12-2013

The Latin Readers of Algazel, 1150-1600

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The Latin Readers of Algazel, 1150-1600

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Anthony H. Minnema
December 2013

DEDICATION

My grandfather shared his love of history with me at an early age and encouraged me throughout my graduate career. He greatly looked forward to the completion of this project, but passed away two months before the defense. I dedicate this dissertation to his memory.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I incurred a multitude of debts while completing this dissertation. First and foremost, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to Thomas Burman for his guidance, vast knowledge, and infectious enthusiasm. Over the years he has been a generous teacher and provided a formidable example of a medieval historian of the translation and circulation of Arabic works in medieval and Early-Modern Europe. I would also like to thank the members of my committee, Maura Lafferty, Robert Bast, and Jay Rubenstein, for their willingness to answer questions and to share their expertise, as well as their insights into the thorny problems that arose during my research. It is also an honor to have Charles Burnett of the Warburg Institute serve as an outside reader for the dissertation. It has been a pleasure to stand on their shoulders as I worked on this project.

I first decided on pursuing the Latin translation of al-Ghazali's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* in the summer of 2010 while researching several manuscripts in Worcester Cathedral with support from the Department of History at the University of Tennessee, which also supplied funds for research travel and reproductions of manuscripts. Three other organizations provided funding for research trips to examine manuscripts in Europe. I would like to thank the Center for European Study for their Andrew W. Mellon/CES Pre-Dissertation Research Fellowship, which allowed me to spend the summer of 2011 at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, the Institut de recherche et d'histoire des textes in Paris, and the Bibliothèque municipale in Laon. During this trip, I greatly benefitted from the assistance of Patricia Stirnemann, who graciously guided me through the extensive resources of the IRHT. The UT Center for International Education

provided a McClure Scholarship to conduct research in Italy during the summer of 2012. The Marco Institute at UT supplied funds to extend this trip to libraries in Austria. With the help of these awards, I was able to visit the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Biblioteca Angelica, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale in Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Universitätsbibliothek Graz, and Österreichische Nationalbibliothek. I am especially indebted to the University of Tennessee Humanities Center for their Graduate Student Fellowship, which allowed me to write most of the dissertation and obtain reproductions of the manuscripts that I could not examine in person. The generous support of these institutions and the helpful staff of these libraries provided me with incredible opportunities to examine and discuss priceless records of Arab philosophy's presence in the Middle Ages.

Many other people were instrumental in the completion of this dissertation. I would like to thank Chad Black, Meghan Worth, Geoff Martin, Josh Durbin, and Kyle Stephens for their participation in the Dissertation Writing Group, which afforded an excellent opportunity for peer review as well as deadlines to write chapters. The Humanities Center also served as an informal setting for discussing the dissertation with other scholars, and its director, Thomas Heffernan, offered considerable encouragement throughout the fellowship year. Frans van Liere supplied helpful insight into the controversy over the Beatific Vision between Pope John XXII and Robert of Anjou. I am especially appreciative of my wife, Linnea, who patiently listened to me talk about all the facets of this dissertation for three years, and my daughter, Joscelyn, whose birth in

February 2013 provided a much-needed sense of perspective and a distraction from the project. I look forward to the prospect of spending more time with the both of them.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how Arabic works found an audience in medieval Europe and became a part of the Latin canon of philosophy. It focuses on a Latin translation of an Arabic philosophical work, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, by the Muslim theologian al-Ghazali, known as Algazel in Latin. This work became popular because it served as a primer for Arab philosophy and helped Latins understand a tradition that had built upon Greek scholarship for centuries. To find the translation's audience, this project looks at two sets of evidence. It studies the works of Latin scholars who drew from Algazel's arguments and illustrates that the translation's influence was more extensive than historians have previously thought. It also examines copies of the translation in forty manuscripts and broadens the Latin audience of Arab philosophy beyond what historians typically study—the university—to include the anonymous scribes and readers who comprise the often-voiceless majority of medieval literate society. These codices yield details about Algazel's readers, their interests and concerns, which cannot be gathered from other sources. Scholars spared little expense with these manuscripts since several are quite ornate or contain gold leaf. Many copies possess wide margins where scholars interacted with the text by writing notes, diagrams, pointing hands, warnings, and the occasional doodle. Scribes integrated the work into the established canon by placing Algazel in manuscripts with Christian philosophers from Augustine to Aquinas. The manuscripts also contain marginalia left by generations of readers, which give insight into how scholars read the text and what passages grabbed their attention. The notes indicate that a few readers agreed with ecclesiastical authorities who condemned

Algazel's work since some scholars wrote warnings in the margins alongside passages that they considered dangerous. Thus, Latins paradoxically expended great effort to understand Arab philosophers while simultaneously condemning ideas in the translations as errors. This study expands our understanding of the European interaction with the Arab tradition by examining reading practices with evidence drawn from the readers themselves. It demonstrates that Europeans read translated Arabic works alongside long-standing authorities and treated Arab authors as valuable members of the Latin canon.

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Abbreviations used in the notes and in the bibliography

AHDLMA	*Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge*
AMOO	*Alberti Magni opera omnia edenda curavit Institutum Alberti Magni Coloniense Bernhardo Geyer praeside*. Münster: Aschendorff, 1951-.
BAV	Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana
BNC	Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale
BnF	Bibliothèque nationale de France
BNM	Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana
PL	J.P. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Latina*
RTAM	*Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*
STP	*Summa theologicae philosophiae* = Latin translation of al-Ghazali's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*
TAOO	*Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita*. Rome, 1882-.

INTRODUCTION

In the fifth volume of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Edward Gibbon speculated about what would have happened if Charles Martel had not defeated an invading Muslim force at Poitiers in 732. This victory was significant for Gibbon because he saw no other force capable of stopping the Muslims from expanding their territory as far as Scotland. The victorious Muslims would have imposed their religion on Europe and, Gibbon quipped, "[p]erhaps the interpretation of the Koran [sic] would now be taught in the schools of Oxford."[1] This conquest of Europe never came to pass, yet Gibbon's imagined Arab conquest of Oxford was not completely illusory. Early thirteenth-century manuscripts from Oxford containing translations from Arabic indicate that Europeans studied Arab philosophy and science even before the formal establishment of a university. Instead of military conquest, Latin Christendom faced an invasion of texts by Arab authors that captured and occupied scholars' minds and libraries for centuries. Gibbon might have found this conquest more insidious since it was an invasion carried out solely by Europeans who were infatuated with the Arab intellectual tradition. European scribes and scholars, not Arab soldiers, would solidify the place of Arab scholarship within the Latin canon for centuries.

Despite the evidence testifying to a medieval European obsession with Arab science and philosophy, it is still difficult to modify the long-held belief of an unbroken Western tradition that stretches back to the Greeks and whose development owes little to

[1] Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 3 vols. (New York: Penguin, 1996): Vol. 3, 336.

other cultures. The perceived intellectual divisions between West and East remain strong in scholarly and popular imaginations, and have grown stronger due to concerns over terrorism and immigration. Modern events obscure the possibility that intellectual borrowing occurred earlier between civilizations, especially during a period synonymous with jihad and crusade, and counterarguments have arisen. In response to claims that Europeans owe their knowledge of Aristotle to the Arabic-to-Latin translation movements in the second half of the twelfth century, Sylvain Gouguenheim asserted in 2008 that much of Aristotle's philosophy was translated from Greek into Latin a half of a century earlier at Mont-Saint Michel.[2] The thesis produced an immediate backlash. Alain de Libera responded in an April 2008 editorial, with signatures from fifty-six scholars, contending that Gouguenheim's position is unsupported by the sources, unevenly argued, and Islamophobic.[3] Many of Aristotle's *libri naturales* were translated from Greek into Latin in the twelfth century, but there are enough variations and omissions in these

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[2] Gouguenheim argues that Greek learning never left the West and that the Arab contribution to Greek philosophy is overestimated. He cites a number of Greek popes in the early Middle Ages and the Greek works of Aristotle sent to Carolingian kings. He emphasizes the role of Christians in the Arabic translation of Aristotle, arguing that Greek philosophy had little effect on Islamic learning because the differences between the languages made it difficult for Arabic to express elements of Greek reasoning. Thus, the Arab world possessed a superficial understanding of Greek philosophy. To demonstrate Aristotle's continued involvement later in the Middle Ages, he argues that James of Venice translated most of his philosophical works from Greek into Latin at Mont-Saint Michel in the 1120s—fifty years before the translation of the same works from Arabic in Toledo. Early copies of James' translations remained in Mont-Saint Michel for centuries, suggesting a lasting interest in Aristotle at the abbey. Sylvain Gouguenheim, *Aristote au Mont-Saint-Michel: Les racines grecques de l'Europe chrétienne* (Paris: Seuil, 2008).

[3] De Libera counters Gouguenheim by arguing that there is little evidence that James of Venice resided at Mont-Saint Michel save for the presence of his translations there. Beyond the mysterious nature of James of Venice, he illustrates that Gouguenheim's arguments are haphazard and driven by ideology. Muslim scholars are accused of being unscientific and anti-philosophic while Latins escape these charges. Arabic is unable to express Greek ideas, but Gouguenheim nevertheless credits Christians with the ability to understand Aristotle in Arabic in the Islamic world. Alain de Libera, "Oui, l'Occident chrétien est redevable au monde islamique," *Libération*, April 30, 2008.

translations to indicate that the program was hardly systematic.[4] Translations from Arabic in the same period demonstrate a more focused attempt to make Aristotle accessible. These scholars translated Aristotle along with a host of commentaries and works by Arab philosophers who built upon the Philosopher's arguments, providing Latins with a vibrant tradition of Aristotelian philosophy. In addition to later waves of translations from Greek and Arabic, the varied application of these two sets of Aristotelian works further complicates the question of precedence since Latin scholars often read the Greek-to-Latin translations of Aristotle in concert with the works of his Arab continuators during much of the Middle Ages. De Libera and others continue to argue in favor of the Arab contribution to the Latin tradition and seek to unmask Islamophobic arguments in modern scholarship.[5] This polemical rhetoric among scholars and the persistent anxiety over the assimilation of Muslims in Europe suggests that the debate over the Arab influence on the West is far from over, but at the heart of the argument should be a focus on sources—not just when they were translated, but when, where, and how they were used.

This study examines one of these works, the Latin translation of al-Ghazali's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa,* and its readers to create an extended case study on the place of Arab philosophy in the development of a Western intellectual tradition. For more than three centuries, Latin scholars read his work as part of a larger project to understand

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[4] The best interpretation of the comparable circulation and usage of the translations of Aristotle from Greek and Arabic can be found in Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Aristotele dal mondo arabo a quello latino," *Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972).

[5] Many authors who signed the article in *Libération* offer more detailed arguments in an edited volume on the subject of the influence of Arab philosophy on the Latin tradition and scholarly efforts to undermine this influence. Philippe Büttgen, Alain de Libera, Marwan Rashed, and Irène Rosier-Catach, *Les Grecs, les Arabes et nous enquête sur l'islamophobie savante* (Paris: Fayard, 2009).

Aristotelian philosophy. Those scholars' treatment of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*—including how scribes copied and decorated the work, the way readers annotated the text, and the quotations authors pulled from its passages—indicate that it was a highly-valued, useful, and authoritative volume in Latin Christendom. Yet the effort expended by scribes and scholars in the copying and use of this work reveals something more. During this project to acquire and assimilate Aristotelian philosophy, scholars integrated the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* into the Latin canon, in which al-Ghazali enjoyed a long and fruitful tenure, even though the text is a poor reflection of the Muslim theologian's legacy in the Arab world. This examination of al-Ghazali's Latin audience participates in a wider discussion about the place and function of Arab philosophy in medieval Europe. Through their widespread use of the Latin translation of al-Ghazali's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, medieval readers and authors blurred the line between Western and Eastern philosophy.

I demonstrate the integration of al-Ghazali into the Western tradition during the Middle Ages by studying two sets of sources: the works of medieval authors who used al-Ghazali's arguments and the medieval manuscripts that contain copies of this translation. Many scholars from across Latin Christendom made use of the work and cited its contents often from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Al-Ghazali also appears with regularity in a variety of influential Latin works of philosophy. However, these sources describe only a fraction of al-Ghazali's Latin audience since there is abundant evidence that many more scholars read the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* than wrote about it. The extant manuscripts that possess the Latin translation of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* contain a wealth of information about the scribes who fashioned these copies and the readers who owned

them. Many codices possess generations of annotations that offer a glimpse into readers' philosophical interests and theological concerns regarding al-Ghazali and Arab philosophy. Using these two sets of complementary sources, this study describes how the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* became a popular text within the Latin canon.

From al-Ghazali to Algazel

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali was born in 1058 or 1059 at Tus in Khurasan, a province in Northeast Persia, where he received an excellent education in Islamic jurisprudence under the most influential Ash'arite jurists of the period. His considerable education and learning attracted the attention of Seljuk viziers and sultans, who awarded him impressive teaching positions in Baghdad and Damascus. This support allowed him to study and write on a wide variety of subjects outside of jurisprudence, including the discipline of *falsāfa*, the Arabic tradition of philosophy. He suddenly abandoned his prestigious post at Baghdad in 1095, compelled by Sufi teachings to pursue a different course of study and an ascetic lifestyle. He taught at several smaller schools in his native Khurasan before dying in Tus in 1111, but many of his works became influential during his lifetime and were read throughout the Arab world.

The reason for al-Ghazali's lasting appeal lies in his ability to argue from a variety of intellectual systems, forging a middle way among the often competing perspectives of Sufi spirituality, Asha'rite theology, and the Arab, specifically Avicennian, tradition of philosophy. In al-Ghazali's eleventh-century Islamic world, there was a precarious balance of intellectual authority between jurists, who advocated a literal reading of the Qur'an in their theology, and philosophically-minded scholars, who

favored a more speculative theology. A jurist by training, al-Ghazali dedicated years to the study of philosophy in order to decipher what was useful and sacrilegious in its teachings. On the one hand, his voluminous *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn* (*The Revival of the Religious Sciences*) is a comprehensive guide to the Muslim religious life. His critique of metaphysics and psychology in the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*) stands as an incisive contribution to Arab philosophy. In the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, al-Ghazali attacks twenty heretical or erroneous philosophical teachings, refuting them with reasoned arguments rather than recourse to the Qur'an. The work was immediately popular, earning al-Ghazali praise from scholars across the Islamic world.[6] Despite the disparagement of philosophy, however, Jules Janssens has argued that al-Ghazali can hardly be called an outspoken critic of the discipline since his logic and argumentation betrays not only a familiarity with the teachings of the philosophers, most notably Avicenna, but also borrows considerably from them.[7] Frank Griffel and Richard

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[6] The *Tahāfut* became an impressive justification for the Ash'arite approach to theology, which appeared to have contained the heretical elements of Aristotelian philosophy while making use of its tools of demonstrative reasoning. The work also attracted rebuttals from Arab philosophers, most notably Averroes' *Tahāfut al-tahāfut*, in which he systematically refutes each of al-Ghazali's arguments. Averroes, *Tahāfut al-tahāfut*, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie catholique, 1930).

[7] Janssens addresses the long-standing opinion that al-Ghazali directed the *Tahāfut* at Avicenna. Instead, al-Ghazali appears to direct his refutation at philosophers of the day who, unlike Avicenna, rely too much on Aristotle's teachings despite their contradictions with religious doctrine. Given his knowledge of Avicenna's philosophy, it seems difficult to believe that al-Ghazali would have placed Avicenna among those scholars who parroted Aristotle. Jules Janssens, "Al-Ghazzali's *Tahāfut*: Is It Really a Rejection of Ibn Sina's Philosophy?" *Journal of Islamic Studies* 12.1 (2001): 1-17; "Al-Ghazzali and his Use of Avicennian Texts," *Problems in Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Miklós Maróth (Piliscaba, Hungary: Avicenna Institute of Middle East Studies, 2003): 37–49. However, the position that al-Ghazali's *Tahāfut* is to be understood as a refutation of Avicenna persists among many scholars. Michael Marmura, "Al-Ghazali," *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 137-154, esp. 144.

Frank have also detected elements of Avicenna's cosmology within al-Ghazali's works.[8] Al-Ghazali's wide-ranging interests and methods of argumentation have raised many questions about his career and audience since different scholars have emphasized the differing elements of his identity and no one image of the scholar has prevailed.

The influence of al-Ghazali on the Arab intellectual tradition is hard to overestimate, though his effect on Latin Christendom is less well-known and less studied. His prolific writings on many subjects make it difficult to chart his thought or to draw lines between his theology and philosophy. Yet among these works it is his spiritual autobiography, which depicts his progression from a jurist to speculative theologian to a Sufi mystic, that has been most successful at obscuring the development of his thought, and scholars only recently have attempted to discuss his philosophy without relying on this source.[9] Thus, while al-Ghazali is an essential figure in the Arab intellectual

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[8] Frank identified places within al-Ghazali's scholarship where he abandons the Asha'rite theological tradition and takes up Avicenna's positions on matters of cosmology, denying God's direct involvement in the act of creation and miracles. Richard Frank, *Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994). Michael Marmura has argued against al-Ghazali's abandonment of the Asha'rite school and reiterates places where al-Ghazali espouses occasionalist arguments. Michael Marmara, "Ghazālīan Causes and Intermediaries," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 115 (1995): 183-204. Frank Griffel synthesizes these opposing views, arguing that al-Ghazali was the first Muslim theologian to attempt to naturalize a philosophical tradition and to promote its use within Islamic theology. Frank Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[9] Griffel argues that two matters complicate the study of al-Ghazali. First, al-Ghazali underwent a spiritual awakening later in life and wrote an autobiography in which he negatively reexamined his philosophical approach to faith. Al-Ghazali, *al-Munqidh min al-dalal*, ed. J. Saliba and K. Ayyad (Damascus: Maktab al-Nashr al-'Arabi, 1934). Historians struggle to reconcile the autobiography with his scholarship, assessing how this revival affected his work. Griffel argued that historians are too willing to accept al-Ghazali's spiritual awakening as a turning point, and he sees little change in his arguments and scholarship. Second, al-Ghazali's teachings spread quickly during his lifetime and attracted followers and detractors throughout the Islamic world. The wide range of responses makes it difficult to ascertain the scope of his contribution and obscures whether audiences understood his teachings or simply accepted or rejected him without comprehension. Nowhere is this dichotomy of the popularity and condemnation of al-Ghazali more prevalent than in the Maghreb. One of al-Ghazali's best students, Ibn al-Arabi, hailed from Seville and

tradition, the breadth of his writing and the impact of his autobiography have made it difficult to gain a comprehensive view of his career.

The Maqāṣid al-falāsifa

The *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* (*The Aims of the Philosophers*) furthers the ambiguity about al-Ghazali's philosophy. For centuries, scholars believed that this work functioned much like a first installment in a two-volume series that culminated in the more argumentative *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*.[10] Al-Ghazali admits as much in his prologue to the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*.

> You have desired from me a doubt-removing discourse, uncovering the incoherence (*tahāfut*) of the philosophers and the mutual contradictions in their views and how they hide their suppressions and their deceits. But to help you thus is not at all desirable except after first teaching you their position and making you know their dogmatic structure...So I was of the opinion that I should prefix to an exposition of how they are incoherent a concise discourse containing a reproduction of their meanings (*maqāṣid*) as to the sciences which they cultivate, logical, physical and theological, without distinguishing between the sound and the false in them. That is, I intend only to make intelligible the ultimate ends of their doctrine without anything like expansion or addition going beyond what they mean. And I shall state it by way of accurate relation of facts and reproduction, joined with what they hold to be proofs. The object of this book is reproduction of the meanings of the philosophers and that is its title....When we have finished with that we

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returned to al-Andalus after studying with al-Ghazali in Baghdad. Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*. 8-12, 61-71. Al-Ghazali's Ash'arite teachings proved so popular in al-Andalus that scholars of rival schools of theology issued fatwas against al-Ghazali and burned several of his works. Delfina Serrano Ruano, "Why Did Scholars of al-Andalus Distrust al-Ghazali? Ibn Rush al-Jadd's Fatwa on Alwiyaʾ Allah," *Der Islam* 83 (2006): 137-156. However, these actions became the legendary justification for the Almohad conquest of al-Andalus. The Almohad's founder, Ibn Tumart, reportedly met al-Ghazali during his travels in the Middle East. When he reported that Cordoban scholars burned the *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, al-Ghazali cursed the Almoravids and entrusted their destruction to him. Roger Le Tourneau, *The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): 6-7.

[10] Eric Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute over al-Ghazālī's Best of All Possible Worlds* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 84. Muḥammad Sherif, *Ghazali's Theory of Virtue* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1975), 4-5. Charles Lohr, "Logica Algazelis: Introduction and Critical Text," *Traditio 21* (1965), 223-290, 223. Manuel Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa: o Intenciones de los filósofos* (Barcelona : Juan Flors, 1963), viii-ix. Duncan Macdonald, "The Meanings of the Philosophers by al-Ghazzālī," *Isis* 25 (1936), 9-15, 10. Dominique Salman, "Algazel et les Latins," *AHDLMA* 10 (1935-1936), 103-127, 103. Miguel Asín Palcios, *Algazel: dogmática, moral, ascética* (Zaragoza, 1901), 192.

> will begin again seriously and with purpose in a separate book which we shall call, if it is the will of God, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*.[11]

Al-Ghazali emphasizes that the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* is a dispassionate survey of philosophers' arguments, which will be very useful when read in concert with his forthcoming refutation, the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*. The prologue has led many modern scholars to conclude that the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* represents not only al-Ghazali's preparatory study of philosophy for the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, but also an attempt to provide jurists with a handy primer on the subject.[12] True to his word, al-Ghazali presents many philosophical positions that run counter to Islamic doctrine in the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* without qualification, including arguments for the eternity of the world as well as limitations on God's power and omniscience.

However, al-Ghazali does not appear to have been the author of the majority of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*. Jules Janssens argues that the work was not originally al-Ghazali's creation, but it is instead an "interpretive translation" of Avicenna's Persian work *Dānesh-Nāmeh* (*The Book of Knowledge*).[13] Besides translating the text into

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[11] Al-Ghazali, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa: Manṭiq wa-'l-iḥyāt wa-ṭabī'īya*, ed. Sulaimān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1961), 31-32. All of the translations are mine unless stated otherwise.

[12] Lohr quotes from the prologue to demonstrate the relationship between the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and *Tahāfut*. Lohr "Logica Algazelis," 223. Alonso cites the prologue for the same purpose, but he concludes that al-Ghazali originally had three volumes in mind. The *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* was to be the objective introduction to philosophy, followed by the refutation of unacceptable doctrines in the *Tahāfut*, and concluding with another work that would discuss philosophical arguments that supported faith. Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, viii-ix.

[13] Janssens compared the structure of *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and the *Dānesh-Nāmeh* and discovered striking similarities. Upon comparing the content of the text, he found that al-Ghazali had translated the text while also simplifying Avicenna's prose and providing summaries and examples. Even with the changes and additions, however, he concludes that much of the work preserves the argumentation of Avicenna and thus labels the work an "interpretative translation." Jules Janssens, "La *Dānesh-Nāmeh* d'Ibn Sina: Un text á revoir?" *Bulletin de philosophie mediévale* 28 (1986): 163-177.

Arabic, al-Ghazali reworked Avicenna's dense style into easier prose and provided many illustrative examples, though he maintained much of the structure of the original work. Despite this discovery, the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* remains closely associated with al-Ghazali since the Arab audience was unaware of the work's indebtedness to Avicenna for the majority of its existence. Thus, I refer to the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* as the work of al-Ghazali rather than of Avicenna in order to maintain continuity with previous scholarship and because the manipulation of Avicenna's text regularly surpasses mere translation to the extent that the work reflects more the mind of al-Ghazali than of Avicenna.[14]

The *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* consists of three books on logic, metaphysics, and physics, in addition to the explanatory preface.[15] Al-Ghazali further divides each of the three books into five treatises. The treatises of the *Logic* focus on the philosopher's tools, explaining how words are used to signify objects and describe qualities, and how they can be used to fashion statements. The most important of its treatises are the fourth and fifth, which deal with the types of syllogisms and how to form and deploy them in a range of arguments. The *Logic* is the simplest and most straightforward of the books since it treats only dialectical matters and leaves descriptions of how the mind grasps these subjects to the other books.

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[14] Janssens admits that it is appropriate to refer to the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* as the work of al-Ghazali for several reasons. First, al-Ghazali's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* was more popular than Avicenna's *Dānesh-Nāmeh*. Second, there are differences in terminology between the two works. Third, the title and prologue that al-Ghazali gave to the work poses a conflict among the ideas of philosophers that Avicenna did not intend. Jules Janssens, Preface to *Ibn Sina and his Influence on the Arabic and Latin World* (Burlington, V.T.: Ashgate, 2006), x.

[15] Al-Ghazali left out Avicenna's book on mathematics when he translated the work from Persian. He explained in the prologue that there was little divergence of opinion among philosophers on mathematical subject, so he left it out. al-Ghazali, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, 31-32.

The *Metaphysics* treats the Aristotelian conception of being, especially the essence and actions of the First or Divine Being—a term that al-Ghazali uses interchangeably with God. This book includes an introduction that explains the structure of philosophy, privileging theology as the first science. The first treatise is an extended study of the subject of metaphysics as being *qua* being and, following closely the Aristotelian tradition, treats eight categories into which being can divided (i.e. essence and accident, universal and particular, one and many, etc). The second and third treatises treat the necessary existence of the First Being and what can be known about his qualities and characteristics. The fourth treatise explains the actions of the First Being and how he operates in his creation through an intermediary First Intelligence, thus maintaining a perfect, eternal state apart from the corruptible world. The fifth treatise follows closely on the conclusions of the fourth since it describes the order of causation from the First Being to ten intelligences whose realms of influence progress from the highest heaven to the sublunary world.

The *Physics* deals with the philosophy of the physical world, or things which are subject to change, motion, and rest. The first treatise begins the discussion of changeable things with a discussion of motion and place. The second and third treatises examine simple and complex bodies, respectively, and observe the natures of the four elements and the results of their interaction with one another. The fourth treatise broadly treats the disposition of souls, including those of plants, animals, and humans. The human soul naturally receives the most attention in this treatise since al-Ghazali enters into a discussion of psychology and explains how human beings discern physical things with

their exterior senses and how they perceive abstract matters with their interior senses, such as memory and imagination. The fifth treatise returns to the subject of its counterpart in the *Metaphysics*, intermediary intelligences, but describes them in greater detail, elucidating the actions of the tenth intelligence, known as the Active Intellect, on the human soul. Al-Ghazali outlines abilities that emanate from the Agent Intellect to human soul, such as the power to see visions or perform miracles. He also attributes the soul's future happiness or punishment after death as the continued connection or total disconnection from the Agent Intellect.

Since al-Ghazali, and Avicenna before him, intended the work to be a summary, the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* is hardly as compelling as the polemical *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, but there is much in this volume to recommend it as a primer on the Arab philosophical tradition. It continues many arguments which Aristotle had left unfinished and on which Avicenna had elaborated, such as the nature of the soul and the relationship between the First Being and his creation. Even without knowledge of its source, Arab scholars had a powerful reference tool in al-Ghazali's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and Latin scholars certainly benefitted from the work's function as handy compendium on speculative philosophy. Despite his importance in the Arab world and his large corpus of writings, Latin scholars' exposure to al-Ghazali began and ended with the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* during the Middle Ages since none of his other works became widely available until the sixteenth century. With only this work at hand, Latins knew nothing about his theological works, conversion to Sufism, or his unique application of philosophy to Islam, allowing them to

form wholly incorrect conclusions about al-Ghazali and his relationship to the Arab intellectual tradition.

Al-Ghazali in Latin Christendom

By the time of al-Ghazali's death in 1111, Latin scholars were only beginning to discover Arab philosophy and science. Translations of Arabic works had been conducted sporadically in Spain and Italy before and during the eleventh century, but the Castilian conquest of Toledo in 1085 opened up a large city with a history of libraries and a highly literate population.[16] The reestablishment of the archbishopric there made Toledo a destination for scholars who came from all over Christendom to pursue the rumors of a wealth of knowledge that could be found in Arabic texts. Toledo became an informal center where scholars from inside and outside of the peninsula could coordinate their translation efforts.[17] Most translations were the product of teams composed of an Arabic-speaking scholar who read the text in a romance dialect to another scholar who rendered

[16] Burnett presents several factors that contributed to the rise of Toledo as an informal center of translation. The first was the linguistic abilities of the people living there in the twelfth century, including the Arabic-speaking Mozarab community, supplemented by recent converts from Islam, and Jews fleeing northward from the Almohad conquest. Toledo was also a great center of learning before the Christian conquest and, apart from Zaragoza, boasted a considerable number of libraries. While most of the Islamic elite of the city left the city over time, it is unlikely that they moved their entire libraries. Several highly literate Muslim families even emigrated to Toledo in the wake of the conquest, such as the last of the learned Banu Hūd in Zaragoza. Charles Burnett, "The Coherence of the Arabic-Latin Translation Program in Toledo in the Twelfth Century," *Science in Context* 14 (2001): 249-298.

[17] While the existence of a "school" at Toledo has proven to be romantic notion, Burnett emphasizes the uniqueness of Toledo as a magnet for translators and scholars who were interested in certain disciplines in which Arabs excelled. Charles Burnett, "The Institutional Context of Arabic-Latin Translation of the Middle Ages: A Reassessment of the 'School of Toledo,'" *Vocabulary of Teaching and Research between Middle Ages and Renaissance*, ed. Olga Weijers (London: Warburg Institute Publications, 1994): 214-235. Scholars have furthered Burnett's arguments: Alexander Fidora, "Religious Diversity and the Philosophical Translations of Twelfth-Century Toledo," and Amos Bertolacci, "A Community of Translators: The Latin Medieval Versions of Avicenna's *Book of the Cure*," *Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe, 1100-1500*, ed. Constant Mews and John Crossley (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 19-36, 37-54.

the spoken word into polished Latin.[18] The translation movement in Spain progressed steadily in the early twelfth century from relatively simple subjects, beginning with astronomical tables and manuals on the astrolabe, to more abstract material in lengthy philosophical works by Aristotle and Avicenna, as well as Averroes later in the thirteenth century.[19]

The team that translated al-Ghazali was one of the few that were indigenous to the peninsula. Dominicus Gundissalinus, archdeacon of Segovia, and "magister Iohannes," his Arabic-speaking associate, translated the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* at Toledo in the third quarter of the twelfth century.[20] Their method of translation was quite literal, rather than periphrastic, which is reflected in title they gave to the work, *De philosophorum*

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[18] The best example of this process comes from the translator of al-Ghazali, Dominicus Gundissalinus, who collaborated with Avendauth on the translation of Avicenna's *De anima*. In the preface to this work, Avendauth explains the process to his patron, John of Castelmoron-sur-Lot, Archbishop of Toledo: "Habetis ergo librum, nobis praecipiente et singula verba vulgariter proferente, et Domenico Archidiacono singula in Latinum convertente, ex Arabico translatum." Avendauth's preface to Avicenna, *De anima*, ed. Simone van Riet, *Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Anima*, I-II-III (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), 4. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny presents the translators and their collaboraters in detail. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Translations and Translators," *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Giles Constable and Robert Benson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 439-459.

[19] Richard Lemay divides the translation movement into three periods, beginning with rudimentary astronomical tables, then progressing to more sophisticated astronomical, medical and mathematical treatises, and ending with translations of philosophical texts. Richard Lemay, "Dans l'Espagne du XII siecle: Les traductions de l'arabe au latin," *Annales Economics, Societies, Civilizations* 18 (1963), 639-665.

[20] The efforts of Dominicus and his colleagues represent a shift in the translation movement towards an interest in Arab philosophy, but Dominicus was unique among translators since he authored his own philosophical treatises, borrowing from many of the Arabic works he rendered into Latin. See the collection of articles in Fuad Sezguin, *Dominicus Gundissalinus (12th c.) and the Transmission of Arabic Philosophical Thought to the West* (Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, 2000), and Alexander Fidora, "Dominicus Gundissalinus," *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (London: Springer, 2010), 274-276. In the case of Dominicus' Arabic associate, several translations with the name "Magister Iohannes" appear in twelfth-century Toledo, which continues to shroud him from our view. Charles Burnett, "*Magister Iohannes Hispanus*: towards the Identity of a Toledan Translator," ed. Guy Beaujouan, *Comprendre et maîtriser la nature au moyen âge, mélanges d'histoire des sciences offerts à Guy Beaujouan* (Geneva: Droz, 1994), 425–461; reprinted with corrections in *Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages: The Translators and their Intellectual and Social Context,* Variorum Collected Studies Series (Burlington, V.T.: Ashgate, 2009), Article V.

intentionibus.[21] The choice to translate this work was in keeping with the development of the translation movement since, by the middle of the twelfth century, many translators were focused on the acquisition of Aristotelian philosophy.[22] The prolific Gerard of Cremona, Dominicus' contemporary at Toledo, focused much of his efforts on the Arabic corpus of Aristotle.[23] However, as medieval Arab scholars discovered and is still the case today, Aristotle is hardly self-explanatory without help from introductory material and many of his arguments are incomplete. For this reason, Arab scholars did not simply preserve Aristotle's works. They also expanded and developed his arguments in a long series of commentaries and original works, fashioning a living tradition of Aristotelian philosophy for Latins to discover.[24] The freshness and utility of the Arab tradition of

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[21] Burnett examines the differences between the earlier translators, whose style of translating was more periphrastic on account of the difficulty of matching Arabic and Latin syntax. However, translation practices changed by the middle of the twelfth century as Dominicus, Gerard, and other scholars become more literal in the translations, perhaps on account of a growing familiarity with the language and better collaboration between Latin translators and their Arabic-speaking associates. Charles Burnett, "Translating from Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages: Theory, Practice, and Criticism," *Éditer,traduire, interpreter: essais de methodologie philosophique*, ed. Steve Lofts and Philipp Rosemann (Louvain: Peeters, 1997): 55–78.

[22] While it is difficult to make a strong distinction between the scientific translations of the eleventh and early twelfth century, scholars recognize the translations of philosophical works in the second half of the twelfth century as a fundamental shift within the translation movement. Charles Burnett, "Arabic into Latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy in Western Europe," *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, 370-404, esp. 372-381. D'Alverny, "Translations and Translators," 451-457.

[23] Gerard of Cremona translated more than seventy works, but this corpus is so large that there have been few monographs on this translator and none of them are recent. Richard Lemay, "Gerard of Cremona," ed. Charles Gillispie, *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, Vol. 12 (New York: Scribner, 1981), 173-192.

[24] "The main advantage of the Arabic Aristotle over the Greek was that it was part of a lively tradition of commentary and teaching up to the time of the translators themselves." Burnett, "Arabic into Latin," 374-375. Burnett also draws a distinction between the translations of Aristotle and those of Arabic philosophy independent of Aristotle. See p. 372-381. Dimitri Gutas points out that the interests of the translators closely followed those of the previous generation of Andalusian scholars rather than the interests of Latins north of the Pyrenees. Dimitri Gutas, "What was there in Arabic for the Latins to Receive?: Remarks on the Modalities of the Twelfth-Century Movement in Spain," ed. Andreas Speer, and Lydia Wegener, *Wissen über grenzen arabisches wissen und lateinisches mittelalter* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), 3-21.

Aristotelian philosophy compelled Gerard and Dominicus to translate a host of works by Arab authors in order to aid Latins in their comprehension of Aristotle. Gerard focused his translation efforts mainly on Arabic texts that dealt directly with Aristotle, mainly in the form of commentaries by al-Farabi, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Themistius, in addition to his herculean task of translating many of Aristotle's works.[25] For his part, Dominicus translated works that were independent of the Aristotelian corpus and represent the maturity of the Arab philosophical tradition, including original treatises by al-Farabi, parts of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Shīfa*, and al-Ghazali's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*.

Dominicus' translation of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* quickly left the Iberian Peninsula, but before I discuss the work's circulation, it is important to address an early development that dictated how the work and author appeared to Latins for the duration of the Middle Ages. The prologue—in which al-Ghazali explains how the work should be read as an objective survey and does not reflect his views—became detached from the rest of the work and survives in only one manuscript.[26] Without the prologue, scholars were left to assume that al-Ghazali, or Algazel as he was known in Latin, was an uncritical adherent of the teachings that appeared in his work, and few in the Middle Ages wrote anything to the contrary.[27] Many saw a strong similarity between the

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[25] For Gerard's vita and a list of his translations, see Burnett, "The Coherence of the Arabic-Latin Translation Program," 275-281.
[26] Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France MS Lat. 16096, f. 74r.
[27] The list of scholars who knew that the *STP* did not represent Algazel's beliefs is quite short. Roger Bacon explains in his *Communium naturalium* that Algazel is only reciting the ideas of others and mentions the existence of the *Tahāfut* ("*De controversia philosophorum*"). However, it is not clear how Bacon came to this information and no other Latin scholar was aware of this important detail—not even Godfrey of Fontaines, who owned BnF Lat. 16096 for a time. The lone exception is Ramon Marti, but he likely read

arguments of these two authors, leading them to call Algazel a "sequax" or "abbreviator" of Avicenna.[28] Another result of the loss of the prologue was that the title, *De philosophorum intentionibus*, fell into disuse since the phrase does not appear again throughout the rest of the text. Instead, scholars referred to the work by many names, but the most common title that appears in rubrics, incipits, and citations is *Summa theoricae philosophiae*, which accurately depicts the work's function in Latin Christendom as a compendium of speculative philosophy.[29]

The transition from al-Ghazali to Algazel created a fundamentally new figure—one that reflects not at all the Arab understanding of this Muslim theologian. That only the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* was translated limited how much Latins could know about al-Ghazali since they learned nothing about his wider career from this work. Yet the prologue's absence further obscured the identity of al-Ghazali to the point that he appeared no different from Avicenna. Dominicus' rather logical choice to translate a helpful primer on Arab philosophy inadvertently enabled Latin scholars to ascribe philosophical teachings to Algazel that al-Ghazali condemned in other works. Thus,

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the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and more of al-Ghazali's works in Arabic, not Latin, and few Latin scholars read his *Pugio fidei*, where he describes Algazel as a theologian who challenged the arguments of Avicenna and other Arab Aristotelian scholars. Salman, "Algazel et les Latins," 109-118.

[28] Scholars explained Algazel's relationship to Avicenna in a variety of ways. The most common title applied to Algazel was that of Avicenna's "abbreviator," which explained both his relationship to Avicenna and that of the *STP* to Avicenna's corpus. The title of Avicenna's "sequax" was also common, though it simply explained the affiliation of the arguments of Avicenna and Algazel. Less frequent used was the title of "expositor" of Avicenna. See chapter 3, n. 46-48.

[29] Scribes and scholars gave the work several titles, including *Summa theoricae philosophiae* as well as *Metaphysica* or *Philosophia*. However, *Summa theoricae philosophiae* appears with some regularity among complete copies of the *STP*, while copies that are less complete, contain single chapters or paraphrases received shorter titles, such as *Logica* and *Physica*. See Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 229 for a range of titles.

Algazel is not al-Ghazali for the duration of the Middle Ages, but a wholly other philosopher who existed only on parchment. For this reason, I will refer to the Latin translation of the *Maqāṣid* as the *Summa theoricae philosophiae* (*STP*) and its author as Algazel to reflect their Latin identity and distance them from the Arab understanding.

Circulation and Condemnation of the STP

The *STP* and other translations of Arab philosophy quickly travelled north to the eager hands of Latin scholars, who were captivated by what they found in these works. The circulation of the translations is perhaps the most curious aspect of the translation movement since few copies have a Spanish provenance, indicating that the movement was conducted chiefly as an export business.[30] The earliest copyists of the translations seemed to understand the importance of reading Aristotle with his Arab continuators and thus scribes scrupulously compiled these works together in manuscripts. Through the practice of binding these works together and on account of their similarity in content, scholars learned to connect Algazel with Aristotelian philosophy and, above all, Avicenna. The work circulated rapidly throughout Latin Christendom and found its way into the schools of England, France, and Italy, where it was studied by the most learned minds of the Middle Ages. However, copies also appear in remote abbeys and in the hands of obscure and humble scholars, indicating that al-Ghazali enjoyed a wide range of readers during his tenure in the Latin canon.

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[30] Charles Burnett introduced the idea of an export business of translation at Toledo and its implications in Burnett, "The Coherence of the Arabic-Latin Translation Program," 253; and again in "Communities of Learning in Twelfth-Century Toledo," *Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe, 1100-1500*, 9-18.

Given the subject matter of the *STP*, it is perhaps unsurprising that Algazel's Latin audience was well educated. University-trained scholars and professors on the faculty of arts and theology comprise a sizable portion of the readership. The list of scholars who read and discussed Algazel contains philosophers who are synonymous with the development of scholasticism—Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Roger Bacon—as well as scholars from later scholastic movements, such as William of Ockham, Nicole Oresme, and John Gerson. Yet not all of Algazel's readers were members of the academy, and the list also includes mystics, poets, and a king, revealing that Arab philosophy's appeal extended throughout Latin Christendom.

The manuscripts reinforce the inclusive nature of Algazel's audience since copies of the *STP* can be found from Spain to Sweden from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Most manuscripts were owned by anonymous or obscure scholars—one did not need to be regent master at Paris or Oxford to possess a copy. The quality in the materials and copying techniques also indicate that the *STP* could be an expensive and cherished member of a scholar's collection as well as a useful resource. For this reason, a significant portion of this study uses physical evidence drawn from manuscripts to describe the circulation of the *STP* and to examine how Latin readers assessed the value of the work and its author.

The rapid dissemination and widespread appeal of the *STP* and Arab philosophy in general was perhaps too successful. These works began to draw the attention of ecclesiastical authorities, whose ability to monitor the content of Aristotelian translations from Spain was outpaced by the demand for them. The University of Paris became the

epicenter of a thirteenth-century debate over the place of these texts in the Latin canon and several restrictions emerged that curtailed the use and teaching of Aristotle and Arab philosophers.[31] The debate reached a boiling point in the 1270s. In 1277, the bishop of Paris issued a condemnation of 219 philosophical doctrines, which carried the threat of excommunication for anyone caught teaching them.[32] The less authoritative but no less damning *De erroribus philosophorum*, attributed to Giles of Rome, appeared around the same time and contained detailed lists of the errors found in the translated works of Aristotle and Arab authors, including sixteen attributed to Algazel.[33] Despite this resistance, fourteenth-century copies of the *STP* reveal that the study of Algazel and Arab

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[31] The condemnations began not long after the establishment of the University of Paris around 1200. The only author mentioned by name in these condemnations was Aristotle, sometimes followed by an indirect reference to his commentators. The first condemnation against teaching Aristotle's natural philosophy and the commentaries on the subject was issued by the Archbishop of Sens (which included the diocese of Paris) in 1210. In 1231 Pope Gregory IX issued *Parens scientiarum Parisius*, prohibiting the "reading" or lecturing on Aristotle's natural philosophy. Condemnations of Aristotle and his commentators appear sporadically throughout the next forty years and many allowances were made for scholars such as Roger Bacon to lecture on Aristotelian natural philosophy. While condemnations were issued against teaching Aristotle's doctrines on metaphysics and natural philosophy, his logical texts comprised the foundation for the arts curriculum and thus gave him a strong foothold in the university. Given Aristotle's prominence, it is easy to see how scholars, knowingly or unknowingly, failed to maintain the line between his logical and metaphysical texts. Gordon Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1968), 138-142; John Wippel, "The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277," ed. Timothy Noone and Jorge Garcia, *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Malden, M.A.: Blackwell, 2008), 65-76.

[32] Stephen Tempier, "Epistola scripta a stephano episcopo parisiensi anno 1277" and "Articuli condempnati a stephano episcopo parisiensi anno 1277" ed. and trans. David Piché, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277: nouvelle édition du texte latin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1999), 72-147.

[33] Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, ed, and trans. Josef Koch and John Riedl, *Errores Philosophorum: Critical Text with Notes and Introduction* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1944), 39-47. Scholars have challenged Giles' authorship of this text since only rubrics in early copies attribute the work to him. He did not cite it in his own works and other authors do not refer to him as author of the work until the middle of the fourteenth century. Silvia Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti aristotelici," and Concetta Luna, "La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano sul Libro III delle Sentenze (Clm. 8005) e il problema dell'autenticità," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* (Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull'alto Medioevo, 1990) .

philosophy continued unabated. Also, Latin scholars continued to cite the *STP* in their own original philosophical treatises and commentaries on a variety of works.

The frequency with which Algazel appears in later centuries strongly suggests that scholars had to have at least a familiarity with the *STP* and its contents in order to understand and participate in the wider philosophical debates in Latin Christendom. The printing of the *STP* in 1506 at Venice as the *Logica et philosophia Algazelis Arabis* allowed Algazel to remain in these discussions and to continue to find a Latin audience into the Renaissance.[34] However, a Latin translation of Averroes' refutation of al-Ghazali, the *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* (*The Incoherence of the Incoherence*), was produced in 1328 by the Jewish scholar Calonymos ibn Calonymos of Arles, which contained the majority of the latter's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, but it failed to receive much attention from Latin scholars during the Middle Ages.[35] This work was also printed at the end of the fifteenth century, allowing Latins to see Algazel as a critic of the Arab philosophical tradition rather than as a disciple of Avicenna.[36] While several authors made this realization, the old view of Algazel persisted in scholarly circles and continued to plague the study of the *STP* and its Latin audience until the twentieth century.

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[34] Al-Ghazali, *Logica et philosophia Algazelis arabis*, (Venice: Petrus Lichtenstein, 1506). The work was printed again at Venice in 1536.

[35] Beatrice Zedler, *Averroes' 'Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis' in the Latin Version of Calo Calonymous* (Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1961), 24-26. This translation was commissioned by Robert of Anjou, who appears to have been familiar with Arab philosophy and quote Avicenna and Algazel in several of his works. However, Robert does not quote from this work and the lack of any medieval copy reveals that it failed to attract an audience until the late fifteenth century, when Agostino Nifo printed the work with his commentary at Venice in 1497.

[36] Agostino Nifo, *In librum Destructio destructionum Averrois commentarium* (Venice, 1497). A revised edition without Nifo's commentary was printed in 1527. Averroes, *Subtilissimus liber Averois qui dictur Destructio Destructionum philosophiae Algazelis*, ed. Calo Calonymos (Venice, 1527).

Historiography on the *Summa theoricae philosophiae*

On account of al-Ghazali's dynamic course of study and large corpus of works, scholars constantly reassess the career of the figure whom Montgomery Watt called "the greatest Muslim after Muhammad."[37] The meaning and importance of his writings has undergone significant revision, but the treatment of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and the *STP* is unique. Instead of relying on the Arab interpretation of the work, modern scholars' assessment of the work has been determined principally by the medieval experience of the *STP*. The absence of the prologue in Latin Christendom during the Middle Ages had a lasting effect on the fate of this work in modern scholarship and many researchers adopted the medieval understanding of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* as proof that al-Ghazali was a devotee of Avicenna at some time in his career. Alternate visions of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and al-Ghazali began to appear in the middle of the nineteenth century. Salomon Munk attempted to correct the confusion in 1857 when he translated a Hebrew version of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and discovered the Latin prologue, explaining that al-Ghazali was only repeating the ideas of other philosophers, not his own. [38] Yet his findings were ignored by all except Arabists while medievalists continued to accommodate the Latin understanding of Algazel, arguing that the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* was representative of his early career as a philosopher before he became a respected theologian. For this reason, historians of philosophy divided al-Ghazali's life into his

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[37] Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964) 14-15.
[38] Salomon Munk, *Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe* (Paris: A. Franck, 1857), 369-373.

years as a philosopher, a theologian, and a Sufi mystic.[39] In the 1920s, Maurice Bouyges and Leon Gauthier reiterated Munk's findings and emphasized that the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* did not reflect al-Ghazali's own views.[40] Finally, Dominique Salman's influential 1936 article in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* settled the issue for medievalists by publishing the Latin version of the prologue.[41] Al-Ghazali's erstwhile career as a follower of Avicenna finally ended after more than seven centuries.

This long process of discovery encouraged scholars to create editions of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and the *STP* in the 1930s. There are several Arabic editions of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, but attempts at a critical edition of the *STP* to replace the version from 1506 have yielded mixed results.[42] In 1933, Joseph Muckle published an edition that he derived primarily from one manuscript: Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS lat. 4481.[43] Although scholars expressed gratitude for this long-awaited

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[39] Pierre Duhem, *Le système du monde*: *histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic*, 4 vol. (Paris, 1913-1917): IV, 501. Duhem's argument was echoed by scholars for another decade. See Louis Rougier, *La Scholastique et le Thomisme* (Paris, 1925), 316.

[40] Monk's argument was upheld by Maurice Bouyges in "Notes sur les philosophes arabes connus des latins au Moyen Âge," *Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale* 7 (1921): 397-406. Léon Gauthier also refuted Duhem's claims in *Scolastique musulmane et scolastique chrétienne* (Paris, J. Gamber, 1928), 358-365.

[41] Salman, Algazel et les Latins," passim. That the effect of Salman's article was immediate can be seen in a series of articles by Duncan Macdonald, who wrote a rather positive review of Muckle's edition of the *STP* in 1936. In 1937, however, he wrote a scathing addition to his review, citing the necessity of Salman's article since Muckle had inexplicably viewed BnF Lat. 16096 and had left out the prologue and the *Logica* from his edition. See note 45.

[42] There are three Arabic editions. The most useful is that of Sulaiman Dunya, which provides commentary and textual variations embedded in the text. *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa: Manṭiq wa-'l-iḥyāt wa-ṭabī'īya*, ed. Sulaimān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1961).The oldest is *Maqāsid al-falāsifah li-ḥijjat al-Islām al-gharā fī al-manṭiq wa-al-hikmah al-il-hīyah wa-al-hikmah al-ṭabī'īyah*, ed. Muhyi al-Din Sabri al-Kurdi (Cairo: al-Maṭba'ah al-Mahmūdiyah al-Tijārīyah bi-al-Azhar. 1936). A revised version of this edition appeared in 2000, *Maqasid al-falasifah: fi al-mantiq wa-al-hikmah al-ilahiyah wa-al-hikmah al-tabi'iyah*, ed. M. Bejou (Damascus, 2000).

[43] Al-Ghazali, *Algazel's Metaphysics: A Mediaeval Translation*, ed. Joseph Muckle (Toronto: St. Michael's College, 1933). In addition to Vat. lat. 4481, Muckle consulted five other manuscripts, including Paris,

volume, it was poorly received on account of his choice of manuscript and the continuation of medieval conceptions about the work.[44] While the text of Vat. lat. 4481 is good, it contains only the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, and lacks the prologue. Scholars found the choice of a truncated version in this manuscript inexplicable since Muckle consulted five other copies, several of which contain the *Logica* as well as the one manuscript that possesses the prologue.[45] He also entitled the edition *Algazel's Metaphysics* even though it contains the *Metaphysica* and the *Physica*—a distinction that he observes in other manuscripts, but chooses not to use.[46] While Latins commonly referred to the entire text as the *Metaphysica*, modern scholars pointed out that it was unnecessary to follow the convention, especially when Muckle researched copies with

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Bibliothèque nationale de France MSS Lat. 6443, 6552, 14700, 16096, 16605 and the 1506 printed edition in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France Reserve 809.

[44] "Cette ancienne [1506] édition étant depuis longtemps introuvable, le Rév. J.T. Muckle eut l'heureuse idée rééditer une partie. Une étude insuffisante de la tradition manuscrite lui a malheureusement fait choisir le médiocre Vat. Lat. 4481 comme base de l'édition, les variantes du Paris N.L. 6552 étant seules reproduites en appendice: double choix d'autant plus regrettable que les bons manuscrits parisiens avaient, semble-t-il, été examinés....On regrettera surtout que l'éditeur ait intitulé "Metaphysics" un ouvrage qui contient à la fois *Métaphysique* et la *Physique*, et que les plus mauvais manuscrits, voire l'édition de Venise, n'avaient jamais appelés que *Philosophia*, terme qui dans son imprécision n'était pas inexact.... Quoi qu'il en soit, M. Muckle a mis à la disposition des médiévistes un texte somme toute utilisable de la majeure partie du *Maqâcid* latin, et tous lui en seront reconnaissants." Salman, "Algazel et les Latins," 123-124.

[45] Macdonald had a change of heart about Muckle's edition and wrote a brief note less than a year after his review, highlighting that Muckle's "ignorance" had allowed him to view and neglect to use the prologue in BnF Lat. 16096 in his edition. He adds a final exasperated shot: "Finally, an Arabist cannot restrain himself from adding here that a great part of the confusion has arisen out of the refusal of Western Medievalists to pay any attention to the Arabic evidence, which is very much as though a student of Cicero's philosophical writings should refuse to learn Greek and to consult Cicero's Greek teachers. In 1859 S. Munk put the matter perfectly clearly with citations of Arabic, Latin and Hebrew authorities and in 1928 the point was restated with still more Arabic authorities by Leon Gauthier in the *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie* for that year, pp. 358-365. Will the present perfectly conclusive article by Fr. Salman, one of themselves, in one of their own journals, make any impression on them? May it even lead some of them to learn some Arabic!" Macdonald, "Note on 'The Meanings of the Philosophers by al-Ghazzali," *Isis* 27.1 (1937), 9-10.

[46] Muckle, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 130.

more inclusive titles.[47] Stylistically, Muckle preserved the medieval punctuation and *mise-en-page* with many long sentences broken up by semi-colons and paragraphs that extend for pages, thus making the work only slightly easier to read than the 1506 printed edition. Although Muckle attempted an apparatus, it appears at the end of the work rather than adjacent to the text.

Scholars almost immediately tried to fill in the gaps left by Muckle. Salman published the prologue in 1936.[48] The *Logica* did not appear until thirty years later, which Charles Lohr edited critically in 1965 by consulting fifteen copies.[49] However, little has been done to improve upon Muckle's work, though Eva St. Clair recently published a critical edition of the fourth treatise of *Physica* with an apparatus.[50] Even Manuel Alonso, who expended considerable effort on the study of the *STP* and was the most vehement critic of Muckle's edition, abandoned the Latin and instead completed a Spanish translation of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*.[51] Thus, there remains no critical and complete

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[47] "We are deeply indebted to Professor Muckle for his most careful edition of the first two books on Metaphysics and Physics—he does not give the Logic—but there is no word of admonition in the preface that these do not give al-Ghazzali's own position. On the title-page they are called 'Algazel's Metaphysics' and the single word 'translation is almost the only hint given that they were not originally written in Latin. Otherwise 'Algazel' might be a mediaeval European philosopher." Macdonald, "The Meanings of the Philosophers by al-Ghazzali," 14.
[48] Salman, "Algazel et les Latins," 125-127.
[49] Al-Ghazali, "Logica Algazelis," ed. Charles Lohr, "Logica Algazelis: Introduction and Critical Text, *Traditio 21* (1965), 223-290, edition on 239-288.
[50] Al-Ghazali, "Algazel on the Soul: A Critical Edition," ed. Eva St. Clair, *Traditio* 60 (2005): 47-84, edition on 60-84. The same text can be found in *STP*, 162-182.
[51] Al-Ghazali, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa o Intenciones de los filósofos*, trans. Manuel Alonso, (Barcelona: Juan Flors, 1963). In an extensive review, Alonso pointed out that Muckle had created his edition with no thought as to how the text in Vat. lat. 4481 or any of the manuscripts compared to the Arabic original. He demonstrated that the text that appears in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France MS Lat. 6552, whose textual variations appear only in the appendix of Muckle's edition, is more faithful to the Arabic than that

edition of the *STP*, and scholars must consult no fewer than three publications in order to view the work in its entirety or make use of the sixteenth-century edition.

Problems in the Historiography

Besides the lack of a complete edition, several problems have plagued the study of the *STP* and its medieval audience. Previous studies have been brief on account of a preoccupation with the medieval misconception of al-Ghazali, which has affected how scholars view the *STP* as a work of philosophy. There are also methodological problems that have hindered the study of Algazel, specifically the way in which scholars assign value to the *STP* and approach its sources. Scholars tend to measure Algazel's influence with criteria that takes the *STP* out of its medieval context or makes unfair comparisons to other Arab authors, downplaying the work's usefulness while not addressing its function or, more importantly, how frequently it was read and cited. This approach extends to the study of the Latin translations of Arab philosophy in general. Scholars have either neglected or underutilized evidence in manuscripts that can give clues regarding the audience of Algazel and Arab philosophy, preferring instead to reduce the Latin opinions of Algazel to those of a few medieval luminaries.

There are a number of articles on the *STP*, but there is no monograph-length study on the subject. The reason for this brevity is not that there is little to say, but because the *STP* and Algazel reside in limbo between disciplines. Arabists naturally have little use for the *STP* as a Latin translation of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, and even less interest in the

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of Vat. lat. 4481. Manuel Alonso, "Los *Maqāṣid* de Algazel: Algunas deficiencias de la edición canadiense," *Al-Andalus* 25 (1960): 445-454.

figure of Algazel since he is a figment of the Latin imagination. This sentiment also affects medievalists, who seem to feel keenly that they are not describing al-Ghazali, but a case of mistaken identity. For this reason, no study of the *STP* is complete without a discussion of how distorted the medieval image of al-Ghazali was—some of them verging on hyperbole. Scholars have called the fate of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and al-Ghazali in Latin Christendom "a singular irony of history" and "one of the most unfortunate misunderstandings in the history of philosophy."[52] While an explanation of the Latin misunderstanding of al-Ghazali is obligatory, this mistake did not prevent the *STP* from having a large medieval audience, nor did it prevent the figure of Algazel from having a long Latin career, both of which have not been studied in detail. Yet the result of this preoccupation is that, in the already-brief studies of Algazel, more attention is paid to how wrong Latins were about al-Ghazali than to how Latin described Algazel or how they used the *STP*.[53] The current study duly addresses the Latin misinterpretation of al-Ghazali, but it also discusses how medieval scholars fashioned the identity of Algazel and how that identity changed over time.

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[52] Before Janssens' discovery that the *Maqāṣid* was a translation of Avicenna, Salman called the separation of the work from the *Tahāfut* and the medieval ignorance of its prologue "une singulière ironie de l'histoire." Salman, "Algazel et les Latins," 103. Macdonald saw less irony and more calamity in this development, calling the loss of the prologue "one of the most unhappy misunderstandings in the history of philosophy." Macdonald, "The Meanings of the Philosophers by al-Ghazzālī," 9. Likewise, Lohr echoes this sentiment almost verbatim, explaining that the loss of the prologue and *Tahāfut* in Latin meant that "[i]n the West, the [*Maqāṣid*] fell victim to one of the most unfortunate misunderstandings in the history of philosophy." Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 224.

[53] Salman's article is essential for the study of the *STP* since it makes available the Latin prologue, but it is also the greatest offender in its preoccupation with the Latin misunderstanding of al-Ghazali, setting the tone for later scholarship. He dedicates pages to Bacon and Marti, who are significant since they were the only Latin authors who knew the truth about al-Ghazali and read the prologue, but there is much less discussion of how the rest of Latin Christendom actually read this work. Salman, "Algazel et les Latins."

In addition to a preoccupation with this mistake, historians of philosophy have come to rather negative conclusions about the importance of the *STP*. In his study of Thomas Aquinas' reading of Algazel, Terry Hanley interprets the consistent rejection of Algazel's positions as proof that Algazel did not influence Aquinas' thought and that Aquinas held him in low regard.[54] He points out that Aquinas mentions Algazel on thirty occasions, but discusses Avicenna and Averroes several hundred times and often agreed with their arguments. Jules Janssens, citing Hanley, expands Aquinas' opinion to the rest of Latin Christendom, asserting that "for Thomas Aquinas, and almost all Scholastics in agreement with him, al-Ġazālī was neither a very important nor an original thinker."[55] He concurs that Avicenna was the more useful author since there was little in the *STP* that could not be found in the translated corpus of Avicenna's works, concluding that "the influence of the Latin translation of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* remained rather limited."[56]

There are several problems with these measurements of Algazel's importance. Both assign a rigid definition to the fluid concept of influence. Hanley and Janssens are correct that Aquinas did not find Algazel's arguments to be convincing, but this hardly means that Algazel was not influential on Aquinas. The thirty citations indicate that

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[54] Terry Hanley, "St. Thomas' Use of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*," *Medieval Studies* 44 (1982), 243-270. Hanley's thesis is that scholars too often try to draw connections between the arguments of this influential Muslim theologian and those of medieval Christian scholars. (In the search for analogous arguments, scholars ignore facts about the transmission of al-Ghazali into Latin and mistake coincidental similiarities in themes and conclusions for access to more of al-Ghazali's works than currently existed in Latin during the Middle Ages. However, Hanley overcompensates in his attempt to outline what Aquinas knew about Algazel. He concludes that Aquinas considered Algazel to be a second-rate philosopher even though Aquinas himself does not express this opinion in any text.

[55] Jules Janssens, "al-Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, Latin Translation of," *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, 387-390, 389.

[56] Janssens, "al-Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*," 389.

Aquinas was quite familiar with Algazel and read the *STP* closely, even if he did not agree with its teachings. While Aquinas is an important medieval philosopher, he is far from the only one to read the *STP*. Many other readers, including Aquinas' teacher Albert the Great, were more positive in their appraisal of Algazel's arguments and cited them with surprising frequency.[57] Also, any negative opinion of Algazel can only be inferred since I can find no author who claims that Algazel was unimportant. On the other hand, the long tenure of the *STP* in Latin Christendom, from its translation in the twelfth century to its printing in 1506, as well as the circulation and citation of the work in the intervening centuries implies that Algazel remained a popular and, in many cases, an influential philosopher in the Middle Ages.

There are also important differences in the volume of the Latin works of Algazel and Avicenna that ought to be considered when comparing the influence of each author. Although scholars have tried to compare the theology of al-Ghazali with that of medieval Christian authors, with dubious results, only one of his philosophical works was widely available in Latin during the Middle Ages.[58] However, the Latin corpus of Avicenna's

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[57] Manuel Alonso conducted a survey of the citations of Algazel by Latin authors and discovered that Albert the Great mentioned Algazel by name on 148 occasions. However, the most recent editions of Albert's work has uncovered more citations from the *STP* in which Albert did not mention Algazel by name, bringing the number of citations above 200. Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxix-xxxiii and chapter 3.

[58] Scholars have tried to compare the thought of al-Ghazali and Aquinas on several fronts, though these discussions often imply that al-Ghazali influenced Aquinas beyond what was available in Latin. Robert Abu Shanab claims that the similarities in al-Ghazali's doctrines, particularly that of occasionalism, appears in several of Aquinas' arguments, which points to a greater knowledge of al-Ghazali's theology even though the only work available in Latin was the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* . Robert Abu Shanab, "Points of encounter between al-Ghazalī and St. Thomas Aquinas," *Atti del Congresso internazionale (Roma-Napoli, 17-24 aprile 1974) Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario* (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italian 1975): 261-267.

philosophy numbers eighteen discrete translations.[59] For this reason, it is difficult to gauge the utility of Hanley's counting of the citations to demonstrate which author was more influential given this disparity in volume. Simply put, scholars mention Avicenna more than Algazel because there was more material from Avicenna to discuss. There is also a difference in the genres of these authors' works to consider. Even without the prologue, Latin scholars viewed the *STP* as a primer on philosophy and an abbreviation of Avicenna's corpus, which was close to what al-Ghazali had intended. In this sense, the *STP* was a useful tool, something to be read before or in conjunction with other works, and its value as an abbreviation should not be overlooked in light of the size of Avicenna's corpus. Both Latin and Arab scholars, including Avicenna, had used summaries in order to make sense of Aristotle, even when they had access to the Philosopher's works.[60] Algazel's relationship to Avicenna can be interpreted in the same fashion with the *STP* serving as a short, but adequate compendium on Avicenna. Thus, Algazel's influence was different from that of Avicenna, but this difference does not mean that scholars held a low opinion of Algazel or considered him unimportant.

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[59] See the list of translations of Avicenna's philosophical work in Burnett, "Arabic into Latin," 394-95. Hanley also makes no distinction between Aquinas' citation of Avicenna's philosophical works or his medical works, which would make this disparity between the two authors much greater. Hanley, "St. Thomas' Use of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*," 268-270.

[60] The most famous example of a scholar's failure to understand Aristotle until reading a summary comes from Avicenna himself, who says that he had read Aristotle's *Metaphysics* fifty times and could not make sense of it. It was only after purchasing a five-page pamphlet by al-Farabi, *The Aims of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, for the tiny sum of 3 dirhams, that Avicenna reports that he finally understood that Aristotle was not discussing the nature of God, but rather the supernatural forces at work that transcend the physical realm. Jon McGinnis, *Avicenna* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18-19.

At the heart of these assessments of *STP* is a decontextualized approach to the sources. For the study of the history of philosophy and science, value is often assigned to a text based on the efficacy of a work's contents rather than the signs of its use, which privileges a scholar's methods of argumentations above the reality of whether or not a work was read.[61] In this sense, Hanley and Janssens are correct in their conclusion that Algazel was not especially influential because the arguments in the *STP* are not as sophisticated or convincing as those of Avicenna. One could argue that the Latin tradition might have developed similarly even without the *STP* since it is an abbreviation of Avicenna's works, which the translators also made available in the twelfth century. For these reasons, Algazel does not merit a place alongside other figures in the history of philosophy whose works fundamentally changed the way Latin scholars thought. However, this judgment does not explain why Latin scholars continued to read, quote, copy, and annotate the *STP* even after the usefulness or novelty of its arguments had apparently expired.

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[61] The best example of style over substance in the study of medieval philosophy is that of Peter Abelard. On account of his novel argumentation, public condemnation, and colorful biography, he stands as an essential figure in the development of medieval philosophy and his works appear in dozens of modern editions. However, some of his works exist only in a half-dozen copies and scholarship on his legacy and influence make for depressing reading since his "school" does not survive the twelfth century. Yukio Iwakuma, "Influence," *The Cambridge Companion to Abelard*, ed. Jeffrey Brower and Kevin Guilfoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 305-335. An excellent counter-example is Owen Gingerich's study of Nicholas Copernicus' *De revolutionibus*, which scholars long assumed was not read and therefore was not influential despite the fact that it contained correct arguments about heliocentricity even before Galileo. However, Gingerich was able to locate hundreds of copies of the work and found that many influential astronomers had read it. Owen Gingerich, *The Book Nobody Read: Chasing the Revolutions of Nicolaus Copernicus* (New York: Walker & Company, 2004).

The methodology that judges the *STP* outside of its medieval context and usage also affects the history of the translations in general. To take a recent example, Gouguenheim privileges the Greek-to-Latin translations of Aristotle by arguing that they predate those from the Arabic, not because they were read more frequently. Unlike Algazel, the efficacy of Aristotle's arguments is indisputable given their importance to development of the Western tradition even before the Middle Ages. Thus, inquiries into how medieval scholars read these translations from Greek are of secondary importance, let alone how they were circulated, copied, and quoted. Only the acquisition of his texts matters, even though Aristotle is neither self-explanatory nor are all of his arguments complete or unassailable. Conversely, Arab philosophers must prove their worth to the Latin tradition despite the vibrant tradition of Aristotelian philosophy they represented. Gouguenheim's study and the backlash it produced illustrate that the nature of the medieval acquisition of Aristotelian philosophy remains an important question and one that carries considerable cultural weight. The consensus among historians is that Latins translated Arab philosophers' works to serve as aids to their comprehension of Aristotle.[62] While this assessment is correct, it is incomplete since does not explain the

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[62] In most surveys of medieval philosophy, the recovery of Aristotle appears as a seminal moment in the development of scholasticism in which Latin translations of the Arab philosopher play a key, but ancillary role. See Steven Marrone, "Medieval Philosophy in Context," *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 32-36; and John Marenbon, "Aristotelianism in the Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic, and Hebrew Traditions," *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, 101-102. Scholars of the translation movement also have interpreted the recovery of Aristotle as the Latins' primary motivator. D'Alverny, "Translations and Translators," 422. However, the current generation of scholars of the translation movement, specifically Charles Burnett, has emphasized the role of Arab philosophers' works in Latin reading of Aristotle. Burnett admits that the twelfth-century reinvigoration of

translation of so many works that were independent of the Aristotelian corpus or why they continued to be read long after Latins created commentaries on Aristotle and had no further need of aid.

A larger question arises from these inquiries: if the need or interest for these texts survived the incorporation of Aristotle into the Latin canon, did Arab authors become part of the canon as well? Moreover, did medieval scholars see such a sharp division between Latin and Arab philosophers? If they did not, how did they categorize these authors within the Latin canon? The prospect of surveying the influence of Avicenna or Averroes is daunting because of the size of the Latin corpus of their works and, as a result, modern scholars have only begun to examine individual translations.[63] The study of Algazel offers unique opportunities, not only because there is one work, but because Latin scholars understood that the *STP* was an aid to their understanding of speculative, specifically Aristotelian, philosophy and thus its continued use after the integration of Aristotle intensifies these questions. To answer them, we must go beyond what important philosophers wrote about Algazel and Arab philosophy. We must widen the scope of analysis to include the entirety of how scholars treated the *STP* from the way scribes created physical copies of the work to how readers annotated its pages.

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natural philosophy led to the recovery of Aristotle, but he is quick to clarify that the translation of Arab philosophers was essential for the Latin comprehension of Aristotle. Burnett, "Arabic into Latin," 372-381.

[63] Dag Hasse's work on Avicenna's *De anima* provides an excellent example of how Arab philosophers' works could be more authoritative and useful than those of Aristotle, at least for a time, during the Middle Ages. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna's 'De Anima' in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160-1300* (London: Warburg Institute Publications, 2000).

The Sources and Structure of the Dissertation

This study describes Algazel and his Latin audience by examining a variety of sources that testify to the reading of the *STP* and illustrate the place of this work within the Latin canon. The sources used in this project are divided between printed editions of the works that mention Algazel and manuscript copies of the *STP*. The first is the traditional source for evidence in a study of the history of philosophy, but the brevity of most scholarship on the *STP* means the bibliographical research into the authors who quote the *STP* is limited. Previous inqueries focus primarily on thirteenth-century scholars with the result that Algazel's audience seems to disappear shortly thereafter.[64] Thus, part of this project is an attempt to provide a new and more comprehensive bibliography on the *STP* from the twelfth to the sixteenth century. However, manuscripts constitute the majority of the sources for this study since they offer views into the largest and most diverse portions of Algazel's audience. Drawing on the manuscript research of Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny and Charles Lohr, I consulted forty medieval copies of the *STP* as well as the 1506 edition.[65] While printed editions are removed by several degrees from

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[64] In preparation for his Spanish edition of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, Alonso created a list of forty-eight scholars who cited Algazel and quoted from the *STP*. Alonso admits that this list is not exhaustive since he was unable to research late medieval authors whose works were not yet available in modern editions. Fifty years later, however, Alonso's bibliography remains the best resource on Algazel's audience despite the fact that more than half of the authors he cited were from the thirteenth century. Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxv-xliii.

[65] Although the manuscripts that contain copies of the *STP* are located in libraries throughout Europe, many of them also possess translations of Avicenna's philosophical works. Thus, Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny's meticulous survey of the manuscripts of the Avicenna Latinus proved invaluable for my research. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, Simone van Riet, and Pierre Jodogne, *Avicenna Latinus: Codices* (Leiden: E. Peeters, 1994). Charles Lohr discovered and described several manuscripts that d'Alverny did not find in Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 232-238 and "Algazel Latinus: Further Manuscripts" *Traditio* 22 (1966): 444-445.

their medieval context, the manuscripts contain evidence left by scribes and scholars that provide an important window onto the interests and concerns of Algazel's readers.

The dissertation proceeds from a description of the manuscripts to the readers of the *STP* and their interests. The first two chapters broadly introduce the manuscripts and illustrate the medieval experience of reading the *STP*. The first chapter considers the appearance of the manuscripts, and what the materials and techniques used to create them can tell about the value of the work. This physical evidence demonstrates that Latin scribes expended considerable effort to make the *STP* both appealing and easy to read. The second chapter examines the practice of compiling the *STP* with other works in manuscripts in order to determine the authors that scribes commonly connected with Algazel. While scholars closely associated Algazel with Aristotle and Arab philosophers for the duration of the Middle Ages, he occasionally broke free from this association since scribes often bound the *STP* with a range of important works by Latin authors, indicating that the use of Algazel matured along with the Latin philosophical tradition.

The next two chapters represent a transition from the manuscripts to the readers and their interests using evidence drawn from printed editions of medieval works. The third chapter begins this discussion with a focus on the authors who discussed Algazel and quoted from the *STP* in their own treatises. It demonstrates that Algazel's audience did not disappear shortly after the thirteenth century, but continued into the sixteenth. It also reinforces the conclusions of the first two chapters by demonstrating how the use of the *STP* changed over the centuries from a tool for understanding the Arab tradition of Aristotelian philosophy to an authoritative text that scholars could quote in their

commentaries on Aristotle, Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, and later the works of Aquinas. In the same way, the identity of Algazel changed over the period of three centuries from an Arab philosopher to a dangerous heretic. The fourth chapter builds upon the previous one by examining the chapters and sections of the *STP* that authors discussed and cited most frequently. This discussion continues into the fifth chapter, which looks at the passages of the *STP* that merited the most annotations from readers.

The last two chapters return to the manuscripts in order to catch scholars in the act of reading as they write notes and other marginalia alongside the text of the *STP*. The majority of the annotators were anonymous, but the number of annotations by these readers in the manuscripts testifies to the fact that many more scholars read the *STP* than wrote about it. Thus, the inclusion of the annotations in this study significantly increases and diversifies Algazel's audience beyond those authors who quote the *STP*. The fifth chapter describes the various methods of annotating that appear in manuscripts, which demonstrate scholars' efforts to understand and remember Algazel's arguments as well as impose their own order on the text. The chapter concludes by returning to the question of which parts of the *STP* were the most popular with scholars, examining which passages received the most annotations and comparing these findings with those of the fourth chapter. The sixth chapter analyses a subset of the annotations that appears as warnings left by scholars to mark theologically-troubling passages. Translation into Latin did not purge the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* of arguments that were contrary to the Christian scriptures and doctrine. For this reason, several of Algazel's arguments appear in thirteenth-century condemnations of Aristotelian philosophy. This chapter examines how these marginal

notes of warning compare with the passages that were listed in condemnations in order to demonstrate that readers were able to recognize erroneous teachings in the *STP*. The conclusion summarizes how the use of the *STP*, the identity of Algazel, and his audience changed from the twelfth to the sixteenth century.

