to examine the relationship between these two aspects of object representation. On the basis of clinical and theoretical considerations, one would not necessarily expect level of cognitive perceptual complexity to be positively correlated with internal capacity to relate to others. For example, given his complex and discriminating views of others, one would anticipate, with Spear (1978) that the representational world of the paranoid personality would be characterized by a high degree of cognitive-perceptual

complexity, while this would not be the case with the hysterical or infantile personality. However, one would also expect a greater capacity to internally relate to others for the latter personality type than for the paranoid personality (Sugarman, 1979).

In summary, this study offered support of an essentially provisional nature for the assertion that the Concept of the Object Scale taps level of object representation in the sense of internal capacity to relate to others. Specifically, the data suggested that the developmental level on inaccurate human percepts might be a sensitive indicator of capacity for relatedness. It must be borne in mind, however, that this conclusion is based on results obtained from an independent measure of object representation which possesses, at best, debatable credentials. Accordingly, this conclusion can only be presented as tentative. At the very least, it does suggest a possible direction for future research. In addition, the findings indicated that, employed in a certain fashion, the scale taps aspects of cognitive-perceptual functioning as manifest in the object-representational arena.

The results suggest, furthermore, that the scale is sensitive to object representational differences among outpatients and non-patients. Heretofore, the research has been largely restricted to severely disturbed inpatients. The present study indicates the potential utility of the scale with a wider range of clinical and nonclinical populations.

This study also represented an attempt to relate a content-oriented approach to object representation, the Ryan scale, to the structural approach of Blatt and his associates. On the whole, there has been little previous effort to compare these divergent approaches to object representation (Blatt & Lerner, 1983b). As Blatt et al. (1976b) have suggested, future research might concentrate on a more comprehensive, integrated approach to the assessment of this construct.

More generally, further studies of the Concept of the Object Scale using well-validated independent measures of object representation are clearly in order. Given the complexity of the task of devising and applying such measures, this is, of course, no simple matter. It would also be of interest to examine the relationship between the scale and overt, interpersonal behavior, or ratings of quality of object relations derived from interview or self-report data. Finally, the relationship between the cognitive-perceptual level of object representation and level of internal capacity to relate to others awaits further investigation.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

A DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF THE
OBJECT ON THE RORSCHACH

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The importance of the human response on the Rorschach has been noted often in a variety of contexts, but generally with a minimum of theoretical elaboration. Aspects of these responses may have particular relevance for the study of the development of the concept of the object and its impairment in psychopathology. This scoring system is an attempt to apply developmental principles of differentiation, articulation, and integration (Werner, 1948; Werner & Kaplan, 1963) to the study of human responses given to the Rorschach.

Differentiation is defined as the nature of the response with human content; Articulation is defined as the degree to which the response was elaborated, and Integration is defined as the way the concept of the object is integrated into a context of action and interaction with other objects. Within each of these areas, categories were established along a continuum based on developmental levels. Within each category, ratings ranged from developmentally lower to developmentally higher levels.

CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS AND SCORING PROCEDURES

I. SELECTION OF RESPONSES

A. Human and quasi-human responses

All human and quasi-human responses are scored. Human and quasi-human details are scored if they 1) involve human activity, (e.g., talking, pointing, struggling) or 2) involve a substantial portion of the card and are not just a small rare or edge detail and 3) contain some description of

explicit human or humanoid characteristics. Thus, independent of their location, the following responses would be scored:

"the face . . . of an old man with wisps of hair on the side"

"a man with sunglasses on"

"a girl's head"

"a baby's face"

"baby's hands with mittens on"

"face with a large hooked nose"

"faces of 2 angels"

B. Animal responses

In some rare instances animal responses are classified as quasi-human if the animal is explicitly given qualities that only a human could have. The exceptional quality of this classification must be emphasized. It is not meant to include all responses scored Animal Movement FM. Though the following responses might be scored FM, they would not be included as human or quasi-human response:

1. Human-like actions which could be achieved as the result of special training and which might, therefore, be expected in the context of a circus act.
2. Activities which humans perform, but which can also be performed by animals (e.g., rubbing noses). The human content must be explicit. If, for example, "Bugs Bunny"

is given as a response, it is scored only if Bugs Bunny is engaged in a clearly human action. Thus, Bugs Bunny crying or talking would be scored as a quasi-human [(H)] response.

Applying these criteria, the following animal responses would be scored as quasi-human:

"a hookah smoking caterpillar . . . from Alice in Wonderland."

"two drunken penguins leaning on a lamp post . . . they're definitely sloshed."

"two lobsters coming out of a saloon . . . and they kind of have their arms around one another."

"sea gull . . . laughing, making fun of somebody."

"two frogs . . . tete-a-tete . . . two angry frogs, their mouths are downcast."

"spiders (at an insect ball) eating spareribs."

II. SCORING PROCEDURES

- A. Accuracy of the response. Responses are classified as perceptually accurate or inaccurate ($F+$, F_{+} , F_{-} , $F-$). $F+$ or F_{+} responses are classified as accurate and $F-$ responses and F_{-} responses are classified as inaccurate (Rapaport, Gill & Schafer, 1945; Allison, Blatt & Zimet, 1968).

B. Differentiation

Here responses are classified according to types of figures perceived; whether the figure or subject of the action are quasi-human details (Hd), human details Hd; full quasi-human figures (H); and full human figures, H.

1. Human responses. To be classified as a human response, the figure must be whole and clearly human. Examples:

"people"

"men"

"baby"

"African natives"

2. Quasi-human responses. Here the figures are whole but less than human or not definitely specified as human.

Examples:

"witches"

"dwarfs"

"two opposing forces, sticking our arms and hands.

Opposing forces, pitted against each other . . .

looking at each other. With complicated . . . talons,

appendages, arms raised in combat . . . Person maybe

. . . standing there, being very offensive and

attacking."

3. Human details. Here only part of a human figure is specified. Examples:

"hands strangling"

"faces staring at each other"

4. Quasi-human details. Here only part of a quasi-human is specified. Examples:

"angel's face"

"witch's head"

"devil's face"

C. Articulation

Here responses are scored on the basis of types of attributes ascribed to the figures. A total of seven types of attributes are considered. These types of attributes were selected because they seem to provide information about human or quasi-human figures. The analyses are not concerned with the sheer detailing of features or with inappropriate articulation. The analyses are only concerned with articulations that enrich a human or quasi-human response, that enlarge a listener's knowledge about qualities which are appropriate to the figures represented. For example, a response which states that a man has a head, hands, and feet does not enlarge the listener's knowledge about the man. Possession of these features is presupposed by the initial response, "man." An articulation such as "a man with wings" is not scored as an articulation because it is an elaboration which does not add to the specifications of the human or quasi-human features of the figure.¹

¹Inappropriate articulations were not scored in the initial

There are two general types of articulation: the articulation of 1) perceptual and 2) functional attributes.

