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Deciding to Divert: Domestic and International Sources of Constraints on Leader Decision-making

Norris Thomas Feeney
nfeeney@utk.edu

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Brandon C. Prins, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

John M. Scheb II, Wonjae Hwang, Lois Presser

Accepted for the Council:

Carolyn R. Hodges

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Deciding to Divert:
Domestic and International Sources of Constraints on Leader Decision-making

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DEDICATION

For my great uncle, Dr. Norris E. Smith, and my late grandmother, Elizabeth S. Ferguson.

Thank you for instilling in me a curiosity about life, an appreciation for intellectual development, and serving as examples of how individuals should contribute to civil society. May I one day become as compassionate, generous, selfless, and wise as you.

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ABSTRACT

Domestic unrest is a constant feature in the international system. Aside from the impact unrest has on domestic populations, political turmoil also has consequences for other states in the international system. A long-held belief, backed by anecdotal evidence, is that leaders use aggressive foreign policy to divert public attention in periods of declining domestic political fortunes. However, consistent evidence for this pattern of behavior has not emerged across large-N analyses in the extant diversionary literature. This dissertation advances the search for evidence of diversion by assessing the likelihood leaders of various regime types will divert, comparing not only non-democracies with democracies, but also various non-democratic regime types to one another for the first time in recent diversionary literature.

Diversion is one of several responses to domestic unrest. Leaders may also choose repression, policy concessions, or resignation from office. Few arguments in the extant literature include more than one alternative, and even fewer, if any, consider resignation. The same institutions defining a regime's type are sources for opportunities and constraints leaders face in pursuing these latter three options. Regime type, therefore, is a domestic factor influencing the likelihood these alternative options are selected as a response, and in turn, the likelihood diversion is selected. However, diversion is unique among the response options in that it requires an additional state. The opportunity for diversion must also be considered. Rival environments are identifiable as opportunity-rich contexts in which the effect of unrest on dispute initiation is expected to be observed.

The results of analyses somewhat support theoretical arguments asserting domestic political institutions influence diversionary behavior. The impact of domestic unrest on the

likelihood of diversion does vary across regime types. Results from analyses including both domestic and international factors indicate rival context indicate the relationship between regime type, unrest, rivalry, and initiation is complex.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Domestic Unrest and International Consequences

In modern history, domestic political conflict has been present in at least one state, and often many states in the international system in each year. The location, severity, and number of states experiencing domestic unrest vary from year to year, but unrest is always present in the international system of states. Events in the Middle East in recent years have enhanced the salience of domestic turmoil as an issue of interest for the international community. Unrest is always present in some state; however, unrest in a region of the world that has received so much attention historically, and has been the scene of some of the most protracted conflicts in human history has served to place the issue of unrest high in the minds of political leaders, diplomats, and society in general. Media reports and policy papers on the domestic turmoil in several Middle East states have explored the domestic and international consequences of unrest in each of these states and the region as a whole. Undoubtedly, deteriorating domestic political conditions impact the leaders, regimes, and populations of states. The international consequences of domestic unrest are equally severe. Domestic conflicts may spill over into neighboring states, engulfing a region, and potentially drawing major powers into armed conflict. As unrest intensifies, a regime may collapse, leading to a failed state that provides an operational base for international terror groups. Alternatively, leaders faced with rising domestic unrest may initiate militarized disputes with other states to divert public attention from the issues driving domestic unrest. This dissertation offers and tests an explanation of such "diversionary" behavior by leaders. The central explanation of the dissertation is that institutions defining a

regime's type are sources of opportunities and constraints on leaders as they select among a set of options to address unrest, one of which is diversion. A second line of explanation assesses the opportunity a leader possesses to divert, selecting strategic rivalry as an opportunity-rich environment where disputes are most likely to occur. Taken together, the theoretical arguments offer a clear picture of where diversionary behavior is likely to occur, and which leaders are most likely to divert. The findings in this dissertation advance the quality of projections made by analysts seeking to understand the international consequences of domestic turmoil in specific states, and are useful for policy-makers seeking to anticipate developments in the international system.

In extant literature on inter-state conflict, the rise of domestic unrest in a state is widely-believed to influence its interactions with other states in the international system. Blainey (1973) summarizes the theoretical connections drawn between domestic and international conflict, separating explanations of "death-watch" wars where states experiencing unrest are believed to be more likely to be targeted militarily by other states and "scapegoat" wars where states experiencing domestic conflict are expected to initiate conflicts against other states in the international system. To date, the majority of research into the link between domestic and international conflict focuses on this "scapegoat" category. More formally, the "scapegoat" explanation of the link between domestic and international conflict is known as diversionary theory.

Theories of diversionary war and diversionary uses of force are found in the modern political science literature from its beginning[1]. The belief that domestic political leaders engage in risky foreign adventures to divert public attention from domestic problems is present in wider society as well. Oneal and Tir (2006) trace this belief even further back in history to Shakespeare. This dissertation examines which leaders are likely to select diversion as a strategy to address domestic turmoil, and which states are likely to be targeted by leaders with diversionary incentives. The central argument is that the institutional structures comprising a regime's type influence the likelihood a leader will select diversion over other potential options as a response to unrest. The regimes identified in the following chapters include the non-democratic regime types identified by Geddes: personalist, military, and single-party regimes. In addition, as the above section indicates, democracies are included.

A military regime is defined as a regime "governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism by which high-level officers could influence policy choice and appointments" (Geddes 2003, 72). In military regimes, the key institution of political decision-making is the military-as-institution, particularly the military leadership. Single party regimes are those in which a "one party dominates access to political office and control over policy, though other parties may exist and compete as minor players in elections" (Geddes 2003, 51). The defining characteristic of single-party regimes is the presence of a single party institution that dominates all aspects of leader-selection and policy decision-making in a state. Personalist regimes are those where an individual leader has

[1] Examples of early research that include elements of the diversionary argument include Rosecrance (1963) and Wilkenfeld (1968).

"consolidated control over policy and recruitment in his own hands" (Geddes 2003, 72). Further, "access to office and the fruits of office depend much more on the discretion of an individual leader" (Geddes 2003, 51). In personalist regimes, the key institution of political decision-making is the individual leader. There is no widely-accepted conceptual definition of democracy in either the international politics or comparative politics literature. I adopt a minimalist definition of democracy. For a regime to be coded as a democracy, a regime must be governed by a written constitution or collection of documents comprising a constitutional tradition that define the institutions of leader selection and policy-making and the relationship among them. Second, the choice of leadership in a regime must occur through elections in which most adult citizens are eligible to vote in free, inclusive, competitive elections in which more than one party competing has the *possibility* of holding power in government either as a majority or as a member of a coalition. The defining characteristic of democratic regimes is therefore the presence of free and competitive electoral institutions structuring the process of leader selection. Examples of regimes of each type are shown in Table 1a.[2]

Anecdotal evidence for the possibility that all four types of regimes engage in diversionary behavior exists. Examples of democratic diversion are abundant in the literature, particularly for the U.S. case. The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 as George H.W. Bush's approval rating sagged early in his term has been suggested as one example of a U.S. diversionary use of force as well as Reagan's intervention in Grenada in 1983 (DeRouen and Peake 2002). More recently, U.S. missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 as Bill Clinton was embroiled in impeachment hearings over the Monica Lewinsky scandal (*New York*

[2] All tables in the dissertation main text are located in Appendix A.

Times 1998) have been cited as an example of diversionary behavior. The actions of Syria, a personalist regime, in recent years have been perceived as diversionary in nature. For example, the flood of Syrian protesters against Israel's occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territory in May 2011 was labeled as a diversionary use of force by an Israeli Defense Forces spokesperson (*L.A. Times* 2011) and by the Israeli Prime Minister (*Haaretz* 2011). While this is not a conventional use of military forces of one state against those of another state, the June 2012 incident where Syria shot down a Turkish plane was.

The Falkland Islands War between the United Kingdom and Argentina is often cited as diversionary use of force (i.e. Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina, ruled by a military junta, experienced overt domestic unrest due to economic failures for several years leading up to the crisis. It was Argentina who precipitated the crisis and initiated the conflict by occupying the disputed but British-held Falkland islands. The territorial dispute, and Argentine occupation of the islands, was anticipated to provide a reinforcement of support for the military regime (BBC News 2012a). A British response that the Argentine rulers failed to anticipate quickly unfolded—a military defeat and the acceleration of the fall of the military regime. Identifying clear-cut examples of diversion by single-party regimes is more difficult. One possible case is the brief invasion of Indian territory (whose ownership was disputed by the Chinese) by Chinese forces in 1967 at the height of unrest related to the Mao's Cultural Revolution. Another potential example is Kenya's dispute with Uganda following post-election violence in Kenya.

The Major Issue in the Diversionary Literature: Faithful Belief and Limited Evidence

The question of which leaders are likely to divert may prove more difficult to answer than one would expect given the degree to which diversionary behavior is thought to exist and

the large body of literature that is devoted to the search for evidence of diversion. Despite Wilkenfeld's (1968) assertion that leaders' use of foreign policy to divert public attention from domestic problems is the "most widely-held notion" among international conflict scholars, the empirical evidence for diversionary behavior is mixed and often inconsistent when comparing results of large-N analyses. Scholars continue to search for evidence of diversionary behavior in cross-national studies despite this lack of consistent support for several reasons. One reason is the "intuitive plausibility" of the diversionary hypothesis (Levy 1989, Clark 2003). Another reason diversionary theory continues to attract academic study is a wealth of anecdotal evidence, which seems to support the diversionary hypothesis in specific cases. The overarching puzzle in the diversionary literature is why this family of theoretical explanations enjoys so little quantitative empirical support in the extant literature despite its attraction and plausibility, which is evident by the number of scholars who have explored it. The diversionary research literature is imposing in its size alone. The size of this body of research suggests a second—and related—puzzling aspect of the literature. As Oneal and Tir (2006) note, diversionary research is unique in the international conflict literature in that so many studies have been done on a theoretical argument that has received so little empirical support. The puzzles are two sides of the same coin. First, despite wide-spread belief that diversionary behaviors do occur, consistent evidence of diversion is not found in the extant literature. Second, despite a large body of research that questions the existence of diversionary behavior, a sizeable ongoing research literature on diversion indicates belief in diversion persists.

In the search for evidence of diversionary behavior, many scholars restrict the set of leaders likely to divert according to regimes they inhabit. Frequently, regimes are separated into

democratic and non-democratic regime types. Proponents of the democratic diversionary literature argue that the presence of elections are a factor that makes democratic leaders particularly responsive to changing domestic political conditions. Unfortunately, exploring democratic diversion leads to some of the same mixed results found in wider studies of diversionary behavior. Undeterred, many researchers focusing on democratic diversion have continued to narrow the set of democratic leaders likely to divert by disaggregating democratic leaders according to executive type, the degree of support and/or party cohesion of the executive's party in the legislature, the party composition of the legislature, the nature of domestic problems, and the left-right political orientation of the executive (often in conjunction with these other factors). Finally, some scholars elect to focus on one democratic case in isolation, that of the United States, as this state is unique among democracies as a superpower in the international system and is therefore argued to have either an overall higher willingness or opportunity to use force. Again, this research has led to mixed results.[3]

This research project contributes to the extant literature on diversionary theory first by exploring diversion by leaders of nondemocratic regimes. Research on non-democratic diversion is much less prevalent in the literature. There are several notable articles demonstrating non-democracies may divert as well. Miller (1995, 1999) is most frequently associated with this position. In his 1995 article, Miller finds that low levels of policy resources (argued to be related to non-democracy) and the higher the level of autocracy, the more likely leaders targeted in a dispute are to respond with force (his indicator of diversion). In his 1999 article, Miller finds

[3] A full exploration of inconsistent evidence for diversion generally, and for diversion by various regime types and by the U.S. is included in Chapter Two.

that non-democracies are more likely to divert than democracies when diversion is measured as a state being an original initiator of a use of force[4]. The second contribution made in this dissertation is exploration of possible variation across non-democracies in their propensities to possess leaders who select diversion as a response to unrest. While distinctions among non-democracies are made as far back as Rummel (1963) and Wilkenfeld (1968) in the study of the nexus of domestic and international conflict, for most of the following decades, non-democracies are generally considered a monolithic category in the conflict literature. In the most recent decade, a small but growing literature on comparative autocratic conflict emerges. Notable examples include Peceny et al. (2002), Lai and Slater (2006), Weeks (2008), Pickering and Kisangani (2010), and Weeks (2012). As Pickering and Kisangani note, only the Lai and Slater article is a comparative autocratic conflict research project grounded in diversionary logic. It is somewhat surprising that comparative autocratic diversion receives so little attention. As Geddes (1999) notes, the differences across non-democratic regimes are as pronounced as those between nondemocratic regime types and democracies. Given that there is such variation among this category, and that considerable work has been undertaken to explore the theoretical and empirical consequences of variation across democracies in the diversionary literature, disaggregating the non-democratic regime category into sub-types seems a logical evolution in the literature.

A third contribution to the literature made by this dissertation is the inclusion of democracies and various types of non-democracies in one theoretical and empirical model.

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[4] Miller finds a strong negative effect of democracy scores on the probability a targeted state will respond to a challenge with force in his 1999 article. This supports his findings and conclusions in the 1995 article.

Pickering and Kisangani (2010) is the only recent example of a study of comparative autocratic diversion. However, they do not include democracies in their analysis. Only Weeks (2012) elects to disaggregate nondemocratic regime types and compare the conflict behavior patterns of these types to democracies. Her project focuses on conflict generally however. The work in this dissertation therefore represents the *only* known work in recent diversionary literature to not only compare the prospects of diversionary behavior across non-democratic regimes but also to compare the diversionary behavior of these subtypes to that of democracies in a single theoretical explanation and empirical analysis.

Aside from these larger contributions, this dissertation makes two additional contributions to the existing literature. Pickering and Kisangani (2010) is the only recent test of comparative autocratic diversion; however, they note that Lai and Slater's (2006) study is the only comparative autocratic conflict research grounded in diversionary logic up to that point. While Lai and Slater (2006) find variation in the conflict patterns of single-party regimes when compared to military regimes, no statistical difference in dispute initiation between single-party and military regime types is found by Pickering and Kisangani (2010). Additionally, Pickering and Kisangani expect that single-party leaders should be somewhat more likely to divert than military leaders and much more likely to divert than personalist leaders. Therefore, the analyses in this dissertation are tests of these somewhat inconsistent findings.[5]

Finally, the data employed in this dissertation are different from that used in the analyses of Pickering and Kisangani (2010). The results in this dissertation also serve as a robustness

[5] Lai and Slater (2006), unlike Pickering and Kisangani (2010), do not include measures for domestic conditions that would indicate possible diversionary incentives such as economic indicators, domestic unrest measures, or political support measures.

check of the findings in Pickering and Kisangani's 2010 article. More importantly, their design has several potential flaws. First, they measure diversion with their international military intervention variable, which codes actual movement of military equipment and/or personnel from the territory of one state into another. Previous diversionary research (e.g. Morgan and Bickers 1992) suggests that diversionary behavior is likely to be characterized as actions below war and other uses of force. Second, they separate domestic unrest into mass and elite unrest categories. While this distinction is not necessarily objectionable, their measure of elite unrest is problematic. This measure contains incidents of purges as well as government crises drawn from the same dataset employed in the dissertation for measures of general unrest. Purges are inappropriate to include as a measure of unrest as this indicates a leader has already decided to address unrest through repression—a possibility that is likely to influence the likelihood of diversion. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising the authors conclude that no significant link is found between their elite unrest measure and dispute initiation.[6] The final contribution of this dissertation therefore, is twofold. First, the results in later chapters provide a robustness test to the findings of Pickering and Kisangani (2010), the only recent comparative autocratic diversion analysis in the extant literature. Second, the analyses in the dissertation rely on previous

[6] They argued that elite unrest increased the likelihood of initiation by single-party regimes more than military regimes, and "especially personalist regimes" in Hypothesis 1 (Pickering and Kisangani 2010, 481). The models indicate this is not the case when looking at unrest in the same year as a potential initiation. Elite unrest is significantly related to dispute initiation for personalist regimes alone. Lagging elite unrest by one year, the effect is no longer significant including all non-democratic regimes. When disaggregating non-democratic regimes, the coefficient of lagged elite unrest is positive and significant at the 0.05 level only for military regimes, and positive and barely missing significance at the 0.05 level for single-party regimes. Additionally, the coefficient for lagged elite unrest fails to reach significance for personalist regimes.

diversionary research to address and correct potential problems in Pickering's and Kisangani's research design.

Summarizing the Theoretical Argument

This dissertation asserts, and finds evidence, that diversionary actions by leaders vary across regimes depending on the institutional constraints present. Arguments belonging to this family of theoretical explanations of diversion view diversion as one option, which leaders may select when faced with rising domestic unrest. Variation in the likelihood of diversion across leaders, regimes, states, and time are explained by variations in the barriers to diversion and options other than diversion posed by the environment inhabited by a leader at any given point in time. Constraints are identified at either the domestic or international level. Clark and Nordstrom divide domestic barriers into structural constraints that are "constitutional constraints that shape the rules and structure of decision-making" (Clark and Nordstrom 2005, 254) and dynamic constraints that are "functions or outcomes of the constitutionally defined political process" (Clark and Nordstrom 2005, 254). While this definition of dynamic constraints is restrictive, in practice the factors included under this banner include "the extent of public participation and public support" (Clark and Nordstrom 2005, 255) in addition to legislative composition. While public participation arguably is under the banner of electoral institutions, and therefore related to the "constitutionally defined political process," public support is not. Additionally, the phrase "functions or outcomes of the constitutionally defined political process" is somewhat vague. This could refer to electoral outcomes, but also conceivably policy outcomes.

To attain a firmer grasp on the concept of dynamic constraints, refer to later sections of their article. They argue dynamic constraints differ from structural constraints in two manners: "these factors change over time as the result of the normal political process" and "different individual executives may be more or less responsive to the objectively constraining or objective circumstances" (Clark and Nordstrom 2005, 255). It seems therefore that the true definition of dynamic constraints is that they are constraints that: (1) vary over time, and (2) are less effective than structural constraints in shaping leader behavior. As structural constraints are more effective determinants of leader behavior, this category is of more interest theoretically. Following the definition of structural constraints offered, selecting regime type—which is defined by the collection of leader selection and policy-making institutions in a state—as a variable is a fruitful manner in which to identify sources of divergent behavior among leaders.

To briefly summarize the argument, the likelihood of diversionary action depends on the institutional constraints leaders confront. Personalist and military leaders are constrained from pursuing policy concessions as an option as they lack the infrastructural institutions of political parties, which allow for the more effective development and implementation of policy reforms. Democratic leaders are constrained from repression as a response to unrest by the presence of elections and constitutional barriers against the use of force internally. Among non-democracies, all leaders face low barriers to repression; however, the unification of military and political leadership in military regimes may lead to levels of constraints on repression that are marginally lower. The presence of regime institutions that specify the process of leader succession and replacement influence the availability and attractiveness of resignation as an option. The development of leader replacement mechanisms is greatest in democracies, followed by single-

party, military, and personalist regimes. In turn, the development of these institutions is related to the likely post-tenure fate of leaders, which influences leader decisions to resign. The less-developed leader replacement mechanisms are, the higher the chances of irregular removal from office and the more likely a leader will face a grisly post-tenure fate. Personalist leaders are most constrained from resignation, followed by military leaders, single-party leaders, and democratic leaders. Combined, these arguments suggest personalist leaders are most likely to divert, followed by military leaders, democratic leaders, and single-party regime leaders under similar levels of domestic unrest.

The likelihood that options other than diversion can and will be pursued is largely based on the domestic characteristics, specifically regime institutions, which define regime types. This explanation only accounts for the willingness of leaders to select diversion as a response to unrest however. Diversion, unlike the other response options, necessarily requires an understanding of the barriers outside the domestic realm. As the strategic conflict avoidance literature suggests, diversionary researchers must also take into account the willingness of *and opportunity* for a leader to divert due to the international context in which the leader is acting. Evidence of diversion and of variations in the likelihood of diversion determined by regime type are expected to be found in rival dyads as these cases represent opportunity-rich environments. Research that supports the selection of rivalry as an environment where evidence of diversion is likely (Mitchell and Prins 2004) goes further however. Democratic regime transparency suggests that no connection between domestic unrest and diversion for democracies should be found in rival dyads, and that variation in the likelihood of diversion across non-democracies should be found in the rival context. Combining the domestic and international constraints

arguments, personalist regimes should be most likely to divert, followed by military regimes and single-party regimes in rival environments.

Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation examines the conditions under which leaders divert. Regime type and international context are explanatory factors conditioning the likelihood a leader selects diversion as a response to unrest. Domestic institutional arrangements (collectively defining regime type) constrain the pursuit of options other than diversion in unique ways for leaders of each regime type. These constraints determine the degree to which leaders are "willing" to divert. The relationships a state has with its counterparts in the international system determine the degree of opportunity a leader experiencing unrest has to divert. The evidence presented in the dissertation suggests regimes vary in their likelihood to initiate international disputes when domestic conditions deteriorate. Initial results somewhat support arguments viewing domestic constraints as a factor that conditions leader response to unrest, and the pattern that emerges is consistent with theoretical expectations. The empirical results provide little support for arguments accounting for the international context. A significant relationship in the expected direction between unrest and dispute initiation is found consistently for only one regime type, democracies. However, the results indicate that this finding holds only in non-rival contexts.

In Chapter Two, existing research on diversion and comparative autocratic conflict is reviewed. There is a large body of research on diversion; however, focus on diversion generally, diversion by democracies, or diversion by specific subtypes of democracies fails to provide consistent empirical evidence for the diversionary use of force by states. This problem persists despite considerable attempts to refine diversionary analyses by defining ever narrower

conditions for where diversion is likely, debates over competing measures of right and left-side measures used in analyses, and the development of competing theoretical explanations of diversionary behavior. Empirical findings in recent research on variation in the conflict patterns of non-democracies suggest theoretically interesting differences exist among non-democratic regimes. Extending the discussion of variation in conflict behavior across non-democracies into diversionary research may therefore be useful in the development of the literature.

Chapter Three identifies regime type and the international context as factors that condition the effect of unrest on a leader's decision to engage in aggressive foreign policy for diversionary purposes. The domestic institutional arrangement, which defines regime type, provides structural barriers to the pursuit of policy concessions, repression, or resignation by leaders. The degree to which these barriers are present in turn influences the likelihood a leader of a specific regime type is willing to seek diversion as a response strategy. The behavior of other states, however, limits the opportunities available to a leader who possesses diversionary incentives. Strategic rivalry with another state may hinder the ability of a rival state to engage in strategic conflict avoidance. Combining these arguments, variation in the likelihood of diversion that I anticipate to be present across different regimes may only be observable in strategic rival contexts.

In Chapter Four, the measures employed and the data used to test the theoretical arguments in Chapter Three are presented. Measures are selected based on the concepts introduced in the Chapter Two, and referencing previous measures of these concepts. Controls commonly used in conflict analyses are also included in the empirical models and are operationalized in Chapter Four. Additionally, the estimators used and decision to include

analyses of both a full dataset and restricted dataset are discussed. Descriptive statistics for these measures in both the full and restricted dataset are presented in Appendices A-C.

Chapter Five includes logit models estimating the effect of domestic unrest, regime type, and the effect of unrest for each regime type on the likelihood of dispute initiation. This chapter is a test of the first part of the theoretical argument, which accounts for variation in the likelihood of diversion by leaders as a function of domestic factors alone (regime type and domestic unrest). The models are first applied to a dataset encompassing all directed dyads in the international system from 1946-2000, and subsequently to a restricted dataset including only politically-relevant directed dyads in the international system from 1946-2000. The results of the politically-relevant-dyads analysis come close to matching theoretical expectations, suggesting some support for the policy constraints argument focused on domestic constraints varying across regime type.

Chapter Six includes logit models designed to test the fully-specified theoretical explanation of diversion in Chapter Three. Again, the analyses are divided into those employing the universe of directed dyads and a restricted analysis estimating models for politically-relevant-directed-dyads alone. Due to data limitations on the rivalry measure, the time period covered is restricted to 1946-1992. The expected relationship between regimes in a rival context is found in the politically-relevant dyads analysis, though strong support of the argument cannot be concluded. While rivalry and domestic unrest are both related to dispute initiation, the conditional effect of unrest is not significant in rival contexts. Interestingly, for two regime types, the conditional effect of unrest is significant in non-rival contexts. This is not supportive of the hypotheses derived from the strategic conflict avoidance argument. Another interesting

and unanticipated empirical finding is a much greater effect of unrest on dispute initiation for military regimes in non-rival contexts than in rival contexts. Again, this contradicts the expectations of strategic conflict avoidance.

Chapter Seven provides a more detailed summary of the results in Chapters Five and Six. The bulk of this chapter attempts to explain results that appear inconsistent with the theoretical argument presented in Chapter Three. First, there are concerns with the regime type measure developed by Geddes and its inclusion of "hybrid" regime types. Second, theoretical omission of variation across democracies may be problematic. Additionally, potential consequences for estimation due to the selection of overt measures of unrest for testing strategic conflict avoidance arguments are explored. Finally, an explanation of the interesting if unanticipated finding of starkly different effects of unrest on dispute initiation among military regimes in rival versus non-rival environments is provided.

In Chapter Eight, I discuss how research on diversion should progress. Drawing extensively on Chapter Seven, a new typology of regime types is developed that is viewed as an improvement on existing classifications as it accounts for both variation across non-democracies and across democracies. This classification is also viewed as an improvement as it eliminates the problem of "hybrid" regimes in the Geddes classification while retaining her foundational data used to classify non-democratic regime types. Finally, improving understanding of the conditions that are likely to result in diversion may require a greater understanding and improved empirical analyses of options other than diversion. If policy constraints do matter in understanding variation in the likelihood of diversion across regime type, improved understanding of the total set of response options, and how regime institutions may influence the

likely pursuit of these options, may illuminate the conditions under which leaders are most likely to select diversion as a strategy to address unrest.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

In Chapter One, a sketch of a research project on diversionary behavior is presented. Domestic unrest is a chronic condition in the international system of states. This unrest has consequences for the population of the afflicted state and its leadership as well as the leaders and populations of other states. One potential consequence that has been long-explored in the literature is diversionary foreign policies—the targeting of other states by a leader facing domestic unrest in an attempt to distract his domestic public's attention from issues driving unrest. This chapter outlines the current state of the diversionary literature. The first component of this chapter is a discussion of the major families of the theoretical explanation of diversion and their empirical and theoretical problems. Drawing upon lessons derived from the work of previous scholars, several theoretical points are highlighted and selected for use in the following chapter. The theoretical argument in Chapter Three is rooted in policy constraints approaches to explain diversionary behavior, which is favored over principal-agent models and the political incentives approach discussed below.

The second component of this chapter is a survey of the diversionary and comparative autocratic literature employing regime type as a central concept in explaining dispute initiations, including diversion. This section guides the theoretical explanation in Chapter Three in that the constraining effects of institutional variation across regime types on the availability of options other than diversion are emphasized to explain where and under what conditions diversion is likely to occur. Institutions, which define regimes, are sources of structural constraints faced by

leaders, which therefore vary by regime type. Additionally, the survey of diversionary analyses linking regime type to aggressive foreign behavior in the face of domestic unrest indicates that previous analyses restricting the scope of explanation to specific regime types rather than encompassing all major regime types has not led to consistent evidence for diversion by specific regime types, particularly in the democratic diversion literature. Finally, recent literature suggests a theoretical and empirical division of regimes that disaggregates nondemocracies may be useful.

The final major section of this chapter focuses on the opportunity leaders have to divert. While structural constraints at the domestic level indicate the *willingness* of a leader to divert, the international context must also be accounted for to understand when diversion will occur. The literature indicates that leaders may be constrained from diversion by the behavior of potential targets who strategically avoid engagement with states whose leaders have a diversionary incentive. The presence of a rival state is an indication that a leader with diversionary incentives possesses the *opportunity* to target a state with diversionary foreign policy actions. This explanation guides the development of the final hypotheses in Chapter Three.

Theoretical Explanations

Explanations of the use of aggressive foreign policy by leaders experiencing domestic political turmoil for diversionary purposes offered in the literature can be grouped into several theoretical families. Three are discussed in this section. Principal-agent arguments highlight information asymmetry and the use of an information advantage by leaders as an explanation for why, where, and when diversion can occur. Political incentive arguments focus on the utility of foreign policy as a domestic political tool for leaders to explain diversion. Policy constraints

arguments explain diversion by exploring the barriers leaders face when seeking to address unrest across a range of options. The theoretical argument favored in Chapter Three is policy constraints. Institutions largely determine these constraints and define a regime's type. Additionally, the nature of interstate relationships between a potential diverter and potential target states serve as a source of constraints at the international level.

Principal-Agent Explanations

Principal-agent models typically include three key factors in defining the conditions for diversion: the competence of a leader, the risk-acceptance of a leader, and information asymmetry. In these models, leaders are usually differentiated between competent and incompetent types. Competent leaders act in the interests of the public while incompetent leaders act in their own interests, which possibly contradict those of the public. The public should retain competent leaders, while removing incompetent ones from office.

Principal-agent explanations of diversion require information asymmetry between the principal (the domestic public) and its agent (the leader) (Downs and Rocke 1994). Under perfect information conditions, the probability of success, the costs, and benefits of a policy action are known to both the principal and agent, and leaders rewarded for making rationally informed decisions and punished for making poor decisions. However, in practice, the executive of a state often possesses a greater level of information about the relative probability of success of a policy and its expected costs and benefits than does the public he represents. Additionally, the public only has access to ex post information about the soundness of a leader's policy decision based on the outcome of policy. Its judgment of leader competence and as a result the

decision to retain a leader is largely driven by the results of the policy rather than the soundness of the decision a leader makes given his higher level of information.

When a leader wishes to use force for diversionary purposes, he has an incentive to underestimate the likelihood of victory. If a leader can successfully convince his public that success is not guaranteed, then the subsequent success in a diversionary conflict signals to the public that the leader is more competent than he actually is. In short, the successful diversionary uses of force (from the perspective of the leader) are cases where an incompetent leader can use information asymmetry to convince the public that he is a competent leader. This may be good for the leader, but a successful diversion is a bad outcome from the perspective of the principal, who thus duped, retains a poor leader. Competent leaders have little incentive to divert, only incompetent ones. For competent leaders, success in military actions only reflects his competence. Further, competent executives may have a disincentive to engage in aggressive foreign policy generally. If they enter a conflict with a high probability of success given the information available and end up losing, "innocent" leaders may be removed though they made the optimal decision (Downs and Rocke 1994, 376).

A complete game-theoretic explanation of the principal-agent model's applicability to diversionary theory frequently includes a discussion of a leader's level of risk acceptance (Richards et al. 1993) or "timidity" vs. "adventurism" (Downs and Rocke 1994). Diversion, like many policy actions carries risks. Diversion is a particularly risky option in that leaders must account not only for the reaction of the public to their policy action but also on the reaction of targeted states and the eventual outcome in the case of actual military actions. Risk-averse

leaders are viewed as less likely to engage in diversion, and more risk-acceptant leaders are more likely to do so.

The conclusions drawn by Richards et al. (1993) differ somewhat from those of Downs and Rocke (1994). First, the equilibria in the Richards et al. (1993) model suggest that good executives have an incentive to use force more frequently than bad executives because it provides an opportunity to further signal competence. Second, incompetent executives are only likely to divert when they can mislead the public on the level of abilities needed to secure military success in a conflict *or* if they are sufficiently risk acceptant. They argue their model also predicts the short-term rally effects enjoyed by leaders. A bad executive is expected to enjoy a temporary boost in popularity due to military success; however, his underlying nature as an incompetent executive should quickly manifest itself through poor subsequent policy decisions, sinking a leader's popularity back towards a level commensurate with his competence.

One limitation of the models of Downs and Rocke (1994) and Richards et al. (1993) is that these models fail to account for the behavior of potential targets when leaders have a diversionary incentive. This limitation is addressed by Tarar (2006). Tarar adds to each endpoint in the Richards et al. game tree a decision by voters to retain or remove an incumbent based on policy outcomes. He then extends the model further by incorporating bargaining between a potential diverting state and its potential target following Fearon's (1995) bargaining model. The combination of the diversionary equilibria from the earlier model with Fearon's two-player interstate bargaining model yields two interesting expected outcomes. First, diversionary wars occur when the office-holding benefit gained from a diversionary use of force is high enough to outweigh the costs of war and other factors, therefore the bargaining range

between states disappears. If the benefit of holding office is not so high, an agreement will be reached. Second, the closer this benefit of holding office is to the level where no zone of agreement is available, the smaller the zone of agreement; and therefore the more beneficial an agreement averting war will be for a leader with diversionary incentives.[1]

A second limitation is the treatment of leaders as risk-acceptant or risk-averse. This problem is highlighted by Downs and Rocke's classification of leaders (timid or adventurous). This discussion treats a key leader difference largely as a psychological characteristic. Psychological characteristics are not easily measured, and few researchers have attempted to study conflict using direct psychological measures in their empirical models. In part, this exclusion could be seen as a potential cause of divergent findings in the empirical diversionary literature. However, risk-acceptance may be associated with factors that are directly measurable. Tarar (2006) avoids this language, substituting "the benefit of holding office."[2] This limitation is

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[1] Tarar uses this second outcome to suggest democratic leaders who are seeking reelection have greater diversionary incentives than autocratic leaders who do not stand in contested elections, and therefore are likely to gain better agreements in international bargaining environment. However, there is another relevant conclusion that can be drawn from this outcome. Leaders with diversionary incentives of all regime types have an incentive to at least issue a challenge other states. While there exists the possibility miscalculation could lead to an unwanted war, this model suggests all leaders experiencing domestic opposition have incentives to act more aggressively in foreign policy in the hopes that they can gain international agreements that are more in their favor. A diplomatic victory may signal executive competence in the same manner as a military victory—at substantially lower costs. This is an interesting possibility to note, but goes beyond the scope of the theoretical explanation in Chapter Three and the empirical analyses in Chapter Five.

[2] While the principal-agent model of diversionary war is not employed in Chapter Three, the theoretical explanation developed does offer a different manner in which to distinguish leaders on the "risk-acceptance" factor. By discussing a measurable phenomenon, post-tenure fate, we can measure the risks associated with losing office (the other side of Tarar's benefits of holding office) and compare these to the risks of diversion. In short, separating leaders on the basis of

not an issue for the validity of formal models. However, this is a limitation when scholars seek empirical evidence supporting or refuting theories of diversionary behavior. While these principal-agent explanations of diversion have considerable utility for the creation of new theory, they are limited in their ability to provide evidence supporting or refuting diversionary explanations.

Additionally, the outcome equilibria reached depend heavily on model construction and the assumptions made by the designer. Their usefulness is therefore highly dependent upon the validity of these assumptions. There are concerns with the validity of the assumptions in diversionary theoretical explanations. Arena and Palmer (2009) note that the theory requires the assumption that leaders believe the risks of aggressive foreign behavior are outweighed by their concern for political survival, irrespective of the preferences of their constituency. Questioning this assumption in particular strikes at the heart of principal-agent models. There are two separate issues worth noting here. First, the expectation that conflict will have a positive effect on post-conflict tenure is tenuous at best given empirical evidence (e.g. Colaresi 2004, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995, Chiozza and Goemans 2003). Second, the idea that leaders will be rewarded politically for pursuing policies that may be in opposition to those preferred by their constituency does not make intuitive sense, directly undermining the assumptions of principal-agent models. Diversionary theory also requires the assumption that publics will not perceive, or if they do recognize it, fail to punish leaders for pursuing high-risk foreign policies for political gain. Again, questioning this assumption directly undermines principal-agent models. Finally,

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likely post-tenure fate, which is argued to be related to regime type in Chapter Three, may be a useful replacement for psychological "risk-acceptance" commonly found in these models.

Arena and Palmer note that diversionary theory requires the assumption that leaders can control conflicts and their escalation. The assumption that a leader of one state can control the response behavior of another is problematic.

Principal-agent models also suffer due to the limited ability they possess in including other factors that may be relevant in understanding the onset of international disputes. Effectively modeling a process with as many players present in and as dynamic as interstate interactions is a difficult proposition. Tarar (2006) is also notable in that his addition of several layers on top of the Richards et al. (1993) game tree provides a cumbersome and somewhat inaccessible explanation of diversionary uses of force. In summary, formal models of diversionary behavior may provide scholars with the method closest to a controlled experiment by setting strict initial conditions and following the mathematical conclusions derived from the model; however, formal modeling when used alone without complementary empirical analyses is of limited utility in advancing the diversionary literature.

Political Incentive Theory

The political incentive explanation of diversion is derived from Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (2003) selectorate theory[3]. The basic assumption underlying political incentive theory is that "political leaders want above all to stay in office" (Pickering and Kisangani 2010, 480; from

[3] A full explanation of selectorate theory requires more space than is available here. However, for clarity, the foundation of the theory relies on grouping individuals of a state into various overlapping categories. These in include: the total population (N); the selectorate (S) ,which is comprised of all individuals with a voice in leader selection; the winning coalition (W), which includes the members of the selectorate who are required for continued hold on office by the leader (L) faced by a potential rival for leadership, the challenger (C). A key component of the theory is the "loyalty norm" defined as W/S.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). As such, tests of political incentive arguments must show (1) evidence of diversionary behavior and (2) evidence that this behavior provided some benefit for a leader in terms of holding office. Pickering and Kisangani (2010) provide a discussion of diversion from the political incentive perspective that is perhaps the most useful as a reference. They begin by noting a key expectation derived from selectorate theory is that public goods become more important for leader survival as the size of a winning coalition increases. In small winning coalitions, the relative cost of providing private goods compared to the provision of public goods is small; however, as the number of individuals in the winning coalition increases, so does the relative cost of private goods compared to that of public goods. One factor is the simple increase in members of the winning coalition. A second key factor is the decreased cost of defection when winning coalitions increase in size, which can be counteracted by increasing the level of private goods for each member of the winning coalition. Essentially, as the winning coalition increases in size, the amount of resources devoted to distribution of private goods required to retain office rises exponentially, while the amount of resources devoted to distribution of public goods required to retain office remains relatively static. It is therefore in the leader's interest to shift the balance towards the provision of public goods rather than private goods as the winning coalition size increases.

Summarizing their argument, autocratic regimes vary systematically by type in the size of winning coalitions, with single-party regimes having the largest, followed by military and personalist regimes. While they separate autocratic regimes into personalist, military, and single-party types, the key difference for the authors is between single-party and personalist

types.[4] In regimes with small winning coalitions (personalist), leaders have to spend far fewer resources providing public goods and can stockpile resources to focus on retaining office in times of trouble. Personalist leaders are less likely to divert as they are able to distribute private goods to their winning coalition more effectively. In contrast, regimes with large winning coalitions (single party regimes, and ostensibly democracies) have fewer available resources to spend on private goods, and may be expected have a higher probability of diversion than other regime types.

Pickering and Kisangani (2010) further argue that because personalist leaders are less reliant on policy success (a public good) than their single-party counterparts, they are more likely to be risk acceptant and select to use force in situations where there is (a) a lower probability of success and (b) therefore experience fewer "positive domestic outcomes" defined as decreases in unrest or improvements in economic performance following a conflict. The effect of policy failure (defeat or unexpected escalation by a target) can be offset by leaders with small winning coalitions by increasing the provision of private goods to the winning coalition. Single-party leaders should select to use force in situations that provide a greater domestic boost. In short, personalist leaders are able to spend more resources on the allocation of private goods (and this expense is more effective) than their single-party counterparts in similar times of trouble, and should divert less often. Reinforcing this effect, personalist regimes, which rely less on public

[4] Military regimes are expected to vary in the size of the winning coalition widely, with some having similar winning coalition sizes to personalist regimes, while others have coalitions similar in size to single-party regimes. They do not argue that military regimes have "middle-sized" winning coalitions as a rule, but that in the aggregate military regime winning coalitions should fall somewhere between their two counterparts. Therefore, the key distinction is personalist vs. single-party regimes for their theoretical explanation.

goods for their survival should experience less of a boost from diversion than their single-party counterparts.