By using Algazel as a case study, this dissertation demonstrates several important aspects of the place of Arab philosophy in Latin Christendom. Most importantly, Latins found Arab philosophy not so much a finite resource to be mined for material as a tool to be learned and used. Scholars did not simply translate new works of Aristotle from Arabic—pristine and unchanged after centuries of absence from Europe—and immediately understand the Philosopher's arguments. Instead, they needed and, in many cases, desired Arab intermediaries that dealt directly and indirectly with Aristotelian philosophy. Of these intermediaries, much has been made of the impact of Avicenna and Averroes, but modern scholarship has treated these figures as interlopers.[66] Their arguments were useful for a time, but they were eventually discarded for a host of reasons: they were perceived to be too dangerous or detrimental to the faith of the readers. They were successfully disproved by concerned theologians or perhaps they simply fell into disuse as scholars favored a closer reading of Aristotle and not his Arab

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[66] Jean Jolivet's explanation of the place of Arab philosophy in the Latin tradition singles out these two philosophers: "From the middle of the thirteenth century, Arab philosophers played an essential part in the development of Western Christian thought, philosophical and theological. The number known was relatively small, but two at least were inevitably familiar: Avicenna and Averroes; these had to be reckoned with, and indeed it soon became imperative to choose between them when framing one's philosophy." Jean Jolivet, "The Arabic Inheritence," *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, ed. Peter Dronke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 113.

continuators.[67] However, any narrative that plots the arrivals and departures of abstract ideas loses sight of the physical evidence that these translations continued to be used. Scholars read, copied, annotated and quoted the works of Avicenna, Averroes, and other Arab authors throughout the Middle Ages, but the *STP* is unique in its mundane and lasting utility as a compendium of philosophy. Latins had many reasons to discard this introductory text after a time, especially since it duplicates the work of Avicenna, yet it remained. The survival of the *STP*, as opposed to lengthier and more sophisticated works, indicates that Latins were successful in their attempts to integrate these texts into their philosophical canon. The translations had become ingrained within the tradition and could not be easily discarded without abandoning the tradition itself. In a very real sense, Arab philosophy was Latin philosophy during the Middle Ages despite the fact that scholars have ever since been redrawing the lines between them until Western and Eastern intellectual traditions have appeared incompatible.

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[67] The otherness of Arab philosophy within the Western intellectual tradition has more or less constant over the last century of scholarship. Pierre Duhem argued that the Condemnation of 1277 marks the birth of modern science since it forced Europeans away from a dependence on Aristotle and his Arab continuators. Pierre Duhem, *Études sur Léonard de Vinci: Les précurseurs parisiens de Galilée* (Rome, 1913), 429. More recent scholarship has been less transparent in portraying Arab philosophy as an obstacle or a problem, but it is still present. In the above quote, Jolivet describes the arguments of Avicenna and Averroes "had to be reckoned with" in the Middle Ages. This notion has even extended to the popular imagination. A special Millennium edition of *The Economist* contained a brief article on the topic of "The Church and Science" that presented an argument that was remarkably similar to that of Duhem. The article posited that the seemingly draconian and bigoted Condemnation of 1277, which Pope John XXI sponsored as a way of curtailing Arab philosophy, actually encouraged scholars to move away from Aristotle as an authority and to explore alternative means of explaining the workings of nature. "Right, for the Wrong Reason," *The Economist*, December 23, 1999 (http://www.economist.com/node/346780).

CHAPTER I - THE MANUSCRIPTS: THEIR APPEARANCE AND DISTRIBUTION

Each medieval copy of the *STP*, and any medieval work for that matter, is different.[1] The handmade nature of manuscripts—everything from the parchment and ink that make up its substance to the script and content of its text—ensures their uniqueness. Despite their best efforts, scribes could not provide readers with reproductions of the *STP* in the same way that print technology provides uniform copies of Muckle's edition. However, while the variation among manuscripts is inherent, there is also an element of volition in their creation. Scribes make choices about the appearance of a text. Some elect to reproduce the whole work; others copy only the passages that interested them. Some meticulously transcribe the letters and decorate the text with initials in a variety of colors; others hastily scribble the words without any adornment. Some use the entire folio; others write only within an inscribed area and leave large margins. In many cases, scribes expended considerable effort to make Algazel attractive and useful. In other words, scribes tried to make the *STP* appear and function like any other medieval work, despite its contents, and in no small way they helped to situate Algazel within the Latin canon. The scribes' efforts in producing excellent copies of the *STP* and other translations of

[1] The fundamental quality of variance between medieval works and how medieval audiences accepted and adapted to this philological reality has been a fruitful source of research. Paul Zumthor, *La lettre et la voix de la "littérature" médiévale* (Paris: Seuil, 1987); Bernard Cerquiglini, *In Praise of the Variant: A Critical History of Philology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Roger Chartier, *The Order of Books: Readers, Authors, and Libraries in Europe between the Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); John Dagenais, *The Ethics of Reading in Manuscript Culture: Glossing the Libro de Buen Amor* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Arab philosophy were so successful that Edward Gibbon and many historians up to the present have missed the significance of this Arab infiltration into Europe.

This chapter describes the physical invasion of the *STP* into Latin Christendom in the form of forty manuscripts from three centuries. It builds upon d'Alverny's research on the manuscripts that contain Latin translations of Arab philosophy by extending the focus from Avicenna to Algazel.[2] The evidence for the chapter is supplemented by Harald Kischlat's study into library inventories and handlists for records of manuscripts, both extant and lost, that possess works of Arab philosophers.[3] The number of manuscripts along with the references to lost codices indicate that the *STP* was somewhat of a medieval bestseller, but numbers alone cannot tell the whole story of how normal Algazel and, by extension, Arab philosophy became within the Latin tradition. There are several reasons why this normalcy should not be the case. The *STP* possesses traits that places it outside of the established canon and could have convinced scholars to treat it differently than other texts. It is a work authored by a foreign, pagan author and it was translated on the borders of Christendom from a language spoken mostly by the enemies of Christianity in Spain and the Middle East. Also, Algazel makes claims to philosophical and theological truths without recourse to Christian authorities. The only authority Algazel cites is Aristotle, but only on a few occasions. The novelty of the work and its

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[2] D'Alverny's *Codices* volume for the *Avicenna Latinus* represents over a decade's work of manuscripts research, published originally as eleven articles in the *AHDLMA* 28-37, 39 (1961-1970, 1972). Simone van Riet and Pierre Jodogne produced an appendix with d'Alverny's notes (*Codices*, 349-420).
[3] Harald Kischlat, *Studien zur Verbreitung von Übersetzungen arabischer philosophischer Werke in Westeuropa, 1150-1400: Das Zeugnis der Bibliotheken* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2000).

Aristotelian arguments appealed to some scholars,—those who would travel to Spain to become translators— but the same qualities of uniqueness and unfamiliarity bred suspicion in others. At the very least, the lack of sanctioned authorities in the *STP* complicates its relationship to the rest of the Latin canon and raises practical questions for scribes regarding how to treat and where to place the *STP* within the canon.

This chapter answers the first question of the scribes' treatment of the *STP*, while the next chapter addresses the compilation of the *STP* with the works of other authors within manuscripts. The first half of the chapter surveys the physical appearance of these copies in order to describe how the *STP* looked to a medieval scholar. Focusing on the *mise-en-page* of the *STP* in manuscripts demonstrates how scribes presented his work to readers in a format that was both accessible and aesthetically appealing. Scholars often spared little expense in fashioning a copy of the *STP* and several are worthy of display, but some copies have qualities that reveal how scribes made every effort to make them easier to read. They took liberties with the structure of Algazel's work by rearranging or excerpting the text. The *STP* proved to be a dynamic work whose structure and appearance sometimes changed to suit readers' needs or interests. Next, I trace the geographical and chronological distribution of the manuscripts in order to provide a map of Algazel's Latin audience. The *STP* travelled far and fast from Toledo in these three centuries. Some copies appear in the most recognizable European centers of learning—Oxford, Paris, Padua, and Prague—sometimes even before these places earned their scholarly reputation. But while many copies and readers are found in prestigious *studia*, Algazel also appears in the possession of remote abbeys in the Austrian Alps and austere

monasteries along the North Sea. Regardless of time or place, scholars from across Latin Christendom show an interest in this philosophical textbook. The *STP* circulated widely and varied in size, shape, and appearance, but scholars consistently copied Algazel's work as a valuable and useful text.

Surveying the *Summa theoricae philosophiae*

The goal of this section is to describe what scholars saw when they turned to a copy of the *STP* in a manuscript. This task is complicated by the fact that there is no standard version of the *STP*. Although this is the fate of all medieval works, there were particular modifications to the work's structure that obscured historians' view of its original form into the twentieth century. Scribes occasionally changed the order of the books or circulated one or two books independently, sometimes labeling the truncated versions as if they were the entire *STP* or even another work by Algazel. Other scholars fashioned unique *florilegia* of the *STP* by excerpting sections or passages into collections of philosophical teachings. In addition to the conscious changes to the text, the variability in the materials as well as in the skill and attention of scribes adds greater degrees of difference between the manuscripts. Because of this lack of uniformity there is a host of information about how scribes chose the present the work, giving us a glimpse into how Latin scholars perceived value of the *STP* through the materials used to create it. Thus, this chapter identifies and describes trends in the construction of manuscripts that illustrate the *STP*'s value for its medieval readers and help us to understand what scholars saw when they handled the work.

BnF Lat. 16096: A Brief Case Study

BnF Lat. 16096 is unique among the manuscripts that contain the *STP* for several reasons. It the only manuscript to possess the prologue and, unlike many other codices, its provenance and owners are well known. It was produced at a scriptorium in Paris in the 1280s[4] and was later in the possession of the philosopher Godfrey of Fontaines before he bequeathed it to the College of Sorbonne along with the rest of his library at his death in 1306 or 1309.[5] However, BnF Lat. 16096 is also significant because it was produced at Paris shortly after the Condemnation of 1277, which censures many doctrines that could be found in works of Arab philosophy and threatened excommunication on those who taught them. The edict specifically denounces a few works, but it does not forbid the possession of texts that expressed these erroneous philosophical doctrines, though it is far-reaching in its application and extends the charge of excommunication even to those who listen to such teachings, giving them a week to report what they have heard.[6] Thus, owning and annotating a manuscript like BnF Lat. 16096, which contains the *STP* as well as translations of Avicenna, Maimonides, and Aristotle, while not illegal, was perhaps not

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[4] Both d'Alverny and Lohr agree on the dating of this manuscript. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 41. Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 234.

[5] "Iste liber est collegii pauperum magistrorum de Sorbona studentium in theologica facultate, ex legato magistri Godefredi de Fontibus." BnF Lat. 16096, f. 1v. This manuscript appears three times (1306/1309, 1320, and 1330) in the inventories conducted at the library of the College of the Sorbonne during the fourteenth century. Kischlat, *Studien zur Verbreitung*, 87, 89, and 120.

[6] The only books that the Condemnation of 1277 specifically censured were *De amore* by Andre le Chapelain and an unidentified treatise on geomancy. Beyond these works, the Condemnation issues a warning about other works: "[i]tem libros, rotulos seu quaternos nigromanticos aut continentes experimenta sortilegiorum, inuocationes demonum, siue coniurationes in periculum animarum, seu in quibus de talibus et similibus fidei orthodoxe et bonis moribus evidenter adversantibus tractatur, per eandem sententiam nostram condempnamus in omnes qui dictos rotulos, libros, quaternos dogmatizauerint, aut audierint, nisi infra septem dies nobis uel cancellario parisiensi predicto reuelaverint eo modo quo superius est expressum, in hiis scriptis excommunicationis sententiam proferentes, ad alias penas, prout culpe qualitas exegerit, nicholominus processuri." Stephen Tempier, "Epistola," 76-78.

prudent for an aspiring late thirteenth-century theology scholar at Paris. Nevertheless, BnF Lat. 16096 was produced at Paris in the wake of the Condemnation of 1277, and Godfrey, who would eventually become a regent master of theology, assiduously read and annotated its contents.

Yet there is nothing in the appearance of the *STP* in BnF Lat. 16096 that suggests that there is anything dangerous about its contents. In fact, its appearance gives the opposite impression. The manuscript consists of large folios (210 x 210mm) of expensive vellum, on which the copyist wrote in an uncompressed and legible Gothic hand while leaving considerable space between words and lines. It displays wide margins all around the text where the scribe made painstaking corrections. An illuminator decorated the initials with red and blue along with interwoven lines and elongations that occasionally stretch across most of the edge of the folio. The first initial, which belongs to the incipit of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, contains gold leaf. Rubrics and paragraph marks appear everywhere to divide the books and treatises, and to break up the text. On the whole, this copy of the *STP* and the rest of the manuscript is the product of a substantial effort by scribes and a considerable sum of money on the part of whoever commissioned it. The detail in its script and the size of its margins indicate that the *STP* is intended to be read and engaged, as Godfrey's ample notes testify. Its initials also indicate that that the *STP* and Arab philosophy are worthy of decoration and something to be enjoyed.

A Scandalous Normalcy: The Size and Shape of the STP

BnF Lat. 16096 is an excellent example of how much value medieval scholars could assign to Algazel. The other thirty-nine manuscripts naturally differ from this one,

but the average copy of the *STP*, while not *de luxe*, is well-constructed and well-appointed, showing signs of both functionality and high style. The scribes, rubricators, and illuminators performed their tasks well and gave no indication, let alone warning, that the text they copied, corrected, and decorated was the work of a foreign author and full of errors. They constructed these copies in a way that indicates that scholars treated it in the same manner as any other text, displaying all of the medieval technology for promoting reading and comprehension. The manuscripts entice readers with gold leaf and colorful initials, help them find and remember passages with rubrics, paragraph marks, and headers, and leave them ample room to make notes. Conversely, there is no evidence in these manuscripts to suggest that the *STP* was copied or read covertly. Thus, it is easy to forget when looking at the manuscripts that the work contains ideas that some ecclesiastical authorities considered dangerous and warranted condemnation. For these reasons, the somewhat scandalous integration of Algazel into the Latin philosophical canon can be credited not only to its quality as a primer to the Aristotelian tradition, but also to the work of scribes who strove to make the text accessible for its audience.

Scribes regularly presented Algazel's work in a format that required considerable expense. Although information on the medieval price for a copy of the *STP* is too sporadic or circumstantial to be useful, the production value of the forty extant copies of the *STP* was relatively high given the careful effort often expended by scribes and the

quality of the materials used, beginning with the folios.[7] Many readers encountered Algazel on the finest material available since ten—a fourth of the total copies—appear on vellum.[8] Scribes fashioned copies in a range of sizes and accommodated a variety of readers and uses. The largest version is a huge, three-columned late thirteenth-century copy in Toledo, Biblioteca Capitular MS 47-15, measuring 580 x 410 mm, though it is certainly an outlier among the forty manuscripts. There are also a number of smaller copies of *florilegia* that fit comfortably in one's hand.[9] Still, the typical *STP* was not a pocket book and appeared to its Latin audience on folios averaging 280 x 200 mm. The majority of the manuscripts also show signs of wear or damage and some have been retrimmed, both of which suggest that the average *STP* was likely larger during the

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[7] A few copies bear inscriptions which assign a monetary value to the work. An early fourteenth-century scholar at the College of Sorbonne guessed at the value of a manuscript which contains a complete copy of the *STP* and only a few fragments from other works of Arabic philosophy: "precium huius libri non inuenimus, sed appreciati sumus eum xx. solidorum." Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France MS Lat. 16605, f. 1v. Another scholar at the College of Sorbonne valued Godfrey of Fontaine's copy of Algazel at "precii xii. librum," BnF Lat. 16096, f. 1v. Unlike the copy in BnF Lat. 16605, however, this copy is bound with a dozen authors and comprises only a sixth of the manuscript. An Italian scholar estimated that his complete copy of Algazel, which is written on vellum and contains no other works, is worth "x. Turonum." Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale MS Magliabechiano Cl. V. 45, f. 73v. The appraisals are arresting, but the currencies, contents, and quality of these manuscripts, as well as the dates and circumstances of the appraisals, are so different that an understanding of the price of the *STP* from this information is impossible.

[8] D'Alverny was keen to describe the manuscripts of the Avicenna Latinus as "vellum," "membrana," or "charta." While it is easy to detect paper, it is notoriously difficult to distinguish between vellum and parchment. For this reason, I conducted my own examination of the ten manuscripts that d'Alverny believed to be made of vellum and how they might differ from those she qualifies as parchment. It appears that there is a difference in the quality of these ten manuscripts (i.e. whiteness, thinness, etc.) that indicates a higher degree of skill in the preparation of their folios, but I could not determine if there was a difference in the skin of the animal.

[9] The smallest copies of the *STP* are a *florilegia* of the *Metaphysica* in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS lat. 3010, measuring 143 x 100 mm, and Uppsala, Universitetsbibliotek MS C. 647 (145 x 100mm) which consists of excerpts from the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica* up through the end of the *Physica*.

Middle Ages.[10] Despite this deterioration, the margins that remain provided scholars with at least two inches of space in the margins for notes.

What scribes did with these folios is significant. They often transcribed the text in a meticulous and elegant fashion, revealing that scribes strove for precision to aid scholars in their reading. The majority are written in two columns of careful script, though a single column of text is also common.[11] In many cases, the script is scrupulously corrected in contemporaneous or slightly later hands. Most corrections repair errors that occurred in copying, but some corrections reveal that a reader had access to another version of the *STP* that supplied variant readings.[12] Informative rubrics, together with running titles, are widespread, though their content and placement is not uniform from manuscript to manuscript. Many more rubrics were planned with the space provided and the contents sometimes written in a lighter ink or lead for rubricators, but they were left incomplete. Paragraph marks appear often in alternating red and blue as well as in green, black and brown. These marks serve to break up the text and help

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[10] All of the manuscripts display a degree of damage either from wear or human effort, but some have lost a sizable amount of their original size. Extra-textual material, such as catchwords and marginalia, is often lost or made illegible. This damage can also extend into the work of scribes. Most of the running titles in the top margin of Edinburgh, University Library MS 134 are lost.

[11] Of the forty extant copies, nine were written in single column and one in three columns. The great majority of scribes wrote in variations of northern and southern Gothic scripts, but there are a few notable exceptions. Both of the fifteenth-century scribes of Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana MS lat. 2546 and Paris, nationale de France MS Lat. 6655 wrote in a humanistic script.

[12] Consistent changes to certain terms indicate that scholars differed on the meaning of the text. Alonso's negative critique of Muckle's edition exposed how Gundissalinus struggled to render concisely some Arabic philosophical concepts, such as *al-mahiyya*—an important variation which Muckle was unable to address. The archdeacon translated the term as "*eo quod ipsum est*" while a later corrector rendered it as "*quiditas*." The latter term often appears as a correction in the margins of manuscripts, but the extent of this change and the possibility of a redaction must await a more critical edition of the . Alonso, "Los *Maqāṣid* de Algazel," 445-454.

scholars to mark and remember passages. The most interesting aids to reading in the *STP* are the diagrams that are present in a significant number of manuscripts. These diagrams typically explain visually the geometrical examples provided by Algazel in the *Logica* and *Metaphysica*.[13] Gundissalinus and his associates appear to have transcribed these diagrams directly from the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*.[14] In sum, scribes presented the text in a clear script and incorporated a variety of textual tools to improve the *STP*'s clarity and functionality.

In addition to these textual aids to comprehension, the artistic qualities of many copies of the *STP* indicate that scholars considered Algazel's work to be worthy of decoration. Almost all of the manuscripts allow space for initials, though only half possess them in any form. These initials run the gamut of color, size, and skill. A significant number of manuscripts have larger inhabited initials whose flourishes can spill out in the margins and run the length of a folio, using many colors and designs.[15] Five manuscripts display gold leaf in their initials.[16] Most other initials are composed of alternating blue and red letters without any additional decoration. More ornate initials

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[13] Muckle was fortunate to select a manuscript which contained almost all of the diagrams which regularly occur in copies of the *STP*. Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 8-12, 40-42. Only one diagram appears in copies of the *Logica*. See al-Ghazali, "Logica Algazelis," 272.

[14] Compare the Latin diagrams in n. 13 above with those in al-Ghazali, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, 79, 145, 148-152. Thirteen of the manuscripts contain one or more of the diagrams that appear in Muckle's and Lohr's editions.

[15] All three chapters in BnF Lat. 16096 (f. 74r, f. 83v, and f. 108r) and Graz, Universitätsbibliothek MS 482 (f. 135r, 141v, and 160r) have initials which extend the length of the margins with red and blue filigree. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Ott. lat. 2186 has peculiar Spanish decorations in green, blue and red in its initials which appear in f. 1r and 26r.

[16] Illuminators used gold leaf in Edinburgh 134; Toledo 47-15; Graz 482; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France MS Lat. 6443 and Lat. 16096.

build upon the letters with additional flourishes of filigree or extend to form colorful borders to the text. Artists sometimes fashioned author portraits of Arab philosophers such as Avicenna or Averroes, either alone or teaching students, but no one depicted Algazel in such a way. Only a few of the manuscripts contain historiated initials, but the images in the initials rarely show any connection to the adjacent content of the text.[17] Naturally, not every copy received the same artistic treatment, yet in the main scribes chose to embellish the *STP*, presenting it to readers in an attractive and sometimes beautiful format.

With all this effort expended, one cannot help but wonder how well the scribes understood the words they were writing as they fashioned copies of the *STP*. There are many reasons to be skeptical about whether they recognized the errors in words they wrote. Simple inattention or a lack of advanced study perhaps allowed scribes to remain ignorant of the contents of the work. However, almost all scribes had some level of formal education, and the frequency of corrections, some of which show a critical understanding of the text or even recourse to a better copy, strongly argues that scholars did not mindlessly transcribe words. Yet even if they did recognize the condemned errors in the *STP*, they choose to do nothing about it. None of the manuscripts show signs of censorship of any kind from scribes. On the contrary, many copies of the *STP* show painstaking effort to present the text in a format that would have been appealing and

[17] The smaller initials for treatises and subsections in Ott. lat. 2186 contain images of a dog (f. 46v), snake (f. 107v), eagle (f. 1v) and human faces (f. 16r, 95v)—none of which are part of the content of neighboring passages.

useful to readers. If Algazel faced resistance, it did not come from the community of scribes.

Algazel Whole and in Pieces

Copies of the *STP* differed in content as well as in the quality of their materials. The differences in content are more than textual discrepancies that came about through scribal error or centuries of damage. The physical forms of the *STP* fall into two broad categories: complete copies that included all three books or partial copies that possessed elements of only one or two books. This divergence occurred because, unlike most of the translations of Arab philosophy, the *STP* consisted of discrete books on different subjects. Despite the clear division between these sections, the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* demonstrate a strong coherence as Algazel progresses from a discussion of abstract, supernatural beings to beings found in nature. The *Logica*, however, does not directly relate to the book that it proceeds and it is more rudimentary in its subject matter. This book could easily be discounted if a reader did not need a review of the basics of grammar or how to form a syllogism. While Algazel makes it clear in the prologue that the work has three parts, very few Latin scholars had access to this information.[18] The disjunction between the *Logica* and *Metaphysica* is compounded by the appearance of an introduction in the latter. This second introduction implies that the *STP* consists of three

[18] In the prologue, Algazel explains that philosophers have four types of disciplines—*doctrinales* (mathematics), *logicales*, *naturales*, and *theologice*— but he will only cover the last three. The mathematical sciences and their subject matter do not lend themselves to speculation or difference of opinion among philosophers and do not warrant treatment in this work. Salman, "Algazel et les latins," 125-7.

books, but it is more concerned with explaining why the work treats metaphysical matters before discussing the physical world, contrary to the practice of other philosophers, since metaphysics deals with matters of divine significance and therefore ought to be treated first.[19] Ignorance of the prologue together with a lack of cohesion between the *Logica* and the other books allowed scholars to deviate from the work's original structure. Some scribes rearranged the order of the books with the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* appearing first, but many others detached the *Logica* from the rest of the work, abandoning the vision for the text's didactic value as a compendium on three disciplines within philosophy.

The bifurcation of the *STP* into complete and partial copies had a significant effect on how Latin scholars perceived Algazel's work, particularly the *Logica*.

Table 1: Complete and Partial Copies of the *STP*

Format	**# of MSS**
All Books	15
Metaphysica and *Physica*	10
Logica and *Physica*	1
Logica alone	5
Metaphysica alone	4
Physica alone	6

[19] "Usus fuit apud phylosophos preponere naturalem scienciam. Nos autem eligimus preponere divinam eo quod magis necessaria est et maioris diversitatis est; et quoniam ipsa est finis omnium scienciarum et inquisicionis earum. Unde ipsi propter difficultatem et obscuritatem suam postposuerunt eam; et quia difficilius est eam scire ante naturalem. Nos autem interponemus aliqua de naturalibus sine quibus non potest divina intelligi; et complebimus id quod dicturi sumus de intencionibus huius divine sciencie in duabus proposicionibus et quinque tractatibus." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 1.

Copies with elements of all three books are the most common format, but they only account for less than forty percent of the total. The *Logica* was the least popular, appearing in only twenty-one manuscripts while the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* are present in twenty-nine and thirty-two copies. Even lost copies mentioned in inventories and handlists reinforce this difference in interest because the *Logica* rarely appears in these records.[20] It seems that scribes began to treat the *Logica* differently almost immediately after the *STP* began to circulate since two of the earliest manuscripts possess only this book.[21] Even in copies that contain all three books, however, scholars sometimes rearranged the order so that the *Logica* appeared last.[22] The *Logica* also tends to have a lower production value, especially if it appears separately from other books. No independent copies of the *Logica* were written on vellum. Even copies that appear with the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* display smaller and less ornate initials as well as fewer paragraph marks, rubrics and headers.[23]

The early separation of the *Logica* gave some scholars the impression that Algazel had written two works. Not only did the *Logica* sometimes appear alone, but scribes also

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[20] Kischlat finds only a few records of the *Logica*. Fourteenth-century inventories from the College of Sorbonne mention the copies of the *Logica* which appear in BnF Lat. 16096 and Lat. 16605. The only record of a lost copy of *Logica* is found in the 1372 inventory from Merton College. All other mentions of Algazel in library records either do not mention the *Logica* specifically or are unclear about the contents of manuscripts. Kischlat, *Studien zur Verbreitung von Übersetzungen* 153-4.

[21] Early thirteenth-century copies of the *Logica* appear in London, British Library MS Royal 15 B.iv, f. 72r-75r and Zwettl, Stiftsbibliothek MS 89, f. 221r-231v. See notes 38 and 39 below.

[22] This rearranged order of the chapters occurs in Worcester, Chapter Library MS Q. 81, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France MS Lat. 14700 and Lat. 6443.

[23] The decoration of the *Logica* and materials used to create these copies are of a noticeably lesser quality. None of the initials in copies of the *Logica* are illuminated with gold, even when the *Logica* precedes the other chapters, as is the case in Edinburgh 134. The most illegible and poorly constructed copy in the collection is the independent *Logica* chapter in Royal 15 B.iv, which was written in a hasty script that leaves little room in the margins.

introduced it differently. Rubrics and library catalogues often subsumed the *Physica* into the *Metaphysica* and referred to the two books collectively as the *Metaphysica*, *Philosophia*, or sometimes the entire *STP*.[24] Conversely, scribes rarely subsumed the *Logica* into other books. For example, a scribe in BnF Lat. 6443 makes this division clear when he provides the rubric "Explicit algazel totus" at the end of a copy of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*. [25] Yet the *Logica* appears only a few folios later with Algazel listed as the author, but with no mention of any connection to the elements of the *STP* that come before it. These practices allowed the *Logica* to maintain a degree of independence throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. The Venetian printer Peter Lichtenstein believed that Algazel's work was actually two texts when he printed the *STP* in 1506 under the title *Logica et philosophia Algazelis Arabis*. This separation persists even into the present with Muckle's edition of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* together, and Lohr's edition of the *Logica.*

Besides detaching and rearranging the books, scholars also fashioned their own copies by extracting passages from the *STP*. These unique *florilegia* of Algazel,

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[24] Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento di San Francesco MS 663 has rubrics introducing the *Logica* and *Metaphysica*, but the rubric for the *Physica* is left blank. Bernkastel – Kues, St. Nikolaus Hospital MS 205 contains all three chapters with an incipit and explicit for the *Logica*, but the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* only has the explicit on f. 133v: "Liber de uniuersali philosophia Algazel." Laon, Bibliothèque municipale MS 412; Erfurt, Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek MS CA. F. 331; and Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana MS lat. 2665 possess the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, but scribes introduce the work only as "*Methaphisica Algazelis*" with no indication that another book begins when the *Metaphysica* ends.

[25] BnF Lat. 6443, f. 165v. The *Metaphysica* and *Physica* occupy f. 143r-165v and the *Logica* f. 202r-208r. The *Metaphysica* and *Physica* have running headers (i.e. "liber primus [secundus, tertius, etc] methaphisice algazelis; liber primus phisicorum algazelis") which indicate that they are chapters within the same work. The explicit on f. 165v reinforces that this work of Algazel is complete and there is no correction or note which implies that the *Logica Algazelis*, as it is titled on f. 202r, is a chapter of the previous work.

sometimes entitled "*excerpta*" or "*abbreviatio*" in rubrics, appear in six manuscripts and invariably find themselves as part of collections of excerpted works by a variety of philosophers.[26] These copies again reflect the popularity of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* since scholars did not excerpt passages from the *Logica*. The quality of the *florilegia* of Algazel is considerably less than that of more complete copies. They are much shorter on average and display fewer artistic flourishes and extra details in the text. The selection of passages in the *florilegia* is idiosyncratic, but two treatises in particular were particularly popular. Scholars excerpted many sections from the fifth treatises of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, which contain several passages that were condemned most frequently.

The differences in the treatment of the *Logica* from the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* suggest that scribes copied the *STP* for two broad audiences. The *Logica* was best suited for those who were beginning their studies. Its rudimentary nature made it useful for students in need of an introduction to grammar and the components of a syllogism. The demonstrably inferior production value of the *Logica*, especially among copies unconnected to the rest of the *STP*, also reflects the lesser means of students. The *Logica* could be used independently and provided students with dialectical skills that they could use in a variety of studies. Scribes constructed the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* with more specific goals in mind. These two books required a little more education than the *Logica*

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[26] The six *florilegia* are found in Prague, Metropolitní Kapitoly MS 1323, f. 115r-117r; Rome, Biblioteca Angelica MS 242, f. 1r-7v; Toledo 47-15, f. 88v-90r; Uppsala C. 647, f. 1r-5r; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Borghesiani lat. 37, f. 317r-324v; Vat. lat. 3010, f. 120r-124r. The incipit in Vat. lat. 3010, f. 120r introduces the work as "excerpta de methaphysica algazelis." the explicit from Borgh. lat. 37, f. 324v: "Abreuiatio algazelis de naturalibus aristotelis."

and were best used together as a cogent progression of study from abstract to concrete bodies. A familiarity with Algazel's *Metaphysica* and *Physica* allowed scholars to study the works of Aristotle or Avicenna with greater comprehension. For this reason, scholars bound these philosophers together, which I demonstrate in the next chapter, in order to derive the maximum benefit of reading these texts in concert. Independent copies of the *Logica* likewise appear sporadically in collections of grammatical texts.[27] As separate works, the *Logica* supplied the necessary tools for advanced study while the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* offered scholars an accessible primer for material they would encounter in more detailed and comprehensive philosophical works.

The *STP* that scholars typically handled was written with care and on parchment of above-average quality. It displays a variety of textual devises to ease reading and comprehension. An array of color appears in the initials as well as in the texts through rubrics, paragraph marks, and extra flourishes. There is a considerable amount of room in the margins for readers to respond to and interact with Algazel's teachings. Also, the division of the *STP* into complete and partial copies effectively splits the work in two in the minds of scholars. Half of the copies do not possess all of the books and are usually missing the *Logica*, with the result that Algazel's readers primarily were aware of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*. Many considered these two books to be the whole *STP* or at least a discrete work apart from the *Logica*. Thus, medieval scholars' experience and treatment of the *Logica* was different from that of the rest of the work, which is a

[27] The *Logica* is bound with the grammatical works of Priscian and Donatus in Royal 15 B.iv.

recurring theme in this study. On average, they exhibit a relatively high production value and their construction betrays nothing about the errors that are contained within its pages as it moved from place to place and scholar to scholar throughout Christendom.

Tracking the *Summa theoricae philosophiae*

The forty manuscripts containing the *STP* have provenances that stretch across three centuries and most of Europe. There are significant differences between the chronological and geographical distribution of the *STP*.

Table 2: Provenance of the Manuscripts

Century	# of MSS		Region	# of MSS
XIII[1]	6		Italian	11
XIII[2]	18		N. French	9
XIV[1]	12		S. French	3
XIV[2]	1		English	8
XV[1]	1		German & Austrian	6
XV[2]	2		Spanish	2
			Czech	1

Scribes produced the bulk of the copies in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries with a sharp decline thereafter. Conversely, the geographical provenance of copies is more even. Regions that developed large and influential *studia* in this period, such as northern France, are well-represented in this list, but they cannot claim a preponderance of copies. Italian scribes produced the most, though there is some ambiguity in the rotunda hands of a few of the southern French manuscripts that might augment this total. The near-absence of Spanish copies is stark, especially since one of the two Spanish manuscripts moved to Italy sometime before the middle of the fifteenth century. The significant number of

copies produced by German scribes, as well as a fifteenth-century Czech manuscript, illustrates how far Algazel travelled from Toledo. Only a few centuries after its translation, the *STP* had gained an audience that stretched to the borders of Latin Christendom.

The evidence regarding the translation movement conducted in Spain indicates that the translations took a variety of paths from the peninsula. Rather than move north or east from Spain in a steady progression, copies appear in the hands of scribes in disparate locations at an early date. Historians continue to investigate the connections between the translation movement and England.[28] Many translators came from the island, some of whom returned with texts, and several of the oldest copies of the translations were made by English hands. Thus, the translators and their associates appear to be the primary disseminators of the translations. Italian scholars also had a long history with the translation movement. Unlike their Spanish counterparts, Italian scholars read copies of the translations produced in their native land since there are many more manuscripts with Italian than Spanish origins. The most prolific of the translators, Gerard of Cremona, may have been responsible for the spread of his works to Italy. After his death, Gerard's circle of associates at Toledo composed a valuable inventory of the works that he bequeathed to the convent of Santa Lucia in Cremona.[29] His circle likely carried out his will since the

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[28] Charles Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927); Charles Burnett, *The Introduction of Arabic Learning into England* (London: British Library, 1997).

[29] For the *vita* and a list of his translations constructed by Gerard's associates after his death, see Burnett, "The Coherence of the Arabic-Latin Translation Program," 275-281.

earliest copies of his translations originate in northern Italy in the beginning of the thirteenth century.[30] Beyond the wanderings of translators, the early-established universities of Paris and Oxford provided a natural meeting place for scholars and the translations as these schools generated increasingly more students and scholarship. However, the manuscripts prove that the translations' audience was not exclusive to the universities and found their way into the hands of a variety of scholars.

The *STP* is fortunate among the translations of Arab philosophy in that we know much about its initial history. We know the translators involved, their location, and the work's relative date of origin in the third quarter of the twelfth century. But as is the case with many of the translations, the evidence surrounding its early circulation leaves much to be desired. We have no autographs from the translators and very few Spanish copies of the *STP*. As a result, Algazel's textual trail goes cold during the rest of the twelfth century. The number of records improves around the beginning of the next century as copies begin to appear in manuscripts and inventories, and increasingly more scholars quote Algazel's arguments, but the *STP* had time to travel in the interim. Algazel appears in various places simultaneously in the early thirteenth century and does not permit us neatly chart the progress of the work throughout Europe.

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[30] Burnett has found Gerard's works in three northern Italian manuscripts, written in the same early thirteenth-century hand, which have connections to the Cathedral of Toledo. Burnett, "Communities of Learning in Twelfth-Century Toledo," 14.

The Early Thirteenth Century

Four manuscripts containing the *STP* date to the early thirteenth century. Each possesses a different version that represents wider trends regarding how scribes copied the work during the Middle Ages. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Ott. lat. 2186 is conspicuous among the earliest copies not only because it is one of the few Spanish manuscripts, but also because it consists of all three books in the correct order.[31] Ott. lat. 2186 is the oldest of twelve copies of the *STP* to have all three books. Like most complete copies, the production value of this manuscript is quite high. The scribe's handwriting is careful and uniform, and there are large initials decorated with several colors. The margins are also large and several readers used them for annotations. Thus, the earliest manuscripts indicate that scribes expended considerable effort when they introduced Algazel to Latin readers, presenting the *STP* in its entirety and in a form that was attractive to encourage a reader's engagement with the text. For all of this manuscript's good qualities, however, it nevertheless seems to be the exception that proves the rule regarding the reception of the translations in Iberia. The only other copy from Spain is a late thirteenth-century fragment of the *Metaphysica*.[32] Even Kischlat's study yields only one additional Spanish copy; an inventory of the books owned by

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[31] D'Alverny labels this manuscript as Spanish in origin, though she leaves room for doubt. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 82-83. The manuscript has the hallmarks of a southern, early thirteenth century rotunda, and there are elements which indicate that the manuscript is Spanish. Overall, the hand displays a degree of angularity which is not typical of Italian rotunda. The hand has a horizontal "a" in its minims which often connects to other letters (see the "ta" in "*credulitas*" in f. 1r, line 8). The letter "d" appears with a straight ascender. The letter "y" is often dotted ("ymagines" in f. 27, line 22). Compare with Albert Derolez, *The Palaeography of Gothic Manuscript Books: From the Twelfth to the Early Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 113-15.

[32] Toledo 47-15, f. 88v-90r.

Sancho of Aragon, archbishop of Toledo, mentions a "*Libro de algazel de philosophia*" in his possession as of his death around 1275.[33] It is fitting that Toledo retained a copy of a translation that was carried out by its archdeacon a century prior, but these paltry records illustrate that Algazel's Latin audience in Spain was never large.

While early thirteenth-century records in Spain are meager, there are contemporaneous copies that appear as far removed from Toledo as England and Austria, and their contents differ in varying degrees from the complete and well-constructed Ott. lat. 2186. The *STP* seems to have participated in the translation pipeline between Spain and England since English scribes produced two copies in the early thirteenth century. One was owned and annotated by a deacon from Lincoln, Nicholas Bacun, who studied Algazel at Oxford in the second quarter of the thirteenth century where the manuscript, now Worcester Chapter Library MS Q. 81, was likely created.[34] Whether Nicholas was related to the near-contemporary Roger Bacon is unknown, but he conducted his studies with support from his famous bishop, Robert Grosseteste, who also developed an early interest in Arab science and philosophy.[35] In addition to his studies, Nicholas was a

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[33] Kischlat, *Studien zur Verbreitung*, 75. Kischlat was able to find only three Spanish records for translations of Arabic philosophy while his study of the inventories of France and England uncovered significantly more bibliographical records for extant and non-extant texts.

[34] Alfred Emden, "Accounts Relating to an Early Oxford House of Scholars," *Oxoniensia* 31 (1966): 77-81; D'Alverny, *Codices*, 162-167; Rodney Thomson and Michael Gullick, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Medieval Manuscripts in Worcester Cathedral Library* (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2001): 176-177. Emden's and d'Alverny's pagination differs from that of Thomson and Gullick, but I have decided to use the latter's pagination because it matches that of manuscript.

[35] Nicholas Bacun appears in records of bishopric of Lincoln having received a moiety of the church of Stoke Rochford in 1244 or 1245 from Bishop Robert Grosseteste. Francis Davis, ed. *Rotuli Roberti Grosseteste, Episcopi Lincolniensis, A. D. 1235-1253* (Horncastle: W. K. Morton & Sons, 1914): 72. Nicholas likely used the resources from this position to fund his studies in Oxford. Emden, "Accounts," 79.

landlord at Oxford and kept records of the rent payments of several masters on blank folios within the manuscript.[36] Worcester Q. 81's version of the *STP* is curious since it consists of the three books with treatises out of order and a substantial part missing. The scribe placed the *Logica* behind the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, and stopped copying it abruptly after filling only the recto side of a folio, leaving the verso side blank.[37] Textual deficiencies and other scribal errors make Ott. lat. 2186 the better of the early copies of the *STP*. The decorations in Worcester Q. 81 are also of a lesser quality since its initials are much smaller and display fewer colors than those in Ott. lat. 2186, but it possesses running headers, rubrics, paragraph marks, and wide margins where Nicholas took the opportunity to write notes and outlines, though he has little opportunity to comment on the *Logica*. The deacon was aware that there were three books in the work, but his reading and experience of Algazel was necessarily different than scholars who encountered a complete copy in Ott. lat. 2186.

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[36] Nicholas collected the year's rent as well as utilities and furnishings: "Memorandum quod N. Bacun recepit a magistro H. de Celesya duos anulos aureos de precio....Memorandum quod de Busca in arriragiis v s. et vi d. scilicet est in uico tres trunci et in curia xi trunci parvi... Nicholaus Bacun soluit pro natis iii d. pro carbon[ibus?] x i d. pro tripode iii d. pro alleis iii ob. pro discis i d." Worcester Q. 81, f. 108v.

[37] Worcester Q. 81, f. 85r-102r contains most of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* (Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 1-52, 69-90, 135-152, 90-114, 119-129, 131-5), but only a fraction of the *Logica* (Algazel, "Logica Algazelis," 239-244). The treatises are jumbled and a folio has been lost. The *Metaphysica* begins on f. 85ra and quits abruptly in the second treatise at the bottom of f. 90vb (*Algazel's Metaphysics*, 52:28). F. 91ra picks up in the middle of the third treatise (69:34), which suggests that a folio is missing. The *Metaphysica* ends again on f. 93rb at the beginning of the fourth treatise (90:10) and is immediately followed by the first treatise, *De loco*, of the *Physica* (135:25). The *Physica* breaks off in the second treatise on f. 95va (152:28), leaving the rest of the folio blank. F. 96ra picks up where f. 93rb left off in the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica*. When the *Metaphysica* is finished on f. 101rb, the first treatise of the *Physica*, *De loco*, appears once again (131:19) and ends again on f. 101vb (135:29). F. 102ra sees the beginning of the *Logica*, but it ends on the same folio (Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 244: 26) with the next folio left blank.

Nicholas's copy illustrates how quickly scholars began to treat the *Logica* differently from the other chapters of the *STP*. An incomplete and hastily-written version of the *Logica* also appears in another early thirteenth-century English manuscript, London, British Library, Royal 15 B.iv.[38] Unlike Ott. lat. 2186 or Worcester Q. 81, this scribe worked very quickly since he often omits words, sentences, or whole sections. The script fluctuates and the ink has bled through in places on account of inferior parchment or the scribe's haste. He uses up the majority of the folio with text, leaving no margins, and spares no room for headings or rubrics to announce the author or title. This manuscript suggests that the scribe created the work for his own use with little thought to other readers. However, the poor quality of Royal 15 B. iv is uncharacteristic among the manuscripts in this collection regardless of whether they contain all or some of the *STP*. A better copy of the *Logica* is found in Zwettl, Stiftsbibliothek MS 89, which originated in the scriptorium of Zwettl Abbey around the same period.[39] The setting of this Alpine Cistercian monastery seems to have afforded the scribe more time, as well as better materials and greater attention to detail since he carefully copied the text and gave it initials, rubrics, and wide margins. Surprisingly, Zwettl Abbey was not the only

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[38] Royal 15 B.iv, f. 72r-75r The scribe copies almost the entire *Logica* (Lohr, 239-285:108) before he stops abruptly on f. 75r, leaving the verso side blank. D'Alverny describes the text as "manu currenti tenuissima exaratus est, sine ullo ornatu." D'Alverny, *Codices*, 136.

[39] The majority of the manuscript is written in a hand that dates to the second half of the twelfth century at Zwettl. The *Logica* is a later addition in a later hand that could be from the end of the twelfth century or early thirteenth century, making it the earliest copy of the *STP* in any form. Charlotte Ziegler, *Zisterzienserstift Zwettl, Katalog der Handschriften des Mittelalters 2, Codex 101 - 200* (Vienna: Schroll, 1985), 174-6. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 184.

Cistercian monastery to house Algazel in its library during the Middle Ages.[40] Despite differences in material and quality, Royal 15 B.iv and Zwettl 89 testify that scribes early on began to copy and circulate the *Logica* as a separate work, giving it an existence that was often separate from the rest of the *STP*.

The paths from Toledo to Oxford and Zwettl led to interesting textual developments for Algazel. Already in the beginning of the thirteenth century, the *STP* travelled on diverse routes to a variety of readers. Some obtained complete copies that possessed many reading aids. Others received versions that had the books out of order or possessed only the *Logica*, and whose legibility and quality of materials varied. In whatever way early scribes chose to present the *STP*, the appearance of these first copies gives no hint that the work, its author and contents are anything out of the ordinary. The methods used to create these manuscripts represent the standard practices employed by thirteenth century scribes when fashioning any philosophical work in the Latin canon. Thus, there is every textual indication that scholars and scribes intended for Algazel to be read widely from its inception.

The Growing Influence of Algazel: 1250 – 1350

The majority of the copies of the *STP* were produced in a roughly century-long period between the second half of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth. During this period, thirty copies were created and the audience reached his

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[40] The Cistercian abbey of St. Lambrecht in the secluded village of Ter Doest (between Bruges and the North Sea in Belgium) mentions "een voumen heet Alghasel" in a 1350 list of manuscripts that are available to lend to readers. Kischlat, *Studien zur Verbreitung*, 110.

furthest geographical extent across Latin Christendom as Algazel gained readers from Spain to Sweden. Some scribes continued to follow the early trends in the layout and appearance of the *STP*, but others presented Algazel in different ways. Many complete copies emerge, but the *Logica* frequently appears alone or detached from the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, furthering the distinction between these books for later audiences. The most ornate copies also originate from this period and reflect the growing audience of the *STP*. Well-known masters at Paris owned beautifully-decorated copies produced by the burgeoning manuscript trade in that city. The greatest variations came from scribes, perhaps students, who created their own *florilegia* of the *STP*. Algazel also began to find his way into other languages during this period to educate scholars outside of the *studia*. Scribes were adapting Algazel to suit the needs of a growing audience until the *STP*, like other Aristotelian works, began to attract the attention of ecclesiastical authorities.

The resistance to Aristotelian philosophy in the thirteenth century complicates the rapid increase in the number of copies of the *STP*. Translations of Arabic works circulated for generations after their creation without close study into their orthodoxy. Despite papal involvement on occasion, there was little systematic examination of these sources or definitive statements about their use in the first half of the thirteenth century.[41]

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[41] Thirteenth-century popes often sent legates and bulls to Paris in order to address the issue of Aristotelian philosophy, but the frequency of these events appears to indicate that these actions were inconclusive. The university's struggle for autonomy during the first half of the thirteenth century likely contributed to the inability to effectively control scholars or enforce rules imposed by authorities outside of the university.

Strident resistance appears in only the decade of the 1270s with the Condemnation of 1277 and *De erroribus philosophorum*. Yet it is during this century and the next that scribes fashioned the most copies. For all the discussion of dangerous errors, threats of excommunication, and increased scrutiny, there is nothing in the manuscript tradition to indicate that this thirteenth-century debate had an effect on scribes. The same period that sees the most controversy also sees the production of the most copies of the *STP*, especially in Paris, where Algazel found one of his largest audiences as well as his sharpest critics. Moreover, the most expensive copies originate during this period. The material evidence signifies that the debate over the place of Aristotelian philosophy did not diminish the interest in the *STP* or the value scholars associated with the text. Instead, the controversy likely stimulated interest in the work and inadvertently created a larger readership.

The debate over Aristotle was in progress when French scribes first fashioned copies of the *STP*. There is evidence that southern and northern French scholars began reading the work in the early thirteenth century, but, unlike the copies found in English hands, the earliest French manuscripts date to the middle of the century.[42] The French audience of Algazel that developed in this period has a distinctly scholastic quality to

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John Wippel, "The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277," 65-72; Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities*, 15-34.

[42] This earliest copy of the *STP* by French scribes is in BnF Lat. 16605 (f. 2r-70v). D'Alverny dated this manuscript to the 1240s as it was owned by Richard de Fournival, who amassed most of his library at Paris between 1246 and 1260. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 50-51. Also, the *florilegia* in Vat. lat. 3010 originates in southern France also around mid-century. It contains excerpts from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, which was translated in Toledo in 1244 and travelled north shortly thereafter. Jacqueline Hamesse, "Les recueils de textes universitaires à l'epoque médiévale," *Segno e testo* 4 (2006): 357-377, 369.

them, meaning that several university masters possessed the *STP* and some copies were produced or housed in famous schools. Other French versions have characteristics that indicate that they were constructed by students. Algazel's French audience represents perhaps his most learned readership, occupying some of the highest levels of education in Latin Christendom.

The list of Parisian masters and institutions that owned the *STP* is conspicuous despite the thirteenth-century debate over Aristotelian philosophy. Richard of Fournival, an avid book collector, possessed and bequeathed perhaps the earliest French copy (c. 1240) to Gerard of Abbeville, a master of theology at Paris, who in turn willed his and Richard's library of three-hundred codices in 1272 to the newly-established College of Sorbonne.[43] Gerard gave his copy and the rest of his collection to the faculty for the purpose of giving secular masters of theology a library that equaled that of his rivals, the mendicants teaching in Paris.[44] Godfrey of Fontaines is perhaps the most prominent figure known to own a copy of the *STP*, which he likewise bequeathed to the Sorbonne after his death in 1306.[45] These copies are well made, displaying blue and red initials, running headers, rubrics and wide margins. Both Gerard's and Godfrey's copies are noted

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[43] An inscription on the last folio of the manuscript records Gerard's will: "Iste liber est pauperum magistrorum Parisius in theologica facultate studentium ex legato magistri Geroudi de Abbatisvilla," BnF Lat. 16605, f. 74v. For a description of Richard's and Gerard's library and its participation on the foundation of the Sorbonne library, see Richard Rouse, "The Early Library of the Sorbonne," *Scriptorium* 21 (1967): 47-51. The rest of the library appears in Léopold Delisle, *Le cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale* (Paris, 1874): vol. 2, 518-535.

[44] Lesley Smith and Benedicta Ward, *Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Margaret Gibson* (London : Hambledon Press, 1992), 208.

[45] Duin provides a description of Godfrey's library and his donation to the Sorbonne library in Johann-Joseph Duin, "La bibliothèque philosophique de Godefroid de Fontaines," *Estudios Lulianos* 3 (1959), 21-36, 137-160.

in book lists from the Sorbonne library in later centuries, yet this was certainly not the only Parisian institution to possess Algazel.[46] A northern French, possibly Parisian, scribe fashioned a copy in the early fourteenth century that once resided at another illustrious center of learning in Paris, the Abbey of St. Victor.[47] It begins with a complete copy of the *STP*, though the scribe placed the *Logica* after the other two chapters. The first folio of the *Metaphysica* is emblazoned with a blue and yellow shield, reflecting St. Victor's claim as the royal abbey, along with a note to return this volume if it is found.[48] While it is hard to gauge Parisian scholars' awareness of the errors of the *STP* in the wake of condemnations, the available evidence in manuscripts gives no sign of controversy. Instead, the manuscripts, book lists, and inscriptions demonstrate that Parisian libraries openly advertised these copies in their holdings.

Many additional versions of the *STP* have strong or tenuous connections to Paris as the city attracted and dispersed scholars and their books throughout Europe. An arts master from Berry sold a late thirteenth-century southern French copy, now Basel, Universitätsbibliothek MS D. III. 7, to another master, Johannes Heynlin in 1461, who was responsible for bringing the printing press to Paris around 1470.[49] Johannes brought

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[46] These two manuscripts are mentioned frequently in inventories conducted at the Sorbonne library in the fourteenth century. Kischlat, *Studien zur Verbreitung*, 85, 87, 89, 90, 92, 95, 99-100, 105.

[47] BnF Lat. 14700 shares a particularly red and blue filigree design in its initials which matches several other copies of the *STP* from Paris, such as Graz 482, BnF Lat. 6443 and Lat.16096. Compare the decorations of the initials on Graz 482, f. 135r; BnF Lat. 16096, f. 74r and BnF Lat. 6443, f. 144v.

[48] "Hic liber est Sancti Victoris parisiensis. Inueniens que ei reddat amore Dei." Also, the shield is placed inside a large inscription "IHS Maria S. Victor. S. Augustinus" on the first folio of the *Metaphysica*. BnF Lat. 14700, f. 2r.

[49] The fifteenth-century cover of Basel D. III. 7 bears the inscription "Hunc librum [emit?] magister Henricus Metenerii anno Domini millesimo CCCC^{o} quinquagesimo VIII," and below "Hunc librum emit

his *STP* to Basel where he entered a Carthusian monastery that took possession of the volume after his death in 1496.[50] A similar case is found in an early fourteenth-century northern French manuscript, Graz 482, whose script and elaborate gold-leaf historiated illuminations shows a resemblance to the work of Parisian illuminators.[51] This manuscript made an even further journey to the isolated Benedictine abbey of St. Lambrecht in the Styrian Alps. From Paris, Algazel could go anywhere in Europe.

Nicholas Bacun's copy of the *STP* suggests that English scriptoria began to produce copies of the *STP* in the early thirteenth century. The colleges of Oxford provided an English forum for the *STP*, but the copies that can be traced to this city are few and the connections are sometimes tenuous.[52] A mid-fourteenth century copy of the *Logica* and *Physica* in Oxford, Merton College MS 285 was copied by John Wyliot, a fellow and chancellor of Merton College.[53] Richard de Wynkels, a Dominican provincial residing in London, purchased a manuscript, now Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Digby

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magister Iohannes de Lapide, magistro Henrico anno 1461, presente magistro Iohanne de Rottenburga." both of whom share few connections except for that they both were studying in Paris at the same time. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 186.

[50] "Liber Cartusien[orum] in Basilia minori provemens a domino Johanne de Lapide confrere nostro," Basel D. III. 7. f. 1r.

[51] See note 47 above and D'Alverny, *Codices*, 178.

[52] Göteburg, Universitätsbibliothek MS lat. 8 possesses a truncated copy of the *Metaphysica* (f. 189r-207v) and likely originated at Oxford before it travelled to Venice and Göteburg in Sweden. See note 61. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Lat. misc. b. 18 contains loose folios from a copy of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, once owned by Merton College, in a fourteenth-century English script. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 159. Oxford, Merton College, 276 has a short fourteenth-century *florilegia* of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* (f. 14r-15v) which was the possession of John Reynham, who was a "sacre pagine professor" (f. 1r) and a fellow of Merton (1335-1358). He manuscript came into the possession of Merton College after his death. Rodney Thomson, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Medieval Manuscripts of Merton College, Oxford*, (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2009), 214.

[53] See Thomson, *Manuscripts of Merton College*, 221-222 and d'Alverny, *Codices*, 153-154.

217, with a copy of the *Logica* in 1336 or 1339.[54] Fourteenth-century library inventories from Merton and Durham (now Trinity) Colleges indicate that several copies were in circulation around Oxford, but these copies have not survived.[55] Other English copies of the *STP* once resided in an Augustinian friary in York as well as in Balliol College.[56] The one unifying characteristic of the English copies is that none are complete and all of them tend to be smaller and less ornate than their continental counterparts.

In addition to the northern centers of Paris and Oxford, the *STP* found a large readership further south in Italy in this period. The early thirteenth-century manuscript Ott. lat. 2186 travelled from Spain to northern Italy sometime before the middle of the fifteenth century when it was copied, most likely in Venice, but several codices arrived much earlier and scholars there were quite receptive to Algazel.[57] Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century copies can be found in the hands of scholars in Rome and in smaller libraries at Todi and Lucca.[58] Among the earliest manuscripts produced in the scriptorium

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[54] "De perquisito fratris Ricardi de Wynkel," f. 179v. See also Kischlat, *Studien zur Verbreitung,*142-143.
[55] Inventories of the library of Durham College from 1315 and 1390 mention "libri naturales Auicenne et Algazel." A 1372 inventory from library of Merton College lists a manuscript containing "logica Algal' cum libris Auicenna," though this might be a dubious attribution since the 1375 inventory makes no mention of Algazel. Kischlat, *Studien zur Verbreitung*, 148-149.
[56] The handlist for the Augustinian's library lists their copy as "Tractatus Algazelis in metaphisica," Kischlat, *Studien zur Verbreitung,* 171. An Italian visitor to Balliol College made notes of some of the library's contents in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. lat. 2099, f. 306v, including "Metafisica Argazelis et eiusdem phisica." Richard Sharpe, *English Benedictine Libraries: The Shorter Catalogues* (London: British Library, 1996), 649.
[57] The mid-fifteenth century copy of the *STP* in BNM lat. 2546, f. 1r-94v is a close copy of the *STP* in Ott. lat. 2186, but it unclear when the latter travelled to Italy. See "Logica Algazelis, 237.
[58] An early fourteenth century Italian manuscript, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Reg. lat. 1870, bears a seal on f. 1r from the church of San Silvestro al Quirinale in Rome. Another Italian manuscript from roughly the same period, Todi, Biblioteca communale MS 90, was once housed in the Franciscan convent at Todi. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 107-108. BNC, Magliab. Cl. V. 45 has a fourteenth-

of the Convent of St. Francis in Assisi is a mid-thirteenth century codex containing a complete copy of Algazel.[59] Venice and Padua provided a large audience, second only to Paris, since at least six manuscripts can be traced to libraries in these cities at one time or another. Abbeys in Padua could claim several thirteenth- and fourteenth-century copies among their holdings. San Giovanni in Verdara possessed two at one time, while Santa Giustina owned an exquisite copy that was embellished with red and blue filigree initials accented by gold leaf and decorative foliage.[60] Venice's character as a cosmopolitan hub for traders, diplomats, and scholars is reflected in these codices. For a time, a Dominican priory in Venice, San Giovanni e Paulo, owned a *STP* that was originally produced in Oxford.[61] It migrated to Sweden where it currently resides in the Göteburg University Library, making it the most travelled copy of Algazel. *La Serenissima* proved to be

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century inscription on the last folio, f. 73v, which indicates that the manuscript was property of "frater Salomon" of Lucca and was to be delivered to the convent of Lucca after his death.

[59] Assisi 663, f. 146r-186r. Construction on the convent began shortly after Francis' canonization in 1228 and was completed in 1239. This manuscript is a testament to the scriptorium's skill and the rapid growth of the library.

[60] Valentinelli's catalog of the manuscripts once at San Giovanni indicates that the abbey possessed Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana MS lat. 2822 before it was moved to the Biblioteca San Marco in 1782. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 119. A second, later copy of the *STP*, now BNM lat. 2546, appears in San Giovanni's possession in fifteenth century. See note 78. A seventeenth-century inscription on the cover of Edinburgh MS 134, "Biblioteca S. Giustina, Padoua," attests to the Paduan abbey's ownership, though it unclear if it originated there. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 272-273.

[61] Paul Lehmann places Göteburg lat. 8 at Oxford before it travelled to Italy based on its script and decoration. Paul Lehmann, *Skandinavische Reisefrüchte* 1 Nachlese 1-5 (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1937), 107. The eighteenth-century catalogue for the library of San Giovanni e Paulo describes a similar manuscript as n. 429. Domenico Maria Berardelli, *Codicum omnium græcorum, arabicorum, aliarumque linguarum orientalium qui manuscripti in Bibliotheca SS. Ioannis, et Pauli Venetiarum ordinis Prædicatorum asservantur* (Venice: 1770), 42-43. Evidence from the manuscript itself is scarce except for a note on f. 221v, 235"Iste liber debet esse in XIIII^{a} bancha ex parte maris," which matches the system of shelfmarks for the library at San Giovanni e Paulo in the fifteenth century. Tönnes Kleberg, *Catalogus codicum Graecorum et Latinorum Bibliothecae Universitatis Gothoburgensis* (Göteburg: Universitetsbibliotek, 1974), 30-33.

Algazel's most enduring audience as the *STP* continued to be copied and read there well into the Renaissance.

Other manuscripts indicate that Algazel began to circulate as *florilegia* as early as the thirteenth century. A mid-thirteenth-century scribe from southern France paired down the *Metaphysica* to five folios of excerpts with a small, yet very legible script in a codex that fits in the palm of your hand.[62] The rest of the manuscript, now Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS lat. 3010, is likewise a collection of excerpts drawn from philosophical works including Boethius, Aristotle (*uetus* and *nova*), and other translations of Arab philosophy. Jacqueline Hamesse and Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny both assert that these collections of choice philosophical arguments likely reflect the work of students who created *excerpta* as study-sheets for their baccalaureate exams.[63] Vat. lat. 3010 is the earliest example of a particular scribal practice of creating *florilegia*, but this method of critical reading and copying was not solely a French practice since similar *florilegia* of the *STP* are found across Latin Christendom. A Roman scholar fashioned his own collection of the doctrines of Algazel, together with "flores" of two-dozen other

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[62] Vat. lat. 3010, f. 120r-124v. Grabmann, d'Alverny and Hamesse all date this manuscript to the thirteenth century, with d'Alverny and Hamesse placing it around the middle of the century. Martin Grabmann, *Methoden und Hilfsmittel des Aristotelesstudiums im Mittelalter* (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1939), 167-8. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "La tradition manuscrite de l'Avicenne latin," *Mélanges en l'honneur de Taha Hussein* (Cairo: 1962), 70. Hamesse, "Les recueils de textes universitaires à l'epoque médiévale," 369. Only d'Alverny asserts that the manuscript's origin is in southern France, but she contradicts this claim by placing it in Italy in another article. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Un témoin muet des luttes doctrinales du XIIIe siécle," *AHDLMA* 17 (1949): 235.

[63] Hamesse, "Les recueils de textes universitaires à l'epoque médiévale," 367-9; D'Alverny, "Un témoin muet des luttes doctrinales du XIIIe siécle," 235

works, in the second half of the thirteenth century.[64] Another copy of *excerpta* was the work of an early fourteenth-century scribe from northern Germany or Denmark and later became the property of Dominican friars at Helsingborg.[65] Whether the *florilegia* represent study-aids for students or personal collections of metaphysical memoranda, scholars were adapting the *STP* according to their needs, extracting the passages they wanted and fitting them into manuscripts alongside the teachings of recognized authorities.

Scholars began to translate Algazel into vernacular languages during this period, extending his audience, and several manuscripts attest to this transition. Curiously, the most diverse readership appeared in Spain, where few copies of the Latin *STP* can be found. Ramon Llull translated the *Logica* into Catalan verse, entitled the *Logica del Gatzell*, after he created an abbreviated Latin version, the *Compendium logicae Algazelis*.[66] Several copies of Llull's translation circulated in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, increasing Algazel's presence throughout Latin Christendom.[67] An anonymous

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[64] Biblioteca Angelica 242, f. 1r-7v. Most of the works in Biblioteca Angelica 242 are *florilegia*, but several works have rubrics which are specifically titled as excerpts. "Incipit Flos primi libri Aristotelis de animalibus," f. 9r; "Incipit flos Boetii Diuisionum," f. 29r; "Incipit Flor Alfarabii secundum sententiam Aristotelis," f. 33r.

[65] Uppsala C. 647, f. 1r-5r. The name of Nicholas Laghon appears on f. 159r, who was a lector at the Dominican convent on Helsingborg in the second half of the fifteenth century. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 271.

[66] For a description of the Catalan version, see Erhard-Wolfram Platzeck, *Raimund Lull: sein Leben, seine Werke, die Grundlagen seines Denkens (Prinzipienlehre)* vol. 2 (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1964):11, 14. For the Latin version, see Charles Lohr, *Raimundus Lullus' 'Compendium logicae Algazelis': Quellen, Lehre und Stellung in der Geschichte der Logik*, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Universität Freiburg, 1967).

[67] Lohr consulted three manuscripts for his edition of the *Compendium logicae Algazelis*, one from the fourteenth-century manuscript, Munich, Staatsbibliothek MS Clm. 10538, and two fifteenth-century manuscripts, Munich, Staatsbibliothek MS Clm. 10544 and Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek MS lat. 2529. The copy in ÖN lat. 2529, f. 1r-31v is part of a much larger collection of Llull's works, but there is no mention in incipits, headers, or rubrics that this is the work of Llull and not Algazel.

scholar translated the *STP* into Castilian in the late fourteenth century, and Manuel Alonso found a Castilian scholar's notebook that contains extensive notes drawn from the work.[68] Moreover, a Jewish translator from southern France provided Latin scholars with another source on Algazel. In 1328, Robert d'Anjou, King of Naples, commissioned the Jewish scholar Calonymos ibn Calonymos of Arles to translate Averroes' *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* into Latin, which, as a refutation of al-Ghazali's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, contained sizeable quotations from the latter work.[69] This text had the potential to change Latin Christendom's understanding of Algazel as a follower of Avicenna, but the fact that the translation only survives in print editions implies that its audience was limited.[70] Al-Ghazali had enjoyed a large Jewish audience since the twelfth century, but the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* became increasingly popular with Hebrew scholars. In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, Jewish scholars in Spain and southern France translated the work into Hebrew three times and copies appear in more than seventy manuscripts.[71]

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[68] Moritz Steinschneider mentions the existence of a Castilian translation from which the Catalan version was made. Moritz Steinschneider, *Die hebraeischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher: ein Beitrag zur Literaturgeschichte des Mittelalters, meist nach handschriftlichen Quellen* (Berlin, 1893): 299.Manuel Alonso supplies length Castilian excerpts from the *STP* in found Madrid, Biblioteca Nacionale lat. 10011 in Manuel Alonso, "Influencia de Algazel en el mundo latino, " *al-Andalus* 23 (1958): 371-380 (375-380).

[69] Zedler, *Averroes' 'Destructio Destructionum philosophiae Algazelis'*, 24-26.

[70] Even King Robert d'Anjou, the patron of the translation of the *Tahafut*, does not seem to have made use of it. However, Robert was quite familiar with the *Maqasid al-falasifa* and quoted Algazel in his treatise on the Beatific Vision to Pope John XXII. See Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Algazel dans l'Occident latin" *Académie du royaume du Maroc, session de novembre 1985* (Rabat, 1986), 3-24, esp. p. 15. Reprinted in *La transmission des textes philosophiques et scientifiques au Moyen Âge* VII, ed. Charles Burnett (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994).

[71] Al-Ghazali's Hebrew audience far outnumbers his Latin readers. Not only was the *Maqasid al-falasifa* translated three times in Hebrew in a short period of time, there are seventy Hebrew manuscripts. In addition, the fourteenth-century Catalonian Averroist Moses Narboni composed a Hebrew commentary on the *Maqasid al-falasifa* which also survives in fifty copies. Steven Harvey, "Why Did Fourteenth-Century

Thus, it became possible for Europeans, both Christians and Jews, to read Algazel in an assortment of vernacular and scholarly languages in this period.

Despite the increased suspicion regarding the doctrines of Arab philosophers, the century between 1250 and 1350 was Algazel's heyday in Europe. The well-travelled Venetian and Parisian copies testify to the growth of Algazel's audience and the *STP*'s mobility. The construction of copies from this period illustrates how the *STP* could be both a textbook and an object of display. Students created imminently portable *excerpta* of the work while other scribes fashioned copies with gold accents and delicate, multi-colored initials. The *STP* appeared in the libraries of the most prestigious universities and some of the most secluded monasteries in Europe. In addition to learning centers in Basel, Padua, and Helsingborg, a fourteenth-century inscription in early Czech appears in a German manuscript containing *florilegia* from the *Metaphysica* and bears witness that scholars were transporting Algazel in every direction.[72] This foreign, even dangerous work found its way into the studies of university scholars, monks, mendicants, and other clerics, but it also had a secular audience that included the mystic Ramon Lull and King Robert d'Anjou of Naples. The *STP* never became part of the established curriculum, but an increasing number of scholars found the text useful and integrated it into their collections.

Jews Turn to Algazeli's Account of Natural Science?" *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 91.3/4 (2001): 359-376.

[72] The note appears to record a sale on or around Palm Sunday. Prague 1323, f. I (cover). Antonin Podlaha, *Soupis rukopisů Knihovny Metropolitní kapitoly pražske* II (Prague: 1922), 244-245.

Decline and Revival: 1350-1506

As the fourteenth century ended, the records of Algazel's presence in the Latin tradition begin to wane. The production of new copies of the *STP* decreased as only four manuscripts originate from the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. However, these four and other previous copies continued to circulate among libraries and scholars, and annotations in later hands argue that Algazel was still read in the Late Middle Ages. This decline ultimately proved temporary as scholars revived interest in many Arab authors in the late fifteenth century and created a second wave of translations. Yet print technology, more than any other factor, gave the *STP* a lease on life within the Latin canon. The printed editions of the *STP* from the sixteenth century meant that Algazel's readership would continue and even thrive during the Renaissance.

The four manuscripts from this period continue the scribal trends that had developed since the early thirteenth century. Although they are few in number, they are surprisingly complete since three possess the whole work or several complete books, and none are *florilegia*. Two fifteenth-century Italian manuscripts, BNM lat. 2546 and BnF Lat. 6655, possess complete copies with the books in the correct order and are the two copies written on paper.[73] A fifteenth-century Czech manuscript, Prague, Metropolitní Kapitoly MS 1585, was likely the property of Charles University and contains only the

[73] BNM lat. 2546 and BnF Lat. 6655 both have connections to Venice or Padua and likely share a scribe or a scriptorium since they both have a similar late fifteenth-century humanistic script and share some similar textual elements. See also n. 70.

fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica*.[74] Erfurt F. 331 includes the *Metaphysica* and *Physica.* This late fourteenth-century manuscript was an early acquisition of Amplonius Rating de Berka's massive library for the college he founded in Erfurt in 1412. The earliest catalogue for this library, made that same year, lists the manuscript as one of fifteen codices under *De metaphysica* and refers to the *STP* as "*Quinque libri methaphisice Algazelis*."[75] Erfurt F. 331 reveals that the *STP* retained enough influence in scholarly circles to be among the first philosophical textbooks acquired by a newly-founded university. Though the records from this period are few, they nonetheless illustrate that the *STP* was still considered to be foundational for philosophical study and continued to attract an audience.

The reasons behind the decline of Algazel's audience are more banal than they immediately appear. Lohr credits the decline to the influence of condemnations from the thirteenth century and later, such as the *Directorium Inquisitorum* (1376) of the Nicholas Eymerich, who reproduced *De erroribus philosophorum* in his inquisitor's manual.[76] However, the number of copies of the *STP* from the late thirteenth to the middle of the

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[74] A fifteenth-century scribe wrote a prediction for a lunar eclipse in the year 1431 which the astronomer dedicates "ad honorem uniuersitatis Pragensis." See Prague, Metropolitní Kapitoly 1585, f. 223v-224.
[75] Wilhelm Schum, *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt* (Berlin, 1887), 818.
[76] "In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with the coming of Scholasticism to maturity and the more direct contact with Aristotle made directly from the Greek, the use of Algazel declines. The number of manuscripts falls off, and the citations become fewer. Perhaps Giles of Rome's *Tractatus de erroribus philosophorum* played a role here. His list of Algazel's sixteen errors came into the *Directorium Inquisitorum* of Nicholas Eymerich." Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 231. Nicholas Eymerich, *Directorium Inquisitorum* (Venice, 1595), 239-40. While Nicholas Eymerich's list purports to be encyclopedic, it is no mere reference text. Eymerich served as the Dominicans' Inquisitor General in Aragon for several years. The *Directorum Inquisitorium* later proved to be popular since it was printed three times in the sixteenth century: Barcelona (1503), Rome (1578) and Venice (1595).

fourteenth century complicates the condemnations' effectiveness unless they required almost century to have an effect. The appearance of *De erroribus philosophorum* a century later in the *Directorium Inquisitorum* implies that Algazel and other Arab philosophers remained popular enough to warrant reiteration. Yet the manuscripts themselves offer no evidence (i.e. physical damage, censorship) that would indicate that scholars sought to rid themselves and others of the offending passages. In point of fact, the opposite appears to be case since the most expensive and ornate copies date from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, indicating that scholars devoted more resources to the production of the *STP* after the condemnations. Additionally, despite their scarcity, several of the fifteenth-century manuscripts are excellent and complete copies of the *STP*.

Even with the decline in copies produced in this period, the appeal and audience of Algazel and other Arab philosophers never disappeared completely. Instead, they experienced a revival of Latin interest in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. Latin scholars, particularly in Italy, reinvigorated the study of Arab science and philosophy, and even began to discover and translate other works by Avicenna and Averroes.[77] The renewed interest in Algazel can be attributed largely to a persistent readership in Venice and Padua, where many copies of the *STP* resided in the Late Middle Ages. Three manuscripts, BnF Lat. 6655, BNM lat. 2665 and 2546, can be placed

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[77] Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Survivance et Renaissance d'Avicenne a Venise et à Padoue," *Venezia e l'Oriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento* (Florence: G.C. Sansoni, 1966), 75-102; and Harry Wolfson, "The Twice-Revealed Averroes," *Speculum* 36.3 (1961): 373-392.

in these cities in the late fifteenth century, testifying that interest in Algazel in that area perhaps never waned. The humanistic doctor and scholar, Giovanni Marcanova, bequeathed his fourteenth-century copy containing the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, now BNM lat. 2665, to the Abbey of San Giovanni da Verdara in Padua in 1467.[78] BnF Lat. 6655 consists of a complete fifteenth-century copy written in a humanistic script and bears a watermark on its paper pages that reproduces a cardinal's seal that was in use at Venice from the end of the fifteenth century.[79] The text and humanistic script of BNM lat. 2546 closely resembles that of BnF Lat. 6655 and it is likely that they share the same scribe.[80] Thus, the printer Peter Lichtenstein had several copies available to him and perhaps a reinvigorated audience of Arab philosophy when he printed the *STP* in 1506. The text of the print edition displays some similarities to BnF Lat. 6655, but it is not a copy.[81] The edition was popular enough to warrant a second printing in Venice in 1536.

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[78] A note on f. 170v of BNM lat. 2546 attests to Marcanova's ownership and his donation to San Giovanni in 1467. : "hunc librum donauit eximius artium et decr[etorius?] medicine doctor magister Iohannes Marchanoua de Venetiis congregationi canonicorum regularium, ita ut tantum sit ad usum dictorum canonicorum in monasterio Sancti Iohannis in Viridario Padue comorantium et quod nunquam possit uendi nec alicui extra monasterirum ipsum commodari." Marcanova was an avid bibliophile whose considerable library passed to San Giovanni after his death. Maria-Cristina Vitali, "L'umanista Padovano Giovanni Marcanova e la sua biblioteca," *Ateneo Veneto* 21 (1983), 127-161.

[79] Charles-Moïse Briquet, *Les filigranes: dictionnaire historique des marques du papier dès leur apparition vers 1282 jusqu'en 1600*, 2nd ed. (New York: Hacker Art Books, 1966): no. 3391.

[80] These two manuscripts share a similar script and some unique textual additions. Both contain complete copies of the *STP* followed by a short excerpt from Avicenna's *Metaphysica* (treatise III, chapter V). Only three other manuscripts (Basel D. III. 7; Ott. lat. 2186, and BNC Magliab. Cl. V. 45) share this composition with Algazel's *STP* and a brief section of Avicenna. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 110-111, 277-278. See chapter II for the practice of binding copies of Avicenna's works with the .

[81] Despite its late date of origin in the fifteenth century, BnF Lat. 6655 was copied from a very good text and displays corrections from an earlier manuscript. The text of the printed edition is considerably poorer and the copyist has read abbreviations incorrectly in several places. See Lohr, "Logica Algazelis, 237-238 and d'Alverny, *Codices*, 277-278. Lohr and d'Alverny disagree on the dating of BnF Lat. 6655 with the former placing its origin in the sixteenth century and the latter in the fifteenth century. Since this manuscript is the only one in the colleciton that is made of paper, d'Alverny is able to identity a watermark

The *STP* had survived the decline of the previous century only to become widely available in a new medium with a new title and all the chapters in their proper order. However, this printed version still lacked the prologue and continued to present Algazel as an uncritical adherent of the Arab philosophical tradition.