1. Perceptual characteristics

- a. Size or physical structure. For this aspect to be scored as articulated, descriptions of the figure must have adjective status. Thus, no credit is given in a response where an examinee only says that a man has feet or that a hand has fingers. Size or structure is only scored as articulated if there is a qualitative description of aspects of body parts or the whole body. Descriptions of bodies or body parts as "funny" or "strange" are not scored as indicating articulation of body structure.

Certain aspects of facial expression can be scored as articulations of size or structure. Included in this category are responses like "eyes closed" or "mouth open" in which the description of facial expression amounts to something more than just a description of physical appearance.

Applying these criteria, the following responses would be scored as articulations of size or physical structure:

"slim men"

research with this manual (Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, & Glick, 1976). In subsequent research it may prove useful to score both appropriate and inappropriate elaborations.

"big feet"

"the top of the body is sort of heavy and her legs are real, real teeny"

"slanted eyes"

"chins protruding down from the face"

"eyes closed"

"mouths open"

"tongue was sticking out"

By contrast, the following responses are not scored as articulations of size or structure:

"women with breasts"

"they're shaped like people"

"eyes, nose, mouth"

"woman doesn't have a head"

"a pervert with bunny ears"

"person with wings instead of arms"

- b. Clothing or hairstyle. For this aspect to be scored as articulated, there has to be a qualitative description of some aspect of either clothing or hairstyle. It must enrich the description of the figure. Simple mention of items of clothing implied by the response does not enrich one's understanding of the figure and is, therefore, not scored as an articulation. Using these criteria, the following responses are scorable as articulations of clothing or hairstyle.

"some kind of moustache . . . right above its mouth"

"girls with ponytails"

"hair and the things sticking out of them, feathers"

"their pants would have to be skintight and when they lean down, their jackets go pointing out, makes it look like a very tight jacket"

"a couple of witches with red hats"

"wearing a black coat and a homburg hat. Black coat is sort of billowing behind him . . ."

". . . a full-tailed coat"

"two little girls, all dressed up in their mother's things"

"Gay 90's type women . . . both wearing a long bustle and feathers in hair"

"an American Indian in some ceremonial costume with wings and paraphernalia"

"a man . . . with sunglasses on"

By contrast, the following responses would not be scored as articulations of clothing or hairstyle:

"two women with skirts on"

"shoes on"

c. Posture. Posture is scored if the response contains:

a) a description of body posture which is separate from the verb describing the activity of the figure,

or b) a description of facial expression that goes beyond mere articulation of the physical appearance of features in that it contains a sense of movement or feeling. Posture is not scored if body posture is implied in the verb rather than being separately articulated or if it is simply a description of a figure's position in space (e.g., facing outward). Thus, the following responses are scored as articulations of posture:

"arms flung wide"

"head tilted"

"standing with legs spread apart"

"leaning on a lamp post"

"shoulders hunched"

"somebody hanging . . . dangling down, drooped, formless, shapeless"

"eyes look piercing"

"gritting teeth"

"smiling"

The following responses are not considered articulations of posture:

"sitting"

"standing"

"doing a high dive"

"back to back"

"facing outward"

""mouth closed"

2. Functional characteristics

- a. Sex. For sex to be scored there either has to be a specific mention of sex of the figure or an assignment to an occupational category which clearly implies a particular sexual identity. If the final sexual identity is not decided but alternatives are precisely considered, sex is scored as articulated. If, however, the indecision is based upon a vague characterization of the figures with an emphasis upon the sexual nature of the figure as a whole, sex is not considered articulated. In the following responses, sex is scored as articulated:

"man"

"girl"

"witch"

"mother"

"priest"

"either an old man or an ugly woman"

"2 boys putting on a disguise kit or a girl
with her makeup kit"

By contrast, sex is not scored as articulated in these responses:

"Well, these look like two human figures.

I think when you look at the breasts there,

they're girls. Then down here could look like

phalluses. I don't know. It's rather ambiguous, confusing . . . protrusions from the thorax, you know."

"Looks like two people. Could be a woman or a man. I debated this for a minute. (mean?) Well, this form could be women or the costuming of man. (?) Well, I guess it would be tights and sort of loose shirt. I don't know exactly."

"Two people beating drums in a way like both might be women. In another way, like men. Doesn't seem to be any real indication whether they are male or female. The rather extended chests seem to represent breast of women and protuberance on bottom seems to be leg. In these respects it has a bisexual appearance. There is something barbaric about the figures. Seems to be something of a representation of gods or something like that. They seem to be wearing high heel shoes. Both of the figures seem to be very awkward and look as though they're doing some clumsy movements in beating the drums. The heads don't look human--look as though they're some kind of bird's heads."

- b. Age. For this aspect to be scored, specific reference must be made to some age category to which the figure belongs. Thus, age is assumed to be delineated in the following responses:

"child"

"baby"

"old woman"

"young girl"

"little boys"

"teenagers"

By contrast, although some indication of age is implied in the following responses, the references are not specific. Thus, age is not scored in these responses:

"man"

"girls"

"boys"

"priest"

- c. Role. When figures are human, a clear reference to the work a figure does (occupation) is scored as an articulation of role. With regard to quasi-human figures, role is scored if the manner in which the figure is represented implies that it would engage in certain activities rather than others. Thus, role is assumed to be articulated in the following responses:

"soldier"
 "priest"²
 "Spanish dancer"
 "ballet dancer"
 "Princess"
 "mother"
 "witch"
 "devil"
 "elves"

Role is not scored in the following responses because there is no clear indication that they refer to occupation rather than a momentary activity.

"dancer"
 "singers"

- d. Specific identity. Here a figure must be named as a specific character in history, literature, etc.³

Examples:

"Charles DeGaulle"
 "Theodore Roosevelt"

²When sexual identity is clearly indicated in a role designation, both sex and role are scored as articulated. Such a situation exists in the following responses: "mother," "witch," "priest."

³To the degree that age, sex, and occupation are clearly indicated in the specific identity, these features are also scored as articulated. Thus, in the response, "Charles DeGaulle," sex and occupation are specified. Such is not the case in the response, "piglet."

3. Degree of articulation

This is the simple enumeration of the total number of types of features articulated. In the preceding section, seven types of attribution were described (size, clothing or hairstyle, posture, sex, age, role and specific identity). Thus, for any single Rorschach response, a total of seven types of features could be articulated. The average number of features taken into account in each human or quasi-human response constitutes the score for the degree of articulation of individual figures. If, for example, a subject gave four human responses and attributed a total of ten types of attributes to them, his score for degree of articulation is 2.5.