Several problems are evident in Pickering and Kisangani's work. Their results indicate that there is little difference in the conflict propensity of different autocratic regime types, which does not support their preliminary hypothesis rooted in political incentive theory. This is unsurprising in retrospect. There is some disagreement over whether winning coalition size does in fact vary across non-democratic regime type. Peceny et al. (2002) cite Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (1999) assertion that "the size of the winning coalition in personalist, military, and single-party regimes may be equally small" (Peceny et al. 2002, 17), indicating a lack of variation across these regime types that is assumed by Pickering and Kisangani.[5]

In addition, on the one hand they argue personalist leaders are less likely to divert because they are able to more effectively shore up support through the provision of private goods than single-party leaders due to smaller winning coalition size. On the other, they argue that because personalist leaders have a smaller winning coalition size, they are more likely to use force (are more risk-acceptant) as the costs of military operations and military defeat are less-severe for leader survival (but these leaders do not gain the same benefits domestically from using force). Again, this is due to the ability of personalist leaders to more effectively buy support or loyalty through private goods. This suggests that the political incentive explanation generates theoretical expectations that indicate conflicting pressures on the likelihood of diversion by leaders for each non-democratic regime type.

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[5] This is notable as it is Bueno de Mesquita and several co-authors who develop selectorate theory, which is the theoretical foundation for Pickering and Kisangani's (2010) article.

Their conclusion is that findings relevant for their second hypothesis lend some support to political incentive theory; however, this positive finding that leaders of single-party regime face a less-negative impact from the use of force is problematic as well. While they find single-party leaders face lower consequences for the decision to initiate conflict for diversionary purposes, this finding is limited to explaining variation in the selection of conflicts on the basis of political incentive theory rather than explaining the selection of diversion through the use of political incentive theory. This is a key difference worthy of further explanation.

First, there is no widely-held assumption in diversionary theory that leaders will select conflicts that are "good" as they yield the highest payoff domestically. The assertion that leaders select good versus bad opportunities to initiate conflict implies that states operate in an opportunity-rich environment where such decisions can be made. This flies in the face of a body of literature in international conflict that emphasizes the relative lack of opportunity to use force for many states (e.g. Mitchell and Prins 2004). Second, it does not make intuitive sense that leaders of any regime type should initiate a conflict expecting a negative outcome either in terms of domestic payoffs or (just as importantly) military victory. Finally, the level of success leaders of different regime types have in terms of conflict outcomes and therefore post-conflict fate may be dependent on other factors such as war-fighting capabilities, which may vary by regime type (e.g. Peceny et al. 2002).

Support for their explanation depends on the presence of a "rally effect" for leaders entering conflict rather than an observed variation in the conflict initiation patterns among non-democratic regimes. This is problematic as the extant literature includes many studies that show the initiation of a militarized dispute, particularly under the conditions where diversion is

expected to be most likely, lead either to no significant increase in or a negative effect on leader popularity or governing parties' electoral performance[6] (e.g. Lian and Oneal 1993; Williams et al. 2010). There are a few ways in which this problem can be addressed. Researchers only have access to what has happened in the world and cannot accurately generate counterfactual conditions and outcomes. What we do not know is what leader tenure would have been if unrest persisted. While conflict may reduce leader tenure, unchecked domestic unrest may reduce leader tenure to a greater degree. Diversion may have bought a leader more time in office than he would have had if he did not divert. We may be looking for a "rally effect" while what we should be looking for is a "survival effect". Requiring an observed boost in support or drop in unrest activity may be too high a requirement for support of the diversionary hypothesis.

The other alternative is to adopt an explanation that does not imply a "rally effect" is a necessary conclusion drawn from the extension of the explanation. The policy constraints approach is an example of such an explanation. The underlying assumption of policy constraints explanations is that the option often selected by leaders is frequently a less-preferred option. Leaders only select this option (in our case, diversion) when they are unable to pursue other more-preferred options. Policy constraints arguments do not require that diversion "work" for a leader but only that diversion is likely under conditions where other actions are constrained in some way.[7]

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[6] Williams et al. (2010) find that the vote share for both the executive's party and for all governing parties present in a coalition fall if using force in periods of negative or slow (below 3%) economic growth measured as change in GDP per capita.

[7] Diversion is therefore conceived of as a sort of "Hail Mary" option where it is selected only when other options are barred. The selection of diversion is not predicated on the belief that such an action will provide the best possible outcome or "work" for a leader. Instead, the

Policy Constraints and Diversion

Explanations of diversionary behavior that focus on policy constraints are widely available in the literature. Democratic leaders have been argued to divert more frequently than nondemocratic ones not out of some innate desire to war or a perceived higher payoff for diversion, but rather as a default when domestic conditions and constitutional barriers prevent the pursuit of all other options (Gelpi 1997). A significant amount of recent democratic diversion and US diversion literature emphasizes the policy constraints faced by democratic leaders as explanations for diversion. This argument can be summarized as diversion is likely only when democratic leaders are unable to pursue domestic policies addressing economic problems. Examples of this research include the discussion of variation in conflict patterns across parliamentary systems as a function of government characteristics (majority, minority and coalition governments (e.g. Prins and Sprecher 1999). In the US diversion literature, the nature of economic problems (Fordham 1998), the presence of divided government where the president's party does not enjoy control of Congress (e.g. Brulé 2006), or a combination of both factors (Brulé and Hwang 2010) is seen as a barrier to economic policy responses and therefore related to higher probabilities of diversion. These explanations, again, are similar in that they perceive diversion as a default response by democratic leaders when they are barred from acting in the economic policy realm. The underlying assumption in these explanations of diversion is that democratic leaders are relatively unconstrained in the realm of foreign policy. This position is echoed throughout the literature (e.g. Stoll 1984; Brulé 2006). Most of the literature covering

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selection of diversion is a default when other preferred options are viewed as unavailable and diversion is therefore remaining option with the highest (though not necessarily high) probability of leading to continued hold on office and/or physical survival.

autocratic conflict or autocratic diversion tends to treat leaders as either unconstrained from pursuing any response to unrest and/or similar across all autocratic regime types in the low level of constraints on these responses (e.g. Peceny et al. 2002).

This position may be overly-simplistic. Weeks (2012) examines how these constraints fluctuate across non-democratic regime types. She notes that constraints can be either *ex ante* (preventing the pursuit of a specific policy before the decision is made) or *ex post*. Her approach focuses on the *ex post* constraints faced by leaders of different regime types, conceived as the punishment leaders can expect for choosing a particular policy option. This explanation centers on the differences across regime types in terms of the potential domestic audience costs a leader may expect to incur. Her argument builds upon an earlier work (Weeks 2008) that showed that contrary to the conventionally-held position, constituencies in non-democratic regimes can impose domestic audience costs on leaders. Further, the level of these costs varies across non-democratic regime types. Regimes may be separated on the basis of Slater's (2003) despotic power dimension (oligarchic vs. autocratic) when assessing the level of domestic audience costs a leader may face.

A second strand of her argument centers on the leader's perception of the costs of fighting, the costs of defeat, and the value of international goods (defined as territory, economic rights, or the removal of an external threat by Weeks) compared to the status quo situation of a leader. This distinction separates military leaders from civilian leaders, i.e. on Slater's (2003) infrastructural power dimension. Military leaders are assumed to favor military policy solutions to a greater degree than civilian leaders following the militarism argument (e.g. Sescher 2004). In this case, the constraint placed on leaders is more a function of the culture in the institution

underpinning the regime or an ingrained psychological trait due to participation in an institution that defines the structure of the regime.

She argues that machines (civilian, oligarchic) tend to be pacific as they possess civilian insiders that do not tend to favor the use of force and where leaders are constrained by a large domestic audience. Juntas (military, oligarchic) possess large audiences, however, the constraining influence of the domestic audience is dampened by the composition of that audience, military officers, who perceive lower costs associated with fighting than civilians. Autocratic (Geddes' personalist) leaders are not constrained by a large domestic audience, however, strongmen (military, autocratic) regimes possess leaders who are both unconstrained and more likely to overestimate the utility and appropriateness of military action as a policy tool. They are marginally more likely to initiate disputes than bosses (civilian, autocratic) who are psychologically predisposed against viewing military options as the appropriate policy options regardless of the issue area addressed.

While most of the work on democratic diversion following the policy constraints approach focuses on barriers to options other than diversion, Weeks' (2012) article on variation in autocratic conflict patterns focuses on constraints leaders face when considering the use of force. Her focus is not on diversion exclusively, but rather on all dispute initiations. However, she does reference some work highlighting the relatively low barriers to the use of force. While her work is influential in that it emphasizes policy barriers and how these may vary across nondemocracies, it is puzzling in that it focuses on barriers to the use of force, a policy area in which democratic executives are often given wide authority and non-democratic leaders may enjoy even greater freedom.

Moving Forward

Three theoretical families of diversionary theory are discussed at the outset of this chapter. Principal-agent models are useful in thinking about diversion theoretically, but there are some limitations to this approach. First, these analyses by design set initial conditions in a manner that may not effectively mirror the empirical record. Second, they rely on a set of assumptions in diversionary theory that have been questioned by researchers.[8] Third, they often do not allow for a complete modeling of the environment in which leaders make the decision to divert as the amount of factors that may be included in these models is limited. While some (i.e. Tarar 2006) attempt to address this by combining principal-agent models with models of international bargaining, the interpretation of these more complicated models becomes increasingly difficult, and therefore damages their utility for those interested in thinking theoretically about diversion. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these models frequently include concepts that are not easily measured such as a leader's level of risk acceptance.

Diversionary explanations rooted in political incentive theory are presented in the discussion of Pickering and Kisanagai (2010). Using their explanation as a model, the major shortcoming of this approach is evident. The extension of political incentive theory into diversionary research leads to potentially contradictory expectations. On the one hand, the authors argue that regimes with small winning coalitions are less likely to use force in response to unrest as these regimes are able to stockpile resources, which can be used to bolster support within the winning coalition when unrest occurs. On the other, the authors believe that the effects of international conflict are less severe for regimes with small winning coalitions for the

[8] Arena and Palmer (2009) provide one of the most complete discussions of this point.

same reason (they can more effectively distribute private goods). This makes regimes with small winning coalitions less risk-averse, and therefore more likely to engage in conflict generally. Looking at this another way, they argue regimes with small winning coalitions may have a lower diversionary incentive; however, the use of diversion is a less-risky option for these regimes when compared to regimes with large winning coalitions. These effects may cancel out, which is what is suggested by their finding of little variation across nondemocratic regime types in the use of force when elite unrest is present.

Policy constraints approaches may be better suited to address diversionary behavior for several reasons. First, this approach does not assume that diversion is a preferred option, or is most preferred by regimes of a certain type. Instead, diversion is seen as a less-constrained option that leaders seeking to address unrest typically have at their disposal when paths to other responses are blocked. Leaders select diversion not because it is lower-cost or less risky but because it is typically available as an option to address unrest. Policy constraints explanations do not require that a discernible effect on post-conflict leader tenure is found as diversion is not treated as the optimal option in terms of leader response. This approach also allows for the elimination of a discussion of "risk-acceptant" leaders by highlighting how the absence or presence of certain institutions may lead to different risks of losing office. The argument in Chapter Three argues that leaders should not be looked at in terms of a psychological "risk-acceptance" but rather we should look at whether the risks of diversion are outweighed by the risks of leaving office, which is linked to the institutions defining a regime by type.

Additionally, the approach allows for a discussion of a full range of options available to leaders rather than restricting an explanation to diversion alone. Diversion is just one of several

options leaders may possess when seeking to respond to unrest. The theoretical argument in Chapter Three is unique in that it considers a full set of response options to unrest. While some authors explain diversion as likely when repression is barred as an option (e.g. Enterline and Gleditsch 2000), others focus on barriers to policy concessions (e.g. Brulé 2006). Few consider both policy concessions and repression as options other than diversion in their theoretical explanation (e.g. Gelpi 1997). The explanation in Chapter Three includes resignation as well. Leaders can and do select resignation in the face of unrest, but this possibility is underemphasized in the diversionary literature due to the strong assumptions diversionary researchers typically make on the degree to which leaders value holding office. The presence of 127 (as an initial count) resignations[9] for reasons other than ill health lend support for a replacement tabbed by a leader, or running for a new chief executive leadership office in situations of regime replacement in the 1946-2008 time period, indicates some revision may be needed for this assumption.

Diversion is defined as the use of aggressive foreign policy by a government's leadership to divert the public's attention away from domestic problems driving domestic political unrest in a state. Aggressive foreign policy is defined conceptually as any threats, shows, or uses of force (including full-scale war) against another state in the international system. The key characteristics of diversionary responses are: (1) such actions do not seek to address underlying issues at the root of unrest, but merely to distract the public's attention away from these issues; and (2) the action is international in that military power is projected across state borders. Repression is defined as "the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual

[9] This number of resignations comes from a dataset coded by the author.

or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of a state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions" (Davenport 2007, 2). Repression and diversion are therefore related in that neither seek to address the underlying causes of unrest and additionally, that both employ uses of violence in a leader's attempt to retain power. The difference is that repression is internally directed violence (actual or threatened) while diversion is externally directed.

Policy concessions are defined as the presentation of programmatic reforms offered to the public by a government to address specific grievances voiced by groups driving unrest. Policy concessions may include economic policy reforms, political system reforms, or social policy reforms. The central distinguishing factor of policy concessions is a change in previous government policy in a specific issue area that is the central concern of a group or groups driving unrest. Resignation is defined as a leader's self-removal from office. Resignation occurs when a leader decides to leave office voluntarily for whatever reasons, including but not restricted to domestic political opposition to his policies or his continued holding of office. Resignation is not a policy concession in that resignation entails a leader has selected not to act to address underlying issues driving unrest. Leaders are not pressured to leave office simply because the population has grown tired of them. Leaders are asked to leave office most frequently due to disillusionment with the policy actions of a leader. This disillusionment has an underlying cause. Following this logic, repressive dictators (e.g. Assad in Syria) are pressured to resign not because the public simply does not "like them", but because the public does not like them due to the policies they have enacted (in the Syria case: alleged massacres of civilians who are agitating for

Assad's removal due to his repressive policies against their groups, cultural and religious differences, and differences over preferred policy directions). A decision to resign therefore contains two elements. First, a leader has determined that no policy concessions or actions are sufficient to reverse his political fortunes. Second, and relatedly, a leader therefore concludes that leaving office without taking policy action is in his best interests.

Selecting a policy constraints approach also requires a discussion of the constraints leaders may potentially face. There are several ways in which constraints have been divided. Constraints may be divided into ex post and ex ante types. Weeks (2012) distinguishes ex ante constraints (preventing the pursuit of a specific policy before the decision is made) from ex post constraints (accountability concerns that constrain the selection of risky or unpopular policies). There is a theoretical justification for arguing ex ante constraints matter more than ex post constraints. Ex ante constraints, by definition, block or bar leaders from pursuing certain policy options. Ex post constraints merely deter a leader's selection of an option. In addition to calculating the costs of pursuing an option for a leader's survival in office, a leader also has a degree of uncertainty over whether he will incur those costs should he select an option. Ex ante constraints are more absolute than ex post constraints. While both ex ante and ex post constraints are discussed in Chapter Three, ex ante constraints may carry a more significant weight on the likelihood a leader will select a specific response option to unrest.

Alternatively, Clark and Nordstrom separate institutional constraints into two types: dynamic and structural. Dynamic constraints differ in that they are dynamic, i.e. changing over time, and include such factors such as electoral outcomes, and the partisan composition of the legislature. Research that uses dynamic constraints in policy availability explanations include

Brulé (2006) who focuses on variation in Congress' party composition as a constraint on a President's ability to pursue economic policy. However, Howell and Pevehouse (2005) found that for major uses of force in particular, US presidents are increasingly unlikely to initiate conflicts as the size of the opposition party in Congress increases. Additionally, they are more likely to engage in major uses of force as the size of their party increased in Congress. The democratic diversion literature utilizing the policy availability approach, which can be considered a subset of policy constraints arguments, typically highlights differences in diversion as a function of dynamic constraints (e.g. Brulé 2006; Prins and Sprecher 1999; Brulé and Williams 2009) with some exceptions (e.g. Reiter and Tillman 2002). In these studies, the focus is on regimes of a specific type, democracies. By and large, the selection of the cases determines whether they focus on structural or dynamic constraints. As there is little variation in structural constraints within a regime type, diversionary behavior differences must explained in terms of dynamic constraints alone.

Structural constraints are classified as constitutional constraints that comprise "the rules and structure of decision-making" (Clark and Nordstrom 2005, 254) and that leaders cannot circumvent. The "rules and structure of decision-making" is similar language to that of the definition of a regime, which is the set "of formal and informal rules and procedures for selecting national leaders and policies" (Geddes 2003, 70). These rules define the institutions existing in a regime and where decision-making power rests on a range of policy issues. Explaining variation in diversionary behavior across regime type suggests a structural constraints approach is appropriate. These constraints are more formidable than dynamic ones as leaders can be differentiated on the basis of their willingness to challenge other political institutions such as

legislatures, which decreases the constraining effect of dynamic constraints on an executive in the aggregate relative to the effects of structural constraints (Clark and Nordstrom 2005).

The differences in regimes on the basis of these rules are manifested in the differences in institutions and the relationship among them in regimes of different types. Following this, regime type is a manner in which states can be differentiated on the basis of *structural* constraints placed on leaders. Structural constraints are related to both ex ante and ex post types in Chapter Three. Leaders are constrained from selecting particular response options other than diversion by the presence or absence of specific institutions (ex ante) and due to the effect the presence or absence of these institutions have on likely post-tenure fate should a response fail and they lose office (ex post). The likely post-tenure fate of leaders varies by the level of development of structures in a regime that determine the process of regime replacement. The development of leader replacement mechanisms (a structural factor) varies across regime types, as does the likely post-tenure fate of leaders. In this manner, the initial structural conditions of regime type play a large role in determining the ex post constraint of expected post-tenure fate.

Diversion and Regime Type: The Evidence So Far

In the search for consistently strong evidence for diversionary behavior, researchers tend to limit the conditions under which diversion is expected to occur. One of the most common restrictions is reducing the scope to democracies. Even within the democratic diversion literature, one case has tended to dominate the landscape, that of the US. While the vast majority of the literature focuses on democratic diversion, there are several recent articles that discuss autocratic diversion as well. The overall conclusion at the end of this discussion is that differentiating regimes by type may be fruitful for the development of diversionary explanations;

however, using these distinctions to restrict the scope of analyses has not led to empirical findings that consistently support diversionary arguments for specific regime types. This latter statement is best supported by at-times quixotic quest for robust evidence for democratic diversion.

Some of the earliest work on diversion suggested regime type is an explanatory factor in likely conflict behavior for leaders facing unrest. Wilkenfeld (1968) adopts a dataset where the regime typology includes five categories initially (polyarchic, elitist, centrist, personalist, and traditional). He reduces this to three potential regime types (polyarchic, personalist, and centrist). These categories appear to roughly-approximate democracies, military and/or personalist dictatorships, and single-party regimes. He reaches several conclusions on the relationship between internal and external conflict. He finds for centrist regimes, certain types of internal conflict are related to later external conflict (diversion). There is a strong relationship between internal conflict and external conflict in both directions (internal conflict leads to international conflict and vice versa) for polyarchic regimes, and a less robust relationship in both directions for personalist regimes.

More recent work has compared democracies to non-democracies when searching for evidence of diversionary behavior. Miller's (1995) argument centers on differences across regime type on the domestic audience costs faced by leaders. Without elections, Miller assumes the domestic audience costs incurred by nondemocratic leaders for uses of force should be lower

and therefore autocratic leaders should be more likely to engage in diversion than their democratic counterparts.[10] The results of his analysis support this claim.

Finally, some research indicates little evidence of diversion can be found for either democratic or nondemocratic leaders. Leeds and Davis (1997) find no evidence of diversion in their explanation focused on strategic avoidance of leaders with diversionary incentives by potential dispute targets.[11] Enterline and Gleditsch (2000) focus on the selection of diversion or repression by leaders. They do not categorize regimes into types, but instead focus on executive constraints as a crude measure for regime type. Democratic systems are typically expected to place greater executive constraints on leaders than autocratic ones. They find that higher executive constraints do indeed limit the overall probability of dispute involvement. More directly to diversionary theory, the authors find while increases in domestic conflict do have a positive effect on dispute initiation, it is not statistically significant. Further, they demonstrate that leaders are much more likely to select repression as a response than diversion. Chiozza and Goemans (2003) find little support for the diversionary hypothesis by showing that leaders of all regime types who are most secure in their tenure are also most likely to initiate crises. Also contradicting the diversionary hypothesis is their conclusion that democratic leaders are more

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[10] The relationship between regime type and audience costs is explored across non-democratic regimes by Weeks (2008). She demonstrates that considerable variation across non-democratic regime types on domestic audience costs exists. This distinction is central to her explanation of divergent patterns of conflict behavior among non-democratic regimes discussed in this chapter.
[11] Miller's later (1999) article is a response to the findings of Gelpi (1997) as well as Leeds and Davis (1997). Miller's results indicate that the strategic avoidance argument finds strong support when applied to democratic regimes; however, autocratic regimes are less affected. He concludes that autocratic leaders do engage in more diversionary behavior than democratic leaders partly due to this different strategic avoidance effect.

pacific than non-democratic leaders and leaders of regimes in transition because regular elections mean democratic leaders have a higher probability of losing office.