The translation of Averroes' *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* also received greater attention with the advent of print and rectified Latin Christendom's misunderstanding about al-Ghazali's mindset. Scholars largely ignored the translation since the early fourteenth century, but renewed interest in Arab philosophy, again in Venice, allowed al-Ghazali's true position on philosophy to come to light. In 1497, Agostino Nifo, a professor at the University of Padua, printed a commentary on Calonymus's fourteenth-century translation of Averroes' *Tahāfut al-tahāfut*.[82] Shortly afterwards, another Jewish translator, also named Calonymus of Naples, resided in Venice and found the previous version of the *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* to be both deficient and incomplete since it was missing four important sections. To fix the problem, Calonymus of Naples set about translating a Hebrew version into Latin and printed it in Venice in 1527.[83] Both Nifo's and Caloymus of Naples' versions would circulate widely as the study of Averroes spread for a second time among scholars, giving Latin readers the ability to mark the difference between the Algazel of the *STP* and the one of the *Tahāfut* who was highly critical of philosophy.

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that was in use in Florence and Venice in the late fifteenth century. Upon examining the manuscript, I agree with d'Alverny that the manuscript's humanist cursive appears to be from the late fifteenth century.

[82] Agostino Nifo, *In librum Destructio destructionum Averrois Commentarium*. See also D'Alverny, "Algazel dans l'Occident latin," 15.

[83] The Hebrew translation was the work of a fourteenth-century Jewish scholar, again named Calonymus of Todros. Calonymos of Naples dedicated this edition to Hercules Gonzaga. Zedler, *Averroes' Destructio Destructionum philosophiae Algazelis*, 26.

Conclusion

The physical appearance of the manuscripts—their materials, layout, decoration, and script—vary in size and quality. These scholars believed that vellum and gold were appropriate materials to use for constructing a copy of the *STP*. Some carefully corrected the work to provide readers with clearest text possible. Others changed its form, excerpting passages and detaching books until it seemed to some scholars that Algazel had actually written two works: the *STP* and the *Logica*. Despite the variety in form and appearance, what is consistent in all these copies is that scribes gave no warning to readers that what they were about to read espoused dangerous errors, and thus a portion of Algazel's success must be attributed to scribes.

The diverse provenances of these manuscripts indicate that Algazel's readership extended from isolated monasteries to the halls of universities, encompassing much of Latin Christendom. The relatively high production value of some copies suggests that a portion of Algazel's widespread audience were scholars of some means. The few known owners of these manuscripts, Gerard of Abbeville, Godfrey of Fontaines, Giovanni Marcanova, and Amplonius Rating de Berka, were well-established clerics or accomplished scholars. The smaller, less ornate manuscripts tend to be *florilegia* containing important selections from the *STP*, which students perhaps used as crib-sheets in the universities. Several august institutions, even those in Paris where the debate over Aristotelian thought was the fiercest, had no qualms with affixing their names to a text whose orthodoxy was suspect. Yet even abbeys with affiliations to monastic orders, such as Cistercians, that were known for their austere reading tastes owned copies of the *STP*. Algazel was more popular in some regions and centuries since the majority of the copies

date to a hundred-year period between the second half of the thirteenth century and first half of the fourteenth. Interest in Algazel appears to have never waned in some areas, especially in northern Italian centers of learning in Padua and Venice where the *STP* was eventually printed.

When readers pulled a copy of the *STP* from shelves or chests, what they initially saw should have given them little cause for concern. They would have to read further and closely if they were to catch Algazel's errors. We turn now to the works that were bound with the *STP* in order to gain a sense of how scribes believed Algazel fit physically within the wider Latin canon.

CHAPTER II – ALGAZEL BOUND

> Works are produced within a specific order that has its own rules, conventions, and hierarchies, but they can escape these and take on a certain density in their peregrinations—which can be a very long time span—about the social world.[1]

A century after the Nicholas Bacun's copy of Algazel can be placed at Oxford, another scholar was making his own copy in that city. John Wyliot was a fellow of Merton College who served as chancellor of Oxford in 1349, though he acquired the position by inciting a riot that may have killed his predecessor and rival.[2] He is better remembered for creating endowments for poor students at Merton College.[3] In addition to being a scholar and patron, Wyliot was also a fair scribe. Most of Merton 285, which contains Algazel's *Logica* and *Physica*, was written in his own hand.[4] However, while Bacun's and Wyliot's manuscripts contain the *STP*, their copies are compiled with very different works of philosophy. Bacun's thirteenth-century manuscript mainly consisted of translations of Avicenna, Aristotle, Algazel and other Arab philosophers.[5] The codex

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[1] Chartier, *The Order of Books*, ix-x.

[2] The previous chancellor died on November 21, 1348 and two candidates were put forth, each representing the northern and southern factions of Oxford. John Wyliot was the southern candidate and William of Hawkesworth the northern candidate, who was elected on March 19, 1349. During a mass in St. Mary's Church, Wyliot's southerners marched into the church and interrupted the service, threatening William and his followers that they, mostly Merton College, would secede from Oxford unless Wyliot was made chancellor. A riot ensued with several casualties. William died shortly thereafter on April 8 and Wyliot gained the chancellorship. Henry Wilson, *The University of Oxford College Histories: From Their Foundations to the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1998), 29-31; Henry Thompson, *The Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford* (Westminster: Constable, 1903), 152-3.

[3] Alan Cobban, *English University Life in the Middle Ages* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1999), 12.

[4] Algazel's works appear on f. 1r-12v. Thomson argues that f. 5r-64v, 93r-115v, 154r-228v were written by John Wyliot, but he admits that Wyliot may be responsible for more since the manuscript's hand or hands varies considerably. Thomson, *Manuscripts of Merton College*, 222.

[5] Translations of Arab philosophy predominate in Worcester Q. 81: Avicenna's *Physica* (f. 1r-26r), *De anima* (f. 28r-55r), Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione* (f. 58r-68r), Themistius' commentary on *Posterior Analytics* (f. 69r-84v), al-Kindi's *De intellectu et intellecto* (f. 84), Algazel (f. 85r-105r), and

serves as a collection of Arab works that left Toledo only a few decades previously, giving Bacun access to a speculative philosophy that Latin scholars were only beginning to process. When Wyliot copied Algazel's text in the mid-fourteenth century, he placed it in front of thirteen works by Albert the Great. The difference between the texts in the two manuscripts illustrates a shift that occurred in scholars' minds in the time between Bacun and Wyliot. Though scribes never disassociated Algazel completely from other Arabs, they deduced that there was a benefit to pairing the *STP* with the works of Latin philosophers. Though Algazel is found with a variety of Latin authors, the condemnations, even those that mention him by name, do not appear with the *STP*. Scribes chose not to compile Algazel with works that censure his arguments and thus did not make the connection between the *STP* and the condemnations for the readers.

This chapter examines which authors and works appear alongside the *STP*. It follows the method of the previous chapter as it depicts the work of scribes and how they chose to present Algazel's work, but it describes the arrangement of entire manuscripts rather than focusing on the appearance of individual copies. Like many medieval texts, the *STP* rarely appears as the sole work in a manuscript.[6] Space on the page and in a manuscript was at a premium, but the practice of gathering texts together into a volume

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Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (f. 108r-111v). Thomson and Gullick, *Medieval Manuscripts in Worcester Cathedral Library*: 176-177.

[6] Berlin, Staatsbibliothek MS lat. Qu. 546 is the only manuscript to possess the *STP* as its sole text, though it contains the *Logica* alone (f.1r-6v) and ends abruptly (Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 239-250), suggesting that it may have been part of a larger manuscript at one time. BnF Lat. 6655 and BNM lat. 2546 also possess only a copy of the *STP*, but they each have a short excerpt from Avicenna's *Metaphysica* (chapter 3, section V) that appears at the end of the *STP*. There is no rubric or title to indicate that the author has changed and most readers probably considered the work to be Algazel's. See note 32.

was not solely the product of material necessity. Rather, scribes compiled individual works, like with like, according to their own hermeneutic, which leads to the question of what texts were placeffffd together and why. This chapter surveys the manuscript corpus of the *STP* in order to illustrate trends in the practice of joining Algazel with other works. Not surprisingly, scribes collected translations of Arab authors and formed volumes on Arab philosophy, but, as Roger Chartier posits in the quote above, works frequently escape their classifications over time. As in the previous chapter, the compilation of the manuscripts betrays a scandalous normalcy since scribes preferred to collate the *STP* with a variety of Latin philosophers and thus situated the text within the accepted canon.

The decision of where to place translations from Arabic within manuscripts likely posed a problem for scribes. They had to ask whether foreign authors ought to be kept together in order to give manuscripts a cultural symmetry, or perhaps works should be gathered according to their discipline even if it meant breaking the cultural and religious boundaries of Arab and Latin, pagan and Christian. The influx of the translations forced scribes to reexamine their holdings, but the twelfth-century translation movement was hardly the first event to cause such a reassessment. Earlier catalysts—the shift from scroll to codex, the infusion of Christianity into Roman culture, and the establishment of the monastery as the repository for texts— had altered the Latin canon between the fourth and eleventh centuries.[7] Texts were removed or repurposed to make room for new

[7] Historians have focused on individual changes to the Latin canon during the Middle Ages, but Martin Irvine's study outlines many of these alterations and their effects from the rise of Christianity in the fourth

arrivals in a continual reshuffling of the canon, but pagan authors remained in Christian libraries. Late antique and early medieval Church Fathers proved unwilling to part with pagan writers and provided rationales for their continued use. Augustine made concessions to learn from the pagans, drawing upon the example of the Jews' despoliation of the Egyptians before leaving for Canaan, and allowed for the study of non-scriptural texts in the service of Christian learning.[8] This reasoning for keeping and introducing foreign works into the canon endured and was exercised by copyists. Vergil, Plato, and Cicero could be found in the company of Christian authors, as well as the Holy Scriptures and patristic texts, with no apparent contradiction.

As the "Egyptians" changed from Greeks and Romans to Arabs, translations of Arab scholarship challenged the imagination of scribes who had to find a place for them. Dozens of works arrived in the space of a few generations as the fledgling universities were configuring their curriculum. Unfortunately, the translators provided little or no explanation as to how the works were to be deployed. The translations bore the transliterated names of foreign authors and titles whose relationship to the established

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century to just before the rise of the university in the twelfth century. Martin Irvine, *The Making of Textual Culture: 'Grammatica' and Literary Theory, 350-1100* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[8] "Philosophi autem qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accomodata dixerunt, maxime Platonici, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis etiam tamquam ab iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda. Sicut enim Aegyptii non tantum idola habebant et onera gravia, quae populus Israel detestaretur et fugeret, sed etiam vasa atque ornamenta de auro et de argento et vestem, quae ille populus exiens de Aegypto sibi potius tamquam ad usum meliorem clanculo vindicavit...sic doctrinae omnes Gentilium non solum simulata et superstitiosa figmenta gravesque sarcinas supervacanei laboris habent, quae unusquisque nostrum, duce Christo, de societate Gentilium exiens, debet abominari atque devitare, sed etiam liberales disciplinas usui veritatis aptiores et quaedam morum praecepta utilissima continent, deque ipso uno Deo colendo nonnulla vera inveniuntur apud eos." Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, PL 34:40, 60.

canon was unclear. A few translations referenced Aristotle, giving clues as to their coherence, but this practice was not widespread or systematic in these works. Even more challenging was the arrival of translations that proposed new ways to imagine the entire structure of the sciences.[9] Thus, scribes were largely free to establish their own methods for compiling the translations within manuscripts.

Despite this freedom, the method behind the compilation of works is far from random. The *STP* had an inherent coherence with translations of Arab scholarship that had been migrating from Spain for decades, but scribes were more specific in their methods of compiling translations. Bacun's manuscript demonstrates that scribes primarily identified the *STP* with translations of Arab philosophy rather than translations in general, but they also connected Algazel to a wider network of scholarship. They placed him with Avicenna and Averroes, but also with Augustine, Boethius, Hugh of St. Victor, Albert the Great, Aquinas, and even Bernard of Clairvaux. Algazel could be found in the company of Arabs, Greeks, Romans, and Jews, and next to monks, mystics, and masters of theology. The one genre of philosophical works that is absent from the manuscripts is condemnations of Arab philosophy. These codices reveal that scholars believed that this text ought to be placed not just with translations of Arab philosophy, but also with authors and works that represented developing trends in the Latin

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[9] Several translations espoused a new organization to knowledge, but al-Farabi's *De scientiis*, which Gerard and Dominicus translated separately, was particularly influential. The seven liberal arts did not include philosophy or theology, leaving their position to other disciplines up to interpretation. Al-Farabi and other Arabic philosophers, however, did not simply offer a newer ordering of the sciences. Al-Farabi provided a reasoned justification for the hierarchy that the liberal arts curriculum had lacked. Al-Farabi, *De scientiis: secundum versionem Dominici Gundisalvi*, ed. and trans. Jakob Schneider (Freiburg: Herder, 2006).

intellectual tradition. When readers picked up a codex containing Algazel, they frequently were holding a volume that possessed a host of material from the accepted canon.

Case Study: The Compilation of BNM lat. 2665, BnF Lat. 16096 and 6552

These three manuscripts demonstrate general trends in the collation of the *STP* with other works. BNM lat. 2665 was originally two codices. The first part of the manuscript, f. 5r-66v, contains Avicenna's *De animalibus* and was completed in 1387 by an Italian scribe "Iohannes Ezzelinga."[10] The rest of manuscript consists of an earlier collection of works written in several Italian hands from the second half of the thirteenth century. The *STP* appears here with translations of Avicenna, al-Kindi, Aristotle, and an astronomical text by Abumashar as well as an excerpts from Boethius' *De trinitate*.[11] Two tables of contents testify that these works were bound together by the middle of the early fifteenth century.[12] With the exception of Boethius and Abumashar, the fifteenth-century scribes who compiled BNM lat. 2665 fashioned a useful textbook of Arab philosophy, consisting mostly of the works of Avicenna that comprise three-fourths of

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[10] The explicit testifies to this scribe's work: "Explicit liber de animalibus Avicennae, scriptus per Ioannem Ezzelingam, anno Domini 1387, in vigilia ascensionis Domini. Deo gratias." BNM lat. 2665, f. 66v.

[11] Avicenna's *De anima* appears in late thirteenth-century hand on f. 67r-93v. Al-Kindi's *De sompno* and the Algazel's *Metaphysica* and *Physica* occupy f. 94r-110v in a thin hand from the mid-thirteenth century. Several similar hands from the same period appear in f. 111r-169v, which contains Avicenna's *Metaphysica* (f. 111r-143r), excerpts of Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione* (f. 144r-144v), Avicenna's *Physica* (f. 145v-f. 163v), Boethius' *De trinitate* (f. 163v-168v), and Abumashar's *Introductorium ad astrologiam* (f. 169r-169v). See D'Alverny, *Codices*, 111-114 and Giuseppe Valentinelli, *Bibliothecae Manuscripta ad S. Marci Venetiarum*, 4 vols. (Venice, 1871), IV, 117-121.

[12] The owner, Iohannes Marcanova, wrote his name, profession, and the date of acquisition of this manuscript, 1440, on f. 4v, followed by a table of contents. The same table is copied on f. 1v in a fifteenth-century hand.

the manuscript. BnF Lat. 16096 is in a northern French hand from the late fourteenth century and exhibits a similar practice of compilation. In addition to a complete copy of the *STP*, scribes gathered translations of Avicenna, Maimonides, and Alexander of Aphrodisias as well as treatises by Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Latin commentaries on several of Aristotle's works.[13] BnF Lat. 6552 also written by one French scribe, but in the early fourteenth century and demonstrates a different method of compilation. Instead of translations of Arab authors, Algazel appears exclusively with Latin philosophers, including Aquinas.[14]

The three manuscripts are typical within the collection since they originate during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when the majority of copies of the *STP* were written. They represent the efforts of Italian and French scribes, who constructed most of the copies. These particular manuscripts exemplify two trends in how scribes compiled the *STP* with other works. The first trend is the placement of Algazel with Arab philosophers. This practice can be seen twice in BNM lat. 2665 since a thirteenth-century scribe first wrote Algazel with al-Kindi in the same codex, which was later bound with

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[13] The manuscript begins with Avicenna's *Metaphysica* (f. 1r-711) and *Logica* (f. 71v-72v), followed by the prologue and all three books of the *STP* (f. 74r-120v). Aquinas' treatise *De occultis operationibus naturae* appears on f. 120v-122. Seven questions on good fortune occupies f. 122r-123v, followed by Maimonides' *Dux neutrorum* (f. 124r-137r) and selections from translations of Alexander of Aphrodisias (f. 138r-149r). The remaining folios consist of Aristotelian commentaries by an unidentified author (f. 149r-178r) and Aristotelian commentaries, treatises, and discourses by Giles of Rome (f. 178r-257v). D'Alverny, *Codices*, 40-42.

[14] John of Sècheville's *De principiis naturae* appears on f. 3r-25v, followed by a short treatise, *De coloribus*, which is attributed to Aristotle (f. 26r-28r). Albert of Orlamunde's *De potentiis animae* occupies f. 32v-35v and Aquinas' *De ente et essentia*, f. 36r-39v. The next works are obscure texts on the fourth treatise of Aristotle's *Meteora* by a "magister W. anglicus mathematicus' (f. 39v-41r) and an alchemical treatise by a "magister Salernus Egrotans" (f. 42r-42v). Algazel's *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, appears on f. 43r-62r, followed immediately by Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, *Memoriale rerum difficilium* (f. 62r-69r). D'Alverny, *Codices*, 273-275.

copies of other Arab philosophers in the fifteenth century. The second trend is the placement of Algazel with Latin philosophers, which is a later phenomenon demonstrated by BnF Lat. 6552. In this manuscript, a scribe copies out the *STP* with the works of several influential Latin scholars. Yet BnF Lat. 16096 illustrates that these two practices were not exclusive. Algazel appears with both Arab and Latin philosophers in this manuscript and even shares the same folio with Thomas Aquinas. This later manuscript illustrates that Algazel was hardly confined to a rigid collection of texts, but rather the *STP* is present in a variety of places with a range of Arab and Latin philosophers.

Algazel and Arab Philosophers

Thirty of the manuscripts that possess Algazel have one or more works by Arab philosophers. Thus, it is safe to assume that scribes associated Algazel with the Arab philosophical tradition throughout the Middle Ages. The contents of Bacun's thirteenth-century manuscript, Worcester Q. 81, read as a who's who of philosophers translated into Latin in the twelfth century: Avicenna, Aristotle, al-Kindi, Algazel, and Qusta ibn Luca. A century later, the scribes of BNM lat. 2822 and Borgh lat. 37 still compiled Algazel with many of the same authors and works.[15] The similarity in the contents of these manuscripts, especially in the earliest codices, suggests that the practice of compiling these authors together may have begun in Toledo. However, the durability of this practice indicates that scholars understood the coherence of these philosophers well enough to

[15] BNM lat. 2822 contains Algazel along with several of Avicenna's works. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 117-119. The scribe of Borgh. lat. 37 binds Algazel with the works of Aristotle, Averroes and Qusta ibn Luca. Anneliese Maier, *Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae* (Vatican City: 1952), 39-43. See Appendix II.

continue gathering them together. The following section discusses the Arab philosophers whose translations were collected frequently with the *STP*, including those by Greek authors that came into Latin through Arab intermediaries. While the majority of the texts were translated at Toledo, they also share similar themes in the topics they treat, specifically the soul, intellect, and the act of intellection.

Avicenna

Among the Arab authors gathered with Algazel, translations of Avicenna's works were the most common, found together in twenty-six manuscripts, and the Latin perception of the relationship between them merits careful consideration. Contrary to the Latin figure of Algazel, al-Ghazali the Muslim theologian has long been seen as an opponent of Avicenna's epistemology, though Janssens argues that he was not radically opposed to Avicenna's philosophy and used Avicenna's arguments in his own work.[16] Latins were unaware of al-Ghazali's complex relationship to Avicenna, but their frequent appearance together in manuscripts is nevertheless appropriate. Despite having been translated from Persian to Arabic and Arabic to Latin, the *STP* maintains elements of the *Dānesh-Nāmeh* and thus provides Latin readers with an accessible compendium to the Avicennian tradition of philosophy. Though Latin scholars could hardly have known the connection between the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and the *Dānesh-Nāmeh*, they closely associated the two scholars in manuscripts and their own philosophical treatises. Scribes

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[16] Jules Janssens, "Al-Ghazzâlî's Mi'yâr al-'ilm fî fann al-mantiq: sources avicenniennes et farabiennes," *AHDLMA* 69 (2002), 39-66; See also Janssens, "Al-Ghazzâlî's *Tahâfut*: Is it really a rejection of Ibn Sînâ's philosophy?" and "La Dānesh-Nāmeh d'Ibn Sina: un text á revoir?"

even confused the two Arab philosophers on occasion and blurred the line between their scholarship.

The Latin corpus of Avicenna, which contains many works, has a more complicated textual history than that of the *STP*. The *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* was translated once as a complete work by a single team of translators. By comparison, Avicenna's most influential philosophical work, the *Kitāb al-shifā*, was translated piecemeal by several scholars. While fifteen manuscripts contain all three chapters of the *STP*, very few manuscripts contain all of the works that comprise the Latin Avicenna. Except for those scholars residing in Latin Christendom's best centers of learning, it was a difficult task to acquire and read all of Avicenna in Latin in the Middle Age, while all of Algazel was more readily available in one volume.

Most of the translations of Avicenna's philosophical works were originally part of one encyclopedic text, the *Kitāb al-shifā* (*The Book of the Healing*)—a work so vast that its title implied that it cured one's ignorance of a variety of philosophical disciplines ranging from syllogistic logic to metaphysics. At least seven scholars–Avendauth, Dominicus, Alfred of Shareshill, Michael Scot, Hermann the German, Juan Gonzalves de Burgos, and an unidentified twelfth-century scholar – translated parts of this *magnum opus* during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[17] All have connections to Toledo.[18] It is

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[17] Burnett provides an outline of Avicenna's translated works, their translators and Latin titles in "Arabic into Latin," 394-6.

[18] The Toledo cartulary provides evidence for presence of translators at the cathedral. Documents testify that Dominicus and Gerard held the positions of archdeacon and canon, respectively, at the cathedral. Avendauth's dedication of Avicenna's *De anima* to the Toledan archbishop suggest that he resided in that

probable that translators received the *Kitāb al-shifā* in pieces for both logistical, given its size, and thematic reasons since the work divides conveniently into discrete chapters on different disciplines within philosophy. The piecemeal translation of this tome meant that Latin scholars received the *Kitāb al-shifā* as separate works: *De philosophia prima* or the *Metaphysica*, *Libri naturalium* or the *Physica*, *Logica* or *Isagoge*, and *De anima*.[19] Few scholars were aware the title of the entire work, which was rendered awkwardly as "*Liber sufficientiae*," yet the name was usually applied to Avicenna's *Physica* alone.[20]

Latin scholars' interest in Avicenna did not stop at the *Kitāb al-shifā*, but extended to his medical expertise. Gerard translated his extensive medical digest, *Kitāb*

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city in the middle of the twelfth century, and his collaboration with Dominicus confirms his presence there. Michael Scot was in Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada's retinue at the Fourth Lateran Council and quotes from works translated at Toledo. Hermann reportedly translated the *Nicomachean Ethics* at the chapel of the Sacred Trinity at Toledo. Burnett, "The Institutional Context of Arabic-Latin Translations of the Middle Ages," 217-224. Alfred's connections to Toledo are more circumstantial as he included Castilianisms in his translations. See note 87 below. Between 1275 and 1280, Juan Gonzalves was commissioned to translate portions of Aristotle's *Physics* by the bishop of Burgos, Gonzalo García Gudiel, who became the archbishop of Toledo in 1280. Manuel Alonso, "Las traducciones de Juan Gonzalez y Salomon," *Al-Andalus* 14 (1949): 291-319.

[19] Most of the Latin translation of the *Kitāb al-shifā* is available in modern editions: *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus* (2 vols); *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (3 vols); *Liber tertius naturalium: De generatione et corruptione*; *Liber quartus naturalium: De actionibus et passionibus*; *Liber primus naturalium, Tractatus primus: De causis et principiis naturalium,* ed. Simone Van Riet (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968–1992); *Avicenna Latinus: Liber primus naturalium, Tractatus secundus, De motu et de consimilibus*, ed. Simone Van Riet, Jules Janssens, and André Allard (Académie Royale de Belgique: Bruxelles, 2006). The *Logica* exists in a facsimile of the sixteenth-century printed edition: Avicenna, *Isagoge* in *Auicenne perhypatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera* (Venice: Caecilius Fabrianensis, 1508; Reprinted Minerva: Frankfurt am Main, 1961), f. 2r–12v.

[20] Scribes typically did not apply the title of *Liber sufficientiae* to *De anima* given its popularity as an independent work. Even manuscripts that contained several of Avicenna's works introduced the *Physica* as *Liber sufficientiae*. BNM lat. 2665 contains most of the Latin translations of the *Kitāb al-shifā*, including the *Metaphysica*, *Physica*, *De anima*, and *De animalibus*, but only the *Phyisca*, which is the last of Avicenna's works to appear in the manuscript, receives the title of "Sufficientia." BNM lat. 2665, f. 145v. Digby 217 introduces only the *Physica* as "Liber sufficientie Auicenne" (f. 46r), while the copies of *Logica*, *Metaphysica*, and *De anima* are given their own titles. The same practice is seen in Worcester Q. 81, where the *Physica* is introduced as "collectio secunda libri Sufficiencie" (f. 1r) and *De anima* as "tractatus super librum de anima" (f. 28r).

al-qānūn fī al-ṭibb (*The Canon of Medicine*), at Toledo in the twelfth century. The popularity of this work rivaled that of the various translations of the *Kitāb al-shifā*. Even his epithet, *al-sheikh al-rais* ("leader of wise men") was known to the Latin world as *princeps medicorum*, which one illuminator interpreted literally by depicting Avicenna with a crown and scepter.[21] His medical works remained influential beyond the Middle Ages and were printed several times.[22] Avicenna's notoriety as a recognized authority in several fields led to some confusion among scribes, who perhaps guessed as to a translation's authorship or wished to give a text an exotic author. Several alchemical treatises dubiously provide Avicenna as the author.[23] Dominicus' translation of the anonymous *Liber caeli et mundi* was commonly misattributed to Avicenna.[24] While his medical works were as popular as his philosophical texts, they rarely appear in the same manuscript since scribes tended to keep these genres separate. By extension, Latin scholars associated Algazel with Avicenna the philosopher and not the physician.

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[21] This miniature appears in in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale MS lat. 6917. D'Alverny, "Les traductions d'Avicenne (Moyen Age et Renaissance)," *Problemi attuali di Scienza e di Cultura* (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1957; reprint, Avicenne en Occident, V), 84.

[22] Avicenna's philosophical and medical works were printed on several occasions at Venice in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. *De anima* was printed there in 1485 and again in 1495. Avicenna's philosophical works were collected and printed as *Opera philosophica* in 1508. The Latin *Qanun*, *Canon medicinae* was printed in 1507. D'Alverny, "Les traductions d'Avicenna, 85-7. In the sixteenth century, Andrea Alpago translated more of Avicenna's works into Latin during a diplomatic mission in Damascus on behalf of the Republic of Venice. His nephew published them in 1546-1547. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Andrea Alpago, interpréte et commentateur d'Avicenne," *Atti del XII Congresso internazionale di filisofia* (Florence, 1960), vol. 9, 1-6.

[23] A brief treatise on alchemy, *Epistola de causa et causato*, circulated under Avicenna's name in the late Middle Ages. Julius Ruska, "Die Alchemie des Avicenna," *Isis* 21 (1934): 14-51. See also Pseudo-Avicenna, *Avicennae ad Hasen regem epistola de re recta*, ed. George Anawati, *Avicenne et l'alchimie, Oriente e occidente nel Medioevo: filosofia e scienze* (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1971), 327–339.

[24] Latin scholars since the early thirteenth-century traditionally attributed this work to Avicenna. Oliver Gutman argues that Hunain ibn Ishaq is likely the author of *Liber celi et mundi*, ed. Oliver Gutman, *Pseudo-Avicenna, Liber celi et mundi: A Critical Edition* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2003), xiii-xxi.

The Latin translations of Avicenna's philosophical works, including misattributed texts, survive in 150 manuscripts, which d'Alverny described in her catalogue published with the *Avicenna Latinus*. Algazel's paltry sum of forty copies seems to pale by comparison, but a study of the manuscript corpuses of these authors yields two results. The chart below lists Avicenna's works with the total number of extant copies and the number of copies appearing in manuscripts with the *STP*.[25]

Table 3: Copies of Avicenna and Algazel

Translation of Avicenna	**Translator**	**# of copies**	**# of copies bound with the *STP***
De anima	Avendauth and Dominicus	54	11
De congelatione lapidum	Alfred of Shareshill	36	2
De animalibus	Michael Scot	32	2
Physica [26]	Anonymous Toledan scholar(s)	32	12
Metaphysica	Dominicus and anonymous associate	31	19
Liber caeli et mundi (Ps.)	Dominicus	27	6
Logica	Avendauth	13	6
De diluviis	Alfred of Shareshill	11	1

The distribution of Avicenna's works is not equal. *De anima* was clearly the most popular text, occupying a third of the total manuscripts, while the *Logica*, like that of the *STP*, was decidedly less prominent.[27] If one were to judge solely by the number of

[25] These counts include complete and incomplete copies of these works. See d'Alverny, "La tradition manuscrite de l'Avicenne latin," 77-8; and idem, *Codices*, passim.
[26] This anonymous translator rendered only first three books of the *Physica* in the *Kitāb al-shifā*. Juan Gonzalves continued this project and translated the remainder of the *Physica*. Alonso, "Juan Gonzalez y Salomon." 291-319.
[27] This work's popularity can be attributed to its influence in the development of the Latin tradition of psychology, surpassing even Aristotle's *De anima* as scholastics' best resource for the philosophical discussion of the soul. Hasse, *Avicenna's "De anima" in the Latin West*, 13-79.

manuscripts, the forty copies of the *STP* make it an influential text when compared to individual translations of Avicenna. With the exception of *De anima*, Algazel was as popular among Latin readers as several of Avicenna's lengthier works, even if the aggregate number of manuscripts is still in the latter's favor. However, raw statistics obscure the fundamental nature of manuscripts as volumes that rarely consist of one text. The fourth column reveals a significant overlap among the manuscripts that contain these authors. Scribes most commonly compiled the *STP* with works by Avicenna that treated similar topics, such as metaphysics, natural philosophy, and the soul. Scribes recognized that the *STP* helped readers to understand similar arguments that appear in Avicenna's works. More than half of the manuscripts containing the *STP* possess a work of Avicenna, and these authors share the same scribe in nineteen of these codices. When a reader picked up a manuscript containing the *STP*, they often were holding one of Avicenna's philosophical works, and vice versa.

The practice of compiling these authors together began shortly after their translation in the late twelfth century. Two of the earliest manuscripts, Worcester Q. 81 and Ott. lat. 2186, as well as eighteen thirteenth-century manuscripts possess both authors' works.[28] Scholars since the middle of the thirteenth century acknowledged in their own works that a connection existed between the two authors, naming Algazel as an

[28] Worcester Q. 81 holds complete copies of Avicenna's *Physica* and *De anima* (f. 1r-55r). Ott. lat. 2186 contains an untitled fragment of Avicenna's *Metaphysica* (f. 110r-112r).

abbreviator of Avicenna.[29] Also, the scribe of BNM lat. 2665, which also contains four works by Avicenna, introduces Algazel as Avicenna's "abbreviator" in a rubric at the beginning of the *STP*.[30] In this way, Algazel's connection to Avicenna became common knowledge among scribes and scholars, but the perceived link between the philosophers some bred confusion among scholars who mistook Algazel as the author of works by Avicenna and vice versa. One scribe vacillates over the authorship of the *Liber caeli et mundi*, listing both Algazel and Avicenna, and another names Avicenna as the author of Algazel's *Logica*.[31] The most curious instance of this confusion is the addition of Book III, chapter 5 of Avicenna's *Metaphysica* at the end of five copies of the *STP*, often without any indication that the author or work has changed.[32] Errors in citations may be the reason scholars occasionally confused quotations from Algazel and Avicenna in their works.[33] This confusion, in addition to the practice of compiling the works of the two

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[29] Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Roland of Cremona, John Quidort, and Siger of Brabant often cited Algazel and Avicenna together. Henry of Ghent referred to Algazel as "expositor Avicennae" while Dietrich of Freiburg called him Avicenna's "abbreviator." Janssens, "al-Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, Latin Translation of," 387-390.

[30] "Metaphysica Algazelis abreuiantis Auicennam"; "Explicit Algazel abreuiator Auicenna." BNM lat. 2665, f 94v, f. 110r.

[31] "Liber de celo et uidetur Auicenne uel Algazelis," Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana MS T. 91 sup. f. 1r. "Incipit loyca Auicenna," Berlin, Qu. 546, f. 1r.

[32] Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia prima*, vol. 1, 132-139. Five manuscripts share this compilation of works, but only two introduce the excerpt from Avicenna: BnF Lat. 6655 and BNM lat. 2546. The three manuscripts without attribution are: Basel D. III. 7, BnF Lat. 6655, and Ott. Lat. 2186. In each case, the manuscript contains Algazel's *Metaphysica* and *Physica* which is immediately followed by the excerpt, which comprises only a few folios.

[33] Scholars often mentioned Avicenna and Algazel together, but they occasionally attributed arguments or citations incorrectly to one or the other. Thomas Aquinas quoted both Avicenna and Algazel, sometimes attributing arguments to both of them together. However, Thomas challenged Algazel's argument about the last intelligence, but he attributed this position wrongly to Avicenna. Thomas Aquinas, *Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium; qui dicitur Summa Contra Gentiles*. *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, Vol. XIV (Rome, 1934): Lib. II c. 76, pericopa 11-12. Compare with Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 186: 30-187: 24.

authors, nevertheless illustrates the close relationship that existed between Avicenna and Algazel in the minds of Latin scribes.

Aristotle

Aristotle is the next most common author to be found with the *STP*, appearing together in seventeen manuscripts or slightly less than half of Algazel's manuscript collection. While Latin scholars only discovered Avicenna and Algazel in the twelfth century, they were quite familiar with Aristotle despite having access to only a fraction of his works during the Early Middle Ages. The Toledan translators made up this deficit by rendering many of Aristotle's works into Latin and, in the wake of these translations, scribes had to decide how to pair Arab philosophers with the old and new traditions of Aristotle. They decided early on to place the *STP* with the Arabic-to-Latin translations of Aristotle rather the Aristotelian canon translated from Greek by Boethius or by James of Venice. The mid-thirteenth century manuscript Vat. lat. 3010 testifies to this early transition since it is the only codex to contain the *STP* alongside Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, Boethius' *De topicis differentiis* and his translation of *Isagoge*, as well as excerpts from the new translations of Aristotle.[34] The later manuscripts that possess the *STP* and Aristotle include only the new translations from Arabic and, to a much lesser extent, Greek (See Appendix I at the end of the dissertation). The fifteenth-century manuscript Prague 1585 demonstrates that this trend continued throughout the Middle

[34] A considerable portion of Vat. lat. 3010 contains excerpts from the old Aristotelian corpus, including Boethius' translation of Porphyry's work, his *De topicis differentiis*, and *Prior Analytics*. The scribe added recent translations of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, *Parva naturalia*, *Metaphysics*, *Physics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. See Appendix IV and Martin Grabmann, *Methoden und Hilfsmittel*, 167-8.

Ages.[35] Thus, scribes viewed the *STP* as part of a shift from the old, limited Aristotelian canon to a new, more inclusive collection of Aristotle.

Aristotle's works became so numerous and pervasive after the translation movement that it is difficult to list all of the Arisotelian and Pseudo-Aristoelian texts found with the *STP* (Appendix I). Moreover, while scribes compiled Algazel with many texts by Aristotle in these seventeen manuscripts, they did not consistently bind the *STP* with any particular work. In general, scribes gathered Algazel with texts from the *Physics*, most of which were translated by Gerard of Cremona. *De generatione et corruptione* and *De memoria et reminiscentia* are the most numerous, bound with a copy of the *STP* in five manuscripts, *Meteora* and *De somno et vigilia* in four. Other sections of the *Physics* appear less frequently, along with individual occurrences of texts from the *Organon*, *Metaphysics*, and *Ethics*. Scribes also collected a number of Pseudo-Aristotelian works with Algazel, such as *De plantis*, *De causis*, *Liber purae bonitatis*, *De pomo* (or *De morte Aristotelis*), and the *Secreta Secretorum*. They understood that Algazel and Aristotle belonged together as part of the same discussion of philosophy, yet they were not partial to binding the *STP* with one specific work.

The connection between Aristotle and Algazel is surprisingly more overt that that of Avicenna and Algazel. Both Avicenna and Algazel were translated as part of larger project to gain access to more of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition. However,

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[35] Prague 1585 possesses elements of the *Parva naturalia* (*De somniis*, f. 12r-36r) and the *Nicomachean Ethics* (f. 162r-164v). Podlaha, *Soupis rukopisů Knihovny Metropolitní kapitoly pražske* II, 452-3.

Algazel never mentions Avicenna while Aristotle appears three times in the *STP*.[36] Thus, while scribes had to extrapolate an association between Avicenna and Algazel from the similarity of their arguments, Aristotle's name was in the text of the *STP* as well as in its argumentation. The practice of binding of Algazel with Aristotle might have originated in Toledo, especially given the frequency of the pairing of Gerard's translations of Aristotle in manuscripts with the *STP*. This practice was continued by scribes and scholars who recognized that the *STP* informed their reading of Aristotle as a participant of the same philosophical dialogue.

Averroes

Attempts to access Aristotle gave rise to translations of his most enthusiastic Arab expositor, Averroes, and scribes naturally bound together the Philosopher and the Commentator. Thus, many of the same conclusions about the compilation of Aristotle with the *STP* can also be drawn with the texts of Averroes. Copies of Averroes' works and commentaries appear in ten manuscripts with Algazel. While this number is considerably less than that of Aristotle, the translation of Averroes' works began only in the early thirteenth century. The scribes who assembled the ten manuscripts that date from the first half of the thirteenth century did not have Averroes available to them, though later compilers occasionally added Averroes to manuscripts containing Algazel.[37]

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[36] Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 85:25, 141:2, and 154:25

[37] Worcester Q. 81 initially ended at f. 111v, but a later scribe added three commentaries by Averroes in a later thirteenth-century hand. The manuscript appears to have come together by the fourteenth century since both parts share an annotator from that century. Thomson and Gullick, *Manuscripts in Worcester Cathedral Library*, 176-7.

If the ten early thirteenth-century codices are discounted from the total, Algazel and Averroes were bound together in a third of the codices that have a *terminus a quo* of late thirteenth century. However, the pairing of the translated works of the two philosophers lasted only a century and is almost exclusively a thirteenth-century phenomenon. Only one of the ten manuscripts that contains both authors, Borgh. lat. 37, dates to the mid-fourteenth century, suggesting that later scribes may have closely connected the two Arab scholars again until the translation of the *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* became more popular in the sixteenth century.

The translation of Averroes' works into Latin and their subsequent textual history can be even more complicated than that of Aristotle. Averroes wrote different commentaries on individual works of Aristotle, which were translated in turn by several scholars. Fortunately for this study, the translations of Averroes that appear with the *STP* were all conducted by Michael Scot, who conducted his work during the early thirteenth century in Toledo and later in southern Italy and Sicily.[38] Seven commentaries and one original treatise by Averroes appear with the *STP*, but only two of these works appear with any regularity (Appendix II). Scribes collected Algazel with Averroes's *De substantia orbis* in seven of the ten manuscripts, in which Averroes attempts to unify Aristotle's disparate discussions on the heavens and to defend the validity of Aristotle's

[38] Hasse's study into the linguistic similarities of Averroes translations yields a new clarity regarding which works were translated by Michael Scot and others. Dag Hasse, *Latin Averroes Translations of the First Half of the Thirteenth Century* (New York: Olms, 2010). Michael primarily translated Averroes' commentaries and works on natural philosophy and metaphysics while others translators (Hermann the German, William of Luna, etc.) concentrated on Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle's ethics and logic. See Haskins, *Mediaeval Science*, 272-98 and Lynn Thorndike, *Michael Scot* (London: Nelson, 1965).

theories on celestial bodies, their forms and their actions, in the face of opposition from later scholars such as Avicenna.[39] Of the commentaries, various elements of the *Parva naturalia* are found in four manuscripts, while the remaining six only are found in one or two manuscripts.[40]

For roughly a century, scribes selected a remarkably consistent group of Averroes' texts to assemble with the *STP* despite the decades that separate their translation into Latin. They consistently bound Algazel with Michael Scot's translations of Averroes' works and Aristotelian commentaries on natural philosophy or metaphysics. These works might encompass Scot's early efforts in Toledo where they likely came into contact with previous translations of Arab philosophy produced by Dominicus and Gerard at the cathedral and circulated together from there to the rest of Latin Christendom.[41] The distance between author, translator, and reader becomes significantly shorter in the thirteenth century as Michael's translations found an audience in Latin Christendom less forty years after Averroes' death in 1198.[42] There are also similarities

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[39] Arthur Hyman, *Averroes' 'De substantia orbis': Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text with English Translation and Commentary* (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1986): 28-35. For the Latin edition, see Averroes, *Commentario al "De substantia orbis" de Averroes (Aristotelismo e Averroismo) por Alvaro de Toledo*, ed. Manuel Alonso (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigationes Científicas, 1941).

[40] Assisi 663, Graz 482, Laon 412 and Morgan 857 contain four books from Averroes' *Commentum magnum in Parva naturalia*: *De sensu et sensato, De memoria et reminiscentia, De sompno et vigilia,* and *De longitudine et brevitate vitae*.

[41] The date and location of Scot's translations are notoriously hard to uncover. His connections to Toledo Cathedral and the court of Frederick II in Italy are well established, but he gives little indication as to where he carried out each translation. Charles Burnett, "Michael Scot and the Transmission of Scientific Culture from Toledo to Bologna via the Court of Frederick II Hohenstaufen," *Micrologus* 2(1994): 101-126.

[42] The rapid circulation of translations during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries seems to have accelerated interest in Arabic philosophy and the demand for texts. The earliest records of Latin scholars reading the *STP* appear at the beginning of the thirteenth century, roughly a century after al-Ghazali's death

in the topics discussed in the *STP* and the selected works of Averroes. The prevalence of *De substantia orbis* is especially significant since these manuscripts join Algazel to an active tradition of speculative philosophy on the heavens stretching from Aristotle to the end of the twelfth century with Averroes. Scribes continued this practice of connecting Algazel to current trends in philosophical scholarship as the Latin world began to produce its own commentators on Aristotle.

The absence of other commentaries by Averroes is also noteworthy. Two of Averroes' translators, Hermann the German (fl. 1240-56) and William of Luna, were active in Toledo and the Hohenstaufen court in Naples—two places where Scot had worked earlier in the thirteenth century.[43] However, these two translators were active later in the century and perhaps their works arrived too late to circulate in the same channels as Michael's translations and the *STP*. Hermann and William also translated commentaries whose subject matter was different from that of the *STP*. Hermann was responsible for the commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Poetics*, while William worked his commentaries on the *Organon* as well as the *Prior* and *Posterior*

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in 1111. Through Scot's efforts, scholars were reading Averroes in Latin only thirty years after his death. René Antoine Gauthier, "Notes sur les débuts (1225-1240) du premier 'Averroïsme,'" *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66.3 (1982): 321-374. Alfred Ivry, "Averroes and the West: The First Encounter/Nonencounter," ed. Ruth Link-Salinger, *A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture, Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1988): 142–158

[43] For discussion of Hermann the German and William of Luna, see Maurilio Pérez González, "Herman el Alemán, traductor de la Escuela de Toledo. Estado de la cuestión," *Revista de Filología Clásica* 6 (1992) 269-283; Charles Burnett, "The Sons of Averroes with the Emperor Frederick and the Transmission of the Philosophical Works by Ibn Rushd," ed. Gerhard Endress, Jan Aertsen, and Klaus Braun, *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition: Sources, Constitution, and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum, Cologne, 1996* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999): 259–299.

Analytics. Thus, scribes gathered Algazel with Michael's commentaries of Averroes, rather than those of Hermann and William, on account of the similarity of their subject matter and perhaps because their common origin in Toledo allowed them to circulate together in the thirteenth century.

al-Kindi and al-Farabi

Works by these two Arab philosophers appear with Algazel in twelve manuscripts, respectively, and eight manuscripts contain all three authors (Appendix II). Each of these texts is quite brief with the longest comprising only six folios, but they were remarkably influential for their size.[44] Most were translated at Toledo by Dominicus or Gerard in the twelfth century; some were translated by both scholars.[45] Unlike the manuscripts that possess the works of Averroes, the provenance of these codices is evenly spread among the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The thematic similarities between the *STP* and al-Kindi's and al-Farabi's philosophical works, which commented or continued discussions on Aristotle, prompted scribes to bind them together with regularity.

The Arab world recognized al-Kindi (d. *c*. 870) as the founder of a unique tradition of metaphysics and natural philosophy which championed the notion that

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[44] Al-Farabi's *De scientiis*, is the largest of the translations of these two authors and comprises not quite seven folios in Graz 482, f. 222v-229r.

[45] The translators of two of the more obscure works, *De radiis* by al-Kindi and *Fontes quaestionum* or *Flos Alfarabii secundum sententiam Aristotelis* by al-Farabi, are anonymous. Burnett, "Arabic into Latin," 393-394.

harmony existed between philosophy and Islam.[46] His elevated position in the Arab world recommended the translation of his works to Latin scholars with any familiarity with the Arab intellectual tradition, but their selection was eclectic and several of the translated works are no longer extant in Arabic.[47] Al-Kindi's Latin readership received a varied image of him as a philosopher, physician, astronomer, and magician with no one figure predominating, but scribes chiefly compiled Algazel with copies of al-Kindi's philosophical works. Two short *rasā'il* by al-Kindi are principally found with Algazel. *De quinque essentiis* and *De ratione* or *De intellectu* are discussions on, respectively, the types of physical beings and the nature of the rational soul with a hierarchy of the intellects, which roughly correspond to elements of Aristotle's canon on the same subjects.[48] Scribes less frequently gathered the *STP* with three others works. *Liber introductorius in artem logicae demonstrationis* and *De somno et visione* appear in three manuscripts.[49] One manuscript possesses *De radiis*, which presents the philosophical

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[46] Although al-Kindi is responsible for a large library of texts on various subjects, his lasting contributions are few and his attempts at harmonization between philosophy and Islam are not very sophisticated. He is perhaps best understood as a promoter of philosophical study in the Arabic world for two centuries, during which time scholars built on and surpassed his arguments. Peter Adamson, *Al-Kindi* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 12-19.

[47] All three works share Gerard of Cremona as their translator, though he and Dominicus each translated one of the works and gave it different names, *De ratione* and *De intellectu* respectively. Charles Burnett, "al-Kindi, Latin Translations of," *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, 676-678.

[48] Richard McCarthy, "Al-Kindi's Treatise on the Intellect," *Islamic Studies* 3 (1964), 119–149.

[49] In *De somno et visione*, al-Kindi develops Aristotle's theory of dreams to address the subject of prophecy. Pier Paolo Ruffinengo, "*Al-Kindi, Trattato sull'intelletto, Trattato sul sogno e la visione*," *Medioevo* 23 (1997): 337–394. *Liber introductorius in artem logicae demonstrationis*, translated by Dominicus, is only attributed to al-Kindi as there is no extant Arabic copy of this work. Carmela Baffioni, "Il *Liber Introductorius in artem logicae demonstrationis*: problemi storici e filologici," *Studi filosofici* 17 (1994), 69-90.

underpinnings of incantations that can alter the physical world.[50] This work attracted the attention since it was a rare attempt to explain rationally the workings of magic. Latins often mentioned al-Kindi alongside Arab philosophers, but because of *De radiis*, he was conspicuous among them as a dangerous magician.[51]

Al-Farabi's interests were narrower than those of al-Kindi, concentrating mainly on philosophical disciplines, but his controversial contributions, which had overshadowed al-Kindi's by the tenth century, and his useful commentaries on Aristotle assured his translation into Latin as part of the effort to acquire more of the Aristotelian tradition.[52] Like al-Kindi, he is often counted in the company of Algazel and Avicenna, and his works were sometimes attributed to Avicenna.[53] Two works that commonly appear with the *STP* are *De intellectu et intellecto* and *De ortu scientiarum*, while *De scientiis* and commentaries on Aristotle are rarer, found in two manuscripts. Al-Farabi's *De intellectu et intellecto* is a more Neoplatonic treatment of the rational soul than al-Kindi's work of the same name. *De scientiis* and *De ortu scientiarum* achieved popularity in Latin Christendom as they offered a new way to comprehend the organizational

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[50] Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny and Françoise Hudry, "Al-Kindi: De Radiis," *AHDLMA* 49 (1975):139–259.
[51] In his *De erroribus philosophorum*, Giles of Rome condemns al-Kindi for his views on magic as well as philosophical arguments which he finds to be erroneous, illustrating the diversity of opinion regarding the Arabic scholar. Giles of Rome, *Errores philosophorum*, 46-54.
[52] Al-Farabi's popularity stems not only from his systematization of philosophy and thorough commentaries on Aristotle, but also his rejection of the harmony between philosophy and revelation, which naturally attracted considerable attention. Majid Fakhry, *Al-Farabi: Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism; His Life, Works and Influence* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002).
[53] The scribe of BnF Lat. 6443, f. 186v gives Avicenna as the author of al-Farabi's *De ortu scientiarum*: "Liber Auic[enne] De Ortu scientiarum." Naples, Biblioteca nazionale VIII. E. 19 possesses a copy of *De ortu scientiarum* with a rubric that lists the author as "Abohali," which is a Latin rendering of "Abu Ali," Avicenna's proper name. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 73.

structure of disciplines than the long-standing curriculum of the liberal arts that had been in place since Late Antiquity.[54] Dominicus made considerable use of his translations of al-Farabi and other philosophers in his own treatises, especially in *De divisione philosophiae*, which discusses the structure of knowledge.[55] Two other works were gathered with Algazel in two manuscripts. *Distinctio super librum Aristotelis de naturali auditu* is a fragment from al-Farabi's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (Books V–VIII).[56] *Fontes Quaestionum* or *Flos Alfarabii secundum sententiam Aristotelis* is an anonymous translation of al-Farabi's *'Uyūn al-masā'il*, which contains an assortment of observations on Aristotle's *Categories* and *De interpretatione*.[57]

Again, the similarities between the *STP* and the works of al-Kindi and al-Farabi—Aristotelian discussions of the soul, the intellect, and how knowledge is organized and grasped—encouraged scribes to gather their works together. Their shared origin in twelfth-century Toledo also may have played a role since the translations of al-Kindi and al-Farabi, at least those whose translator can be identified, were the work of Dominicus or Gerard. Additionally, of the fourteen manuscripts that contain a copy of Dominicus'

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[54] Gerard and Dominicus each translated these works independently of one another with the latter rendering the Arabic with a less literal, periphrastic style. See Burnett, "Arabic into Latin, 393 and al-Farabi, *De scientiis: secundum versionem Dominici Gundisalvi*.

[55] Dominicus quoted extensively from al-Farabi's *Kitab ihsa' al-'ulum* in this work, almost more than any other author, in addition to borrowing most of the hierarchy of knowledge espoused in this work. Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae*, ed. and trans. Alexander Fidora and Dorothée Werner (Freiberg: Herder, 2007), 12-24 and passim. See also n. 84 below.

[56] This fragment translated by Gerard could have been part of a much larger version of al-Farabi's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* which is no longer extant. Alexander Birkenmajer, *Eine wiedergefundene Übersetzung Gerhards von Cremona*, (Münster: Aschendorff, 1935).

[57] Mario Grignaschi, "Les traductions latines des ouvrages de la logique arabe et l'abrégé d'Alfarabi." *AHDLMA* 47 (1972):41–107.

original works and the *STP*, twelve include a work by al-Kindi, al-Farabi, or both (Appendix IV). Thus, scribes compiled not only translations with similar subject matters, but they also collected the translations with the original works of the Toledan translators, viewing al-Kindi's and al-Farabi's brief works as useful supplements to Aristotle, Algazel, and the treatises of Dominicus.

Other Philosophers Translated from Arabic

The aforementioned five philosophers formed the core of Arab philosophy for Latin scholars who often grouped them together to compare their ideas and arguments.[58] The constant gathering of these authors in the same manuscripts serves to reinforce the cohesiveness of this core group in the minds of Latin scholars, but Algazel was also bound with translations of other Arab philosophers, though less frequently. These authors have qualities that place them outside the mainstream of the Arab tradition. Some are Jewish or Christian scholars who wrote in Arabic, others were Arabic translations of Greek texts that helped to decipher Aristotle. Again, many of these works were gathered with the *STP* on account of their utility in the wider project to understand Aristotelian philosophy.

Jewish scholars Isaac Israeli, Solomon ibn Gabirol and Moses Maimonides form a small, but significant portion of the translations bound up with Algazel. All these works

[58] If the order of Giles of Rome's *De erroribus philosophorum* is any indication of a hierarchy in Latin Christendom, the order proceeds in descending order from Aristotle to Averroes, Avicenna, Algazel, al-Kindi and Maimonides, indicating that al-Farabi's works were either secondary or obsolete by the late thirteenth century. Giles of Rome, *Errores Philosophorum*, 1-67. William of Auvergne associates Aristotle with "sequaces eius, videlicet Alpharabius, Algaxel [sic], et Avicenna." William of Auvergne, *De anima*, ed. Blaise Le Feron, *Guilielmi Alverni Opera Omnia*, 2 vols. (Paris: 1674; Reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), vol. 2, c. 5, f. 112b

were rendered from Arabic, not Hebrew, and all but Maimonides were translated in Toledo. Ten manuscripts possess a translation of Isaac's philosophical or medical works alongside the *STP* (Appendix III). Little is known about Isaac's life (d. *c.* 955/6) or training except that he resided in Qayrawan and served at the emir's court in the ninth and tenth centuries.[59] Isaac was primarily of interest to Jewish and Muslim scholars in Andalusian communities, both of which could have exposed Latin translators to his works. Only fragments of Isaac's works exist in Arabic, indicating that he enjoyed a larger audience in Latin. The Latin versions of his *De elementis* and *De descriptione rerum et diffinitionibus earum* reveal that his thought mirrors al-Kindi's attempt at synthesizing Aristotelian and Neoplatonic arguments. These works address theological questions in descending order from discussions of the human knowledge of God to its understanding of intellects, souls, and matter.[60] Gerard and Dominicus were responsible for the translation of Isaac's philosophical treatises while Constantine the African translated his medical works in the eleventh century.[61]

It is curious that scribes consistently included Isaac Israeli in manuscripts alongside the works of Algazel given his relative obscurity with Arab audiences, while more popular authors Ibn Gabirol and Maimonides are each found in only two

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[59] Alexander Altmann and Samuel Stern, *Isaac Israeli: A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth Century*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), xvii-xxiii.
[60] Isaac Israeli, *De diffitionibus*, ed. Joseph Muckle, "Isaac Israeli: Liber de definicionibus," *AHDLMA* 12(1937-1938), 299-340; Altmann and Stern, *Isaac Israeli*, 149-95.
[61] Isaac's medical treatises appear with the *STP* in Vat lat. 3010 along with excerpts of Isaac's philosophical works: *Dietae uniuersales* (f. 124r-130r), *De elementis* (f. 130r-133v), and *De urinis* (f. 133v-137v). Enrique Montero Cartelle, "Costantino Africano e il recupero dei testi greci antichi di medicina," *Schola Salernitana* 3-4 (2000), 9-29.

manuscripts with Algazel. Ibn Gabirol's literary career flourished during the eleventh-century *Taifa* period in al-Andalus, moving from court to court as a poet and philosopher. Although he composed hundreds of verses in Hebrew, he wrote philosophy only in Arabic, thereby participating in the wider intellectual culture of the region.[62] Ibn Gabirol, or Avicebron in Latin, has pronounced Neoplatonic elements in his *Fons vitae*, which Dominicus and Johannes Hispanus translated. In it, he constructs a hierarchy descending from God, whose Will, as the First Cause, allows him to remain in absolute simplicity while form and matter emanates in decreasing degrees of perfection into an inferior world.[63] Several works by Maimonides were rendered into Latin in the thirteenth century.[64] Only his *Guide for the Perplexed*, or *Dux neutrorum* in Latin, was bound with the *STP*, in which Maimonides offers a defense for the study of theology as a rational discipline to those raised in the Jewish tradition, using as much scriptural and rabbinic material as reasoned argumentation.[65] *Dux neutrorum* proved to be popular in Latin

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[62] This bifurcation of his writings into two languages caused some confusion for historians who believed Ibn Gabirol the poet was a different person than Avicebron the philosophy, who many believed to be an Andalusian Muslim scholar until the middle of the nineteenth century. Raphael Loewe, *Ibn Gabirol* (London: Halban, 1989), 39-40.

[63] This inferior reality gives a glimpse of the superior world since it was created in the latter's image, but the First Cause, along with God, cannot truly be known, only inferred by its effects. His brand of hylomorphism proved popular among early scholastics and was not directly challenged until Aquinas. Loewe, *Ibn Gabiro*l, 39-53.

[64] John of Palermo translated the *Guide for the Perplexed* into Latin in Italy in the early thirteenth century. Several of Maimonides' medical words were also translated. Wolfgang Kluxen, "Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides," *Recherches de thélogie ancienne et médiévale* 21 (1954), 23-50.

[65] Harold Davidson, *Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 98-116.

Christendom, greater than that of Ibn Gabirol or Isaac Israeli, and received the same scrutiny as the rest of the Arabic Aristotelian corpus.[66]

Jews were not the only non-Muslims to appear in Latin translation alongside the *STP*. The Melkite Christian scholar Qusta ibn Luqa (d. 912) appears in six manuscripts and his texts occupy an important place in both the Arab and Latin world. As a Greek, Syriac, and Arabic polymath, he translated dozens of works on astronomy, medicine, and philosophy for wealthy Baghdadi and Armenian patrons in the ninth and tenth centuries.[67] Interest in his scholarship spilled over Latin Christendom quite early in the translation movement. John of Seville's early twelfth-century translation of his philosophical work, *De differentia spiritus et animae*, received considerable attention and was one of the few translations not authored by Aristotle to be included in the arts curriculum at Paris.[68] Scribes compiled this widely-accepted work with Algazel and other potentially dangerous Arab philosophers in five manuscripts (Appendix III), though none have a Parisian provenance. *De differentia spiritus et animae* also has a connection to Toledo since John dedicated the work to the first patron of the translation movement in that city, archbishop Raymond de Sauvetât, but it is unclear whether John worked there.

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[66] Fifteen of Maimonides' doctrines make Giles' list of errors along with those of Algazel. Giles of Rome, *Errores philosophorum*, 59-67.

[67] Judith Wilcox, "Our Continuing Discovery of the Greek Science of the Arabs: The Example of Qustā ibn Lūqā," *Annals of Scholarship* 4.3(1987): 57–74.

[68] Charles Burnett, "John of Seville and John of Spain: a mise en point," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 44 (2002): 59-78. Constantine the African translated his medical treatise *De physicis ligaturis* in the late eleventh century, but only one manuscript has this work and the *STP* (Graz 482, f. 230r-230v). Judith Wilcox and J.M. Riddle, "Qusṭā ibn Lūqā's *Physical Ligatures* and the Recognition of the Placebo Effect," *Medieval Encounters* 1 (1995): 1-50. See Heinrich Denifle and Emile Chatelain, ed. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (*CUP*), 4 vols (Paris, 1889-1897), vol. 1, 278 for the inclusion of *De differentia spiritus et animae* in the Parisian curriculum.

Dominicus' citations from this work indicate that it was available to Toledan scholars later in the twelfth century and was perhaps well-known among the translators and their associates.[69]

In addition to Jewish and Christian authors, scribes gathered works by Greek scholars with the *STP* in eight manuscripts. Commentaries on Aristotle translated from Greek or Syriac into Arabic retained their utility until the Latin translation project in Spain, despite the centuries between the movements. Seven manuscripts containing the *STP* possess a copy of one or more of Alexander of Aphrodisias' Aristotelian commentaries while only one manuscript contains a translation of Themistius' commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, most of which were translated by Dominicus or Gerard (Appendix III). The Athenian Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200) was the first to perform a systematic commentary on the Aristotelian canon, earning the title of "the Commentator" before Averroes.[70] The Constantinopolitan Themistius (d. *c.* 388) carried on the work of Greek commentaries on Aristotle into the late fourth century.[71] A sizeable portion of their works came into Arabic in the ninth century, but influence with Arab audiences dwindled by the twelfth. However, the presence of these twice-translated Greek works in manuscripts alongside Arab philosophers testifies to the Latin scholars' desire for texts that elucidated Aristotle and the long tradition of Aristotelian philosophy.

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[69] Judith Wilcox, *The Transmission and Influence of Qusta ibn Luqa's On the Difference between Spirit and the Soul* (Ph.D dissertation, The City University of New York, 1986).
[70] Jonathan Barnes, *Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1-7* (London: Duckworth 1991), 4.
[71] Themistius, *In Posteriora*, ed. James O'Donnell, "Themistius' Paraphrases of the Posterior Analytics in Gerard of Cremona's translation," *Medieval Studies* 20 (1958):239–315.

Several trends arise from this survey of the Arab works bound with the *STP*. Scribes consistently gathered Algazel with translations of philosophical works, specifically other translations that discussed, directly or indirectly, the teachings of Aristotle. Twenty-four of the manuscripts in question possess a work by Aristotle or commentaries on his works by Averroes, al-Farabi, and others. Many other codices contain treatises that discuss or build upon arguments introduced by Aristotle. Scribes also closely connected Algazel to Avicenna, who appears with the *STP* more than any other author. The compilation of these two authors is quite fortuitous since the *STP* naturally covers a significant amount of material found in Avicenna's works, but in a more rudimentary format. Thus, scribes appear very concerned with the thematic consistency of the translations within the manuscripts. These are not haphazard amalgamations of translations from Arabic since the larger corpuses of medical, astronomical, mathematical, or theological works that were translated from Arabic appear only infrequently or not at all. Instead, considerable thought has gone into creating these coherent volumes of Aristotelian philosophy, many of which consist solely of Arab scholarship.

The majority of the works paired with the *STP* also share Toledo as their place of origin. Dominicus Gundissalinus, Gerard of Cremona, and Michael Scot were responsible for the translation of most of the texts that appear with Algazel. Translations of philosophical works performed outside of Toledo or from Greek are decidedly less

common, as are translations conducted after the early thirteenth century.[72] The next section will demonstrate that original works by the Toledan translators appear regularly with the *STP*. Yet the binding of the *STP* with later twelfth-century authors such as Maimonides and Averroes indicates that scholars did not consider Algazel to be fixed in time or relevant only to those who came before him. Instead, several scribes believed Algazel's use extended beyond the Arab tradition since they consistently bound him with Latin authors.

Algazel and Latin Scholarship

Zwettl 89 is an outlier among the manuscripts that contain the *STP*. Its first section dates from the second half of twelfth century and its second section, containing Algazel's *Logica* (f. 221r-231v), was added in the beginning of the thirteenth century. Both halves originated in Austria, most likely at the Zwettl scriptorium, far from the centers of learning where Algazel and the translations found their largest concentrations of readers.[73] Zwettl 89 is also one of the few manuscripts to possess no other translations from Arabic aside from the *STP*. Instead, a Zwettl monk compiled Algazel with Augustine's *Confessions* (Books 1-13), biblical commentaries, and Dominicus's *Tractatus de anima*. While Algazel is rarely without Arab compatriots in a manuscript,

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[72] Translations of Greek works by James of Venice or William of Moerbeke appear sparingly, as do the translations from Arabic by Hermann the German. Translations of Aristotle and Averroes by William of Luna and Juan Gonzales de Burgos do not appear at all. The absence of translations from Greek in the Algazel corpus and in d'Alverny's catalogue for Avicenna suggests that the works circulated separately or had different audiences. William and Juan's translations may have arrived too late to circulate with earlier efforts. See Appendix I.

[73] See chapter I, n. 39.

Zwettl 89 illustrates how scribes extended their methods of compilation beyond the concern for cultural symmetry. The translation movement was ultimately successful in its goal of providing greater access to the Aristotelian tradition, whose choice of works display a decidedly Andalusian or Toledan quality, and the rapid consumption of the translations allowed Latin scholars to produce their own Aristotelian commentaries and treatises. As a resource on Aristotle and Avicenna, as well as an object of study in its own right, the *STP* proved its utility and flexibility as scribes gathered the work with elements of the growing Latin Aristotelian library.

The scribes' ability to recognize wider applications for the *STP* demonstrates a puzzling dichotomy in the knowledge of scribes. In many cases, scribes knew enough about Algazel to gather his work with Latin authors who cited his arguments or those who discussed the arguments of Aristotle and Arab philosophers. Despite the scribes' apparent understanding of links between the *STP* and these authors, they failed to make the connection between Algazel and the condemnations, such as *De erroribus philosophorum*, which outlines the errors found within the *STP*. The well-informed pairing of the *STP* with Latin authors betrays a rudimentary knowledge of Algazel's arguments, but there is also a degree of indifference toward the errors on the part of scribes. The absence of condemnations from the manuscripts reinforces the notion that Algazel did not face resistance from scribes. In addition to displaying him in an appealing format, they worked to make him more accessible in the accepted canon by pairing him with Latin Christian authors who commented and built upon the Aristotelian tradition of philosophy.

Algazel and Latin Scholarship before the Translation Movement

Early manuscripts demonstrate the difficulty of grafting translations of Arab philosophy into the established library. The *STP* materializes alongside authorities who were studied for centuries before the translation movement. Zwettl 89 illustrates that the theological and philosophical works of Augustine were paired with the *STP*, appearing together in five manuscripts (Appendix IV). Other manuscripts reveal more conscious efforts on the part of scribes to place Algazel with Latin philosophical works. The early separation of the *Logica* from the rest of the *STP* allowed scribes to form compendia on grammar and dialectic. Such a volume occurs in the early thirteenth-century manuscript Royal 15 B. IV, which contains the works of the late antique grammarians Donatus and Priscian as well as Algazel's *Logica*.[74] The philosophical *florilegia* that appears in the thirteenth-century manuscript Vat. lat. 3010 suggests that its scribe viewed Algazel as part of a continuum that extended from the interests of the previous centuries. Boethius' works and translations of Aristotle are prominent in Vat. lat. 3010, as well as in seven other manuscripts.[75] The scribe also placed Algazel among established pagan

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[74] This manuscript is in several pieces, each with a separate thirteenth-century hand, but a table on f. 1r indicates that the eleven works were together by the middle of the fourteenth century. The codex begins with an anonymous commentary on Priscian's *Institutiones grammaticae* (f. 1v-7v) followed by Peter Helias' commentary on the same, *Summa super Priscianum* (f. 8r-15v). The grammatical preface to Alexander Neckam's *Corrogationes Promethei* appears next (f. 16r-23v) along with fragments of Donatus' *Ars grammatica* and the complete *De partibus orationis* (f. 24r-28v). The letters of Peter of Blois (f. 29v-65v) and a few papal letters (f. 65b-60r) occupy f. 29v-70r before the focus on grammar returns with an anonymous treatise on logic (f. 70r-71v) and Algazel's *Logica* (f. 72r-75v). The manuscript ends with the life of the Irish saint Modwenna. George Warner and Julius Gilson, *British Museum: Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King's Collections* II (London, 1921), 153-155.

[75] Scribes bound the *STP*, howbeit infrequently, with a mixture of Boethius' theological and philosophical works. *De topicis differentiis*, *De consolatione philosophiae* and *De hebdomadibus* appear roughly as often as *De christiana religione* and *De trinitate.* See Appendix IV.

philosophers, including excerpts from Plato's *Timaeus* and the *Logica vetus* of Aristotle. The *Timaeus*, which enjoyed so much popularity among philosophers in the twelfth century, was bound with Algazel in only three manuscripts from the thirteenth-century, demonstrating the growing appeal of Aristotelianism to the detriment of previous philosophical traditions.[76] The scribe of Vat. lat. 3010 appears to be keenly aware of the changes to Latin philosophical canon in his inclusion of new translations of Aristotle, Avicenna and Algazel alongside older authorities. However, later scribes did not connect Algazel with the older tradition of Aristotle and bound him almost exclusively with newer translations.

In addition to placing the *STP* with established texts of long-standing influence, scribes bound Algazel with more recent philosophical works from twelfth-century scholars. Although the works of early or proto-scholastic writers appear infrequently, the quantity and diversity of authors are significant and reflect the interests of Algazel's first and primary audience in the growing schools of the thirteenth century. Alan of Lille's treatises and poetry are found in three manuscripts with Algazel.[77] One of these, Laon 412, possesses the *STP* followed by a copy of Alan's *De articulis fidei* and *De trinitate* in

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[76] Scholars have described the twelfth century as a time of great intellectual ferment, but the disparate pursuits of the period did not create a systematic curriculum. Winthrop Wetherbee asserts that translations from Greek like the *Timaeus* "could stimulate scientific investigation, but it could not provide material for new thought." Winthrop Wetherbee, "Philosophy, Cosmology, and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance," *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, 21-53. Chenu is more positive in his assessment, but still expressed the limitations of Neoplatonic Greek texts in Latin Christendom. Marie-Dominique Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 49-98.

[77] Toledo 47-15 contains an excerpt from *De planctu naturae* while Erfurt F. 331 possesses a fragment of the satirical poem *Apocalypsis Goliae*, which the scribe attributes to Alan (f. 29v: "Carmen Alani apokalipticum"), but the work is damaged and a few folios appear to be missing. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 197.

the same hand, and a later scholar bound this collection of Algazel and Alan with a complete copy of Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalicon*. A variety of other early scholastic authors make singular appearances with the *STP*, including Adelard of Bath, Adam Parvipontis, Alexander Nequam and others.[78] Brief selections from Peter Lombard's *Sentences* appear in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS lat. 2186. [79] They discuss how those seeking after religious knowledge differ from those who gain understanding from philosophical inquiry—which is lodged among the translations of al-Kindi, al-Farabi, and Avicenna in addition to Algazel. While some unity can be found in these manuscripts as scribes collected works under the broad category of speculative philosophy, scribes sometimes created strange literary bedfellows. Zwettl 89 again provides an excellent example since it is difficult to see the connection between Algazel's *Logica* and a biblical commentary by the Carolingian scholar Angelomus of Luxeuil. Stranger still is the appearance of Bernard of Clairvaux's *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae* only a few folios after Algazel, written in the same hand in Uppsala C. 647.[80]

Scribes had trouble deciding how to compile Algazel with Latin philosophy that came before the translation movement. Augustine and Boethius, whose works and

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[78] BnF Lat. 14700 contains Adam Parvipontis's *Ars dialectica* (f. 246-272), followed by Adelard of Bath's *Quaestiones Naturales* (f. 273-296v), all of which are in the same hand as the complete copy of the *STP*. Alexander Nequam's biblical approach to teaching grammar, *Corrogationes Promethei*, appears in Royal 15 B. IV, f. 16r-23r.

[79] This commentary amounts to only two folios (f. 19r-19v) roughly corresponds to the prologue of the *Sentences*. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 91.

[80] Excerpts from Bernard's *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae*, which is critical of speculative inquiry, appear on f. 6v-7r following excerpts from Algazel's and Avicenna's works (f. 1r-6r). The excerpts begin on first chapter of Bernard's work and continue throughout the text. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Tractatus de gradibus humilitatis et superbiae*, ed. Jean Leclercq, *Opera Sancti Bernard opera omnia* (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963): 13-59.

influence were ubiquitous throughout the Middle Ages, appear only sporadically in these manuscripts. Works that became influential during the twelfth century like the *Timaeus* are even rarer and, with the exception of the translators, there is little coherence to the twelfth-century authors paired with the *STP*. Instead, scribes chose to place the *STP* with Latin scholarship that postdated the translation movement. They compiled the *STP* with Latin authors who closely followed the newly translated Aristotelian tradition, including twelfth-century translators and some of the most influential philosophers of the thirteenth century.

Dominicus Gundissalinus

Dominicus Gundissalinus is conspicuous among the members of the translation movement. The archdeacon had both a fruitful career as a translator and as an author of five philosophical treatises. His works also contain extensive quotations from the texts he translated, making him the first critical Latin reader of Arab philosophy and perhaps the best exponent of the translation movement's intentions for how these new texts ought to be used. The influence of his works was widespread and even found a Jewish audience that translated his works into Hebrew.[81] His treatises on the soul and his familiarity with Avicenna's *De anima*, which he translated with Avendauth, made him influential in the development of medieval psychology.[82] He was equally instrumental for the development of epistemology since his *De divisione philosophorum* promoted a new classification of

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[81] French and Italian communities of Jewish scholars translated his *Tractatus de anima* in the late twelfth century and continued to study it for two centuries. Alexander Fidora, "Religious Diversity and the Philosophical Translations of Twelfth-Century Toledo," 31-34.
[82] See note 27 above.

the sciences espoused by al-Farabi in *De scientiis* and Algazel in the *STP*.[83] His *De unitate et uno* advances Ibn Gabirol's discussion of matter and form, and introduces arguments regarding divine unity which would be contested throughout the Late Middle Ages. Through his treatises and translations, Dominicus was instrumental in the reassessment of the sciences that allowed philosophy to become a discipline distinct from theology. Despite his contributions, he was not cited as an authority as often as the Arab authors he translated, but he also avoided formal condemnation while borrowing substantially from their arguments. Yet some annotations indicate that not all readers approved of his work. One scholar wrote "Nichil valet monacho" in Zwettl 89 alongside his *Tractatus de anima* while a reader of Vat. lat. 2186 placed a warning, "hec cave non est enim uerum theologice loquendo" in the margins of *De processione mundi*.[84]

No Latin author has a stronger connection to Algazel in the manuscript tradition than Dominicus, whose works appear with the *STP* in fourteen manuscripts. Scribes bound Algazel with the works of Dominicus more than any other Latin writer, and as the translator of Avicenna, al-Farabi, al-Kindi, Israel Israeli, and others, his translations appear more often with the *STP* than those of any other scholar. Of all the Latin authors bound with the *STP*, the practice of binding Algazel with Dominicus' treatises was the most natural. His works treat topics that Algazel discusses in the *STP*, and he includes many quotations from the *STP*—a practice which one careful reader marked with

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[83] Alexander Fidora, "Dominicus Gundissalinus und die arabische Wissenschaftstheorie," ed. Speer and Wegener, *Wissen über Grenzen: Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter* (New York: De Gruyter, 2006), 467-482.
[84] Zwettl 89, f. 219r; Vat. lat. 2186, f. 7v.

annotations in Vat. lat. 2186.[85] His works also originated in Toledo and doubtlessly were some of the first texts to be bound and to travel with the *STP*. Four of the five original works of Dominicus appear with the *STP* (Appendix IV). *De unitate et uno*, *De processione mundi*, and *Tractatus de anima* appear in six manuscripts while *De divisione philosophorum* is in three manuscripts. *De immortalitate animae* is curiously absent. Also, eleven of the fourteen manuscripts include another translation by Dominicus in addition to the *STP*. Scholars seem to have understood the connection between Dominicus and Arab philosophers even when his works do not appear in manuscripts. One reader of Vat. lat. 4481, which contains only the *STP* and Avicenna's *Physica*, thought it prudent to write out lengthy excerpts from *De divisione philosophiae* in the margins of several folios.[86] The commonality of his interests with the sources he translated, along with his direct citation from them, seems to have encouraged scribes to continue to compile his treatises and translations together.