D. Integration

Integration of the response was scored in three ways:

a) the degree of internality of the motivation of the action (unmotivated, reactive, and intentional), b) the degree of integration of the object and its action (fused, incongruent, nonspecific, and congruent), and c) the integration of the interaction with another object (malevolent-benevolent and active-passive, active-reactive, and active-active). These analyses can only be applied to figures engaged in human activity.

1. Motivation of action

The articulation of action in terms of motive implies a developmentally advanced perception of action as differentiated from but related to the subject. Moreover, motive can be ascribed in two ways: as reactive or as intention. Reactive explanations involve a focus on past events and behavior is explained in terms of causal factors; one assumes that, for certain prior reasons, an individual had to do a certain thing. By contrast, intentionality is proactive and implies an orientation toward the present or future. The individual chooses to do something to attain a certain end or goal. The ability to choose between motives and to purposely undertake an activity implies a greater differentiation between subject and action than is the case when an individual is impelled to take an action because of past occurrences. For this reason, the analysis of action will consider whether or not a motive was provided and whether the motivation was reactive (causal) or intentional.

a. Unmotivated activity

Here action is described with no explanation of why it occurs. Examples:

"two people kissing each other"

"women looking at each other"

"men leaning against a hillside"

b. Reactive motivation

Here perceived activity is described as having been caused by a prior situation (internal or external) and the subject is seen as having little choice in his reaction. Examples:

"a German soldier on guard duty. I think he sees something and points his gun at it"

"Arabs recoiling from an Israeli bomb"

"a person afraid of a snake, standing on a rocky cliff with arms upraised as if he's going to hit it with something"

"two women struggling over ownership of a garment"

c. Intentional motivation

For motivation to be scored as intentional the action must be directed toward some future moment and the subject must be seen as, in some sense, choosing his action rather than having to react.

Examples:

"Halloween witches, making incantations over the fire, in preparation for all hallows' eve"

"an orchestra conductor, his arms raised, about ready to begin"

2. Object-action integration

In this analysis, four levels of integration of the object with its action are distinguished (fused, incongruent, nonspecific, and congruent).

- a. Fusion of object and action. For a response to be included within this category, the object must be amorphous and only the activity articulated. In such situations, object and action are fused. The object possesses no separate qualities of its own. It is defined only in terms of its activity. This type of response is exemplified below. In both instances, nothing is known about the object except what it is doing. Examples:

"Two opposing forces, sticking out arms and hands. Opposing forces, pitted against each other . . . looking at each other. With complicated . . . of talons, appendages, arms raised in combat . . . person maybe . . . standing there, being very offensive and attacking."

"Figure there with hands, standing with legs spread apart, reaching out with hands as if trying to grab something."

- b. Incongruent integration of object and action

For a response to be included within this category, there should be some separate articulation of object

and action. Something must be known about the object apart from its activity. Nevertheless, the activity is incongruous, unrelated to the defined nature of the object. The articulation of action detracts from, rather than enriches, the articulation of the object. Examples:

"a great big moth, dancing ballet"

"two figures, one half human and one half animal holding two sponges"

"a little baby throwing a bucket of water"

"a satyr-thing bowling"

"two sphinxes pulling a decapitated woman apart"

"two beetles playing a flute."

c. Nonspecific integration of object and action.

Inclusion within this category also requires some separate articulation of object and action. However, the relationship between the two elements is non-specific. The figures, as defined, can engage in the activity described but there is no special fit between object and action. Many other kinds of objects could engage in the activity described. Thus, while the articulation of action does not detract from the articulation of the object, neither does it enrich it. Examples:

"one big person standing with arms raised"

"a knight, standing ready to do his job"

"cavemen leaning against a hillside"

"two figures dancing"

"two older women trying to pull something
away from each other"

"two men fighting"

"a man running away"

"a person, sort of a girl, standing on her
toes"

d. Congruent integration of object and action.

For a response to be assigned to this category, the nature of the object and the nature of the action must be articulated separately. In addition, the action must be particularly suited to the defined nature of the object. By way of contrast with the preceding category, the action must not only be something the object might do; it must be something that the object would be especially likely to do. There is an integrated and particularly well-suited relationship between the object and the specified action. Moreover, the articulation of the action enriches the image of the object.⁴

⁴In situations where the role definition of the object amounts to nothing more than a literal restatement of the action, object and action are not considered integrated. Responses like "dancers

3. Integration of interaction with another object

- a. Nature of interaction. This analysis applies to all responses involving at least two human or quasi-human figures. In addition this analysis can also pertain to situations where a second figure is not directly perceived, but its presence is necessarily implied by the nature of the action.

1. Active-passive interaction.

Two figures can involve a representation of one figure acting upon another figure in an active-passive interaction. One figure is active and the other entirely passive so while acted upon, it does not respond in any way.

2. Active-reactive interaction.

In another type of interaction the figures may be unequal. One figure is definitely the agent of the activity, acting upon another figure. The second figure is reactive or responsive only to the action of the other.

This is defined as an active-reactive interaction.

dancing," or "singers singing" are scored as nonspecific (level 3) relationships. However, responses such as "ballerina dancing" or "character from a Rudolph Falls opera, singing" are classified as a congruent (level 4) relationship.

3. Active-active interaction.

In a third type of interaction, both figures contribute equally to the activity, and the interaction is mutual.

b. Content of interaction⁵

1. Malevolent: The interaction is aggressive or destructive or the results of the activity implies destruction or harm or fear of harm.
2. Benevolent. The activity is not destructive, harmful or aggressive. It may be neutral or it may reflect a warm positive relationship between objects.

⁵Attached are examples of scoring both the nature and content of interactions. Notations in the left hand margin indicate scoring for the nature of the interaction. [Active-Passive (A-P), Active-Reactive (A-R), and Active-Active (A-A)] Notations in the right hand margin indicate the scoring for the content of the interaction [Malevolent (M) and Benevolent (B)].