Democratic Diversion

Most research on diversion has asserted democracies, not non-democracies are more likely to possess leaders who engage in risky foreign policy for political gain. Gelpi (1997) argues that autocrats choose to respond to overt demonstrations of unrest by using force internally (repression). Democratic leaders are constrained from using force internally, and therefore are only left with the option of diversion, the use of force externally.[12] He finds support for his hypothesis that diversion is likely for democratic leaders facing unrest[13], and unlikely to occur in a systematic manner for non-democratic leaders facing domestic unrest. Supporting democratic diversion as well, Pickering and Kisangani (2005) find that diversion is likely for mature democracies faced with elite or mass unrest. However, neither autocrats nor democratic leaders respond to economic problems with risky foreign military interventions.

While these examples highlight some of the research explicitly testing whether democratic leaders are more likely to divert than their non-democratic counterparts (or vice versa), the heavy focus on democracies in the literature indicates that many diversionary researchers assume at the outset that diversion is most likely to be found in democracies alone.

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[12] This assumption is challenged by Enterline and Gleditsch (2000) who found that as the level of executive constraints a regime places on a leader increases, the probabilities of diversion and repression decrease. However, the effect of executive constraints was greater on diversion than repression.

[13] Davies (2002) concludes non-violent strife is related to involvement in military disputes for democratic regimes. Violent strife, however, is related to higher probabilities of dispute involvement for both democracies and non-democracies.

In an attempt to find consistent evidence of democratic diversion, democracies have been increasingly separated into various sub-types. Democratic systems are frequently divided into presidential and parliamentary types. Smith (1996) argues this division of democracies may matter. In presidential systems, executives may be sanctioned for the use of force by the legislative branch. Knowing this, he asserts presidents do not intervene unless it is in the national interest. Several additional factors are also important in presidential systems according to Smith. The presence of divided government (where the president's party does not hold a majority in the legislative branch) likely yields higher constraints on an executive than environments where government is not divided.

Parliamentary and presidential systems have been theoretically distinguished from one another in other manners. Reiter and Tillman (2002) suggest three sources of institutional constraints on democratic leaders seeking to initiate conflicts are relevant: (1) the domestic public, viewed as the level of public participation in elections; (2) constraints within the legislature, measured by the number of parties and whether the leader's party enjoys a single-party majority; and (3) the manner in which foreign policy decision-making is divided between the executive and legislative branches. They expect democracies with few disenfranchised voters are less likely to initiate conflicts than democratic systems where the electoral laws restrict the eligible voting pool to a higher degree. As the number of parties in the legislature increases, the probability of initiation should decrease. Additionally, single-party governments are more likely to initiate than coalition majority governments, and this difference should be even greater when comparing single-party majority governments to minority-party governments.

They argue two competing explanations generate opposing hypotheses on the effect power-sharing among institutions should have on the initiation of conflict. The first perspective, focusing on power-sharing across all areas of policy, emphasizes the degree to which leaders are constrained in the decision to use force abroad. This perspective expects presidential executives to be less likely to use force than parliamentary leaders as they must also gain the support of the legislature before using force.

The second perspective emphasizes executive authority. Presidential executives are expected to be more likely to initiate disputes than parliamentary leaders. This argument views presidential systems as democratic regimes where each branch is given relative autonomy over specific issue areas (ostensibly the executive handles foreign policy while the legislature focuses on domestic policy). In parliamentary systems, the leader and the government formed out of the legislature are dependent upon one another for political survival. Following this argument, the legislature and executive work closely on all areas of policy as disagreements between the branches can lead to outcomes such as parliamentary votes of no confidence, the dissolution of coalitions and therefore governments, or the dissolution of parliament (in systems where the executive enjoys such powers).

They find that democracies with electoral systems that are less-restrictive in defining the eligible pool of voters are also less likely to initiate conflicts. They do not find any robust and easily discernible difference between presidential and parliamentary systems on the probability of dispute initiation, nor do they find a statistically significant relationship between the number of legislative parties and dispute initiation. To sum up their findings, their results suggest that there is little variation in the conflict propensity of different democratic regime types, but the

degree to which they are democratic (by measure of the degree to which enfranchisement is universal) does have an influence on conflict initiation.

Even finer divisions of democratic subtypes have been delineated. In parliamentary systems, a primary determinant of institutional constraints on a leader may be legislative composition along party lines. Smith (1996) only discusses coalition dynamics, and briefly. He argues that the majority coalition party (which is likely to be the party of the executive as well) advocates policies that further their electoral fortunes. Minority coalition partners are expected by Smith to favor policies in the national interest rather than following electoral concerns as they expect to be the king-makers and therefore part of national government whether the current majority partner holds power or is replaced. This view may over-rely on his selection of Germany as an example and a conception of a three-player coalition-formation model.

Other researchers have attempted to explore the possibility of variation across parliamentary systems more comprehensively. Prins and Sprecher (1999) separate parliamentary systems into three groups: (1) single-party governments, (2) coalition governments, and (3) minority governments. They initially argue that single-party governments face the fewest difficulties in foreign policy decision-making. Coalition governments must overcome potential disagreements over foreign policy and decision-makers are constrained from following individual policy preferences due to the reliance on one another for the continued existence of government. Minority-party leaders are least constrained and "demonstrate the least ability in developing and sustaining a coherent and stable foreign policy" (Prins and Sprecher 1999, 274). These constraints are argued to relate to dispute reciprocation. The least constrained

governments (single-party) should have a greater ability to respond in disputes when targeted than other government types (coalition and minority).

Alternative arguments, however suggest a different relationship between parliamentary government composition and dispute reciprocation. Coalition governments may be able to more effectively pass the blame when engaging in risky foreign policy. Majority-party regimes may prove to be more cautious than other parliamentary types when targeted in a dispute, as the government may fear reciprocation or a negative conflict outcome may be seized upon by parties in opposition to undermine the majority party's support in the electorate. Prins and Sprecher's (1999) final argument considers the effect of fractionalization and polarization in the party system. Systems where a strong opposition is present and those where the party positions are highly polarized should be less likely to reciprocate in disputes. Prins and Sprecher find that polarization in the party system and coalition governments are related to higher probabilities of dispute reciprocation across parliamentary systems.

More recent research has also highlighted the importance of the party composition of the legislature as a factor relevant to understanding democratic diversion. Brulé and Williams (2009) use some of the same divisions of democracies as Prins and Sprecher (1999). In their article, Brulé and Williams focus on how the composition of government and the party system influences executive accountability and policy availability. They propose the larger the number of parties in a coalition, the less likely executives are to initiate disputes in times of poor economic performance as these executives have a stronger belief in their ability to deflect blame for poor economic performance on other political actors. Minority governments in regimes with poor economic performance are more likely to initiate disputes as they are likely to get the blame

for poor economic performance as the largest party in the legislature and government, and are barred from pursuing domestic policy as they lack a legislative majority. Their final expectation is that governments with weak party cohesion are more likely to initiate disputes in response to poor economic performance. Leaders are expected to become a target for blame by the electorate, and weak party cohesion presents a barrier to economic policy formulation. Their analyses lend support to all three theoretical expectations.

Non-Democratic Diversion

Only recently has the possibility of non-democratic diversion been resuscitated as a potentially fruitful ground in which to explore diversionary uses of force. This relatively small body of research focuses primarily on assessing differences among non-democratic regime's patterns of diversionary behavior. Pickering and Kisangani's (2010) article represents the most recent example of this research. The relative underdevelopment of this field is highlighted by the authors: "Lai and Slater's (2006) analysis is also the only study in the comparative autocratic conflict literature grounded in diversionary logic" (Pickering and Kisangani 2010, 479).

Given the relative dearth of previous research on comparative autocratic diversion, researchers interested in the possibility of variation in the diversionary patterns across nondemocracies experiencing unrest have to look at a similarly small comparative autocratic conflict literature for direction. The most recent examples are Weeks (2012), Pickering and Kisangani (2010), Debs and Goemans (2010) and Lai and Slater (2006). Aside from these

works, comparison of conflict behavior across autocratic regime types is essentially limited to Peceny et al. (2002), Weart (1994), Oren and Hayes (1997), and Bebler (1987).[14]

To date, the evidence seems to indicate that non-democratic regimes whose characteristics are closest to those of democracies seem to be the most pacific, and least likely to divert. Separating regimes by leader type, Debs and Goemans (2010) argue that the "private stakes of holding office" vary across non-democratic types. They separate non-democratic regimes into monarchic, civilian, and military leader types, using the typology of Cheibub and Gandhi (2004). These "private stakes" are discussed in terms of the likely post-tenure fate of leaders. They assert that the lower the private stakes a leader has in holding office, the less likely a leader will become involved in a war. They find support for their hypothesis that civilian autocrats are expected to have lower levels of private stakes than military and monarchic autocrats, and therefore a lower likelihood of experiencing war outbreak.

Civilian sources of leadership and leadership power are also linked to a lower likelihood of dispute initiation by Lai and Slater (2006). In Slater's 2003 article, he divided non-democratic regimes on the basis of both infrastructural power and despotic power. In the 2006 Lai and Slater article, the authors argue infrastructural power, and the institutions providing this power matter in distinguishing the conflict patterns of various non-democracies from one another. Lai and Slater (2006) separate non-democratic regimes into Geddes' (1999) military and single-party

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[14] Peceny et al. (2002) find little evidence of a separate dyadic peace similar to the democratic peace among nondemocratic regimes of similar types, though there is some suggestion that single-party regimes may behave more pacifically toward one another in some of their analyses. Oren and Hayes (1997) find a dyadic peace effect among socialist states. Bebler (1987) finds Marxist-Leninist states were likely to war with one another, a finding unsupported in Peceny et al. (2002). Weart (1994) finds oligarchic regimes are unlikely to fight one another.

types, collapsing the personalist category into these other categories. They argue the infrastructural power dimension is central to understanding divergent conflict patterns among nondemocracies as civilian sources of infrastructural power are more useful in coopting dissidents and mobilizing popular support for troubled leaders. As military regimes lack this source of infrastructural power, they are more likely to respond to domestic turmoil through aggressive foreign policies. The results of their analysis suggest single-party regimes are less likely to initiate conflict than military regimes, or more accurately, that non-democratic regimes underpinned by civilian institutions are less likely to initiate conflicts than non-democratic regimes structured around the military as a political institution.

Recently, the decision to exclude the despotic power dimension in Lai and Slater (2006) has been called into question. Weeks (2012) brings this second dimension back into the picture, dividing non-democratic regimes along both dimensions. Regimes are divided along the infrastructural power dimension (civilian vs. military) and the despotic power dimension (oligarchic vs. autocratic). This yields four non-democratic regime types: machines (oligarchic, civilian), juntas (oligarchic, military), bosses (autocratic, civilian) and strongmen (autocratic, military). Discussed more in-depth earlier in the chapter, her results suggest that machines[15] are less likely to initiate conflicts than not only their non-democratic counterparts but also democracies. She also presents some less-robust evidence that strongmen are more likely to initiate disputes than juntas and bosses.

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[15] Machines are roughly equivalent to Geddes' single-party regimes. The division between strongmen and bosses is essentially a separation of personalist regimes into subtypes. While Lai and Slater collapse this category into the other two, Weeks takes the opposite approach in disaggregating the personalist category. Despite this difference, Weeks' (2012) results are supportive of the findings of Lai and Slater (2006).

Not all research has found variation across non-democratic regime type. Pickering and Kisangani (2010) distinguish the probability of diversion across regime types using the Geddes (1999) regime typology. Geddes' classification is "used in the majority of the studies of comparative autocratic behavior to date" (Pickering and Kisangani 2010, 274), and is the typology adopted in Chapter Three for similar reasons. They find little substantive variation in the probability personalist, military, and single-party leaders initiate disputes in response to elite unrest, contrary to their expectations based on political incentives[16], derived from selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

The results of analyses disaggregating the nondemocratic regime category hint at key difference in conflict behavior across these types. This is not surprising as Geddes (2003) noted there is as much variation among nondemocratic regime institutions as there is between nondemocratic and democratic regime institutions. While Pickering and Kisangani are a recent exception, the evidence from previous research suggests that single-party regimes tend to be pacific, possibly even more so than democracies.

Summary

Scrutinizing the literature above, one is drawn to two conclusions. First, a simple division of regimes into simple democratic and nondemocratic types has not led to a great advancement in understanding diversion, as the evidence for diversion is mixed on either side of this divide. Second, research looking for a connection between regime type and diversion typically focuses on democracies, and the high concentration of diversionary analyses on the

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[16] Pickering and Kisangani's (2010) explanation of comparative autocratic diversion is fully summarized earlier in the chapter in the section covering the political incentives approach.

democratic side of the nondemocracy/democracy divide has failed to generate robust evidence of diversionary behavior.

The general argument in favor of diversion being a phenomenon primarily observed for democracies is that elections are a relatively low-cost leader replacement mechanism from the perspective of the public. Leaders who face elections must be more responsive to public opinion and the conditions of society if they wish to retain office. Democratic leaders are therefore less secure. Poor domestic conditions have a greater effect on their continued tenure, and leaders are therefore more likely to divert attention from unrest either generally or when barriers exist to addressing these conditions through domestic policy. Democratic leaders are most likely to face the possibility of losing office when an election approaches, therefore, democracies should initiate international disputes more frequently as elections approach compared to periods following elections following this logic. A problem with this argument is that election cycles have not been tied to diversion in a consistent manner in empirical analyses. [17] As with the democratic diversion on electoral cycles specifically, in general, increasingly nuanced

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[17] Chiozza and Goemans (2003) find regular elections make leaders more, not less, pacific in their interactions with other states. More directly focused on the electoral cycle, Huth and Alee (2002) find democratic leaders are more aggressive in their interactions with other states after elections, not before. Focusing on the US, Ostrom and Job (1986) find that the likelihood of a use of force for the US increases as elections approach, but this effect was not significant; however, adding a measure of the "severity" of international situation in a quarter, elections are found to be positively and significantly related to all major uses of force by US presidents in crisis situations (James and Oneal 1991). The finding of James and Oneal (1991) is not supported by the analyses of Meernik and Waterman (1996) and Howell and Pevehouse (2005). Controlling for the international environment in a different manner, Stoll (1984) concludes that US uses of force in election years were more frequent in wartime periods than peacetime periods as uses of force were more salient in wartime election years. Fordham (1998) and Clark (2003) do find a positive and significant effect of wartime elections on US uses of force, but no significant effect in peacetime election years.

explanations of democratic diversion have failed to generate consistent empirical results in favor of democratic diversionary arguments. This calls into question the decision to restrict diversionary analyses to democratic states. The presence of a small handful of articles (e.g Miller 1995; Miller 1999), which suggest nondemocracies may divert, complements this conclusion. Relatedly, only democratic leaders were widely-argued to face domestic audience (due, in part, to elections). Weeks' (2008) article demonstrates that not only do autocratic leaders face audience costs despite lacking electoral mechanisms, but these costs vary by non-democratic regime type.

There does seem to be some benefit in disaggregating regime type beyond this dichotomous classification. The results seem to be particularly interesting when comparing nondemocratic regime types. In the wider comparative autocratic *conflict* literature, a fairly consistent finding is found for the pacific nature of single-party regimes, though extending this expectation into diversionary conflict (Pickering and Kisangani 2010) did not generate similar results. These conclusions suggest a study of diversion and regime type that disaggregates regimes into democratic types and various non-democratic types. Further, the decision to divide regimes into various types complements the selection of policy constraints explanations of diversion, and the previous decision in this chapter to focus on structural constraints as an explanation for divergent patterns of diversionary behavior among leaders.

Despite their findings indicating little variation in the dispute initiation patterns of various non-democratic regimes experiencing elite or mass unrest, Pickering and Kisangani's (2010) work is useful for the development of Chapter Three. First, their analysis is the only explicit test of diversionary behavior across non-democracies, a key interest in the dissertation. Second, the

results of their analysis focusing on the diversionary behavior patterns of various non-democratic regimes stands in contrast to the conclusions drawn from the comparative autocratic conflict literature, which indicates differences among non-democracies do indeed exist. Third, as they note, the Geddes classification is the most commonly-used typology in the comparative autocratic literature.

This dissertation offers: (1) a test of a novel diversionary argument that encompasses *a comprehensive set* including democracies and various non-democratic regime types; (2) a robustness test of the findings of Pickering and Kisangani—the only recent comparative autocratic diversion research, which contradicts findings in the wider comparative autocratic conflict literature; (3) an improvement theoretically and methodologically on Pickering and Kisangani's work; and (4) that is comparable to other research on comparative autocratic conflict generally by selecting the most commonly-used division of non-democratic regimes in the literature, that of Barbara Geddes.

Focusing on Opportunity to Divert Rather than Domestic Unrest Alone

Up to this point, most of the literature introduced into this chapter focuses on explaining diversion as a function of a leader's willingness that is largely shaped by domestic factors. While opportunity is mentioned in passing, a full discussion of opportunity is required to understand diversion. Diversion is a subset of international conflict, and the requirement of both opportunity and willingness to divert as conditions for conflict has long been part of the literature (e.g. Starr 1978). Willingness to divert, therefore, must necessarily occur in conjunction with the presence of a target for diversionary behaviors to be observed. While the willingness of a leader

to divert is largely a function of domestic conditions and constraints, the opportunity to divert is almost universally viewed as a function of the international environment.[18]

Lack of attention to the opportunity to use force has long been an explanation for inconsistent support for the diversionary hypothesis (e.g. Meernik 1994). One manner in which this has been addressed is in changing the unit of analysis from state-year or dyad-year to crises[19] (Gelpi 1997). Others have controlled for international conditions (Clark 2003 controls for US uses of force with ongoing wars, peacetime elections, wartime elections, and the effect of Vietnam; Meernik and Waterman (1996) limit analyses to present threats). Still others control for unique dyadic conditions including territorial disputes (Heldt 1999) or rivalry (Mitchell and Prins 2004). Use of dispute reciprocation as a dependent variable (e.g. Miller 1995; Schultz 1999) has also been explored, but theoretically this is problematic as diversionary theory suggests that dispute initiation is a more appropriate measure of diversionary behavior.

Recognizing the relative dearth of opportunities for diversionary uses of force also led to the development of a full-fledged theoretical literature on strategic interaction, or as it is more commonly called strategic conflict avoidance. The basic link between all these explanations of the state of the diversionary literature is that we have not found evidence of diversion because potential targets strategically avoid interactions that could lead to being targeted when facing a leader of a state with diversionary incentives. Therefore developing and including measures that

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[18] Tir and Jasinski (2008) are an exception in their research on "domestic diversion", which could also be viewed as repression. The key difference is that their "domestic diversions" are cases where repression occurs against scapegoat groups in a state rather than against groups driving unrest.

[19] Oneal and James (1993) argue that crises may alter presidential decision-making in such a manner that domestic factors play less, not more of a role. This argument is not supported by their results.

account for the opportunity to divert have been offered as a potential improvement for diversionary analyses.

Strategic conflict avoidance literature also contains arguments that suggest an explanation for the limited findings on democratic diversion. Democratic transparency may provide potential target states with a greater level of information on the domestic conditions facing a leader (Smith 1996). When these conditions deteriorate, democratic leaders find that potential conflict partners have distanced themselves from positions that may be exploited by a democratic leader as an excuse to initiate conflict. Such explanations suggest democracies cannot divert despite incentives to do so. Clark (2003) asserts that Smith's argument implies that no relationship may be found in the aggregate between domestic and international turmoil, or if a relationship is found, it may be negative. His second argument rooted in Smith's work is that while no direct link may be found between domestic turmoil and international conflict, there may be an indirect effect of domestic conflict on the "unobservable posturing that precludes conflict" (Clark 2003, 1018). This conclusion is clearly problematic for researchers seeking observable empirical evidence in favor of diversionary arguments.