Alfred of Shareshill

Alfred of Shareshill also has the distinction of being both translator and author, but unlike Dominicus, he split his scholarly efforts between Spain and England, though there is little evidence about his life and career.[87] Alfred's translations circulated with

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[85] A reader of Vat. lat. 2186 had considerable knowledge of a variety of translations of Arabic philosophy. He places the names of "Algaçel" as well as "Alfarabius," "Aviceni," and "Ysaac [Israeli]" alongside their corresponding quotations in Dominicus' *De divisione philosophiae*. See Vat. lat. 2186, f. 24v, 25v, 26r, 26v, 27r, 28v, 29r, 29v.

[86] Vat. lat. 4481, f. 150v-152r.

[87] There is little evidence to mark Alfred's life and career in Toledo or Oxford, though he is attested to have been in both places. He reports that he translated with the help of a learned Jew, Salomon Avenraza, and there are some Castilianisms in his works that point to his time in Spain. James Otte, ed. *Commentary on*

Algazel in several manuscripts, perhaps as part of a collection of translations performed and preserved in Toledo. His translations of Avicenna's works, entitled *De congelatione lapidum* and *De diluviis*, and of Nicholas of Damascus' work *De plantis*, attributed erroneously to Aristotle, appear in three manuscripts.[88] His original work, *De motu cordis*, is present with the *STP* in five manuscripts, more than any of his translations (Appendix III). *De motu cordis* is hardly a medical text, but rather it is an exploration into the location of the soul, which, he argues, resides in heart rather than the brain, drawing from Aristotle's position on the subject.[89] He dedicated the work to Alexander Nequam, to whom he gave the title of *magister*, signifying that the work was completed after 1186, when Alexander returned from teaching in Paris, and before 1213 when Alexander became abbot at Cirencester. The work enjoyed an audience in Alfred's homeland of England, specifically in Oxford, and in Paris, where it was studied by the faculty of arts.[90]

Alfred's connection to Spain and England poses problems for gaining a clear picture of how his works circulated, particularly with the *STP*. Alfred could have composed *De motu cordis* when he returned to England since it is likely that he amassed a considerable library of Aristotle's works during his travels. English scholars benefitted

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the 'Metheora' of Aristotle (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 3-15, specifically 8-9. Daniel Callus, "Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 29 (1943), 229–281. James Long, "Alfred of Sareshel's Commentary on the Pseudo-Aristotelian *De plantis*: A Critical Edition," *Mediaeval Studies* 47 (1985), 125–167.

[88] See chart of translations of Avicenna's works on pg. 11 and of Aristotle's works in Appendix I.

[89] Alfred of Sareshel, *Des Alfred von Sareshel (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift 'De motu cordis'*, ed. C. Baeumker, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 23 (Münster: Ashendorff, 1923), 1–21, dedication on p. 11.

[90] Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben: Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, 2 vols. (Munich: Hueber, 1936): II, 192.

from an early connection to a pipeline of translations from Spain since the twelfth century. Toledo also would have been an excellent choice for an itinerant scholar in need of Arabic manuscripts, Latin translations of Aristotle by previous scholars, and assistance from Arabic-speaking scholars, which he found in his Jewish associate Saloman. He may have left copies of his works in Toledo that scribes eventually copied and circulated with other elements of the Toledan translation corpus. *De motu cordis* circulated commonly with translations from Toledo and scholars closely associated Alfred with Arab philosophers that they likely read in same manuscript.[91] Scribes treated Alfred's work much like those of Dominicus, compiling their original compositions with the *STP* on account of the similarity of their subject matter and the Arab authorities cited therein.

Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas

As the thirteenth century progressed, Latin scholars' growing familiarity and dexterity with Aristotle allowed them to produce their own commentaries on the Philosopher's works and contribute to arguments presented by Arab philosophers. The increased output by Latin authors had a marked effect on the compilation of translation of Arab philosophical texts. Late thirteenth-century manuscripts give an early indication that the genre of Aristotelian philosophy now included recent contributions by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Each author appears with Algazel in six manuscripts, three

[91] Robert Grosseteste places him among the "modern" philosophers with translated Arabic authors, even confusing him with al-Farabi. Roger Bacon names him among the translators who lack sufficient scientific knowledge to have rendered the Arabic correctly. Otte, *Commentary on the 'Metheora' of Aristotle*, 6-8; Callus, "Introduction of Aristotelian learning to Oxford," 236-238.

of which possess all three philosophers.[92] This number represents a fourth of the twenty-four manuscripts that originated after the death of both scholars in the last quarter of the thirteenth century.[93] As scribes began to see Latin authors as part of the Aristotelian corpus, Algazel did not lose his place and scribes continued to gather the *STP* with the translations from Arab philosophers as well as new Latin philosophical texts into the Late Middle Ages.

No individual work or commentary by Albert prevails in these six manuscripts, but while this assortment of Albert's texts is eclectic, the pairing of Algazel and Albert was deliberate in several cases and began not long after Albert's passing. The thirteenth-century scribe of Laon 412 places Albert's *Commentum in De anima* and Algazel adjacent to one another.[94] In Merton 285, John Wyliot began by copying Algazel's *Logica* and *Physica*, while the next 300 folios are dedicated to sixteen of Albert's treatises and commentaries.[95] He further indicates his interest in reading Algazel and Albert together by leaving annotations sporadically throughout the manuscript. Though there was little consensus on which of Albert's many works to bind with Algazel, scribes agreed that the *STP* and Albert's works could be read together as complimentary texts within the Latin canon. The pairing of Algazel and Albert is particularly fitting since

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[92] See Appendix IV.
[93] The earliest manuscripts to possess Algazel and Albert or Thomas originate from the final quarter of the thirteenth century. BnF Lat. 16096 is likely to be the earliest (c. 1280) since it contains Algazel and Thomas in the same hand.
[94] Laon 412, f. 69r-v contains Albert's *Commentum in De anima*, III, v, 4, followed by an imperfect copy of Algazel *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, f. 70-88. Albert the Great, *De anima*, ed. Clemens Stroick, *AMOO* VII (Münster: Aschendorff, 1968), 248-250.
[95] Thomson, *Manuscripts of Merton College*, 221-2.

Albert cited Algazel more than any other Latin scholar, as I will discuss in the next chapter.

Scribes had a more consistent method of compiling the works of Thomas with the *STP*. Four of the six manuscripts contain Thomas's treatise *De ente et essentia*, in which he elaborates his views on the distinction between being and essence.[96] In this work, he quotes extensively from Arab philosophers as well as Aristotle, though not from Algazel. As with Albert's works, there is often a deliberateness to the compilation of Thomas' and Algazel's works. BnF Lat. 16096 contains a copy of the *STP* that is immediately followed by Thomas' *De occultis operationibus naturae* on the same folio in the same hand.[97] This brief treatise addresses questions regarding why things move or change, seemingly through unseen forces, according to their properties (a magnet attracts iron, water cools hot metals, etc.). The work is directly related to text preceding it, Algazel's *Physica*, which provides a review on the characteristics of natural bodies. As is the case with Albert, the pairing of Thomas with Algazel in 16096 reveals that scribes began to connect the two authors shortly after the former's death in 1274. Its owner, Godfrey of Fontaines, may have commissioned BnF Lat. 16096 with Thomas and Arab philosophy in mind. He

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[96] See Appendix IV. Thomas Aquinas, *De esse et essentia*, *TAOO* 43 (Rome, 1976): 367-81.
[97] The scribe included a complete copy of the *STP* on f. 74r-120v before this short work by Aquinas appears on (f. 120v). Thomas Aquinas, *De operationibus occultis naturae ad quendam militem ultramontanum*, *TAOO* 43: 181-186.

was likely a student of Thomas at Paris and, based on his works and annotations, an avid reader of Arab philosophy who spoke against the Condemnation of 1277.[98]

Algazel retained his position as a member of the Latin philosophical canon in the minds of scribes who continued to bind the *STP* with two prolific philosophers synonymous with thirteenth-century scholasticism. However, a few manuscripts suggest that scribes gathered Algazel with Albert and Thomas to promote a more critical approach to Arab philosophy. In BnF Lat. 6443, a scribe placed Thomas' *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* after the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* of the *STP*.[99] Thomas contradicts Averroes on two occasions in this work by using quotations drawn from Algazel concerning the infinite number of souls or intellects.[100] Uppsala C. 647 begins similarly with lengthy excerpts from the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* while Albert's own *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* appears further in the codex, in which he lends his weight to the controversy over Averroes with recourse to the arguments of other Arab philosophers.[101] Thus, instances where Algazel appears alongside a Latin work that can be construed as critical of Arab philosophy are rare. Many more manuscripts indicate that scribes believed that there was distinct benefit in placing and, by extension, reading these

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[98] Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les Quodlibets onze et douze*, ed. J. Hoffmans, *Les Philosophes Belges*, Vol. 5. (Louvain, 1932), Q. XII, q. 5, 100. See also John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 382-385.

[99] A complete copy of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* appears on f. 143r-165v, followed by Aquinas' *De unitate intellectus* on f. 167r-172r. Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, *TAOO* 43: 289-314.

[100] Edward Mahoney, "Aquinas' Critique of Averroes' Doctrine of the Unity of the Intellect," *Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy*, ed. David Gallagher (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1994): 83-106.

[101] Albert the Great, *Libellus de unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, ed. Alfonsus Hufnagel, *AMOO* XVII.1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1975).

sources together. Albert, Thomas, and Arab philosophers not only discuss the same philosophical matters, but the Latin authors are contributing a more judicious reading of Arab philosophy, pointing out its uses and flaws. The scribes indicate not only what texts ought to be read together, but they also suggest a sequence in which they ought to be read in order to trace the development of Aristotelian thought from Arab to Latin scholars.

Conclusion

As Chartier predicted in the quote from the beginning of this chapter, the *STP* escaped its initial classification as a work that belonged with translations of Arab philosophy. Scribes typically bound Algazel with other Arab philosophers throughout the Middle Ages, but scribes such as John Wyliot found that the work could also be useful as an introduction for the advanced study of new Latin pillars of philosophy who studied and quoted Algazel in their own works. In several cases, this escape from the normative pairing of Algazel with other Arab philosophers was an extension of the translation movement's endeavors. The Latin author most frequently found with the *STP* is its translator, Dominicus, whose own works are a mixture of Arab and Latin traditions. Some of the earliest manuscripts reveal that these two authors likely travelled together from Toledo, but the similarities in subject matter and quotations from Arab philosophers made them a logical accompaniment to Algazel in the minds of scribes. However, John Wyliot's manuscript indicates that the *STP* not only retained its audience into the fourteenth century, but its use matured alongside the development of the Latin philosophical tradition. Thirteenth-century manuscripts testify that scribes associated the *STP* with the works of Thomas and Albert only a few years after their deaths. This

connection helped Algazel to remain part of the philosophical canon into the fifteenth century and beyond.

Scribes were consistent in their methods of compilation, which demonstrates their care and consideration in the placement of the *STP* within manuscripts. Algazel is found most frequently in the company of translations, specifically works of philosophy. Scribes did not group translations of Arab philosophy and science together, but took into consideration the genre and function of the *STP* as a work that fit best with works of the Aristotelian tradition. For this reason, the *STP* appears commonly with Aristotle and Avicenna, whose content and arguments matches that of Algazel. The newer Latin philosophers that are present with the *STP* tended to be those who were affiliated with the translation movement and engaged Arab philosophy in their own works. On the other hand, Algazel rarely appears with Latin scholarship that predates the translation movement, which suggests that scribes saw the *STP* as part of a new wave of scholarship. Historians have often explained the translation movement as an attempt to fill in gaps in the Latin tradition, specifically deficiencies in their knowledge of Aristotle. However, the scribes did not usually place Algazel with authors from the twelfth century or earlier, and they did not rebind existing manuscripts with copies of the *STP*. Even copies of the *vetus* tradition of Aristotle appear very infrequently with Algazel. By gathering the *STP* with other translations from Arabic and new philosophical treatises by Latin authors, scribes indicate that Algazel was part of something novel in Latin scholarship. Instead of looking to the past and binding Algazel with previous authorities, scribes opted to group him with more current philosophical endeavors.

Scribes also did not bind Algazel with condemnations. The current and previous chapters describe the experience of reading Arab philosophy in Latin, but scribes performed their tasks so well that the *STP*—both in its physical appearance and in its compilation with other Latin works—was indistinguishable, *prima facie*, from any other text in the Latin philosophical canon. In short, scribes bound the *STP* with texts that promote, rather than hinder, the reading of Algazel, and there is one exception that proves the rule in addition to the evidence given above. The thirteenth-century manuscript BnF Lat. 6443 possesses perhaps the most expensive copy of the *STP*. On f. 143r, Algazel's *Metaphysica* begins with an ornate initial "U," which is decorated with red, yellow, and blue ink as well as pieces of gold leaf. The illuminator extended the initial's decoration into the left margin where it continues for a quarter of the length of the folio, which is made of large pieces of vellum (380 x 245mm). It is a striking display of color and skill, and an auspicious beginning for a work known to contain dangerous errors.[102] However, on the last folio of manuscript, a scholar has jotted down a list of errors, entitled "*articuli dampnati ab episcopo parisiensi*," in an early fourteenth-century cursive hand.[103] The errors are copied almost verbatim from the Condemnation of 1277.[104] Whether the annotator is calling attention to errors in the *STP* or other works is unclear since he failed

[102] The rest of the works in this manuscript consists receive similar treatment to their initials. The same illuminator decorated the initials for the works appearing in f. 1r-156v. A second illuminator, or perhaps the same illuminator using a different style, decorated smaller and less ornate red-and-blue initials throughout the manuscript.
[103] BnF Lat. 6443, f. 221r.
[104] The three correspond to errors # 96 ("Quod deus non potest multiplicare indiuidua sub una specie sine materia."), 196 ("Quod dignitatis esset in causis superioribus, posse facere peccata et monstra preter intentionem, cum natura hoc possit.), and 81 ("Quod, quia intelligentie non habent materiam, deus non posset plures eiusdem speciei facere."). Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 108, 138, 104.

to cite any author or work where the errors might be found. This brief list is the only instance where a copy of the *STP* appears with a condemnation in a manuscript, and there is no indication that the annotator directed these errors at the *STP*. Thus, as a rule, scribes did not place Algazel with *De erroribus philosophorum*, the Condemnation of 1277, or other scholarship that warned against the reading of Arab philosophy. Readers would have to find Algazel's errors on their own.

CHAPTER III:
ALGAZEL IN THE WORKS OF LATIN SCHOLARS

In 1963, Manuel Alonso published a Spanish translation of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* along with a list of citations of Algazel in the works of Latin scholars. His list outlines the citations from the *STP* in the works of forty-eight scholars, and represents the most thorough bibliographic analysis of Algazel's Latin readership from the twelfth to the sixteenth century.[1] Despite this achievement, Alonso confessed that the list was far from exhaustive and that more citations might exist. He lamented that many authors, particularly those of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, had not yet been edited or were in early printed editions that were difficult to find and hard to search.[2] The list indeed consists mainly of thirteenth-century scholars, possessing only five authors with a *terminus post quem* of 1330. The limited source material available to Alonso inadvertently gives the impression that Algazel's audience decreased sharply in the early fourteenth century. Later studies endorsed this timeline for the audience's decline of since it corresponds neatly to the generation of scholars who were educated before the backlash against Aristotelian philosophy that culminated in the condemnations of the late thirteenth century.[3] However, Alonso gave no indication that the audience declined in the

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[1] Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxv-xliii.

[2] "Aun entre los autores cuya actividad se desarrolla entre 1250 y los primeros años de siglo XIV, existen muchos que están sin editar. Algunas cosas se han editato, al menos parcialmente, en Colecciones o en Revistas que no es fácil tener a mano. Ciertas obras impresas en el siglo XV y en el XVI tampoco son tan accesibles que cualquiera pueda utilizarlas. Quedarán aquí omitidas a pesar de haberlas buscado. El lector puede con derecho inferir que la influencia explicita de Algazel pudo haber sido mucho mayor que lo que nos dicen los siguentes autores." Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxvi.

[3] Charles Lohr, hypothesizes that the number of readers declined after the thirteenth century, crediting the condemnations' influence: "In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with the coming of Scholasticism to

fourteenth century and left the question open until more authors became available in modern editions.

Over the last half-century, editions of medieval authors have become more numerous and easier to search, but no one has augmented Alonso's list. As a result, our knowledge of Algazel's audience barely extends beyond the thirteenth century. This chapter seeks to remedy part of this issue by looking again at the authors who cited Algazel with an eye towards expanding Alonso's list. In it, I elucidate the early and later audiences, and investigate the ways in which authors described Algazel over the period of four centuries. As Alonso guessed, Algazel continued to appear as an authority and enjoyed a wide audience into the fourteenth century and beyond.

This chapter is in two sections. The first describes the composition of Algazel's audience based on an examination of the authors who quoted the *STP*. While Alonso's list provides a starting point, there are more than ninety additional authors (See Appendix 6) who cite Algazel from the twelfth to the sixteenth century and more citations to be found in works examined by Alonso.[4] Contrary to what historians have argued, the

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maturity and the more direct contact with Aristotle made directly from the Greek, the use of Algazel declines. The number of manuscripts falls off, and the citations become fewer. Perhaps Giles of Rome's *Tractatus de erroribus philosophorum* played a role here. His list of Algazel's sixteen errors came into the *Directorium Inquisitorum* of Nicholas Eymerich." Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 231. Lohr mentions Alonso's list and offers a few fourteenth-century additions to it, but he does not mention Alonso's concerns about the later use of Algazel. Janssens draws directly from Lohr on the subject when discussing the reception of the *STP*: "In the fourteenth century, explicit references to the *Maqāṣid* became rare, except perhaps in Spain where one finds an anonymous Castillian manuscript offering many quotations." Janssens, al-Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, Latin Translation of," 389.

[4] Although this study focuses on the medieval audience of Algazel, I include authors from the sixteenth century in this chapter for two reasons. I wished to maintain continuity with Alonso's list, which contains several sixteenth-century authors, but I also noticed that the fifteenth-century decline was followed quickly by a recovery and could not end the study without exploring this sixteenth-century development.

audience shows no decline from the thirteenth to the fourteenth century since number of scholars who cite the *STP* remains roughly constant in this period. The earliest readership overwhelmingly consisted of university-trained scholars, indicating that knowledge of Algazel was common in the schools even though the *STP* was not a part of the curriculum, but the audience becomes more diverse in the fourteenth century. Although this new evidence does not do away with the decline implied by Alonso's list, it places it a century later and mitigates its effects. A decline instead begins to appear in the late fourteenth century, but does not fully manifest itself until the fifteenth. However, this development is short-lived since the sixteenth century sees a sharp increase in citations, though later scholars quoted and viewed Algazel in different ways than their earlier counterparts. Despite their fluctuation in numbers, authors consistently cited Algazel in the same genre of works while the size and shape of their citations vary. Authors quoted directly from the text or refer to various chapters and sections for the benefit of other scholars. Even in passing references to Algazel where quotes or citations do not appear, there is an expectation on the part of authors that readers would understand when they spoke obliquely of Algazel's position. Scholars juxtaposed his arguments with those of new Latin authorities as they became more adept at Aristotelian doctrines. Algazel's constant presence within the most influential philosophical works of the Middle Ages indicates that the application of the *STP* matured with the intellectual trends of the period.

The second section of the chapter examines how scholars described Algazel over four centuries. It begins by introducing the elements of Algazel's image that endured throughout the period: an Arab, a follower of Avicenna, and a Peripatetic. The rest of the

section treats the elements of Algazel's image that were subject to alteration, illustrating how he changed in the minds of scholars from a newly translated philosopher in the thirteenth century to an ancient heretic in the sixteenth. This development has three phases, with the first corresponding to Algazel's heyday in the thirteenth century when there is rapid growth in the number of readers. The second period, or Algazel's middle age, corresponds to the diversification of his audience in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Algazel's newness wore off in these centuries, but rather than disappear, he became a more familiar part of the canon of medieval philosophy. The final part of this section looks at the radical changes to the perception of Algazel in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Two new adjectives appear as print technology allows for greater dissemination of the *STP*. In a reversal from the thirteenth century, scholars began to refer to Algazel in the fifteenth century as an "ancient," grouping him with Greek philosophers. Thus, Algazel changes from a fresh, new authority to a timeworn, established member of the Latin philosophical canon in less than three centuries. Algazel's religion also became more important to scholars of this period. Previous generations referred to Algazel simply as an Arab with no indication as to his religion, but scholars of this period often identified him as a Muslim and a heretic.

By building on Alonso's pioneering work, this chapter illustrates that the *STP* did not disappear in the fourteenth century, but retained its utility with Latin philosophers for centuries. Just as the perceptions of Algazel changed over time, the use of the *STP* matured alongside the greater scholastic project of the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance. Previous studies have focused on the thirteenth-century audience when

Algazel had just arrived and his teachings were fresh, approaching the *STP* as a monument in the narrative of medieval philosophy that falls into disuse and, along with Arab philosophy, gives way to more innovative ways of thinking. By approaching the *STP* as a subject in the history of reading, this chapter describes the work's later audience and reveals how Algazel, while no longer novel, nevertheless survived to become an "ancient" in the eyes of scholars who read the *STP* in a variety of ways over the centuries.

The Composition of Algazel's Audience

In searching the works of Latin scholars for citations and references to Algazel, I expanded Alonso's list from forty-eight to one-hundred and forty known and anonymous authors who cite the *STP* from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century.

Table 4: Algazel's Audience by Century

Century	**Authors (Alonso's list)**
Twelfth Century	2 (1)[5]
Thirteenth Century	39 (24)
Early Fourteenth Century	36 (20)
Late Fourteenth Century	13 (1)
Fifteenth Century	9 (1)
Sixteenth Century	41(1)
	140 (48)

It is easy to conclude from Alonso's totals that Algazel's audience reached its apogee in the late thirteenth century and began to decline soon after in the wake of the condemnations. The number of authors decreases with each successive decade in the

[5] Dominicus Gundissalinus and an anonymous author of short work on the sole are the only only twelfth-century author who quote from the *STP*. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Les pérégrinationes de l'âme dans l'autre monde d'après un anonyme de la fin du xiie siècle," *AHDLMA* 13 (1942): 239-299.

fourteenth century and all but disappears by the end of the century.[6] Furthermore, the later scholars in Alonso's list are hardly an endorsement of the *STP*. The lone late fourteenth-century author is Nicholas of Autrecourt (d. 1369), who quoted Algazel in his *Exigit ordo,* which he was forced to burn at Paris in 1347 and survives in only one copy.[7] The new evidence brings several changes to our knowledge of Algazel's Latin audience. The number of early fourteenth-century scholars alone now exceeds those from the thirteenth century, though several early fourteenth-century scholars began their careers in the previous century and could be counted in either column.[8] Most importantly, the sharp and lasting fourteenth-century decline that occurs in Alonso's list cannot be found here; the audience of Algazel outlives the generation that sees the Condemnation of 1277. The narrative of Algazel's audience now sees a steady increase during the thirteenth century that continues into fourteenth. Then, a gradual decline starts in the late fourteenth century and continues into the fifteenth, only to reverse sharply in the sixteenth. While this new

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[6] Alonso's list of authors tails off quickly in the early fourteenth century. He lists eleven authors who died between 1301 and 1310, five between 1311 and 1320, three between 1321 and 1330, and only one between 1330 and 1340. Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxv-xliii.

[7] Nicholas of Autrecourt, "Exigit ordo executionis", ed. Reginald O'Donnell, *Mediaeval Studies* 1 (1939), 179-280, particularly p. 208 for his citation of Algazel. Nicholas was a student of theology at the College of the Sorbonne before he was summoned by Pope Benedict XII to Avignon in 1340. He was convicted and forced to recant at Avignon and again in 1347 at Paris, where he burned his offending works. For his biography, philosophy and trial proceedings, see the articles in Stephano Caroti and Christophe Grellard, *Nicholas d'Autrécourt et la faculté des arts de Paris (1317-1340)* (Cesena: Stilgraf Editrice, 2006).

[8] It is hard to make a clear division between thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholars, but the studies dedicated to 1270s suggest that that decade was a watershed in the development of the medieval intellectual tradition. This decade sees an intensification of the debate over Aristotelian thought that concludes in the Condemnation of 1277, as well as the death of figures such as Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Albert the Great, who become authorities in later decades. Thus, the generation of scholars that was educated after that decade and wrote in the fourteenth century seems to occupy a different world than their predecessors. See Kent Emery and Andreas Speer, "After the Condemnation of 1277: New Evidence, New Perspectives, and Grounds for New Interpretations," ed. Johannes Aertsen, Kent Emery, and Andreas Speer, *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts : Studien und Texte* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), 3-19.

list appears to move the period of decline a century later, the sixteenth-century recovery raises questions about the composition of Algazel's readership and how it changed over the period of four centuries.

The Thirteenth-Century Audience

University-trained masters comprise the majority of the thirteenth-century authors who quoted Algazel and almost all have a connection to Paris, Oxford, or other universities as students or teachers.[9] There is an even distribution among the secular orders, Dominicans, and Franciscans among these masters, which suggests that the *STP* caught the early attention of mendicants as they became an increasingly influential demographic within the student body. Some of Dominic's earliest recruits were familiar with the *STP* and quoted from it in their own works, including the first regent Dominican master at Paris, Roland of Cremona.[10] The learned Dominican *par excellence*, Albert the Great, cited and appreciated the *STP* perhaps more than any other scholar of the Middle Ages, mentioning Algazel in excess of two-hundred times.[11] Albert's citations greatly exceed those of other scholars since the next most frequent references to Algazel appear

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[9] Only two of the scholars who cited Algazel before the fourteenth century, Dominicus Gundissalinus and Ramon Marti, cannot be placed at any university with certainty. Additionally, only three scholars from this group do not appear to have a connection to Paris or Oxford, but spent time at other universities: of Cremona (Bologna), Peter of Ireland (Naples), and Bernard of Trilia (Montpellier).

[10] Roland of Cremona, *Summa Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis O.P. Liber tertius* ed. Aloysius Cortesi (Bergamo, 1962), f. 62r.

[11] Alonso found 146 citations of Algazel in the works of Albert the Great. Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxix-xxxiii. However, recent editors of Albert's works have found many quotations from the *STP* that Albert did not credit to Algazel. In his *De causa et processu universitatis a prima causa* alone, there are dozens of places where he quotes or paraphrases passages from the *STP* with no mention of Algazel. Since earlier editors only located quotations in the *STP* when Albert mentioned Algazel by name, the extent of Albert's use of the *STP* is not yet fully known and Algazel's influence may have been considerable. Albert the Great, *De causa et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. Winifred Fauser, *AMOO* XVII.2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1993), 204-205 and passim. See Appendix 6.

in the works of Roger Bacon (43) and Thomas Aquinas (30).[12] Thus, Algazel's early readership was well-educated and could count the most of academic elite of among their number. Although the *STP* never became part of the curriculum at any university, it appears to be one of the most frequently-read non-required texts among thirteenth-century university scholars.

The *STP* arrived in the universities during a formative period when there appears to have been some uncertainty about how to apply new texts, especially translations by foreign authors. Some early scholars, including the translator Dominicus, were unsure about whether their colleagues would recognize and accept the authority of Arab philosophers, whose works had only begun to circulate in Latin Christendom, and choose to copy passages from the *STP* without mentioning the work or author by name.[13] An earlier twelfth-century translator, Adelard of Bath, also failed to mention his Arab sources by name and was careful to explain that he was merely relating their positions rather than arguing for their validity.[14] Perhaps Dominicus also did not believe his readers would recognize Arab authors such as Algazel or their authority, and thus he chose to

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[12] See Appendix 6. For Bacon's citations, see Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxviii-xxix; for Aquinas, see Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxxiii-xxxiv and Hanley, "St. Thomas' Use of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*," 248-249.

[13] Alexander Fidora points out that Dominicus derives much of the beginning of *De divisione philosophiae* directly from the introduction to the *STP* (Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 1-5). Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae*, p. 62-66, 70-73, and 76.

[14] "He [Adelard's nephew] urged me to put forward some new item of the studies of the Arabs....For the present generation suffers from this ingrained fault, that it thinks that nothing should be accepted which is discovered by the 'moderns.' Hence it happens that, whenever I wish to publish my own discovery, I attribute it to another person saying: 'Someone else said it, not I!' Thus, lest I have no audience at all, some teacher came up with all my opinions, not I. Adelard of Bath, *Questions of Natural Science*, ed. and trans. Charles Burnett, *Adelard of Bath, Conversations with His Nephew* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 83.

keep his sources anonymous. The anonymous quoting of the *STP* extended into the thirteenth century when the unknown author of *De anima et de potentiis eius*, who composed the treatise around 1225, and Phillip the Chancellor (d. 1236) both quoted the *STP*, but make no mention of the work or its author.[15] This practice ended by the middle of the century, but it is clear that scholars needed some time to adapt to the *STP* as a citable authority. The *STP* arrived without a clear application and its use changed as its audience became more familiar with Arab philosophers—a process of adaptation that continued for the next three centuries.

Algazel's thirteenth-century audience quoted the *STP* in a variety of texts that can be associated with the activities of scholars in the thirteenth-century university. Algazel's name appears most frequently in three genres of works: treatises on the soul, commentaries on Aristotle, and philosophical *summae*. While Algazel discusses the soul in only the last half of the *Physica*, quotations from the *STP* appear in a host of psychological works produced in the thirteenth century. The *STP* owes its position as an authority on the soul to Avicenna since scribes often bound the *STP* with *De anima* and because scholars commonly referred to Algazel as Avicenna's abbreviator. Most of the scholars who quote Avicenna regularly cite Algazel in their works. Scholars often discuss Algazel and Aristotle together since quotations from the *STP* appear the new Latin commentaries on works of the Philosopher. Thus, thirteenth-century works reinforce the

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[15] Anonymous, *De anima primis et de potentiis eius*, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier, "Le Traité *De anima et de potentiis eius* d'un maître ès arts (vers 1225)," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 27-55 (53); and Phillip the Chancellor, *Questiones de anima*, ed. Leo Keeler, *Philippi Cancellarii Summa de bono* (Munster, 1937): 65, 77, 91.

evidence found in manuscripts that the *STP* fulfills its purpose as a translation that makes Aristotle more accessible and easier to understand. Since Latin scholars believed the *STP* to be a summary of the Arab philosophical tradition, they quickly recognized its value as a resource for their own *summae* on philosophy. References to Algazel appear in large compendiums on metaphysics, like that of Albert the Great, as well as on natural philosophy, such as Vincent of Beauvais' *Speculum naturale* and Bartholomew of England's *De proprietatibus rerum*.[16] These discussions often bled into divine matters and, as a result, references to Algazel and quotations from the STP often appear in theological *summae* as well as biblical commentaries.[17] Scholars very rarely quoted Algazel in works on logic, which also echoes the evidence found in manuscripts that the *Logica* was treated differently from the rest of the *STP*.[18] Quotations from the *STP* appear with less frequency in other texts associated with the early scholastic project, including *quodlibeta* and commentaries on the *Sentences*. However, his presence in these texts

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[16] Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, *AMOO* XVI.1, 138, 214, 217, 495, and 526. Vincent of Beavais, *Speculum naturale* (Venice, 1591), Lib. IV, c. 15, f. 41va; Lib. XXIII, c. 39, f. 287ra-va and c. 67, f. 290va; Lib. XXV, c. 54, f. 309ra-vb, c. 65, f. 310rb, c. 76, f. 311rb, c. 91, f. 312vb and f. 313ra; and Lib. XXVI, c. 1, f. 314rb and c. 40, l. 332vb. Bartholomew of England, *De proprietatibus rerum*, (Nuremberg, 1519), Lib. VIII, *De spendore*, c. xxxiii and *De stellis fixis*, c. xl; and Lib. XIX, *De coloribus in particulari*, c. x.

[17] Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, ed. Bernardinus Klumper (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924), vol. I, q. 13, f. 118 and 120; vol. II, q. 75, f. 508, 509-510, 511, 512 and 513; q. 77, f. 525, 527, 529, and 530; Lib. XII, f. 89. Robert Grosseteste, *Expositio in epistulam sancti Pauli ad Galatas*, ed. Richard Dales *CCCM* 130 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), cap. 3, 73. Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexameron*, ed. Ferdinand Delorme, *S. Bonaventura Collationes in Hexaemeron et Bonaventuriana selecta quaedam* (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1934), Visio I, Collatio II, 75; 2; Visio III, Collatio VII, 222; and idem, "Quaestiones de Theologia," ed. G.H. Tavard, *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale* 17 (1950), 218. Henry of Ghent, *Commentarium in Hexaemeron*, ed. Beryl Smalley, "A Commentary on the Hexaemeron by Henry of Ghent," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale* 20 (1953), 83.

[18] Again, Albert the Great appears as the exception to this rule since he quoted the *Logica* extensively in his *De praedicamentis*. See citations 1-16 of Alonso's list in Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxix and Appendix 6.

would increase in the fourteenth century as scholars became more adept with Algazel's arguments and Aristotelian philosophy in general.

Continuity and Diversity in the Fourteenth Century

The number of authors who cite the *STP* increased in the fourteenth century as its university audience grew, but references to Algazel also begin to appear in the works of scholars outside of the university as well as in vernacular texts. As in the previous century, those who cited the *STP* continued to be some of the most prominent philosophers of the age, such as John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Nicole Oresme, and Marsilius of Inghen. However, the readers of the fourteenth century were not only academics, but also influential officials, and included university chancellors, cardinals and papal legates, and leaders of the mendicant and secular orders. This audience knew no intellectual boundaries and consisted of Averroists (John of Jandun), inquisitors (Nicholas Eymerich), Spiritual Franciscans (Peter John Olivi), adherents and critics of Ockham (Adam Wodeham, Walter Chatton), as well as advocates of papal supremacy (Jacques de Therines) and royal power (John of Paris). Though Algazel still remained outside of the curriculum, university-trained scholars had to have some knowledge of the *STP* in order to understand the references that consistently appear in the works of their colleagues. In this way, to be educated in the fourteenth century meant that one had to at least be familiar with Algazel and his arguments.

Citations of Algazel also appeared in the works of notable fourteenth-century scholars who did not attend university. Dante Alighieri mentions Algazel twice in *Il Convivio* and on both occasions in relation to Plato, Aristotle, and Avicenna.[19] Ramon Llull read the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* in Arabic early in his career and translated his own version of the chapter on logic into Latin as the *Compendium logicae Algazelis*, which may have influenced his unique brand of logic and philosophy.[20] Robert of Anjou, the learned king of Naples, took a great interest in Arab philosophy and quoted both Avicenna and Algazel in his treatise on beatific vision dedicated to Pope John XXII, in which he argued that Algazel's argument was clearer ("manifestius") on the matter than that of Avicenna.[21] Thus, the *STP* was read by scholars who were outside of the academe, but were nonetheless familiar with new intellectual authorities and were often capable of discussing the finer points of Algazel's arguments.

In addition to extending beyond the university, Algazel's audience became more diverse in the fourteenth century as the *STP* appears in several vernacular languages. As I have said in previous chapters, there is little evidence to suggest had Algazel had Latin readers in Spain during the Middle Ages, but fourteenth-century vernacular translations of the *STP* indicate that Algazel had a following on the Iberian Peninsula. Ramon Lull

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[19] Dante Alighieri, *Il Convivio*, ed. Cesare Vasali, *Opere minori*, Vol. 1, Pars 2. (Milan/Naples: Riccardi, 1988), II, xiii, 5 (p. 216); IV, xxi, 2 (p. 753).
[20] Ramon Llull, *Compendium logicae Algazelis*, ed. Charles Lohr, *Raimundus Lullus'' Compendium logicae Algazelis*. For the influence of Algazel on Llull, see Mark Johnson, *The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Lull* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 34-37 and Charles Lohr, "The Arabic Background to Ramon Lull's *Liber Chaos* (CA. 1285)," *Traditio* 55 (2000): 159-170.
[21] Robert of Anjou, *De visione beata*, ed. Marc Dykmans, *La vision bienheureuse: traité envoyé au pape Jean XXII* (Rome: Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1970), 62, 63, 65.

not only translated his own Latin version of the *Logica*, but he also composed a versified Catalan translation of the same chapter, *Logica del Gatzell*, in rhyming couplets.[22] Alonso discovered several manuscripts that contain lengthy passages of the *STP* in Castilian, which suggest that a Castilian translation may have existed.[23] Yet it was Jews, not Christians, who comprised the largest non-Latin audience in fourteenth-century Europe. Jewish scholars from northern Spain and southern France translated the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* three times from Arabic into Hebrew during the fourteenth century.[24] However, there seems to have been little or no interaction between Latin and Hebrew readers since the latter, having access to more works by Algazel, understood well his position regarding philosophy, but did not share this knowledge. The Hebrew audience appears to be distinct from that of Latin Christians, and thus they and their interests are beyond the scope of this study.[25]

Latin authors cited the *STP* in many of the same works between the thirteenth and fourteenth century, but as their interests shifted over this period, they began to place Algazel in a variety of different works. The number of philosophical treatises on the soul diminishes greatly with increased contact with Aristotle's *De anima* and Averroes' commentaries, and with increased interest in theories on the physiology of the soul put

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[22] Ramon Llull, *Logica del Gatzell*, ed. Jordi Rubio i Balaguer, *Ramon Llull i el Lullisme* (Monserat, 1985). See also chapter 1, note 65.
[23] Alonso, "Influencia de Algazel en el mundo latino," 374.
[24] Harvey, "Why Did Fourteenth-Century Jews Turn to Alghazali's Account of Natural Science?" 359-376.
[25] There is considerable work to be done on the Latin and Jewish readers of Arab philosophy. Alexander Fidora's research on the interaction between these communities at Toledo has brought attention to Hebrew translations of Dominicus Gundissalinus' *Tractatus de anima*. The use of this text over the next two centuries further emphasizes that Jewish philosophy had significant dealings with Latin philosophical trends. Fidora, "Religious Diversity and the Philosophical Translations of Twelfth-Century Toledo," 19-36.

forth by medical writers.[26] Likewise, large philosophical *summae* give way to commentaries on philosophical authorities as the primary activity of scholars at universities. The quotations of the *STP* shift along with these new interests and practices. While the presence of Algazel in commentaries on Aristotle had been well established in the thirteenth century, passages from the *STP* and citations of Algazel are common in commentaries on the *Sentences* in the fourteenth-century. Algazel also appears with greater frequency in *quodlibeta* and *quaestiones disputatae*. Later in the fourteenth century, scholars begin to write commentaries on the works of Aquinas, disputing and amending his arguments, and scholars often juxtapose the positions of Algazel with this new philosophical authority and saint.[27] Surprisingly, it is rare to find a reference to Algazel in commentaries on Albert's works, despite the fact that Albert was one of the most dedicated readers of the *STP*, but instead scholars juxtapose the two authors in a variety of other texts. [28]

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[26] Hasse gives several reasons for the declining use of Avicenna's *De anima*. Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* made the Philosopher's work more accessible, allowing Aristotle to challenge Avicenna's position as the primary philosophical authority on the soul in the thirteenth century. He also identifies a shift in intellectual interests away from the soul to the intellect. Hasse, *Avicenna's "De anima" in the Latin West*, 75-79.

[27] Algazel appears in a series of texts entitled "*Correctorium*" that both challenge and support Thomas's arguments. William of Macklefield, *Le Correctorium Corruptorii* '*Sciendum*,' ed. Palémon Glorieux (Paris: J. Vrin, 1956), Liber I, tract. II, art. I, 197; Q. de veritate, art. 1, 294. John of Paris, *Le correctorium corruptorii* '*Circa*,' ed. Jean Pierre Muller (Rome: Herder, 1941), *Metaphysica*, 2, 12, 35, 47, 60, 64, 65, 68, 71, 74, 75, 98, 106, 158, and 202; *Physica*, 71, 73, 160, 202, and 239. William de la Mare, *Le Correctorium Corruptorii* '*Quare*,' ed. Palémon Glorieux (Kain: Saulchoir, 1927), 211, 218, and 299. Rambert de Primadizzi de Bologne, *Apologeticum veritatis contra corruptionium*, ed. Jean Pierre Muller (Vatican City, 1943), 163, 167, and 168-169. Thomas de Vio, *In De ente et essentia divi Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria*, ed. M.H. Laurent, *Thomas de Vio Cardinalis Caietanus (1469-1534), Scripta philosophica: commentaria in praedicamenta Aristotelis* (Taurini: Marietti, 1934), 34, 40, 87, and 157.

[28] Scholars as early as the thirteenth century compare the arguments of Albert and Algazel. Vincent of Beauvais or more likely his continuators discuss the positions of Algazel and Albert in the *Speculum*

The use of the *STP* as a quotable authority changes to suit the interests of its fourteenth-century readership. That the *STP* became common in the public forum of the *quodlibet* indicates that scholars were expected to understand these references and be able to respond to them. More importantly, the increased presence of Algazel's arguments in the systematic textbook of theology, the *Sentences*, which provided a framework for theological debate for much of the Middle Ages, also suggests that the *STP* was a work that scholars discussed often both inside and outside of the university. Finally, quotations from the *STP* in commentaries on Aquinas illustrate how the place of Algazel matured alongside its audience. Algazel continued to function within the Latin tradition of Aristotelian philosophy as it began to generate its own authorities and refine their arguments.

The Fifteenth-Century Decline

The decline of the *STP*'s audience was not as swift as Alonso's list implies, but the work was losing its popularity among scholars by the fifteenth century. This downward trend in readership corresponds with the lack of manuscripts from late

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naturale on several occasions. Vincent of Beavais, *Speculum naturale*, Lib. XXV, c. 55, f. 309rb and c. 91, f. 312vb. This practice remains consistent into the fourteenth century: Radulfus Brito, *Quaestiones in Aristotelis Librum tertium De anima*, ed. Winfried Fauser, *Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu Buch III De anima* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1974), Q. 24.135, 281. Bartholomew of Bruges, *De sensu agente*, ed. Adrian Pattin, *Pour l'histoire du sens agent: La controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun ses antécédents et son évolution: étude et textes inédits* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1988), 72. James of Thérines, *Quodlibet I et II*, ed. Palémon Glorieux (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958): 272-273. John of Jandun, *Quaestiones super tres libros aristotelis de anima* (Venice, 1587; reprint Minerva, Frankfurt am Main, 1966) Lib. III, c. 22, 327. This practice would continue into the sixteenth century: Thomas de Vio, *In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria*, 222, 223. Agostino Nifo, *Agostino Nifo: De intellectu*, ed. Leen Spruit (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2011), 148, 372. Vincentius Quintianus Patina, *Eruditissimae dilucidationes trium librorum Aristotelis qui De anima* (Bologna, 1581), f. 230.

fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, though the reasons for the decline are not immediately obvious. The few scholars who did cite the *STP* continued to be university-trained and included notable figures such as John Gerson and Jan Hus. With the exception of Gerson, scholars with close connections to Paris and Oxford are no longer well-represented in the fifteenth-century audience, but instead the *STP* finds readers in smaller and newer universities at Padua, Cologne, and Prague. It appears that Algazel was read less and less by those at the institutions traditionally associated with scholastic thought and more by those on the periphery of the scholastic world, but the fifteenth-century evidence is too sparse to draw strong conclusions on this matter. It is more significant that no scholars associated with early humanism cite the *STP* in the fourteenth or fifteenth century. The failure to catch the attention of this new audience, more than any condemnation, offers a better explanation for the fifteenth-century decline of Algazel's audience.

The new list of Algazel's readers indicates that resistance to and condemnations of Aristotelian philosophy in the thirteenth century could be responsible for a decline that occurred more than a century later. There are also no comparable fourteenth-century condemnations that could account for this decline. The one exception is Nicholas Eymerich's *Directorium Inquisitorum*, a late fourteenth-century manual for inquisitors. Although the work condemns many of Algazel's arguments, Eymerich copied them verbatim from *De erroribus philosophorum*, along with the errors of Aristotle, Averroes,

Avicenna, al-Kindi and Maimonides.[29] Thus, the *Directorium Inquisitorum* should not be interpreted as renewed resistance to Aristotle and his Arab continuators. On the contrary, Algazel's presence in the *Directorium* demonstrates at the very least, an attempt to catalog previous literature on condemned Aristotelian teachings. Eymerich's inclusion of *De erroribus philosophorum* also implies that works by Arab philosophers were still being read in the late fourteenth century. At any rate, there is little evidence in the works of medieval scholars that condemnations of Algazel or Aristotelian philosophy in general were instrumental in the decline in the *STP*'s audience because scholars very rarely cited the Condemnation of 1277, *De erroribus philosophorum*, or Eymerich's *Directorium* to refute Algazel's arguments.[30]

There are several reasons for the decline in the citations of the *STP* in the fifteenth century and they are far less dramatic than the condemnations imply. First, it is likely that

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[29] Nicholas Eymerich, *Directorium Inquisitorum*, 238-241, see 239-240 for Algazel's errors. There is also good reason to believe that not all of Eymerich's readers seem to have agreed with his identification of the heresy in this case. The sixteenth-century commentator of the above edition of *Directorium*, Francisco Peña, writes a lengthy comment at the end of the section that contains the list of Algazel's heresies. In this comment, Peña explains that the pagan ("*gentiles*") philosophers discussed here cannot be heretics because they never claimed to adhere to the Catholic faith. See Peña's "Commentarium XXIX" in *Directorium Inquisitorum*, 241-242.

[30] While several earlier scholars appear to quote from the Condemnation of 1277 when discussing Algazel, they do not mention the edict by name. The earliest explicit references to this condemnation together with Algazel appears twice in the works of John Gerson more than century after the condemnation was issued: "Intellectus agens, secundum Avicennam et Algazel, erat primo Deus respectu primae intelligentiae, et secunda intelligentia respectu tertiae, et ita deinceps usque ad animam rationaelm quae habeat ultimam intelligentiam pro intellectu agente, aut forte plures, differendo in hoc a Commentatore, ita quod motum orbium causabant influentias corporeas in corpora et formas spirituales in animas, et hoc est articulus parisiensis merito damnatus." John Gerson, *Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii De coelesti hierachia*, ed. Palémon Glorieux, *Jean Gerson: Oeuvres Complètes*, 8 vols. (New York, Desclée, 1962): vol. 3, 210 (referring to perhaps errors 30, 65, or 74 in the Condemnation of 1277); "Contra hanc imaginationem est parisiensis articulus quamquam Avicenna et Algazel de beatitude intelligentiarum visi fuerint huius imaginationis extitisse." Idem, *Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii De coelesti hierachia*, 263; James of Thérines mentions Algazel and one of the errors condemned in 1277 in the same argument, but as different distinctions. James of Thérines, *Quodlibet I et II*, 98.

the *STP* outgrew its usefulness with scholars by the fifteenth century, which corresponds to the maturation of the Latin philosophical tradition during the Middle Ages. When the *STP* arrived in the early thirteenth century, scholars quoted it without mentioning the title or author because they were unsure of how the work's authority would be accepted by their colleagues, but by the middle of the century they regularly made reference to Algazel and chapters of the *STP*. For more than a century afterward, the work served as a compendium on Arab philosophy that helped elucidate the translations of Aristotle and his Arab commentators. Citations from the *STP* in Latin commentaries on Aristotle as well as in *quodlibeta* and commentaries on the *Sentences* testify to the work's utility in the thirteenth and fourteenth century. In the same period, Latins developed their own tradition and weaned themselves off of their Arab supports while preserving Aristotle as a seminal authority. Scholars continued to cite the *STP* in commentaries on Aquinas's works and regularly compared Algazel's arguments with those of Thomas and Albert, but Algazel and Arab philosophers in general were being replaced by Aristotle and newer Latin authorities. Hasse ascribes a similar fate to Avicenna's *De anima*, which previously had been more popular than Aristotle's *De anima*, only to lose its appeal in the wake of greater accessibility to Aristotle and Averroes' commentaries.[31] Since Algazel did not discuss Aristotle at length and did not have a connection to Averroes until a century later, the *STP* steadily lost ground as an authoritative text.

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[31] See note 26.

Algazel's decline also matches that of the scholastic endeavor at large, which loses much of its vigor during the fifteenth century. While the nature of scholasticism, as well as where and when it declined and survived is still much debated, scholars agree that the fifteenth century represents a low point in the scholastic project as alternative intellectual projects began to take shape in the form of the ethical and philological concerns of early Renaissance humanism.[32] The questions that preoccupied later scholastic thinkers, such as the arguments of Ockham and the mysticism of Eckhart, had little need to look to the *STP* for answers. Algazel is also noticeably absent from the works of the authors identified with early humanism. The *STP* and Arab philosophy in general could be seen as one of the first casualties of the retreat of scholasticism. Algazel would have died a natural death within the Latin tradition, rather than quick exit brought on by condemnations, if a second wave of translations and the printing press did not reinvigorate the study of Algazel and Arab philosophy.

The Sixteenth-Century Recovery

The increase in the number of citations of the *STP* in the sixteenth century is much easier to explain than the decrease during the previous century since it can be attributed to two events. The printing of the *STP* as the *Logica et philosophia Algazelis Arabis* in 1506 and again in 1536 at Venice allowed for a reinvigoration of the study of

[32] Many scholars begin the narrative of scholasticism's decline already in the fourteenth century. Gordon Leff, "The Fourteenth-Century and the Decline of Scholasticism," *Past and Present* 9 (1956): 30-41. John Marenbon identifies a slackening of original thought and intellectual energy at Paris and Oxford in the second half of the fourteenth century, despite developments in the field of logic. However, he cautions that the negative perception of philosophy during this later period is somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy that has allowed for a gap in modern historical knowledge. John Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy: An historical and philosophical introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 325-327, 349-351.

the *STP* throughout Latin Christendom. Also, the rediscovery and subsequent printing of Averroes' *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* by Agostino Nifo at Venice in 1497 and a revised edition printed in 1527, known in Latin as the *Destructio destructionum philosophiae Algazelis*, allowed scholars to read passages of Algazel's work that accurately reflected his attitude toward philosophy.[33] Both of these printings at Venice, where the study of Algazel seems to have continued unabated, were part of a larger second revelation of Arab philosophy that occurred in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[34] Despite the renewed interest, the new printed editions and their sixteenth-century audience represent a break from the medieval readership of Algazel.

Agostino Nifo's printing of the *Destructio* had the potential to destroy the medieval image of Algazel and replace it with a newer figure who was closer to the Arab understanding of al-Ghazali. As a refutation the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, Averroes' *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* contained large excerpts from al-Ghazali's work which contradicted many of the positions discussed in the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*. Nifo was not the translator of the *Tahāfut al-tahāfut*, but rather he popularized an existing text. The *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* had been translated into Latin already in the fourteenth century by a Jewish scholar Calo

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[33] Agostino Nifo, *In librum Destructio destructionum Averrois commentarium*. For more information on the translation, the various editions, and their circulation, see Zedler, *Averroes'* '*Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis,'* 18-31

[34] Wolfson, "The Twice-Revealed Averroes," 373-392. Charles Burnett, "The Second Revelation of Arabic Philosophy and Science," ed. Charles Burnett and Anna Contadini, *Islam and the Italian Renaissance* (London: Warburg Institute Publications, 1999), 185–198.

Calonymos at the request of Robert of Anjou.[35] However, Robert and Latin Christendom paid little attention to the work and failed to notice the differences between the Algazel of the *STP* and that of the *Destructio* for almost two centuries.[36] Nifo printed the *Destructio* with his commentary, but his edition is defective in places and lacks the last chapters. The poor quality of Nifo's edition and the distraction of his commentary on the work, which was already a refutation of a refutation, prompted another Jewish scholar, also named Calonymos, to fashion a new edition in 1527 that was printed several times throughout the sixteenth century.[37] Additionally, Nifo quoted from both the *STP* and the *Destructio* in his *De intellectu*, presenting dissimilar arguments by the same person.[38] By presenting a very different version of his philosophy, these three works threatened to replace a medieval vision of Algazel that had endured for three centuries.

The printing of the *Logica et philosophia Algazelis Arabis* correlates with this increase in readers, but there is some evidence which points to its role as a cause. Many sixteenth-century scholars continue the previous practice of referencing the chapters of Algazel's work (i.e. "in sua metaphysica"). Given that medieval readers viewed the

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[35] Calonymos, a Jewish scholar from Arles, reports that he completed his translation of the Averroes's *Tahafut al-tahafut* on April 18, 1328, which had been commissioned by Robert of Anjou. Zedler, *Averroes'* '*Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis*,' 24.

[36] Only Pietro del Monte (c. 1400-1456), a Venetian legal scholar, mentioned the difference between these two conflicting figures of Algazel before the printing of the *Destructio*: "Quod si Algazel sedit quandoque super thalamo irreligiosorum philosophorum cognita alia maiori veritate surrexit et inde abiit." Pietro del Monte, *De unius legis veritate et sectarum falsitate opus* (Venice, 1509), Lib. II, c. xcxiii.

[37] Nifo's edition of the *Destructio* was printed by Bonetus Locatellus with his commentary. It was reprinted in 1517, 1529, and 1542 in Lyons. Calo Calonymos, a Jewish scholar working in Venice, noticed the poor quality of Nifo's edition, which was missing two of the disputations on metaphysics and four of the disputations on phyiscs. Calo set out to print a better edition in 1527, which was reprinted in 1550, 1560, and 1573. Zedler, *Averroes'* '*Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis*,' 26-29.

[38] Agostino Nifo, *De intellectu libri sex* (Venice, 1503). I refer to the modern edition later in the chapter by Leen Spruit, ed., *Agostino Nifo: De intellectu* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

Logica as a separate work from the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, references by sixteenth-century authors to Algazel's "*Logica et philosophia*" suggests that they were citing the print edition and not a manuscript copy.[39] However, the citations of Algazel in sixteenth-century works also indicate that, apart from Nifo, few, if any, scholars read the *STP* and the *Destructio* together, and thus the old perception of Algazel as Avicenna's follower and abbreviator was able to endure.[40]

This audience appears to be quite different from that of previous centuries. The easy access to Algazel's arguments provided by the printing of the *STP* brought about decisive changes in Algazel's readership and the works that possess citations of the *STP*. The sixteenth-century audience defies categorization and transcends both the university and languages as easy divisions. References to Algazel appear in German, French, and Italian texts as well as works by Catholics and Protestants with disparate levels of education and humanist leanings.[41] The genres of texts that possess quotations from the

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[39] "Cum, ut ait Algazel anima humana habeat duas facies unam erectam ad superiora speculanda, reliquam inclinatam ad corpus regendum tract[atus] [quintus] in logica et philosophia." Antonio Polo Veneti, *Abbreviatio veritatis animae rationalis* (Venice, 1578), f. 180.

[40] In addition to the widespread and continuous practice of citing Avicenna and Algazel together, scholars occasionally describe Algazel as Avicenna's adherent in several ways. "Algazel Avicennam praeceptorem sequens..." Francesco Romeo, *De libertate operum et necessitate* (1538), f. 224. "Ad Avicennam et Algazelem dico quod nihil contradicunt..." Thomas de Vio, *In De ente et essentia Divi Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria*, f. 40. Even Nifo refers to Algazel as Avicenna's abbreviator: "Avicenna et suus abbreviator Algazel de intellectu agente et possibili eodem modo loquuntur." Agostino Nifo, *De intellectu*, 398.

[41] The majority of the sixteenth-century authors who cite the *STP* were Catholic, but a few references to Algazel in the work of Protestant authors indicates that the audience of Arab philosophy was not divided along sectarian lines. These Protestant authors also were more likely to discuss Algazel in the vernacular. The Italian Protestant Girolamo Zanchi mentions Algazel in his *De natura dei seu de divinis attributis libri V* (1577), Lib. I, c. XV, f. 52. Kaspar Franck was born a Lutheran before converting to Catholicism later in life. He included Algazel in his list of heretics of the Catholic faith in *Catalogus hereticorum* and *Chronica*, both of which were written in German. Kaspar Franck, *Catalogus Haereticorum* (Ignolstadt, 1576), f. 23 and Sebastian Franck, *Chronica, Zeitbuch und Geschichtbibell* (Ulm, 1536), f. 77. French Protestant

STP are also hard to typify. The *quodlibeta* and commentaries on Aristotle and the *Sentences* produced by sixteenth-century authors rarely contain quotations from the *STP*, though later Thomists continue to mention Algazel in their commentaries on Aquinas' works.[42] Instead, Algazel appears in a much wider variety of works than in previous centuries. Expositors of "hidden" philosophies and the cabbalistic arts as well as defenders of Catholic dogma quote from the *STP*, though for very different reasons.[43] Algazel appears even in a sixteenth-century Dominican's sermon notes on the subject of hell.[44]

The sixteenth-century audience differed from previous readers of Algazel in two important ways. For the first time, a sizeable group of Latin scholars was exposed to Algazel's criticism of the Arab tradition of Aristotelian philosophy, but the revelation did not subvert the established perception of Algazel. Also, the relative silence of the fifteenth-century audience combined with the proliferation of copies of the *STP* in the

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Philippe de Mornay discussed Algazel in his French work *De la verité de la religion chrestienne* (Paris, 1585), c. IX, f. 107 and c. XVII, f. 247. Catholic authors also mentioned Algazel in their vernacular works. Federico Pellegrini cites Algazel's discussion of the separation of the soul from the active intellect in his Italian treatise *Conversione del peccatore overo riforma della mala vita dell'huomo* (Venice, 1591), f. 393.

[42] Later Thomists, particularly Spanish Jesuits, who commented on Aquinas' works continued to cite Algazel in their works, often in passages where Aquinas had not discussed Algazel. In addition to Thomas de Vio, Francisco Suarez, Domingo Bañez. Francisco Murcia de la Llana, and Francisco de Toledo call attention to Algazel in their Latin and Spanish commentaries on Aquinas' works

[43] The Hebraist and Cabbalist scholar Johann Reuchlin mentioned Algazel in his *De arte cabalistica* (1530), f. 2v, which was frequently copied in later works on the same subject. See Pietro Colonna Galatino, Opus de arcanis catholicae veritatis, (Basel, 1561), 435. Johann Pistorius the Younger, *De arte cabalista* (Basel, 1587), 613. Defenders of Catholic doctrine also make reference to the *STP*. Algazel also appears in the *Malleus Maleficarum* along with Avicenna on the matter of fascination. Jacob Sprenger and Heinrich Institoris, *Malleus Maleficarum*, ed. Christopher Mackay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 231. The *Malleus* also discusses the enchanter's power to throw a camel into a pit on p. 238, which appears to be anonymous reference to Algazel's discussion of the same in *Algazel's Metaphysics, 194.* See also note 87.

[44] Johann Aquilanus, *Sermones quadragesimales*, Feria tertia, Dominica undecima, Sermo XXVIII: *De inferno* (Venice, 1576), 344-363, especially 346.

sixteenth century allowed for a new, disparate group of readers to emerge with novel ideas about Algazel and the application of his ideas to their own works. To understand newness of the later audience and their interests, we must look at the medieval perceptions of Algazel and how they changed over three centuries.

Perceptions of Algazel

Historians have long held that the *STP* was one of the works through which Latin scholars came to understand the Arab tradition of Aristotelian philosophy.[45] However, there has been little discussion regarding the Latin perception of its author. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the *STP* arrived in Latin Christendom with little description of the identity of Algazel, and scribes were left to decide where the work should fit in the wider canon. The best source of information, the explanatory prologue, was almost non-existent in Latin. There are few transliterated Arabic works and no Islamic invocations in the *STP*. The translator Dominicus also failed to mention Algazel in his own works despite including several extensive quotations from the *STP*. Thus, neither Algazel nor his translator provided much information as to his identity, and scholars were left to construct an image of Algazel just as the scribes had to decide where to place the *STP* within the wider Latin canon.

The image they constructed had three elements that lasted throughout the Middle Ages: Algazel's identity as an Arab, his position as a follower of Avicenna, and his

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[45] Etienne Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augistinisme avicennisant," *AHDLMA* 4 (1929): 5-129, particularly 74-79. Salman, "Algazel et les Latins," 110. Dario Cabanelas, "Notas para la historia de Algazel de España," *Al-Andalus* 17 (1953): 223-232. Alonso, "Influencia de Algazel en el mundo latino," 371-380. Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 230.

membership within a wider group of Peripatetic philosophers. While it is important to point out how distorted this image truly was, previous scholarship has been so focused on this case of mistaken identity that no one has systematically treated how scholars described Algazel beyond his position as Avicenna's abbreviator. If we step back from how wrong Latins were about Algazel and look at the other adjectives applied to the author of the *STP*, we find that the perception of Algazel changed several times over the period of three centuries. The first scholars to read the *STP* in the thirteenth century received Algazel as a new authority and some occasionally referred to him as one of the "modern" philosophers. During the fourteenth century, Algazel lost his novelty and moved gradually from a new to an old or ancient philosopher alongside the Greeks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Algazel's religion also became more of an issue in later centuries. Thirteenth- and fourteenth-centuries scholars considered Algazel to be an Arab whose religious leanings were not explicitly stated. Readers of the *STP* did not emphasize or perhaps realize his Muslim identity until much later, and his errors, which early readers considered to be philosophically incorrect, gradually became theologically dangerous heresies in the eyes of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century scholars.

The Consistent Image of Algazel

"Arabs," "sequax Avicennae," and "Peripateticus" were the most consistent adjectives applied to the figure of Algazel during the Middle Ages. "Arabs" was used regularly by early authors like Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great as well as by later

authors such as Denis the Carthusian and Agostino Nifo.[46] The term is ambiguous because it could carry geographical, ethnic, and linguistic connotations, but it does not have a strong religious distinction for Latin scholars since there were Arab Christians in Spain and the Middle East. For this reason, Algazel was never mistaken for a Latin or Greek, but his religion appears to have been unclear since he was occasionally called a Jew or a Christian.[47] However, there is no explicit reference to Algazel's Muslim identity until the fifteenth century. In addition to his distinctly non-Latin name, scholars appear to have concluded that Algazel was an Arab through one or more channels despite the aforementioned lack of information about him. It is probable that scribes were the party most responsible for spreading this information. Several incipits and explicits in manuscripts mention Dominicus' translation work from Arabic into Latin. [48] As I argued

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[46] "Algazel enim Latinus non fuit, sed Arabs." Thomas Aquinus, *De unitate intellectus*, c. 5, p. 119. "Et hoc probat Avicenna et Alpharabius et Algazel et omnes Arabes sic." Albert the Great, *De praedicabilibus*, ed. A Borgnet, *Beati Alberti Magni Ratisbonensis episcopi Ordinis Praedicatorum opera omnia* I (Paris: Vivès, 1890), Tract. IV, c. III, f. 41, col. 1. "Quod ergo ex his accipimus est positio media, quam Avicenna, Algazel et Constabel et alii Arabes dixerunt..." Agostino Nifo, *De intellectu*, 381. "Denique Avicenna et Algazel Arabes philosophi in contemplatione beatitudinem hominis statuerunt." Denis the Carthusian, *Contra Alchoranum et sectam Machometicam Libri* (Cologne, 1533). Lib. I, f. 93.

[47] A few anonymous authors regarded Algazel as a Jew in the thirteenth century. Rene Antoine Gauthier, "Trois commentaires 'averroistes' sur l'Ethique a Nicomaque," *AHDLMA* 16 (1947-48): 187-336, specifically 260, 281, 283. The anonymous author of the *Summa philosophiae* places Algazel among the Arabic-speaking Christians. "A tempore autem Heraclii imperatoris, quo gens Arabum per Machometum arabem pseudoqueprophetam seducta etiam Romano imperio distenso paulatimque serpendo Aegyptum Africamque nec non et Hispaniarum partem Galliarum subegit, in gente illa praeclarissimi philosophi extiterunt, videlicet Avicenna, Alfarabius....Ceteri vero Christiani: Plato Tiburtinus, Costa ben Lucae, Algazel et Gundissalinus, Constantinus, Theophilus Macer ac Philaretus." Pseudo-Grosseteste, *Summa philosophiae*, ed. Ludwig Baur, *BGPhTM* 1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1912), c. 6, 279.

[48] "Liber philosophie Algazer translatus a magistro Dominico archiacono Sedobiensi apud Toletum ex arabico in latinum," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 43r. "Incipit liber Algazel de summa theoricae philosophiae translatus a magistro Iohanne et Dominico archidiacono in Toleto de arabico in latinum," Assisi 633, f. 146r. "Incipit liber Algazelis de summa theorice phylosophe translatus a magistro Iohanne et D[ominico] archdiacono in Toleto de arabico in latinum," BAV Ott. lat. 2186, f. 1r. This same rubric in Ott. lat. 2186 can also be found on f. 1r of BNM lat. 2546.

in the previous chapter, early scribes established that Algazel's place in the canon was alongside Arab philosophers and compiled their works together. Most authors who cited Algazel were likely reading the *STP* in a manuscript that also contained other Arabs' works and thus Algazel likely became an Arab by association. Moreover, a few transliterated Arabic words appear in the text of the *STP* and gave readers hints about the author's background.[49] Algazel's identity as an Arab seems to have been well-established among scribes and authors in the thirteenth century and "Arabs" continued to be the most common adjective used to describe him.

The practice of compiling the *STP* with the works of Avicenna allowed scholars to discover the close relationship between the two philosophers. Authors introduced Algazel with a variety of terms to indicate Algazel's position as one who summarized Avicenna's large philosophical corpus and agreed with many of his teachings. Albert the Great and William of Ockham stressed Algazel's position as Avicenna's "sequax."[50] Henry of Ghent called Algazel an "expositor" of Avicenna.[51] The author of *De erroribus philosophorum*, Dietrich of Freiburg, John of Jandun, Agostino Nifo, and even Albert were more specific and described Algazel as Avicenna's "abbreviator."[52] The frequent

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[49] "azucaro" Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 33:19, "alcotoni" 158:6; "fard"35:25.
[50] Albert the Great, *Liber de natura et origine animae*, ed. Bernhard Geyer and Ephrem Filthaut, *AMOO* XII (Münster, Aschendorff, 1955), tr. II, c. 3, p. 23, 63; Albert also referred to Algazel as Avicenna's in "insecutor." Idem, *Metaphysica*, *AMOO* VII, lib. 3, tr. 3, c. 9; 219:40. William of Ockham, *Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, ed, Rega Wood, *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica*, Vol. 5 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y, St. Bonaventure University, 1985), lib. 8, c. 1, 705.
[51] Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, ed. Raymond Macken, *Henrici de Gandavo Opera omnia*, Volume 13 (Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1983), Q. 8, 177.
[52] Giles of Rome (dub.), *Errores philosophorum*, 38. Dietrich of Freiburg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch, *Opera Omnia:* Vol. 1 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1977) L. I, c. 11, 144. Agostino Nifo,

citation of these two philosophers together, almost as inseparable collaborators, reinforces the Algazel's connection to Avicenna even when these titles do not appear.

These terms could suggest that scholars considered Algazel to be an unoriginal disciple of Avicenna, whose work was inferior to the voluminous texts of the latter. Historians[53] who make this case cite a statement by Albert the Great about Algazel's similarity to Avicenna: "Algazel says the same thing [as Avicenna] in his *Metaphysica* because Algazel's judgments are nothing but an abbreviation of Avicenna's judgments."[54] While this claim could be read as an indictment of Algazel's work, Albert's overall use of the *STP* provides a counterargument. In fact, no author mentioned Algazel more than Albert, who cited him by name one-hundred and fifty times—more than a third of which do not mention Avicenna—and often quoted the *STP* without crediting the author.[55] Given Albert's proclivity for quoting from the *STP*, the above statement should not imply that Albert is degrading Algazel's arguments. Moreover, there is significant evidence that scholars respected Algazel's arguments even in relation to those of Avicenna. Not all of the titles implied inferiority on Algazel's part. Peter of

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De intellectu, 398. Albert the Great, *De generatione et corruptione*, ed. Paul Hossfeld, *AMOO* 5.2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1980), tr. VI, c. IX, f. 44, col. 1. Even scribes referred to Algazel as Avicenna's "abbreviator:" See BNM lat. 2665, f. 110r.

[53] Salman cites this quotation from Albert as "unflattering" assessment of Algazel. Salman, "Algazel et les latins," 106. Other scholars come to similar conclusions. See Hasse, *Avicenna's "De anima" in the Latin West*, 63. Janssens, "al-Ġazālīʾs *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, Latin translation of," 389.

[54] "Idem omnino dicit Algazel in sua Metaphysica, quia dicta Algazelis non nisi abbreviatio dictorum Avicenna." Albert the Great, *De homine*, ed. Henryk Anzulewicz, *AMOO* 2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2008), q. 55, a. 3, 462.

[55] Alonso lists 148 citations of Algazel by Albert and I have found considerably more. The more recent editions of Albert's works reveal that he copied a considerable amount from the *STP* without mentioning a source or author for these ideas. See Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxix-xxxiii and Appendix 6.

Abano referred Algazel as Avicenna's "colleague," indicating a degree of parity between the two, while Agostino Nifo went so far as to call him Avicenna's "subtle and insightful colleague."[56] More importantly, the endurance of the connection between Algazel and Avicenna raises a question: why would scholars choose to refer to the two authors together if it was widely understood that one was clearly better? If Avicenna was superior in the minds of medieval scholars, Algazel should quickly fall into disuse, but this is not the case during the Middle Ages.

There are several explanations for the continued use of Algazel despite his apparent subservience to Avicenna. On a practical level, medieval authors wanted their readers to understand and access the references that they used in their works. However, they could not expect their readers to have all of Avicenna's work available to them. The citation of Avicenna's works and the corresponding chapters in the work of his abbreviator Algazel allows for a greater number of readers to find these arguments and understand their meaning. From the reader's perspective, the *STP* could be quite valuable as an abbreviation of Avicenna since most scholars in Latin Christendom could be not expected to read, let alone recall, all of Avicenna. Much of the translation movement and the later growth of its readership were driven by the need and desire for different approaches and often short summaries of Aristotelian philosophy. Furthermore, Algazel was not the only Arab philosopher to be given these titles. Even Avicenna was referred to

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[56] "Avicenna maxime de anima 4 et Algazel ipsius collega volentes..." Peter of Abano, *Conciliator controversiam quae inter philosophos et medicos versantur* (Venice, 1565), Differentia XXXVII, f. 56v, col. 2G. "Item, Algazel Avicennae collega subtilis ac profundus..." Agostino Nifo, *De intellectu*, 303

as Aristotle's "sequax" and Aquinas mentions that Avicenna and Algazel have "sequaces."[57] Roger Bacon, who was one of the few Latins to read the *STP*'s prologue, described Avicenna and Algazel as "recitatores non auctores" and chastised scholars for ascribing ideas to the authors that they did not endorse.[58] In addition, Averroes' moniker of "The Commentator" hardly disparages his relationship to Aristotle "The Philosopher." To assume that these titles degrade Arab authors misrepresents the medieval understanding of authority and the scholastic project in general since the primary activity of medieval philosophers was to be commentators, expositors, and abbreviators of the texts of others. For these reasons, the titles are best understood to describe the relationship between Algazel and Avicenna rather than imply the inferiority of Algazel.

The title of "Peripateticus" appears with less frequency than the other two, but it is prevalent enough to indicate that scholars closely associated Algazel with the Aristotelian tradition. In addition to Thomas and Albert, Siger of Brabant, Matthew of Aquasparta, and Agostino Nifo call attention to Algazel's membership in the wider

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[57] "...ex quibus fuit Aristoteles, et sequaces eius, videlicet Alpharabius, Algaxel (sic), et Avicenna, et plures alii qui post eum et per eum forsitan a via veritatis in parta ista deviaverunt." William of Auvergne. *De anima* (Paris, 1674) c. 5, pars secunda, f. 112b. "Aristoteles autem et sui sequaces, ut Avicenna et Algazel, posuerunt quidem non unam animam totius caeli vel mundi." Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de anima*, ed. A. J. Gondras, "Les *Quaestiones de anima* VI, manuscrit de la Bibliothèque communale d'Assise n° 159, attribuées à Matthieu d'Acquasparta," *AHDLMA* 24 (1957): 203-352 (295). "Et ideo alii dixerunt, scilicet Avicenna et Algazel, et sequaces eorum, quod Deus cognoscit singularia universaliter; quod sic exponunt per exemplum." Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros sententiarum*, ed. Pierre Mandonnet and Marie Fabien Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-1947), lib. 1, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1.

[58] "Et hoc omnino considerandum est pro libris qui Avicenne ascribuntur et Algazeli, quoniam eis non sunt ascribendi nisi tanquam recitatoribus non auctoribus, sicut ipsemet volunt in prologis illorum librorum." Roger Bacon, *Communium naturalium*, ed. Robert Steele, *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi* (Clarendon, Oxford University Press, 1920), Fasc. 3, 249.

Peripatetic tradition.[59] Again, trends in manuscript compilation likely were responsible for the early connection between Peripatetic philosophy and Algazel since scribes frequently paired the *STP* with works by Aristotle and Aristotelian commentaries. The three references to Aristotle in the *STP* also provide clues to the reader that Algazel is in dialogue with the wider Aristotelian corpus.[60] The close association of Algazel, as well as other Arab philosophers, to Aristotle may have contributed to the silence over Algazel's religious affiliation as some scholars may have assumed that he adhered to Aristotle's philosophical paganism rather than to Islam.

While these descriptors appear to be consistent throughout the Middle Ages, they leave much to be desired regarding the attitudes of scholars toward Algazel. "Arabs" indicated a linguistic, geographical or ethnic distinction, but reveals little about whether scholars viewed Algazel as something positive or new. "Sequax Avicennae" and "Peripateticus" are also quite bland, indicating only Algazel's relationship to other philosophers and intellectual trends. However, there are also other telling adjectives that scholars applied to Algazel over the period of three centuries that give us a better picture of Latin perceptions of the *STP* and its author.

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[59] "quod antiquiores Peripateci ut dicunt Alfarabius et Algazel in quinque modis." Albert the Great, *De praedicabilibus*, tr. I, c. V, f. 6, col. 2. "Et hoc est quod dicunt Algazel et Avicenna et omnes Peripatetici," Siger of Brabant, *Questiones super Physicam*, ed. Ferdinand van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites*, *Les philosophes Belges*, Vol. 12 (Louvain, 1931), Lib. I, q. 37, 188. "maxime Aristotelis et eius sequacium sive peripateticorum; nam et substantias et intelligentias separatas eos appellant, sicut Aristoteles, II *Metaphysicae*, et Avicenna et Algazel, omnino a materia et a corpore immunes," Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de anima*, 235. "His acceptis ac perfecte expositis scientia omnium Peripateticorum est, ut Alexandri, Themistii, Simplicii, Averrois, Avicenna, Algazelis, Alpharabii, Avempace et omnium antiquorum." Agostino Nifo, *De intellectu*, 571.
[60] See Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 85:25, 141:2, and 154:25.