Integration of Interaction

<u>Nature of Interaction</u>		<u>Content of Interaction</u>
A-P	A couple of undertakers lowering babies into the pit	M
A-P	A prostitute rolling a drunk	M
A-P	Crucified man	M
A-P	A mother holding out her arm and telling her kid never to come back	M
A-P	Two sphinxes pulling a decapitated woman apart	M
A-P	Two people kneeling down with hands extended toward and touching other people	B
A-R	African natives beating a drum; Martians applaud	B
A-R	Eve being tempted by a snake (snake seen on card)	M
A-R	Two people with hands up as if trying to ward off the two people coming to get them. Two guys with black capes . . . coming in to get the other people . . .	M
A-R	German soldier--think he sees something and points gun at it	M
A-R	An orchestra conductor, arms raised, just about to begin	B
A-R	A man running away	M
A-R	A woman crying out for something . . . two forces pulling her apart, one is depression, one is suicide	M
A-R	A man trying to kill a little girl, whose running away	M
A-A	A woman with a child looking up at her	B

<u>Nature of Integration</u>		<u>Content of Interaction</u>
A-A	Someone having intercourse, a man child and a woman child, trying to make love but not knowing how	B
A-A	One person there is pointing and the other is listening.	B
A-A	Two people and two martians fighting	M
A-A	Two women having a fight, calling each other names	M
A-A	Two gremlins ready to hit each other	M
A-A	People pledging hands together--like victors, walking along like that	B

Scoring Outline

Categories of Analysis

- I. Accuracy of response (F+ or F-)
- II. Differentiation (types of figures perceived)
 - (1) Human
 - (2) Quasi-human
 - (3) Human detail
 - (4) Quasi-human detail
- III. Articulation
 - (a) Perceptual attributes
 - (1) Size or physical structure
 - (2) Clothing or hairstyle
 - (3) Posture

(b) Functional attributes

- (1) Sex
- (2) Age
- (3) Role
- (4) Specific identity

(c) Degree of articulation (# features articulated/
responses)

IV. Integration

(a) Motivation of action

- (1) unmotivated
- (2) Reactive
- (3) Intentional

(b) The integration of object and action

- (1) Fusion of object and action
- (2) Incongruent action
- (3) Non-specific action
- (4) Congruent action

(c) Integration of the interaction with another object

(1) Nature of interaction

- (a) Active-passive
- (b) Active-reactive
- (c) Active-active

(2) Content of interaction

- (a) Malevolent
- (b) Benevolent

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APPENDIX B

CONCEPT OF THE OBJECT SCALE SCORING OUTLINE

<u>Categories of Analysis</u>	<u>Scores</u>
I. Accuracy of response	F+ or F-
II. Differentiation	(1-4), total, subcategory
(1) Human	(4)
(2) Quasi-human	(3)
(3) Human detail	(2)
(4) Quasi-human detail	(1)
III. Articulation	(0-11), total, subcategory
(a) Perceptual attributes	
(1) Size or physical structure	(0-1)
(2) Clothing or hairstyle	(0-1)
(3) Posture	(0-1)
(b) Functional attributes	
(1) Sex	(0-2)
(2) Age	(0-2)
(3) Role	(0-2)
(4) Specific identity	(0-2)
IV. Integration	(0-12), total, subcategory
No action	(0, on all integration scores)

<u>Categories of Analysis</u>	<u>Scores</u>
(a) Motivation of action	
(1) Unmotivated	(1)
(2) Reactive	(2)
(3) Intentional	(3)
(b) The integration of object and action	(1)
(1) Fusion of object and action	(2)
(2) Incongruent action	(2)
(3) Non-specific action	(3)
(4) Congruent action	(4)
(c) Integration of the inter- action with another object	
(1) Nature of interaction	
(a) Active-passive	(1)
(b) Active-reactive	(2)
(c) Active-active	(3)
(2) Content of interaction	
(a) Malevolent	(1)
(b) Benevolent	(2)
	Total (1-27)

APPENDIX C

QUALITY OF OBJECT RELATIONS SCALE

(Ryan, 1970,¹ 1973,² 1974)

This scale is an attempt to measure the quality of a person's object relations through an analysis of his/her early memories.³ This analysis is based on the assumption that we learn much about an individual's character structure and inner object world if we treat his/her early memories not as historical truths (or half-truths) but as thematic representations of prototypical dilemmas, life strategies, and role paradigms around which he defines his relationship to himself and to his personal world.

The scale is divided into four major categories which seem to reflect the natural breaks in a continuum of quality of object relationships. (While no attempt was made to construct a simple health-sickness scale, it is assumed that this continuum will be significantly correlated with such a scale).

In terms of quality of object relations, the "psychotic" memories are different from the "borderline" memories in the way that totally alien experiences are different from a sense of alienation from otherwise "normal" experiences. The "psychotic" memories are generally characterized by qualities of chaos or other-worldliness or objectlessness, setting them apart from the "borderline" memories, which have a more coldly narcissistic character. There are people in the "borderline" memories whom we can recognize, but one has the sense that the subject lacks the ability to make a warm,

¹Copyright by Edward R. Ryan, Ph.D.

²Ryan, E. R. (1970) Object relations and ego coping style in early memories. Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Michigan.

Ryan, E. R. (1973) The capacity of the patient to enter an elementary therapeutic relationship in the initial psychotherapy interview, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan.

Ryan, E. R. The capacity of the patient to enter an elementary therapeutic relationship in the initial psychotherapy interview. Paper presented at the Fifth Annual International Convention of the Society for Psychotherapy Research, Denver, Colorado, June, 1974.

³While the scale was developed for use with early memories, it is assumed that it may be used with any projective production (dreams, test responses, autobiography, etc.).

interactional, human contact with them. One senses a self-contained, essentially affectless detachment from people in the "borderline" memories, a detachment from people with whom the subject is unable to or unwilling to become engaged.

The "neurotic" and "normal" memories differ from the "borderline" and "psychotic" memories in one essential respect: in the former categories, one feels the presence of human objects with whom the person is involved, in an affectively charged human interaction. However, the "neurotic" memories represent this quality of relationship at an essentially regressed stage. The person is engaged in painful, conflictual, crisis-laden interactions with the objects of his childhood. The assumption here is that the objects have some real character for the subject, but that this character remains fixed at the subject's infantile experience of these objects, seen through the affectively biased and developmentally immature eyes of his childhood. The listener, in turn, experiences these objects empathically as figures who are in some ways larger than life, protagonists of infantile conflicts, but figures with whom it is possible to make an affective contact that isn't possible in "borderline" or psychotic" memories.⁴

The "normal" memories allow one to have a sense of human engagement with essentially real people at a level of interaction much closer to the present-day adult world of the subject, of the objects, and of the listener. In the normal memories the person perceives, experiences and responds to the other person in a way that another adult, observing the interaction might have responded to him as well. This consensual adult perception is different from the emotional distortion of the characters of the "neurotic" memory, in that the "neurotic" object is pulled into being a figure in a transference conflict rather than an object in his own right.