The possibility of strategic conflict avoidance has been addressed by controlling for state relationships characterized as rivalries (Mitchell and Prins 2004). The existence of a rival presents a leader with a diversionary incentive with a clear target. The presence of a rival allows a leader to more credibly link the need to use force in a situation, as enduring rivals have been perceived as a threat by the public prior to the decline in leader support. Leaders may be able to sell a diversion to the public more effectively as well as mask the true individual motives behind his decision to initiate a dispute. Combining their arguments on the degree to which enduring

rivalry creates an opportunity-rich environment and the possibility of a target's strategic conflict avoidance due to the transparency of democratic institutions, the authors expect dispute initiation to be higher in dyads where a nondemocratic states experiencing declining economic fortunes initiates against an enduring rival. They do in fact find that poor economic conditions are related to fewer dispute initiations in nonrival dyads, no effect of economic conditions on dispute initiation by democratic regimes in rival dyads, and a positive influence on the probability a nondemocratic state experiencing economic misfortune will initiate militarized disputes in rival dyads.

The overly-simplistic reaction to the strategic conflict literature would be to either strategically avoid the diversionary literature in one's research agenda or to declare diversion valid but hard to support empirically. Fortunately, recent research has instead focused on improving controls for opportunity. Somewhat dampening the relevance of the opportunity to use force argument to explain diversion is Clark (2003) who finds that there was little discernible relationship between uses of force by Democratic or Republican presidents and the level of opportunity present. The work of Mitchell and Prins (2004) addresses this finding; however, as the democratic transparency found in the US case reduces the opportunity of US presidents to engage in diversionary policies even in rival contexts. Their finding also suggests that diversionary researchers may find a greater level of success in the search for evidence of diversion by looking at non-democracies.

The theoretical argument in Chapter Three contains explanations of the conditions where diversion is likely to be observed as related to strategic conflict avoidance and rivalry. Strategic conflict avoidance is defined as a reduction in (or a shift towards conciliatory) interactions by a

state that is a potential target of aggressive foreign policies by another state. Conditions for conflict include both willingness and opportunity to use force (Starr 1978). Strategic conflict avoidance argues a relationship may exist between the willingness to uses force and the opportunity to do so. When a state perceives one of its counterparts may be contemplating aggressive foreign policies against it, the potential target should alter its relations with this potential initiator in such a manner where it is strategically avoiding confrontation with the potential initiator.

The potential for strategic conflict avoidance is particularly useful in diversionary research, and has been used as an explanation for why evidence for diversion has not been found regularly across large-N quantitative analyses. The same measurable conditions research indicates are related to diversion in empirical tests (deteriorating economic conditions, declining political support for leaders, and overt unrest incidents) are conditions that may also be signals to potential targets of diversion in the international system of a state's diversionary incentives. As states recognize the potential willingness of a leader to divert, they engage in strategic conflict avoidance behaviors to reduce the available opportunities to divert for this leader. Controlling for the possibility of conflict avoidance by selecting environments where strategic conflict avoidance behavior is less likely to occur or be effective is one way researchers have accounted for this possibility. Rival environments may be special in that they are opportunity-rich and conditions where it strategic conflict avoidance may be difficult to effectively pursue. Rivalries are defined as relations between pairs of states that are engaged in, or believed to be engaged in some economic, diplomatic, or military competition with one another.

The strategic conflict avoidance argument also dovetails nicely with the policy constraints argument. The policy constraints argument occupying the bulk of Chapter Three focuses on domestic-level structural constraints leaders face when seeking options other than diversion to address unrest. The rationale behind this argument is that diversion is an option with low constraints at the domestic level, and seeking to explain diversion on the basis of weak constraints on executive decisions to use force may be problematic. Strategic conflict avoidance arguments can be conceived of as a policy constraints argument that views the changing international environment as a constraint on the pursuit of diversion. In short, the literature treats the international system as an environment that becomes increasingly opportunity-poor as potential targets become aware that a leader may seek to divert. Domestic unrest measured by overt demonstrations of unrest should be a clear signal to the international community that a leader may have a desire to divert. In these cases, the leader selection of diversion may be constrained as states retreat from a potential diverter or become more pacific in their relations with a potential diverter.

Viewing strategic conflict avoidance literature as related to, or part of, the policy constraints literature, two core lines of argument can be identified to structure theoretical explanations developed in Chapter Three. The domestic institutional environment (regime type) determines the structural constraints leaders face when seeking to pursue options other than diversion as a response to unrest. The degree to which alternative options are available to leaders, in turn, influences the likelihood a leader will select diversion, or his willingness to divert. Strategic conflict avoidance of potential diverters by potential targets may be viewed as a dynamic, international-level constraint on the option of diversion. Strategic conflict avoidance is

more difficult for strategic rivals of potential diverters, therefore the influence of this constraint on the opportunity to use force is lower in these contexts.

Conclusion

In the first section of this chapter, the policy constraints, principal-agent modeling, and political incentive theory approaches to explaining diversionary literature are introduced. The policy constraints approach is favored over principal-agent models as the latter rely heavily on sets of assumptions questioned by some diversionary researchers and also suffer from the inclusion of concepts that are not easily measured. Political incentive theory is rejected as a theoretical foundation primarily due to the somewhat contradictory expectations the theoretical argument generates over the influence unrest will have on the likelihood of diversion. On the one hand, political incentive theory leads to the expectation that regimes with small winning coalitions will be less likely to divert than those with large winning coalitions as they are more able to address unrest through private goods distribution while simultaneously leaders of these regimes gain a smaller benefit from the public goods generated by favorable foreign policy outcomes. On the other hand, proponents of political incentive theory also argue that leaders of regimes with small winning coalitions are more risk-acceptant than leaders of regimes with large winning coalitions as they can absorb the political costs of unfavorable foreign policy outcomes through the same provision of private goods. In effect, this theoretical approach generates expectations in direct conflict with one another, and is therefore of limited utility.

The second major section of this chapter explores previous research linking regime type to diversion. While a few analyses have compared democracies to non-democracies, most research on diversion that speaks to regime type focuses on democratic diversion, particularly the

U.S. case, and at times variation across democracies in diversionary patterns. The diversionary literature comparing the two catch-all categories as well as the literature narrowing the scope to democracies is similar in that neither has generated consistent empirical evidence for diversion. A developing comparative autocratic conflict literature, however, suggests that single-party regimes are less likely to initiate conflict generally than other types of non-democracies. The sole modern comparative autocratic diversion analysis fails to find a similar divergence among non-democracies. Taken together, the literature in this section suggests that all types of regimes should be included in diversionary explanations, rather than restricting the scope to a subset of regimes. Additionally, the comparative autocratic literature suggests that non-democracies should be disaggregated. As Geddes (1999) notes, these regime types differ from one another as much as they differ from democracies.

These first two sections lay most of the groundwork for the theoretical explanation in Chapter Three, which links domestic-level concepts (unrest and regime type) to diversion. However, these two concepts influence the willingness of a leader to divert when compared to his willingness to pursue other policy options to address unrest. A complete explanation of diversion also requires understanding the opportunity to divert, primarily a function of the international context. The final section in this chapter focuses on opportunity as a factor of the international context, identifying the well-developed strategic conflict avoidance literature as a foundation for the development of theory in Chapter Three. Rivalry, in particular, is isolated as an international factor that influences opportunities for diversion.

In the next chapter, a policy constraints theoretical explanation of diversion across regime types is presented. The domestic structural constraints on leaders' pursuit of repression,

resignation, and policy concessions, and the international dynamic constraints on diversion are highlighted. Focusing on domestic structural constraints leads to an explanation that is centered on regime type. Recognizing recent literature that suggests differences in conflict behavior patterns exist across non-democratic regime types, regimes are classified as democratic, single-party, personalist, or military types. The constraints leaders face on selecting diversion are argued to be largely related to international factors. Combining both elements, previous research in strategic conflict avoidance has also suggested nondemocracies may be more likely to divert than democracies due to differences in regime transparency (Mitchell and Prins 2004).

This approach offers several contributions to the existing literature. First, it describes a leader's response set more fully by presenting leaders with four rather than two options when addressing unrest. Second, it is the second comparative autocratic diversion analysis in the literature, and the only one to also include democracies. Third, the theoretical argument differs significantly from Pickering and Kisangani (2010) as does the empirical analysis (theirs is the first recent comparative autocratic diversion study). Finally, the constraints faced by leaders are viewed at both the domestic and international levels. The theoretical argument in Chapter Three blends the domestic and international constraints discussed in the extant literature, disaggregates nondemocratic regime types as recent research indicates is a fruitful avenue for future research, and more fully discusses the response set option leaders choose from when experiencing unrest.

CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

Introduction

In Chapter Two, the previous literature on diversion and comparative autocratic conflict is discussed. Preference for the policy constraints approach is noted, and the utility of disaggregating non-democratic regimes is also highlighted. Division of decision-making power across institutions in most democratic regimes suggests that democratic leaders should be more constrained from diversion than leaders of other regime types. However, democratic executives face fewer domestic constraints in the foreign policy realm than in the domestic policy realm (Stoll 1984; Brulé and Williams 2009). On uses of force more explicitly (the most severe of foreign policy actions), Howell and Pevehouse (2005) find US presidents face few constraints on low-level uses of force and small-scale military interventions[1], the same class of incidents Morgan and Bickers (1992) expect to populate the sample of empirical conflict cases comprising diversionary behavior. If leaders of the likely most-constrained regime type (democracies) face few institutional constraints on diversionary behavior, then explanations of diversion that emphasize the domestic barriers on foreign policy decision-making may be missing the relevance of institutional variation across regime types.

Looking at the constraints leaders face when seeking options other than diversion may be a more fruitful approach, and is the heart of many policy constraints explanations of diversion in the literature (e.g. Brulé 2006; Lai and Slater 2006). Offered in this chapter is a theoretical

[1] They also find however that decreasing size of the president's party's share of seats in Congress leads to lower probabilities US presidents engage in major uses of force (discussed in Chapter Two).

explanation of diversion emphasizing the structural constraints faced by leaders seeking to respond to unrest through non-diversionary policies. The primary sources of structural constraints are institutions. The focus on structural constraints suggests differentiating leaders on the basis of as regime type, which is defined by institutions. Regime institutions, which define a regime's type, are factors that influence the pursuit of policies other than diversion utilized by leaders to address unrest. Differences in the likelihood of diversion across regime types is partly determined by the degree to which leaders of differing regime types are able to pursue preferred options.

The likelihood a leader selects diversion is also conditioned by a second factor discussed in Chapters One and Two: the degree to which the international environment presents opportunities for diversion. An extended discussion of the strategic conflict avoidance literature introduced the international constraints on opportunity facing leaders who may seek to divert. This literature explains inconsistent findings in the diversion literature by accounting for the behavior of potential targeted states. In short, the domestic conditions that indicate a leader may have incentives to divert are also strong signals to other states about a leader's desire to divert. Potential targets should respond by altering their interactions with potential diverters by becoming more conciliatory toward or reducing the level of contact with regimes experiencing domestic unrest. The same factors that indicate a leader may be willing to divert are therefore signals to other states that should alter their behavior to limit the opportunities for diversion.

The theoretical argument developed to explain diversion in this chapter is unique to the diversionary literature in that it uses the institutional opportunities for and constraints on *a range*

of options other than diversion to explain differences in leaders' willingness to divert across regime type. Typically, only one alternative to diversion is considered in policy constraints explanations of diversion. This theoretical argument is also unique in that the scope is not restricted to one regime type (in the literature typically democracies) or comparison of regimes on one side of the democratic/non-democratic divide (e.g. Lai and Slater (2006) focus only on non-democracies). Finally, this argument, following the examples of previous research, accounts for both domestic and international factors that influence the willingness and opportunity a leader has to divert. Understanding both the constraints on options other than diversion at the domestic level and the constraints on the opportunity to divert at the interstate level is necessary to provide a complete theoretical explanation for diversionary uses of force.

How Leaders Respond to Unrest

Before discussing the institutional constraints leaders face when seeking to respond to unrest, the set of response options identified in Chapter Two must be re-introduced. Gelpi (1997) argues leaders whose political survival is threatened by domestic unrest select from three options: (1) enact policy reforms to address the grievances of groups whose dissatisfaction is the driving force of political unrest; (2) engage in repression, or the use of force internally; and (3) diversion of the public's attention from the grievances aired by dissatisfied groups by using force externally. To this group of potential responses, (4) resignation is also included. Resignation is rarely discussed as an option available to leaders. In part, this is due to the strong assumptions about leaders' desire to retain office frequently voiced in the literature. However, a strong assumption about leaders' attempts to hold onto office at all costs is not supported by the

empirical record. By my count[2], there are at least 127 resignations in the post-WWII period that were not linked to ill-health or transfers of power to individuals selected by an outgoing leader.

Diversion is defined as the use of aggressive foreign policy by a government's leadership to divert the public's attention away from domestic problems driving domestic political unrest in a state. Diversionary behavior is risky. Diversionary behavior short of war can lead to unanticipated escalation by the diversionary target, dragging the leader (with his state in tow) into an unwanted and possibly unwinnable war. Diversionary wars, like all wars, may lead to all sorts of unintended consequences: poorly masked diversionary intentions may provide further justification to other domestic actors to remove the leader (Lian and Oneal 1993), an expected quick and easy conflict may turn into a long and brutal war of attrition, or miscalculation of the other side's capabilities and resolve may lead to a resounding defeat of the diverting state. The potential costs of diversionary behavior are very high.

Repression is defined as "the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of a state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions" (Davenport 2007, 2). Repression differs from other forms of coercion according to Davenport (2007) in that it is a use of state power to violate "First-Amendment-type" rights including the freedoms of speech, assembly, travel, association, spiritual beliefs, to peacefully protest and strike. In addition, repression by his definition includes violations of due process and personal security.

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[2] This number, again, comes from a dataset developed by the author. This dataset is available upon request.

Repression is commonly treated as the preferred method for dealing with unrest in the diversionary literature (ex. Davies 2002, 675). Gelpi's (1997) argument in favor of democratic diversion can be distilled into an explanation of diversion being a phenomenon unique to democracies as policy concessions are unavailable as a response once unrest is manifested in overt demonstrations (Gelpi 1997, 260) and repression is unavailable due to the presence of elections and constitutional barriers for democracies (Gelpi 1997, 260-261). Gelpi views non-democracies as similarly constrained from pursuing policy concessions once unrest is manifested in overt demonstrations; however, they will nearly always select repression according to Gelpi as he views this response as universally preferred by leaders. This treatment does not fully explain the issues surrounding repression, however. Repression carries risks. Repression of disaffected groups may provide further justification of their need to demand reforms, encouraging continued pressure upon the government leadership. The use of coercive policies against disaffected groups may lead elements of agitating groups to respond with violence, escalating what may have been initially peaceful protest into violent domestic conflict. Repression could lead other groups to agitate against leadership in the fear that their turn may be next. In addition, "sheer repression has its limits as a strategy for maintaining control" (Lai and Slater 2006, 117; see also Danopoulos 1988; Wintrobe 1998). Further, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argue repression is not always effective even for leaders of non-democracies.

Further, there is the possibility that the security apparatus of even non-democratic regimes would balk at an order to use force internally, while remaining open to the use of force externally. Dassel and Reinhardt (1999) argue that military leaders are reluctant to use force internally for two reasons: it is "demeaning" to the military to ask it to crush unarmed protesters

given its preparation for conventional interstate war-fighting, and repression may threaten the existence of the military if societal divisions manifested in unrest also exist in the military rank-and-file. They argue militaries favor the use of force externally over the use of force internally, and are only willing to use external force as a response to unrest if that unrest threatens the interests or existence of the military institution.[3]

Repression and diversion are essentially two sides of the same coin. Both options serve not as long-term solutions to effectively end unrest but as short-term dampers on unrest through the use of violence. Leaders must calculate whether diversion or repression are likely to succeed in maintaining their grip on office, while also taking into account possible constraints placed on their selection of either of these options. Repression and diversion are also similar in that each is an indirect response to the underlying cause of unrest. Both options address the visible symptoms of problems in a state (domestic discontent) rather than directly addressing the underlying problem plaguing the state. Repression and diversion only differ in the geographic location force is used.

Policy concessions may be viewed as the presentation of programmatic reforms offered to the public by a government to address specific grievances voiced by groups driving unrest. Policy concessions may include economic, political, or social policy reforms. The central distinguishing factor of policy concessions is a change in previous government policy in a

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[3] Such a view is, in part, an explanation for the rise of parallel security organizations in some states. Parallel security forces are typically created with the purpose of keeping the domestic peace through repression, and are more beholden to the leader for continued existence and support. Additionally, as discussed in Chapter Eight, any empirical analysis of repression should include variables measuring (at a minimum) the presence and size of these specialized forces within a regime.

specific issue area that is the central concern of a group or groups driving unrest. Gelpi argues: "Once demonstrations have broken out, we cannot assume a strong relationship between regime type and the granting of demands" (Gelpi 1997, 260).[4] This assumption is not shared—concessions remain a viable option in the presence of demonstrations against domestic leadership. Miller's argument is preferred and extended: "leaders facing declining levels of support prefer to implement policies that address the cause of their decline to diversionary policies" (Miller 1995, 766). Leaders often choose to make policy concessions to "thwart the threat of rebellion" (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1282). Note the authors here indicate that even in nondemocratic regimes, policy concessions remain a viable option even as internal unrest intensifies to a level where rebellion seems likely.

Policy concessions may be risky for a leader to offer and implement. Meeting political reform demands is particularly risky, especially if these reforms alter the rules of leader selection. Even marginal alterations to the rules of leader selection introduce uncertainty to a leader's hold on office. A leader who has attained office under a specific set of institutionalized rules for leader selection may not be confident that he will remain victorious over potential political rivals when the rules of the game have changed. Despite these risks, policy concessions should be the preferred option of leaders of all regime types when faced with domestic unrest. The dismissal of the prime minister and cabinet by King Abdullah II of Jordan, Saleh's pledge to step down after his current presidential term is completed in Yemen, Mubarak's (unsuccessful) pledge to remain out of the presidential race in Egypt, and Mohamed

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[4] Interestingly, Morgan and Bickers (1992) expect diversion to be unlikely once overt demonstrations occur in a state.

VI's announcement of political reforms in Morocco are recent examples of leaders selecting policy concessions at the outset of unrest over other available options to address unrest.

Resignation is defined as a leader's self-removal from office. Resignation may be viewed by some as a form of policy concession to disaffected groups, but is qualitatively different. Resignation is surrender to the pressures of unrest faced by a leader rather than a leader's attempt to address unrest directly or indirectly. Even if the most frequently voiced demand from disaffected groups is leader replacement, there is an underlying cause for this demand. Elements of the domestic population do not organize and demonstrate against a leader whose policies are perceived as satisfying their wants and needs.

Resignation is viewed as the least preferred option for leaders facing domestic unrest. A major assumption of diversionary literature is that leaders value political survival, particularly the retention of office. Political leaders typically fight hard battles in the domestic arena to rise to their positions, and are therefore unlikely to surrender these gains without attempting to retain office through at least one of the other three options available. Resignation is extremely risky. Leaders who resign, particularly in non-democratic regimes, have very real concerns for physical survival after they leave office. Once a leader has resigned, he has given up his last bargaining chip—leadership office—and his continued freedom and survival is largely dependent on successors in office holding to their word of personal guarantees offered as part of the leadership transition. Resignation is therefore seen as the option of last resort once previous attempts to address unrest directly or indirectly have failed.

Regime Type: Domestic Institutional Constraints and Opportunities

Leaders do not operate in a vacuum, nor do all leaders operate in a similar institutional environment. Recent research has linked leader-centric attributes and outcomes clearly with the type of regime a leader populates (Ex. Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005; Gelpi and Grieco 2001; McGillivray and Smith 2005). While all leaders have at their disposal the same set of potential options when dealing with domestic unrest, the attractiveness of each of the options in the set and the likelihood that a leader will be able to successfully pursue each of the options is conditioned by his or her environment and the consequences of failure to address unrest. The environment in which a leader calculates the attractiveness of each option in the response set is comprised of the domestic political institutional arrangement—collectively termed the "regime". Therefore, the environment in which a leader acts differs across regime types.

Understanding the likelihood of diversion across regime types requires an understanding the opportunities and barriers leaders of different regime types face in pursuing the other response options. While the selection of one option does not bar leaders from selecting the others simultaneously, regime type does impact the set of available options for leaders. In short, leaders of some regimes are able to select from more options than leaders of other regimes. If diversion is one of two options, the likelihood of diversion should be higher than the likelihood of diversion for a leader who enjoys freedom to select diversion from the full range of four response options.