The Early Identity of Algazel

Medieval scholars might not have been wholly certain about the identity of Algazel beyond his qualities as an Arab and follower of Avicenna and Aristotle, especially when the *STP* first arrived in Latin Christendom. However, they understood that Arab philosophy in general represented something new. The notion that Arabs possessed something novel in their philosophy was present already in the twelfth century and perhaps compelled some to seek knowledge at the edges of Christendom as translators of Arab texts. Adelard of Bath applied the term "modern" to the ideas he gleaned from his Arabic studies and, as I mentioned above, he was careful to clarify that he was simply relaying arguments that did not necessarily reflect his own opinions.[61] While Adelard implied that modern ideas were to be praised, the terms "modern" could also be used in a pejorative sense and medieval scholars did not universally accept that new doctrines were always beneficial.[62] Despite the possible negative connotations of novelty and modernity, twelfth- and thirteenth-century scholars often expressed admiration for the Arabs and the fresh approach that their ideas brought the study of various disciplines.[63]

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[61] Adelard of Bath often juxtaposed the 'ancients' and the 'moderns' in his works and he seems to have been keenly aware that being 'modern' was not often a positive quality. See note 14 above.

[62] Adelard's near contemporary Alan of Lille referred to the "unsophistication of the moderns"("ruditatem modernorum") in the prologue of his *Anticlaudianus*. Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus*, ed. Robert Bossuat (Paris, J. Vrin: 1955), 55.

[63] Like Adelard Daniel of Morley, voiced dismay at the type of hidebound study and slavish reliance on authority that he found in England and Paris, which prompted him to travel to Toledo in search of the learning of the Arabs. While he does not describe them expressly as moderns, he speaks of Arab scholars as a necessary remedy for the stale methods of Latin philosophers. Daniel of Morley, *Philosophia*, ed. Gregor Maurach, *Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch* 14 (1979), 204-255. Despite Daniel's unequivocal praise of the Arabs, Burnett has discovered that there is surprisingly little material in Daniel's *Philosophia* that can be

There is some evidence that thirteenth-century scholars counted Algazel among the newer philosophers. When introducing his commentary on *De somno et vigilia*, Albert the Great explains his approach to Aristotle and his reliance on new authors for help in interpretation.

> Since we possess a book of Aristotle on that science [*De animalibus*] we follow him in the same way we follow him in other works, making digressions from it whenever something imperfect or an unclear statement appears, dividing a work by books, treatises, and chapters, as we have done in others works. Having omitted the works of some moderns, we follow only the positions of the Peripatetics and particularly Avicenna, Averroes, al-Farabi, and Algazel, whose books we consider to be in agreement on this matter. We also will touch sometimes on the opinion of Galen and others. [64]

Albert judiciously decides to limit his reference material for the study of this Aristotelian work to the more recent Peripatetics, which comprises translated Arab authors including Algazel, while he uses sparingly the older authors like Galen. He uses similar language to describe Algazel's place on the philosophical continuum in his *De causis et processu universitatis* by juxtaposing the positions of "antiquos Peripateticos" (Theophrastus, Porphyry, and Themistius) with those of "posteriores" such as Avicenna, Algazel, and al-Farabi.[65] For this influential Dominican teacher, Algazel occupies a position among the new continuators of Aristotle.

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attributed to Arab scholars, which raises questions about the nature of Daniel's experience in Toledo. Charles Burnett, "The Introduction of Arabic Learning into British Schools," ed. Charles Butterworth, *The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy Into Europe* (New York : E.J. Brill, 1994), 40-57 (49).

[64] "Quia vero librum Aristotelis de scientia ista habemus, sequemur eum eo modo quo secuti sumus eum aliis, facientes digressiones ab ipso ubicumque videbitur aliquid imperfectum vel obscurum dictum, dividentes opus per libros et tractatus et capitula, ut in aliis fecimus. Nos autem omissis operibus quorumdam modernorum sequemur tantum Peripateticorum sentencias et praecipue Avicennae, et Averrois et Alpharabi et Algazelis, quorum libros de hac materia vidimus concordantes; tangemus etiam quandoque opinionem Galeni, etcetera."Albert the Great, *Liber de somno et vigilia*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia* IX (Paris, 1890) tr. I, c. I, f. 65, col. 1.

[65] "Si autem quaerimus exemplum huius, quo aliqualiter manifestari possit tanta subtilitas, dicendum, quod ab antiquis Peripateticis, Theophrasto scilicet et Porphyrio et Themistio et a posterioribus, Avicenna scilicet

Algazel also appears as a new philosopher in the enigmatic thirteenth-century work *Summa philosophia*, which was attributed to Robert Grosseteste, but now appears to be the work of another English scholar from the late thirteenth century.[66] The author divides philosophers into temporal categories, beginning with Plato, Aristotle, and their contemporaries, followed by a group of Greek and Roman philosophers up to the time of the Arabs, and ending with the "famous Arab, Spanish, and other philosophers who are either contemporary or the Latins who succeeded them."[67] The author proceeds to give an extensive register of Arab authors, but further subdivides the list into Muslims, Christians, and Jews.[68] Oddly enough, Algazel does not appear with the Muslim philosophers, but among the Christians and is closely associated with his translator

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et Algazele et Alfarabio, quoddam inter cetera convenientius exemplum positum est." Albert the Great, *Liber de causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, tr. II, c. VII, 32. Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 67:3-70:17; 175:3-22.

[66] The evidence of Grosseteste's authorship are mostly circumstantial. One of the three manuscripts has a cryptic couplet that refers to the year of Grosseteste's death, followed by a "Robertus G." In addition to Grossesteste, historians have attributed this work to Roger Bacon or one of his disciples, Bartholomew of Bologna, and Robert Kilwardby. Charles McKeon, *A Study of the 'Summa philosophiae' of Pseudo-Grosseteste* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948): 7-13, 22-23.

[67] "De philosophis magis famosis arabis vel hispanis et aliis eis vel contemporaneis vel succedentibus etiam Latinis." Pseudo-Grosseteste, *Summa philosophiae*, 279. The list misplaces the Jewish scholars Ibn Gabirol and, shockingly, Isaac Israeli among the Muslims. It is also worth noting that the author identifies Gundissalinus as an Arab or a Spaniard rather than as a Latin, implying that his work as a Latin translator of Arab works supersedes his position as Latin author. See note 68 below.

[68] "A tempore autem Heraclii imperatoris, quo gens Arabum per Machometum arabem pseudoqueprophetam seducta etiam Romano imperio distenso paulatimque serpendo Aegyptum Africamque nec non et Hispaniarum partem Galliarum subegit, in gente illa praeclarissimi philosophi extiterunt, videlicet Avicenna, Alfarabius, Alguegi, Avempache, Avencebrol, Alkindi, Averroës peripatetici; mathematici vero Albumazar, Arzachel, Albategni, Thebit, Avennalperi, Avennarcha, Alfraganus vel correctius Affarcus, Iulius Firmicus; medici autem Isaac, Haly, Almanzor, qui et Rasi dicitur, horumque certissimus supradictus Avicenna, qui medicam completissimus omnium edidit. Ceteri vero Christiani: Plato Tiburtinus, Costa ben Lucae, Algazel et Gundissalinus, Constantinus, Theophilus Macer ac Philaretus. Hebraei vero utrique Rabbi Moyses quorum tamen posterior conversus egregium volumen pro fide contra Iudaeos scripsit." Pseudo-Grosseteste, *Summa philosophiae*, 279-280.

Dominicus. He concludes the chapter and his timeline with the names of notable Latin philosophers, including Alfred of Shareshill, Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great.

> There are many other men of exceptional philosophy, and although we examine their philosophy, nevertheless we either do not know their names or leave them unsaid without cause. Yet, we reflect upon John the Peripatetic [??] and Alfred [of Shareshill] and more modern scholars ["moderniores"], the Franciscan Alexander [of Hales] and the Dominican Albert of Cologne, judging them to be exceptional philosophers, but not holding them as authorities.[69]

The author of the *Summa philosophiae* is keen to demonstrate his knowldge of the most recent Latin philosophers of the thirteenth century, but he also illustrates the wariness of medieval scholars toward most modern thinkers as authorities. However, it should be noted that he offers no such disclaimer about the authority of Arabs that he has mentioned previously. Thus, on the timeline proposed by the author of the *Summa philosophiae*, Algazel and Arab scholars stand near the end of a historical continuum and thus are among the modern philosophers, but they are not so new that their authority is not yet recognized and established.

Like their twelfth-century counterparts who translated Arabic works or travelled to Toledo for translations, thirteenth-century scholars described Arab philosophy as something new, though inextricably connected to the Aristotelian tradition, and Algazel was no exception. Albert and his contemporaries regarded both Greek and Arab philosophers as Peripatetics, they recognized that Algazel and other Arabs offered new insights that were distinct from ideas of Aristotle, even if they owed many of their

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[69] "Sunt et alii quam plures eximiae philosophiae viri, quorum etsi philosophiam inspeximus, nomina tamen ignoramus vel non sine reticemus, quamquam et Iohannem peripateticum et Alfredum modernioresque Alexandrum minorem atque Albertum Coloniensem praedicatorem philosophos eximios censendos reputemus, nec tamen pro auctoritatibus habendos." Pseudo-Grosseteste, *Summa philosophiae*, 280.

premises to the Philosopher. The author of the *Summa philosophiae* envisions even more temporal distinctions within the philosophical pantheon, separating Plato and Aristotle from later Greek philosophers. He makes contemporaries of Arab and Latin philosophers of previous centuries and connects the period of the Arabs to present age. In this way, thirteenth-century scholars were able to express how the scholarship of previous generations of philosophers related to their own. However, this quality of newness associated with Algazel and Arab philosophers could be lost over time while Aristotle seems to have been ageless during the Middle Ages.

The Middle Age of Algazel

While there is some evidence to suggest that scholars considered Algazel to be a new philosopher, there is much more evidence of his maturity within the Latin tradition. The association of Algazel and Arab philosophy in general with new scholarship appears to have lasted through the thirteenth century, but begins to show signs of age in the fourteenth century. The English Dominican Thomas of Sutton made a distinction between modern scholars and Algazel while struggling with the notion of whether Aristotle argued for the existence of single intellect or a multiplicity of intellects.

> It must be said that what the Philosopher thought on this matter cannot be known, that is, whether there are multiple intellects, or whether it is inconsistent for infinite souls to exist in reality or not (just as Algazel said that it is inconsistent), because not only moderns, but even those commentators of Aristotle, as is clear from Averroes and Algazel, say that the Philosopher thought in a variety of ways. But however this matter was considered in the mind of the Philosopher, it must be realized, truly and certainly, that the generation of persons, just as of other things, had a beginning in time, and that souls are multiplied by [the number of] bodies and are finite.[70]

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[70] "Dicendum quod non potest sciri quid Philosophus senserit in hac materia: utrum, scilicet, intellectus multiplicenter vel non, nec utrum sit inconveniens infinitas animas esse in actu vel non, sicut Algazel dixit

Though Thomas of Sutton acknowledges that Algazel remains an authority along with Averroes on the interpretation of Aristotle, he implies that Algazel is not to be counted as one of the modern interpreters. Another fourteenth-century Dominican scholar, Nicholas of Strasbourg, offers a similar appraisal of Algazel's position on the continuum between modern and ancient.

> It must be known that, although the opinions of earlier philosophers concerning the making of a substantial form, that is, that [opinion] of Anaxagoras on the hiding of forms and that of Plato, Avicenna, and Algazel on the introduction of forms by external and separate agents, is rejected and refuted commonly by all in the modern age, nevertheless some are quite particular to one of those [opinions]...but only novices hold on to that position. [71]

Again, Algazel is an authority whose opinions belong to an indeterminate earlier age and some of his positions are dismissed by existing scholars. Despite this rejection, Nicholas is quite familiar with Algazel and expects other scholars to understand his allusion to Algazel's position on forms. This passing reference reinforces that the *STP* has lost its modern quality, but it also complicates the question of Algazel's relevance in later centuries. Nicholas rejects Algazel's position on the role of external agents, but he admits

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quod non est inconveniens, quia non solum moderni dicunt Philosophum diversimode sensisse, sed etiam ipsi expositores Aristotelis, ut patet de Averois et Algazel. Sed quomodocumque sit de mente Philosophi hoc pro vero et pro certo tenendum est quod generatio hominum, sicut et aliarum rerum, habuit initium temporis et quod anime sunt multiplicate per corpora et sunt finite." Thomas of Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae*, ed. D. E. Sharp, "Thomas of Sutton, O. P.: His Place in Scholasticism and an Account of his Psychology," *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie* 36 n.41 (1934): 332-354, 342. Here Sutton is referring to the sixth division of being (finite and infinite) in the first treatise of the *Metaphysica* (Algazel*, Algazel's Metaphysics*, 40-41).

[71] "Propter quartum sciendum, quod, quamvis opiniones philosophorum priorum de formae substantialis productione, ut scilicet illa Anaxagorae de latitatione formarum et illa Platonis et Avicennae et Algazel de introductione formarum ab agentibus extrinsecis et separatis, quantum ad modum positionis ab omnibus communiter moderni temporis respuantur et refutentur...sed tantum incohantiones in ipsa habere." Nicholas of Strasbourg, *Summa*, ed. Gianfranco Pellegrino, *Nikolaus von Strassburg, Summa, vol. 1: Liber 2, Tractatus 1-2* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2009), 10. (Algazel*, Algazel's Metaphysics*, 16-19).

there are still some who cling to these erroneous positions. However, he feels the need to mention Algazel's position even though most scholars do not adhere to it. The wrongness of Algazel's arguments does not preclude Thomas of Sutton or Nicholas of Strasbourg from citing the *STP*, and while Algazel's arguments may not be as novel or effective as they once were, it is clear that he is still part of the Latin philosophical tradition and that Algazel remained a topic of conversation among fourteenth-century scholars.

There are other indications that the use of Algazel was maturing within a developing Latin program of Aristotelian philosophy. Previous generations in the thirteenth century had compared the arguments of Arabs with those of Aristotle and Greek philosophers. However, the Latin philosophers cited by thirteenth-century scholars were few and did not extend much beyond Augustine or Boethius. Yet the growing familiarity with Aristotle and his Arab commentators in the thirteenth century allowed for some Latin authors to join these luminaries and become quotable authorities on Aristotle. Around the fourteenth-century, scholars began to juxtapose the arguments of new Latin authorities with the older corpus of Aristotelian works including the *STP*. John of Paris (d. 1306) believes he sees the thought of Algazel at work in chapter 52 of Book II of Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, though Aquinas makes no mention of Algazel here.[72]

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[72] "Item Thomas, Contra Gentiles, lib. II, cap. 52, in ultimo argumento dicit quod 'esse competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam, et ideo non convenit aliis nisi per modum participationis, sicut calor aliis corporibus ab igne.' Hoc idem dicit Algazel, a quo forsan frater Thomas accepit dictum suum." John of Paris, *Quaestio de unitate esse et essentiae*, ed. Palémon Glorieux, "Jean Quidort et la distinction réelle de l'essence et de l'existence," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médievale* 18 (1951): 151-157 (156-157). John also connects the arguments of Algazel and Aquinas elsewhere in his rebuttal to the charges brought against Aquinas, but he does not cite a specific work by Aquinas. See article 6 in John of Paris, John of Paris, *Le correctorium corruptorii* '*Circa*,' 47.

While disputing the eternity of the world, William of Alnwick (d. 1333) reiterates Duns Scotus' rejection of Avicenna's and Algazel's arguments before addressing the question of whether Aristotle believed the world to be eternal.[73] Fourteenth-century authors regularly compared the arguments of Algazel with those of Albert the Great.[74] The practice of connecting the thought of Thomas, Albert, and other Latin philosophers with Algazel persisted into the next two centuries as Aristotelian thought in Latin Christendom continued to evolve.

Algazel aged within the Latin philosophical canon in the fourteenth century to become a recognized authority whose arguments were continually debated and compared with those of more recent scholars. There appears to be no decline in readership from the thirteenth to the fourteenth century since number of scholars who cite Algazel from each period are roughly equal. What is different in the evidence from the thirteenth to the fourteenth century is the volume of references to Algazel by individual authors. Albert quotes from the *STP* more than one-hundred and fifty times, followed by Roger Bacon and Thomas Aquinas.[75] Authors of the fourteenth century might be forgiven for not being as prolific as these three, and thus a decrease in the volume of citations per author is perhaps understandable. Still, it is difficult to find a fourteenth-century philosopher of note who did not cite the *STP*, either extensively or in passing, since many notable

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[73] William of Alnwick, "Determinationes," ed. Athanasius Ledoux, *Fr. Guillelmi Alnwick O.F.M. Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de quodlibet* (Florence, 1937), xxx-xxxi. Ledoux found a list of disputed questions by William entitled "Determinationum" in a single manuscript, which he did not edit, but instead provided a redacted version in the preface of this larger work.
[74] See note 28.
[75] See Appendix 6 and Alonso, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, xxviii-xxxiv.

scholars mentioned Algazel, including John of Jandun, William of Ockham, Nicole Oresme, and Marsilius of Inghen. However, the decline in the audience of the *STP* can be detected by the end of the fourteenth century, though it is not as sharp as Alonso's list implies. The decline manifests itself in fifteenth century along with radical changes to scholars' views of Algazel.

Algazel the Ancient Saracen and Heretic

The late fifteenth and early sixteenth century was a watershed moment in the study of Algazel. The printing of the *STP* placed Algazel in the hands of many more scholars and the printing of the *Destructio destructionum Algazelis Arabis* had the potential to dismantle an image of Algazel that had endured for three centuries, but the old view of Algazel as "sequax Avicennae" survived. Although scholars did not embrace wholly the Algazel that appeared in the *Destructio*, his identity underwent profound temporal and religious transformations. Later writers counted Algazel as an ancient and often made him indistinguishable from Greeks. Algazel's religion also became increasingly important as scholars began to identity him as a Muslim and, ironically, as a heretic. While previous generations had been content to point out Algazel's flaws as philosophical errors, sixteenth-century scholars considered Algazel's ideas to be a threat to faith as well as reason.

Algazel enjoyed a sort of middle-age within the Latin Aristotelian corpus during the fourteenth and much of fifteenth century, in which his thought was neither new nor old. It was not until the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that scholars placed Algazel among the ancients. The early sixteenth-century Dominican Thomas de Vio, better

known as Cajetan, was one of the first to place Algazel in the past: "This opinion seems to have come from the old [philosophers] ("antiquis"), that is, Plato, al-Farabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Boethius, Hilarius, Albert [the Great], and their followers..."[76] Unlike the author of the *Summa philosophiae*, who is meticulous, though sometimes incorrect in his categorization, Cajetan makes no distinctions between Greek, Latin or Arab, but collapses space and time so that Algazel is an "old" philosopher alongside Plato and Albert. Jacopo Nacchiante, likewise distances Algazel from the current age when he discusses the history of the idea of the eternal prime mover, saying that this notion preoccupied scholars such as Algazel, Isaac Israeli, and Moses Maimonides, "who were (fuerunt) most wise in their time."[77] Thus, Algazel possessed a wisdom that occupied another age and now belongs the completed past. The philosopher Antonio Persio (d. 1612) offers a similar list of *antiqui philosophi* in which Algazel appears as the penultimate figure.[78] Serafino Capponi also calls Algazel an ancient in his commentary on Aquinas' *Summa theologicae*.[79] In the space of three centuries, Algazel had gone from

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[76] "Videtur etiam haec opinio ab antiquis derivata, Platone scilicet Alpharabio, Avicenna, Algazele, Boetio, Hilario, Alberto, et eorum sequacibus, licet ab Aristotele nihil manifesti in hac re habeamus..." Thomas de Vio, *In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria*, f. 157.

[77] "qui suo tempore fuerunt sapientissimi" Jacopo Nacchiante, *Theoremata Metaphysica sexdecim et Naturalia duodecim* (Venice, 1567), "De infinitate primi motoris," Q. 4, f. 169.

[78] "Quorum nomina nimirum antiquorum ut animam quorundam explerem, qui difficiliores ad credendum sunt; magna ex parte recensebo, hi sunt...ex Arabis, Avicenna Algazel, Avempates." Antonio Persio, *Liber novarum positionum in rhetoricis, dialecticis, ethicis, iure civili, iure pontificio, physicis* (Venice, 1575), f. 223.

[79] "Caeterum et rationem ampliorem et damnationem per Ecclesiam factam contra Algazelem vide infra, q. 21 art. 2. Pro nunc sufficiat audite Directorium ipsum universaliter damnantum sic: Antiqui philosophi etcetera Algazel multos errores et haereses contra fidem sanctam nostram posuerunt, quod patet prosequendo ut sequitur. Et postea inter alios recitat sententiam Algazel supradictam 4 vides: quomodo vicisim ex his firmentur conclusiones." Seraphino Capponi, *Elucidationes formales totius Summae Theologiae sancti Thomae* (Venice, 1588), Q. XIV, Art. XVI f. 18.

a novel authority alongside his Arab colleagues to be counted as an ancient philosopher with Greeks who had been dead for more than a millennium.

Algazel's identity as a Muslim philosopher became an important issue slightly earlier than his new identity as an ancient. The first scholar to make this distinction was the fifteenth-century theologian Denis the Carthusian, who discussed Algazel in philosophical works and a polemical text against Islam. When discussing various philosophical positions on the disposition of Hell in his *Liber de quatuor hominis novissimis*, Denis groups Algazel with other adherents to the Qur'an.

> The infernal place is without measure, deep without bottom, full of incomparable fire, incredible pain, and unending punishment....On this matter, a consecrated [monk] asserted in his treatise *De quatuor novissimis* that Averroes the Commentator said: "In the infernal place there is continuous sadness and grief without comfort." Yet it is well known among those learned in philosophy that Averroes did not say this, for he was, at first, from the law of the Muhammad, just as Avicenna and Algazel, but later he abandoned the law of the most wicked Muhammad on account of the most blatant falsities that are contained in the Qur'an.[80]

While Averroes rejected Muhammad's law, Algazel and Avicenna were life-long Muslims. Denis approves of the faithfulness of Algazel and Avicenna since Averroes also rejected the laws of Christ and Moses and "fell into many very serious errors," while the former are not singled out for any discussion of their errors.[81] However, Denis observes

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[80] "Infernus locus est sine mensura, profundus sine fundo, plenus ardore incomparabili, dolore innarrabili, ac poena interminabili. Ad quod quidam devotus in suo Tractatu de quatuor novissimis, allegat Averrois commentatorem dicentem: 'In inferno continua est tristitia, et moeror sine consolatione. Veruntamen bene eruditis in Philosophia constat, quod Averrois hoc non dicat. Fuit enim primo de lege Mahumeti, quemadmodum Avicenna et Algazel. Postmodum vero legem impiissimi Mahumeti reliquit, propter apertissimas falsitates, quae in Alchorano continentur." Denis the Carthusian, *Liber utilissimus de quatuor hominis novissimis* (Cologne, 1579), *De dispositione loci infernalis*, art. XLIII, f. 200-201. The "devotus" mentioned is Gerhard von Vliederhoven in *Das cordiale de quatuor novissimis*.

[81] "Sprevit quoque legem Christi, propter multa incomprehensibilia et supernaturalia, quae in evangelica lege habentur. Similiter vituperavit et Moysi legem, volens esse naturali lege contentus; sicque iusto Dei

some tension between Muhammad and Muslim philosophers, especially in the matters of bodily pleasure and the nature of the afterlife.

> This teaching of Muhammad is so very fixed that it cannot be accepted in any way except by carnal persons. Our holy doctors bring forth many and various most subtle rationales against those arguments, which I pass over for the sake of brevity. In the first treatise above, I already proved from the scriptures of the Old and New Testament that beatitude in no way resides in those carnal delights, but in the clear and fruitful vision of the divine essence by man. Indeed, Arab philosophers Avicenna and Algazel placed the beatitude of man in contemplation, but Muhammad was given to wild and ugly sensualities more than the philosopher Epicurus, who all the later, better philosophers deride.[82]

Denis utilizes an old rationale developed by members of the translation movement to explain the dissonance between the wisdom of Arab philosophers and the carnality of Muhammad's law. The translator Mark of Toledo posited that Muslim philosophers were not true followers of Muhammad, but rather paid lip service to the religion to allay suspicions.[83] Denis suggests that Algazel and Avicenna might not be the best Muslims given their theological disagreement with what Denis believes are the practices of

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iudicio permissus est cadere in multos errors gravissimos." Denis the Carthusian, *De quatuor hominis novissimis*, f. 201.

[82] Haec autem Mahon doctrina talis certissime est, ut nequaquam nisi a carnalibus credi possit hominibus. Ad ista probanda sancti doctores nostri multas adducunt et alias subtilissimas rationes, quas brevitati studens dimitto. In primo quoque libello iam supra ex scripturis novi ac veteris testamenti probavi, que nequaque in carnalibus illis deliciis, sed in clara ac fruitura divinae essentia visione homine beatitudo consistat. Denique Avicenna et Algazel Arabes philosophi in contemplatione beatitudinem hominis statuerunt. At vero Machometus magis rudis, turpis, carnalisque fuit, quam Epicurus philosophus, quem omnes posteriores meliores philosophi deriserunt." Denis the Carthusian, *Contra Alchoranum et sectam Machometicam libri*, Lib. I, f. 93.

[83] When the preface to his translation of *De unione Dei* by Ibn Tumart, Mark of Toledo argues that the work is esteemed by many philosophers on account of its reasoning and not its use of the Qur'an. In fact, the author is only nominally a Muslim who only places quotations from the Qur'an in his work on account of social convention: "maioris ponderis sunt apud discretos uiros et prudentes argumenta et persuasiones quas Habentometus [Ibn Tumart] induxit in libello Vnionis quam uerba Mafemeti in Alchorano...quoniam quidem hic Habentometus necessariis innixus assertionibus ad probandum unum Deum esse primum et nouissimum, suam bene fundauit intentionem; et reprehenditur tamen a nonnullis sapientibus in eo quod licet unum Deum esseque unam essentiam rationibus probat efficacissimis, inserit tamen auctoritates Alchorani; et de ipso credatur quod purus fuerit Maurus, cum in nullam crediderit legem, utpote philosophus Algazelis didasculus." Mark of Toledo, *De unione Dei*, ed. Marie-Thérèse D'Alverny and George Vajda. "Marc de Tolède, traducteur d'Ibn Tumart," *Al-Andalus* 16 (1951):99-140, 259-307 (269).

Muhammad's law. Yet he identifies Algazel as a Muslim nonetheless and is the first medieval scholar to stress this aspect of Algazel's identity.

References to Algazel's affiliation with Islam become more common in the sixteenth century as the *STP* regains its popularity. Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa associates Algazel with "Mahomistae philosophi" in his *De occulta philosophia*.[84] Pietro Colonna Galatino also refers to Algazel as a follower of Muhammad in his popular *De arcanis catholicae veritatis*.[85] Algazel was even recognized as a Saracen in vernacular texts by Spanish Thomists and French Protestants alike.[86] It is unclear why Algazel's affiliation with Islam became an important matter in the sixteenth century or how scholars deduced that Algazel was a Muslim since writers in previous centuries were either ambivalent or unaware of his religion. The *Destructio* likely played a role in this regard since it contains more references to Islamic concepts and Arabic words than the *STP*. However, Algazel's quality as a philosopher did not suffer in the eyes of sixteenth-century scholars because of his Muslim identity. It is possible that they possessed a view similar to that of Denis the Carthusian and other writers who made a distinction between the universally-reviled

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[84]"et Algazel in libro de scientia divina, caeterique; Arabes et Mahomistae philosophi, sentiunt quod operationes animae coniuncto corpori communes, imprimunt in animam usus et exercitii characterem..." Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, *De occulta philosophia libri tres*, ed. Vittoria Perrone (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), Lib. 3, f. 424.

[85] "Non ignoravit Algazel Marrane tuus, ille Mahumetista hos sibi contrarios in anima motus sursum et deorsum homini docto quam infelicissimos fore, cum in libro de scientia divina demonstrat, quod ex contrarietate huiuscemodi attrahentium impressionum fit cruciatus in anima fortissimus et maxime formidolosus." Pietro Colonna Galatino, *Opus de arcanis catholicae veritatis* (Basel, 1550), f. 441.

[86] "por lo qual dixo aquel illustre Sarraceno de Algazel que quando naturaleza llego a la composicion del hombre..." Juan de Pineda, *Historia maravillosa de la vida y excelencias de S. Juan Baptista* (Medina del Campo, 1604), Liber Segundo, Articulo Tercero, capitulo III, f. 106v. "Que le Monde a esté creé de Dieu, voire de rien, et Algazel Sarrazin contra Averroes...," Phillip de Mornay, *De la verité de la religion chrestienne*, c. 9, f. 107.

Muhammad and Muslim philosophers, who were good philosophers and therefore reluctant Muslims.

Sixteenth-century scholars were far more concerned with what they saw as Algazel's heretical teachings than his Muslim identity. This charge not only represents a shift from previous views of Algazel, but it also alters the nature of heresy itself since no medieval author considered Algazel to be a Christian, aside from the author of the *Summa philosophiae*, and therefore he could not apostatize. Medieval scholars instead referred to the faults in Algazel's arguments as philosophical "errors." These errors could have theological implications and, as the Condemnation of 1277 demonstrated, those who chose to teach them could be threatened with excommunication, but the errors were not heretical by themselves. Only Nicholas Eymerich identified the flaws in Algazel's arguments in his *Directorium Inquisitorum* intermittently as "heresies" and "errors, but no other medieval author categorized Algazel as a heretic.[87]

The distinction between error and heresy in Algazel's teachings appear to break down early in the sixteenth-century. The German theologian Konrad Wimpina (d. 1531) composes the longest and most detailed list of Algazel's errors, which he often describes as contrary to the Christian faith as well as reason.[88] Serafino Capponi drew directly from Eymerich when discussing Algazel's heresies, some of which he believes are doubly

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[87] Nicholas Eymerich, *Directorium Inquisitorum* , f. 238 and note 28.

[88] "Quibus haec quae de Algazelis erramentis perhibuimus liquent; et quamquam philosophis se quadrent in naturae lumine quaeque rimantibus, tamen a fidei veritate dissonant, quo perhibetur in lumine videri lumen: hoc est nequaquam per naturam sed per gratiam nos sublumine gloriae contingere beatifici obiecti visionem. Konrad Wimpina, *In libros de sex sophorum erramentis*, ed. Johannes Sotorem, *Farrago miscellaneorum* (Cologne, 1531), Lib. II, c. 12, f. 128r. "Sed nequaquam assentit Christiana fides praedictis nec consonat Peripatetica doctrina illis..." Idem, Lib. II, c. 14, f. 129r.

damned by the *Directorium* and Holy Scripture.[89] Also, Algazel's name begins to appear in alphabetical Latin and vernacular indexes of heretics in the sixteenth century among more serious offenders such as Arius, Albigensians, Anabaptists, and Arnold of Villanova.[90] These catalogers chose not to interpret all of Algazel's errors as heresies, but rather focused on Algazel's interpretation of the punishment of wicked souls as merely the separation from the active intellect. However, a telling distinction between medieval and renaissance mindsets arises in these brief entries. All of them cite the same chapter in Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles* (Lib. 3, c. 45) as proof of the heretical nature of this teaching. Though Aquinas refutes this teaching in this chapter, he does not mention Algazel nor does he call the argument heretical.[91] Thus, later writers saw heresy in the

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[89] "Ex articulo habes primo quomodo per rationem interimas haeresim Averrois et Algazel (Direct[orium] inquis[itorum] 2 par[s] Q. 4 blasphemantium): quod Deus non cognoscit singularia in propria forma. Haec ex seipsa haeresim adduximus etiam supra ar[ticulo] 6 quia et contra illum articulum pugnabat in alio quodammodo sensu inquantum s[cilicet] res non cognosci a deo propria cognitione, continet secundo habes: quomodo per rationem offendas, hanc merito damnari ibi a Directorio universaliter, sic: Antiqui philosophi ut etc. Averroes Algazel multos errores et haereses contra sanctam fidem nostram posuerunt, ut patet prosequendo ut infram et particulariter damnari a psal[mo] 138." Serafino Capponi, *Elucidationes Summae Theologiae*, Q. XIV, Art. XI, f. 17.

[90] "Algazel. 27: de hoc haeretico divus Thomas lib. 3, contra gent. Cap. 45 scribit illum in hac fuisse haeresi, ut affereret, hanc solam poenam reddi peccatoribus, quod pro amissione ultimi finis affligerentur contra illud Concilii Florentini decretum agentes, quod ita habet: Diffinimus, illorum animas, qui post baptisma susceptum nullam omnino peccati maculam incurrerunt, illas etiam quae post contractam peccati maculam, vel in suis corporibus, vel eisdem exutae corporibus sunt purgatae, in caelum mox recipi, et intueri clare ipsum Dominum trinum et unum, sicuti est, pro meritorum tamen diversitate, alium alio perfectius: illorum autem animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato, vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, poenis tamen disparibus puniendas." Gabriel du Préau, *De vitis, sectis et dogmatibus omnium haereticorum elenchus alphabeticus* (Cologne: Calenius & Quentel, 1569), 21-22; "Algazel hanc seminauit haeresim, quod pro peccato redderetur poena, quod pro amissione ultimi finis affligerentur animę. Ut D[ivus]. Tho[mas]. ait 3. cont[ra]. Gent[iles].Paolo Grisaldi, *Decisiones fidei catholicae et apostolicae* (Venice, 1587), f. 44. See also Kaspar Franck's citations of Algazel in note 40 above.

[91] Chapter 45 treats specifically "Quod non possumus in hac vita intelligere substantias separatas," but Algazel is curiously absent among those philosophers cited by Aquinas. Instead, he mentions Themistius, Averroes, and Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, *TAOO* XV, Lib. 3, c. 45.

teachings of Arab philosophers where their medieval counterparts did not and believed that their medieval predecessors considered these teachings to be heretical as well.

Conclusion

Alonso's admittedly incomplete list of scholars who cited the *STP* gives the impression that Algazel's tenure within the Latin tradition was quite brief, encompassing the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Thus, historians were correct in searching for signs of decline in the late thirteenth century and arguing for the condemnations as the reason for the work's decline. By testing Alonso's hypothesis that more citations of Algazel might be found in the works of later medieval scholars, I discovered evidence that compels a revision of the narrative of Algazel's audience that can be summarized in four points. First and most importantly, there is little indication that the citation of the *STP* disappeared in the fourteenth century since just as many or perhaps more authors cited the *STP* in the fourteenth century than in the thirteenth century. Algazel's audience is also far from static. The majority of Algazel's early readers in the thirteenth century came from the universities—a trend that would continue throughout these four centuries, but the fourteenth-century audience shows more diversity and includes scholars who were not trained at university and wrote in vernacular languages. Scholars began to read elements of the *STP* in Catalan and Spanish, and references to Algazel appear in a variety of languages by the sixteenth century. The endurance and diversity of the scholars who cite the *STP* indicate that knowledge of Algazel was more widespread than previous studies have shown.

Secondly, a decline in the citations of the *STP* occurs during the fifteenth century, but it was short lived and is more complicated than Alonso's list suggests. The decline

begins in the late fourteenth century and becomes more pronounced in the fifteenth. The deterioration of Algazel's usefulness might be symptomatic of the fate of Arab philosophy generally in Latin Christendom. There is also a marked decline in the citation of other Arab authors who do not directly discuss the works of Aristotle while commentaries of Averroes remain in use. Both the degeneration of the scholastic audience, which had borrowed extensively from Arab philosophy, and the rise of humanism, which had little use for the Arab tradition in its return to classical philology and philosophical emphasis on ethics rather than metaphysics, played a likely role in the decline of Algazel's influence. However, any assessment about the extent of this decline must be moderated by the increase in the citations of the *STP* in the sixteenth century. The printing of the *STP* made Algazel more accessible to readers and the *Destructio* enhanced interest in Algazel, but these incidents do not explain why scholars began citing the *STP* again after a century of relative silence. It is possible that Algazel was cited by more late fourteenth- and fifteenth-century authors whose works have not been edited since this period traditionally has not been as popular among medieval or Renaissance scholars. At the very least, knowledge of Algazel did not disappear during the fifteenth century to the point that later scholars needed to be reintroduced to the *STP*.

Third, the use of the *STP* changed along with Latin intellectual trends. One reason why scholars were able to pick up the *STP* so quickly again in the sixteenth century is because earlier authors frequently cited referenced Algazel in works that were essential to the development of the Latin philosophical tradition. The *STP* had been translated as part of a larger project to understand Aristotelian philosophy and scholars as early as the

thirteenth century dutifully quoted Algazel's arguments and debated their merits in commentaries on the works of Aristotle. Yet scholars also found quotations from the *STP* to be useful in their discussions on the nature of the soul, commentaries on the *Sentences*, and later on the works of Thomas Aquinas. Later authors had to continuously refresh their knowledge of the *STP* as they came across references to Algazel made by Thomas, Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, and a host of new Latin authorities on philosophy. In this way, the fate of Algazel was uniquely tied to the scholastic project since the continuous referencing of the *STP* in authoritative texts kept Algazel current within the Latin philosophical tradition. Rather than a quick disappearance brought about by condemnations, the use of the *STP* grew, matured, and declined with the intellectual system that fostered it.

Finally, the perception of Algazel also transformed in important ways, but the changes were most drastic between the readers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Only the image of Algazel as an Arab remained constant, since the printing of the *Destructio* at the end of the fifteenth century allowed some scholars to reexamine the notion that Algazel was a follower of Avicenna and Aristotle. Algazel was able to age gracefully within the Latin canon, enjoying an identity as a modern in the thirteenth century and a period of middle age in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in which he was neither new nor old. It was only in the sixteenth century when scholars called him an ancient. Also, medieval scholars seem unaware of or unphased by Algazel's religion, while sixteenth-century scholars point out his adherence to Islam. In spite of the thirteenth-century condemnations, medieval scholars were consistent in maintaining a

distinction between philosophical error and theological heresy when discussing Algazel's arguments. This distinction begins to blur with Nicholas Eymerich in the late fourteenth century, but it disappears in the sixteenth century when Algazel appears in several lists of heretics. These changes illustrate the differences in how medieval and Renaissance audiences viewed the image of Algazel. Later scholars stressed the elements that distanced Algazel from the present and the orthodox by identifying him as an antique philosopher, indistinguishable from the Greeks, as well as a Muslim or a heretic. Conversely, earlier scholars distinguished between Arab and Greek philosophers, and were more inclusive in that they discussed Algazel's errors without the charges of heterodoxy. This changing image of Algazel reinforces the dynamic nature of Algazel and *STP* within the Latin tradition.

In addition to Alonso's suggestion that there might be more readers of the *STP*, there is an unfinished task that is implicit in Alonso's list. Alonso recorded where citations of Algazel and quotations from the *STP* could be found in the works of Latin writers, but he did not cross-reference these quotations in Latin works with the corresponding passages in *STP*. Cataloguing which quotations were used most frequently will demonstrate which passages were the most popular with Latin scholars. The next two chapters will discuss which passages were quoted most frequently by scholars and will compare these findings with which sections that received the most annotations from the readers of the forty manuscript copies of the *STP*. Together these two sets of evidence allow for a more complete understanding of how and why Algazel was read.

CHAPTER IV: POPULAR PASSAGES IN THE *STP*

Quotations from Algazel are scattered across the works of medieval philosophers and annotations from readers litter manuscript copies of the *STP*. Yet scholars did not treat all of the work equally and some parts were cited and glossed more frequently than others. Previous historians have hypothesized about the attractions of the *STP*, but no one has systematically addressed which parts were the most popular.[1] In an effort to establish some criteria to determine popularity, the next two chapters examine two sets of evidence from scholars who read the *STP*. The current chapter builds on the previous one by studying the first set of evidence: the chapters or sections that were cited most frequently by scholars in their own work. The second set of evidence consists of annotations to manuscript copies of the *STP* left by generations of readers, and is the subject of the fifth chapter. By comparing which passages were quoted and annotated most often, these two chapters allow for a better understanding of what medieval scholars were looking for when they read Algazel and how these interests fit within the wider medieval philosophical milieu.

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[1] Alonso's list demonstrates how many scholars read the *STP*, but it gives little information as to which parts were the most popular. While Alonso was aware of Muckle's edition, he does not cross-reference the citations of Latin authors with the corresponding passages in the *STP* except in the case of Matthew of Aquasparta. Alonso, *Maqasid*, xxxv. Lohr lists topics that the *STP* could address for scholars ("the division of the sciences, the distinction of essence and existence, the procession or all things from the One, the eternity of the world and the number of souls, the doctrine of the two faces of the soul.") and where they appear in a handful of scholars' works, but he gives no criteria for why these were popular or if some were cited more than others. Lohr, "Logica Algazelis," 230. Janssen describes which doctrinal concepts were unique to the *STP* (the "dator formarum" and an example of "fascinatio" or the evil eye) and therefore most useful to medieval scholars who would not find them elsewhere, but this approach illustrates novelty rather than popularity. Janssens, "al-Ġazālīʾs *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, Latin translation of" 389.

The two sets of evidence, citations and annotations, appear unevenly matched at first glance. One scholar's use of quotations from the *STP* can be compared with that of his contemporaries to illustrate the common concerns of the period and with that of later scholars to demonstrate changing interests. For these reasons, historians have established working groups and have written monographs on how medieval luminaries read Arabic philosophers.[2] Marginalia suffer by comparison because they are harder to contextualize. While annotations similarly serve as evidence of reading, they are often the product of anonymous scholars whose intentions and education cannot be known. Unlike quotations used by known authors, anonymous notes are difficult to date and are not easily compared or connected to wider intellectual trends. Despite the limitations of annotations as evidence, however, they are almost ubiquitous in manuscripts since the reading and glossing of a select number of authoritative works represent an essential activity in the Middle Ages. Only a small percentage of medieval scholars composed their own works and even fewer wrote texts that were not commentaries, but all were readers and most of them occasionally left traces of their reading behind in manuscripts. In light of this medieval reality regarding reading and writing, John Dagenais proposes that more attention should be paid to annotations, or "lecturature," not only because of their ubiquity, but because "marginalia (and interlinealia) help us to measure the pace of

[2] There has been considerable effort to decipher Thomas Aquinas' use of Arab philosophers. The "Aquinas and the Arabs" working group at Marquette University has been in operation since 2005. Aquinas is also the only author whose use of Algazel has been studied in detail. See Hanley, "St. Thomas' Use of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*."

medieval reading, the places where it starts and stops, refers, expands, takes note."[3] In addition to being plentiful, annotations provide a more immediate glimpse than citations into the searching, finding, and reacting that comprise the practice of reading. Thus, the two sets of evidence in these two chapters offer complimentary approaches to assessing which passages of the *STP* were popular with medieval scholars.

Before describing the passages, it is important to address what constitutes popularity among the citations since medieval citation practices vary widely. Some scholars copy discrete passages from the *STP*, complete with the title of the chapter and section numbers. Others are less complete in their citations, mentioning Algazel's name and leaving the reader to decipher which passage was meant, or they include Algazel in a list of philosophers whose arguments were similar on a particular point. Still others copy passages from the *STP* with no mention of the work or author. While it is not possible to pair every appearance of the name of Algazel with a specific passage, I counted those citations that could be located either by using the references supplied by the authors or by searching for a corresponding passage or close paraphrase in the *STP*. One-hundred and forty authors discuss many parts of the *STP*, but five passages attracted the attention of between twenty and twenty-eight scholars, or fifteen to twenty percent of the total number surveyed: the divisions within philosophy (Introduction to the *Metaphysica*), the existence of an infinite number of souls (*Metaphysica*, tr. 1, section 6), the issuing of all things from the First Principle (*Metaphysica*, tr. 5), the Giver of Forms (*Physica*, tr. 4, ch.

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[3] Dagenais, *The Ethics of Manuscript Culture*, 27, see also p. 20-29 for his discussion of "lecturature."

5), and the role of the Agent Intellect in human souls (*Physica*, tr. 5). The first two passages are often quoted because they raised useful discussions about the organization of the sciences or arguments about the concept of infinity. However, the last three gained recognition from the dangerous errors that they contained, all of which appear in condemnations of Aristotelian and Arab philosophy. Thus, the most popular passages of the *STP* are divided along the lines of licit and illicit.

***Division of the Sciences* (*Metaphysica*, tr. 1)**

The beginning of the *Metaphysica* contains an organizational structure for the sciences that interested many scholars, particularly those of the thirteenth century. Algazel first divides the sciences into two branches: active, the study of things that exist through human action, and speculative, the study of things that exist outside of human action.[4] He subdivides each branch into three groups of sciences. The active sciences treat how to govern others, a household, and oneself.[5] Algazel abruptly abandons the

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[4] "Sine dubio igitur cognitio sapientie dividitur in duo; quorum unum est quod facit scire dispositiones nostrorum operum et vocatur sciencia activa; cuius utilitas est cognoscere per eam maneries actionum agendarum, per quas proveniant utilia nobis in hoc mundo, et certificatur nostra spes de vita eterna. Alterum est quo cognoscuntur disposiciones omnium que sunt; ad hoc ut describatur in animabus nostris forma universi esse secundum ordinem suum sicut describitur forma visibilis in speculo; huiusmodi autem descripcio in nostris animabus est perfectio ipsarum, quoniam aptitudo anime ad recipiendum ea proprietas est ipsius anime." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 1-2.

[5] Activa enim dividitur in tria; quorum unum est scientia disponendi conversationem suam cum omnibus hominibus; homo enim est creatura quam necesse est conversari cum hominibus, quod non potest sibi bene ordinari ita ut utile sit ei in hoc mundo, et in futuro nisi secundum modum proprium; huius autem scientie radix est scientia fidei. Sed perfectio eius sunt sciencie disposicionum que necessarie sunt ad regendas civitates et cives earum. Secundum est sciencia disponendi domum propriam per quam cognoscitur qualiter sibi vivendum sit cum uxore, et filiis, et servis, et cum omnibus domesticis suis; tercium est scientia moralis qua cognoscitur qualis in se debeat esse homo scilicet castus, et utilis in suis moribus, et proprietatibus, et quoniam omnis homo vel est solus, vel admixtus aliis; admixtio autem vel est proprie cum domesticis sue domus, vel communiter cum concivibus; idcirco hec scientia secundum has tres disposiciones dividitur in tria sine dubio." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 2.

active sciences and focuses instead on the speculative, which are the divine science or metaphysics, mathematics, and the natural science or physics, explaining that they are divided according to their relationship to matter. His first definition of metaphysics is quite literal since he describes the first philosophy as the study of objects that exist beyond the physical realm, but he expands the definition to include the study of that which is common to all things, that is, being stripped of matter.[6] The sciences in metaphysics encompass the order of causation and theology since they share God as the First Principle. Mathematics also treats objects that exist outside of matter since its subject is measurement, but its sciences require matter to have something to measure.[7] Algazel praises mathematics in the prologue to the *STP* as the discipline furthest from doubt and error, but, like the active sciences, he does not speak of it after the introduction to the *Metaphysica*.[8] He defines physics as the study of things that exist in matter and are subject to change, motion, and rest.[9] Within this description of the speculative sciences

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[6] "Sciencia igitur que tantum tractat de his que sunt omnino extra materiam est theologia....Sciencie vero divine subiectum est id quod est communius omnibus scilicet esse, simpliciter, vel absolute. Quod autem queritur in hac sciencia sunt consequencia ipsum esse in quantum ipsum est esse tantum, que sunt substancia et accidens, universale et singulare, unum et multa, causa et causatum, in potencia et effectu, conveniens et inconveniens, quod debet, vel quod est necesse esse, et possibile et similia; hec enim omnia consecuntur esse ex hoc quod est ens non sicut triangulacio, et quadracio que consecuntur ens, sed postquam fit mensura, nec sicut paritas et imparitas que consecuntur ens, sed postquam fit numerus, nec sicut albedo, et nigredo, que non consecuntur ens nisi postquam fit corpus naturale." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 3, 4.

[7] "Que vero tractat de his que possunt estimari extra materiam, sed non habent esse nisi in materia est mathematica." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 3.

[8] In the prologue, Algazel explains that the mathematical sciences and their subject matter do not lend themselves to speculation or difference of opinion among philosophers and do not warrant treatment in this work. Salman, "Algazel et les latins," 127.

[9] "Sciencie autem naturalis subiectum est corpora mundi secundum quod cadunt in motum, et in quietem, et permutacionem non secundum quod habent numerum, mensuram, et formam, et rotunditatem nec secundum quod partes eorum comparantur aliis, nec secundum quod sunt factura dei altissimi.

and their subjects, he establishes a hierarchy among the speculative disciplines in which metaphysics is the first philosophy, mathematics the middle ("media"), and physics the lower ("infima").[10]

Algazel's organization of the sciences attracted attention early and, like much of the early usage of the *STP*, many thirteenth-century scholars quoted from Algazel on this topic without mentioning his name. The first scholar to quote this passage was Dominicus Gundissalinus in his *De divisione philosophiae*.[11] After Dominicus, ten thirteenth-century scholars cite parts of this passage. Richard Rufus divides the sciences similarly into the study of things inside or outside of human action, but he does not credit Algazel with this arrangement.[12] The anonymous quotations from the introduction to the *Metaphysica* end around the middle of the century. Vincent of Beauvais cites Algazel's definition of

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Consideracio enim corporis potest fieri his omnibus modis; naturalis autem tractator non considerat corpora nisi secundum quod permutantur et convertuntur tantum." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 4.

[10] "Scientia vero speculativa similiter dividitur in tria. Quorum primum dicitur scientia divina et philosophia prima. Secundum dicitur scientia disciplinalis vel mathematica, et vocatur scientia media; tercium est scientia naturalis et scientia infima; hec autem scientia non ob aliud dividitur in tria nisi quia omnia que intelliguntur, vel sunt omnino extra materiam nec coherent corporibus convertibilibus et mobilibus, ut est ipse deus altissimus, et angelus, et unitas, et causa, et causatum, conveniens et inconveniens, et esse, et privacio, et similia." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 2-3.

[11] Dominicus found his definitions of the sciences largely in the *STP*: "Secundum alios vero praedicta divisio videtur aliter fieri, sed tamen sub eodem sensu hoc modo: *omnia, quae intelliguntur, aut omnino sunt extra materiam et motum, nec coherent corporibus convertibilibus et mobilibus, ut Deus et angelus et unitas, causa et causatum et conveniens et inconveniens et esse et privatio et similia* sed *ex his quaedam sunt, quae impossible est existere in materia, sicut Deus et angelus; quaedam sunt, quibus licet non sit necesse existere in materia, accidit tamen eis existere in materia, ut unitas et causa – corpus enim dicitur unum et dicitur causa sicut et angelus* dicitur causa et unus; aut omnia sunt in materia et motu, ut figura et humanitas." Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophia*, 66-68, (emphasis mine). Compare with Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics,* 2.35-3.11. Alexander Fidora points out in his introduction to the edition of *De divisione philosophia* that much of the text is drawn directly or paraphrased from the *STP*. See especially notes on 60-72.

[12] "Dividitur philosophia in duas partes, quarum una est de his quae sunt a natura et naturae opera, et alia quae est de his quae sunt a nobis et nostra opera." Richard Rufus, *In physicam Aristotelis*, ed. Rega Wood, *Richard Rufus of Cornwall: In Physicam Aristotelis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 89. Compare with Muckle, 1:20-26.

metaphysics as the study of being in the *Speculum doctrinale*.[13] Albert the Great prefers Algazel's second definition of metaphysics as the study of the order of causes.[14] Despite this thirteenth-century popularity, Algazel's organization of the sciences failed to interest authors over the next two centuries, though scholars began to cite this passage again in the sixteenth century when the study of the *STP* recovered in the wake of the 1506 printing.

The passage's prevalence in the thirteenth century stems from the novelty of Algazel's system, its relationship to Aristotle, and its theological overtones. The organization provided by the seven liberal arts still held sway with scholars when the *STP* was translated.[15] However, the seven liberal arts do not explicitly include philosophy or theology and though it was assumed that together they prepared a scholar for advanced

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[13] "Algazel. *Divinae scientiae subiectum est id quod est communius omnibus, scilicet* ens *simpliciter vel absolute.* Quae *autem* in ea quaeruntur, *consequentia sunt ipsum esse inquantum* ens *tantum.* Haec *sunt substantia, accidens, universale, singulare, unum, multum, causa, causatum, potentia, effectus, conveniens, inconveniens,* quid *debet, vel* quid *necesse est esse, et* quid *possibile; haec enim omnia consequuntur* ens, *sed postquam fit mensura; nec sic albedo et nigredo, quae non consequuntur ens, nisi postquam* fuerit *naturale corpus. Et omnino quicquid dicitur, quod non consequentur ens, nisi postquam fuerit subiectum alicuius duarum* scientiarum, *scilicet mathematicae et physicae, illud profecto non pertinet ad considerationem huius scientiae*." Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum doctrinale* (Venice, 1494), Lib. XVI, c. 59, f. 288va, italics mine. Compare with Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 4:17-33).

[14] "Et ideo dicit omnium causarum speculationem non esse nisi philosophi primi. In idem et per eandem rationem consentit Algazel. Et his consentire videtur, quod haec scientia est de primis principiis entis et haec non videntur esse nisi causarum genera." Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, Lib. III, tr. 3, c. 1, 138.

[15] The endurance of the seven liberal arts, particularly the *trivium*, at the universities can be found in several works. In his *Philosophia*, Daniel of Morley registers his disgust at the hidebound interests of Parisian scholars, who seem slavish in their attention to authority and preoccupied with Roman law, and expresses his admiration for the studies of the Arabs, which consist mainly in the *quadrivium.* Daniel of Morley, *Philosophia*, 212. However, a more nuanced twelfth-century perspective can be seen in John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon*, in which he defends the robust study of logic and the liberal arts in general against those who find a liberal education unnecessary and only wish to gain a tacit understanding of sciences through surveys like those of Boethius. In his defense, John of Salisbury promotes the study of Aristotle, including new translations, though he is unsure of their contents or application. John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, ed. John Hall and Katharine Keats-Rohan, *CCCM* 98 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991).

studies, the relationship between them was more allegorical than rational.[16] Algazel's system provided a new way to think of how disciplines could be organized around principles such as the relationship of the sciences to matter, but novelty was not the only reason to quote this passage. The principles that shaped this view of the sciences were essential to Aristotelian philosophy, which was increasingly popular with thirteenth-century scholars. As Aristotle became more ubiquitous, Algazel's statements about the relationship between the active and speculative sciences or the foundations of metaphysics and physics were useful quotations for commentaries on Aristotle.[17] This view of the sciences also offered a hierarchy that echoed a Neoplatonic notion of knowledge moving from the basest discipline, which dealt with the things of this world, to the highest level of wisdom, which explicitly included theology. Algazel preserves God as the ultimate object of philosophy and explained that the "root of the active disciplines was the science of faith" and that metaphysics is good for the soul and leads to

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[16] The relationship between the seven liberal arts was most commonly illustrated in the form of allegory. Martianus Capella first described the seven liberal arts in the fifth century with his *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, which depicted a marriage ceremony where the personified arts introduce their respective subjects in a mixture of prose and verse. The work continued to be commented on into the thirteenth century by notable scholars such as Alexander Neckam. Michael Winterbottom, "Martianus Capella" ed. Leighton Reynolds, *Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).

[17] Four thirteenth-century scholars cite Algazel's division of the science in their commentaries on Aristotle's works. Albert the Great, *Super Ethica*, ed. Wilhelmus Kübel, *AMOO* XIV.2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1987) Lib. VI, lectio IX, 455; Peter of Spain, *Commentum in librum de anima*, ed. Manuel Alonso, *Pedro Hispano Obras Filosófia*, Vol. 2 (Madrid, 1944), 79, 137, 173; Adam of Buckfield, *Sententia super secundum Metaphysicae*, ed. Armand Mauer, *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers: A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1955), 99-144 (101); and Richard Rufus, see note 12 above.

"the highest nobility in the present and the cause of beatitude in the future."[18] These statements appealed to thirteenth-century scholars who were eager to find the spiritual elements in Arab philosophy and adapt them to their tradition. This organization of the sciences was simple, elegant, and, unlike other popular passages, innocuous. By the time scholars adapted this approach in the thirteenth century, there was little reason to revisit the rationale behind it.

The Existence of an Infinite Number of Souls (*Metaphysica*, tr. 1, divisio 6)

Algazel spends more than a third of the *Metaphysica* discussing eight divisions in the Aristotelian characteristics of being, but the sixth division, finite and infinite, attracted the most attention.[19] To demonstrate the two qualities, Algazel discusses the existence of infinity through four arguments concerning the possibility of an infinite number of souls that could exist separate from bodies.[20] He offers the premise that the

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[18] See bolded text for quotations: "Sine dubio igitur cognitio sapientie dividitur in duo; quorum unum est quod facit scire dispositiones nostrorum operum et vocatur sciencia activa; cuius utilitas est cognoscere per eam maneries actionum agendarum, per quas proveniant utilia nobis in hoc mundo, et certificatur nostra spes de vita eterna. Alterum est quo cognoscuntur disposiciones omnium que sunt; ad hoc ut describatur in animabus nostris forma universi esse secundum ordinem suum sicut describitur forma visibilis in speculo; huiusmodi autem descripcio in nostris animabus est perfectio ipsarum, quoniam aptitudo anime ad recipiendum ea proprietas est ipsius anime. **Unde describi ea in anima, in presenti quidem est summa nobilitas et in futuro causa felicitatis sicut in sequentibus ostendetur, et hec dicitur sciencia theorica**. Unaqueque autem harum scientiarum dividitur in tria. Activa enim dividitur in tria; quorum unum est scientia disponendi conversationem suam cum omnibus hominibus; homo enim est creatura quam necesse est conversari cum hominibus, quod non potest sibi bene ordinari ita ut utile sit ei in hoc mundo, et in futuro nisi secundum modum proprium; **huius autem scientie radix est scientia fidei**." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 1-2.

[19] These divisions are, in order of apperance: "substancia et accidens," "universale et particulare," "unum et multa," "prius et posterius," "causa et causatum," "finitum et infinitum," "quod est in potentia et quod est in effectu," "quod necesse est esse et quod possible est esse." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 5-52.

[20] "Infinitum vero dicitur, quattuor modis quorum duo non sunt, duos vere esse argumentacio deprehendit; dicitur enim quod motus celi non habet finem scilicet non habet principium, et hec iam deprehendit argumentacio. Dicitur eciam quod anime humane que separantur a corporibus sunt infinite; hoc autem necessario verum est, si removeatur finitas a tempore et a motu celi quod est remocio incepcionis. Tercius

world, specifically the motion of the heavens as a measure of time, has no rational starting point.[21] Like the motion of the heavens, souls are eternal since all those that were, are, and will be exist before being placed in bodies and survive after death. By removing a starting point in time, the number of eternal souls stretches back indefinitely. Thus, an infinite number of souls separated from bodies is not only possible, but it is also necessary if the world has no beginning.

Unlike Algazel's organization of the sciences, scholars consistently cited this passage from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century because of its theological consequences and Aquinas' interest in the matter. This thought experiment on the existence of infinite souls has troubling implications for Christian scholars since it argues for the existence of infinite, eternal beings apart from God and for an eternal world without a Biblical creation. No scholar references this passage more than Thomas

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est ut cum dicitur corpus, et spacia infinita, a superius usque inferius, sed hoc quoque falsum est. Quartus est ut cum dicitur cause sunt infinite, eo quod res habent causam, et causa habet causam, et sic non pervenitur ad primam causam, que non habet causam; sed hoc quoque falsum est; nam sensus huius est quod omnis numerus intelligitur multa simul, que habent ordinem per naturam, et habent ultra, et citra in quo sic est infinitas ut in causis que sunt infinite." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 40.

[21] "Ordo autem inter causam et causatum necessario naturalis est, qui si removetur, illud causa non remanet; similiter corpora et spacia sunt ordinabilia quoniam quedam eorum sunt citeriora aliis necessario, cum inceperis ab una parte; hec autem ordinacio est situ non natura, inter que differencia iam assignata est in tractatu de prius et posterius. In quocumque autem fuerit unum istorum sine alio, infinitas non removebitur ab eo sicut a motu celi; qui quidem habet ordinem, et progressionem, quoniam omnes partes eius non sunt simul in una disposicione. Cum ergo dicitur quod motus celi non habet finem, non intelligimus per hoc removeri finitatem a motibus qui sunt, sed ab omnibus simul qui sunt, et fuerunt, et futuri sunt. Similiter et animas humanas que sunt separabiles a corporibus per mortem, concedimus esse infinitas numero, quamvis habeant esse simul quoniam non est inter eas ordinacio naturalis qua remota desinant esse anime, eo quod nulle earum sunt causa aliis, sed simul sunt sine prius, et posterius, natura et situ. Non enim intelligitur in eis prius, et posterius, nisi secundum tempus sue creacionis. In essenciis autem earum secundum quod sunt essencie, et anime non est ordinacio ullo modo, sed sunt equales in esse, e contrario spaciis, et corporibus, et cause, et causato. Sed quod possibile est animas non habere finem, et motus non habere inicium, posterius dicemus, et quecumque inducuntur in probacionibus earum."Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 40-41.

Aquinas, who discusses the problems raised here by Algazel on eight occasions.[22] While Thomas' frequent treatment of the passage implies that he is interested in the argument, he dismisses its line of reasoning. He explains that Algazel does not demonstrate the existence of infinite souls, but rather he hypothesizes that an infinity of souls is probable given the possibility that the world is eternal.[23] Algazel oversteps the mark when he uses the eternity of the world as a premise because it cannot be proven otherwise. Since the world's eternity cannot be demonstrated, Algazel's infinite number of souls remains only a possibility. Thomas concludes in the *Summa theologica* that the number of souls can be called infinite accidentally ("per accidens"), but not in reality ("per se").[24]

This simple refutation is indicative of other treatments of this passage. Many scholars follow Thomas' reasoning or draw their conclusions directly from Thomas. Nicholas of Strasbourg uses this passage to demonstrate how the quality of infinity exists

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[22] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros sententiarum*, Lib. 2, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5; *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 10; *Quodlibet* 9, q. 1, a. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles* 2. 81; *De immortalitate animae* 12; *De unitate intellectus*, c. 5; *Summa theologica* 1.7.4 resp. and 1.46.2 ad 8. Hanley discusses at length Aquinas' arguments regarding an infinity of souls, see "St. Thomas' Use of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*," 250-254.

[23] Thomas occasionally reports Algazel's argument without comment or simply mentions that it is probable, though not demonstrable, but he points out its inconsistency in *De veritate*. "Sed infinitum per accidens posuerunt non solum esse in potentia, sed in actu; unde Algazel in sua metaphysica ponit animas humanas a corporibus separatas esse infinitas, quia hoc sequitur ex hoc quod mundus, secundum ipsum, est aeternus: nec hoc inconveniens reputat, quia animarum ad invicem non est aliqua dependentia; unde in multitudine illarum animarum non invenitur infinitum nisi per accidens." Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 2, a. 10.

[24] "Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Quidam enim, sicut Avicenna et Algazel, dixerunt quod impossibile est esse multitudinem actu infinitam per se, sed infinitam per accidens multitudinem esse, non est impossibile. Dicitur enim multitudo esse infinita per se, quando requiritur ad aliquid ut multitudo infinita sit. Et hoc est impossibile esse, quia sic oporteret quod aliquid dependeret ex infinitis; unde eius generatio nunquam compleretur, cum non sit infinita pertransire. Per accidens autem dicitur multitudo infinita, quando non requiritur ad aliquid infinitas multitudinis, sed accidit ita esse." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, ed. Pietro Caramello (Rome: Marietti, 1946), Lib. I, q. 7, a. 4.

only "in potentia," not "in actu."[25] Though he does not mention Thomas, Matthew of Aquasparta offers a similar refutation, arguing that eternal motion is not demonstrable and thus Algazel concludes that an infinite number of souls is merely "not impossible" rather than probable.[26] More than a century later, Denis the Carthusian chooses to quote directly from Aquinas' *Summa theologica* to address this question.[27] Several scholars who cite this passage ignore Algazel's intention and use it instead to address the question of an eternal world.[28] Despite the frequent citation of this passage, its implications and erroneous conclusions, it was so easily dismissed that it failed to elicit formal condemnation. *De erroribus philosophorum* does not mention this passage or the existence of infinite souls in its list of Algazel's errors.[29] One article in the Condemnation

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[25] "Dicitur etiam, quod est infinitum per se et quoddam per accidens, sicut dicit Algazel in sua Metaphysica et supra tactum est, cum ostendebatur Deum non posse facere infinita in actu." Nicholas of Strasbourg, *Summa*, ed. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, *Nikolaus von Strassburg, Summa, vol. 3: Liber 2, Tractatus 8-14* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990), 189.

[26] "Quod patet, quoniam ad rationem de infinitate animarum respondent uno modo quod non est impossibile esse animas infinitas secundum Algazelem." Matthew of Aquasparta, *De productione rerum*, ed. Gideon Gál, *Quaestiones disputatae de productione rerum et de providentia* (Florence: Quaracchi, 1956), 94.

[27] "Ad secundum, videlicet an possibile sit esse multa infinita secundum actum, [Thomas] respondet: Circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Avicenna namque et Algazel dixerunt quod impossibile est multitudinem actu infinitam esse per se, non autem per accidens." Denis the Carthusian, *In sententiarum librum I-IV commentarii* (Venice, 1584), f. 612.

[28] Several scholars draw from Algazel's ancillary statement, often anonymously, regarding the eternity of world for the sake of argument during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. John Pecham, "Utrum mundus potuit ab eterno creari," ed. Richard Dales and Omar Argerami, *Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 79. Anonymous Parisian Franciscan Master, "Utrum deus creaverit vel creare potuerit mundum vel aliquid creatum ab eterno," *Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World*, 111. Peter of Auvergne, "Utrum deus potuerit facere mundum esse ab eterno," *Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World*, 147.

[29] The author of *De erroribus philosophorum* does mention Algazel's discussion of the eternal motion of the heavens: "1. Algazel autem, ut plurimum Avicennam sequens et eius abbreviator exsistens, erravit ponens motum caeli aeternum esse, ut patet ex Metaphysisa sua, capitulo Quomodo corpora supercaelestia sunt mobilia per anima." Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 38. However, the chapter he cites ("Quomodo corpora supercaelestia sunt mobilia per animam") occurs later in the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica* (Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 104).

of 1277 could be applied to this passage, but it censures the existence of infinite substances in reality and makes no mention of souls.[30] Thus, scholars cite Algazel's argument for the existence of infinite souls for the sake of discussion rather than to eliminate controversy.

***The First Principle and the First Intelligence* (*Metaphysica*, tr. 5)**

Several passages in the *Metaphysica*'s fifth treatise attracted considerable attention from scholars. Unlike other treatises, Algazel gave this one the arresting title of "Flos divinorum."[31] It warranted special treatment in Algazel's mind since he indicated in several places that the previous treatises of the *Metaphysica* were building up to this final discussion of how all things derive their being from the First Principle.[32] He begins by assigning God or First Principle—terms he uses interchangeably—the dual role of the final cause as well as the founder of the order of causes, but he explains that the oneness

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[30] "86. Quod substantie separate sunt actu infinite. Infinitas enim non est impossibilis, nisi in rebus materialibus." Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 104. The condemnation does censure several errors concerning the eternality of the world. See errors #91 and 95 on p. 106 and 108.

[31] Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 119.

[32] Algazel outlined in the introduction to the *Metaphysica* that the first treatise deals with the divisions of being, but the next three focus on the attributes and actions of God or the First Principle while the fifth illustrates the connection between God and all things: "[e]t complebimus id quod dicturi sumus de intencionibus huius divine sciencie in duabus proposicionibus et quinque tractatibus. Quorum primus est de divisionibus esse et de iudiciis eius. Secundus de causa universi esse que est deus altissimus; tercius de proprietatibus eius. Quartus de operibus eius et de comparacione eorum que sunt ad ipsum. Quintus est quomodo habent esse ex illo secundum intencionem eorum." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 1. In the beginning of the fourth treatise, he reiterates the subject of the fifth treatise, almost as a reminder of the importance of the discussion to come, before introducing the subject of the present treatise. "Postquam expediti sumus ab enumerando proprietates primi, necesse est ut loquamur de operibus eius scilicet, de speciebus omnium que sunt. Quidquid enim aliud est ab eo, opus eius est, et sic cum sciverimus species omnium que sunt, ostendemus postea in tractatu quinto, quomodo omnia provenerunt ex ipso, et quomodo series est ordinacionis causarum, et causatorum, quamvis sint plura, et quomodo ad ultimum omnia reducuntur ad unam causam, que est causa causarum." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 90.

of the First Principle does not allow it to participate in anything that is not one.[33] To preserve the unity of the First Principle and still establish an order of causes, he proposes that a necessary and naked ("nuda") intelligence issues from, though is not equal to, the First Principle, which is able to possess the qualities of diversity and multiplicity, and thus can create things other than itself.[34] However, this first intelligence is not the only intermediary in the order of causes. From the first intelligence springs a second, inferior intelligence, whose sphere of influence is the highest heaven. The second intelligence produces a third, which governs the orbit of the zodiac, and so on until the hierarchy of progressively inferior intelligences reaches ten intermediaries with nine corresponding celestial orbits.[35] The remainder of the treatise examines how the First Principle directs

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[33] "Incipit tractatus quintus de hoc, quomodo omnia habent esse a primo principio, et quomodo est ordo causarum et causatorum, et quomodo omnia proveniunt ad unum qui est causa causarum. Tractatus iste quasi flos divinorum qui est id quod acquiritur ex eis, et quod ad ultimum queritur ex eis post cognicionem proprietatum primi, et veri; primum autem, quod hic involutum est, hoc est, scilicet, quoniam predictum est quod primus unus est omni modo absolute, et quod ab uno non provenit nisi unum." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 119.

[34] "Igitur ex primo provenit intelligencia nuda, que non habet ex primo inpari, nisi esse inparem scilicet, primum, propter quod necesse est eam esse; possibilitatem vero habet ex se ipsa, non ex primo; cognoscit autem se, et cognoscit suum principium. Si autem cognoscit se et principium suum quoniam ex ipso est suum esse, multiplicatur autem consideracio eius propter hoc tunc secundum consideracionem huius multitudinis, provenit ex ea multitudo, et deinde non cessat multiplicari paulatim donec perveniatur ad ultimum eorum que sunt; postquam igitur opus fuit multitudine, nec esse potest multitudo nisi hoc modo; ipsa autem multitudo parvissima est, tunc ea que fuerunt prima; non fuerunt multum plurima, sed secundum gradus ceciderunt in multitudinem, ita quod sunt intelligencie, et anime, et corpora, et accidencia, et hee sunt divisiones omnium que sunt." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 120-121.

[35] "Intelligitur autem angelus intelligencia nuda; oportet autem ut id quod est nobilius proveniat ex forma nobiliore. Intelligencia vero nobilior est; forma autem quam habet ex primo scilicet, necessitas est nobilior; igitur provenit ex ea intelligencia secunda secundum quod consideratur esse necesse, et provenit ex ea celum supremum, secundum consideracionem possibilitatis que est ei sicut materia. Ex intelligencia vero secunda, provenit intelligencia tercia et circulus signorum....et ex nona, decima, et circulus lune et sic completum est esse omnium celestium simul, sed ea que sunt nobiliora excepto primo, provenerunt decem et novem, decem intelligencie, et novem celi; hoc autem verum est, nisi numerus celorum fuerit maior isto si enim fuerit maior, opportebit eciam addi numero et intelligenciarum ad complendum numerum omnium celorum." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 121.

the natural world from the four elements to man's actions through the intelligences. The existence of intermediary forces in creation proceeds to a discussion of providence and whether the First Principle remains responsible for good and evil.[36] Algazel argues that evil is merely the absence of good and that the First Principle permits evil to occur accidentally. He draws on the example of basic elements, such as water, that are essentially good and necessary for existence, yet become evil in the event of a flood.[37] However, he admits that some elements of providence cannot be known and concludes the *Metaphysica* with the pious declaration that "only God knows more than this."[38]

The scholars citing the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica* were primarily interested in the necessity of the first intelligence and the order of causes, and sparingly quoted from Algazel's explanation of providence. Similar ideas could be found in Avicenna's works and scholars frequently connected the corresponding passages between the fifth treatise of the *STP* and the ninth treatise of Avicenna's *Metaphysica*, but there are indications that citations of Algazel's fifth treatise were more than passing remarks.[39]

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[36] "Si quis autem dixerit nos videmus mundum plenum maliciis, nocumentis, et turpitudinibus, sicut fulguribus, et terre motu, et publicis tempestatibus, et rabie luporum, et aliis huius modi, similiter eciam in animabus humanis videmus voluptatem, iram, et cetera huius modi. Quomodo ergo veniet malicia ex primo? Venitne ex providencia primi vel non?" Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 126.

[37] "Unde si bonitas est in hoc, tunc malicia est in eius opposito scilicet, privacione essendi, vel privacione sue perfeccionis. Igitur malicie non est essencia; esse vero est pura bonitas; privacio vera eius est malicia. Causa vero malicie est id quod facit destrui rem esse, vel destrui aliquam suarum perfeccionum. Igitur malicia est relativa ad id quod destruit....Similiter pluvia si non esset creata, destrueretur seminacio et deficeret mundus; creata vero necessario destruit planiciem domus vetule pauperis, cum cadit super eam; non est autem possibile ut pluvia creetur que discernat in suo descensu an cadat hic vel ibi." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 126-127.

[38] "[H]oc igitur est secretum providencie secundum quod dicitur, deus autem plus novit quam hoc." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 129.

[39] Matthew of Aquasparta and Roger Bacon connected these two treatises by Avicenna and Algazel. See notes 44 and 46 below.

Several scholars, including Roger Bacon and the author of *De erroribus philosophorum*, refer to it as the "Flos divinorum" and are well-aware that these metaphysical discussions encroached on matters of divinity.[40] The association of God with the concept of a First Principle did not trouble Christian scholars, who were less preoccupied with preserving divine oneness than the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*'s original Muslim audience. However, Algazel predicates the necessity of an intermediary between God and creation on the premise that "nothing comes from one except for one," which presented a challenge to God's omnipotence and the Trinity.[41] The argument raised concerns early in the thirteenth century with William of Auvergne, who decries the need for a first intelligence and argued that several substances could issue forth from something that is one.[42] Algazel's subsequent progression of causes appears to be well known among scholars into the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and several roundly criticize the existence of ten intelligences with nine heavens.[43] Some philosophers seek to disprove the existence

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[40] Both Roger Bacon and the author of *De erroribus philosophorum* mention this title when citing the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica*. "Aliam distribucionem intelligenciarum ponunt diversi philosophi, et [qui] precipue Algazel in v. Methaphyisce capitulo, qui intitulatur flores divinorum." Roger Bacon, *Summulae dialecticae*, ed. Robert Steele, *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi*, (London, 1965), Fasc. 15, 215. *De erroribus philosophorum* locates errors #4-8 in this treatise: "Omnes autem hi errores eliciuntur ex Metaphysica sua, in tractatu De proprietatibus primi, quem appelavit Florem divinorum." Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 40.

[41] "[Q]uod ab uno non provenit nisi unum." See note 33.

[42] William addresses the concept of the First Principle and the issue of the first intelligence at length in the ninth chapter of *De universo* and mentions Algazel in the heading, though it is unclear whether his name appears in the manuscripts or only in the early printed edition. William of Auvergne, *De universo creaturum*, ed. Blaise Le Feron, *Guilielmi Alverni Opera Omnia*, vol. 1, c. 9, f. 816b.