From the point of view of affective valence, the "psychotic" memories are pre-ambivalent: the die has been cast in the direction of a belief in the existence of only malevolent objects. Good objects are simply wiped out of the inner world of the psychotic. "Borderline" memories also tend to be pre-ambivalent in which objects tend to be "all good" or "all bad." The relationship here is not to objects in a real world; but rather to a projection of the narcissistic sense of the all-good or all-bad self. From the "neurotic" memories one has a sense of ambivalent conflict which does not blot out the reality of the other person. The subject can recognize these

⁴ Because this scale measures relatively undisrupted, self-reported early memories, the lowest scale points represent the object world of those people who can remember and who can communicate their memories when asked.

conflicting aspects of the other person but is unable to resolve them by himself/herself. The "normal" memories range from not quite post-ambivalent, in which the subject does not pull the object into gross distortions, struggling with an unmanageable ambivalence, to post-ambivalent, in which more attention is available for investment in the object as a more fully integrated human being whose many-faceted nature one can tolerate, become engaged with, and enjoy.

An attempt has been made to differentiate each scale point from the next by offering a complex, multi-dimensional definition for it. However, an attempt has also been made to insure that the richness of each scale point is directly referent to an object relations configuration, a level that defines a person engaged in or interacting with a psycho-social world. The attempted result is a scale of the multifaceted definitions of narcissism and object relatedness as manifested in "remembered" self-other interactions.⁵

A. Prototypes of severe disturbances in object relatedness such as occur in psychotic or borderline states. These memories express an absence of any sense of real human objects in a real interpersonal world, and depict instead a malevolent object world, which at worst is nightmarish, and at best offers only an ephemeral glimmer of hope of rescue in an otherwise paranoially evil world.

1. The object world is unreal, nightmarish, other-worldly.

In El paso in the Hilton Hotel And I was there with another boy, I guess it was a boy, and he wanted to leave and get out. And I couldn't get him to stay. So I followed him. We went out on the corner. And I held him back and waited for the lights. And we went down the block. And we went into another hotel. . . . He was all lost. I was just following him. He started crying, so then I took him back to the hotel. (?) I remember my mother said it's a wonder you didn't get run over. I told her I waited for the lights. But she wouldn't believe I

⁵For scoring purposes, the scale may be regarded as a 20 point continuum.

knew the lights. The more I told her the more she wouldn't believe. So I just shut up and let her have her way.

2. The self is the object of malevolent attack in a hostile world of "bad" objects. No vestige of a good human object anywhere to intercede, stave off, or mitigate the threat. More archaic than the feeling of loneliness or deprivation. The experience is not so much of being deprived of good objects, as of being beset by destructive forces in a psychic world devoid of good objects filled exclusively with bad objects.

About five years old. Got bit by a dog . . . the dog was eating and I took a bone away from the puppy and I had to get rabies shots . . . (Where bit?) On the finger. (Painful?) What the fuck! It didn't tickle . . . and the rabies shots didn't either. Now I'm getting sarcastic. (Why?) Why? What the fuck . . . how can I remember . . . I'll get "crazy" and tell you it was fun, I loved it! This reminds me of the Senate investigation.

3. No control over potentially devastating events, and no sense of having any control over them. The self is represented as a victim of the unexpected and uncontrollable occurrence, not at all able to influence or forestall destructive events. People are not experienced as agents but rather as elements in a field of forces--self as well as others--and these forces originate outside of the self. The story is told with a matter-of-fact acceptance of the evil or dangers depicted.

My early memory is riding in a baby buggy down a hill and cutting my eye open. Somebody pushed me down a hill in a buggy. They say I was very young . . . about 2 or so . . . very young. (?) I can still feel myself going down that hill and I can see the hill. (Feeling tone?) I made quite a fuss about it I guess. I was much too young to have feelings of anything but fright. (?) It was either some relative or some neighbor child who pushed me down . . . older children did it. As I grew up they talked about it and that helped me to remember it.

4. At best these memories involve a cry of protest out of the field of forces depicted in A3. There is a hint of emerging assertion of self against a cold, or hostile, or uncaring, or uncontrollable object world.

Another one I remember. I was very upset and I was telling my mother that I got blamed for everything that happened around here. I yelled and then I couldn't get my breath. She spanked me with a lathe. (?) A thick, rough yardstick with slivers on it. And I remember getting so mad that I couldn't breathe. I wondered if I was going to die.

5. The cry for help, or the plight itself, finally brings about some glimmer of hope in the form of a seemingly fortuitous intervention; the "good object" who might come to one's rescue is more magical than real.

I think the earliest I remember is being in the convent when I was about five. Mother put me in the convent because of my brother's illness. I remember being surrounded by a lot of nuns and being terrified. They looked like bit black crows--very menacing. One in particular had big black eyebrows and I think she gave me a lollipop which helped to lull me a little bit.

- B. These memories depict a level of disturbance in object relatedness closely akin to the malevolence of the A-category memories. The B-memories, like the A-memories, show no vestige of a sense of real, good objects in the subject's inner world. Memories B1 to B4 convey instead a sense of empty aloneness with, at best, some wholly self-invested satisfactions filling the peopleless world. B5 depicts a state of chronic object-hunger, i.e., a bleak, hungry, deprived sense of separateness or aloneness.
 1. The world is not so much "bad" as it is empty, essentially devoid of "good" human objects, past or present, and equally devoid of good self-feeling. Or the memory may also be a purely narcissistic expression of well-being, unrelated to the presence in the person's object world of other people as instrumental to his/her well-being.

I remember when I was 4, or maybe 5, at my great-grandmother's house, in Denver. Behind the house there was a garden, or a terrace with a garden. I used to go out there and sit and watch the birds and the neighbor's cat. It was a very peaceful setting . . .

perfect. (?) There was a white picket fence all around.
 (?) I feel like I'm at peace with the world . . .
 I can see it clearly.

2. The self is narcissistically self-absorbed due to an illness, wholly invested in the fact of being ill or in the experience of the pains, symptoms, or deprivations associated with being ill. There may be some allusions to an attendant care-taker, but these people exist only as props in the subject's wholly self-involved state.

No idea how old, still in a crib. Always sick at Christmas. Sick all my early life. Sick in crib and could see a Christmas tree. Could have been two and thats all I have, the impression of the Christmas tree and that I was sick. (Feelings?) I don't know. Sometimes I thought about it. Never could remember much of my childhood. No feeling. I could imagine having a feeling. (?) Feeling I wish I hadn't been ill. (Age?) Two. (?) No, must have been in a living room. Brought into the room with the tree, but I was ill, don't know whether a cold or illness or what.

3. Alone except for things rather than people. The self is related to possession rather than people. The inanimate objects acquire a very special value which gives them the status of transitional objects. (There is in these relationships to things a central component of "primary narcissism.")