The Importance of Political Parties and Policy Demands for Policy Concessions

Political parties are instruments that political leaders may use to build and maintain support for policy reform programs throughout the implementation process and through which

successful implementation may be facilitated. Important differences exist between parties in nondemocratic and democratic systems; however, parties act similarly regardless of regime type in terms of providing opportunities for embattled leaders. Parties in autocratic regimes "mobilize popular support and supervise behaviors of people unwilling to identify themselves with the ruler" and are "an instrument by which the regime can penetrate and control the society" (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1283; see also Gershenson and Grossman 2001). Lai and Slater (2006) emphasize the role of political parties in single-party regimes as an institutions that are "effective purveyors and organizers of elite patronage" (Lai and Slater 2006, 116). Political parties in these systems also bolster the regime by involving inhabitants in "pro-regime political organizations" (Lai and Slater 2006, 117). These organizations, in turn, may be mobilized by the government to implement sweeping policy programs that are meant to address the root causes of unrest.

Personalist regimes may possess a political party or parties. However, the role of the party and degree to which it is developed as an effective institution is stunted by the nature of personalist regimes. By definition, leadership and policy-making decisions are vested in the leader, not the party. Following this, the party's existence is dependent on the continued support of a leader; however, the leader's continued hold on office is not dependent on the party. Part of perpetuating this imbalance of power between the leader and the institution is often the periodic removal of individuals from the party apparatus once a leader feels they present a political threat. This prevents the political party in a personalist regime from becoming an effective institution constraining a leader, which also has the effect of crippling the institution as an effective instrument in policy-making.

Parties in these regimes are created for the purpose of distributing goods to leaders' supporters or for providing the appearance of communal decision-making, and are not typically tasked with effectively implementing policy. Members of the upper echelon in a party in personalist regimes are often in place due to close political, ethnic, or familial ties to a leader rather than through competence in policy-making. Military regimes similarly do not have a party apparatus that stands on its own power aside from the military as a political institution. Military regimes have "less capacity to counter popular dissent through cooptation and are more often forced to rely on raw coercion" (Lai and Slater 2006, 117) when compared to single-party systems.

The first division of regimes that matters for predicting the likelihood a state will exhibit diversionary behavior is between party-based systems (democracy and single-party) and non-party based systems (personalist and military). The presence of political parties in democracies and single-party systems provides an institutional opportunity for leaders of these types of regimes to pursue policy concessions. The absence of effective political parties in military and personalist regimes operates as a structural constraint on the pursuit of policy concessions by regime leadership. As the constraints on policy concessions are high for personalist and military regimes, the likelihood leaders will select this option is low. In turn, this increases the likelihood leaders of these types of regimes will select diversion.

Barriers and Opportunities for Repression

Single-party regimes, personalist regimes, and military regimes are likely to place few effective institutional constraints on the selection of repression by leaders. Across these regime types, the attractiveness and utility of repression may be determined by other factors such as: the

size, strength, effectiveness, and loyalty of security forces to the leader; the cultural focus of the military institution (is the military trained to focus on domestic or foreign threats to the regime); the presence of a state security apparatus focusing on internal control in parallel to a military focused on foreign threats; state history of repression; and international pressure[5].

Most of these constraints on repression vary by factors that are unrelated to regime type. However, military regimes differ from their non-democratic counterparts in one key manner—the unification of political and military leadership. In single-party and personalist regimes, there is a greater possibility for the military to refuse a leader's order to repress. This can occur either when the military as a whole refuses an order. Or, the military institution fragments into pro-regime and anti-regime forces as in the recent case of Syria. Supporting this argument, Pierskalla (2010) finds that repression has a higher likelihood of success in stable non-democratic governments with sufficient levels of capabilities and resolve. He finds that unstable, transitioning regimes are more likely to experience an escalation of violence than an effective suppression of violence. His formal models demonstrate that third-parties (other than government and opposition) described as the military or hard-liners within a regime refrain from staging coups in the face of strong governments and succeed in coups when facing a weak government. These models illustrate both the potential risk to office for leaders selecting repression and the distinction that can be drawn between regimes where military and political leadership is unified compared to regimes where the military remains a powerful force outside the political leadership.

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[5] However, as Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007) find, international human rights treaties have little impact on historically repressive regimes, and the key determinants of treaty effectiveness are the presence of a democratic regime in a state as well as strong civil society activism.

Democratic leaders face the highest institutional barriers to repression. As noted by Gelpi (1997), democratic leaders are frequently barred constitutionally or by other present power-sharing political institutions from selecting repression as a response. For democracies, "physical repression is not a viable option" (Pierskalla 2010, 135). Additionally, most modern developed democracies possess militaries that are culturally trained to focus on external rather than internal threats to the state, and domestic publics that are culturally opposed to the use of military force against domestic targets. In summary, democracies are considered to face the highest constraints on repression. Non-democratic regimes are similar in their low barriers to repression as a response option with military regimes experiencing extremely low barriers to repression compared to the other two non-democratic types.

Institutions and Resignation

Resignation is one of the few political outcomes receiving little attention in the political science literature. As such, most of the theoretical explanations and derived expectations for resignation are unique and original. The argument separating regimes on the basis of resignation constraints largely focuses on leader-replacement mechanisms likely in place in the institutional environment characterizing each "ideal" regime type. Previous literature has argued that the ease of leader replacement is closely related to regime type (e.g. Debs and Goemans 2010; Goemans 2008; McGillivray and Smith 2005). Leader-replacement mechanisms are also related to the cost of losing office, discussed as post-tenure fate, which is also related to regime type. Debs and Goemans (2010) make the theoretical connection between leader-replacement mechanisms and the "private stakes" of holding office for a leader. Debs and Goemans (2010) discuss this

concept in terms of expected post-tenure fate, meaning they view "private stakes" in terms of the costs of losing office rather than as benefits of holding office.

The most important component in understanding the value of holding office for various leaders is the cost of losing office. The consequences of losing office are in part determined by the manner in which a leader loses office (Goemans 2008), either through regular replacement or irregular replacement. Regular replacement is defined as replacement "driven by the prevailing norms, rules, and procedures of each country and regime" (Goemans 2008, 774). Irregular leader removal is removal by "the threat or use of force" (Goemans 2008, 774). Goemans (2008) finds leaders who are removed from office in a regular manner only suffer exile, jail, or death 8 percent of the time, while leaders removed in an irregular manner can look forward to exile, jail, or death 80 percent of the time. Importantly, imprisonment, exile, and death all implicitly include the loss of political survival as a cost in addition to physical costs such as displacement, loss of freedom, or loss of life. The costs of losing office differ across regime types, in relation to the manner of exit (Goemans et al. 2009; Debs and Goemans 2010). The presence of regular replacement mechanisms is related to the likely manner of exit, and therefore the costs of losing office, conceived as post-tenure fate. As these costs increase, the probability of resignation should decrease. Barred from selecting resignation, leaders should therefore be more likely to select other options as strategies to retain their position in a state.[6]

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[6] This argument also yields similar expectations as that of Goemans (2008) on the question of diversion. While my argument is more nuanced, it does stay true to the importance of regime type for constraints on an option other than diversion. Goemans (2008) finds that leaders facing a high probability of irregular removal have much more to gain from successful challenges in international conflict and lose relatively little, with the exception of losses in full-scale war, when compared to leaders who expect likely regular removal.

Regimes dominated by a highly institutionalized party or parties are expected to have in place regular mechanisms for leader replacement. In democratic regimes, leaders may be replaced either by losing the position of party leadership or, more frequently, through regular institutionalized elections. Leader replacement is therefore easier in democratic systems than single-party systems, though formal institutions for replacement exist in each. Unlike single-party regimes, most democratic regimes offer the leader a fixed term in office. In the diversion literature, this often leads proponents of democratic diversion to argue that an unpopular leader may have few incentives to resign rather than to ride out his term and engage in activities—including diversion—to boost his popular support before a known upcoming election. The other side of this argument, however, is that democratic leaders face less-severe consequences for leaving or being removed from office. As leader removal is typically regular in democracies, as opposed to irregular in nondemocracies (Goemans 2008), democratic leaders are less likely to fear the threat of unpleasant post-tenure fates and may therefore be expected to hold on to office less strongly than non-democratic leaders. In short, because the likelihood of violent post-tenure fates is lower for democratic leaders, they may choose to resign into retirement rather than incur the likely costs both to the regime and to the leader personally inherent in diversion. As such, democratic leaders should have a higher likelihood of resignation than leaders of other regime types that do not have mechanisms for regular leader replacement.

In single-party regimes, leaders may lose their position through semi-regular (although often mere "rubber-stamp") party or general elections or by loss of support from key internal party groups and are replaced as factions compete for leadership of the party (and regime). Recent leadership handovers in China, which occur relatively smoothly, are examples of this

orderly mechanism for leader replacement in single-party regimes. The presence of this kind of institutionalized leader replacement arguably decreases the probability a leader will choose to resign. Again, however, because these mechanisms for leader replacement exist in single-party regimes, the costs of losing office are expected to be lower. These mechanisms allow for a regular manner of exit for beleaguered leaders and therefore decrease the risk of a leader facing a grisly post-tenure fate. The related factors of existing leader replacement institutions and lower costs of losing office therefore make resignation an option that leaders of single-party regimes are more likely to consider than leaders of regimes lacking regular leader replacement mechanisms. As democracies contain a more robust and regular mechanism for leader replacement, single-party leaders should be somewhat less likely than democratic leaders to resign.

Leaders of military regimes may be replaced by agreement among other members of the junta to support another military officer in place of the current regime leader. While this form of leader replacement is somewhat structured by the military institution, the mechanism of leader replacement is not formally institutionalized. As these regimes lack formal leader replacement mechanisms, pressures on unpopular leaders to resign may be more common. Again, however, this same lack of formal leader replacement mechanisms means military leaders face a much higher probability of irregular removal than democratic or single-party leaders, and in turn a much higher cost of losing office. Military regime leader replacements are often violent as factions within the military fight amongst themselves for power. Often, this leads to a series of bloody leadership changes and often regime transitions.

Supporting this link between resignation difficulty and feared post-tenure fates are cases of successful military leadership resignation in regime transitions. Military leaders often negotiate their exits with incoming leaders to avoid prosecution for crimes committed during their tenure. Additionally, military leaders may negotiate their continued position as the military leadership after handing over the reins of political leadership (e.g. Karl 1987). In these cases, the military—in the interest of preserving institutional integrity and internal cohesion—will support a "return to the barracks", precipitating a pacted regime transition after the resignation of a leader. A military regime leader may hand power over to new civilian leadership based not only on personal security interests, but also in the interests of the military institution as a whole. The dual role of military regime leaders as leaders of the domestic political institutions and the military as an institution may increase the likelihood of military leader resignation when compared to personalist regimes, while overall this likelihood is lower than for single-party and democratic regimes respectively.

Few personalist regimes have a formal process through which power is handed over. In successful cases, a personalist leader grooms his or her replacement, typically a family member or close political ally, to take the mantle upon his or her death.[7] In some cases, the transition is a smooth one; however, the process often breaks down as potential rivals for power vie for leadership as the incumbent's death is imminent. Travel down this potential pathway is often facilitated by the incumbent as most personalist leaders work throughout their tenure to eliminate

[7] In any case, the coding of personalist regimes in the dataset views personalist regimes as living and dying with an individual leader, and the discussion of leader turnover in personalist regimes is therefore left to expectations of leader turnover in the event of regime transition, a special subset of cases.

potential rivals and have been known to purge even family members that have been groomed for succession as their hold on power appears close to an end either through age and illness or through political instability. Evidence of this behavior can be found in the Kim Jong Il's tenure in North Korea cycled through a series of favored successors, including at least one of his sons. Lacking formal institutional mechanisms for regular leader replacement, and in turn risking a higher chance of unpleasant post-tenure fates following an irregular leader replacement, resignation is very unlikely in personalist regimes.

Looking to examples of personalist leader resignation again highlights this connection between a lack of regular replacement mechanisms, the high costs of losing office, and resignation. In recent cases in Yemen, Tunisia, and Libya, leaders of personalist regimes attempted to negotiate the terms of their resignations, and all three cases demonstrate the perils faced by personalist leaders whose support has evaporated. Ben Ali of Tunisia is currently in exile in Saudi Arabia and being tried in absentia in Tunisia (Reuters 2012). Saleh of Yemen was granted immunity from prosecution in return for his resignation (BBC News 2012b), and importantly many of his family members continue to hold prominent roles in the Yemeni government. Finally, Gaddafi in Libya sought immunity from prosecution and the protection of his financial assets (Ynet News 2011). Anti-regime forces in Libya seemed willing to entertain a Gaddafi exit agreement; however, such efforts were quickly abandoned after the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for his arrest (Al Jazeera 2011) before his death at the hands of rebels. Tellingly, successful negotiations for leader resignation in personalist regimes almost always include guarantees of an outgoing leader's financial and physical security. The

value of these guarantees is also highly dependent on a state's new leadership and in recent years, is often tempered by the actions of international organizations.

The arguments above suggest institutionalized mechanisms for replacement are most robust in democracies, somewhat present in single-party regimes, largely absent in military regimes, and generally absent in personalist regimes. Regular replacement should be most frequent in democracies, followed by single-party regimes, military regimes, and personalist regimes. The costs of losing office should be lowest for democratic leaders, followed by single-party leaders, military leaders, and finally personalist leaders. Table 3a illustrates that the costs of losing office do vary across regime type in such a pattern. Resignation should be most likely in democracies, followed by single-party regimes, military regimes, and personalist regimes at similar levels of domestic unrest. Following this, the greatest negative effect on diversion probability due to the probability of resignation follows the same rank-order.

Summarizing Domestic Constraints and Opportunities for Leader Responses to Unrest

The above theoretical argument on the link between regime type and institutional constraints on leader response options other than diversion is summarized in Table 3b, illustrating both the expected constraints on each option for each regime type and the resulting expected impact on the probability of diversion. To summarize, personalist leaders and military leaders, lacking effective political parties face high barriers to policy concessions. Democracies and single-party regimes, in contrast, face relatively low barriers to policy concessions. Constraints are highest on repression for democratic leaders; however, military leaders may be somewhat freer to select repression than personalist and single-party leaders due to the unification of political and military leadership in military regimes. The presence of

institutionalized rules for leader selection is related to the likelihood a leader experiences a regular removal. In turn, this influences the likely post-tenure fate of leaders. Regular removal (and a relatively rosy post-tenure fate) is most likely for democratic leaders, followed by single-party leaders, military leaders, and personalist leaders. Therefore, resignation is most likely for democratic leaders, followed by single-party leaders, military leaders, and personalist leaders.

Increasing domestic political unrest influences the likelihood of diversion when domestic institutional barriers to options other than diversion are present. These institutional constraints flow from the institutions that define a regime's type. The combined effect of domestic constraints on options other than diversion posed by regime type for leaders is shown in the "Overall Effect" column in Table 3b. This column represents the combined effect regime-specific constraints on alternative response options has on the likelihood of diversion when unrest occurs in a state. The probability of diversion is considered to be similar across regimes before the effect of domestic constraints on these alternative options is considered. Under similar levels of domestic unrest, the more constrained a leader is from pursuing options other than diversion due to the regime type he inhabits, the greater the likelihood of diversion by that leader, manifested by an increased likelihood a state exhibits aggressive foreign policy behavior.

Hypothesis 1: The effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation will be largest for personalist regimes, followed by military regimes, democratic regimes, and single-party regimes.

Accounting for International Constraints on Foreign Policy

The literature on strategic conflict avoidance presented in Chapter Two introduces a potential additional factor that needs to be accounted for in theoretical explanations of

international conflict, a literature including diversionary behavior. Simply stated, leaders engaging in aggressive foreign policy need an available target. Willingness and opportunity must both be considered in studies of international conflict (Starr 1978). The above arguments focusing on the domestic constraints faced by leaders seeking to respond to unrest speaks primarily to the willingness of leaders to divert. The strategic conflict avoidance literature emphasizes international barriers to diversionary behavior, and by extension the opportunities for diversion. The strategic conflict avoidance literature explains the inconsistent results in large-N quantitative diversionary analyses by highlighting the problem of diversionary opportunity. States that confront a counterpart experiencing domestic conditions suggesting a willingness to engage in foreign policy for diversionary purposes act to limit the opportunity this state has to engage in aggressive foreign policy. Potential targets may limit the opportunity a leader can select diversion by appearing conciliatory or reducing their interactions with this leader's state. The most interesting component of the strategic conflict avoidance explanation is that the same conditions, which are used by researchers to measure the likelihood a state will seek to divert, are conditions that are simultaneously discussed as signals to potential targets of this willingness to divert.

A simplified version of strategic conflict avoidance arguments would suggest that the Hypothesis 1 will not be supported in empirical analyses if the level of opportunity in the international environment is omitted from research designs. The opportunity problem has been widely considered in the international conflict literature prior to the more robust development of the strategic conflict avoidance argument in the past decade. Employing controls for dispute opportunity including distance between states, shared borders, and relative capabilities is perhaps

the most familiar method. Also widely used is the restriction of datasets to "politically-relevant dyads,"[8] which are politically-relevant in that there exists at least the possibility for militarized disputes between states. The strategic conflict avoidance literature goes a step farther in accounting for opportunity. Rather than isolating dyads where disputes are "possible" due to power and geographic proximity considerations, the focus is on dyadic pairs where states may have a difficult time in strategically avoiding a determined initiator. Dyadic relationships can be characterized as opportunity-poor or opportunity-rich. Isolating these opportunity-rich environments is the primary task in accounting for strategic conflict avoidance.

One set of dyadic cases that has been identified as an opportunity-rich set is rival dyads (Mitchell and Prins 2004). Rivalry is argued to be related to diversion directly by providing an opportunity-rich environment where clear targets may be identified by potential diverters. Additionally, the supposed threat posed by a rival that a leader uses to justify dispute initiation may be more easily accepted by the domestic public of a diverting state.[9] A second set of hypotheses that account for the opportunity environment is suggested by this discussion of rivalry.

Hypothesis 2: There is no effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation in non-rival dyads, regardless of regime type.

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[8] Politically-relevant dyads (discussed fully in Chapter Four) are those in which at least one state in the pair is a major power (and can therefore project power globally) or states that are close geographically (and a projection of power from one state into another is possible). A "non-relevant" dyad would be something like Liechtenstein-Tuvalu in the current year where the distance between and capabilities of these states make the possibility of militarized disputes in this dyad unlikely if not impossible.

[9] Indirectly, the presence of a rivalry is expected to influence the likelihood of diversion by increasing the likely initiation of militarized disputes with states other than its primary rival if such a dispute is seen as relevant to the rivalry (Mitchell and Prins 2004)

Hypothesis 3: The effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation will be largest for personalist regimes, followed by military regimes, democratic regimes, and single-party regimes in rival dyads.

These hypotheses, however, ignore the second argument of Mitchell and Prins (2004), which elaborates upon the strategic conflict avoidance argument. Transparency is a second factor they highlight in their explanation of diversion, which accounts for strategic conflict avoidance considerations. They argue that the transparency of democratic regimes when compared to non-democratic regimes influences the ability of potential targets to avoid entanglements with potential diverters. The consequence of democratic transparency is that democratic leaders with diversionary preferences find fewer available targets than non-democratic leaders with diversionary preferences. They do in fact find evidence of non-democratic diversion in rival contexts, but fail to find evidence of democratic diversion in rival contexts. Among non-democracies, transparency does not vary according to regime type. However, a considerable difference between the transparency of democratic regimes and non-democratic regimes in the aggregate is expected. The combined effects of international constraints proposed in the strategic conflict literature and domestic constraints discussed earlier in this chapter suggest two final hypotheses.

Hypothesis 4: There is no significant effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation by democratic regimes in rival dyads.