[43] "tamen manifeste habetur ab Avicenna in methaphysica sua, cuius abbreviator fuit Algazel; posuerunt autem dicti philosophi res fluere a Deo, secundum quendam ordinem, ut videlicet primo procedat a Deo prima intelligentia et ab hac procedat intelligentia secunda et anima primi caeli et primum caelum, ab hac autem secunda intelligentia procedat...a qua procedit anima infimi caeli et infimum caelum et illa intelligentia, quae causat substantiam generabilium et corruptibilium." Dietrich of Freiburg, *De intellectu et*

of intermediary intelligences with their own arguments while others cited a variety of authorities. Matthew of Aquasparta calls the idea absurd and claimed that Augustine had refuted a similar error held by older heretics.[44] John Gerson references a more recent source when he rejected Algazel's notion of intelligences issuing from God, contending that this position was among the articles condemned at Paris in 1277, though he declined to mention which one.[45] Algazel's discourse on the nature of good and evil also garners citations from notable scholars, including Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon, though Algazel's conclusion that providence permitted evil to occur is not widely discussed.[46]

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intelligibili, 144; "Et secundum omnes habemus decem sphraeres caelestes, de quarum cuiuslibet condicionibus specialibus dicendum." Nicholas of Strasbourg, "Utrum sint plures spherae," *Summa*, tr. 3, q. 5, vol. 2, 33; "Philosophus namque duodecimo metaphysicae accipit numerum substantiarum illarum secundum numerum coelestium motuum, non orbium: quamvis Avicenna, Algazel, et alii quidam computant illas secundum orbium numerum." Denis the Carthusian, *In Sententiarum librum I*, f. 27.

[44] "Alii dixerunt esse quidem multa et diversa et ab uno non tamen immediate, sed mediate, sicut Avicenna et Algazel. Quorum modus et ratio ponendi, prout apparet ex IX Metaphysicae ipsius Avicenna, cap. 4, et ex V Algazelis....Istum eundem errorem videntur posuisse Saturniniani et Meneandriani. Posuerunt enim Deum mediantibus angelis mundum creasse, sicut recitat Augustinu, in libro De haeresibus, cap. 2 et 3. Sed iste error omnino absurdus est: primo quia limitat et arctat divinam potentiam ad unum tantum, quae tamen est infinita et immensa; tum quia ponit ordinem et decorem universi casualem dum rerum diversitatem non attribuit intentioni agentis propter aliquem finem, sed magis arctationi et necessitati et terminationi potentiarum et virtutum agentium ad suos effectus. Fuerunt autem isti decepti quia posuerunt res provenire a Primo quadam necessaria consecutione; quod falsum est, quoniam Primum non producit per necessitatem, sed magis per rationem et per voluntatem." Matthew of Aquasparta, *De productione rerum*, q. 5, 118.

[45] "Intellectus agens, secundum Avicennam et Algazel, erat primo Deus respectu primae intelligentiae, et secunda intelligentia respectu tertiae, et ita deinceps usque ad animam rationalem quae habebat ultimam intelligentiam pro intellectu agente, aut forte plures, differendo in hoc a Commentatore, ita quod motum orbium causabant influentias corporeas in corpora et formas spirituales in animas, et hoc est articulus parisiensis merito damnatus." John Gerson, *Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii De coelesti hierarchia*, 210.

[46] "Queritur de malo, et primo utrum sit. Quod non (videtur): bonum et ens convertuntur; set malum not est bonum, ergo non est de genere entis....Item dicit Avicenna, ix Metaphysice et Argazel [sic], 5 Methaphysice, et hec concedo, set dico quod ens dupliciter; aut ens absolutum a privatione, et sic malum non est ens; aliud est ens coniunctum cum natura privationis, et sic malum est ens; et hec distinctio cadit in rebus, quia cadit in principiis et in principiatis, et ita malum est de natura eorum que non habent naturam completam entis...Respondeo quod pura privatio dupliciter est; aut quod est pure nichil et privat ens simpliciter, et sic sumitur 5 Methaphysice; si sit pura privatio, non quod est pure nichil set quod est alterum

The theological implications of the fifth treatise were not lost on scholars, many of whom vehemently rejected its arguments. For this reason, many statements from this treatise find their way into condemnations. Of Algazel's sixteen errors enumerated in *De erroribus philosophorum*, five (#4-8) originate from the fifth treatise, which comprises only ten pages in Muckle's edition.[47] Conversely, none of the errors in the Condemnations of 1277 appear to be direct quotations from this treatise, but several can be read in a way that they can be applied to one or more of its teachings.[48]

The Giver of Forms (*Physica*, tr. 4, ch. 5)

Algazel dedicates the fourth treatise of the *Physica* to the study of various souls at work in creation. The first four chapters of this treatise briefly treat the vegetative soul, the souls of animals, and the external and internal senses of human beings before arriving at the longer fifth chapter, which explores the human soul. In the opening sentence, Algazel privileges the human soul as a gift bestowed on a physical being that achieves the most perfect combination of the elements.

> When the mixture of elements has been more beautifully and more perfectly balanced than any that can be found, like that of human seed, whose maturity comes into the

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extremum contrarietatis, et sic malum per se est pura privatio." Roger Bacon, *Questiones super libros primae philosophiae*, Fasc. 10, 311. "Praeterea, sicut Algazel dicit, bonum est perfectio cuius apprehensio est delectabilis. Sed non omne ens habet perfectionem; materia enim prima non habet perfectionem aliquam. Ergo non omne ens est bonum...Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut materia prima est ens in potentia et non in actu; ita est perfecta in potentia et non in actu, bona in potentia et non in actu." Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 2.

[47] These errors include the procession of multiplicity from the first intelligence rather than God (#4), the existence of the ten intelligences (#5), the procession of goodness from the first intelligence (#6), God can only create by necessity and is bound by the laws of nature (#7), and the permission of evil by the divine providence (#8). Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 38, 40.

[48] For the procession of multiplicity from the first intelligence, see errors #44: "Quod ab uno primo agente non potest esse multitudo effectuum." and #58: "Quod Deus est causa necessaria prime intelligentie: qua posita ponitur effectus et sunt simul duratione." Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 94and 98.

> human body from nutrients which are more subtle than the nutrients of animals and of vegetables, and from strengths and minerals that are more beautiful than the strengths and minerals of animals, then it becomes worthy to receive from the Giver of Forms ("dator formarum") a more beautiful form than other forms, which is the human soul.[49]

Having introduced the origin of the soul, Algazel proceeds to describe its composition and how it receives and comprehends information, but it is the concept of the "Giver of Forms" that grabbed the attention of Latin authors. While scholars cite several discussions of the soul in the fourth treatise of the *Physica*, they quote the first sentence of the fifth chapter more than any other passage in the *STP*.[50] Many other authors refer to Algazel's concept of a "dator formarum" without mentioning where the concept appears in the *STP*. However, there is considerable confusion about the Giver of Forms and scholars are of very different minds regarding its nature and validity.

Unlike the First Principle, which is synonymous with God in the *STP*, it is unclear whether the Giver of Forms is God or a powerful intermediary between him and the world. Algazel mentions this figure several times throughout the fifth chapter of this treatise and makes references to a Giver of Forms elsewhere in the work, but there is no indication whether the term is meant to describe an abstract concept or a real force at work in creation like the first intelligence.[51] Early thirteenth-century readers leave the

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[49] "Cum commixtio elementorom fuerit pulcrioris, et perfeccioris equalitatis, qua nichil possit inveniri, subtilius, et pulcrius sicut est sperma hominis, cuius maturitas venit in corpus hominis ex cibis qui sunt subtiliores cibis animalium, et cibis vegetabilium, et ex virtutibus et mineris que sunt pulcriores virtutibus, et mineris animalium, tunc fiet apta ad recipiendum a datore formarum formam pulcriorem formis que est anima hominis" Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 172.

[50] In addition to the quotations from Alexander of Hales and Thomas Aquinas below, this passage is copied verbatim by Peter of Abano, *Conciliator*, Diff. XX, f. 32r and Agostino Nifo, *De intellectu*, c. xxii, 303.

[51] The term "dator formarum" appears in Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 124, 125, 149, 151, 160, 165, 167, 181. In each of these instances, Algazel is unclear as to the exact nature of the "dator" and he does not connect the concept to God, the First Principle, or any intermediary intelligence.

question open or accept that the Giver of Forms was a synonym for God. Alexander of Hales cites this passage on several occasions without ruling on the nature of the Giver.[52] Thomas Aquinas also quotes this passage along with the next few sentences about the soul's nature to illustrate how the intellect is a part of the human soul rather than a single entity that can exist even though it is separated from the body.[53]

Later scholars were more skeptical and believed the Giver to be an intermediary intelligence rather than God. While debating a question of providence, Matthew of Aquasparta refers to the generation of forms from a Giver, rather than immediately from God, as an error of Avicenna and Algazel.[54] Walter Chatton likewise faults Avicenna and Algazel in a commentary on the *Sentences* for posing the existence of not one, but several Givers.[55] This skepticism about the Giver of Forms also reached the condemnations.

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[52] Alexander of Hales quotes the beginning of the fourth treatise verbatim on four occasions. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, vol. II, q. 75, 508, 512-513; q. 77, 525 and 530.

[53] Sed verum est quod postea dicit et probat quod anima humana, secundum id quod est sibi proprium, i. e. secundum vim intellectivam, non sic se habet ad corpus ut forma, nec eget ut sibi praeparetur organum. Deinde subiungenda sunt verba Algazelis sic dicentis: *cum commixtio elementorum fuerit pulchrioris et perfectioris aequalitatis (...) tunc fiet apta ad recipiendum a datore formarum formam pulchriorem formis aliis, quae est anima hominis. Huius vero animae humanae duae sunt virtutes: una operans et altera sciens*, quam vocat intellectum, ut ex consequentibus patet. Et tamen postea multis argumentis probat, quod operatio intellectus non fit per organum corporale. Haec autem praemisimus, non quasi volentes ex philosophorum auctoritatibus reprobare suprapositum errorem, sed ut ostendamus, quod non soli Latini, quorum verba quibusdam non sapiunt, sed etiam Graeci et Arabes hoc senserunt, quod intellectus sit pars vel potentia seu virtus animae quae est corporis forma." Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus*, c. 2, italics mine. Aquinas elsewhere attributes the "dator formarum" to Avicenna in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 76.

[54] "Item, si omnes formae sunt a Deo immediate, ita quod non mediantibus agentibus creatis, tunc omnes formae habent esse per creationem; ergo generatio est creatio, et recidimus in errorem Avicennae et Algazelis, qui posuerunt omnes formas a datore." Matthew of Aquasparta, *De providentia*, ed. Gideon Gàl, *Quaestiones disputatae de fide et de cognitione* (Florence: Quaracchi, 1957), 314.

[55] "Solebat esse difficultas circa istud punctum inter philosophos, et etiam inter Doctores de opinione philosophi. Nam quidam posuerunt omnes formas creari, et hoc videtur Commentator imponere Christianis; et in hanc videtur redire opinio praetacta, et etiam opinio Avicennae et Algazelis, qui posuerunt datores formarum. Sed contra: forma naturalis est educibilis de potentia transmutabili materiae; sed potentia

While the Condemnation of 1277 is silent on the matter, the author of *De erroribus philosophorum* condemns the influence of the Giver of Forms on human souls, citing the fourth treatise with no mention of Avicenna, and associates the Giver of Forms with the last of the ten intelligences.[56] Scholars continued to offer conflicting opinions into the sixteenth century. Konrad Wimpina criticizes the notion of a Giver of Forms throughout his refutation of Avicenna's and Algazel's errors, though he singles out Algazel and his "Flos divinorum" as the propagator of this concept.[57] Conversely, when discussing the names ancient philosophers used for the Divine Being, the Venetian philosopher Antonio Polo claims that Algazel referred to God as the "Giver of Souls."[58] Thus, there was no consensus during the Middle Ages about the nature of the Giver of Forms despite the fact that it was one of the most widely referenced topics of the *STP*.

The Agent Intellect (*Physica*, tr. 5)

Algazel structured the *Physica* much like the *Metaphysica* since both books build to a final treatise whose subject is intermediary intelligences. In the last treatise of the

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passiva non est ponenda ex parte Dei, quia ipse non indiget tali potentia ad hoc quod producat; ergo respectu alterius agentis quod exigat talem potentiam necessario ad hoc quod producat." Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super Sententias super Librum*, ed. Girard Etzkorn and Joseph Wey (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 316.

[56] "10. Ulterius erravit ponens animam hominis procedere a datore formarum, et quod omnes formae hic inferius procedunt ab illo datore, qui dator est intelligentia ultima, ut patet ex his quae ait in Scientia De Naturalibus, tractatu iv^{o}." Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 42.

[57] "Denique in tractatu Metaphysicae suae, quem Florem diuinorum prętitulatiuat, errasse comperitur. Primum hinc, quod ferme omnia ex naturae necessitate prodire scripsit; quodque nihil in subcoelestibus, nisi quod fit, a deo fieri possit, deo non agente, nec agere potente: adiecto etiam exemplo muscae, quam necessitate quadam naturae muscam factam contendit, quod illius materia non potuerit formam excipere perfectiorem quod ubi potuisset, procul dubio a formarum datore, alia illi forma perfectior data fuisset." Konrad Wimpina, *In libros de sex sophorum errramentis*, Lib. II, c. 10, f. 126r.

[58] "Nam Deus ipse, ut ait Alcinous et Maximus Tirius Platonicus, est omnium rerum auctor, factor, et conservator; et Algazel dicit, quod Deus est dator animae, et Cicero ait..." Antonio Polo Veneti, *Abbreviatio veritatis animae rationalis*, f. 160.

Metaphysica, the topic of discussion was the first intelligence and the issue of lesser intelligences is derived from it. The fifth treatise of the *Physica* focuses on the last intelligence or Agent Intellect, which is responsible for the workings of the sublunary world and the human souls that inhabit it. Algazel further divided this treatise into ten chapters, each of which treats a quality that "flows" from the Agent Intellect or that the Agent Intellect "imprints" on souls.[59] The ten qualities include the power to comprehend abstract concepts, rather than rely on the senses, as well as the ability to see visions, predict the future, perform miracles, and prophesy.[60] A soul's actions also have eternal consequences for its relationship to the Agent Intellect. A moral soul maintains its connection with the Agent Intellect after death, allowing it to enjoy eternal happiness apart from the body in a state of blissful contemplation.[61] An immoral soul, which Algazel describes as one which has a preoccupation with bodily pleasures, loses its

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[59] "Tractatus Quintus de eo quod fluit in animam ab intelligencia agente. Non est dubium quod consideracio de intelligencia agente pertineat ad divinorum tractatum, in quo predictum est, et quod intelligencia est, et que est eius proprietas; hic autem non consideramus de ea secundum quod ipsa est modo, sed secundum quod imprimit in animas, nec est hic consideracio de ea secundum quod imprimit in animas, sed secundum quod anima imprimatur per eam." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 183.

[60] "Dicamus ergo in hoc tractatu primo, quomodo anima significat esse intelligenciam agentem, deinde quomodo fluit sciencia in animam ab ipsa, deinde quomodo beatificatur anima per eam post mortem, et deinde quomodo punitur anima que separatur ab ipsa pravis moribus, deinde de causa vere visionis, deinde de causa false visionis et deinde de causa eius quod anima apprehendit scienciam occultorum per aplicacionem sui cum seculo scienciarum. Deinde de causa presentandi, et cernendi in vigilando formas que non habent esse extra. Et deinde de intencione prophecie, et miraculorum, et de ordine eorum, et deinde quod prophecie sunt, et quomodo opus est eis. Hec igitur sunt decem." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 183.

[61] "Cum anima fortunata fuerit propter aptitudinem recipiendi infusionem ab intelligencia agente, et confidenter letatur propter coherenciam sui cum illa insolubilem, supersedet a negocio regendi corpus et ab his que conveniunt sensibus, non tamen cessat corpus retrahere eam et inpedire, et prohibere a perfeccione coherendi cum ea. Cum autem liberatur ab occupacione corporis per mortem, removetur velamen et prohibens, et durat semper coherencia quoniam anima permanet semper, et intelligencia agens permanet semper, et infusio ex parte eius est largissima, quoniam hoc est sibi ex se; anima vero apta est ex seipsa ad recipiendum ab illa cum nichil est quod prohibeat; nichil est autem quod prohibeat cum presencialiter (vel immediate) coheret." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 185.

connection with the Agent Intellect after death.[62] Separated from the Agent Intellect and its body, the wicked soul experiences eternal torture as it forever contemplates its worldly desires and cannot fulfill them. Algazel admits that topics in this treatise touch on divine matters and thus the Agent Intellect could have been covered in the *Metaphysica*, but, he chose to discuss it at the end of the *Physica* because the Agent Intellect is best understood through what it gives to human souls.[63] Having returned to divine matters, he ends the fifth treatise, and with it the *STP*, rather abruptly after the section on prophecy.

Just as Algazel's discourse on the first intelligence attracted attention on account of its theological implications, scholars cited the fifth treatise of the *Physica* more than any other because of Algazel's claims regarding Agent Intellect's influence on souls and its connection to the afterlife. Thirty-three scholars—almost one-fourth of the authors who quoted the *STP*—cited either this treatise in general or one of its ten chapters. As with the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica*, scholars found that the last treatise of the *Physica* contained many errors. Six of these errors are included in *De erroribus philosophorum* along with a reference to the fifth treatise of the *Physica*.[64] There are several errors in the Condemnation of 1277 that discuss the Agent Intellect and bear some

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[62] "Quartum est cruciatus, cum anima est remota ab hac felicitate, que debetur ei secundum suam naturam. Cum enim separacio fit inter eam, et id quod diligit, tunc punitur; non separatur autem ab ea, nisi quia sequitur voluptates, et totum eius studium est circa id quod appetit natura corporalis, in tantum quod fiunt in anima eius disposiciones obsequentes, et appetentes id solum quod competit corpori, et delectacioni huius mundi vilis, et corruptibilis. Unde illa disposicio propter usum imprimitur in anima eius et inheret vehementer desiderium eius ad illam; postea vero per mortem amisso instrumento rei desiderate remanet desiderium eius, et amor, et hic est cruciatus ineffabilis." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 186-187.
[63] "Non est dubium quod consideracio de intelligencia agente pertineat ad divinorum tractatum, in quo predictum est, et quod intelligencia est, et que est eius proprietas..." See note 59.
[64] See errors #11-16, Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 42, 44.

similiarities to passages from this treatise.[65] Thus, there appears to be a correlation between the number of errors in a treatise and its popularity with scholars given the preponderance of errors and citations in the fifth treatises of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*.

The most popular sections of the fifth treatise of the *Physica* were the related third and fourth chapters on the Agent Intellect's role in eternal happiness and suffering in the afterlife, which elicited citations from twenty-three scholars and contained three errors listed in *De erroribus philosophorum*.[66] Scholars customarily objected to Algazel's interpretation of the afterlife as too cerebral. Thomas Aquinas refutes Algazel's lack of corporeal punishment for wicked souls in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, citing Matthew 25:41 in a way that resembles error 19 in the Condemnation of 1277.[67] Robert Holcot

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[65] The Agent Intellect appears in errors #115, 118, and 123. None of these errors refer directly a specific passage in the *STP*, but error #112, while not discussing the Agent Intelligent, seems to be aimed at fifth treatise of the *Physica* since it mentions the influence of intelligences, providing the example of a magican throwing a camel in a pit: "Quod intelligentie superiores imprimunt in inferiores, sicut anima una intellectiua imprimit in aliam, et etiam in animam sensitiuam; et per talem impressionem incantator aliquis prohicit camelum in foueam solo uisu." Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 112. Compare with the passage from the *STP* in n. 78.

[66] "12. Ulterius errauit ponens animam nostram esse beatam in eo quod intelligit intelligentem ultimam. 13. Ulterius errauit ponens ultimam beatitudinem nostram esse naturalem. Uoluit enim quod naturaliter deberetur animae talis beatitudo... 14. Ulterius errauit circa poenam animae ponens talem poenem solum esse ex eo quod separatur ab intelligentia agente. Unde in anima separata non posuit poenam sensus nisi inquantum habet poenam damni. In anima uero coniuncta ex poena damni non posuit prouenire poenam sensus, dicens animam coniunctam corpori non dolere et non sentire dolorem ex eo quod separatur ab intelligentia agente propter occupationem quam habet circa corpus." Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 42.

[67] "Quidam ergo attendentes passionem in anima proprie esse non posse, dixerunt, omnia quae dicuntur in Scripturis de poenis corporalibus damnatorum, intelligenda esse metaphorice; ut scilicet per huiusmodi corporales poenas apud nos notas, significarentur afflictiones spirituales, quibus spiritus damnati puniuntur; sicut e contrario per corporales delectationes repromissas in Scripturis intelligimus spirituales delectationes beatorum. Et huiusmodi opinionis videtur fuisse Origenes, et Algazel. Sed quia resurrectionem credentes non solum credimus futuram esse poenam spirituum, sed corporum; corpora vero puniri non possunt nisi corporali poena, eadem poena hominibus post resurrectionem et spiritibus debetur, ut patet Matth. XXV,

also contests Algazel on this point with recourse to scripture, but he focuses on the promised resurrection of the body before the final judgment.[68] Algazel's eternal beatitude met with similar challenges. John Gerson rejects that the beatific vision consisted of the eternal contemplation of the Agent Intellect, and also references the Condemnation of 1277.[69] Not every citation met with disapproval since Vincent of Beauvais, Albert the Great, and Agostino Nifo discuss Algazel's concept of beatitude and damnation without criticism.[70] However, these passages of the fifth treatise of the *Phyica* only became more infamous with time as sixteenth-century scholars consistently applied the previous

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41, ubi dicitur: ite maledicti in ignem aeternum et cetera." Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 1. Compare with error #19 in the Condemnation of 1277: "Quod anima separata nullo modo patitur ab igne." Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 84.

[68] "Omnes morimur et quasi aquae dilabimur in terram, quae ultra non revertetur. Item Algazel 5 Meta. suae cap. 4, dicit: 'Quod anima quae est expers scientiarum et sordida, propter consuetudinem voluptatum cruciatur: quia amissum est instrumentum, scilicet corpus sine quo non potest consequi illud ad quod eam revocat concupiscentia. Et dicit ibidem, quod illa est maxima poena aeterna.' Sed aeterna non foret si corpus esset reparandum. Item. I Corint[hianos] 15: Caro et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebunt." Robert Holcot, *In librum sapientiae regis salomonis Praelectiones CCXIII* (Basel, 1586), 63.

[69] "Contra hanc imaginationem est parisiensis articulus quamquam Avicenna et Algazel de beatitude intelligentiarum visi fuerint huius imaginationis extitisse." John Gerson, *Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii De coelesti hierachia*, 263.

[70] "Cum autem liberatur a corporis occupatione post mortem, removetur velamen et prohibens, duratque spiritualiter coherentia: quoniam anima permanet spiritualiter, et intelligentia agens spiritualiter, et infusio ex parte illius est largissima. Algazel, ii lib. ii. Cum ergo separata fuerit anima a corpore durabit eius coherentia cum intelligentia agente perficietur que eius dispositio ac delectabit in delectione." Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale*, Lib. XXIII, c. 67, f. 290va. "Traditio autem Avicennae et Algazelis videtur esse magis conveniens, licet et ipsa aliquid contineat imperfectionis. Hi enim videntur tradere animam separatam post mortem intellectum possibilem habere et per hunc ad intelligentiam agentem ab ipsa separatam converti et accipere ab ipsa formarum intelligibilium lumine et speculationes." Albert the Great, *Liber de natura et origine animae*, tr. II, c. 10, 35. "His acceptis ac perfecte expositis scientia omnium Peripateticorum est, ut...Algazelis...et omnium antiquorum, quod foelicitas formaliter est intellectus agens ita, quod sicut intellectus agens est formaliter foelicitas, ita foelicitas formaliter intellectus agens. Sunt enim nomina diversa idem significatum secundum rem habentia." Agostino Nifo, *De intellectu*, 571.

arguments against Algazel, often mentioning Aquinas' rejection in the *Summa contra Gentiles*.[71]

The most interesting discussion of Algazel's vision of eternal reward came not from the academy, but from Robert of Anjou, King of Naples, in a treatise debating Pope John XXII's position on the Beatific Vision. On All Saints' Day in 1331, Pope John XXII preached a sermon in which he argued that the souls of the blessed do not see God upon death, but rather they receive this vision only after the Last Judgment.[72] Until then, souls content themselves with the consolation of Christ, through whom they would see a dim reflection of God's divinity. Disputations over this doctrine arose immediately in the universities and refutations of the pope's position earned scholars imprisonment and censure until John's death in 1334.[73] Robert of Anjou, who read widely and preached on occasion, composed his own refutation, *De visione beata*, in September 1332 and addresssed it to the pope in Avignon. The king quotes an array of authorities in the five chapters of the treatise, one of which Robert dedicated to the opinions of philosophers. Algazel's last treatise of the *Physica* figures prominently in this chapter along with a

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[71] For example, Gabriel du Préau's entry for Algazel in his catalog of heretics is keen to mention Thomas' involvement in the refutation of this argument: "Algazel 27: de hoc haeretico divus Thomas lib. 3, contra gent[iles] Cap. 45 scribit illum in hac fuisse haeresi ut affereret hanc solam poenam reddi peccatoribus...," in *Elenchus de vitis, sectis et dogmatibus omnium haereticorum*, 21-22.

[72] John XXII, "Sermo in festivitate Omnium Sanctorum," ed. Marc Dykmans, *Les sermons de Jean XXII sur la vision béatifique* (Rome: Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1973), 85-99.

[73] The Beautific Vision became a subject of quodlibetal disputations at Paris and Naples, as well as the Roman curia and the imperial court at Munich around the end of 1332. Even the Master of the Sacred Palace at Avignon, Armand of Belvézer, disputed the topic. Not all of the disputants sided with the Pope, but only few sharply criticized him. Several Dominican scholars were tried by the inquisition, but only the Dominican Thomas Waleys was imprisoned for his attack on the pope's position. Marc Dykmans, *Les sermons de Jean XXII sur la vision béatifique*, 165-197.

similar discussion in the ninth book of Avicenna's *Metaphysica*. Robert acknowledged the position of each author in turn, but he preferred Algazel's explanation.

> The rationale of this purification after death is as Avicenna says in book nine....However, Algazel expresses more clearly the very same rationale of eternal or not eternal punishment in the fifth treatise of his *Metaphysica*, saying that when a soul is separated from the happiness owed to it according to its nature, then it is in torment.[74]

While Avicenna receives pride of place, Robert believes that Avicenna's abbreviator conveys the subject matter in a way that is more apparent and perhaps more convincing. He relies again on Algazel later in the chapter, saying that "whether by faith or knowledge, the disposition [of a soul] is toward happiness according to what Algazel says in the fifth treatise" and quotes Algazel's discussion on the continuation of the soul's inclinations toward good or evil after death.[75] Though Robert is noticeably silent on the role of the Agent Intellect in the beatific vision, he twice cites the fifth treatise of the *Physica* without qualification.[76] For this learned king, the Beatific Vision could be defended as a doctrine of faith as well as a matter of philosophical truth by using a dubious passage from Algazel that many scholars in Robert's time had condemned.

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[74] "Ratio autem huius purgationis post mortem est quam dicit Avicenna, libro nono....Istam autem rationem pene, eterne et non eterne, exprimit manifestius Algazel in sua *Metaphysica*, tractatu quinto, dicens quod cum anima est separata a felicitate ei debita secundum suam naturam tunc est ipsa in cruciatu." Robert of Anjou, *De visione beata*, 62.

[75] "Item utrum non tantum fides set et scientia, dispositio est ad felicitatem, secundum quod dicit Algazel, tractatu 5: 'Quod cum cognitiones que sunt adiudicate nature virtutis' intellectus, 'ut Dei et angelorum, presentes fuerunt anime,' ita quod occupare in illis non diligens corpus nec eius accidentia, et fuerit studiosissima circa intelligentiam eorum, profecto talis, cum 'fuerit separata a corpore,' durabit 'eius coherentia et perficietur eius dispositio, et delectabitur delectatione, cuius esse non potest sermone explicari.'" Robert of Anjou, *De visione beata*, 65.

[76] Here Robert illustrates how Latin scholars conflated the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* into one work that they commonly referred to as the *Metaphysica*.

The other chapters of the fifth treatise of the *Physica* were less popular, but they consistently held scholars' interest during the Middle Ages. Given the nature of the *STP* as an abbreviation of a wider corpus of philosophy, these chapters were too short and superficial to demonstrate in detail how a soul sees visions or performs miracles. Yet scholars were intrigued by the soul's supernatural abilities and they found it useful to cite Algazel as an authority who discussed such topics, although briefly. Most authors simply mentioned that Algazel believed that soul could perform these wonders, but one proverb in the ninth section was particularly arresting and appeared frequently in Latin works.

> Sometimes the attack by a soul reaches a body so that it destroys a spirit by imagination and affects a man by imagination, and this is called fascination. There is a proverb on account of this, that the eye casts a man into a pit or a camel into a cauldron, and it is said because it is true that men are fascinated, but the meaning of the matter is this: that because a camel is pleasing to him and he admires it, his soul is spiteful and jealous. He imagines the death of the camel and the body of the camel is afflicted by his imagination, and it immediately dies. Since this is possible, then it is not long before one soul becomes much more powerful than another one.[77]

Algazel here describes the power of the Evil Eye, but Latin scholars could hardly be expected to recognize that he attributes a Middle Eastern curse to the power of the Agent Intellect. The curious mention of a camel makes this passage unique and even authors who do not cite a source clearly obtained this proverb from the *STP* or from someone who was familiar with the work. This example of natural magic proved popular early in

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[77] "Aliquando autem impressio alicuius anime pertransit ad aliud corpus, sic ut destruat spiritum estimacione, et inficiat hominem estimacione, et hoc dicitur fascinacio. Et propter hoc est illud proverbium, quod oculus mittit hominem in fossam, et camelum in caldarium, et dicitur quod homines fascinari verum est; huius autem rei sensus hic est, quod quia multum placet ei camelus, et miratur de eo, et eius anima est maligna, et invidiosa, estimat casum cameli, et inficitur corpus cameli ab eius estimacione, et statim cadit; postquam autem hoc possibile est, tunc non est longe quin aliqua anima multo forcior quam ista." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 194.

the thirteenth century.[78] William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and Robert Grosseteste refer to the ability to kill a man or a camel using only the imagination, though William and Peter fail to name Algazel as the source.[79] Scholars continued to mention this deadly form of telepathy into the late fourteenth century, when Nicole Oresme changed the unfortunate recipient from a camel to a mule.[80] Sixteenth-century scholars remained interested in Algazel's enchantment or "fascinatio," but they failed to mention eyes, camels, and caldrons.[81]

Conclusion

Before I move to the next set of evidence, there are a few observations that arise from this survey of the passages that were most commonly cited by scholars. First, although many of the passages frequently cited by scholars also appear directly or

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[78] John Pecham, *Quodlibet Romanum*, ed. Ferdinand Delorme (Rome, 1938), q. 2, 77; Richard of Middleton, *Authorati theologi Ricardi de media villa: minoritane familie ornamenti tria recognita reconcinnataque quodlibeta*, Quodlibet III, q. 12, 35. Peter of Abano, *Conciliator*, Diff. XXXVII, f. 56v.

[79] "Cum autem volueris ad lucidum hoc intelligere, cogita fortitudinem imaginativae virtutis, ex cuius operatione sequitur ex necessitate forinseca operatio, quemadmodum dixit quidam philosophus de quodam qui imaginabatur casum cameli et statim cecidit camelus." William of Auvergne, *De universo creaturum*, in *Guilielmi Alverni Opera Omnia*, vol. 1, c. 21, f. 615a; "Et secundum hunc modum forte non est fascinatio nisi in anima rationali. Algazel autem philosophus dicit, 'Affectus dilectionis erga corpus suum facit eam imprimere in illud. Aliquando autem impressio alicuius animae pertransit ad aliud corpus sic, ut destruat spiritum aestimatione et inficiat hominem aestimatione, et hoc dicitur fascinatio.'" Robert Grosseteste, *Expositio in epistulam sancti Pauli ad Galatas*, c. 3, 73. "[U]nde anime maligne ductus fascinationis corpus dissipat et corruptionem inprimendo, vulgo enim dicitur oculum malum hominem fosse mandare et camelum caldario. Set videtur hoc dissonum veritati." Peter of Spain, *Scientia libri de anima*, ed. Manuel Alonso (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigationes Científicas, 1941), 476. Peter curiously attributes this phenomenon to a folk tale ("vulgo") instead of Algazel, but perhaps that is his rendering of "proverbium."

[80] Nicole Oresme also changed the author of this idea from Algazel to Avicenna. While Avicenna does discuss the concept of "fascinatio," he does not mention a mule or camel. "Quid autem scivit Avicenna utrum illud quod ibi ponit sit verum, scilicet quod ymaginatio fecit cadere mulum et cetera? Unde fuerunt alii quam Avicenna ut Agazel et quidam alii qui posuerunt quod materia obedit intellectui non solum in eodem subiecto sed et in diversis." Nicole Oresme, *De causis mirabilium*, ed. Bert Hansens, *Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985), 314-315.

[81] Heinrich Kramer and Jacob Sprenger, *Malleus Maleficarum*, 21. Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, *De occulta philosophia*, 67.

indirectly in *De erroribus philosophorum* and the Condemnation of 1277, scholars did not often make the connection between the *STP* and the condemnations. Only two medieval scholars, John Gerson and James of Thérines, associated Algazel's teachings, from any of the treatises, with the Condemnation of 1277 in their own texts.[82] With the exception of Nicholas Eymerich's *Directorium Inquisitorum*, no scholars connected the *STP* with *De erroribus philosophorum*. This lack of association between the *STP* and the condemnations in the writings of scholars indicate that the reactions against these teachings were not prescribed by any authority or legislation, but represent organic responses to encounters with errors in Algazel's arguments.

The most frequently-quoted passages are not spread equally across the *STP*. Three are from the *Metaphysica*, two from the *Physica*, and none from the *Logica*. With the exception of Albert the Great, who seems to have had an impressive command of the entire *STP*, only a handful of scholars quoted from the *Logica* and no particular part of it received special attention. The lack of interest in the *Logica* is in keeping with comparably small number of copies of this book in manuscripts. It proved to be a useful

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[82] John Gerson closely connects Algazel and the Condemnation of 1277 on two occasions. John Gerson, *Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii De coelesti hierachia*, 210 and 263, see note 45 and 69 above. James of Thérines mentions Algazel's teaching and the Condemnation of 1277 in a question over the motive force behind the heavens, howbeit remotely: "Ad quartum distinctionem de Avicenna et de Algazele dicendum quod illa inductio procedit ab insufficienti; quia movetur ab intelligentia que est motor separatus et non ab anima....Ad quintam difficultatem quod si non uniretur orbi per essentiam et per consequens in ratione anime, sed solum per potentiam, et non habet nisi intellectum et voluntatem, sequeretur quod in quacumque distantia posset movere quodcumque mobile quia illud posset velle; quod est inconveniens et contra articulum episcopi Parisiensis." James of Thérines, *Quodlibet I et II*, Q. I, q. 5, 98. James refers to a passage in the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica* (104-118). The error in question is #212: "Quod intelligentia sola uoluntate mouet celum," Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 144.

enough tool to merit copying throughout the Middle Ages, but logicians did not find quotable material or arguments in it.

Scholars were most interested in citing passages from the last treatises of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*, specifically regarding Algazel's discussions about the first and last intelligences. This phenomenon among scholars quoting the *STP* can also be seen in the manuscripts. Most codices consist of the entire *STP*, one or two complete books, or a hodgepodge of excerpts drawn from the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*. However, Prague 1323 and 1585 contain independent copies of the fifth treatise of the *Physica* and *Metaphysica* respectively.[83] Why scribes chose to copy these treatises independently from the rest of the *STP* is unclear from the manuscripts alone, but the fact that scholars frequently cited these two treatises helps to explain the otherwise inscrutable actions of scribes, who perhaps responded to interest in these passages by fashioning more copies. In these two instances, there is much to be discovered about Algazel's audience by reading the two sets of evidence together—Latin works containing quotations from Algazel and manuscript copies of the *STP*—that could not be known by reading one set alone. For this reason, we turn to the manuscripts and ask the same questions about which passages were most popular with readers.

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[83] Prague 1323, f. 115r-117v possesses only the chapters on eternal happiness (Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 185-186), eternal suffering (186--188), the ability of perform miracles (193-196), and the facility to prophesy (196-197). Prague 1585, f. 1r-7v contains all of the fifth treatise. D'Alverny, *Codices*, 331-335, 336.

CHAPTER V: ANNOTATING ALGAZEL

The copy of the *STP* in Vat. lat. 4481 once was the property of a fourteenth-century Italian Dominican, John de Oculo, whose glosses show a keen interest in Algazel and an impressive ability to connect his arguments to those of other authors.[1] In his glosses on the first few folios, John compares Algazel's division of the sciences with that of Boethius as well as al-Farabi and Avicenna via excerpts from their translator Dominicus Gundissalinus.[2] He also shows an interest in many of the same sections of the *STP* that were quoted frequently by more well-known scholars. His annotations demonstrate a comprehension of Algazel's arguments and more than a few warnings indicate that he was concerned about their theological implications.[3] In many ways, John's interests and concerns mirror those of Algazel's audience in general, but they are articulated through a medium that is less accessible than the editions of medieval authors. His notes are often brief, eccentric, and even illegible. He frequently breaks or ignores the laws of Latin grammar. However, the sporadic notes left by John throughout the

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[1] The last folio of the manuscript has a note of ownership in a fourteenth-century hand: "fratris Iohannis de Oculo ordinis predicatorum." Vat. lat. 4481, f. 152v. I have not found much information about Johannes, but there is a noble family of the same name near Mantua from the early thirteenth century. While Johannes appears to be a scholar of some means, the details of his education and his priory are unclear. Stefano Davari, "Per la genealogia dei Bonacolsi," *Archivio Storico Lombardo* 31 (1901): 25-33 (26).

[2] "ob hoc dixit boetius quod physica est inabstracta et cum motu; mathematica, abstracta et cum motu; theologia uero abstracta et sine motu." Vat. lat. 4481, f. 1v. See Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 3:25. (Hereafter I use the page number and line in parentheses to refer to where a note appears approximately). On f. 1r-3r, John copied several long passages from Dominicus' *De divisione philosophiae*, which contain Avicenna's and al-Farabi's division of the sciences, evidently to compare them with Algazel's organization system. Muckle added these notes to his edition of the *STP* as Appendix A (198-210)

[3] John de Oculo wrote copious notes, many of them warnings, alongside the same passages discussed in the previous chapter. He also placed warnings in the form of the command "cave hic" alongside thirteen different passages in his copy of the *STP* in Vat. lat. 4481. Several of the arguments that elicited these warnings were also condemned in *De erroribus philosophorum* and also resemble many of articles of Condemnation of 1277. The warnings of John and other annotators are the subject of the next chapter.

manuscript indicate that he read most, if not all of the *STP*, and he is not alone in this regard. Many copies, like that of Vat. lat. 4481, contain annotations from generations of readers who greatly outnumber the medieval authors who cite Algazel in their own works, reinforcing the idea that more scholars read the *STP* than wrote about it.

This chapter seeks to uncover how the annotations add to our understanding of Algazel's Latin audience. It also outlines the passages that were most commonly annotated and, together with the previous chapter, illustrates which sections of the *STP* were the most popular. There are distinct advantages to the use of annotations in a study of reading practices. Annotations can represent a scholar's spontaneous responses to reading a text, perhaps for the first time, while quotations and citations are likely the product of several readings and are more calculated responses to a work. They can also provide better indications of a scholar's breadth of knowledge of a text. The appearance of the same glossing hand throughout the *STP* is a fair indication that a scholar read the majority of the work. Conversely, save for the authors who cite Algazel extensively like Albert the Great, it is difficult to determine whether those who quote the *STP* once or twice actually read beyond these few passages. Moreover, the placement of a note carries a degree of precision that many medieval citations lack. An annotation, which is typically written in the imperative (i.e. "nota quod..."), draws attention to an adjacent passage or section. On the other hand, an author may reference a treatise of the *STP*, but unless he supplies a quotation or the title of a chapter, which was by no means the universal practice, it is unclear which passage in the treatise illustrates his point. The value of

annotations as evidence in a study of reading practices resides in their specificity and immediacy—often in places where citations are ambiguous.

However, the study of glosses is complicated by the fact that every annotation is unique and its context is not readily available when nearly everything about the annotator—his education, age, location, reason and intention for reading Algazel—is unknown. Just as no two copies of the *STP* are alike, no two readers gloss a text in the same way. Also, the context behind anonymous marginalia is necessarily more ambiguous than the quotations deployed in the reasoned argumentation of medieval philosophers. The *sui generis* nature of annotations signifies that individual glosses cannot be as easily compared as the use of a passage from the *STP* by Albert or Thomas. Glosses therefore must be approached with care because so little is known about the authors and their intentions.

Despite these caveats, annotations provide opportunities to catch scholars in the act of reading. They are especially useful in this study on account of their number and variety. Though the annotators are often anonymous, they are more numerous than the scholars who quoted Algazel. It is not uncommon for a chapter of the *STP* to receive twenty or more annotations from different readers. If the same number of authors quoted from or cited the same section, it would represent a significant level of interest in the context of the previous chapter. Thus, the glosses grant access to a larger body of Algazel's audience than the quotations and represent a more diverse cross-section of readers. The scholars who quote the *STP* were among the best and brightest in Latin Christendom, but they are a rather homogenous group since most of them received the

same education, read the same works, and were responding to the same questions. Many occupied prestigious chairs in the faculty of arts or theology at Paris or Oxford. While some in this elite group owned and annotated copies of the *STP*, they do not comprise the majority. As discussed in chapter one, both remote abbeys and university libraries produced and owned copies of the *STP*, and these manuscripts enjoyed a multiplicity of owners with a wide range of education from all over Europe. For these reasons, the annotators are a wide-ranging body of readers who differ geographically and temporally, and vary in their education, philosophical interests and theological concerns.

The glossators of the *STP* are not as influential as the scholars who quoted Algazel in works that have come to us in modern editions, but they nonetheless represent a significant portion of Algazel's Latin audience and offer a unique perspective on how scholars read Arab philosophy. Thus, this chapter attempts to give voice to the often-voiceless majority of the medieval readers. The first part of the chapter outlines the variety of annotations within these manuscripts and the different tasks they perform. This section builds upon the greater thesis of the project—that Algazel was a long-standing and influential member of the Latin philosophical canon—by illustrating the effort expended by readers to aid in their understanding of the *STP*. Scholars left copious notes, paraphrases, and marginalia in an effort to make sense of the text, highlighting passages that were of interest and concern to them. The second half examines which portions of the *STP* received the most annotations from readers. I compare these findings with those of the previous chapter, demonstrating where these two sets of evidence overlap and where they differ.

The Function of Annotations in the *STP*

Scholars wrote in copies of the *STP* for a host of reasons, but there are consistent glossing practices that fall into several categories. Annotations frequently demonstrate readers' efforts to understand and make better use of the text. Some glosses act as mnemonic devices for scholars who wished to return to a notable passage. Readers also write brief paraphrases or summaries to condense the sense of a section. Other glosses reveal how readers viewed the *STP* in the context of other authorities. Like John's notes in Vat. lat. 4481, scholars compare Algazel's arguments with those of Arab and Latin philosophers. In this way, annotators place Algazel in dialogue with the wider Latin philosophical tradition, but the readers themselves occasionally enter into the conversation. More than a few scholars offer their own judgments of Algazel and point out flaws in his arguments, even placing warnings near dangerous passages. However, some scholars take a lighthearted approach to their reading, drawing doodles or turning marginalia into faces, animals, or decorative designs. The annotations reveal a range of approaches to Algazel and illustrate the hypertextual nature of manuscripts. Unfinished folios, margins, and spaces between lines serve as forums to customize, restructure, and talk back to the *STP*. Here scholars can bring in authorities to speak with Algazel and are free to leave reminders for themselves and cautions to others. Memory aids and paraphrases act as new rubrics that personalize the text and offer clues to the interests of a reader who consistently glosses the same topics. Readers cover the pages of the *STP* with layers of quotations, insights, and concerns in an effort to tease out the meaning of Algazel's words and to make better use of them.

Aids to Reading and Memory

The most common way for readers to assist their reading and recollection of parts of the *STP* is the command to "note" or "mark," usually in the form of "nota" as a word or monogram that highlights an idea in the adjacent text. John de Oculo places many "nota's" to mark Algazel's division of knowledge into active and speculative branches as well as the subsequent division of the speculative branch into the divine, mathematical, and natural sciences.[4] While John focuses on grasping the author's organization of the sciences, he is equally interested in recalling smaller details. In a later discussion of God's characteristics, John leaves a reminder with the gloss "note clearly that essence and being are the same only in God."[5] A fourteenth-century reader of Reg. lat. 1870 likewise wishes to remember a similar idea in the first treatise of the *Metaphysica* when he writes "note the manner of receiving a division of being into substance and accident."[6] He applies a different command, "attende," near Algazel's discussion of naked intelligences, reminding himself in forceful terms to "pay very close attention to what he says here."[7] Though annotators wrote most of the notes for their own benefit, it is likely that they placed these finding and memory aids for others within their community. The

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[4] "nota sapiencie cognicionem diuidi in duo." Vat. lat. 4481, f. 1r (1:26); "nota dupliciter scienciam actiuam et speculatiuam et sicut actiua diuiditur in tria, ita et speculatiua." f. 1r (2:12); "nota speculatiuam diuidi in tria sicut et actiua." f. 1v (2:31); "nota quod quedam sciencia est que tractat interdum modo de his que penitus sunt expoliata a formis, et illa est diuina sciencia que tractat de deo et angelis; quedam sciencia est que tractat de his que possunt estimari extra materiam cum non sunt et est matematica; quedam est que tractat de his que habent esse interdum in materia et est sciencia naturalis." f. 1v (3:9).

[5] "nota clare quod in solo deo idem est quiditas et esse," Vat. lat. 4481, f. 32v (88:6)

[6] "Nota modum accipiendi diuisio entis in substantiam et accidens." Reg. lat. 1870, f. 26vb (6:7). This annotator provides a similar type of annotation below on the same folio: "Nota quomodo ex dictis de differentia accidentis et forme substantalis et de essentia et sequitur quoniam appellatur diuisione id in quod existit ut quemque." (7:4)

[7] "Attende quod hic dicit diligentius," Reg. lat. 1879, f. 40va (90:35-91:1)

commands to note this or that passage were not only for the individual who wrote them, but scholars also glossed the *STP* to share their insights and assist later readers.

The frequent glossing of key words was another finding aid or aid to memory that gives clues to a reader's interests. Scholars scoured the *STP* for certain terms and wrote them in the margins as a rudimentary indexing tool. Popular search items include, but are not limited to: God, angels, intelligences, hyle, any of the four elements, and the motion of the heavens. Rarely did a reader show interest in all of these and some believed on occasion that they saw these concepts even where they did not appear. The thirteenth-century annotator of Basel D. III. 7 marks each appearance of God in the text, but he also noted words that might be construed as God, such as "primum principium" and "necesse esse."[8] Although dozens of readers leave many "nota" in the margins and do not specify what they want to remember or why, the few that highlighted key words are consistent or prolific enough that it is possible to tease out their interests.

Some readers condense chapters and sections into paraphrases to aid their comprehension. The glossator of Laon 412 describes the contents of the beginning of the *Metaphysica* as "the prologue of the first book in which [Algazel] defines the division of the sciences."[9] This type of note sometimes takes the form of writing out the first sentence or phrase in a chapter or treatise. A reader of Laon 412 copies out the majority of the first sentences of chapters and treatises, often regardless of whether a rubric

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[8] The annotator of Basel D. III. 7 notes each occurrence of the mention of God throughout the *STP* with the abbreviation "de[9]."

[9] "preterea prologus primi libri in qua determinat de divisione scientiarum," Laon 412, f. 70ra. (1:18)

already appears. One glossator similarly writes out the first sentences of the chapters in the fifth treatise of the *Physica*, beginning with the controversial discussion of the Agent Intellect and soul's beatitude or suffering after death.[10] Some scholars were interested in summarizing the conflicting opinions of philosophers as well as the judgments offered by Algazel. A reader of Basel D. III. 7 was careful to mark when Algazel presented an opinion ("opinio") and where he refutes it ("destructio").[11] The annotator of Graz 482 points out when Algazel offers a proof or "probatio," including his argument for the existence of an infinite number of souls.[12] These attempts at paraphrasing serve several purposes in addition to aiding a reader's memory. They not only condense a chapter into a concise phrase, but they also customize the text. A reader fashions an alternative set of rubrics with these summaries, structuring the text to reflect his approach as well as creating a separate set of finding aids for himself and later scholars.

Less common forms of marginalia are the outlines fashioned by readers. These are not the diagrams that were originally in the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and that the translators incorporated into the Latin version and were copied sporadically by scribes, though correctors or glossators sometimes took it upon themselves to add these diagrams

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[10] "Quartum est cruciatus cum anima est remota ab hac felicitate que debetur ei secundum suam naturam... Decimum est quod necesse esse prophetam esse et quod debet credi ipsum." BnF Lat. 6655, f. 86vb-91vb. (186:30-196:25)

[11] "prima opinio de compositione corporis / destructio prime opinionis," Basel D. III. 7, f. 98r (10:11-10:18); "destructio secunde opinionis de compositione corporis," f. 99r (13:26); "tertia opinio que ponit corpus esse compositum ex materia et forma," f. 99v (14.25).

[12] "probatio quod infinitas non est in causis / quod non sit infinitas in causis et spaciis / quod motus celi est infinitus / qualiter anime separate infinite," Graz 482, f. 146vb (40:1-41:13)

later in the margins.[13] The most prolific author of outlines is an annotator of BnF Lat. 6443, who lists the divisions of the *Physica*, the types of motion, the forces of the human soul, and the accidents of the intellect.[14] The annotator of BNC Magliab. Cl. V. 45 creates an outline corresponding to a section in the *Logica* that describes how each science has a question as its subject and, in good Aristotelian fashion, these questions have five accidents.[15] Even Nicholas Bacun above lists the reasons why objects become hot on account of the properties of the elements in a copy of the *Physica* in Worcester Q. 81.[16]

As a translation, the *STP* contained words and concepts that were foreign or less well known to Latin scholars. In order to maintain a degree of fidelity with the original, the translators fashioned neologisms or transliterated a word from Arabic to Latin characters when an equivalent was unavailable. They found that the Arabic terms to describe something's essence outstripped those in Latin. One neologism, "anitas," consistently elicited a definition from readers. This Latin equivalent for "anniyah (انية "that-it-is-ness," i.e. "existence") appears in direct relationship to a similar term for something's "what-ness," which the translators rendered as "quiditas."[17] The appearance

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[13] BnF Lat. 16096 contains several diagrams that were placed by the original scribe or illustrator in the text, but the diagram on *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 8 is written in the margins of f. 85ra in a later hand. Similar occurrences appear in in BnF Lat. 6552,f. 47ra (41:21). See also p. 48, n. 13.

[14] "Phisica / de forma / hyle / motu / loco" BnF Lat. 6443, f. 157 (131.8); "motus / per accidens / per uiolentiam / per naturam," f. 158rb (134.5); "uirtus / sciens / operans / speculatiuam / actiuam," f. 162vb (172:10-11); "intellectualis / in potentia / in habitu / in effectu," f. 163ra (175:3-9).

[15] "subiectum questionis probanda in aliqua scientia uel erit scientia dummodo tantum / Ipsum subiectum tantum / Ipsum subiectum cum impressione essentiali / Species subiecti / Subiecti species cum impressione / Impressione tantum," BNC Magliab. Cl. V. 45, f. 14v; Algazel, "Logica Algazelis," 284:103-285:133.

[16] "Quod caliditas agit in aliquid de causis / uicinitate corporis calidi / motu / luce," Worcester Q. 81, f. 94v (145:15-21).

[17] "Diversitas autem inter hanitatem, et quiditatem cognoscitur diffinicione intelligibili, non sensibili, sicut diversitas forme et hile." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 25:23-25." "[I]gitur hoc unum propter

of "anitas" together with "quiditas" attracted considerable attention from glossators who provide definitions to distinguish between the two. The same annotation appears alongside the first appearance of "anitas" in two manuscripts, BnF Lat. 6655 and Lat. 16605: "Note that 'anitas' is the answer to the question made regarding 'whether it is.' 'Quiditas' is the answer to the question made regarding 'what it is.'"[18] However, not all scholars recognized the difference between the words, such as Nicholas Bacun, who equates the two in Worcester Q. 81.[19] Other words received definitions sporadically from readers. One reader of BnF Lat. 6552 offers a definition of "alambic"—a vessel used for distillation—that Algazel introduces when discussing how vapor is produced from a combination of cool water and warm air.[20] Some definitions appear to be an appreciation of a turn of phrase, as occurs in Worcester Q. 81 where Nicholas Bacun writes out Algazel's description of fire as "aer adurens."[21] These definitions reveal that scholars were not content to pass over foreign words or neologisms, but wanted to develop their understanding of Arab philosophy for their own benefit as well as that of later readers.

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multitudinem que in eo est, fecit debere esse multitudinem, et ob hoc multiplicata sunt ea que sunt, nec potest esse aliter nisi sic, sed modus proveniendi hanc multitudinem est hic, quoniam primus est unus et verus, eo quod esse eius est esse purum, cuius hanitas est ipsa eius quidditas, et quicquid est preter illum est possibile." 120:2-8. See also Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny's article on the subject, "Anniyya-Anitas," in *Melanges offerts a E. Gilson* (Toronto and Paris, 1959): 59-81.

[18] There are slight differences between these notes. "nota hanitas est quod (respo)ndetur ad interrogationem factam per an est" / "nota quiditas est id quod respondetur ad interrogationem factam per quid est" BnF Lat. 16605, f. 23r (25:23). "queritur cum anitas est id quod responditur ad interrogationem factam per an. / Quiditas est id per quod respondetur ad interrogationem factam per quid est [sic]." BnF Lat. 6655, f. 28rb (25:24).

[19] "anitas id est quiditas," Worcester Q. 81, f. 94va (144:26)

[20] "vasum in quo vapores continentur," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 58ra.

[21] "ignis est aer adurens," Worcester Q. 81, f. 95ra (148:32).

A few scholars left drawings in the margins that enhanced their reading or provided a needed break from the text. Manicula were the most widespread form of artwork employed by readers. These hands were perhaps the most direct form of marginalia since they literally point to a line of text. However, they are also the most ambiguous in regards to their meaning and context. Beyond calling attention to a passage, it is unclear whether the annotator intended this hand as a finding aid, an *aide de memoire*, or something else entirely.[22] The straightforward nature of the pointing hands meant that artists rarely had to provide an explanation as to their significance. Drawing brackets alongside the text served a similar purpose and everything from hasty squiggles to decorated pillars were often placed in concert with notes. In addition to his annotations, Nicholas Bacun often bracketed passages in Worcester Q. 81, which he sometimes turned into faces with eyes, large noses, gaping mouths, and occasionally eyebrows that give a menacing appearance.[23] The annotator of Reg. lat. 1870 likewise adds brackets to his notes and fashions them into faces that are less exaggerated than those of Nicholas, though he is able to incorporate the text into these faces, using the final 'o' of a word at the end of a line as an eye.[24] Save for the manicula, the artwork and doodles that appear in the margins has little to do with the text's content and seem to be the product of boredom, yet it is possible to see a scholar's mind wander as he reads. After a reference to a blind man who cannot see the motion of the heavens, the annotator

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[22] For an extended discussion of the varied meaning of the manicule, see William Sherman, *Used Books: Marking Readers in Renaissance England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 25-52.
[23] Worcester Q. 81, f. 88ra, 88va, 89va, 92ra. The face on f. 88va has a paragraph mark as an eye.
[24] Reg. lat. 1870, f. 31rb (34:17). See also f. 33ra (45:17).

of Laon 412 sketches the profile of a blind man—indicated by the blacked-out eyes.[25] Clearly, Algazel did not fascinate every reader and many tried to break the monotony by engaging their creative side.

Dialogue with Other Authorities

Just as scholars compiled the *STP* with the other philosophical works and compared his arguments with those of old and new authorities in their own writings, they also read the *STP* side-by-side with these authors and juxtaposed their ideas in the margins. Since Algazel is regularly identified as an Arab, annotators considered his positions to be representative of the Arab philosophical tradition. One fourteenth-century reader of Graz 482 pointed out that Algazel's proof that color can be both accidental and essential to a being was in keeping with the "understanding of Arabs" on the matter.[26] Annotators could also be specific in their comparisons between Algazel and members of the Arab tradition. Scholars naturally placed Avicenna, the philosopher most closely associated with Algazel, in conversation with the *STP*. Godfrey of Fontaines, who once owned BnF Lat. 16096, wrote lengthy notes at the beginning of the *Logica* comparing Avicenna's approach to grammar and intellection that stretch across several folios.[27]

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[25] Laon 412, f. 83vb (104:19).

[26] "probatio quod color est accidens et est substantialis secundum intellectum Arabum" Graz 482, f. 144va (23:4).

[27] Godfrey of Fontaines compares Algazel's description of logic with a lengthy excerpt from that of Avicenna that stretches over the margins of two folios. Compare Avicenna, *Logica*, f. 2a-3a with Godfrey's notes:"auicenna sicut res scitur duobus modis uno ut intelligatur tantum ut cum nomen habeat quo appelletur representetur in animo eius intentio, quamuis non sit ibi ueritas uel falsitas, sicut cum dicitur homo aut cum dicitur fac hoc, cum ergo comprehenderis intentionem eius quod tibi dicitur iam intellexisti. Altero ut cum in intellectu sit credulitas sicut cum dicitur tibi quod omnis albedo sit accidens ex quo non habebis intelligere huius dictionis intentionem tantum, sed etiam credere ita esse....comparatio autem huius

Aristotle was likewise on scholars' minds as they read Algazel. One reader of Ott. lat. 2186 finds connections between the *STP* and Aristotle's corpus, citing arguments from the *Metaphysics* and *De caelo* regarding why the sea is salty and the origin of earthquakes.[28] The annotator of Laon 412 believes that Algazel obtained his argument for an infinite number of souls in the *Metaphysica* from Aristotle.[29] Annotators recognized the *STP*'s place within the Arab tradition and often took the opportunity to make connections between Algazel and other Arab philosophers.

Annotators also understood that elements of the *STP* bore similarities to the works of Latin philosophers. John de Oculo drew distinctions between Boethius' organization of the sciences and that of Algazel in his copy of the *STP* in Vat. lat. 4481.[30] Annotators, like scribes, closely associated Algazel with his translator Dominicus, whose works often appeared in the same manuscripts. Vat. lat. 2186 possesses a copy of Algazel's *Logica* as well as *De divisione philosophiae*, in which an annotator is able to identify a quotation

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doctrine ad intellectum interiorem qui vocatur locutio et sicut comparatio melodie ad metrum, sed melos non tantum prodest ad mensurandum metra, sensus enim excusat ab hoc quod ad grammaticam arabicam sufficit aliquando natura rusticorum. hac autem doctrina eget homo qui acquir[i]t scientiam cogitando et considerando nisi fuerit homo diuinitus inspiratus, cuius comparatio ad considerantes est sicut comparatio rustici arabici ad discentes arabicum." BnF Lat. 16096, f. 74r-74v.

[28] "dicit aristotelis in libro metha[phisice] quod salsedo in mari propter confricationem terrestrium partium. per quas fit adustio quamdiu. et propter talem confricationem; et adustione fit salsedo in mari. et fit mare salsum. uidendum est nec qualiter facti sint montes et mare. Aristotelis dicit in libro celi et mundi quod principiis causa maris et montium fuit diluuium. nam terra a principio fuit creata in specie rotundi. sed adveniente diluuio facte sunt concauitates in ea. et ex quo fuerunt concauitates. necnon fuerunt montes et maria." Ott. lat. 2186, f. 91v (154); "de terremotu consequiter agendum et uidendum est qualiter fiat terremotus et unde non est enim sicut quidam dicunt. quam non omnis motus terre dicitur terremotus. hoc est sicut dicit aristotelis in libro methe[phisice]. Ott. lat. 2186, f. 92r (156).

[29] Algazel refers to a "tractatu de prius et posterius" in his discussion of the possibility of infinite souls in the *Metaphysica*'s first treatise (40:23). The annotator of Laon 412 informs later readers that Algazel follows Aristotle's argument on the matter: "composita supra consequentiam aristotelis si infiniti homines" Laon 412, f. 75rb.

[30] See note 2 above.

from Algazel that Dominicus copied from the *STP*.[31] The passage quoted here by Dominicus does not appear in the *Logica*, but in the *Metaphysica*, and thus this astute reader had access to more of the *STP* than what appears in this manuscript or perhaps he knew the text well enough to recall the passage from memory. Other codices also demonstrate that scholars read Algazel and Dominicus together. BnF Lat. 14700 contains a complete copy of the *STP* and *De divisione philosophiae*. One of its annotators or perhaps the scribe identifies several passages in *De divisione philosophiae* that Dominicus copied from Algazel. The annotator writes "Algazel the philosopher" and inscribes his name ("Agaçel") twice more in the left margin to indicate where Dominicus copied parts of the *STP*, specifically alongside Algazel's division of the sciences.[32] Thus, readers compare Algazel's arguments to those of Latin scholars and could identify elements of Algazel in Latin works.

Reactions and Judgments

In the margins of the *STP*, readers placed Algazel in conversation with an assortment of Arab and Latin philosophers, but they also entered into the conversation with their own opinions. Some show an appreciation of the *STP*. An annotator in BnF Lat. 6443 admired parts of the *Logica*, particularly his use of a mirror as metaphor for the

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[31] "Agaçel philosophus." Vat. lat. 2186, f. 25va. Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae*, 66-68. (Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 3:1-14). Surprisingly, this annotator is able to locate quotations from Avicenna and al-Farabi as well as those of Algazel in *De divisione philosophiae*: "alfarabius" on f. 26va (*De scientiis*, 172-180), "auiceni" on f. 28va (*Metaphysica*, I, 2, 16), "auiceni" on f. 28vb (*Metaphysica*, I, 2, 16-17), "alfarabius" on f. 29ra (*De scientiis*, 180-184), and "auiceni" on f. 29va (*Metaphysica*, 1, 3, 19-20) roughly correspond to Dominicus' quotations from these authors in *De divisione philosophiae*, 76, 98, 100, 104, 106.

[32] BnF Lat. 14700, f. 299v (1-3). Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philsophiae*, 62, 64, 66.

soul, since both bear the reflection of an individual, calling this comparison "very beautiful."[33] He also appreciated Algazel's expression "the beginning of comprehension is the end of striving," referring to it literally as a *bon mot*.[34] However, while some scholars praise Algazel for a useful turn of phrase, others are less enthusiastic about his arguments and voice their disapproval. A reader of Graz 482 calls Algazel's discussion of the properties of light in the *Physica* "erroneous," though he does not specify what about this position is incorrect.[35] An annotator in BnF Lat. 6552 is more forthcoming in his evaluation of Algazel's explanation of the order of causes from the first intellect, instructing himself or the reader to "note the error of many things regarding the issue of matters into being."[36]

While the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 appears to be pointing out a flaw in Algazel's argument, this comment and others like it can also be interpreted as warnings. Many annotators warn readers by writing "beware of this" ("cave hic"), indicating that a few readers were apprehensive regarding contents of the *STP* and jumped at the opportunity to highlight parts they believed to be dangerous, even when they did not explain their concern. The annotator of Ott. lat. 2186 is wary of Algazel's argument that it is the nature of the first principle or God to be very generous ("largissimus") as it is the ultimate source of good. He writes the comment "beware of this because it could have a

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[33] "nota anima comparatur hic speculo valde pulcre," BnF Lat. 6443, 202va; Algazel, "Logica Algazelis," 242:88.
[34] "Nota hic bonum verbum" BnF Lat. 6443, f. 204rb; "Initium autem cognitionis finis est operis," Algazel, "Logica Algazelis," 242:.3-4.
[35] "opinio erronea de luce," Graz 482, f. 162ra (145:34).
[36] "nota errorem plurum de exitu rerum in esse" Paris BnF 6552, f. 54rb (121:5)

wicked meaning (malum intellectum)" adjacent to this passage to register his anxiety, though he does not explain what is wicked about this argument.[37] Although the annotators may be slightly oversensitive, more than a few readers are able to identify passages that challenge Christian doctrines and had merited condemnation in the Condemnation of 1277 and *De erroribus philosophorum*. Indeed, these notes of warning are so numerous and overlap so closely with the concerns of the condemnations that they are the focus of the next chapter.

The positive and negative reactions to the *STP* reinforce that annotations were often meant for a wider audience and indicate an awareness of a larger community of scholars who read Algazel. The majority of the annotations were for the use of the individual who wrote them since they reflect the interests of the reader and what he wanted to remember. Many notes, especially the warnings, suggest that readers had other scholars in mind when they glossed their copies of the *STP*. Indeed, it is unlikely that scholars wrote warnings for themselves since there would be little reason for a reader to remind himself to beware of a passage that he had already identified as dangerous. The warnings thus were directed primarily at others who might come upon these dangerous arguments. The annotator of Ott. lat. 2186 had future scholars in mind when he placed the note "reader beware" near Algazel's inclusion of incantations ("incantationes") and charms ("allectationes") in the natural sciences.[38] The warnings reveal that readers felt a degree of responsibility toward other scholars. Given the lack of private libraries

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[37] "cave hic quia potest habere malum intellectum," Reg. lat. 1870, f. 38va (79:32)
[38] "cave lector," Ott. Lat. 2186, f. 27r (4:10).

throughout the Middle Ages and the succession of *ex libris* in manuscripts, readers understood that their codices and the notes contained therein eventually would become the property of someone else. Since most annotators never composed a work of their own, the notes were their sole method of communicating their opinions and insights regarding Algazel with the wider community of readers.

Frequently Annotated Passages of the *STP*

The number and variety of annotations indicate that many scholars took an active approach to their reading of the *STP*, yet it is clear that some passages attracted more attention than others. Naturally, there is considerable overlap between the interests of the authors who quoted Algazel and the annotators since these two groups do not represent so much separate audiences as different sets of evidence from the same audience. The annotators show a similar interest in Algazel's discussions of the divisions of the sciences and of the existence of naked intelligences. However, there are significant differences in these two sets of sources. The annotations reveal that Latin scholars read more of the *STP* and that their interests ranged wider than the citations demonstrate. In general, there is an important distinction in the attention paid to the *Logica* and that of the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*. Although authors rarely quoted from the *Logica*, the number of annotations that appear in manuscript copies reveals that readers nevertheless found this book of the *STP* to be worthy of a few notes. Annotators also focus considerable attention on two chapters in the *Metaphysica* that were less popular with authors: God's largesse (tr. III, ch. 10), and the motion of celestial bodies and the existence of naked intelligences (tr. IV, ch. 3).

The similarities and differences in these sets of evidence present a more detailed picture of Algazel's audience.

Overlapping Interests between Authors and Annotators

It is difficult to make a strong distinction between these two sets of evidence because of the number of the annotations throughout the manuscripts. Scholar for scholar, the annotators provide more evidence of reading than the authors who quote Algazel and it is hard to find a part of the *STP* that did not receive at least some annotation. Nevertheless, there are two sections that are quite popular with authors as well as annotators, both of which are in the *Metaphysica*: the division of the sciences, and the discussion of the first principle and first intelligence.

Division of the Sciences

The beginning of the *Metaphysica* contains more annotations than any other section of the *STP*, demonstrating that readers were intrigued by Algazel's organizational system for the sciences and eager to understand this hierarchy. Each of the divisions within the active and speculative branches of philosophy received many notes and comments. One glossator took the trouble to draw an outline to illustrate these divisions.[39] Annotators or correctors quibbled with the translators over the use of the term

[39] The annotator of Basel D. III. 7 outlines the subject matter of most of the division of the sciences at the beginning of the *STP* from f. 95r to 96r: "propositio prima / divisio scienciarum / theorice / actiua diuisio / diuisio speculatiua / theologia / mathema [sic] / naturalis / propositio secunda / subiectum naturalis philosophie / subiectum theologice." John de Oculo performs roughly the same task, but his notes along the division of the sciences are more fulsome, see note 2 above.

"speculativa" and substituted the word "theorica" in the margins."[40] Like the authors who quoted this section, the annotators show an interest in the spiritual overtones of this hierarchy. A reader of Graz 482 points out the spiritual efficacy of the active branch, "note concerning the hope of eternal life," as well as of the study of the divine science, "note concerning eternal happiness."[41] Thus, this section was popular with annotators for the same reasons it was popular with authors, but there is a sense that readers were interested in this passage because it functions as an introduction to the *STP* in the place of the all-but-disappeared prologue. Although we cannot assume that medieval scholars always read texts from beginning to end, the number of annotations steadily decreases from the *Metaphysica* to the *Physica*, indicating that the introduction to the *Metaphysica* and sometimes even the *Logica* benefitted from the readers' attentiveness and goodwill while the last treatises of the *Physica*, which contain much more material that appears in condemnations, received markedly less attention.

The First Principle and the First Intelligence (*Metaphysica,* tr. 5)

The fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica* caught the eye of authors and annotators alike, and many annotators appear to share the authors' concern about the errors and implications of its passages. Many scholars marked its incipit and wrote numerous notes alongside Algazel's discussions of the influence and powers of the first intelligence over

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[40] A correction mark appears alongside the marginal note "theorica," which corresponds to the same mark written in text adjacent to the word "speculatiua." BnF Lat. 6552, f. 43ra (2:12). The same correction appears in Basel, D. III. 7, f. 95r.
[41] "nota de spe uite eterne / nota de felicitate eterna" Graz 482, f. 141ra.

creation.[42] Readers were clearly intrigued by this treatise and demonstrated their interest even in manuscripts that did not contain it. The copy of the *Metaphysica* in BnF Lat. 6655 ends with the fourth treatise and *Physica* begins immediately after, but a later annotator writes out the entire fifth treatise in the margins of the next two folios.[43] While most annotations do not register any concern, there are a few warnings among them, though not as a many as the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica*. The annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 tells readers to "note the error of many matters regarding the issue of things into being" adjacent to Algazel's first assertion that the order of causes proceeds from the first intelligence.[44] In the same way, a reader of Laon 412 writes "note this most cautiously (cautissime)" near Algazel's explanation of evil as the absence of good.[45] Other annotators are not as explicit in their warnings, but rather tell the readers to "note well" or "note carefully" several other passages that, like those above, were censured in several condemnations.[46] These annotations demonstrate that scholars approached this treatise with a mixture of interest and trepidation. A reader of Vat. lat. 4481, perhaps John de Oculo, illustrates the watchful approach to this section when he draws an eye from which

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[42] One annotator of BnF Lat. 14700 singles out the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica* with the brief note "5tus tractatus." BnF Lat. 14700, f. 36va (119:1). An annotator of BnF Lat. 16096 (not Godfrey of Fontaines) encourages the reader to "nota totaliter." BnF Lat. 16096, f. 105va (119:1).
[43] The fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica* ends on f. 65r of BnF Lat. 6655 and *Physica* begins immediately after, but a corrector has taken the trouble to write out the entire fifth treatise—ten pages in Muckle's edition—in the margins from f. 65r to 66v.
[44] "nota errorem plurum de exitu rerum in esse," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 54rb (121:3)
[45] "nota hanc cautissime," Laon 412, f. 87va (128:6).
[46] Several readers wrote notes that can be construed as warnings adjacent to the same passage where Algazel introduces his discussion of the origin of evil (126:11). The annotations of BnF Lat. 14700 are fairly sparse, but one reader writes "nota bene" alongside this passage on f. 38vb. Similarly, the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 writes "nota diligenter" on f. 54va. John de Oculo does not place one of his many commands to "cave" near this passage, but he writes a less vehement "nota" on f. 47r.

emanates two diagonal lines of sight that bracket the same passage that elicited the above warning from the annotator of Laon 412.[47]

The Infinite Number of Souls, The Giver of Forms, and The Agent Intellect

The other three sections that were popular with the authors who quoted the *STP* were not as popular with annotators and elicited only a limited amount of marginalia. The contents of these glosses give the impression that the readers' focuses differed from those of the authors. The sixth division of the *Metaphysica*'s first treatise, which discussed the existence of an infinite number of souls, attracted several comments, but the notes indicate that annotators were more interested in Algazel's true intention for the section, demonstrating the existence of an infinite number of causes, rather than the ancillary argument regarding souls that he used to illustrate infinite causes.[48] In this regard, the authors who quoted from this section slightly misrepresent Algazel since they take an illustrative example, raised for the sake of argument, as something that Algazel asserts as truth. Some readers seem to grasp the distinction and note that Algazel proposes four ways of understanding infinite causation before settling on one.[49] Yet not all readers gave Algazel the benefit of the doubt since John de Oculo leaves a note of caution to warn

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[47] Vat. lat. 4481, f. 47v, corresponding roughly to 128: 1-5: "Non tamen potuerunt creari nisi sic, ut aliquantulum mali proveniat ex eis, et quamvis noverit creator hoc malum proventurum ex eis, tamen permittit; igitur bonum provisum est per se, malum vero provisum et permissum est accidentaliter." This passage also corresponds to error #8 in *De erroribus philosophorum*, 40.

[48] "probat que non sit impossibile longitudine infinita," Laon 412, f. 75rb (41:15). " anime humane separabiles a corpore sunt infinite," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 47ra (40:30). "nota quatuor modi infiniti" Reg. lat. 1870, f. 32rb (40:17).

[49] The annotator of Graz 482 notes that Algazel proposes four inquiries into the existence of infinity, "infinitum modis 4" and writes out these inquiries in shorthand: "motus celi / anime humane separate / spacium aut corpus / cause infinite primi. He continues to follow these arguments and marks them as they occur in the text: "probatio quod infinitas non est in causis / quod non sunt infinitatis in causis et spaciis / quod motus celi est infinitus / qualiter anime separate infinite." Graz 482, f. 146vb (40:1-30).

later scholars of this section.[50] Thus, it is difficult to know whether the notes alongside this passage were placed there out of philosophical curiosity or theological concern.