I can remember it was summer and I was lying in the bed. I'm not sure whether I was about four months old or what. I can just remember lying in a crib and looking out a window. I'm not sure whether that's how old I was. I think that's about it. Sometime when the snow was off the ground anyway. (Saw?) Oh, I just saw the stuff in the backyard--clothesline, and stuff like that--nothing much, but I must happen to remember the incident. (Feeling tone?) Well, no, I was all by myself. (Feeling?) Oh, I think it was a kind of good feeling. Of course, most kids when they're only four months old, they shouldn't feel too bad. (Age?) I'm not sure whether it was four months or whether I was a year old, but I know it was summer and we lived in the same house for only two summers. I know it was in that house. I figure it was about four, four to five months. (Thought of before?) Oh yeah, I remember that all the time. I doubt that I could forget it. I mean once it sticks with you, it sticks with you.

(NOTE: If the object is enjoyed or treasured because of its secondary narcissistic values, i.e., for its socially defined, mutually enjoyed and other-rewarded qualities, it belongs in category C, e.g., the "yellow sunsuit" example in C2.)

4. Other people if present at all, are incidental, shadowy, two-dimensional in character. They may not be bad objects, but are not yet good or real objects. They remain essentially impersonal props rather than participant others. Self and other come across as vague, detached, impersonal, almost shadowy in character (despite inquiry aimed at eliciting more convincing expression of interpersonal involvement). Both self and others could just as well not have been there at all as far as any real effect it would have had on others.

Or, the self may have been only the inertly participating object of others' initiatives. There may be what seems like an interaction between self and other, but the separate participants evoke no empathy from the examiner. Also included here are interactions of a grossly devaluing, exploitative nature; the other is treated as a "thing."*

I remember . . . I don't know where I was or how old I was, but they took me in this place to have my picture made and the people were . . . plate glass window with people passing by. There was a stand with artificial grass they put me on and took my picture. I remember standing up there on that green and people passing by looking in. I think I remember that. (Feeling?) No . . . (Old?) I think I asked my mother once how old I was and I think it was under two years old, they have the picture hanging on the wall. (?) When I was a little kid and see the picture I guess.

5. A painful yearning for unavailable or lost objects in an otherwise bleak world, or a euphoric basking in a diffuse goodness. The other persons, if present, are anonymous figures, interchangeable one with another. They are conveyors of the global feeling-quality, or pegs onto which to hang the feeling state.

It's hard to place them in time. I remember sitting in a kitchen with a large black stove . . . I was sick with something because I was wrapped up in a blanket. This may have been the time I fell in a fishpond.

*Ryan, personal communication, 1985.

I've never been sure. And the kitchen was full of friendly people. I don't remember who they are. Chiefly, I remember the blanket and the stove. (Feeling tone?) Of comfort, and of people paying attention to me. Being taken care of.

C. Other people do appear as important foci of one's relatedness to the world, but relationships with them are childishly conceived, neurotically defined, or self-centeredly limited. The sense of others as objects in their own right is stunted or warped. People in the stories take on their significance only in terms of the subject's pressing needs or intrusive transference paradigms.

1. The other person is present in the life space, important to the subject, but his character is defined almost solely as a need-satisfying or need-frustrating object or being. (If that object takes on traces of a more individually distinctive person, the score would move up to C2 or even C3).

Then I was sent to the orphans' home. While there I can remember my brother and I were both there. I remember just looking toward the building where I knew he was. Realizing that he was not far away.

2. The self is caught up in some special, interpersonally relevant but nonetheless self-centered interest of its own in relation to others. The self may be doing something with others, but it would be essentially a parallel activity rather than a full-bodied interaction with them.

I think the first thing that I remember is playing with dolls in the back yard, under an apricot tree with a little girl. We were aware of each other but we each played with her own doll and didn't have much to say to each other. A very nice time being together, enjoyed it very much. (?) I can remember in a vague way what she looked like and I remember that she moved away. She wasn't living there too long.

3. Both self and other are more distinct people, but they are defined exclusively by the subject's immediate intrapsychic conflict or affect state, not as unique persons in their own right. Generally, they simply represent starkly set, incompletely integrated needs or restrictions or conflicts. Although the people often seem more alive, the essentially infantile transference elements in their characterization is readily apparent.

I recall during the first world war when the troops were coming back. I can remember a night when it was raining and troops were marching down the street in the rain. Then I recall my uncle . . . I mean my father's younger brother . . . coming in the front door dripping wet. He seemed immensely tall, he took off his sidearm and laid it on the table in the front hall. The thing fascinated me. When I thought no one was looking I reached up for the pistol. My uncle's voice from behind me said, "Look out! That will bite." It seems like I could almost see the thing move and it scared the hell out of me. I backed away from it. (Age?) Two and a half.

4. Some give and take in relation to others, but the overriding focus is on the self. Others are aware of and responsive to the self but are decidedly secondary figures in the case of characters. The self seems somewhat aware of and responsive to events, people, and things in a real world, and this world shows the beginning signs of a reality and validity of its own, one which exists independently of the event being reported. Sometimes there is an inversion of this relationship between self and others, such that the self is seen as the more shadowy, secondary object, and the others seem more alive and real enough to empathize with.

Well, I know quite well because I've thought about it. They say I was two and a half at the time and we were beside a lake someplace in the States and I was playing with this ball and while I was playing with it it rolled into the lake. Did I say I was with my mother and sisters? And the current carried it away. My mother told me it was going to flow into the ocean and never come back. And I was fairly astounded by this. I just stood there and watched sort of dramatically. (?) I thought it was sort of dramatic. (?) It's quite often true of things that happen in life, you can't bring them back. (?) Well, you could say it represents a sort of fatalistic philosophy of my own and you can't change it or do

anything about it, just resign yourself to it. I didn't cry, I just stood there thinking and was just very surprised.

5. The self-other interaction depicted in the story involves traces of a real relationship; it is more than an exclusively transference-based or conflict-drenched representation of self and other. Nonetheless, the characterizations, especially of other persons in the story, remain thin. The other person does not quite emerge with a full-bodied identity of his own. The interactions at this level begin to seem more palpable and real, as increasingly believable motives are ascribed not only to the self but to the others as well.

When I was sick, about three years old. It was the next day after my mother and father had a big party during prohibition. I was sitting under the piano eating cheese and crackers and drinking stale booze--trying to hide from my mother. I took a drink from a glass--spit it out. My mother came and caught me and scolded me. In fact, I got a few pokes from that. I don't know if it's the earliest one but it's the one that came to mind right away.

- D. As depicted at this level, interpersonal relationships reflect a more sharply defined differentiation of a real self from real others in real mutual interactions. Other persons come across as people with their own personalities, motives and emotional postures; they are clearly more than mere extensions, props, or projected facets of the self. The story presents distinct characterizations of self and others. Even in those stories which are built around prototypical unconscious themes (usually "phallic" or "Oedipal"), the figures emerge as separate and distinct people with identities which clearly transcend their roles as transference objects. The listener is provided with a sound basis for empathizing with the motives and viewpoints

of each figure in his own right, not just as a transference object who really provides the listener empathic access to the subject himself.