Hypothesis 5: The effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation by non-democratic regimes will be largest for personalist regimes, followed by military regimes, and single-party regimes in rival dyads.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the likelihood of diversion is linked to both domestic and international sources of constraints. Domestically, regime type, determined by the institutional composition of a regime a leader inhabits, reduces the likelihood a leader will select options other than diversion when facing rising domestic unrest. Regime type determines the structural constraints faced by leaders. In turn, the effects of regime type on the likelihood other potential responses will be pursued influences the likelihood of diversion across regime types. Referencing the strategic conflict avoidance literature discussed in Chapter Two, leaders are constrained from diversion by the nature of the international environment. Leaders operating in an opportunity-poor environment have little opportunity to divert due to a lack of potential targets. Following the example of Mitchell and Prins (2004), rivalry was offered as a context where opportunity-rich environments may be identified. Additionally, democratic transparency may have an effect, which eliminates the opportunity for democratic regimes to engage in diversionary behavior, even in rival contexts.

The theoretical argument suggested five competing hypotheses, which are inconsistent with one another but consistent with the layering of arguments as the chapter proceeds. The first hypothesis is derived from the domestic constraints argument alone. This hypothesis is tested in Chapter Five, and the measures and modeling of the analysis are discussed in Chapter Four.

Hypotheses 2-5 are derived from the combined arguments on domestic and international constraints. Hypotheses 2 and 3 focus on the influence rivalry has on providing opportunities to initiate disputes for diversionary purposes. Hypotheses 4 and 5 condition the influence of domestic constraints and international constraints on diversion in rival contexts on an additional domestic factor identified in Mitchell and Prins (2004), democratic transparency. Hypotheses 2-5 are tested in Chapter Six, and design decisions are discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

This chapter outlines the research design guiding analyses in Chapters Five and Six. The theoretical explanation in Chapter Three is that domestic political institutions, which also define regime type, present leaders with structural constraints on repression, resignation, and policy concessions as responses to unrest. The domestic constraints on these options influence the likelihood leaders of each regime type will pursue each of these options. By extension, altering the likelihood of options other than diversion is argued to influence the likelihood of diversion for leaders of each regime type in a systematic manner that is determined by regime type. In addition, the strategic behavior of potential target states may provide a source of international constraints on the selection of diversion. Rivalry is suggested in Chapter Three as a characteristic of potential subset of dyadic cases where this constraint is least likely to have an impact.

The discussion of previous literature in Chapter Two also covers points that are relevant for this research design chapter. Disconnect between anecdotal evidence supporting diversionary arguments and large-N time-series, cross-sectional analyses that fail to provide consistent support for diversionary arguments is a major concern in the literature. Given the widely-held belief that individual cases of potential diversion can be and have been identified, a qualitative design that relies on case studies would present yet more anecdotal evidence in favor of diversion without addressing the problem of inconsistent evidence for diversion in large-N cross-sectional analyses. Consistent empirical support in quantitative analyses of diversion is a central issue in the diversionary literature, not the ability to identify possible cases of diversion.

Unit of Analysis Choices

In international relations literature, there has long been a debate on the proper level of analysis for the development and testing of theoretical explanations for international outcomes. These arguments are discussed by Waltz in *Man, the State and War* (Waltz, 1959) and Chapters Two-Four of *Theory of International Politics* (Waltz, 1979). Waltz's arguments have cast a long shadow over the development of international relations theories and the selection of a unit of analysis in quantitative research within the subfield, as has the development of widely-used datasets focusing on the state and system levels (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). When confronted with the unit of analysis choice, it is essential to explore the strengths and weaknesses of various options. The ideal unit of analysis choice reflects the theoretical arguments being tested; however, other factors such as data availability and model specification with appropriate controls also must be considered by quantitative researchers. The selection of one unit of analysis over others frequently involves trade-offs that often impact the results of quantitative analysis and inferences drawn from these results.

As a general rule of thumb, research design questions are best answered by referencing the theoretical explanation being tested. Following the theory somewhat confuses the unit of analysis question. The theoretical explanation is leader-focused in the sense that it seeks to explain leader decision-making. However, the factors that influence leader decision-making are state-level or regime-level (regime type) and international-level (rival environment). Additionally, the outcome of interest is diversion, indisputably an international-level outcome.

Most key independent variables used in the analysis (discussed later in this chapter) are comprised of state-year observations. This means that leader-year analyses would also suffer

from data availability issues. The two key independent variables (domestic unrest and regime type) are measured at the state-year level. Similarly, regime type data were coded in the state-year format, and the dataset does not include begin and end dates for regimes in years where a regime transition occurred. The dependent variable, international conflict initiation is an international-level phenomenon. Whether a dispute has been initiated by a state can be and has been measured in a monadic design. However, the theoretical arguments in Chapter Three indicate the relationship between states matters in understanding dispute initiation. Measuring rivalry requires the use of a dyadic design.

Finally, when conducting quantitative analyses, researchers also must take into account other factors widely-demonstrated to impact the outcome of interest by including them as control variables in statistical models. In the international relations literature, several control variables are considered standard in international conflict models (see Bremer 1992). These variables include: relative capabilities, distance, and contiguity among others. All of these "standard" controls are necessarily measured at the dyadic level, and therefore are only possible to include in dyadic analyses. The central concern is that failure to model the effects of these factors may lead to invalid results when modeling international conflict behavior. A dyadic design is therefore favored.

When selecting a dyadic design, researchers must choose between a directed versus a non-directed dyadic dataset. A directed-dyadic dataset is employed in the following chapters as this allows the researcher to more effectively measure the direction in which conflict behavior occurs at the outset (i.e. distinguish targets from initiators). A non-directed dyadic set includes only observations for all pairs of states in a given year (e.g. U.S.-China 1947 is included alone).

With such a construction, only the presence of a dyadic dispute may be coded fully. A directed-dyad design accounts for direction (e.g. US-China 1947 and China-U.S. 1947 are both included). In this structure, a dispute between a pair of states is coded as occurring in both observations. However, providing two observations per dyad in a year allows for the coding of initiators and targets. If China initiated a dispute against the U.S. in 1947, the initiation measure would be coded as "1" for China-US 1947, but zero for U.S.-China 1947. Given the outcome of interest, diversion, requires the distinction between initiators and targets, a directed-dyad dataset is more appropriate than a non-directed dyad dataset.

While many recent researchers have presented a compelling case for the use of leader-year units of analysis (e.g. Wolford 2007, Chiozza and Goemans 2003), and this unit of analysis is in part suggested by the theoretical argument, the leader-year specification cannot adequately control for factors that are known in the literature to be related to international conflict. Chiozza and Goemans (2003) explicitly mention the costs incurred when failing to conduct analyses of conflict with dyadic data with similar controls. However, they elected to continue with a leader-year analysis as "this data structure places at the forefront the mechanism of diversionary conflict, that is, the incentives of leaders to start conflict as a function of their grasp on power" (Chiozza and Goemans (2003, 444). In short, they decide to go with the model that best fits the theory as they see it. I have argued that following the theoretical argument is not so clear-cut. Following the available data also limits the utility of a leader-year approach and suggests a state-year analysis may be possible. The costs of failing to conduct analyses of conflict with a dyadic design are severe, however. This issue is precisely why the state-year (monadic) approach declined in use over the past decade or so in the international conflict literature in favor of dyadic

approaches, and should be viewed as a warning to those favoring a leader-year approach. Given that the outcome of interest is a specific type of international conflict, models that employ the leader-year and state-year units of analysis cannot fully specify the factors that have been shown repeatedly to have an effect on international conflict over time. This could lead to biased estimated results. Again, as the theoretical argument and related hypotheses seek to explain dispute initiation by a state against another state, a directed dyadic unit of analysis is selected as the unit of analysis employed in the models of Chapter Five and Six.

Measures Used in Empirical Analyses

Chapters Five and Six contain the directed-dyadic analyses that test the theoretical expectations identified as hypotheses in Chapter Three. This section discusses the measures used in subsequent empirical models, providing a justification for their use and potential concerns with these measures. For all variables, descriptive statistics can be found in the Appendices A-C. Appendix A presents statistics on all variables, including interactions in the full dataset. Appendix B presents equivalent descriptive statistics for the politically-relevant-dyads dataset. Appendix C includes a summary of missing data in each dataset.

Diversion

The key outcome concept of interest is diversionary international conflict behavior, defined as the use of aggressive foreign policy for domestic political purposes. The variable we can actually measure is the initiation of a dispute by one state against another.[1] This variable

[1] Tir and Jasinski (2008) explore the interesting possibility of diversionary behavior occurring within states, where the leadership in power uses force internally against specific groups outside

includes all disputes, not just diversionary disputes. Finding a statistical link between unrest and general dispute initiations does however provide supporting evidence for the diversionary argument.

One central question long-discussed in the diversionary literature is the hostility level of a diversionary action. Wilkenfeld's (1968) analyses on the link between domestic and international conflict separate foreign conflict behavior into several categories: "war" conflict behavior, "diplomatic" conflict behavior, and "belligerency" conflict behavior. Morgan and Bickers (1992) argue "…because war involves great costs and risks, threats and uses of force short of war may be the normal form of diversionary behavior" (Morgan and Bickers 1992, 29). Following Morgan and Bickers (1992) and the examples found in recent diversionary research, a measure encompassing aggressive foreign policies at all hostility levels is viewed as appropriate in testing diversionary arguments. Their argument represents a shift from earlier diversionary research focusing on diversionary war to recent research on more general diversionary behavior. The dependent variable selected includes all dispute behavior exhibited by a leader's state in a given year up to and including war.

Aside from selecting the level of hostility expected in a diversionary action, researchers must also choose a dataset on international conflict behavior. The measure selected for analyses in the following chapters is the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute (COW MID)

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the central support base of leadership. While interesting, this type of diversionary behavior falls outside the scope of the current study and is left for future research. Additionally, these actions could also be considered incidents of repression.

dataset (Singer and Small 1972; version 3.10 Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).[2] The COW MID dataset has several strengths. First, this dataset is the most widely-used and among the longest-existing datasets on international conflict behavior. Second, the COW MID dataset is available in multiple formats, including a directed-dyadic format through the use of EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000). Third, and perhaps most importantly, the COW MID dataset includes disputes at a variety of hostility levels, including low-level disputes, which previous researchers suggest are most likely the type where diversionary behavior occurs. Finally, the COW MID data contain a variety of measures that allow the coding of initiators of new disputes and original participants.

Diversionary behavior is measured by selecting events where a leader's state begins a new MID in a given year (omitting ongoing MIDs) where that state is on side A of and an original participant in a MID. *Dispute initiation* is coded as "1" if country code 1 (first state in a dyad) is on side A of and an original participant in a new MID where country code 2 (second state in a dyad) is not on side A of a new MID coded for the directed-dyad year.

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[2] Pickering and Kisangani frequently use their own International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset (Kisangani and Pickering 2008; Pickering and Kisangani 2009) built upon Pearson and Baumann's (1993) IMI dataset, which codes the deployment of physical forces across territorial borders. However, in the study of diversionary behaviors, as previously noted, there is an expectation that diversionary behavior may be more likely to occur at levels below the actual use of force or below full-scale war. The use of force issue is also present in the Military Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS) dataset (Sullivan and Koch 2008) and the UCDP/PRIO (Uppsala Conflict Data Program/International Peace Research Institute) Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000) has also been used widely in conflict literature, and is employed by Gelpi (1997) in his democratic diversion article. The ICB dataset relies heavily on leader perceptions of threats, as seen in the definition of crisis triggers. A potentially major difficulty in using the ICB data is in the coding of the "triggering entity". The ICB dataset codes this as 995 if the trigger was "internally generated", which sounds close to expectations for some diversionary behavior.

Domestic Unrest

The primary independent variable of interest is domestic unrest. One of the first modifications to empirical diversionary analyses is a discussion of the types of unrest measures likely to be related to unrest. Wilkenfeld (1968) uses overt demonstrations of unrest, but divided this into "turmoil" (anti-government demonstrations, riots, and major crises), "revolutionary" (revolutions, number of people killed in unrest, purges, and general strikes), and "subversive" (guerilla warfare and assassinations) types.[3] Overt indicators of unrest are still used in diversionary research. Gelpi (1997) separates protest actions from rebellion actions. Davies (2002) concludes non-violent strife is related to repression in non-democratic regimes and involvement in military disputes for democratic regimes. Violent strife, however, is related to higher probabilities of dispute involvement for both democracies and non-democracies.

For many diversionary researchers, abandoning indicators of overt unrest altogether is preferred through the use of proxy measures for public dissatisfaction that are less threatening to leadership and regime survival. Morgan and Bickers (1992) argue that by the time domestic conditions deteriorated to the level of overt demonstrations of dissatisfaction, the window of opportunity for diversion may have closed. One set of possible indicators of domestic unrest or dissatisfaction that has been proposed as an alternative to overt measures of unrest are measures of economic conditions. The variety of these indicators and the inconsistent results reflect the overall picture of the diversionary literature as a body of work where replacing measures at times

[3] Interestingly, this is an earlier version of the Banks data I am using in the analysis in Chapter Five.

seems favored over attempts to address potential theoretical shortcomings. GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment are most frequently used, either alone or in combination.[4]

Like the broader diversionary literature, analyses that use economic indicators, even under highly restrictive conditions, as factors related to diversion offer contradictory results. The selection of economic indicators such as unemployment, inflation[5], and GDP growth[6] as measures of unrest has not proven to be consistently useful in explaining diversion. Further, the use of economic indicators requires a pair of large assumptions. First, the public is aware of and notices often small overall changes in the performance of the state's economy as a whole. The second assumption made is that the public necessarily blames the leader rather than some other force that may impact the economic performance of a state (such as the legislature, foreign powers, international shocks, etc.). The literature that separates parliamentary systems into majority-party, minority-party, and coalition-majority types suggests that the assigning of blame for deteriorating economic conditions is not so clear-cut. Related to this, such an assumption

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[4] Brulé (2006) uses all three.

[5] The misery index (inflation+unemployment is frequently used in analyses as an indicator of domestic conditions that may influence international conflict behavior. The misery index is found to have a positive effect on dispute initiation in several studies (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991) but is found to have a negative and significant effect in others (Meernik and Waterman 1996). Aside from the combined misery index, inflation is linked to dispute initiation by states (Mitchell and Prins 2004) as well as unemployment under certain conditions (Fordham 1998; Brulé and Hwang 2010).

[6] GDP growth is found to be related to fatal militarized dispute initiation by democracies in Oneal and Tir (2006) in a linear fashion. However, Oneal finds in earlier works that slow GDP growth is related to militarized disputes (Oneal and Russett 1997) and then not (Russett and Oneal 2001). Others find that only negative GDP growth rates as a measure of "absolute deprivation" is correlated with the use of force in territorial disputes but this is conditioned by risk and democratic regime type (Heldt 1999).

also requires researchers to hold that leaders are unable to guide public opinion by cueing the public on where to assign blame.

While in American politics, we often boil presidential election down to the line: "It's the economy, stupid", the empirical evidence linking economic indicators to diversionary behavior is as scattershot as the empirical results in diversionary literature as a whole. Further, Meernik and Waterman argue: "While this hypothesis makes intuitive sense, it would seem to fail a more commonsense test" (Meernik and Waterman 1996, 579). More recent research finds that democratic leaders are actually punished at the polls by engaging in risky foreign adventures while the economy is performing sub-optimally (Williams et al. 2010), drawing the conclusion that the public punishes leaders who appear to be ignoring economic policy in times of economic stress.

Aside from economic indicators, other measures broadly termed political support measures are identified as factors related to the external use of force by executives. A major weakness in employing measures of partisan support, party cohesion, or presidential approval as proxies for domestic dissatisfaction is again, conflicting evidence on the significance and direction of the effect on these indicators on the use of force.[7] More importantly, selection of such indicators limits the ability of diversionary researchers to study diversion generally by restricting analyses to democratic cases where data on these measures can be collected. Additionally, the data are most frequently available for a subset of democracies (modern

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[7] Morgan and Bickers (1992) find a significant and negative relationship between partisan support and dispute involvement (as support among members of the President's party declines, the probability of a military dispute increases). Somewhat inconsistent with these results, Meernik and Waterman (1996) find the level of partisan support in Congress is negatively related to the use of force by US Presidents, but statistically insignificant.

industrialized democracies), limiting the development of and transferability of these analyses and explanations to an even smaller number of cases. Finally, the data are richest and—likely by no coincidence—coverage in the literature is greatest for a unique case in the international system: the US. Political indicators of these types are likely of limited use for researchers seeking to explain differences across and among democratic and nondemocratic regime types.

While much of the recent research on diversion has elected to use economic indicators or measures of a leader's political support rather than overt measures of unrest, such measures are still used. There may be a trend to shift back toward these indicators as well. Banks' Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (DataBanks 2010) provides measures of assassinations, general strikes, guerilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations by country-year. Pickering and Kisangani (2010) use this dataset for their measure of domestic discontent, and further these measures are drawn from a dataset that traces its roots to the one used in Wilkenfeld (1968). Another example of recent scholarship employing the "Banks" measures of domestic conflict is Enterline and Gleditsch (2000).

Political unrest is measured by looking at the number of various public displays of dissatisfaction found in a country in a given year, as measured in the Banks dataset (DataBanks 2010). The measure is coded as the sum of all riots, general strikes, and anti-government protests occurring in country code1 (state 1) in a given directed-dyad-year. Guerilla warfare, government crises, assassinations, and revolutions are excluded from the domestic unrest indicator. The theoretical justification for exclusion of guerilla warfare, government crises, assassinations, and revolutions is that once political unrest has reached these levels, governments necessarily use force inwardly to stave off imminent internal threats to regime survival and

respond directly to violence from groups, rather than having the opportunity to divert attention externally. Diversion should still occur with lower levels of political unrest where leaders may be in danger but regime survival is less threatened. These types of events are qualitatively different as they all involve direct and present threats to regime survival and/or violence. Purges[8] are likely to be a measure indicating a leader has decided on repression over—or in conjunction with—policy concessions and diversion as a response to unrest. Purges therefore are outcomes related to unrest rather than indicators of unrest.

Regime Type

The data for regime type are self-compiled using the nondemocratic regime typology of Geddes' (2003), with the addition of democracy to the list. Geddes' dataset on non-democratic regimes is not the only non-democratic regime typology available but is the most widely-used in the wider recent political science literature. *Regime type* is therefore divided into four categories: Democracy, Personalist, Single-party, and Military. Geddes' classification of non-democratic regimes is followed for state-years where her data are available. State-years that are omitted from Geddes' classification are coded based on my understanding of her definitions of each non-democratic regime type and familiarity with her previous coding decisions. Regimes are defined as the domestic political institutional arrangement present in a state. Regimes can be categorized based on key differences in central political decision-making institutions and the relationship between them.

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[8] Pickering and Kisangani (2010), however, do include the purge measure from the Databanks dataset. The researchers include purges as an indicator of elite unrest along with government crises. This is one of several issues highlighted throughout the dissertation that I have with their 2010 article.

A military regime is defined as a regime "governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism by which high-level officers could influence policy choice and appointments" (Geddes 2003, 72). In military regimes, the key institution of political decision-making is the military-as-institution, particularly the military leadership. Policy and leader selection decisions are made within the members of the ruling junta or in the inner circle of military elites supporting a military leader. The regime in Brazil from 1964-1988 is an example of a purely military regime from our dataset. The military regime is replaced when the leadership of Brazil was no longer decided upon by the military but is instead popularly elected with the election of Collor de Mello in 1989.

Single party regimes are those in which a "one party dominates access to political office and control over policy, though other parties may exist and compete as minor players in elections" (Geddes 2003, 51). The defining characteristic of single-party regimes is the presence of a single party institution that dominates all aspects of leader-selection and policy decision-making in a state. Many single-party regimes also possess constitutions and elections. However, in single-party regimes, the ability to compete in elections is determined by the party in control. Elections are typically between members of a sole party and/or designed to select individuals to populate a legislative body that has little effective control in decision-making. The key decisions are made by the party elites and within the party apparatus. An example of a single-party regime is Côte d'Ivoire from 1960-1999. Though nominal multiparty elections began in 1990, the PDCI dominated elections until a coup in 1999.

Personalist regimes are those where an individual leader has "consolidated control over policy and recruitment in his own hands" (Geddes 2003, 72). Further, "access to office and the

fruits of office depend much more on the discretion of an individual leader" (Geddes 2003, 51). In personalist regimes, the key institution of political decision-making is the individual leader. All policy decision-making powers are concentrated in the hands of a personalist leader. Geddes notes that in some cases, personalist leaders are backed by a party or the military. The difference between these personalist regimes and other autocratic regimes is "neither the military nor the party exercises independent decision-making power insulated from the whims of the ruler" (Geddes 2003, 51). Leader succession is decided entirely by a personalist leader, and the personalist leader controls access to the other institutions of a personalist regime underpinning his rule. However, as a leader is the key institution of personalist regimes, these regimes are considered replaced upon the exit of the leader.[9] Franco's leadership of Spain from 1936 to his death in 1975 is an example of a personalist regime. This regime ends upon his death, and is replaced officially when a new democratic constitution is ratified in 1978 after a caretaker government is formed under Juan Carlos I to transition the state to a democratic regime.