The *Physica* on the whole receives fewer annotations than the *Metaphysica*, even though its last two treatises contain subjects that were of great interest to authors: the Giver of Forms and the Agent Intellect. Annotators pay little attention to the Giver of Forms or the fourth treatise of the *Physica* in general. It is not one of the terms that scholars wrote in the margins to remember or find again later, nor does its appearance elicit many notes from scholars. At most, readers make a note of the incipit of the chapter *De anima humana* at the beginning of the fourth treatise and leave a few annotations, though they are brief and scattered.[51] The fifth treatise of the *Physica* attracted more attention from readers, receiving a greater number of annotations as well as more detailed notes. Unlike the Giver of Forms, annotators take notice of the Agent Intellect. Readers marked the opening of the treatise and wrote out of its incipit as their own finding aid.[52] One scholar even wrote out the fifth treatise's incipit at the beginning of the *Physica* as if heralding important things to come later in the treatise.[53] Several chapters in this treatise invited annotations, including those on the relationship between the Agent Intellect and

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[50] "hic cave" Vat. lat. 4481, f. 14r (40:27).
[51] Most annotations to *De anima humana* chapter of the fourth treatise are too brief or sporadic to determine any of the readers' interests except in the case of the annotator of BnF Lat. 6443. This glossator directs his interests mainly at Algazel's description of the two virtues of the human soul, the acting ("operans") and the knowing ("sciens") that he further divides into the speculative and the active. The annotator outlines these two virtues and continues to note discussions of the process of intellection in the soul. BnF Lat. 6443, f. 162vb-164ra (172:9-15).
[52] "Quomodo anima significat esse intelligentiam agentem," BnF Lat. 6552, (183:22). "tractatus quintus de eo quod fluit in animam ab intelligentia agente," BnF Lat. 6443, 164r (183:1).
[53] "quintus de eo quod fluit in anima ab intelligentia agente." BnF Lat. 16605, f. 52v. (183:1).

the soul's eternal happiness and suffering.[54] There was also interest in the abilities that flowed from the Agent Intellect. A reader of Graz 482 marked the proverb provided by Algazel to elucidate the powers of fascination to kill a man or a camel.[55] Yet annotators are less perturbed than authors by the contents of this treatise, which contains five of the sixteen errors listed in *De erroribus philosophorum*, or if they were concerned, they did not choose to voice their anxiety. Of the notes that appear alongside these errors, most discuss the influence of the Agent Intellect on human souls without qualification.[56] Only John de Oculo writes a warning in the margins alongside the discussion of the soul's eternal punishment after death as simply mental rather than corporeal, yet even this Dominican scholar, who places so many warnings in the *STP*, is undisturbed by the majority of its treatise and leaves no other annotations.[57]

Sections Popular with the Annotators

The Generosity of the First Principle (*Metaphysica*, tr. 3, ch. 11)

Along with the division of the sciences at the beginning of the *Metaphysica* and the discussions of intelligences in the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica*, two additional sections of the *STP* were frequently annotated. The third treatise of the *Metaphysica* held the attention of readers on account of its treatment of the characteristics attributed to God

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[54] The annotator of BnF Lat. 6655 starts to note the chapter titles of the fifth treatise after the fourth chapter, "Quartum est cruciatus cum anima est remota ab hac felicitate que debetur ei secundum suam naturam (186:30-31)," and continues to write them in the margin up through the tenth chapter, "decimum est quod necesse esse prophetam esse et quod debet credi ipsum." BnF Lat. 6655, f. 86vb (196:24-25).
[55] "prouerbium / de fascinatione" Graz 482, f. 169ra (194:18-19).
[56] The annotator of BnF Lat. 6552, f. 61va largely copies the incipit to the eighth chapter: "Cur videatur in vigilando forma que non habet esse / Quare non corraborat imaginatio inter vigilandum" BnF Lat. 6552, f. 61va (192:14-28).
[57] "Cave hic," Vat. lat. 4481, f. 70r (187:29).

or the First Principle. Algazel divides these characteristics into eleven "sententiae," which are mainly focused on the First Principle's will, power, and knowledge.[58] Christian authorities naturally had debated these qualities of God in considerable detail, but the discussion of these qualities in a work by an Arab philosopher piqued readers' interest even if these attributes were not entirely novel. Algazel's discussions on the First Principle's knowledge, especially his assertion that it does not have knowledge of particulars, caught the eye of some readers.[59] However, the tenth sententiae, that God is "largissimus" or most generous, seems to have been usual to scholars and prompted many responses. Algazel explains that the First Principle's generosity is integral to its nature since it is both the paradigm of goodness and font from which goodness emanates.[60] In

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[58] The eleven sententiae are spread throughout the third treatise and Algazel does not list them conveniently anywhere in the text. Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 62-89. Some of these qualities are rather simple, such as that the First Principle is living ("vivens"), powerful ("potens"), and wise ("sapiens"). However, several of these qualities concern the First Principle's knowledge, specifically its knowledge of the existence of contingent matters, but not the specific contingencies themselves.

[59] Algazel uses an example of an eclipse to demonstrate the difference, explaining that the First Principle knows of the occurrence of eclipses, but not when and where an eclipse will happen since that information is contingent upon place and time, and such knowledge would introduce multiplicity to the First Principle's essential unity. Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 72:24-73:8. John de Oculo placed a "cave hic" here on Vat. lat. 4481, f. 26v, but several other annotators pointed out this discussion without warning, such as that of Graz 482, f. 151ra ("quod scientia primi est uniuersalis de particularibus et ab eterno"). The annotator of BnF Lat. 6443 drew several manicula along this passage on f. 150vb and 150ra.

[60] "Sentencia decima est quod primus largissimus est a quo emanat omne bonum. Bonum autem multis modis emanat ab aliquo scilicet, vel ut propter hoc aliqua fiat ei retribucio alicuius emolumenti, vel ut nulla, sed quia oportet illud eum fieri sin aliqua retributione sibi facienda. Retribucio autem dividitur vel ut pro dato reddatur sibi simile, sicut cum datur pecunia pro pecunia, vel non simile sicut cum datur pecunia spe vite eterne, vel laudis, vel acquirendi bonam consuetudinem faciendi bonum, et consequendi perfeccionem; hoc aut commercium, et commutacio,et negociacio est, non largitas, sicut prima est comercium quamvis vulgus appellet earn largitatem; largitas erum est conferre beneficium oportunum sine spe reconpensacionis. Cum enim quis dat ensem ei qui non eget eo, non dicitur largus; primus vero largus est quia iam effudit habundanciam suam super esse quod est sicut oportuit, et secundum quod opus fuit sine retencione alicuius quod fuit ei possibile ad necessitatem, vel fuit ei opus ad decorem; hoc autem sine spe retribucionis, vel alicuius emolumenti. Essencia enim eius talis est quod ex ea fluit super omne quod est, quicquid convenit ei. Ipse igitur vere largus est." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 79:19-80:4.

keeping with its abundance, the First Principle dispenses goodness without any anticipation of reward or recompense that might degrade its perfect generosity.

Half of the manuscripts contain some sort of annotation near this passage. Its popularity may have stemmed from interest or confusion over the meaning of "largissimus," which appears to have been a rarely-used word, especially in the context of the nature of God. Several readers pointed out Algazel's definition: "'largitas' is to confer advantageous favor without hope of compensation."[61] This explanation did not satisfy everyone. One reader of BnF Lat. 6552 provides "liberalitas" as an equivalent.[62] Other scholars were wary of the assertion of God's or the First Principle's munificence. As mentioned previously, the annotator of Reg. lat. 1870 believes that readers should exercise caution here, telling them to "beware of this because it could have a wicked meaning."[63] What this "wicked meaning" could be is not immediately clear. There is no objection to God's "largitas" in any of the condemnations. Even Bonaventure interprets this passage in a favorable light as an expression of God's generosity.[64] However, the key

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[61] "largitas enim est conferre beneficium oportunum sine spe reconpensacionis," Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 79:30-31.

[62] ""liberalitas quid / quod sit largitas," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 50vb (79:30). See also "largitas / nota / deus largus" Basel D. III. 7, f. 123r; "nota" Edinburgh 134, f. 29r; "quid est largitas" BNM lat. 2665, f. 100va.

[63] "cave hic quia potest habere malum intellectum." Reg. lat. 1870, f. 38va (79:32). It is perhaps too much to hope that the large wine stain across the folio that bears this warning is related to the annotator's shock over f. 38v-39r.

[64] Bonaventure quotes directly from this section (79-80) in his *Collationes in Hexameron* when discussing the qualities that philosophers, including Aristotle, have ascribed to the First Being, such as "liberalitas" and "magnificentia" : 'Item, nota quod liberalitas proprie dicta est tam circa pecuniarum contemptum cum debitis circumstantiis; communiter dicta est collatio beneficii opportuni, sic est species remunerationis, et sic dicit Algazel, in sua *Metaphysica*: 'Primus est largissimus, a quo emanat omne bonum."' Bonaventure does not object to Algazel's assessment, but he too quibbles as to the meaning of all these terms for generosity. He argues that "liberalitas" and "magnificentia," and perhaps by extension "largitas," are

to this passage's popularity and perhaps the reason for the aforementioned warning may lie in the lack of recompense that the First Principle expects for its outpouring of goodness. Some Christian readers appreciated the philosophical interpretation of grace that Algazel ascribes to the First Principle, such as the annotator in BnF Lat. 6552 who underlines in red the words "without hope of compensation" and "without holding back."[65] However, readers like that of Reg. lat. 1870 perhaps objected for the same reason since God seems to have no criteria for his generosity, thereby nullifying any need for recipients to do anything to merit favor in this life or the next. When explaining the extent of this largesse, Algazel enumerates how the emanation of goodness from the First Principle differs from any exchange that anticipates compensation, even the giving of gifts in hope of eternal life.[66] The note of warning may be the result of thinking that Algazel exaggerates God's mercy, but it is clear that this reader is in the minority.

Naked Intelligences and the Motion of Celestial Bodies (*Metaphysica*, tr. 4, ch. 3)

The fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica* was one of the most popular with readers. Many medieval and Renaissance authors cite or quote from it, though not enough to merit inclusion in the previous chapter.[67] Readers were specifically interested in the third and

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ultimately quite similar in meaning and differ only according to reason ("et sic non differunt specie, sed solum ratione"). Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexameron*, Visio I, Collatatio II, 75.

[65] "sine retencione" and "sine spe retribucionis," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 50va, ll. 21, 22 (79:31, 35).

[66] "Retribucio autem dividitur vel ut pro dato reddatur sibi simile, sicut cum datur pecunia pro pecunia, vel non simile sicut cum datur pecunia spe vite eterne, vel laudis, vel acquirendi bonam consuetudinem faciendi bonum, et consequendi perfeccionem; hoc aut commercium, et commutacio,et negociacio est, non largitas, sicut prima est comercium quamvis vulgus appellet earn largitatem; largitas erum est conferre beneficium oportunum sine spe reconpensacionis." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 79:23-31.

[67] Just over ten percent of the authors studied, fifteen scholars, quote or cite this chapter in the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica*. The distribution of these scholars consists mainly of those of the thirteenth century and interest in this chapter continued to be cited into the fifteenth century.

last chapter of this treatise, whose importance is reflected in the attention paid to it by scribes who commonly titled it "Dictio de corporibus celestibus."[68] This practice singles it out from other chapters in the *STP* since very few received consistent rubrication other than the headings of treatises. In this third chapter, Algazel describes the motion of celestial bodies that he attributes to a single intellect, which becomes the subject of the fifth treatise—the first intelligence—and the starting point for a discussion of the ten intelligences in the ensuing fifth treatise.[69] Algazel subdivides *De corporibus celestibus* into seven sententiae that argue that there is a will and purpose behind the motion of celestial bodies. The ultimate source of this willed motion is a soul that Algazel says can only be described as a pure intellect without matter or changeability or, in short, a "naked intelligence."[70] Algazel concludes in the final sententia that the first intelligence directs the motion of celestial bodies through lesser intelligences and thus sets up a discussion of the order of causes in the next treatise.[71]

Since *De corporibus celestibus* functions much like a preface to the popular fifth treatise, it is understandable that readers expended effort annotating a chapter that

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[68] This rubric appears in BnF Lat. 16605, f. 45r; Ott. lat. 2186, f. 69v; BNM lat. 2546, f. 56v; Vat. lat. 4481, f. 39r.

[69] "Sentencie de hoc sunt hee quod celestia corpora sunt mobilia per animam, et per voluntatem, et percipiunt hec singula statim cum fuerint, et per hoc quod moventur aliquid intendunt. Non intendunt autem curare ista inferiora, sed desiderant assimilari substancie nobiliori se inter quam, et corpora non est ulla communicacio, que vocatur a philosophis intelligencia nuda, et in lege vocantur spiritus deo proximi, et quod intelligencie sunt multe. Et quod corpora celestia sunt diversarum naturarum, et quod nulla ex eis sunt causa essendi alia ex eis." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 104:30-105:7.

[70] Algazel dedicates the fourth sentencia of the fourth treatise, third chapter to proving the existence of naked intelligences. Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 112-115.

[71] "Sentencia septima est, quod intelligencias nudas oportet esse multas, nec potest concedi eas esse pauciores numero celestium corporum; stabilitum est enim celos esse diversarum naturarum et eos esse locales, vel possibiles." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 117.

introduced such interesting topics as naked intellects that directed the orbit of planets as well as the actions of human souls. Many notes congregated around Algazel's proof for the existence of the intelligences, the fourth sententia, yet it was the sentiments that he ascribed to these forces that caught their eye and compelled readers to write dozens of annotations.[72] Algazel has little trouble demonstrating that celestial bodies move, but he struggled to explain the motive behind this movement and why intelligences willed them to orbit rather than remain stationary. After dismissing the motives of carnal desire ("concupiscentia") and anger ("ira"), he settles on two metaphors to explain the force behind their motion.[73] He likens the seemingly-endless movement of celestial bodies to the motives of a lover toward the beloved or a searcher toward the thing sought, arguing that the intelligences desire beauty within their systems.[74] The all-too-human sentiments

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[72] Multiple "nota" and annotations appear in the fourth sentencia in the third chapter, fourth treatise: Laon 412, f. 83vb-84ra; Edinburgh 134, f. 35va-36rb; Uppsala C. 647, f. 2v; BnF Lat. 6552, f. 53ra-53va; Vat. lat. 4481, f. 39r-39v; and Ott. lat. 2186, f. 69v-70r.

[73] "Sentencia tercia est quod celestia corpora non moventur propter curam inferioris mundi, quoniam mundus iste non est illis cure tantum, sed intendunt per motum suum quiddam aliud quod est multo excellentius illis. Quod sic probatur; omnis motus voluntarius vel est corporalis sensibilis vel intelligibilis. Sensibilis motus est ex concupiscencia vel ex ira. Impossibile est autem motum celi esse ex concupiscencia. Concupiscencia enim est virtus appetens id per quod conservatur in vita. Quod vero non timet de se minui, vel destrui, inpossibile est habere concupiscenciam. Impossibile est eciam ut sit ex ira. Ira enim virtus est repellens contrarium et nocumentum quod facit debere minui, vel destrui. Et quia concupiscencia est virtus appetens quod convenit, et ira est virtus repellens quod non convenit; impossibile est autem celum minui vel destrui; igitur non potest intencio eius esse huius modi, necesse est igitur ut sit intelligibilis." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 107:30-108:10.

[74] "necesse est igitur ut anime celi insit apprehensio pulcritudinis illius amati ad hoc, ut ex imaginacione illius pulcritudinis, crescat fervor sui amoris qui facit eam contemplari superius ut ex eo proveniat sibi motus per quem possit aplicari ad id cui querit asimilari; igitur imaginacio est causa pulcritudinis fervoris amoris, et fervor amoris causa est inquisicionis. Et inquisicio causa et motus. Et illud amatum, vel est primus, et verus, vel est id quod propinquius est primo ex angelis propinquis scilicet, intelligenciis nudatis eternis, inpermutabilibus, quibus nichil deest de perfeccionibus quas habere possibile est. Si quis autem dixerit quod necesse est distinguere inter ardorem huius amoris, et hoc ardenter amatum, et formam que queritur acquiri per motum, dicetur quod cursus omnis inquisicionis est ad id quod proprium, vel

of the intelligences intrigued readers who regularly marked Algazel's explanations of love as the motive force of the planets as well as his rejection of other emotions as the reason for their movement. Although Algazel piqued their interest with this argument, however, it appears that scholars did not know how to respond and thus the notes surrounding the third sententia are numerous, but they do not contain much substance or detail.[75]

Scholars nevertheless had doubts about this passage and directed warnings at the intelligences and their eternity. In Algazel's eccentric explanation of planetary motion, he habitually refers to the ceaseless motion of the heavens and extended this quality of timelessness to the naked intelligences, even describing the naked intelligences as eternal in other parts of in this chapter.[76] The notion of independent and powerful forces within creation without beginning or end disquieted readers who continually noted statements about eternal intelligences. Two readers sometimes voiced their apprehension and left

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propinquum, est ad necesse esse, quod est stabile in effectu, et in quo nichil est in potencia imperfeccionis est." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 113:30-114:13.

[75] "quod motor celi non potest esse nisi res intelligibilis" Graz 482, f. 156ra (106:12); "de intentione motus eius responsio" Laon 412, f. 84vb (110:25); "motor duplex" BnF Lat. 6552, f. 53va (112:17); "nota quod motus naturalis non est nisi fuga," Vat. lat. 4481, f. 39v (105:33). "de motu duplex / nota anime motus" Uppsala C. 647, f. 3r (112:17, 113:35).

[76] "Unde sequeretur quod superiora essent viliora inferioribus, quamvis superiora sint eterna non receptibilia destruccionis nee permutacionis." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 109:16-18. "Motus enim celi significat vere esse substanciam excellentem, non mutabilem, que non est corpus, nec inpressa corpori. Et huius modi substancia vocatur intelligencia nudata. Motus vero non significat eam esse, nisi mediante remocione finitatis [s]ue; predictum est enim hunc motum ab eterno esse sine fine." 112:4-7. "Et illud amatum, vel est primus, et verus, vel est id quod propinquius est primo ex angelis propinquis scilicet, intelligenciis nudatis eternis, inpermutabilibus, quibus nichil deest de perfeccionibus quas habere possibile est." 114:2-6.

notes of caution for other readers.[77] The concern manifested here in the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica* appears elsewhere in the *STP* when Algazel mentions the power of intelligences, and thus the warnings alongside these passages demonstrate a common anxiety among Latin scholars.

Although the motion of the heavens and naked intelligences held readers' attention into the fifth treatise, there is one short passage in the *De corporibus celestibus* that elicited more annotations than any other part of the chapter. To demonstrate the power of superior celestial beings and intelligences on lesser beings and intelligences, Algazel draws upon the example of the sun, which is larger than the earth and exerts considerable influence on it. In order to drive home the point, he estimates the sun's magnitude, asserting that it is one-hundred and sixty-five and a third times larger than the earth.[78] This anecdote has little to do with the main thrust of the chapter, but readers show great interest in it, frequently marking and copying it in the margins.[79] This inexplicable burst of attention to a passing reference to the size of the sun within the most popular section of the *STP* is indicative of a larger trend in the annotations. This and other notes reveal scholars did not always read Algazel purely for his discussion of abstract, metaphysical topics, but they often mined him as a source on the physical world.

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[77] John de Oculo writes "cave" on Vat. lat. 4481, f. 42v as well as the annotator of Ott. lat. 2186, f. 73v. See "necesse est igitur ut anime celi..." in n. 75 above (113:30).

[78] "Sol enim cencies sexagies quinquies et tercia unius maior est quam terra; corpus vero solis minimum est comparacione sui circuli, et quanto minus est comparacione ultimi circuli." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 109:21-24.

[79] Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 109: 20-22: "magnitudo solis," Laon 412, f. 84va; "nota," Edinburgh 134, f. 35va; "Nota quod terra minima pars est comparatione corporis solis," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 53rb; "Magnitudo solis," Ott. lat. 2186, f. 71v; nota magnitudinem solis," Uppsala C. 647, f. 2v; "nota," Vat. lat. 4481, f. 41r.

Interest in Natural Science

The overlap in the passages that drew the attention of authors and annotators suggests that many scholars approached the *STP* for similar reasons. The authors who quote Algazel did so in the context of speculative philosophy or metaphysics, and the annotation of the same passages indicate that readers likely shared these interests. However, the frequent annotation of natural phenomena, such as the passing reference to the sun's magnitude, indicates that annotators were engrossed in elements of the *STP* that do not appear readily in the works of medieval authors. The difference—the annotators' concern for natural science and the authors' lack of interest in these matters—does not demonstrate separate audiences as much as it highlights the differences in how Algazel was read and applied.

At first glance, readers could expect to find much about the natural realm in the *STP*. The *Physica* ostensibly treats things which are subject to change, motion and rest, but much of this book treats matters that are outside of nature. The fourth treatise focuses on the soul while the fifth treatise centers on the Agent Intellect, neither of which could be considered physical. Algazel admits that much of the fifth treatise could have been discussed in the *Metaphysica*, but he chose to treat these matters here because the soul's connection to physical bodies places it outside of the purview of metaphysics and the Agent Intellect is best explained through the things it influences—human beings and their souls.[80] Only the first three treatises of the *Physica* actually discuss the matters of the

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[80] "Tractatus Quintus de eo quod fluit in animam ab intelligencia agente. Non est dubium quod consideracio de intelligencia agente pertineat ad divinorum tractatum, in quo predictum est, et quod

natural world including the nature of motion, physical space, the four elements, and the senses.[81] Authors quote sparingly from this part of the *STP* and no one section receives enough attention to warrant special mention. Yet these three treatises received steady annotation from readers. Readers were fascinated by Algazel's explanation of the four elements and occasionally wrote out his descriptions of them.[82] Other scholars mark his discussions of each of the five senses.[83] Thus, the annotators paid more attention to the *Physica* than the authors who quote from the *STP*, indicating again that scholars read more of the *STP* than they chose to write about in their own works. While the last two treatises were popular with both parts of this audience, the annotations reveal that scholars read the entire *Physica* and not only the controversial chapters in the last half.

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intelligencia est, et que est eius proprietas; hic autem non consideramus de ea secundum quod ipsa est modo, sed secundum quod imprimit in animas, nec est hic consideracio de ea secundum quod imprimit in animas, sed secundum quod anima imprimatur per eam." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 183.

[81] "Et hoc est subiectum speculacionis naturalium, que versantur circa speculacionem corporis mundi, secundum quod subiacet permutacioni et motui, et quieti. Igitur intencio eius continetur in quatuor tractatibus, quorum primus est de hoc quod comitatur (sequitur) omnia corpora, quod est omnibus communius de quibus agit sicut est forma, et hile, et motus, et locus. Secundus est de hoc quod est minus commune quod est speculacio iudiciorum de simplicibus corporum. Tercius est de compositis, et de commixtis. Quartus est speculacio de anima vegetabili, et sensibili, ex humana, et in hac completur intencio. Tractatus primus est dehis que sunt communia omnibus corporibus, que sunt quatuor scilicet, forma, et hile sine quibus non potest esse corpus, de quibus iam tractavimus, et motus, et locus, et necesse est nunc loqui de his." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 130-131.

[82] Algazel discusses the four elements and the result of their composition with one another in the second and third treatises of the *Physica* (141-162), which receive considerable annotation, though many of these are simple "nota" or less descriptive marginalia like pointing hands and bracketing.: "quod aer convertitur in aquam / Quod aqua conuertitur in aerem / Conuersio autem aque in aerem / Quod aqua conuertitur in terram / "conuersionem uero aque in terram," New York, Pierpont Morgan Library MS 857, f. 88ra (148-149); "nota oportet quod aer est naturaliter calidus per experimentum / nota quare aer sentitur et cetera/ nota quid est forma elementi," BnF Lat. 6443, f. 159rb (143-144); "ignis paruus non habet colorem si lumen sicut nec aer," BNM lat. 2665, f. 106vb (156). "ignis est aer adurens," Worcester Q. 81, f. 95ra (148).

[83] Algazel outlines the five senses in the third chapter ("Diccio de certitudine aprehensionum exteriorum") of the fourth treatise of the *Physica* (165-169). "de olfactu / de auditu / de gustu / de uisu," BnF Lat. 6443, f. 162ra (165-166); "auditus sonus / sonus ex percussione / sonus ex separatione / quo modo sit auditus," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 58vb-59ra (166).

In addition to their attention to the *Physica*, the content of many notes found throughout the *STP* is a strong indication that scholars were reading Algazel with somewhat of a naturalist bent. Like Algazel's estimation of the sun's magnitude, passing references to the physical world often grabbed readers' attention even if they had little to do with the subject matter. Scholars were intrigued by discourses on atoms and their role in the composition of the body.[84] Readers were eager to point out passages that were related to the study of alchemy.[85] The curiosity in alchemy may have fueled the interest in the four elements in the *Physica*, but the material cause or substance "hyle" received much more attention," which appears often in the *Metaphysica* and *Physica* as primary abstract matter.[86] Some annotations reveal a more substantive reading of the text. Nicholas Bacun highlighted a passage that explains how the elements transform into one another. Algazel illustrates the changes by describing how moisture manages to penetrate an empty glass jar when it is placed in snow, alongside of which Nicholas writes "experimentum."[87] The annotator of BnF Lat. 6443 notes another experiment in the *Physica* to demonstrate that air is warm by nature.[88] Yet it is the readers' preoccupation with motion where the interest in the natural world is most keenly felt. The motion of

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[84] "quod corpus non sit compositum ex infinitis athomis," Basel D. III. 7, f. 99v (14:25); "opinio de athomis," Graz 482, f. 142 (10:13); "Quod corpus non sit ex athomis," Laon 412, f. 71vb (14:25); "Quod corpora non sunt composita ex atomis," BnF Lat. 6443, f. 144ra (10:13); "probatio nobilis de athomis," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 44ra (11:5).
[85] "nota alkimie," BnF Lat. 6552, f. 49va (69:11); "alkimie," BNM lat. 2822, f. 101rb (149:18).
[86] The mention of hyle appears often throughout the *STP* and attracted considerable notes and marginalia: "quod yle non possit esse sine forma," Basel D. III. 7, f. 100r (16:10); "nota quod hyle sit sine mensura," BnF Lat. 6443, f. 158ra (133:31); "nota formam esse in yle et in materia," Vat. lat. 4481, f. 2v (7:5).
[87] Worcester Q. 81, f. 95ra.
[88] "nota oportet quod aer est naturaliter calidus per experimentum" BnF Lat. 6443, f. 159rb (143:34).

celestial bodies was popular, but concern for this subject extends beyond the skies. Scholars noted Algazel's definitions of motion in the *Physica* and his explanations of the motion of things; others drew outlines of the different types of motion.[89] The most telling example is a large note on the first folio of BNC Magliab. Cl. V. 45, in which a reader summarizes the types of motion as they appear in the first treatise of the *Physica*, often titled "De motu."[90] However, the note does not appear near the *Physica* or any mention of motion for that matter, but at the beginning of the *Logica*. This annotator marks the same passage in the *Physica* later in the *STP*, but it appears that this discussion was of particular interest and led him to paraphrase on the first folio of the manuscript.

The disparity between how authors and annotators treated topics of natural science in the *STP* raises questions about how scholars used Algazel. Authors had little interest in Algazel's discussions of natural science. They did not quote him on the subjects of the sun's magnitude, the nature of atoms, or the study of alchemy, though they did make use of his discussions of eternal celestial motion, if only on account of its philosophical and theological implications. Yet the annotations indicate that scholars were not oblivious to discussions of the physical world in the *STP* and, in many cases, it

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[89] The annotator of BnF Lat. 6443 creates a large outline for the types of motion with several subheadings: motus / - per accidens / - per uiolentiam / - per naturam – ad partem id est naturaliter / - uel ad partes secundum naturaliter / - uel ad diuersas partes," BnF lat. 6443, 158rb (134).

[90] "Motus alius secundum substantiam alius secundum quantitatem, alius secundum qualitatem, alius secundum locum. Motus autem secundum locum naturaliter est naturale aut uiolentus, aut animale. Naturale uero alius est rectus. Alius circularis. Motus uero rectus. Alius est a centro. Alius est ad centrum. Circularis uero alius est motus rei mutantis situm sed se totum. Ut motus plaustri. Alius est rei mutantis situm sed partes non secundum se totum ut motus celorum. Motus uero planetarum accidentalis est. Non nisi planeta per se locum mutat. Sed quia celum mouetur in quo planeta fixus tenetur." BNC Magliab. Cl. V. 45, f. 1r.

appears that scholars were quite interested in these topics. The explanation for the disparity in interests is likely due to the brevity of these discussions and the perceived nature of the *STP*. Many of Algazel's discussions of the natural world, such as the sun's magnitude, are not detailed enough to be useful or authoritative in arguments because Algazel declines to provide how he came to his conclusions. Furthermore, scholars understood the *STP* to be a work of philosophy and did not approach the text expecting to find information about the natural world. The annotations alongside these particular passages likely represent happy accidents of discovery where a scholar's reading is momentarily arrested.

Conclusion

An examination of the quotations and the annotations from the *STP* yields several conclusions about the reading practices of scholars. First, the *Metaphysica* was the most popular section of the *STP*. It contains several discussions that piqued the interests of authors and annotators alike, including the division of the sciences (tr. 1) and explanations of the role of intermediary intelligences that emanate from God or the First Principle (tr. 4-5). Interest in other sections of this book was more prominent in only one of the sets of evidence, such as the existence of an infinite number of souls (tr. 1, div. 6) or the generosity of the First Principle (tr. 3, ch. 11). Elements of the *Physica* also caught scholars' attention, but practice of quoting and annotating this book was less consistent than that of the *Metaphysica*. Authors often quoted the beginning of the fourth treatise on the Giver of Forms or referred to Agent Intellect in the fifth treatise, but annotators were relatively uninterested in these sections. Both sets of evidence indicate that scholars were least interested in the *Logica*. Its passages failed to appeal much to authors or annotators

and what little attention that is paid to this book is inconsistent and rarely exceeds matter of fact discussions of content. The lack of interest in the *Logica* is consistent with its treatment more broadly in Latin Christendom since the book was often separated from the rest of the *STP* in manuscripts, frequently appearing as an independent work, and in the minds of scholars as a text that was distinct from the *Metaphysica* and *Physica*.

The annotators also differ in their reading practices and interests from those of the authors in several ways. Authors only needed a few select quotations from Algazel in their own works while readers' notes litter the margins of the *STP* in manuscripts. The annotations constitute a much larger body of evidence than quotations, but the annotations also demonstrate a wider range of interests. The annotations indicate that scholars were free to engage all of the *STP* and thus they are more evenly spread throughout the work, including in the *Logica* and *Physica*. The notes and marginalia suggest that scholars had an interest in Algazel's discussions and digressions into natural science.

These two sets of evidence together indicate that one of the most intriguing topics in the *STP* was the role and actions of intermediary intelligences. They are the main subject of the treatises that were most commonly cited and most frequently annotated, appearing as one of the most popular terms that readers wrote in the margins and wished to remember about the *STP*. However, the intermediary intelligences implied many things that were contrary to Christian doctrine. As a result, many arguments about these intelligences appear in thirteenth-century condemnations when the debate over the place of Aristotelian philosophy reached its height. The next chapter examines the relationship

between the errors of the *STP*, the condemnations, and the warnings left by scholars in the margins of this work.

CHAPTER VI: WARNINGS FROM READERS AND THIRTEENTH-CENTURY CONDEMNATIONS

Six of the manuscripts containing the *STP* display annotations that serve as warnings against the errors in Algazel's arguments. These annotations belong to six medieval scholars, one of which is John of Oculo, but the remaining five annotators are anonymous. Their notes are typically brief and do not amount to more than a few words with little or no explanation as to the reason for their placement alongside a particular passage. In this way, the warnings are easy to overlook and have been ignored in previous studies.[1] Despite their brevity, the notes of concerned readers illustrate how the *STP* and translations of Arab philosophers in general led a complicated existence within the Latin canon as simultaneously useful and dangerous texts. The previous chapters have demonstrated that scribes expended considerable effort to make the *STP* easy to read and appealing to the eye, and that they thoughtfully compiled Algazel with other Aristotelian works and commentaries by Arab and Latin authors. Likewise, scholars widely discussed Algazel's arguments in their treatises and commentaries. This treatment and usage did not change the fact that the *STP* contains errors that were pointed out in condemnations of philosophical doctrines as early as the thirteenth century. Yet scribes continued to produce and annotate excellent copies of a text that was known to contain damnable

[1] Muckle uses the manuscript that contains no less than a dozen warnings, Vat. lat. 4481, to fashion his edition, and copied many of these annotations into the appendix. However, he fails to discuss these arresting annotations in his introduction and even misses four that are difficult to see in the microfilm reproduction, which suggests that he was not working with the original. Compare Appendix B in Muckle, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 211-247 with the table at the end of this chapter. No other scholars mention the notes of warning in the manuscripts that contain the *STP*.

errors. However, it is unclear if the medieval scholars recognized the errors when they read the *STP* or if they associated the text with the wider efforts to censure of Aristotelian philosophy since few authors cite the condemnations when discussing Algazel's arguments. This chapter addresses the paradox of the medieval fascination about and anxiety over Arab philosophy by examining the connections between the condemnations, the *STP*, and the warnings left by readers in copies of this work.

The condemnations produced in the thirteenth century attract much attention in the scholarly and popular imagination because they encompass a stereotype about medieval scholasticism: ecclesiastical authorities issue sweeping edicts that threaten curious scholars with excommunication if they continue to study or teach dangerous doctrines from the newly-translated works of the Arab tradition.[2] Thus, the Condemnation of 1277 is understood to be an important, if not essential moment in the history of medieval philosophy.[3] While this and other condemnations presented legitimate challenges to the application of Aristotle and his Arab continuators, they represent the responses of only a few scholars and provide a mostly institutional

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[2] *The Economist* discusses the Condemnation of 1277 in its millennium issue at the end of 1999 on the topic of Church and Science. The article says that the edict "seems like a textbook example of bigotry blocking intellectual progress," but then argues that the condemnation inadvertently put European scholars on the path to modern science by insisting that much of Aristotle was incorrect and new approaches to examining the natural world needed to be explored. "Right, for the Wrong Reason," *The Economist*, December 23, 1999.

[3] John Marenbon describes two schools of thought regarding the Condemnation of 1277: the maximalists and the minimalists. The minimalists focus on the haphazard nature of the condemnation and emphasize that no scholars actually espoused these doctrines as a challenge to orthodoxy, but instead the errors are taken out of context and the Condemnation of 1277 was not responding to a real problem. The maximalists underscore that while the errors in the Condemnation of 1277 do not represent scholars' actual ideas, it nevertheless had a lasting effect on the development of medieval philosophy. By exaggerating the conclusions that scholars could draw, it seeks to limit the study of philosophy as an autonomous discipline and thus checks its application and expansion. Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy*, 266-270.

perspective on what was a widespread concern. They also do not address the question of whether medieval scholars recognized errors when they read the *STP*. This study uses marginalia to gain a new perspective by looking at these anxieties from the bottom up—using evidence from a variety of concerned readers. Examining the condemnations in the light of these notes clarifies the context of both sources. The readers shared the concerns behind the condemnations, but this solidarity was limited to the act of annotation alone. They were anxious enough to mark the presence of errors, but their concern did not lead them to amend, bowdlerize, or stop reading the text. The annotations both reveal that scholars could identify the errors in the *STP* and illustrate the lengths and limitations of medieval censorship.

The Condemnations

While the annotations in copies of the *STP* indicate that scholars read the text throughout the Middle Ages, the condemnations of Algazel and Aristotelian philosophy in general were sporadic. Two documents produced in the tumultuous decade of the 1270s, the Condemnation of 1277 and *De erroribus philosophorum*, had the greatest potential to influence the reading of the *STP*, but they were only the most forceful attacks in a line of periodic censures of Aristotelian philosophy. The works of Aristotle and Arab authors were able to circulate widely in the decades after their translation. Serious efforts to scrutinize their contents and restrict their usage only begin to appear in the thirteenth century. Among the first records of the University of Paris are bans on some Aristotelian

texts and commentaries in 1210 and 1215.[4] While Paris was deeply divided over this issue, other centers of learning were involved in the discussion. As Paris became more restrictive, the fledgling university at Toulouse advertised that it allowed the study of books banned at Paris.[5] Members from every level of the religious hierarchy, even popes, commented on the place of these texts within the Latin canon. After the repeated involvement of papal legates in the debate, Pope Gregory IX called on faculty to examine prohibited works, but he gave conflicting directives. In his 1231 bull *Parens scientiarum*, he reiterated the condemnations of 1210 and 1215, but he allowed faculty to decide which texts ought to be condemned and which ought to be studied without suspicion.[6] Syllabi from the 1240s and 1250s made by members of the arts faculty at Paris suggest that scholars liberally interpreted *Parens scientiarum* since they list a host of Aristotle's works.[7] The conflicting messages about Aristotle and Arab authors, along with their

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[4] The 1210 edict forbids the teaching of "libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia nec commenta" under penalty of excommunication, with the "commenta" likely including translations from Arabic within the Aristotelian tradition. *CUP*, vol. 1, 70-71. The 1215 edict allows for instruction in Aristotle's dialectic, but not his books "de methafisica et de naturali philosophia, nec summe de eisdem." Again, it is likely that the Latin al-Ghazali would fall in the category of "summe" since it was commonly referred to as the *Summa theorice philosophie*. *CUP*, vol. 1, 78-80. See also Fernand van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism* (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1955) 70, 89 for a discussion of what is meant by "commenta" and "summe."

[5] The University of Toulouse issued a circular advertising that the "libros naturales" prohibited at Paris could be studied there and extolling their masters' proficiency with Aristotle. *CUP*, vol. 1, 129-131.

[6] Gregory IX upholds the previous Parisian condemnations on "naturalistic books", but with the caveat "until they have been examined and purged from all suspicion of errors" ("quousque examinati fuerint et ab omni errorum suspitione purgati"). *CUP*, vol. 1, 138.

[7] Gordon Leff has found two syllabi from Paris that include several metaphysical texts of Aristotle and Arab authors. The first appears between 1230 and 1245 and likely functioned as a crib sheet for the examinations in the arts faculty. It condenses each of the textbooks with examples of answers for the *Liber de causis*, attributed to Aristotle, as well as Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Physics*. A syllabus that dates to 1255 is more forthcoming and displays even more interest in Aristotle. Among the works on the schedule are most of the available translations of Aristotle's corpus. Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, 140-141.

apparent usefulness and widespread appeal, meant that the study and proliferation of texts such as the *STP* were largely unchecked for much of the thirteenth century.

The Condemnation of 1277

The debate over the use of Aristotelian philosophy at Paris came to a head in the 1270s during the episcopate of Stephen Tempier. He had been a master of theology and chancellor at Paris before becoming bishop in 1268. On December 10, 1270, he condemned thirteen doctrines related to Aristotelian principles and threatened to excommunicate anyone teaching them.[8] The Condemnation of 1270 appears to be the short form of the Condemnation of 1277 as Tempier expanded the list from thirteen to two-hundred and nineteen doctrines with help from the faculty of theology.[9] This condemnation does not supply information on authors, books, or faculty who were responsible for these errors.[10] It instead consists of a list of philosophical or theological dicta that ought not to be taught or discussed. The bishop and the faculty of theology expended little effort in explaining the errors or why they were false. Only thirty receive any explication or counterargument, though most of them ultimately can be traced to

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[8] *CUP*, vol. 1, no. 432, 486-487.

[9] Historians long believed that Rome pressured Tempier to conduct this condemnation. Pope John XXI sent a message to Tempier on January 18, 1277 concerning some rumors he had received about heresies radiating out of Paris. Thijssen argues that Tempier was already investigating before the pope's letter and it is highly doubtful that Tempier received a letter from Rome in less than two months, let alone conducted a thorough investigation into this matter to produce such a sweeping condemnation. Also, John XXI sent a second letter to Tempier on April 28, making no mention of the actions taken by the bishop on March 7. J. M. M. H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 43-50.

[10] The only bibliographical information appears in the prologue with the titles and incipits to two works, *De amore* by Andreas Capellanus and a book of divination (*librum Geomantie*), but courtly love and magic play no further part in the list of condemned doctrines. Stephen Tempier, "Epistola," 76.

Aristotle or Arab philosophers.[11] It is difficult to summarize all of the two hundred and nineteen errors, let alone find their original order.[12] However, several topics appear frequently in the list: the eternality of the world; the existence of intermediary agents between God and creation; limitations to God's knowledge, will or power; and the efficacy of reason or philosophy over faith and Christian doctrine (i.e. the trinity, creation, heaven and hell).[13] Despite their brevity, these broad statements leave substantial room for nuance. Many dicta could be doctrinally sound if their context was clarified, and several even contradict one another.[14] For these reasons, Roland Hissette questions the coherence of the condemnation, calling it "a hasty and disordered survey that betrays the partisan spirit of Tempier and certain theologians."[15] The sheer length of

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[11] Roland Hissette searches for the author of each condemned doctrine, linking 151 to scholars of the period with varying degrees of certainty. He argues, however, that the most of these 151 doctrines do not reflect the authors' beliefs, but were positions drawn from texts in the Aristotelian tradition, which scholars raised for the sake of argument. In turn, Hissette offers probable citations for these articles in the translations of Aristotle and Arabic philosophers, including the Latin al-Ghazali. Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1977), 313-318 and *passim.*

[12] There are three different orders of the condemned articles and each list uses different source material: Charles du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus* (Brussels: Culture et civilisation, 1963); Pierre Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle*, 2 vols. (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'Université, 1911): vol. 2, 175ff; *CUP*, vol. 1, 544-55, which Piché followed in his edition. Hissette provides a table of concordance which compares the three different orderings of the articles. Hissette, *Enquête*, 319-21.

[13] Hissette counts eighteen errors that affirm the eternity of the world, combined with twenty-two more that espouse this idea along with an erroneous conception of creation or divine action. Twenty-five argue for a determinism that is attributed to an intermediary intelligence or celestial body. Thirteen espouse a monopsychism that is also connected to intelligences. Eighteen attack theology or religion in general, often in favor of philosophy, while eight clash with scripture or Christian doctrine. The Christian conception of God is often challenged, directly and indirectly, throughout the list, though only a few deny the doctrines of the Trinity, monotheism, and divine providence. Five question the possibility of an afterlife and two the resurrection. Hissette, *Enquête*, 313-314.

[14] Hissette believes thirty-three of these articles are compatible with the Christian faith and that five are heretical only in part or in a certain context. Hissette, *Enquête*, 314.

[15] "On l'a dit souvent, ce décret est le résultat d'une enquête hâtive et désordonée, qui trahit l'esprit partisan de Tempier de ce certain théologiens." Hissette, *Enquête*, 318.

the list and its lack of unity suggest that the condemnation was the sum total of the frustrations of a group of clerics and faculty who voiced all of their concerns in one edict.

The condemnation was contested for decades after Tempier's death in 1279.[16] Its lack of coherence impeded enforcement, but the larger obstacle was the bishop's limited authority over the university. Tempier overstepped his jurisdiction by issuing the edict since it was the faculty's prerogative to investigate scholars suspected of teaching errors.[17] Before and after 1277, the university requested the bishop's judicial services only when a scholar refused to recant after having been investigated and condemned by the faculty of theology.[18] None of the university's records preserved Tempier's edict since it was issued by the episcopal court and not by any university institution.[19] The university was not obligated to implement it and thus did not use the condemnation's

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[16] A later bishop of Paris retracted many of the articles of Tempier's condemnation in 1325. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy*, 53-56.

[17] The University of Paris spent most of its formative years struggling against local authorities for autonomy. The bishop of Paris often claimed jurisdiction over university affairs, but the growing body of masters regularly appealed to the papacy for support of the university's self-governance. The students also found themselves at odds with citizens, often resulting in riots and even a general strike by the students and faculty in 1229. The papacy frequently sent legates to adjudicate between these parties and consistently sided with the university. Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities*, 27-33.

[18] Tempier's involvement with the university often put him in conflict with the faculty, but many cases were settled without his involvement. While most historians see Siger of Brabant as one of the leaders of the radical masters of arts at Paris, it was the Inquisitor of France, Simon du Val, not Tempier, who was charged with prosecuting the scholar. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy*, 43-48. In 1275, the papacy dispatched Simon de Brion to oversee the installment of a new rector at the university. Simon issued a letter warning both parties against interfering in this matter. *CUP*, vol. 1, no. 459, 460, 520-30. See also John Wippel, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7(1977): 169-201 (185-186).

[19] Courtenay explains that many non-university records were considered important since many papal, royal and episcopal letters were preserved in the university registers. However, he concludes that scholars at Paris must have considered Tempier's condemnations in 1270 and 1277, as "not statutory" and made no effort to record or enforce them. William Courtenay, "The Preservation and Dissemination of Academic Condemnations at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages," *Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Age*, ed. Benardo Bazán (Ottawa: Legas, 1992): 1659-1667 (1660-1661).

contents as grounds to indict scholars. In a very real sense, a scholar's adherence the Condemnation of 1277 was voluntary in spite of the vehemence of its claims.

Despite its limitations, the Condemnation of 1277 was a formal edict issued by an ecclesiastical authority in the city that housed the most prestigious university in Latin Christendom, where many of Algazel's readers were educated and where many copies of the *STP* were produced. The ambiguity of the condemnation could also have been a boon to Tempier's cause because it encouraged scholars to watch over their public and private studies. Its preface urged faculty and students to police each another since teachers and hearers alike faced the same sentence. Tempier's actions fostered a spirit of distrust among scholars, but the bishop's agenda may have extended beyond the classroom.[20] The university issued an edict in 1276 forbidding private instruction, likely with Tempier's approval if not at his instigation.[21] It is unclear whether the edict protected the university from competition with freelance tutors, or curtailed the spread of dangerous ideas that were not formally taught, but it is in keeping with Tempier's program of preventing the dissemination of false doctrines. Also, while the bishop did not censure texts or authors by name, the preface suggests that he was aware of the circulation of dangerous works.

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[20] Thijssen posits that the mere accusation of false teaching could be devastating: "Most likely, error and heresy were charges that were difficult to recover from. To his colleagues and peers, if not to the panel that supervised the disciplinary proceedings, a scholar charged with false teaching was presumed guilty until proven innocent. To these censured academics the process itself may have seemed the punishment." Thijssen. *Censure and Heresy*, 35.

[21] *CUP*, vol. 1, 538-539. Wippel connects this 1276 statute to the Condemnation of 1277 and the problem of secret instruction specifically on the works of Aristotle and Arabic philosophers. John Wippel, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris," 186, and idem, "The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277," 67.

> A impassioned report from notable and important persons insinuated repeatedly and with concerns for the faith that some studying at Paris, exceeding the limits of the disciplines in the faculty of arts, presume to dispute and debate in the schools certain obvious and detestable errors, or rather the false vanities or ravings, contained in the attached scroll or pages with the present letter, as if they are in doubt....*We pronounce the same condemnation through our same judgment on all those who propound or hear the aforementioned scrolls, books, and quires*.[22]

Tempier describes a range of texts that contain errors including bound manuscripts and loose pamphlets. While he does not say that scholars could not read or own the texts that possessed these errors, the fact that scholars could be indicted if they taught, heard, or simply talked about them in passing certainly limited the acceptable forums in which they could be safely discussed. A scholar who possessed a work that exhibited these errors was obliged to keep his studies to himself. Although the jurisdiction and authority of the Condemnation of 1277 was vague and the list lacked coherence, it instilled a spirit of suspicion toward Aristotelian texts in a generation of scholars.

The presence of Algazel, or even Aristotle for that matter, in the Condemnation of 1277 can only be inferred since Tempier declined to provide citations for the errors. However, the lack of bibliographical information did not hinder scholars from making connections between the *STP* and the edict. James of Thérines and John Gerson cite the condemnation in their works as counterarguments to Algazel's teachings.[23] While these scholars represent a fraction of those who cite the *STP*, it is likely that many had their

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[22] "Magnarum et grauium personarum crebra zeloque fidei accensa insinuauit relatio, quod nonnulli parisius studentes in artibus proprie facultatis limites excedentes quosdam manifestos et execrabiles errores, immo potius uanitates et insanias falsas, in rotulo seu cedulis presentibus hiis annexo seu annexis contentos quasi dubitables in scolis tractare et disputare presumant...[P]er eandem sententiam nostram condempnamus, in omnes qui dictos rotulos, libros, quaternos dogmatizauerint aut audierint." Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 76-78. (Emphasis mine)
[23] See chapter 3, n. 27 and 29.

reading of Algazel and Arab philosophers informed by the condemnation. Henry of Ghent, the only known member of the faculty of theology who aided Tempier, argued against Algazel in several of his works, though he did not mention the condemnation.[24] A few articles from the edict can even be found on the last folio of a manuscript containing a copy of the *STP*, written in a later hand by a concerned scholar, but it is unclear whether he directed the articles at Algazel.[25] It appears that some scholars, therefore, took it upon themselves to fill in the blanks left by Tempier and applied his edict in their own original works and even in their manuscripts.

De erroribus philosophorum

Much less is known about the other condemnation, *De erroribus philosophorum*. Scholars previously had attributed the work to Giles of Rome as part of his early career around the year 1270.[26] However, conflicting philosophical positions on the unity of forms in *De erroribus philosophorum* and one of Giles' early works calls his attribution

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[24] In his ninth quodlibet, Henry of Ghent argues against Algazel's discussion of infinity and the eternal motion of the heavens, though he draws on Aristotle for a counterargument. "Conclusionem autem dictam non concederet nisi secundum modum quo dicit Algazel in Metaphysica sua, quod *in quo fuerit* multitudo *sine* ordine, scilicet essentali, *infinitas non removetur ab eo*, *sicut* nec *a motu caeli*, nec ab *anima*bus manentibus post *corpora*, *quoniam eo quod* un*a earum* non e*st causa esse al*ter*i*, *non est ordo earum essentialis qu*o *remoto* anima *desinat esse anima*, *sed* simul *sunt* natura *in essentiis* suis *secundum quod sunt essentiae*, licet accidentaliter una praecedit alteram *secundum tempus creationis suae*" (*Algazel's Metaphysics*, 40:23-41:10). Sed re vera modum istum non poneret Aristoteles, quia nihil talium poneret esse novm, ut iam videbitur." Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), q. 14, 249-250.

[25] The last folio of BnF Lat. 6443 (fol. 221r) is an addendum to the rest of the manuscript and bears a heading of "Articuli dampnati ab episcopo parisiensi," followed by three articles from the Condemnation of 1277: #96, 196, and 81. The purpose of this addendum is uncertain, as is the choice of these three errors, and it is unclear what relationship, this addendum has to the works within this manuscript, which possesses an excellent copy of the *STP* (f. 143r-208v).

[26] Josef Koch argues that Giles of Rome is the author of the *De erroribus philosophorum* based on the attribution of the work by several early fourteenth-century scholars. He sees this work as representative of Giles' early work while he was still a student at Paris. Koch, *Errores philosophorum*, xxix-xl.

into question, though it does not negate the possibility of his authorship.[27] Giles certainly read Algazel, whom he cites occasionally in his works, and demonstrates a command of Aristotelian philosophy. Whoever wrote *De erroribus philosophorum* fashioned a catalog of the errors appearing in the works of Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna, Algazel, al-Kindi and Maimonides. The text greatly surpasses the Condemnation of 1277 in its level of detail. The author divides his catalog by author and supplies the book and chapter where an error is found. Many of the same errors appear in Tempier's condemnation, though not verbatim. These similarities between the condemnations suggest a commonality in late thirteenth-century concerns toward Aristotelian philosophy rather than any borrowing between them. If Giles was the author of *De erroribus philosophorum* while in Paris in the 1270s, the bishop did not consult him concerning the Condemnation of 1277, but rather began an investigation that led to Giles' exile from the city in that same year.[28]

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[27] Silvia Donati and Concetta Luna both cite Giles' conflicting judgments on the matter of the unity of forms in *De erroribus philosophorum* and his *Quaestiones metaphysicales*, which was one of his first works, written in 1270. Donati explains that it is not impossible for Giles to have changed his mind or to have vacillated on the matter, and concludes that this evidence does not rule out Giles as the author. However, Luna is firmer in her conclusions and asserts that it is unlikely that Giles would change his position in the matter of months in two different works. Silvia Donati, "Studia per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano," and Concetta Luna, "La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano sul Libro III delle Sentenze (Clm. 8005) e il problema dell'autenticità," *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* , 29-32 and 165-167.

[28] Giles was the first scholar to be prosecuted after the condemnation on March 7, 1277. On March 28, Tempier condemned fifty-one propositions in Giles' commentary on the *Sentences*. This list of propositions bears no resemblance to the earlier condemnation, indicating that they are separate inquiries despite their proximity in time. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy*, 52-56. Giles was required to stop teaching until he recanted these statements. He refused and left Paris for Italy, halting his teaching career until 1285, when he finally recanted. For the recantation, see Giles of Rome, "Apologia," *Opera omnia Aegidii Romani*, ed. Robert Wielockx (Florence: Olschki, 1985), vol. 3, 49-64. Defiance should have been grounds to convict Giles, but the sentence was never pronounced. It seems that Giles inherited the doctrinal conflicts of his teacher, Thomas Aquinas, but also his allies at the papal curia, who dissuaded Tempier from pursuing Giles and, by proxy, Aquinas. This second condemnation is further evidence of Tempier's agenda and its limitations. The bishop could raise suspicion against scholars and dangerous ideas, but he faced strong

The treatment of the philosophers in *De erroribus philosophorum* is uniform with each author accused of between twelve and twenty-two errors.[29] The author discusses each philosopher in turn and catalogues their errors twice, once in detail and again in an abridged form. The eighth chapter introduces Algazel as the follower and abbreviator of Avicenna.[30] It provides exceptional clarity about the sixteen errors in Algazel's work, giving the corresponding references in the *STP* and sometimes supplying counterarguments.

> 8. Again he [Algazel] erred on the subject of divine providence, not holding that evil is permitted by divine providence insofar as good is derived from it, but rather that it proceeds from the inner determinism of matter. He held that Saturn, Mars, fire and water could not have proceeded from God without some evil arising from them. But this is false, because at the end of the world these will still remain and yet there will be no evil arising from them because generation and corruption will be at an end. It is possible for God to prevent evil while still conserving things in their being. But He permits evil to happen only that He may draw greater good from it. All these errors are drawn from his *Metaphysics*, in the section "On the properties of the First Principle." This section he called, "The flower of divine things."[31]

This method of describing errors was more complete than that of Tempier and left less ambiguity concerning the meaning of each statement. By comparison, the second,

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resistance in terms of enforcement. The university was not obligated to enforce his edicts and the curia was mute concerning their execution. Giles' career was hardly damaged by the eight-year exile since he later became a master of theology at Paris, prior general of the Augustinian order, archbishop of Bourges, and an influential member of the papal curia at Avignon. See Silvia Donati, "Giles of Rome," *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Timothy Noone and Jorge Gracia (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003): 266-271.

[29] For a detailed description of Giles' use of sources, see Koch's introduction to *Errores Philosophorum*, xli-liv.

[30] "Algazel autem, ut plurimum Avicennam sequens et eius abbreviator..." Algazel, *De erroribus philosophorum*, 38.

[31] "8. Ulterius erravit circa divinam providentiam non ponens malum permitti a divina providentia, inquantum ex eo elicitur bonum, sed magis provenire ex necessitate materiae. Voluit enim non potuisse procedere a Deo Saturnum, Martem, ignem et aquam, nisi proveniat aliquod malum ex eis. Quod falsum est, quia in fine mundi talia remanebunt, et tamen non erit malum ex istis, quia cessabit generatio et corruptio. Potest enim Deus impedire mala conservando res in esse suo, non tamen permittit mala fieri nisi ut ex eis eliciat maiora bona. Omnes autem hi errores eliciuntur ex Metaphysica sua, in tractatu De proprietatibus primi, quem appelavit Florem divinorum." Algazel, *De erroribus philosophorum*, 40.

abridged list of these errors reads more like the dicta of the Condemnation of 1277: "8. That no goodness in us comes directly from God."[32] The author was a careful reader of these philosophers, relying almost exclusively on the translations for his information, and did not make use of ancillary works by Latin scholars who had previously discussed these sources.[33] The author appears to have marked the errors as he read since the list of errors begins in the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica* and progressively moves through the work to the fifth treatise of the *Physica*, with one exception.[34]

If the goal of these condemnations was to limit the use of Aristotle and Arab philosophers, the author of *De erroribus philosophorum* produced a more useful and detailed document than the bishop of Paris and his supporters in the faculty of theology. His list of errors shows a command of the *STP* and other translations, and the ability to articulate these errors to readers. Yet there are important similarities in the subject matter of the condemnations. The type of errors that caught the author's attention in the *STP* mirror those that concerned Tempier, and the errors of *De erroribus philosophorum* can be categorized in the same way: eternity ("1. That the motion of the heavens is eternal");

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[32] "Quod nulla bonitas in nobis est immediate a Deo." Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 44.

[33] There is little indication that the author of the condemnation referenced works beyond these translations. He only quoted John of Damascus and Augustine each once throughout the work. A few of his refutations of Arabic philosophers bear resemblance to some arguments of Peter Lombard, but Koch mentions that the author was remarkably independent in his use of sources. Koch, *Errores philosophorum*, li-lii. However, van Steenberghen mentions that this movement away from reliance on the arguments of Lombard or Augustine was a marked trend which coincided with Giles' teachers, Albert the Great and Aquinas, in the second half of the thirteenth century. van Steenberghen, *Aristotle and the West*, 121-30.

[34] For Giles, al-Ghazali's errors are concentrated in the fourth and fifth treatises of the *Metaphysics* and the Physics, respectively. Errors 1-3 originate in the *Metaphysics*, treatise IV (Muckle, 104-18); 4-8 from *Metaphysics*, treatise V (Muckle, 119-29); 9 comes from *Metaphysics*, treatise III (Muckle, 72); 10 from *Physics*, treatise IV (Muckle, 172); 11-16 from *Physics*, treatise V (Muckle, 183-97).

intermediary agents (6. "That the first angel created the first heaven, the second angel created the second heaven, and so on"); God's omniscience and omnipotence ("11. That God does not know particulars in their individual natures"); and matters of doctrine ("14. That our soul's beatitude consists in the intellectual vision of the last angel").[35] *De erroribus philosophorum* was more detailed and contained more bibliographic information than the Condemnation of 1277, and thus was the more useful of the two condemnations. However, scholars did not cite *De erroribus philosophorum* when they discussed Algazel's errors. Yet the number of extant copies and its appearance elsewhere indicate that scholars were familiar with it. Nicholas Eymerich copied the entire work into his *Directorium Inquisitorum* and Konrad Wimpina's refutation of Algazel closely resembles parts of the work.[36] In spite of the differences in clarity between the condemnations, the presence of similar errors in their lists indicates that *De erroribus philosophorum* and the Condemnation of 1277 together reflect wider anxieties of thirteenth-century readers about these translations.

No institution or juridical authority enforced the condemnations. Instead, scholars had to choose to apply them to their studies. Despite their very different authorships, the condemnations share a dependence on the participation of scholars in the wider project of policing the study of Aristotelian philosophy. This dependence comes as a surprise in the

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[35] "[11] Quod Deus nescit particularia in propria forma." "1. Quod motus caeli est aeternus." "6. Quod primus angelus creavit primum caelum, et secundus angelus secundum caelum, et sic deinceps." "14. Quod anima nostra erit beata intelligendo ultimum angelum." Algazel, *De erroribus philosophorum*, 44, 46.
[36] Nicholas Eymerich, *Directorium Inquisitorum*, 239-40. Konrad Wimpina, *In libros de sex sophorum erramentis*, f. 125v-129v.

case of *De erroribus philosophorum* since it is the work of a freelance scholar and does not appear to have been commissioned by any patron. Although the Condemnation of 1277 was produced by the bishop of Paris and carried the weight of his office, it also required the assistance of scholars in order to be effective. The University of Paris did not include the Condemnation of 1277 in its records and did not expend much, if any effort to enforce it, but this text along with *De erroribus philosophorum* became influential as reference works without juridical authority. Extant copies of the condemnations confirm that individuals, not institutions, took the initiative since both appear in the same manuscripts as part of wider collections of philosophical censures.[37] The first was a late thirteenth-century English work entitled *Collectio errorum in Anglia et Parisius condempnatorum* while a second, similar *Collectio errorum* appeared in the fourteenth century, but neither of these works achieved any juridical status, nor were they used to prosecute scholars.[38] In whatever form the condemnations appeared, they did not compel as much as they informed scholars about the errors in works of Aristotelian and Arab philosophy. Several readers of Algazel shared these concerns and voiced them in the margins of manuscripts.

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[37] Of the twenty-seven copies of *De erroribus philosophorum*, nine appear bound in manuscripts which include Tempier's condemnation. Koch, *Errores Philosophorum*, iii-xiii.

[38] Thijssen argues that the first and second *Collectio errorum in Anglia et Parisius condempnatorum* were not part of the official records of the University of Paris up through the sixteenth century. J.M.M.N. Thijssen, "What Really Happened on 7 March 1277?: Bishop Tempier's Condemnation and Its Institutional Context," ed. Edith Sylla and Michael McVaugh, *Texts and Contexts in Ancient and Medieval Science*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), 84-114.

The Warnings

Thirteenth-century condemnations may have awakened scholars to the errors in these texts, but they did little to discourage scholars' preoccupation with Aristotle and Arab philosophers. Readers, like the scribes who were responsible for compiling the *STP* with other works, were free to make their own decisions about Algazel, but some scholars left notes as warnings near errors whose presence pricked their consciences. However, the warnings often comprise only a few words, making it difficult to understand from the manuscripts alone why readers choose to advise caution near certain passages. Reading the annotations in conjunction with the condemnations clarifies the annotators' otherwise ambiguous warnings. The similarities between the annotated passages and the errors listed in the Condemnation of 1277 and *De erroribus philosophorum* indicate that anxiety over some doctrines in the works Arab philosophers was widespread. Yet the unofficial nature of the condemnations indicates that the annotations were not dictated by any institution or authority, but were the product of the reader's own concerns. The notes of caution demonstrate what scholars objected to in the *STP* and reveal the limits of this anxiety. By only writing warnings, these readers left the text unchanged and allowed later readers to read and judge these errors for themselves.

The notes of warning appear in manuscripts that possess excellent copies of the *STP*: Laon 412, BnF Lat. 6552 and Lat. 14700, Ott. lat. 2186, Reg. lat. 1870, and Vat. lat.

4481. Most contain all three books, though some of them are out of order or incomplete.[39] The manuscripts show a high production value in the scribe's attention to detail and in the addition of rubrics and decoration.[40] All of them originate in France or Italy with the exception of the Spanish manuscript Ott. lat. 2186.[41] They were produced in late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries when Algazel's presence in the Latin canon grew significantly.[42] Ott. lat. 2186 again appears as outlier in this regard since it originated in the early thirteenth century. Thus, the superior and complete copies of the *STP* seem to have encouraged this kind of close reading of Algazel while less detailed and truncated copies did not receive as much scrutiny.

"Cave hic" - Vat. lat. 4481

The annotator of Vat. lat. 4481, who was likely the fourteenth-century Italian Dominican John de Oculo, wrote more warnings than any other annotator of the *STP*. John wrote the command "*cave*" or "*cave hic*" ("beware here" or "beware of this") twelve times in the margins. These warnings differ in meaning and tone from other annotations in the same hand. John frequently wrote "*nota*" ("note" or "mark") to call

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[39] All of the manuscripts contain the *Logica*, *Metaphysica*, and *Physica* except for BnF Lat. 6552, which lacks the *Logica*. Laon 412 and BnF Lat. 14700 also have the books out of order with the *Logica* appearing last or detached from the others. While I examined these manuscripts, my findings regarding their quality and provenance do not vary substantially from those of d'Alverny, who provides extensive descriptions of these six manuscripts in her *Codices* volume for the *Avicenna Latinus*.

[40] All of the manuscripts display aids to reading and memory, such as chapter headings, rubrics, wide margins and paragraph marks, and decorative flourishes in their initials, though none of them contain gold leaf. Laon 412, BnF Lat. 14700 and Vat. lat. 4481 are written on vellum.

[41] Laon 412, BnF Lat. 6552 and Lat. 14700 are of French origin while Vat. lat. 4481 and Reg. lat. 1870 have an Italian provenance.

[42] The oldest of these manuscripts is Ott. lat. 2186, which was produced in the early thirteenth century. The rest appear to have originated in the last quarter of the thirteenth century or the first quarter of the fourteenth.

attention to perfectly orthodox passages (f. 32v: "note clearly that essence and being are the same only in God"), but "*cave*" points out sections that could be construed as errors (f. 21v: "that the world is eternal / beware here").[43] As with most annotations, any explanation of a warning is rare since annotators assumed that readers could decipher what was wrong with a passage without clarification. The majority of John' warnings appear in the first four treatises of the *Metaphysica*, though his annotations can be found throughout. Many of the passages that elicited warnings from John closely resemble errors in the Condemnation of 1277 and *De erroribus philosophorum.* Given the number of his warnings, it is difficult to summarize John's concerns, but he was generally troubled by the powers and independence that Algazel ascribes to celestial bodies or intelligences, while several warnings are reactions to contradictions to Christian doctrine.

John registers his concerns early in *STP*, particularly toward matters of celestial motion. His first warning appears in the *Metaphysica*'s first treatise, specifically the sixth division of being into finite and infinite. He does not seem to be interested in Algazel's broader discussion of infinity as much as in the suggestion that the motion of heavens proves the eternity of the world since this motion has no discernible beginning or end. He writes "hic cave" on f. 14v near the following passage.

> The order between cause and effect is natural by necessity, and if the order is removed, the cause also disappears...However, in the event that one of them would exist without the other, the quality of infiniteness will not be removed from [the order] just as from the motion of heaven, which naturally has order and forward progress, since all its parts are not simultaneously in the same arrangement. Thus, when it is said that the motion of heaven does not have an end, we do not understand by this statement that finality has

[43] "nota clare quod in solo deo idem est quiditas et esse," Vat. lat. 4481, f. 32v; "quod mundus ab eterno / cave hic," Vat. lat. 4481, f. 21v.

> been removed from the motions which exist, but simultaneously from all those movements which are, were, and will be.[44]

Like other authors who discuss this argument, John is sensitive about this passage.[45] Aquinas and several scholars expose Algazel's reasoning as a non-sequitur since Algazel only claims that the eternity of celestial motion and does not prove it.[46] For his part, John provides a warning to future readers. He reiterates his apprehension about the eternity of celestial motion later in the second treatise of the *Metaphysica* on f. 21v, where he writes another warning along with the note "that the world is eternal."[47] Two other passages in the fourth treatise that claim the movement of the heaven has no beginning or end receive similar warnings from this scholar.[48] However, John's concerns regarding eternal beings

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[44] "Ordo autem inter causam et causatum necessario naturalis est, qui si removetur, illud causa non remanet....In quocumque autem fuerit unum istorum sine alio, infinitas non removebitur ab eo sicut a motu celi; qui quidem habet ordinem, et progressionem, quoniam omnes partes eius non sunt simul in una dispositione. Cum ergo dicitur quod motus celi non habet finem, non intelligimus per hoc removeri finitatem a motibus qui sunt, sed ab omnibus simul qui sunt, et fuerunt, et futuri sunt." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 40.

[45] This passage was among the most frequently cited sections of the *STP*. See "The Existence of an Infinite Number of Souls" in chapter four.

[46] Thomas Aquinas cites Algazel's discussion of this matter eight times. For Aquinas' refutation of Algazel's argument, see note 22 of chapter four.

[47] Johannes writes "Quod mundus ab eterno / cave hic" on Vat. lat. 4481, f. 21v alongside the passage: "Et hoc intelligimus, de omni quod factum est; mundus igitur est possibilis, igitur factus est. Sensus autem facture est ipsam esse ab alio et non a se, igitur respectu sui non habet esse, sed respectu alius a se, habet esse. Sed quicquid est rei ex se prius est quam id quod est ex alio a se prioritate essenciali; non esse autem est ei ex se; esse vero ex alio a se; igitur eius non esse prius est quam eius esse; ergo factus est ab eterno perpetuus eo quod habet esse ab alio ab eterno." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 60.

[48] "cave hic," Vat. lat. 4481, f. 38v: "Questio autem de illa disposicione adhuc restat scilicet, cur est modo, et non prius, egebit igitur causa, et sic de aliis consequenter, et ita id quod incipit esse, egebit causis non habentibus finem; necesse est autem ut ille cause, et occasiones habeant esse simul, vel per successionem; esse simul causas infinitas impossibile est; hoc enim iam destructum est; non sunt igitur nisi per successionem; hec autem successio non potest esse nisi per motum perpetuum, cuius unaqueque pars est quasi nunc incipiat. Ipse vero totus motus incessabiliter consequitur, nec cepit esse, ita ut unaqueque parcium eius sit causa alterius partis que consequitur. Si autem ponatur motus iste aliquo modo quiescere, tunc inpossibile est post eius quietem incipere aliquid esse." (Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 102-103); "cave hic," f. 39v: "Nullus autem locus est celo ad quem non redeat cum permotum discesserit ab eo, et ita

extend from celestial motion to prime matter when he places another warning alongside this passage in the *Metaphysica*'s first treatise.

> It is not possible that the first matter began to exist, but is eternal, for whatever begins to exist, exists potentially before it begins, that is, it is able to begin to exist before it begins. Therefore, the possibility of beginning precedes the beginning-to-be.[49]

Whether Algazel is discussing matter or celestial motion, John is suspicious about claims regarding the eternity of any entities apart from God and believes that they merit warnings for future readers who might come across these dubious passages.

The discussions of intermediary intelligences in the chapter *De corporibus celestibus* caught John' attention in particular and prompted him to litter the margins of the *Metaphysica*'s fourth treatise with warnings. He begins to mark these celestial forces with a note of caution at the top of f. 41r where Algazel describes how the actions of these celestial forces are discernible through the effects of the superior intelligences on the lesser.[50] John writes another warning on f. 42v in Algazel's arguments for the existence of intelligences, specifically alongside a discussion of the motive force behind the soul of heaven—a desire and love of beauty—which, as we will see, attracted the attention of several concerned annotators.

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est semper recedens, et rediens; hoc igitur non est tantum ex natura, sed ex voluntate, et eleccione; non est autem voluntas, nisi cum ymaginacione." (Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 106).

[49] "Igitur non est possibile ut materia prima ceperit esse, sed est eterna; quicquid enim incipit esse, antequam incipiat, est in potencia scilicet ante quam incipiat, potest incipere esse; possibilitas igitur incipiendi precedit incipere esse." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 44.

[50] "Restat igitur ut sit intencio intelligibilis. Impossibile est autem ut intencio eorum sit curare hec generabilia et corruptibilia, sic ut intencio sui esse, et sui motus, sint hec inferiora. Quicquid enim queritur per aliud, vilius est eo propter quod queritur sine dubio. Unde sequeretur quod superiora essent viliora inferioribus, quamvis superiora sint eterna non receptibilia destruccionis nee permutacionis. Sed hee inferiora sunt diminuta, et mutabilia, et sunt in potencia, et omnis terra cum omni quod in ea est minima pars est comparacione corporis solis." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 109.

> It is necessary that the soul of heaven possesses the apprehension of the beauty of that beloved object so that the ardor of its love grows from the vision of that beauty, which causes it to contemplate ever higher so that, from that fervor, motion issues forth to it through which it is able to connect to that which it wishes to embrace. The vision is the cause of beauty for the ardor of the lover and the ardor of the lover is the cause of its search, and the search is the cause of motion. The beloved object is either the First [Principle] or something true, or it is something which is near the First from the neighboring angels, that is, eternal, naked, and unchanging intelligences, which lack nothing of the perfections which it is possible to possess.[51]

In addition to asserting the existence of intelligences, there are other elements in the passage that might have provoked John. Algazel declares that the intelligences are eternal and attributes human emotions and a will to these celestial bodies, which seem to operate independently of God. John continues to read the fourth treatise closely for errors, protesting Algazel's contention on f. 43r that, because celestial bodies have no beginning and do not possess matter, they lack any potency to existence and therefore must exist in reality ("in effectum").[52] He places one more warning at the close of the fourth treatise on f. 44v in which Algazel reiterates that the intelligences operate free from the constraints of matter and, by extension, are eternal.[53]

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[51] "[N]ecesse est igitur ut anime celi insit apprehensio pulcritudinis illius amati ad hoc, ut ex imaginacione illius pulcritudinis, crescat fervor sui amoris qui facit eam contemplari superius ut ex eo proveniat sibi motus per quem possit aplicari ad id cui querit asimilari; igitur imaginacio est causa pulcritudinis fervoris amoris, et fervor amoris causa est inquisicionis. Et inquisicio causa et motus. Et illud amatum, vel est primus, et verus, vel est id quod propinquius est primo ex angelis propinquis scilicet, intelligenciis nudatis eternis, inpermutabilibus, quibus nichil deest de perfeccionibus quas habere possibile est." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 113-114.

[52] "Corpus vero celeste non est in potencia in sua substancia ullo modo; non enim cepit esse, nec est in potencia eciam in suis intencionibus essencialibus nec in figura, sed est in effectum, et habet quicquid ei possibile fuit habere; habet igitur ex figuris nobiliorem que est spherica. Et ex maneriis, nobiliorem scilicet, luminosam, et similiter de ceteris formis. Unde nichil restat nisi unum quod non est possibile esse ei in effectu scilicet, situs." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 114.

[53] "Unicuique igitur eorum est anima appropriata sibi ad movendum illud per presenciam, et accionem, et est nuda intelligencia appropriata ei ad desiderandum eam per motum; anime vero sunt species celestes propter apropriacionem suam cum suis corporibus, et ipse intelligencie sunt odeo proxime propter inmunitatem pendendi ex materiis, et affinitatem proprietatum suarum ad dominum dominorum scias hoc." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 118.

Beyond his systematic concerns regarding eternal celestial motion and intelligences, John places two warnings alongside passages that broadly contradict elements of Christian doctrine. The first warning appears on f. 26v in the *Metaphysica*'s third treatise where Algazel claims that the "First Principle does not know particulars except in a universal sense."[54] Algazel illustrates his point by explaining that the First Principle has a universal knowledge of events, such as the astronomical rationale behind eclipses, but it does not know the particular time and place of eclipses because they differ by location.[55] The First Principle's perception of variable events challenges its quality of immutability.[56] However, this argument to preserve the First Principle's nature directly challenges God's knowledge of his creation and thus elicits a warning from John as well as refutations from other scholars.[57]

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[54] "Si autem fuerit sciens quod eclipsis est, tunc hec disposicio diversa est ab illa, fit igitur permutacio; primus autem non s[c]it partlcularia nisi secundum maneriam universalem, et talis intelligendus est ab eterno sine fine, quoniam non permutatur." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 72.

[55] "Sicut si sciat quod sol cum transit nodum caude, post tempus statutum redit ad illum, et scit lunam iam pervenisse ad illum, et posita sub illo, aufert nobis quasi terciam partem solis; unde facit debere videri quasi terciam partem solis eclipsatam in aliquo proprie climate, et hoc ita scit eternaliter, et hec sciencia est vera, sive sit eclipsis sive non. Sed ut dicamus quod ipse scit solem modo non eclipsari, et dicamus cras, scit quod modo eclipsatur, tunc primum scire, erit diversum a secundo; hoc autem non convenit ei in quo non potest esse permutacio; nullum igitur particulare est adeo minimum quod non habeat causam, et ipse scit illud per causam suam sed admodum universaliter nec est in illo designacio aliqua temporis vel hore. Unde restat quod ipse scit illud sciens ab eterno sine fine." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 72-73.

[56] For this reason, Aristotle and Avicenna preserved this quality of immutability by elevating the First Principle's knowledge to universals alone. Peter Adamson, "On Knowledge of Particulars," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series* 105(2005), 257-278.

[57] Several scholars discuss and offer arguments against Algazel's claim that God does not have knowledge of particulars. "Et ideo alii dixerunt, scilicet Avicenna et Algazel, et sequaces eorum, quod Deus cognoscit singularia universaliter; quod sic exponunt per exemplum." Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros sententiarum*, Lib. I, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1. "Et ideo patet falsum esse opinionem Avicennae et Algazelis et Isaac philosophorum, qui dixerunt Deum res cognoscere in universali et non in particulari." Ulrich of Strasbourg, *De summo bono*, ed. Alessandra Beccarsi (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2007), Lib. 2, tr. 5, c. 3, 15. "Secundo defecerunt aliqui, non quia negarent a Deo cognititionem particularium; sed quia dicebant Deum cognoscere particularia universaliter, non secundum quod particularia sunt: propter quod Deo imperfectam

Although John wrote five warnings in the *Metaphysica*'s fourth treatise, he was mostly untroubled by the later sections of the *STP*, even the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica*, whose errors attracted so much attention from scholars and *De erroribus philosophorum*. However, he found an error in the eternal punishment of souls in the *Physica*'s fifth treatise on f. 70r. He placed a warning alongside a passage that illustrates the torment that a soul endures after it is removed from body, but is still plagued by its desires.