1. Although the memory is a self-centered one, other people and circumstances are brought onto the scene in a way which adds realism and puts the self-other interaction into a broader, more realistic, less self-centered perspective. The event seems real and permits empathy not only with the self, but to a somewhat lesser extent, with the somewhat contrasting separate posture(s) of the other person(s) in the story. Thoughts and feelings of self and other(s) are recounted by the subject, or are clearly implied.

When I was in crib--I must have been two years old--my mother was saying goodnight to me and I had my finger on my penis and my mother said don't ever touch that. That's the first memory I can tell with any assurance. (How did you feel?) Well, my mother hadn't told me the name of that part of my body. I just had an impression that there must have been something wrong with it. But I think she must have said something about it before to me or I wouldn't have felt the way I did. (?) Seemed to sink in so much. I don't know that one saying would have had that effect. Though maybe it could have. Our own son has developed a special interest in his sexual organs at the same age. My mother was looking at me when I put my hand on it and I think I had some misgivings about it when I did it--fear that what she would say she actually ended up saying--that she would actually say what she did.

2. Events are reported with a less self-centered bias. The memory involves sharing with or joining with others in a common interest in something outside the self. Together, self and other(s) experience some interest, activity, person, thing or event which does not necessarily have more immediate bearing for the subject than for any of the others who share that experience with him. The subject's life span seems less narrowly, less egocentrically delimited than in the preceding examples.
3. The self-other interaction reflects clearly the separate, inner-directed motives of self and others. Thoughts and feelings of all participants in the event are conveyed well enough to allow the listener to empathize vicariously with

both the self and the others. One can readily participate vicariously in the event as it was experienced by the significant others in the story, as well as in how it seemed to the subject. The others' point of view is adequately grasped and effectively mediated in the subject's report of the incident.

4. There is active, two-way communication of separate, or even contrasting, two-way communication of emotional and interpersonal messages. The other(s) seem real, very much there, with well-differentiated thoughts, feelings, and motives of their own. Each of the characters emerges in a way which makes him seem real and recognizable as a person in his own right, someone whom we can imagine in situations other than the one recounted.
5. Multiple, bilateral role relationships with a variety of different people, with a clear articulation of the distinct individuality of the self and others in these relationships. A sense of belonging to a community of separate individuals. A spirit of positive interactions; even negative aspects are presented in a wider context of mutual trust, acceptance, regard or affection.

I remember going on vacation with my family (smile). I always looked forward to going camping . . . we usually went camping in a tent when I was a kid . . . I still do it today with my family. Well, I remember one time in particular. We were all filling the car getting ready to go. And each of us had our own jobs. My brother and I were horsing around with the sleeping bags and as usual my mother and father got into an argument about how much to take. They always started something when we were just about ready to leave. My mother was always fussing at the last minute and this always got my father grumpy. When they saw my brother, J_____ and me laughing--he was about five then--my father chased us down the driveway. (?) About seven I think. I remember him scooping us up and carrying us back to the car and we were yelling and laughing at the same time. We still kid about it today. (?) I don't know but I guess my brother and I must have seemed like rascals at the time because they really got mad at us when we laughed. (?) No, this happened lots of times. (?) At the time I just remember feeling good and as I look back at it now I feel I was pretty lucky.

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APPENDIX D

COLLAPSED VERSION OF OBJECT RELATIONS SCALE

<u>Ryan Object Relations Scale</u>	<u>Collapsed Version Applied to ORT Stories</u>
A 1	1
2	
3	2
4	
5	3
B 6	
7	
8	4
9	5
10	6
C11	7
12	8
13	
14	9
15	
D16	10
17	
18	
19	11
20	

APPENDIX E

ORT STORIES EXEMPLIFYING LEVELS OF OBJECT REPRESENTATION

LEVEL 1

This man, he has a lot of things on his mind. He's standing trying to think . . . and something's huddled on the ground next to him--an old woman with a hood, something evil. Something trying to make him think something, get in his mind. And he's trying to look away, tries not to look at it. And at the same time he's very mixed up, and . . . sick.

LEVEL 2

This looks like an old kitchen, a country kitchen of some sort, and it looks homey--except for this weird shadow at the window. This is another one of those frightening pictures. There's someone hanging back just looking and watching and waiting, and they don't look like they're trying to get in the window, they're just watching and looking in.(?) Maybe to hurt someone or rob someone. Maybe he's angry.

LEVEL 3

The solitary man is walking down the steps of the courthouse. The people below are furious, the mob. They want justice against this man--they're a lynch mob. They will abruptly and without warning grab him and take him to a tree and hang him. (?) The man's experiencing fear, dread--he knows what will happen. He also knows it's inevitable, there's no escape. Even the police are looking the other way.

LEVEL 4

Like a man in a dreamworld or a spirit world. He's observing something he's never seen before, as if it's unreal or imagined. He's not quite sure if he's really there. This seems to represent a fountain of light, not a fountain of water. Like he's standing on a little island and water's flowing around. There's a glow about him as if he's not real. (?) I guess he's very tired, as if his mind is drifting off into some sort of wild imaginative thing. He's totally relaxed, looks like serenity. He's escaped to a place where he's totally relaxed, at peace.

It's a shadow of a man or a woman--I can't tell which. I can't make a story out of that. It's a man or a woman just standing there. (?) It could be on solid ground with mist around it. It might

be a man standing on the edge of the universe surveying the world.

LEVEL 5

It's hard to feel anything about this picture. It's foggy. There's a shadow of a man and a shadow, it looks like, of a woman that's sitting on the ground beside him. They're surrounded in fog. They're on a river bank it looks like, and that looks like a weeping willow in the background. The man is just there, not doing anything. And the woman is there in the corner. They're just there and there doesn't seem like there's anything else that's going to happen; that just looks like the way it's going to be.

A man and a woman have just finished screwing. They're in a room; they live there. Very poor, probably a rundown hotel. And after that, they have nothing to say to each other. There's not much to their relationship. He's staring out the window; she's lying in bed, smoking. They'll leave after awhile.

LEVEL 6

This looks like someone coming up to a very empty room. There is a drabness about it, a coldness. It's a man, hands in his pockets. There is a terrible emptiness there, no comfort, nothing to look forward to. I'd say he's lonely, very lonely. If someone's just left him he should get her back, make it up. Either he has lost someone, and is just lonely, or someone has left him, and he feels very empty.