> Because the instrument is lost and the desire recalls the soul to that which it lost, then certainly this desire prevents it from being connected to that which concerns its nature and this is the greatest eternal punishment. This soul is that which is free from knowledge and vile as a consequence of the fulfillment of pleasures. However, a man in whom intellectual virtue is complete on account of the perception of abstract concepts, but follows after its pleasures, surely the tendency toward pleasures and the love of them remains in its soul and drags it down. Yet the knowledge that is held in it draws the soul to a higher fulfillment. Thus, the most dreaded torment occurs in the soul by reason of the contrast of these attractions, it nevertheless will not end, it is eternal because the substance in a soul is complete and its tendencies are accidental.[58]

John opposes Algazel's conception of the punishment of wicked souls in the afterlife, which consists of a separation from the fulfillment of their desires rather than the physical

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cognitionem rerum particularium tribuebant: et huius positionis videntur fuisse Avicenna et Algazel." Giles of Rome, *Super librum I Sententiarum (reportatio)*, ed. Concetta Luna, "Fragments d'une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur le premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 et Paris, B. N. Lat. 15819*", Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 74 (1990), d. 36, q. 1, a. 1.

[58] "Et quia amissum est instrumentum, et concupiscencia revocat eam ad id quod amisit, profecto hec concupiscencia prohibet eam applicari ad id quod pertinet sue nature, et hec est pena maxima eterna, et hec anima est illa que est expers scienciarum, et sordida propter consecucionem voluptatum; homo autem in quo perfecta est virtus intelligibilis propter acquisicionem abstractorum, sed sequitur voluptates, profecto disposicio voluptatum, et amor earum remanent in anima eius, et trahunt eam deorsum . Sed sciencia que habetur in ipso pertrahit eam ad plentitudinem superiorem. Unde ex contrarietate attrahencium fit in ea cruciatus maxime formidandus, finietur tamen nec est eternus, quoniam substancia in eo completa est, et disposiciones iste sunt accidentales." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 187.

suffering that appears in Christian doctrine.[59] Surprisingly, his other annotations in the fifth treatise of the *Physica* indicate that he does not object to the rest of Algazel's discussion of the Agent Intellect.

Similarities with the Condemnations

John appears to share the concerns of the condemnations, but his placement of warnings in the *STP* closely mirror the errors listed in *De erroribus philosophorum*, which can be located with a degree of accuracy using the citations provided by the author.[60] Several of John' warnings in the *Metaphysica*'s fourth treatise correspond to the first three articles of the condemnation. The first article argues that Algazel erred in his position that the motion of the heavens is eternal, citing the chapter *De corporibus celestibus* in the fourth treatise.[61] Algazel's first suggestion that the movement of the heavens is eternal in this chapter appears on line four, page 106 of the modern edition, which is approximately where John writes "cave hic" in f. 39v of Vat. lat. 4481.[62] However, a closer connection appears on f. 43r where John writes a warning alongside a passage that corresponds to the third article in *De erroribus philosophorum*.

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[59] Thomas Aquinas and Robert Holcot cite scripture, Matthew 25:41 and 1 Corinthians 15:50 respectively, in order to refute Algazel on this point. See notes 67 and 68 in chapter 4.

[60] The editor of *De erroribus philosophorum*, Josef Koch, supplies a corresponding passage or passages for each of the errors of Algazel and the other philosophers in the work Koch argues that the errors proceed linearly through the *STP* from the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica* to the end of the work with the exception of error #9, which appears in the third treatise of the *Metaphysica*. Koch, *Errores philosophorum*, xlv-xlvi.

[61] "Algazel autem, ut plurimum Avicennam sequens et eius abbreviator exsistens, erravit ponens motum caeli aeternum esse, ut patet ex Metaphysica sua, capitulo Quomodo corpora supercaelestia sunt mobilia per animam." *De erroribus philosophorum*, 38.

[62] "Nullus autem locus est celo ad quem non redeat cum permotum discesserit ab eo, et ita est semper recedens, et rediens; hoc igitur non esct tantum ex natura, sed ex voluntate, et eleccione; non est autem voluntas, nisi cum ymaginacione." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 106.

Vat. lat. 4481, f. 43r:
Corpus vero celeste non est in potencia in sua substancia ullo modo; non enim cepit esse, nec est in potencia eciam in suis intencionibus essencialibus nec in figura, sed est in effectum, et habet quicquid ei possibile fuit habere; habet igitur ex figuris nobiliorem que est spherica. Et ex maneriis, nobiliorem scilicet, luminosam, et similiter de ceteris formis. Unde nichil restat nisi unum quod non est possibile esse ei in effectu scilicet, situs.

De erroribus philosophorum, Error #3
Ulterius [Algazel] posuit corpora supercaelestia non incepisse, et quod in esi non est potentia ad esse, sed ad situm. Quae omnia patent ex dicto capitulo [*De celestibus corporibus*] dicti libri.[63]

Another connection can be seen between John' warning on f. 26v and the ninth article, that the first principle does not know particulars, which is conspicuous for its example of eclipses.

Vat. lat. 4481, f. 26v
Si autem fuerit sciens quod eclipsis est, tunc hec disposicio diversa est ab illa, fit igitur permutacio; primus autem non s[c]it partlcularia nisi secundum maneriam universalem, et talis intelligendus est ab eterno sine fine, quoniam non permutatur. Sicut si sciat quod sol cum transit nodum caude, post tempus statutum redit ad illum, et scit lunam iam pervenisse ad illum, et posita sub illo, aufert nobis quasi terciam partem solis; unde facit debere videri quasi terciam partem solis eclipsatam in aliquo proprie climate, et hoc ita scit eternaliter, et hec sciencia est vera, sive sit eclipsis sive non.

De erroribus philosophorum, Error #9
Ulterius erravit circa cognitionem primi ponens ipsum nescire particularia in propria forma, sed scire ea quasi uniuersaliter, sicut si aliquis sciret omnes distantias orbium et motus eorum, cognosceret omnes eclipses. Haec autem sententia colligitur ex Metaphysica sua, in tractatu De diuersitate praedicationum.[64]

The similarity between the placement of John' warnings and the errors in the condemnation raises the question of whether he read these two works together. It is possible that he had access to the work given the existence of several late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century copies. His reading of the work would appear to be partial or haphazard since he fails to identify many of the errors listed in the condemnation,

[63] Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 38.
[64] Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 42. This title corresponds to the third treatise, which appears in the modern edition as *De assignacionibus primi*. Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 62.

especially those regarding the intelligences in the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica* and the Agent Intellect at the end of the *Physica*. This uneven coverage of the errors complicates the possibility that John owned a copy of the work. Yet John's ability to draw attention to the many of the same passages as the author of *De erroribus philosophorum* leaves open the possibility that he was familiar with the work.

It is also possible that John was influenced by the Condemnation of 1277. All of the errors that John pointed out also appear in some form in this edict. The eternal nature of celestial bodies, their motion and the intelligences that move them was of great concern to Tempier and the faculty of theology. These topics are the subject of eight articles, five of which pertain to the passages annotated by John in the *STP*.

> 89. That it is impossible to make sense of the reasonings of a philosopher regarding the eternity of the world unless we say that the First Being is engaged in completely impossible things.
> 91. That the reasoning of a philosopher who explains how the motion of heaven is eternal is not sophistic and it is remarkable that thoughtful men do not see this.
> 92. That celestial bodies are moved by an internal principle, which is a soul, and that they are moved by means of a soul and an instinctive power, just as an animal, for in the same way an animal is moved by its desire, so it is with heaven.
> 94. That there are two eternal First Beings: the body of heaven and its soul.
> 95. That there are three First Beings in the heavens: the object of eternal motion, the soul of a celestial body, and the First Being moving toward that which it desires.[65]

These brief dicta closely resemble the first three errors in *De erroribus philosophorum* and could easily be applied to a number of passages in Algazel's chapter *De corporibus*

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[65] "89. Quod impossibile est solvere rationes philosophi de eternitate mundi, nisi dicamus, quod voluntas primi implicat incompossibilia; 91. Quod ratio philosophi demonstrans motum celi esse eternum non est sophistica; et mirum quod homines causis supernaturalibus; 92. Quod corpora celestia moventur a principio intrinseco, quod est anima; et quod moventur per animam et per virtutem appetitvam, sicut animal. Sicut enim animal appetens movetur, ita et celum; 94. Quod duo sunt principia eterna, scilicet corpus celi, et anima eius; 95. Quod tria sunt principia in celestibus: subjectum motus eterni; anima corporis celestis; et primum movens ut desideratum." Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 106, 108.

celestibus since they broadly condemn arguments for the eternity of the world, the eternal motion of the heavens, the soul that moves celestial bodies and the desires that propel it. There are also condemnations of errors such as God's ignorance of particulars (#42, 56) and the lack of physical torment of souls after death (#19).[66] The connections between these errors in the Condemnation of 1277 and the passages that elicited warnings from John also raise the question of whether he read the *STP* with this edict. As a Dominican whose level of education is unclear, albeit sufficient to understand Algazel's arguments, John could have come across the edict in his studies given its prominence in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century. However, as is the case with much of the Condemnation of 1277, the lack of detail in these articles makes it difficult to connect them with certainty to a particular passage in any work. The lack of citations complicates any connection between John' warnings and the Condemnation of 1277, while the references to chapters of the *STP* in *De erroribus philosophorum* at least allow for the possibility that he might have read Algazel with this text.

Despite the possible connections between John's warnings and the condemnations, it is equally plausible that he identified errors in the *STP* without assistance. Many of the errors pointed out in the condemnations are not subtle since several do not withstand logical scrutiny or directly challenge Christian doctrine. Yet his

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[66] "42. Quod causa prima non habet scientiam futurorum contingentium. Prima ratio, quia futura contingentia sunt non entia. Secunda, quia futura contingentia sunt particularia; Deus autem cognoscit virtute intellectiva, que non potest particulare cognoscere"; "56. Quod Deus non potest inmediate cognoscere contingentia, nisi per aliam particularem causam et proximam"; "19. Quod anima separata nullo modo patitur ab igne." Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 93, 98, 84.

warnings indicate that this Italian Dominican was a scholar who was likely well-read in speculative philosophy and was gravely concerned about Algazel's arguments. Moreover, his inclination to write warnings in the margins did not also lead him to alter the text in any way or abandon his reading. In spite of the errors, John perused the majority of the *STP* since he wrote many annotations throughout the work.

"Nota diligenter" - BnF Lat. 6552

The anonymous annotator of BnF Lat. 6552, a fourteenth-century French manuscript, left fewer and less vehement notes of warning in the margins of his copy of the *STP* than John de Oculo. While he does use the imperative "cave," he prefers to write "nota diligenter" ("note carefully") to call readers' attention to an error. While "nota" seems less forceful than "cave," warning or caution is still implied by the added adverb "diligenter," which the annotator uses sparingly in order to differentiate its use from "nota" alone. This annotator places all of his warnings in the *Metaphysica*, but, unlike John, his attention extends into the fifth treatise. His warnings occasionally overlap with those of John and other annotators, but in general his annotations indicate that he shared in the wider concerns of the thirteenth-century condemnations. The placement of these notes indicates that the annotator is apprehensive about discussions of intelligences and the limitations that Algazel's arguments place upon God.

Most of the warnings from the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 illustrate a discomfort with the philosophical constraints placed on the First Principle to preserve its perfect unity, which forces it to emanate intermediary intelligences in order to have any means of producing corruptible things and operating in the created world. He voices his concern

most strenuously regarding this matter in the *Metaphysica*'s fifth treatise when he writes "nota errores plurium de exitu rerum in esse" on f. 54rb alongside Algazel's lengthy description of the order and disposition of the ten intelligences from the First Principle.[67] This comment is exceptional among the notes of warning not only because it provides more detail than the command to "beware" or "note," but also because it is the only annotation that specifically labels a passage in the *STP* as an error. The note provides some context for shorter warnings placed by this annotator, who is particularly sensitive to statements about the emanating ("fluendi") of causes from the First Principle.[68] He also echoes the concerns of other annotators since he calls attention to a passage in the *Metaphysica*'s fourth treatise that elicited a warning from John in Vat. lat. 4481, in which

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[67] "Si quis autem quesierit quomodo potest discerni eorum ordo, dicetur quod ex primo provenit intelligencia nuda in qua est dualitas, sicut predictum est, unius quidem que est ei ex primo, et alterius quod est ei ex se ipsa; igitur provenit ex ea angelus, et celum. Intelligitur autem angelus intelligencia nuda; oportet autem ut id quod est nobilius proveniat ex forma nobiliore. Intelligencia vero nobilior est; forma autem quam habet ex primo scilicet, necessitas est nobilior; igitur provenit ex ea intelligencia secunda secundum quod eonsideratur esse necesse, et provenit ex ea celum supremum, secundum consideracionem possibilitatis que est ei sicut materia. Ex intelligencia vero secunda, provenit intelligencia tercia et circulus signorum. Et ex intelligencia tercia, provenit intelligencia quarta, et circulus saturni, et ex quarta quinta et circulus iovis. Et ex quinta, sexta, et circulus martis, et ex sexta, septima, et circulus solis. Et ex septima octava, et circulus veneris, et ex octava nona, et circulus mercurii, et ex nona, decima, et circulus lune et sic completum est esse omnium celestium simul, sed ea que sunt nobiliora excepto primo, provenerunt decem et novem, decem intelligencie, et novem celi; hoc autem verum est, nisi numerus celorum fuerit maior isto si enim fuerit maior, opportebit eciam addi numero et intelligenciarum ad complendum numerum omnium celorum." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 121.

[68] He writes "nota diligenter" on f. 49ra in the *Metaphysica*'s third treatise alongside the following passage: "Igitur quod intelligitur de divina sciencia non est nisi principium fluendi distinccionem ab.ea, in alia que extra ipsum sunt; igitur sciencia eius est principium creans distincciones scienciarum in essenciis angelorum, et hominum. Igitur ipse est sciens secundum hanc consideracionem." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 68-69; and writes "item cave" on BnF Lat. 6552, f. 50ra: "Sed in necesse esse nichil est in potencia quod queratur haberi, sicut probatum est ex premissis; non restat igitur nisi ut dicamus quidem eum prescire ordinem universitatis est causa fluendi ordinem universitatis ab eo." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 74-75.

Algazel asserts that the intelligences are eternal.[69] This annotator appears to pay close attention to the necessary limitations that Algazel places upon the First Principle so as not to compromise its nature, but he is especially perturbed by the need for the intelligences and conditions that proceed from it.

Since several of the warnings written by the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 appear in the same locations as those of John or echo his concerns, many of the same connections can be made between the annotator's warnings and the condemnations. In general, the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 identifies the same errors as *De erroribus philosophorum* and the Condemnation of 1277 regarding intelligences and their theologically troubling nature as eternal and independent beings in the fourth treatise of the *Metaphysica*. His warnings near passages that discuss the emanation of entities from the First Principle in the third treatise also resemble several parts of the condemnations. The fourth of Algazel's errors in *De erroribus philosophorum* condemns the argument that multiplicity could not issue directly from the First Principle on account of its perfect unity and thus the First Intelligence is necessary for the First Principle to create.[70] Similar censures against the necessity of the First Intelligence appear in articles 44 and 58 in the Condemnation of

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[69] The annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 writes "nota diligenter" on f. 53vb near the statement "Et illud amatum, vel est primus, et verus, vel est id quod propinquius est primo ex angelis propinquis scilicet, intelligenciis nudatis eternis, inpermutabilibus, quibus nichil deest de perfeccionibus quas habere possibile est." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 113-114. John's annotation, "cave," corresponds to the sentence that appears just prior to this one that discusses the will of the soul of heaven, but his other warnings indicate that he likely just as concerned about the eternity of the intelligences. Vat. lat. 4481, f. 42v.

[70] "Ulterius posuit quod a primo principio immediate non potest progredi multitudo. Propter quod immediate a Deo non potuit progredi nisi unum tantum, ut intelligentia prima siue primus angelus." *De erroribus philosophorum*, 38.

1277.[71] His comment "nota errores plurium" alongside the order of the ten intelligences in the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica* is unique. No other annotators placed a warning here, but the author of *De erroribus philosophorum* included this passage as Algazel's fifth error, which is so detailed that there is no doubt about which part of the fifth treatise is meant.[72]

The annotator of BnF Lat 6552 is also unique in his scrutiny of the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica*. He writes a word of caution ("nota diligenter") at the beginning of Algazel's discussion of providence and the nature of evil.

> If anyone says that we see the world full of evils, annoyances, and deformities, such as lightning, earthquakes, storms, wolves, and other such things, we also see lust, anger, and other desires in human souls. On account of these things, how does evil come from the First Principle? Does it come from the providence of the First Principle or not? If it does not come from its providence, then is there something outside the power of the First Principle? And where does it come from? If it does come from the First Principle, then how does it make provision for evil when it itself is pure goodness and nothing but goodness flows from it?[73]

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[71] "44. Quod ab uno primo agente non potest esse multitudo effectuum; 58. Quod Deus est causa necessaria prime intelligentie: qua posita ponitur effectus, et sunt simul duratione." Stephen Tempier, "Articuli condempnati," 94, 98.

[72] "Ulterius posuit quod ex primo angelo processit secundus angelus et primum caelum, et ex secundo angelo processit tertius angelus et secundum caelum, et sic deinceps, donec deventum sit ad ultimum caelum et ultimam intelligentiam. Uoluit autem esse decem intelligentias et nouem caelos, quae omnia sumperserunt originem modo praedicto. Ait autem quod non sunt plures intelligentiae quam decem, nisi poneremus esse plures orbes quam nouem. Posuit autem unam intelligentiam praeesse istis inferioribus; uolebat enim quod ista inferiora constituerent unam sphaeram. Ideo in uniuerso posuit decem sphraeras, uidelicet primum mobile et circulum signorum et septem sphraeras planetarum et sphaeram actiuorum et passiuorum. Et quia cuilibet sphaerae uoluit praesse aliquam intelligentiam, ideo posuit intelligentias decem. Cum ergo secundum hanc positionem non omnes sphraerae sint caelestes sed nouem tantum sint caelestes, decima uero sit actiuorum, oportuit Algazelem sequendo positionem suam dicere esse nouem caelos et decem intelligentias." Giles of Rome (dub.), *De erroribus philosophorum*, 38-40.

[73] "Si quis autem dixerit nos videmus mundum plenum maliciis, nocumentis, et turpitudinibus, sicut fulguribus, et terre motu, et publicis tempestatibus, et rabie luporum, et aliis huius modi, similiter eciam in animabus humanis videmus voluptatem, iram, et cetera huius modi. Quomodo ergo veniet malicia ex primo? Venitne ex providencia prima vel non? Si autem non venit ex providencia, tunc aliquid est extra primi potenciam, et voluntatem; igitur ex quo erit? Si vero venit ex providencia eius, tunc quomodo providet maliciam cum ipse sit pura bonitas, et a quo non fluit nisi tantum bonitas?"Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 126.

While Algazel is only raising questions at this point in the discussion, the annotator seems to object to the line of questioning since Algazel suggests only two possible answers: either the First Principle is responsible for evil or it is not in control of it. The annotator does not offer any more warnings through the rest of the discussion, but he writes annotations at several of the main points, including the conclusion in which Algazel argues that the First Principle is unable to stop evil from occurring.[74] This passage also corresponds with the eighth error listed in *De erroribus philosophorum*, which condemns Algazel's argument that evil is only the absence of good in an otherwise natural occurrence, citing the beneficial and destructive qualities of water and fire.[75]

Most of this annotator's concerns appear in the same vein as those of his thirteenth- and fourteenth-century contemporaries. His warnings alongside passages that discuss the nature of intermediary intelligences closely align with errors that appear in the condemnations, especially *De erroribus philosophorum*. Like John, the connection between his warnings and this condemnation suggests that he might have had access to the work. However, while John's warnings encompass the errors in the third and fourth treatises of the *Metaphysica*, the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552's warnings are fewer and more sporadic, making it less likely like that he read the *STP* with this condemnation.

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[74] After the warning to "nota diligenter," the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 writes a series of notes from f. 54vb to f. 54ra (*Algazel's Metaphysics*, 126-128): "exemplum de malicia mundi / bonitas duobus modis dicit / bonitas pura / Malitia pura / Malitia vinci bonitatem et bonitas malitia / bonifer / bonum primum per se"

[75] See note 31 above.

Warnings in Other Manuscripts

The warnings that are present in other manuscripts run the gamut in their coverage of Algazel's errors. One note suggests that scholars were somewhat hypersensitive in their reading of the *STP*. An annotator of Ott. lat. 2186 writes "Cave lector" at the beginning of the *Metaphysica* when Algazel merely mentions that the disciplines of natural science include the study of "incantations" and "charms."[76] However, some scholars second the concerns of other annotators by writing warnings near the same passages regarding the existence of intelligences. Despite his alarm at the mention of the black arts in Algazel's description of the natural sciences, the annotator of Ott. lat. 2186 records only one additional warning in his thirteenth-century copy of the *STP*. He echoes the concerns of John de Oculo and the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 by writing "cave" in the chapter *De celestibus corporibus* where Algazel claims that the intelligences are eternal and perfect.[77] Algazel's discourse on divine providence in the fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica* likewise attracted notes of caution from two readers in addition of the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552. A reader of BnF Lat. 14700 glosses the beginning of this discussion with the noncommittal comment "nota bene."[78] However, the annotator of Laon 412 offers a more strident warning, "nota hanc cautissimum" near Algazel's conclusion about the natures of good and evil.

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[76] This warning appears on Ott. lat. 2186, f. 27r alongside: "Sciencia vero naturalis habet plures ramos, sicut medicinam, ymagines, incantaciones, allecciones, et cetera." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 4:9-10.
[77] The annotator writes his warning on Ott. lat. 2186, f. 73va near the passage "Et illud amatum, vel est primus, et verus, vel est id quod propinquius est primo ex angelis propinquis scilicet, intelligenciis nudatis eternis, inpermutabilibus, quibus nichil deest de perfeccionibus quas habere possibile est." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 113-114.
[78] BnF Lat. 14700, f. 38vb. The warning appears on *Algazel's Metaphysics*, p. 126 in the approximate location as the annotator of BnF Lat. 6552 on f. 54vb.

> When [good and evil] are compared between each other, good is understood universally to exist, just as rain is created and Saturn, Mars, fire and water, pleasure and anger are created for the sake of good, although these sometimes cause harm. If those things are not created, a great good is destroyed on account of their absence. Yet they could not be created unless a small amount of evil proceeds from them, and although the creator knows that evil proceeds from them, he nonetheless permits them. Thus, good is supplied by itself, but evil is supplied and permitted accidentally, and both are ordained.[79]

The annotators' use of the superlative reinforces the potential danger that this argument poses. It implicates the creator in the existence of evil since he is bound by nature to make allowances for evil in the process of creating good. For this reason, the author of *De erroribus philosophorum* registers this discussion as Algazel's eighth error. These three warnings in the margins alongside this section of the fifth treatise, together with scholars' arguments against Algazel on this point in several works in addition to *De erroribus philosophorum*, make this the most dangerous passage and readily-identifiable error in the *STP*.[80]

While these warnings display a uniformity of concerns among several scholars, the annotator of Reg. lat. 1870 believes he sees an error in the *Metaphysica*'s third treatise, which the other annotators and the condemnations did not notice. On f. 38va, he writes "cave hic quia potest malum intellectum" beside Algazel's attribution of the

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[79] "Cum enim comparantur hec inter se, omnino cognoscitur bonum esse ut crehetur pluvia et ob hoc creati sunt saturnus, et mars, et ignis, et aqua, et voluptas, et ira, quamvis hec aliquando noceant. Si enim ista non crearentur, destrueretur magnum bonum propter privacionem eorum. Non tamen potuerunt creari nisi sic, ut aliquantulum mali proveniat ex eis, et quamvis noverit creator hoc malum proventurum ex eis, tamen permittit; igitur bonum provisum est per se, malum vero provisum et permissum est accidentaliter. Utrumque igitur ordinatum est." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics,* 127-8.

[80] See note 46 in chapter four for Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon's citations and reactions to this passage in the *STP*.

quality of generosity ("largitas") to the First Principle.[81] This reader appears to be worried that Algazel's description of God's generosity goes too far and perhaps weakens his divine justice. The use of "potest" suggests that he is not certain that this is an error, but, as a precaution, he advises future readers to consider carefully the meaning of this statement. Yet this reader appears to be alone in his concerns. Many readers glossed this passage, but none of their annotations indicate that they shared his apprehension. The condemnations also do not appear to have endorsed this warning from the annotator of Reg. lat. 1870 since neither work includes an error that resembles this statement from Algazel regarding God's generosity.

Conclusion

The warnings left by readers in the *STP* indicate that medieval scholars could identify the errors widely supposed to infect Arab-Aristotelian philosophy. The passages marked by these readers closely resemble many of the errors condemned by Stephen Tempier and the author of *De erroribus philosophorum*. These findings build upon Roland Hissette's study into the origins of the 219 articles of the Condemnation of 1277, in which he concluded that the errors do not represent the actual beliefs of teachers and students at Paris, but rather these heresies appeared in Aristotelian texts read by

[81] "[L]argitas erum est conferre beneficium oportunum sine spe reconpensacionis. Cum enim quia dat ensem ei qui non eget eo, non dicitur largus; primus vero largus est quia iam effudit habundanciam suam super esse quod est sicut oportuit, et secundum quod opus fuit sine retencione alicuius quod fuit ei possibile ad necessitatem, vel fuit ei apus ad decorem; hoc autem sine spe retribucionis, vel alicuius emolumenti." Algazel, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, 79-80.

thirteenth-century scholars who raised these points for the sake of argument.[82] Hissette could only speculate as to medieval scholars' awareness of errors while reading translations of Arab philosophy. While it is clear that Tempier and the faculty of theology at Paris could recognize such errors, they were among the best-trained theologians in Latin Christendom. The wide and diverse readership of Algazel represents a cross-section of scholars from different regions and centuries with varying levels of education. Their annotations reveal that scholars were sensitive to the presence of errors in the *STP*, marking passages which they found to be particularly unsettling with strong words of caution.

The warnings or notes of caution in the manuscripts constitute only a fraction of the annotations left by readers of the *STP*. Thus, it is easy to overlook the one or two warnings that appear among these annotations, especially if the notes are phrased in the noncommittal language of "nota diligenter." However, when these individual warnings are located within the *STP* and systematically compared with errors in contemporary condemnations, a coherent picture emerges regarding the concerns that scholars brought to their reading of Algazel. In general, the annotators and the authors of these condemnations highlighted three errors: the necessary existence and eternal nature of intermediary intelligences, the philosophical limitations placed on God or the First

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[82] Hissette searches for the author of each condemned doctrine, linking 151 to scholars of the period with varying degrees of certainty. He argues, however, that most of these 151 doctrines do not reflect the authors' beliefs, but were positions drawn from texts in the Aristotelian tradition, which scholars raised for the sake of argument. In turn, Hissette offers probable citations for these articles in the translations of Aristotle and Arabic philosophers, including the Latin al-Ghazali. Hissette, *Enquête*, 313-318 and *passim.*

Principle, and the ascription of the origin of evil to divine providence. The warnings appear mainly in the third, fourth and fifth treatises of the *Metaphysics*.[83] While *De erroribus philosophorum* locates six of Algazel's sixteen errors in the fifth treatise of the *Physica*, only John de Oculo identifies any errors in this book. Neither the annotators nor the condemnations find any errors in the *Logica*.

Several annotators have an uncanny ability to locate errors that also appear in condemnations. John de Oculo is conspicuous among the annotators, not only because he inserted twice as many warnings as any other annotator, but also because he is also unique for his ability to find errors in most of the treatises of the *STP* and places warnings alongside several of the errors identified or copied in *De erroribus philosophorum*.[84] However, John and the annotators did not find all sixteen of Algazel's errors listed in *De erroribus philosophorum*, let alone all of the errors of the Condemnation of 1277 that could be found in the *STP*. Still, the sheer length of the Condemnation of 1277 and the broad nature of its short dicta mean that many of these warnings can be connected loosely to the Condemnation of 1277.

It is difficult to say with certainty whether the annotators were prompted to identify the errors in the *STP* due to the influence of the condemnations. It is possible that

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[83] See Appendix V at the end of the dissertation for a layout of the annotators, their warnings and where they appear in Muckle's edition of the *STP*.

[84] The outliers in this annotator's concerns are his preoccupation with eternal celestial motion and with the torment brought on by the soul's separation from the Agent Intellect. See notes 44 and 51. However, the implications of eternal celestial motion fall under the annotator's anxiety over God's eternal sovereignty over creation. His concern for the discussion of the torment of souls is unique among the annotators, but Giles and perhaps Aquinas as well noticed this passage given its contradiction of doctrinal and biblical positions on the soul, its punishment or reward, and the bodily resurrection, and thus the annotator's concern here is uncommon for a late medieval audience.

the readers had access to the condemnations since the works were circulating in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when these annotators wrote their warnings. The first nine errors of Algazel listed in *De erroribus philosophorum* appear in the *Metaphysica* and annotators were able to identify most, if not all with their warnings. These six annotators wrote warnings alongside passages that correspond to the citations in the condemnation or alongside passages that closely resemble the sense of the errors. However, only John de Oculo wrote any warnings in the *Physica*. The fact that the annotators identified the errors in the *Metaphysica* and largely overlooked those in the *Physica* makes it unlikely that they read *De erroribus philosophorum* and applied only half of it to their studies. The influence of the Condemnation of 1277 is even more difficult to detect, despite its greater notoriety. While a few of the errors identified by the annotators resemble articles in this condemnation, the lack of references to or quotations from the *STP* complicates the evidence of a clear connection between the readers, Algazel, and the Condemnation of 1277. In addition, the condemnations faced significant obstacles to their enforcement outside of the specific case of the *STP*. The high profile of the Condemnation of 1277 was offset by its ambiguity. *De erroribus philosophorum* was more detailed, but did not carry the weight of Tempier's edit. For these reasons, the influence of the two condemnations on Algazel's readers can only be indirect.

There remains the question of why the annotators objected to roughly the same things as these condemnations. How did scholars like John de Oculo locate many of the same errors in the *STP* as the author of the *De erroribus philosophorum*? Since the connections between the condemnations and the warnings do not seem to indicate that the

former directly caused the latter, the evidence reveals a more general consensus about the *STP*. The warnings and the condemnations describe the concerns of late medieval scholars when they perused the *STP*. When readers opened a copy of the *STP*, many shared a common objection to Algazel's discussions of intermediary intelligences, celestial bodies, and their wider theological implications. Their warnings in the margins represent organic and spontaneous responses to the *STP*, but both illustrate an anxiety that late medieval scholars possessed regarding the errors which were widely supposed to reside in the translations of Arab-Aristotelian philosophy.

Despite the shared concerns between the notes of warning and the condemnations, the annotators did not stop their reading or attempt to censor the text. Instead, they anticipated later readers and actively sought to communicate caution near certain passages, commanding their posterity to "beware" or "note." This active engagement with the text reveals that Latin readers of Arab philosophy not only identified errors for their own benefit, but also saw themselves in a dialogue with a larger community of scholars for whom they were partially responsible. This responsibility differs greatly from the responsibility felt by authorities such as Tempier. By writing warnings in the margins, the annotators agreed that the *STP* contained errors, but they did not wish to end the conversation. In fact, these words of warning could have had the opposite effect of drawing the eyes of readers to dangerous ideas. Generations of later annotations appear alongside the cautionary notes and testify that scholars continued to read despite the condemnations and even the warnings of past readers, ensuring that Algazel's arguments

remained topic of discussion. At the very least, these warnings represent a conscientious attempt to learn from Algazel and to locate the useful and the dangerous in this text.

This practice of annotating errors in the *STP* is consistent with the medieval mindset discussed in earlier chapters that considers the flaws in Algazel's arguments to be merely philosophical errors rather than theological heresies, even when scholars draw counterarguments from scripture. This important distinction allowed scholars to continue to read and study Arab philosophy even when they encountered errors. However, scholars in later centuries increasingly labeled Algazel and Arab philosophers as heretics and their errors as heresies. These changes in perception affected the reading of Algazel and Arab philosophy in Latin Christendom and allowed scholars to ignore or reject these texts out of hand since they did not adhere to reason or revelation.

CONCLUSION

In the twelfth century, Latin scholars translated the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* as part of a project to acquire the Aristotelian tradition of philosophy that had flourished in the Arab world. During the centuries that followed, scholars treated this translation as an integral part of the medieval tradition of philosophy and a variety of sources describes Algazel's absorption into the Latin canon. The numbers of references to and quotations from the *STP* in medieval works reveal that many authors were familiar with Algazel and expected their colleagues to have a command of his arguments as well. The manuscripts that contain the *STP* demonstrate the thought and effort that scribes put into the integration of this text. The physical appearance of these copies matches the norms of manuscript production in the Middle Ages with the result that the *STP* was both useful and attractive. Scribes also compiled Algazel with similar works to form useful compendiums on the Latin tradition of Aristotelian philosophy. Many copies can be found in universities that are synonymous with scholasticism, but Algazel also appears in obscure monasteries and in the hands of a wide range of readers. Indeed, the annotations left by these readers in the margins of copies of the *STP* form the best evidence of Algazel's integration. The notes reveal how scholars actively engaged and personalized the text. They connect passages of the *STP* with arguments that they have read in works by Arab and Latin authors. They paraphrase Algazel's arguments and mark the sections they wish to recall later, even placing warnings alongside errors in the *STP*. In spite of the resistance from thirteenth-century condemnations and a decline in readership in the

fifteenth century, the *STP* remained influential enough to see a renewal of interest in the sixteenth century.

Despite the *STP*'s long tenure in Latin Christendom, Algazel fell out of favor by the middle of the seventeenth century. This final chapter addresses the rise and decline of the *STP* within the Latin canon and its implications. It emphasizes the depth of Algazel's absorption into the medieval intellectual tradition, but it also offers arguments regarding how the fate of the *STP* illustrates the general decline of Arab philosophers. Although the *STP* faced resistance in the form of condemnations during the Middle Ages, no medieval intellectual movement or attempt at censorship was able to restrict the use and reading of the work. In fact, the *STP* was so closely tied to the medieval milieu that its removal from the Latin canon coincides with the decline of scholasticism and the humanist rejection of Arab philosophy. This indifference or antipathy toward Arab authors in favor of classical sources precipitated a decrease in the number of forums where Algazel was discussed. Renaissance scholars saw Arab authors in a different light than their predecessors and often referred to Algazel as a heretic and a Muslim. The success of the Renaissance assessment of Arab philosophy has had a lasting effect on the modern interpretation of Algazel and Arab authors in the development of the European intellectual tradition.

The manuscripts that contain the *STP* possess a provenance that extends across much of medieval Europe. Thus, Algazel enjoyed widespread appeal as a work that aided in the reading of Aristotle, but in addition to this useful quality, the far-reaching circulation of Algazel can be attributed to the work of scribes, copyists, and illuminators. The manuscripts give no indication that the work contained arguments that were foreign

or dangerous. Instead, scribes expended considerable energy and expense to create these copies and strove to make them easy to read and attractive to the eye. They used excellent and expensive materials to create these manuscripts and applied every technology at their disposal that might make the text accessible and useful. Scribes compiled these copies of the *STP* with the translations of Aristotle and other Arab philosophers to form volumes on Peripatetic philosophy. In time, they connected Algazel with the works of Latin scholars who had borrowed from the translations and built on their arguments to develop the European tradition of philosophy. Algazel also circulated with a coherent group of texts that included other translations of Aristotle and Arab philosophy, but some manuscripts indicate that scholars associated his arguments with a range of Latin authors, revealing that scholars viewed Algazel as an integral part of the Latin philosophical tradition as it matured over the period of several centuries. After their creation, the information surrounding the ownership of these manuscripts demonstrates that Algazel found readers in the loftiest centers of learning like Paris, Oxford, and Padua. However, Algazel appears in remote abbeys like the Cistercian monastery of Zwettl in the Austrian Alps and a book list from an abbey in the hamlet of Ter Doest in Belgium along the North Sea also mentions that their library once included Algazel's work. The quality of the medieval copies of the *STP* and their thoughtful compilation with similar works, together with their circulation and unlikely appearances in far-flung regions of Europe signify the extent of Algazel's incorporation into the minds and libraries of Latin scholars.

For centuries, authors quote from the *STP* and cite its arguments in their own works and commentaries, often juxtaposing Algazel with other authorities on speculative philosophy. Scholars in the thirteenth century compared the arguments of Algazel with those of Avicenna and Aristotle, but as scholastic authors became more skilled with Aristotelian arguments they began to juxtapose Algazel with new authorities such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, both of whom discussed the *STP* at length. By revisiting Alonso's list of citations and looking for additional readers of the *STP*, we find an extensive list of medieval scholars who quote from the work. The most important finding in this new list is that Algazel's audience extends into the fourteenth century and beyond, contrary to previous scholarship. The narrative of Algazel's medieval audience still begins with rapid growth in the thirteenth century, but now includes steady readership during the thirteenth and sees a decline in the fourteenth. The beginnings of the decline can be detected in the late fourteenth century, which corresponds to the challenges to Arab philosophy offered by early humanists such as Petrarch. The fifteenth-century decrease in the number of scholars who cite Algazel is significant, though its extent is unclear. The printing of the work in 1506 and the rise in the number of citations suggest that the study of Algazel was alive and well, if only in particular areas like the Veneto where interest in the *STP* remained constant. Yet the fact that influential figures such as John Gerson continued to cite Algazel during this period indicates that the study of Algazel was not relegated to specific regions. This evidence of survival raises the same question that Alonso posed: are there more citations of the *STP* in as-yet unedited fifteenth-century works? This possibility seems unlikely given the declining number of

readers already in the late fourteenth-century, but historians of medieval philosophy traditionally do not pay as much attention to scholastic authors from this period, many of whom remain unedited. In addition to the fluctuation in numbers, Algazel's audience also becomes more diverse over time. While the majority of his readership was in the university, the *STP* gradually found a wider audience in later centuries to include scholars outside of the academy and vernacular readers.

The reason for the *STP*'s popularity in Latin Christendom originally stems from Algazel's understood connection to Aristotle and Avicenna, but scholars developed a particular interest in several sections of the work. Some of these passages were innocuous and immediately useful, such as Algazel's description of the organization of the sciences, which offered a novel way to view the hierarchy of scholarly disciplines apart from the seven liberal arts. Other sections were of interest on account of the dangerous arguments they raised, which several authors and annotators identified as errors. In general, these passages pertained to the role of intermediary intelligences in the physical world from the issue of the first intelligence from First Principle or God to the influence of the Agent Intellect over human souls. The chapters that discussed these topics, specifically the fourth and fifth treatise of the *Metaphysica* and the fifth treatise of the *Physica*, also contained most of the errors. Thus, the most discussed parts of the *STP* were also the most controversial.

The myriad ways in which scribes, scholars, and readers made use of the *STP* provide a detailed view of the text's influence and also demonstrate how ingrained Algazel became within Latin tradition of philosophy. However, the warnings that appear

in the margins of the *STP* perhaps best illustrate the nature of medieval scholars' interest in Algazel. The original appeal of the work stems from Algazel's connection to Aristotle and Avicenna, but those who cited and annotated the *STP* paid particular attention to the very parts of the texts that the condemnations warned against. The note "cave hic" offers a warning, but it also serves to point out a stimulating passage without changing the text. It informs scholars that this section contains something dangerous and thus tantalizes readers as much as it warns them about what they are about to read. This practice of writing warnings is emblematic of the medieval mindset toward Arabic philosophy. Scholars in the Middle Ages viewed these errors as aberrations in an otherwise useful text. Unlike their successors, medieval scholars considered Algazel to be an Arab philosopher who made some errors in his arguments rather than a heretic or a perfidious Muslim whose errors were offensive to faith as well as reason. Thus, a shift occurred during the Renaissance in the perception of Arab philosophers and their works that dislocated them from the canon and downplayed their historical significance.

The Decline of the Algazel and Arab Philosophy

Scholars during the Renaissance were more critical than their predecessors regarding the application of Arab philosophy. Some continued to read the *STP* and other works by Arab authors, but others were vehemently opposed to Arab philosophy and even called for its removal from the canon. Humanists wrote diatribes against Arab scholarship and argued strongly about the merits of classical sources over the works of Arabs as well as the medieval authors who had relied upon them. However, the detractors of Arab philosophy revised a considerable amount of history in order to advance their

arguments. Artists often depicted Arab philosophy as something antithetical to the classical tradition despite the long-standing tradition of Greek scholarship in the Middle East. They also portrayed medieval scholars triumphing over Arabs as if their philosophy was a kind of obstacle. In addition, sixteenth-century scholars began to change the way they viewed Algazel from an Arab philosopher, whose work contained several errors, to a heretic and a Muslim. On the other hand, the pervasiveness of Arab philosophers in the works of medieval scholars allowed humanists to associate Averroes, Avicenna, Algazel and others with the worst qualities of scholasticism. These combined factors led to the gradual decline of Algazel and Arab philosophy within the Latin canon. Yet these efforts to make Arab philosophers and their works appear foreign and heretical, but also integral in the Middle Ages have caused a great deal of confusion regarding the place of Arab authors in the Latin intellectual tradition up to the present. The experience of the *STP* in the Middle Ages acts as a corrective to many of these claims and offers a different view of Arab philosophy's place in Latin Christendom and why it declined.

Artwork from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century touches on this debate and depicts Arab philosophy as something to be overcome. The most common image is that of Thomas Aquinas triumphing over a learned Arab, who is often wearing a turban and traditionally seen as Averroes. The earliest is Lippo Memmi's fresco *The Triumph of St. Thomas* (ca. 1344) in the Church of St. Catherine in Pisa, in which Thomas sits with his books atop a defeated Averroes, who turns his face from his conqueror (Figure 1) while the prophets, evangelists, and even Aristotle and Plato face Thomas and show him their works. Andrea di Bonaiuto's fresco *St. Thomas Enthroned* (ca. 1366-1368) in the

Basilica of Santa Maria Novella in Florence depicts Thomas in a similar fashion, sitting with his books above a crouching, despondent Averroes as well as Sabellius and Arius (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Lippo Memmi

Figure 2: Andrea di Bonaiuto

Later artists in the fifthteenth century mimic Lippo Memmi's interpretation of this scene and render Averroes lying on the ground beneath Thomas, vanquished physically and intellectually. Giovanni di Paolo's *St. Thomas Confounding Averroes* (ca. 1445-1450) portrays a dejected or sleeping Averroes clutching a book as Thomas above offers instruction (Figure 3), presumably from his own writings.[1] Benozzo Gozzoli's *The Glory of St. Thomas Aquinas* (1471) bears an even closer resemblance to Memmi's fresco with

[1] This work was mostly likely commissioned by the Dominicans of Siena, who employed Giovanni di Paolo on several occasions. The painting now resides in the St. Louis Art Museum.

a recumbent Averroes with a book beneath a radiant Thomas, who is flanked by Aristotle and Plato, who are standing and demonstrate the importance of classical authors over Arabs (Figure 4).[2]

Figure 3: Giovanni di Paolo

Figure 4: Benozzo Gozzoli

Although Thomas discussed Averroes and other Arab philosophers and sometimes disagreed with their conclusions, these images obscure Thomas' use of these authors, whose works more often functioned as tools rather than obstacles. In the case of Algazel, Thomas was well aware of the arguments in the *STP* and cited them in his *Summa contra gentiles* as well as in his commentary on the *Sentences*. Rather than proclaiming victory over Arab philosophy, Thomas' citations of Algazel and other Arabs contributed to the continued study of the *STP* in later centuries and encouraged Thomists to read the work

[2] This painting was completed while Gozzoli was working in Pisa, but it now resides in the Louvre.

that had influenced this saint. However, these artists either could not depict Thomas' nuanced usage of Arab authors or chose to interpret his engagement with Arab learning as a victorious campaign of refutation.

Raphael's *School of Athens* offers a more detailed vision of how Renaissance scholars viewed Arab philosophers. In this fresco commissioned by Pope Julius II for his study in the Apostolic Palace, Raphael creates an image that depicts the classical roots and spirit of the Renaissance by bringing together the pantheon of Greek learning in a thoroughly sixteenth-century building.[3] It is also a rejection of the intellectual culture of the previous centuries since Raphael does not depict any late medieval authors and his treatment of the one Arab figure in the painting is of particular interest. Traditionally seen as Averroes, this turbaned figure is as an interloper within the scene, craning his neck to look over the Pythagoras' shoulder.[4] Conversely, Raphael places Aristotle with Plato at the center as the classical fathers of philosophy, obscuring the fact that much of Aristotle's influence on Latin Christendom can be traced back to Arab intermediaries. For centuries, Latin scholars relied on copies of Aristotle's works that had been translated from Arabic. More importantly, their understanding of Aristotle was shaped by Arab commentators who had examined his teachings, elaborated on his arguments, and

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[3] The Stanza della Segnatura in which *School of Athens* held Julius II private library of 218 books. Ingrid Rowland, "The Intellectual Background of the *School of Athens*: Tracking Divine Wisdom in the Rome of Julius," ed. Marcia Hall, *Raphael's School of Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 131. Raphael may have been inspired by the new St. Peter's Basilica, which was being built under the direction of Bramante around the same time that Raphael was painting in the Apostolic Palace. The architecture of the fresco resembles the basilica's ceiling. Raphael himself succeeded Bramante as the architect of St. Peter's in later years. Horst Janson and Anthony Janson, *History of Art: The Western Tradition* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), 576.

[4] Rowland, "The Intellectual Background of the *School of Athens*," 154-155.

generally promoted the study of his approach to philosophy. Many Latin scholars referred to Algazel and other Arab philosophers as Peripatetics—honorary members of Aristotle's Lyceum. Thus, their contributions to the Latin tradition of Aristotelian philosophy earned them a place within any Latin Christian depiction of a metaphorical School of Athens, especially since many of their works were housed in the reorganized Vatican Library, which was only stone's throw from where Raphael was painting this fresco in 1510.[5] Yet in place of the Arabs whose works were at the forefront of intellectual pursuits over the last few centuries and were currently among the holdings in the Vatican Library, Raphael depicts a curious mix of classical scholars, many of whom had written no works or whose works were no longer extant. Raphael's representation bends space and time by placing classical figures in a Renaissance building, but it also writes the Arabs out of the history of European philosophy. Instead of standing on the shoulders of giants like Aristotle in order that they may see farther, the Arab scholar in this fresco is physically as well as intellectually ostracized as he strains to see over a Greek's back.

These early Renaissance artists depict a profound shift in which Averroes and Arab philosophy progressively move from the center to periphery in both art and

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[5] The earliest catalog of the manuscripts in the Vatican Library lists several works by Arab authors, including a fourteenth-century Arabic copy of *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, now in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Ar. 357, f. 23r-134v. Giorgio Levi della Vida, *Ricerche sulla formazione del più antico fondo dei manoscritti orientali della biblioteca vaticana* (Vatican City, 1939), 50-51. In 1475, Pope Sixtus IV and Giuliano della Rovere, who would become Julius II, reorganized the Vatican Library in a suite that was only two floors beneath the Stanza della Segnatura. Ingrid Rowland claims that librarian of the Vatican, Tommaso Inghrirami had close contact to Raphael during the creation of the *School of Athens* and that Giles of Viterbo provided much of the intellectual inspiration for the fresco. Christiane Joost-Gaugier, *Raphael's Stanza della Segnatura: Meaning and Invention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9-17 and passim. Ingrid Rowland, "The Intellectual Background of the *School of Athens*, 138-140.

scholarship. Artists already in the middle of the fourteenth century portray Arabs in a misleading fashion as the antagonists of Thomas Aquinas: Averroes or an unnamed Arab appears on the ground while Aristotle and Plato face Thomas and offer him their books. Yet Arab philosophy retains a central position within these paintings and while the artists confidently assert the supremacy of the Latin tradition, they still feel the need to depic these two traditions in opposition. The continued presence of Averroist thought in the regions where these paintings were produced (Florence, Pisa, Siena) likely compelled the artists or their patrons to make a bold visual statement about the intellectual triumph of Latins over Arabs. However, Raphael's masterpiece removes Arab philosophy from its central position. Unlike Thomas, Averroes is a part of the School of Athens, but he is off to the side and almost hidden from the audience, straining to see and be seen. This artistic shift is indicative of wider intellectual movements in the sixteenth century that seek to displace and remove Arab philosophy from the Latin intellectual tradition and its history.

The artwork of the Renaissance frequently downplayed the role and importance of Arab philosophy in the Middle Ages, but some humanist scholars also overtly rejected Arab scholarship as a viable pursuit, even in the place where Algazel's readership had remained constant. The printing of the *STP* in 1506 at Venice saved the work from its decline in readership during the fifteenth century. The decision to print the *STP* stemmed from the growing interest in Arab scholarship at Venice and Padua during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, where the study of Averroes and Avicenna flourished despite the derision of humanist scholars. The frequent citation of Algazel with other Arab philosophers allowed the study of the *STP* to suffer by its association with

scholarship broadly described as Averroism.[6] The Renaissance audience of Algazel and Arab philosophy differed considerably from the thirteenth-century scholars who were eager to get their hands on any text that might aid their understanding of Aristotelian philosophy. These later readers had access to Aristotle's entire corpus and were increasingly drawn to the translations from Greek rather than Arabic, but a new mindset toward Arabic sources fostered by Renaissance humanism was more damaging to the study of Algazel than any emphasis on the study of Aristotle alone.

Humanists as early as the fourteenth century extolled the value of classical sources and decried the non-classical qualities of Arab authors who did not read Aristotle in the original Greek. Francisco Petrarch was one of the fiercest detractors, who wrote a scathing critique of Arab scholarship, *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia*, which he wrote in Venice in 1367 and was later printed in 1501.[7] He criticizes Arab scholarship for its lack of access to Aristotle in Greek, its dry literary style and, more importantly, its superfluous existence given the availability of Aristotle in Latin alongside new translations of Greek commentators who were closer temporally and culturally to the Philosopher than Arab scholars. Petrarch's assessment gained ground over the next centuries as more and more scholars began to view Arab authors, particularly Averroes,

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[6] Ever since Ernst Renan's *Averroès et l'averroïsme*, scholars have differed on the types of Averroistic thought during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. For a description of the distinctions between Averroan, Averroist, and Averroistic thought, see Guido Giglioni's "Introduction" in *Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni (New York : Springer, 2013), 1-34.

[7] Francisco Petrarch, *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia*, ed. Antonietta Bufano, *Opere latine*, vol. 2 (Turin: Unione tipografico-editrice torinese, 1975).

with disdain.[8] For many Renaissance scholars, the scholarship of Arabs did not resemble their classical predecessors in form or substance, but rather was part and parcel of a dead scholastic system. Defenders of Arab scholarship argued that while Greek commentators mixed Aristotle's thought with that of Plato, Averroes strove to elucidate Aristotle's true positions rather than compromise them for the sake of harmony.[9] While this argument salvaged Averroes' reputation, it did not aid the study of Arab scholarship as a whole since Avicenna and, by extension, Algazel had incorporated elements of Platonism into their arguments. Interest in the works of Arab authors during the Renaissance remained strong primarily in the Veneto, where they were published frequently in the sixteenth century, while the study of authors other than Averroes was intermittent elsewhere. However, even scholars in this region ceased to read these works by the middle of the seventeenth century.[10]

Condemnations of Algazel's errors reappeared in the sixteenth century, but these attacks began to take on new meanings. Several later authors offered philosophical refutations of Algazel's errors. The *De erroribus philosophorum* continued to advertise

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[8] In the introduction to the 1550-1552 Aristotle-Averroes edition, Tommaso Giunta explains the inferiority of Arabs and the necessity to read them with Greek works: "Aetas vero nostra, contempta et quasi iam conculcata Arabum doctrina, nihil recipit, nihil miratur, nis quod a Graecorum thesauris huc norit esse translatum." *Aristotelis...omnia quae extant opera* (Venice, 1550-1552), I, pt. i, fol. 2. See also Charles Schmitt, *Aristotle and the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 23-25.

[9] Girolamo Borro's defenses of Averroes were as vigorous as humanists' criticisms. Most humanists argued that Averroes was derivative and unoriginal in his commentary. Borro countered that Averroes at least was striving to maintain the distinction between Aristotle and Plato and later Greek Neoplatonists. Craig Martin, "Humanism and the Assessment of Averroes in the Renaissance," *Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath*, ed. Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni (New York: Springer, 2010), 65-79 (76-77).

[10] Michael Barry, "Renaissance Venice and Her 'Moors,'" ed. Stefano Carboni, *Venice and the Islamic World: 828-1797* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 155-157.

the errors of the *STP* in the form of a printed edition of Nicholas Eymerich's *Directorium Inquisitorum*, while Konrad Wimpina fashioned a new condemnation of the errors of Algazel and other Arab philosophers. However, an important shift occurred in the minds of Renaissance scholars who began to refer to Algazel as a heretic or a Muslim, and his arguments as heresies rather than errors in judgment. This transition substantially changed the perception of Algazel's identity. Medieval scholars primarily connected Algazel with philosophers within the Arab or Latin Aristotelian traditions. Yet the name of Algazel, along with Avicenna and Averroes, begins to appear in sixteenth-century directories of heretics written by Catholics and Protestants in a variety of languages. Scholars previously had seen the errors in the *STP* more or less as aberrations in an otherwise sound and useful text. Even the medieval annotators who could identify these errors as they read the *STP* simply marked the passages that troubled them with a note of warning and continued to examine the text. The charge of heresy was harder to overlook and the incorporation of Arab philosophers into directories of heretics placed Algazel alongside Arius. Thus, Renaissance scholars viewed Algazel and Arab philosophers in a darker light than their medieval predecessors.

Renaissance scholars supplied a varied, though ultimately negative set of images when they discussed Arab philosophy and its place within the Latin tradition. Artists of the period often depict Thomas Aquinas overcoming Arab scholars, but these artistic expressions are gross distortions of medieval scholars' use of Arab philosophy. In the same way, Raphael's masterpiece obscures the connection between Aristotle and his Arab continuators that medieval scholars understood to exist. Petrarch and other

Renaissance humanists rejected Arab philosophy on stylistic and cultural grounds, citing the dry nature of its argumentation and the distance of Arab authors from antiquity. They also believed that there was little need for Arab philosophers' works given the availability of Aristotle and regarded the medieval dependence on these texts to be a sign of intellectual weakness. However, Renaissance scholars were only half right when they assumed that the only reason medieval scholars read these texts was to better understand Aristotle. Beginning in the twelfth century, medieval scholars discussed Algazel and Arab philosophers as objects of study in their own right, and cited their arguments not only in commentaries on Aristotle's works, but also in a range of philosophical and theological texts. Humanists depicted Arab authors as heretics in their scholarship and art, which was a step backward from the medieval categorization of Arabs as useful, albeit flawed scholars whose works were helpful tools for interpreting philosophy as well as other disciplines.

When describing the differing perspectives of Renaissance scholars toward Arab philosophy, Charles Schmitt claims that "humanists were generally closed to Averroism and restrictive, while the scholastics were open and receptive to new currents."[11] The restrictive mindset of humanists manifested itself in diverse ways and those who supported the study of Arab philosophers could hardly mount a defense to withstand every attack. While several of the points raised by humanists could be countered, the most difficult argument to refute was that of the sufficiency of Aristotle. The availability

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[11] Schmitt, *Aristotle and the Renaissance*, 25.

of the entire Aristotelian corpus and an increased emphasis on reading him in Greek negated the need for Arab commentators like Averroes. Arab authors such as Algazel who dealt indirectly with Aristotle became doubly unnecessary. Over time, humanists convinced the whole of Latin Christendom that what was most needed to understand Aristotle was Aristotle. This conclusion also allowed humanists to look back at their predecessors with disdain since medieval scholars could not seem to grasp that all they needed was Aristotle, pure and unfiltered, but instead they remained preoccupied with commentators and proxies who had never read him in the original Greek. Having been rendered superfluous, Arab philosophy and Algazel faded from the Latin canon.

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We live in a world that is still shaped by Renaissance arguments regarding the influence of Arab philosophers on the development of the European intellectual tradition. As Raphael depicted five centuries ago, Aristotle remains at the center of the Western pantheon of philosophers and Arab philosophers appear off to the side, barely visible on account of all the Greeks. Gougenheim has modified the argument of Renaissance scholars in claiming that Greek scholarship never disappeared from Europe during the Middle Ages, but the goal is the same: to reiterate the sufficiency of Aristotle and demonstrate the superfluity of Arab philosophers. While historians reserve special mention for Averroes and Avicenna, many perpetuate the idea that access to Aristotle was the primary motivation for translating and reading Arab philosophers, and there

remains a sense of surprise when these authors appear as objects of study in their own right.[12] Arab philosophers function as place holders, like so many John the Baptists, waiting for and heralding the time when Aristotle comes in his fullness, but ultimately unnecessary after his arrival. However, the copying and use of Arab philosophers, including mundane abbreviators of Avicenna like Algazel, continues in the centuries after Aristotle is widely available and appears in unlikely places. The long-standing presence of Arab philosophers in the Latin canon presents a challenge to the Renaissance assessment of their unimportance, but we continue to view the Middle Ages through a Renaissance lens that obscures the development of the European intellectual tradition.

In order to remove the obstacle to our historical understanding, we must change the lens from the Renaissance view, which assigns value based on how closely a work conforms to a classical ideal or how effective or influential its arguments are, to a perspective that allows medieval readers to assign value to a text. Algazel's integration into the Latin tradition during the Middle Ages demonstrates the openness and receptivity that Schmitt broadly attributes to scholastic authors. By examining the ways in which

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[12] Some of the best scholarship on the influence of Arab philosophy on Latin Christendom operates under the premise of Aristotle's looming supremacy. In his study of Avicenna's *De anima*, Dag Hasse outlines the Latin use of this work up to 1300 and illustrates how thirteenth-century scholars preferred Avicenna's arguments to those of Aristotle in the study of psychology. He concludes with a variety of fourteenth-century developments that led to the work's decline, including an increased access to and interest in Aristotle's approach to psychology. However, this end date proves somewhat arbitrary since d'Alverny's catalog of manuscripts that contain the *De anima* indicates that a significant number of copies were made in the fourteenth-century or later. Hasse also does not examine the scope of Avicenna's decline in the face of Aristotle's rise and declines to examine where Avicenna remained influential. Thus, Hasse plays upon Renaissance sensibilities regarding Arab philosophy in Latin Christendom since his argument posits that it is surprising for scholars to have preferred Avicenna to Aristotle, if only for a time, while it is unsurprising that Aristotle broadly surpassed Avicenna in the realm of psychology during the fourteenth century. Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West*, 225-229.

scholars copied, cited, and annotated the *STP* from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, we see the value that scholars gave to this text. Medieval scholars did not emphasize hard and fast distinctions between East and West, Arab and Latin (or Greek), but instead they considered Latin and Arab philosophers equally as "Peripatetici." They understood that Algazel informed not only their reading of Aristotle, but also of Avicenna, Thomas and Albert, and often juxtaposed their arguments in their own works as well as in the margins of the *STP*. As well as an object of close study, medieval scribes believed that the *STP* was a text worthy of decoration and all of the textual technologies that might make the work easier to read and remember. Despite the condemnations and the occasional warning from other readers, scholars were comfortable reading the *STP* in the centers of learning at Paris and Oxford as well as in remote places like Zwettl and Ter Doest. The varied application of the *STP* in Latin works, along with its treatment by scribes, illustrate the depth of familiarity and acceptance that Arab philosophy achieved during the Middle Ages. Only the decline of the scholastic project and the unwillingness of Renaissance humanists to continue reading Arab philosophers brought an end to this integration and turned these former denizens of the Latin canon into interlopers whose influence on Europe remains contested.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I – Aristotle with the *STP*

Work of Aristotle	Corpus	Translator	#	Manuscripts
Analytica Priora	*Organon*	Boethius	1	Vat. lat. 3010 (florilegia)
Posterior Analytics	*Organon*	Gerard of Cremona	2	BnF Lat. 14700, Vat. lat. 3010
Problemata	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona (?)	1	Assisi 663
Physica	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	3	Toledo 47-15 (florilegia), Borgh. lat. 37, Vat. lat. 3010
De coloribus	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	1	BnF Lat. 6552
Metheora	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona / William of Moerbeke	4	GC: Bib. Angelica 242; WM: Morgan 857, BnF Lat. 6552, Borgh. lat. 37
De generatione et corruptione	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	5	Toledo 47-15, Borgh. lat. 37, BNM lat. 2665, Worcester Q. 81, Vat. lat. 3010
De caelo	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	3	Toledo 47-15, Borgh. lat. 37, Vat. lat. 3010
De somno et vigilia	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	4	Assisi 663, Prague 1585, Toledo 47-15, Uppsala C. 647;
De morte et vita	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	3	Assisi 663, Bib. Angelica 242, Vat. lat. 3010
De anima	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	3	Toledo 47-15, Borgh. lat. 37, Vat. lat. 3010
De longitudine et brevitate vitae	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	1	Toledo 47-15
De memoria et reminiscentia	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	5	Assisi 663, Toledo 47-15, Uppsala C. 647, Borgh. lat. 37, Vat. lat. 3010
De sensu et sensato	*Physics*	Gerard of Cremona	2	Borgh. lat. 37, Vat. lat. 3010
De animalibus	*Physics*	Michael Scot	4	St. Nikolas Hospital 205, Göteborg lat. 8, Laon 412, Vat. lat. 3010
Metaphysica	*Metaphysics*	James of Venice	2	Borgh. lat. 37, Vat. lat. 3010
Rheotorica	*Rhetoric*	Herman the German	2	Toledo 47-15, Vat. lat. 3010
Liber Ethicorum	*Ethics*	Herman the German	2	Prague 1585, Vat. lat. 3010
Ps. Aristotle				
De pomo		Manfred	3	Morgan 857, BnF Lat. 14700, Prague 1323
De causis		Gerard of Cremona	3	Assisi 663, Merton 285, Bib. Angelica 242
Liber purae bonitas		Gerard of Cremona	2	Bib. Angelica 242, Uppsala C. 647
De plantis		Alfred of Shareshill	3	Morgan 857, BnF Lat. 14700, Toledo 47-15
Secreta secretorum		Phillip of Tripoli	2	Toledo 47-15, Prague 1323
Vita Aristotelis		Anonymous	1	BnF Lat. 14700

Appendix II – Averroes, al-Kindi, and al-Farabi

A.

Work of Averroes	Translator	#	Manuscripts
De substantia orbis	Michael Scot	7	Graz 482, Laon 412, Morgan 857, Digby 217, BnF Lat. 6443, Uppsala C. 647, Borgh. Lat. 37
Comp.Parva naturalia	Michael Scot	4	Assisi 663; Graz 482; Laon 412; Morgan 857
Comm. med. in De generatione et corruptione	Michael Scot	2	Graz 482, Laon 412
Comm. mag. in Metaphysicam	Michael Scot	2	Graz 482, Bodleian lat. B. 18
Com. mag. in De animalibus	Michael Scot (prob.)[1]	1	Graz 482
De caelo	Michael Scot	1	Graz 482
Com. mag. in Physica	Michael Scot	1	Worcester Q. 81
Com. mag. in De anima	Michael Scot	1	Worcester Q. 81

B.

Works of al-Kindi	Translator	#	Manuscripts
De intellectu or *De ratione*	Dominicus Gundissalinus / Gerard of Cremona	7	DG: (*De intellectu*): Graz 482, Laon 412, Digby 217, BnF Lat. 6443, Angelica 242, Vat. lat. 2186, Worcester Q. 81; GC (*De ratione*): BnF Lat. 6443, Angelica 242
De quinque essentis	Gerard of Cremona	6	Digby 217, BnF Lat. 14700, BnF Lat. 16605, Prague 1323, Angelica 242, Vat. lat. 2186
Liber introductorius in artem logicae demonstrationis	Dominicus Gundissalinus	3	Digby 217, BnF Lat. 6443, Vat. lat. 2186
De somno et visione	Gerard of Cremona	3	BnF Lat. 6443, Reg. lat. 1870, BNM lat. 2665
De radiis	Anonymous	1	Prague 1323
Works of al-Farabi[2]			
De scientiis	Dominicus / Gerard	2	GC: Graz 482; DG: Worcester Q. 81
De ortu scientiarum	Dominicus Gundissalinus?	5	DG: St. Nikolas Hospital 205, BnF Lat. 14700, Prague 1323; GC: BnF Lat. 6443, Toledo 47-15

[1] While Hasse confidently attributes the other works in this collection to the translation work of Michael Scot, he is less confident about the *Commentum medium De animalibus*. Hasse, *Latin Averroes Translations*, 19-20.

[2] Most of his works came into Latin through the efforts of Dominicus and Gerard, but Latin scholars seem to know more about al-Farabi than what is extant in these texts. Several scholars quote selections from his Aristotelian commentaries that were never translated in full and some of them are not extant in Arabic. Dominique Salman, "The Medieval Latin Translations of Alfārābī's Works," *New Scholasticism* 13 (1939): 245–61.

De intellectu et intellecto	Dominicus Gundissalinus	5	Graz 482, Morgan 857, Digby 217; BnF Lat. 6443, Vat. lat. 2186
Fontes quaestionum / Flos Alfarabii secundum sententiam Aristotelis	Anonymous	2	Angelica 242 (*Flos)*, Vat. lat. 2186 (*Fontes*)
Distinctio super librum Aristotelis de naturali auditu	Gerard of Cremona	2	Assisi 663, Graz 482

Appendix III – Other Philosophers Translated from Arabic

Issac Israeli	**Translator**	**#**	**Manuscripts**
De elementis	Gerard of Cremona	6	Assisi 663, St. Nikolas Hospital 205, Edinburgh 134, Göteburg lat. 8, BnF Lat. 14700, Vat. lat. 3010
De descriptione rerum et diffinitionibus earum	Dominicus Gundissalinus	8	Assisi 663, St. Nikolas Hospital 205, Edinburgh 134, Digby 217, BnF Lat. 6443, BnF Lat. 14700, Angelica 242, Vat. lat. 2186
Medical Works (*De urinis, Dietae universales*)	Constantine the African	1	Vat. lat. 3010
Solomon ibn Gabirol			
Fons vitae	Dominicus Gundissalinus	2	BnF Lat. 6552, BnF Lat. 14700
Moses Maimonides			
Dux neutrorum	John of Palermo	3	Graz 482, BnF Lat. 16096,
Qusṭā ibn Lūqā			
De physicis ligaturis siue de incantatione	Constantine the African	1	Graz 482
De differentia spiritus et animae	John of Seville	5	Assisi 663, Toledo 47-15, Uppsala C. 647, Borgh. lat. 37, Worcester Q. 81
Alexander of Aphrodisias			
De tempore	Gerard of Cremona	3	Assisi 663, Graz 482, BnF Lat. 6443
De sensu	Gerard of Cremona	1	Graz 482
De intellectu et intellecto	Dominicus Gundissalinus	4	Digby 217 (2x), BnF Lat. 6443, Angelica 242, Vat. lat. 2186
De augmento	Gerard of Cremona	2	BnF Lat. 6443, Angelica 242
De fato	William of Moerbeke (trans. from Greek)	1	BnF Lat. 16096
Themistius			
In Posteriora	Gerard of Cremona	1	Worcester Q. 81

Appendix IV – Latin Scholars with the *STP*

Augustine	*De spiritu de anima*	3	Prague 1585, Angelica 242, Toledo 47-15
	Dialogus LXV quaestionum	1	Laon 412
	De honestate vite	1	Toledo 47-15
	Confessiones (Books 1-13)	1	Zwettl 89
	De immortalitate animae	1	Zwettl 89
Boethius	*De trinitate*	2	Laon 412, Toledo 47-15
	De topicis differentiis	2	Angelica 242, Vat. lat. 3010
	Opuscula theologica	2	Angelica 242, BNM lat. 2665
	De hebdomadibus	1	Laon 412
	De christiana religione	1	Toledo 47-15
	De consolatione philosophiae	1	Uppsala C. 647
	Commentum in Isagogen Porphyrii	2	Vat. lat. 2186, Vat. lat. 3010
Dominicus Gundissalinus	*De unitate et uno*	6	St. Nikolas Hospital 205, Graz 482, BnF Lat. 6443, BnF Lat. 16605, Prague 1323, Angelica 242
	De processione mundi	6	Laon 412, Morgan 857, BnF Lat. 6443, Toledo 47-15, Vat. lat. 2186, Vat. lat. 3010
	De anima	6	BnF Lat. 14700, Prague 1323, Toledo 47-15, Vat. lat. 2186, Reg. lat. 1870, Zwettl 89
	De divisione philosophiae	3	BnF Lat. 14700, Vat. lat. 2186, Reg. lat. 1870
	De invisibilibus Dei	1	Vat. lat. 3010
Alfred Shareshill	*De motu cordis*	5	St. Nikolas Hospital 205, Graz 482, Laon 412, BnF Lat. 6443, 14700
Albert the Great	*Commentum in De anima*	2	Laon 412, Merton 285
	Liber de intellectu et intelligibili	2	Merton 285, Prague 1323
	Commentarium in Aristotelis de spiritu et respiratione	2	Merton 285, Uppsala, C. 647
	De natura et origine animae	2	Merton 285, Uppsala C. 647
	De potentiis animae (dub.)	1	Prague 1323
	De quiditate et esse	1	Morgan 857
	De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas	1	Uppsala C. 647
	De animalibus	1	Uppsala C. 647

	Thirteen works in Merton 285[3]	1	Merton 285
Thomas Aquinas	*De ente et essentia*	4	Morgan 857, Digby 217, BnF Lat. 6552, Prague 1323
	De mixtione elementorum	2	Morgan 857, Prague 1323
	Liber de motu cordis	2	Morgan 857, Prague 1323
	De occultis operationibus naturae	1	BnF Lat. 16096
	De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas	1	BnF Lat. 6443
	Tractatus de mixtione	1	BnF Lat. 6443

[3] *Commentum in De somno et vigilia; In Physica; In De caelo et mundo; In De generatione et corruptione; In Sentencias; In Meteora; In De vegetabilibus et plantis; In De morte et vita*; *De motibus animalium*; *De mineralibus*; *De nutrimento et nutrito*; *De natura loci*; *De causis proprietatum elementorum*

Appendix V – Warnings in the *STP*

Annotators	Warning	Approximate location of warning
Ott. Lat. 2186, f. 27r	"Cave lector"	*Metaphysica*, I (4:10)
Vat. lat. 4481, f. 14r	"hic cave"	*Metaphysica*, I (40)
Vat. lat. 4481, f. 15v	"cave hic"	*Metaphysica*, I (44)
BnF Lat 6552, f. 48va	"nota diligenter"	*Metaphysica*, II (59)
Vat. lat. 4481, f. 21v	"cave hic"	*Metaphysics*, II (60)
BnF Lat. 6552, f. 49va	"nota diligenter"	*Metaphysica*, III (68-9)
Vat. lat. 4481, f. 26v	"cave hic"	*Metaphysica*, III (72)
BnF Lat. 6552, f. 50ra	"item cave"	*Metaphysica*, III (74-75)
Reg. lat. 1870, f. 38va	“cave hic quia potest habere malum intellectum”	*Metaphysica*, III, (79)
Vat. lat. 4481, f. 38v	"cave hic"	*Metaphysica*, IV (102-103)
Vat. lat. 4481, f. 39v	"cave hic"	*Metaphysica*, IV (105)
Vat. lat. 4481, f. 40v	"cave"	*Metaphysica*, IV (109)
Vat. lat. 4481, f. 42v	"cave"	*Metaphysica*, IV (113-114)
Ott. Lat. 2186, f. 73va	"cave"	""
BnF Lat. 6552, f.53vb	"nota diligenter"	""
Vat. lat. 4481, f. 44v	"cave"	*Metaphysica*, IV (118)
BnF Lat. 6552, f. 54rb	"nota errorem plurum de exitu rerum in esse"	*Metaphysica*, V (121)
BnF Lat. 6552, f. 54va	"nota diligenter"	*Metaphysica*, V (123)
BnF Lat. 6552, f. 54vb	"nota diligenter"	*Metaphysica*, V (126)
BnF Lat. 14700, f. 38vb	"nota bene"	""
Laon 412, f. 87va	"nota hanc cautissime"	*Metaphysica*, V (128)
Vat. lat. 4481, f.50r	"cave hic"	*Physica*, I (134)
Vat. lat. 4481, f.52v	"cave hic"	*Physica*, II (141-142)
Vat. lat. 4481, f.70r	"cave hic"	*Physica*, V (187)

Appendix VI - Authors who cite the *STP* or refer to Algazel

This list of authors and works is an expansion of the list prepared by Manuel Alonso in his edition of the *Maqasid al-falasifa*. It includes one-hundred and forty authors, the works in which they cite the *STP* or refer to Algazel, and the page number or folio in which the citation appears. I have also updated Alonso's citations wherever possible since many new editions of medieval philosophers' works have appeared, especially those of Albert the Great, since the Alonso's publication in 1963. I made use of the biographies in Appendix B of the *Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 2009) in order to make the list as comprehensive as possible, with the exception of Islamic and Jewish authors. In keeping with the parameters of Alonso's list, I chose to include sixteenth-century authors in order to examine changes in Algazel's audience after the printing of the *STP* in 1506. However, there is no comparable reference work that catalogs Renaissance philosophers and thus my selection of Algazel's sixteenth-century readers is eclectic. As Alonso believed, there could be more readers of Algazel from the sixteenth century than those I have listed, which may be found as more editions become available or as the digital scanning of early printed texts improves. Yet in the case of medieval readers, I believe this list reliably demonstrates the extent of the *STP*'s audience.

Adam of Buckfield

- *Sententia super secundum Metaphysicae*, ed. A Maurer, *Nine Medieval Thinkers: A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1955): 101, 103.

Adam Wodeham

- *De notitia intuitiva sine re visa*, ed. R. Wood and G. Gál, *Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, Vol. 1: Prologus et distinctio prima* (St. Bonaventure: St. Bonaventure, 1990): 69.

Agostino Nifo

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[4] Manuel Alonso counted these citations twice since they are found in this work as well as in Ignatius Brady, ed. "Two sources of the *Summa de homine* of Saint Albert the Great," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 20 (1953): 222-271, which he also included in his list.

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[6] Refers to an argument from Algazel in *Destructio destructionum*

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[7] Refers to an argument from Algazel in *Destructio destructionum*

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[8] In these two citations, Jan Hus quotes from a work *De forma speculi*, which he attributes wrongly to Algazel. Although Algazel waxes eloquent about mirror as a metaphor for the soul in Lohr, "Logica Algazelis, 242:88, the passages quoted by Hus do not correspond to any part of the *STP*.

[9] See also the 1581 German printing, *De Daemonomania magorum: Vom Außgelassnen Wütigen Teuffelsheer der Besessenen*, f, 204.

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