LEVEL 7

He seems to be comforting her or something. I think she's worried, fearful about leaving that room. He's assuring her, comforting her, telling her it will be alright. Hard to say why she's nervous. Maybe she's going to have something done--maybe going to the doctor. I think it turns out alright--she's got someone who's interested in her. Because she knows he wants her and wants her to be alright, then she will be alright.

LEVEL 8

The group of people are listening to somebody and the one, the separate one, is halfway listening but would rather stand apart and touch that wall. That's what they are listening to, something about that ruin. And the one apart does not like being there because the

possibilities of, what that ruin, used to hold are endless. That one wants to go back alone, later. (?) Cuz that one doesn't care what the ruin is made of, that's what they're listening to.

LEVEL 9

There were a husband and a wife, visiting the wife's mother's house. One night the mother was coming upstairs to go to bed and she saw the husband and wife standing in the hallway hugging one another and sort of talking to each other. The husband and wife seemed to have just been talking about something personal, or just resolved a conflict, because they were looking at each other with a lot of meaning in their eyes. The mother seemed to be able to sense these things so the mother stayed there in the shadows until the husband and wife went in their room. Then the mother went to bed.

LEVEL 10

There's a man standing next to a creek, kind of a wide creek. There's a willow branch hanging down, it's a humid area. His arms are folded; he's just had an argument with this woman over here. She's sitting on the ground with her knees drawn up and her arms around her knees. They're not speaking to each other, but they will be soon. (?) She's pregnant and she wants to have the baby but he doesn't think they can afford it and they're really not mad at each other. They don't really even have enough information, I mean, she's pregnant but she's been taking the pill 2 weeks not knowing she's pregnant, so they don't know how it will affect the baby.

LEVEL 11

This is the daughter of this man. This is her first date. She's in high school; this fellow here asked her to a dance at the school. He's taken her home and they're getting ready to say goodbye and kiss goodnight. The father is sort of like an observer; he's in the background here. The whole situation has been a struggle for everyone. Daughter had finally gotten up the courage to ask her father for permission to go on a date; she'd asked knowing how often he'd carried on about how young she was. She and her father ended up having a big argument about it. Finally he admitted that maybe he was wrong and gave her his permission. The fellow had been nervous too about asking the girl out; this was his first date. He also thought that her father was not real happy about it and so he'd been pretty uneasy when he'd picked her up that night. Anyway, as the father watched them when they returned from the date, he began to realize once again that he was being too nosy and maybe protective.

So, he sort of laughed at himself about it and left to go into the house. His daughter got to say goodnight to her date without benefit of his supervision.

APPENDIX F

STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT
(Clients)

The research which you are being asked to participate in seeks to examine the ways people experience and relate to one another. The research study is not related to any service you may be receiving at the (Psychological Clinic, Counseling Center). In return for participation in the study, you will receive \$10.00.

You will be given several standard psychological tests mainly involving describing pictures or telling stories. These tests, which are used routinely in settings such as the (Clinic, Center), will be administered by the project director and a research assistant. Two 60-90 minute sessions will be required to complete all of the tests, and one of the sessions will be recorded on videotape.

Should you decide at any point that you wish to discontinue the testing and withdraw from the study, you are free to do so without penalty. Withdrawal from the study will not affect the availability of any services you are presently receiving from the (Clinic, Center). You are in no way obligated to your therapist or the (Clinic, Center) to participate in the testing.

All results will be held in strict confidence. Your therapist will not be informed of your participation or of any results. All data will be identified by number, not your name, and will be stored in a secure file. The tapes will only be viewed by the project director and a research assistant. Following completion of the study, videotapes will be erased, while written test results, identified only by number will be kept in the possession of the project director. Any publication of the findings from this study will be presented in such a way as to protect the identities of individual subjects.

You have the right to ask any questions about the research. Should you wish to be informed of the overall results of the study, a summary will be sent to you upon its completion. If you desire such a summary, you should give your name and mailing address to the project director. Individual test results will not be made available to subjects.

I have read and understood this statement of informed consent.

Signed: _____

Date: _____

Witness: _____

Project Director:

Address:

Phone:

APPENDIX G

STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT
(Students)

The research which you are being asked to participate in seeks to examine the ways people experience and relate to one another. The research study is not related to any Psychology Department coursework which you may be presently involved in. In return for participation in the study, you will receive \$10.00.

You will be given several standard psychological tests mainly involving describing pictures or telling stories. These tests, which are used routinely in clinical settings, will be administered by the project director and a research assistant. Two 60-90 minute sessions will be required to complete all of the tests, and one of the sessions will be recorded on videotape.

Should you decide at any point that you wish to discontinue the testing and withdraw from the study, you are free to do so without penalty. Withdrawal from the study will not affect your standing in any psychology course you may be taking. You are in no way obligated to your instructor or the Psychology Department to participate in the testing.

All results will be held in strict confidence. Neither your instructor nor the Psychology Department will be informed of your participation or of any results. All data will be identified by number, not your name, and will be stored in a secure file. The tapes will only be viewed by the project director and a research assistant. Following completion of the study, the videotapes will be erased, while written test results will be kept in the possession of the project director. Any publication of the findings from this study will be presented in such a way as to protect the identities of individual subjects.

You have the right to ask any questions about the research. Should you wish to be informed of the overall results of the study, a summary will be sent to you upon its completion. If you desire such a summary, you should give your name and mailing address to the project director. Individual test results will not be made available to subjects.

I have read and understood this statement of informed consent.

Signed:

Date:

Witness:

Project Director:

Address:

Phone:

APPENDIX H

FEEDBACK TO SUBJECTS

Thank you for participating in this study. I will now briefly explain its purpose. I was interested in examining whether the types of images of people produced on the Rorschach Inkblot Test would reflect different aspects of how an individual perceives or views others. The procedures that required telling stories or relating a memory were used in order to provide an independent basis for assessing portrayals of other people and human relationships. The results from these procedures were then compared to the findings from the Rorschach test.

The results of the study indicated that, in certain respects, one's Rorschach images of people do express aspects of how one perceives and experiences other people. It was found that the more unrealistic one's Rorschach images of people, the more likely that others, and human relationships, are viewed in relatively unsatisfying or conflictual ways. In other words, human images on the Rorschach do seem to say something about whether an individual is likely to experience difficulties in his or her relationships with others.

This conclusion is only tentative and requires further study. Nevertheless, the results may be of value in better understanding and assisting people who are experiencing problems in their relationships with others.

Once again, thank you very much for participating in this study.

Sincerely,

Larry F. Brown

VITA

Larry F. Brown was born in New York City on March 1, 1950. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in religious studies from Moravian College in 1972. He entered the doctoral program in psychology at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, in 1979. He completed an internship at Topeka State Hospital in 1984. He received a Doctor of Philosophy degree with a major in Psychology in June, 1986.