There is no widely-accepted conceptual definition of democracy in either the international politics or comparative politics literature. Defining and coding democracies is one of the most hotly-contested areas of research in the comparative politics literature. Much of this debate centers not on whether a state possesses democratic institutions but over how well these institutions function, or how "democratic" a regime is in practice. As the definition of democracy is unsettled, declaring one state as more "democratic" than another is even more contentious. In many cases, decisions of how "democratic a regime is" are made on the basis of

[9] For example, North Korea's personalist Kim Jong Il regime is replaced by the Kim Jong-Un personalist regime upon Kim Jong Il's death in December of 2011.

perceived leader behavior; however, for other definitions, these decisions are made with a reference to how closely societal behavior matches the researcher's own beliefs of how civil society in his own ideal democracy is supposed to function.

Given these controversies, and a definition of regimes that emphasizes institutional characteristics, I adopt a minimalist definition of democracy. For a regime to be coded as a democracy, a regime must be governed by a written constitution or collection of documents comprising a constitutional tradition that define the institutions of leader selection and policy-making and the relationship among them. Second, the choice of leadership in a regime must occur through elections in which most adult citizens are eligible to vote in free, inclusive, competitive elections in which more than one party competing has the *possibility* of holding power in government either as a majority or as a member of a coalition.

The defining characteristic of democratic regimes is therefore the presence of free and competitive electoral institutions structuring the process of leader selection. Democratic regimes have their institutions and institutional rules enshrined in constitutions or constitutional traditions. These rules indicate the selection of leaders responsible for policy-making is done in largely free and fair, contested elections where a near-universal segment of the population is legally allowed to vote. The key institutions of political decision-making are populated by popularly elected leaders who face credible opposition in their elections. Populating other regime institutions occurs through direct election of individuals to these institutions or appointment of individuals to these institutions by popularly-elected officials. This is a minimal definition often referred to as an electoral definition of democracy. The most prominent example of democracy is the regime in place in the US since 1789.

In the directed-dyad set, regime type is coded as "1" for appropriate regime type categories based on the regime type present in ccode1 (state 1) of a dyad in a given year. Following Geddes (1999; 2003), nondemocratic regimes possessing institutions common for more than one type of regime are coded as such (i.e. personalist/military). Given the theoretical argument presented, which centers on the constraints and opportunities on leaders presented with a set of institutions comprising a regime, coding hybrid regimes in such a manner makes some sense theoretically but may be problematic. In short, a personalist regime with characteristics of one or more other regime types may gain the opportunities associated with that regime type, but may face fewer constraints than a "pure" form of that regime type described conceptually above. For example, leaders of personalist/single-party regimes may gain the opportunity to pursue policy concessions. Making judgments on which sorts of institutions trump others is difficult as evidence of whether a leader or a party (for example) holds power may only become clear after a struggle between the two institutions, and in fact may represent a change in the central institutions and the regime. Further, the relationship between institutions may fluctuate over time. For example, under Stalin, is the USSR single-party, personalist, or a combination of both? Unlike most Soviet leaders, Stalin dominated the Politburo rather than the Politburo dominating the leader (Weeks 2012). With these concerns in mind, regimes which are "hybrid" types in that they contain characteristics of more than one regime type are excluded from the analyses in Chapters Five and Six.[10]

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[10] As discussed in Chapter Two, Lai and Slater eliminate the personalist category. However, this masks important differences between single-party and single-party/personalist regimes as the relationship between the leader and the party is different. In true single-party regimes, a leader must also satisfy the party before a policy is presented. In single-party personalist regimes, a

Rivalry

In Chapters Two and Three, the strategic conflict avoidance argument is introduced. States that possess leaders who seek to divert (and have few domestic constraints from doing so) may be constrained by the international environment. Domestic unrest provides leaders with a potential need to respond with diversion, however, these same events are a signal to other states that a leader may be searching for an opportunity to use force internationally. States that perceive a leader may have diversionary intentions make themselves scarce internationally, thereby reducing the opportunities a leader has to divert. This international constraint on diversion may explain why researchers have not consistently found evidence of diversion in the extant literature.

Under some conditions, strategic avoidance may be difficult. If the historical relationship between a pair of states is contentious, then a leader with diversionary preferences may have a greater opportunity to engage this state in a dispute. Additionally, a conflict-prone past relationship with another state may be an issue that is highly salient domestically, and on which a leader could hope to gain to a greater degree domestically if engaging in aggressive policy. Two possible groups of cases may fit these descriptions: states that have an unresolved territorial dispute or states that are "rivals".

The analysis in Chapter Six includes a variable identifying dyads characterized by strategic rivalry. Rivals are identified using the Rasler and Thompson (1998) measure, with

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leader is not constrained in any effective and consistent manner by the party. Weeks (2012), also discussed in Chapter Two, is an important improvement in the classification of non-democratic regimes. While I do have strong preferences for this framework, data availability limitations at the current time, combined with the widespread use of Geddes's typology led to the decision to use the Geddes framework.

dyads coded "1" if the states are strategic rivals in a given year. As Rasler and Thompson (2000) note, rivalry measures that focus on dispute density[11] in a dyadic relationship as the identifying characteristic of rivalry may be selecting cases on the dependent variable when the outcome of choice is conflict. The authors also argue dyadic dispute density measures of rivalry may overlook strategic rivalries that are not particularly conflict-prone, yet are contentious relationships. The Rasler and Thompson measure includes a larger number of dyadic pairs as rivals compared with other measures of rivalry, and relies on diplomatic histories to assess whether decision-makers in these pairs of states identified one another "as distinctive competitors posing some actual or potential military threat" (Rasler and Thompson 2000, 513). These cases represent opportunity-rich environments for potential diverters. Mitchell and Prins (2004) find that diversion may be more likely by non-democratic states that have an enduring rivalry with another state. Chapter Six follows this finding employing an alternative, and more inclusive measure of strategic interstate rivalry. Further, the results in Chapter Six may provide a test of Mitchell and Prins's (2004) conclusion that democratic transparency allows for greater strategic conflict avoidance by potential targets of democracies compared with potential targets of non-democracies, even in rival contexts. An interesting finding of variation among non-democracies experiencing unrest in their dispute initiation patterns in rival contexts may indicate that democratic transparency alone does not explain why some nondemocratic leaders are able *and willing* to divert.

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[11] The Diehl and Goertz (2000) "enduring rivals" dataset, which is commonly used in the rivalry literature, is an example of such a measure.

Interaction Effects

The effect of domestic unrest on leader selection of a response option is argued in this dissertation to be conditioned by regime type and rivalry. Therefore, interaction terms for domestic unrest and each category of regime type are also included in the analysis as right-side variables in Chapters Five and Six. In Chapter Six, a triple interaction term of regime type, unrest, and rivalry is employed. To interpret the effect of unrest on diversion for each regime type, the marginal effect (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006) of unrest for each regime type (and for rival and non-rival contexts respectively in Chapter Six) is also included in the summarized results in Chapters Five and Six.

Controls[12]

As discussed above, the directed-dyad analysis allows for the use of a more robust set of controls in models of international conflict behavior. The controls employed in the analyses presented in the next chapters include the common controls found in conflict literature. For the results estimated using the universe of post-World War II cases, a relative capabilities measure is included as well as a control for distance and territorial contiguity. For the analyses estimated for politically-relevant dyads, relative capabilities and distance measures alone are included as contiguity is part of the identification of politically-relevant dyads (discussed below).

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[12] Presence of a Defense Pact between dyadic partners as a measure of alliance ties is also included in some analyses not presented in Chapters Five and Six. States that have a Defense Pact are not expected to fight one another Bremer 1992). The alliance measure is rarely significant. Additionally, removing the alliance control does not substantively alter the estimated coefficients of the key independent variables in direction or significance; therefore, this control is dropped from the analyses presented in Chapters Five and Six.

Capabilities are widely-demonstrated to influence dispute involvement (Ex. Blainey 1973, Gilpin 1981). Capabilities are measured in the directed-dyad analysis to account for power parity. This measure is generated by taking the natural log of the ratio of the most powerful state's Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score to the less powerful state's CINC score for each directed dyad-year.[13] CINC scores (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972) are generated in EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000).

Distance and contiguity are rough measures controlling for opportunity of a dyad to experience a militarized dispute, and increase the likelihood of interstate friction (Bremer 1992). *Distance* is measured as the natural log of capitol-to-capitol distance in miles between ccode1 and ccode2. This measure is generated in EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000) as well. *Contiguity* is coded as "1" if states share a land border or are separated by less than 25 miles of open water and is generated in EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000).

Estimation and Scope

A concern in most analyses utilizing time-series cross-sectional data with a dichotomous dependent variable is serial correlation, primarily first-order auto-correlation. This violates the independence of observations assumption underpinning logit and probit estimation models (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). In the analyses in Chapters Five and Six, there is a concern that a dispute initiation in in one year will influence the likelihood of dispute initiation in subsequent

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[13] In Stata 10 (StataCorp 2007), this is done by creating variables capmax and capmin that capture the high and low capabilities scores in a directed-dyad-year. Then a variable capratio is created by dividing capmax over capmin. Finally ln(capratio) is generated as the natural log of this capabilities ratio for each directed-dyad-year. Capratio ranged from 1 to 167359. As the dependent variable is dichotomous, this led to extremely small coefficients. The logged measure ranges from 1 to 12.

years. On the one hand, an initiation in one year may make initiation the following year less likely as states are wary of incurring the costs of a dispute in consecutive years. On the other hand, a dispute initiation in one year may indicate a troubled relationship between states, which increases the likelihood of dispute initiations in subsequent years. In either case, the independence of observations assumptions is violated. Following Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), all models include a variable for previous initiations by country code 1 against country code 2 in a unique dyad and cubic splines.[14] Including a cubic spline also allows for the use of a straightforward logit model rather than a cross-sectional, time-series estimator such as xtlogit in Stata 10 (StataCorp 2007). All analyses in Chapters Five and Six include the initiation year measure and cubic splines in a logit model with robust standard errors.

The initial results presented in Chapter Five are generated using a dataset encompassing all directed-dyadic pairs in the international system from 1946-2000.[15] This comprises the universe of cases in the post-World War II international system. Secondary analyses in Chapter Five include only politically-relevant dyads in the international system from 1946-2000. International conflict is an extremely relatively rare event. In a dataset including all potential dyads, there are many dyadic pairs where the possibility of militarized disputes is effectively

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[14] Peace-year cubic splines are more commonly seen in conflict literature. However, the argument of Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) is that a "failure" i.e., dependent variable equals 1 in one year, influences the likelihood of a "failure" in subsequent years within a cross-section. The use of splines is a mathematical method to account for serial autocorrelation, and use of peace years rather than initiation years does not follow the logic underlying the use of splines as a corrective measure in the current analysis. This suggests use of previous initiation and cubic splines rather than peace-year splines as appropriate.

[15] 2000 is chosen as a cutoff due to data availability. The COW MID Dataset includes measures of key variables on observations through the year 2001. The DataBanks Dataset ends at 2003. The regime typology dataset is coded until 2000.

zero due to geographical proximity and power limitations.[16] The inclusion of so many cases where the effective probability of dispute initiation is zero by nature is likely to introduce bias into the estimated results. By attempting to restrict the analysis to cases where dispute initiation is "possible" (Weede 1976), this bias may be overcome. Lemke and Reed (2001) highlight the potential selection bias issues that arise when employing politically-relevant dyads in a design. However, they conclude this bias does not lead to issues for estimated results.

Politically-relevant dyads are identifiable in the dataset along two factors demonstrated by Bremer (1992) to be highly influential on the probability of interstate conflict: geographic proximity and great power status. Politically-relevant dyads have been increasingly used in case selection for analyses of interstate conflict (Lemke and Reed 2001). States sharing land borders or separated geographically by small distances of water have an opportunity to engage in military interstate interactions with one another. Additionally, dyads where one or both states are a major power have a greater opportunity to experience militarized disputes. Major powers are able to project their material power across the globe to all regions. Additionally, this projection of power presents all states the opportunity to initiate disputes with a major power that is active within or holding assets in all geographic regions. Politically-relevant dyads are defined in the secondary analyses in Chapters Five and Six as those containing at least one major power and/or share a land border or are separated by fewer than 25 miles of water (following the contiguity measure in the initial analyses). In Chapter Six, data availability on the rivalry measure restricts the time period covered for both the full and politically-relevant-dyads dataset to 1946-1992.

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[16] For example, Tuvalu is unlikely to experience a conflict with Estonia as neither state has a sufficient level of capabilities to project physical power globally, nor are they geographically close to one another.

Conclusion

Previous research suggests that several units of analysis may be used for the testing of the hypothesized relationship between domestic unrest, regime type, and dispute initiation presented in Chapter Three. The theoretical argument in Chapter Three also indicates on the surface that a leader-year analysis may be appropriate as the argument is centered on a leader's decision making. However, the factors that influence this decision-making are state-level and international-level attributes: domestic unrest incidents, regime type, and interstate rivalry. Finally, the outcome of interest is one that occurs at the international level. Previous literature on international conflict strongly suggests dyadic approaches are appropriate as these approaches allow for the inclusion of a set of controls whose empirical connection to conflict is found to be robust in the extant quantitative literature. Given that the dependent variable of interest is dispute initiation rather than dispute involvement, the unit of analysis selected is the directed-dyad-year.

The analyses in Chapters Five and Six employ an operational measure of unrest that encompasses a variety of non-violent domestic dissatisfaction behaviors occurring in a state in a given year. Regime type is measured along a criterion that emphasizes institutional variation—the defining characteristic of regime type variation and the core regime characteristic related to the structural constraints on leader response to unrest discussed in Chapter Three. The controls included reflect the measures widely-accepted as prudent in quantitative analyses of international conflict. To improve upon the controls for opportunity, the initial dataset in Chapter Five that estimates the likelihood of dispute initiation across the universe of directed-dyads in the post-1945 international system with controls for capabilities, distance, and contiguity is replaced in

the secondary analyses by a model that includes politically-relevant dyads only and controls for capabilities. The analysis in Chapter Five only provides an adequate test for Hypothesis 1. Hypotheses 2-5 argue the effect of domestic unrest on dispute initiation is conditioned not only by regime type but also by the relationships between states. In Hypotheses 2-5, the relationship between states treated as particularly opportunity-rich where diversionary behavior is most likely to be observed is one of strategic interstate rivalry. The analysis in Chapter Six accounts for this dyadic context by using the more inclusive strategic rivalry measure of Rasler and Thompson (1998) as a right-side variable conditioning the effect of unrest on dispute initiation.

CHAPTER FIVE
DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS AND DIVERSION

Introduction

Chapters Two and Three emphasize the utility of several additional theoretical and methodological considerations in the study of diversion: disaggregating non-democracies, focusing on domestic constraints on options other than diversion in dealing with unrest (which vary by regime type), and international constraints on diversion. This chapter focuses on the domestic constraints, and tests Hypothesis 1 from Chapter Three. The institutional arrangement defining a regime's type is argued to present a series of domestic structural constraints limiting the ability of leaders to select options other than diversion. The less likely one or more of these options is pursued by a leader facing unrest, the more likely he can be expected to exhibit diversionary behavior. Political parties are the primary facilitator of policy concessions. Constitutional barriers often prevent repression among democracies. Leader replacement mechanisms are related to the costs of losing office; and the development and presence of these mechanisms varies by regime type as do the costs of losing office. Combined, these arguments suggest that diversion is most likely for personalist leaders, followed by military, single-party, and democratic leaders respectively as stated in Hypothesis 1.

The results in this chapter are not supportive of Hypothesis 1 in Chapter Three. The expected rank-order of regimes in terms of the impact domestic unrest has on the likelihood of dispute initiation does not mirror the generated results, though it is closer to theoretical expectations in the politically-relevant dyads analysis. Additionally, the marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation is only statistically significant for military regimes and democracies

in the analysis employing the full dataset, and personalist and democratic regimes in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis. Despite this, there are some interesting findings that may be useful for future research, and these possibilities are discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight. The results in this chapter indicate that selection of all dyadic cases versus politically-relevant-dyadic cases has implications for empirical findings. Additionally, the relationship between unrest and initiation by democracies may deserve more attention. Finally, there is some evidence that variation in the likelihood of dispute initiation under similar conditions of unrest exist among non-democratic regimes and disaggregating the non-democratic category remains a useful advisement for conflict scholars.

Re-introducing Hypothesis 1

In Chapter Three, domestic political institutions, which define regime type, are argued to pose unique constraints on leaders of various regime types for options other than diversion when domestic unrest is rising in a leader's state. The likelihood of diversionary responses to unrest is therefore seen as a function of the availability of options other than diversion due to the domestic institutional arrangement. The institutional features that are considered theoretically useful are political parties, firm constitutional barriers to repression, and leader replacement mechanisms. The lack of parties constrains military and personalist leaders from pursuing policy concessions. Constitutional barriers frequently bar repression as an option for democratic leaders. Leader replacement mechanisms and their degree of development are argued to be inversely related to the likely costs of losing office, conceptually explored as post-tenure fate. The highest costs in order are for personalist leaders, followed by military leaders, single-party leaders, and democratic leaders. As these costs increase, the barrier to resignation becomes more formidable.

Derived from this argument is the first hypothesis, which only considers domestic constraints faced by leaders as factors related to divergent patterns of diversionary behavior.

Hypothesis 1: The effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation will be largest for personalist regimes, followed by military regimes, democratic regimes, and single-party regimes.

Empirical Results I: All-Dyads Analysis

This hypothesis is tested first in an analysis of all directed dyads from 1946-2000. Diversion is measured as dispute initiation where state 1 is on side A and an originator of a new militarized interstate dispute against state 2 in a given directed dyad-year. Four initial logit models are estimated in this analysis, and are presented in Table 5a. Model 1 is a base model where only unrest is included as a key independent variable. The estimated coefficient for domestic unrest is positive and significant, as is expected. Model 2 includes unrest and personalist, military, and democratic regime types. Single-party regime type is excluded as the base category. Unrest is positive and significant once again. Personalist is positive and significant, indicating a statistically significant difference between personalist and single party regimes. The coefficient for military regime is positive, yet insignificant. The coefficient for democracy is negative and significant, indicating democracies are less likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes.

Model 3 includes unrest, regime type, and interactions for all types except single-party. The coefficients for personalist, military, and democratic regime type are similar in terms of significance and direction to the estimates in Model 2. As single-party regime is excluded as the base category, the estimated coefficient for unrest in Model 3 is the effect of unrest on single-party regimes and is not significant. The coefficient for the unrest interaction with personalist is

positive and insignificant, which may indicate there is no statistical difference in the effect of unrest on personalist and single-party regimes. The coefficients for unrest with democracy and unrest with military are both positive and significant, suggesting the effect of unrest is greater on these regime types than for single-party regimes, and this effect may be significant. Model 4 is similar to Model 3, with personalist replacing single-party as the base regime type. This model is useful to compare with Model 3 to ensure proper specification for generating results later in this section. A comparison of Model 3 and Model 4 shows that the coefficients for personalist and its interaction with unrest in Model 3 and single-party and its interaction with unrest in Model 4 are similar in terms of reported estimate and significance, with the exception of a reversal in sign (positive to negative).

The proper way to assess the effect of an independent variable when the hypothesized relationship is conditional—and therefore employs interaction effects with other independent variables—is to estimate the conditional marginal effect of this variable and its standard error (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). The conditional marginal effect of unrest for each regime type is presented in Table 5b.[1] The effect of unrest on dispute initiation is expected in

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[1] The basic function is:
Y (Probability of Dispute Initiation) = $\beta_0+\beta_1 RT+\beta_2 DU+\beta_3 RT\text{x}DU+\beta_4 CTL+\varepsilon_i$

Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder, the calculation of the marginal effect of unrest is:
$ME_{unrest}= \beta_{2+} \beta_{3*}RT$
As RT is either zero or one, the ME of unrest is either β_2 (for regime not of a certain type) or β_{2+} β_3 (for a regime of that type).

The SE of the ME is calculated as the square root of the variance, following the equation
$Var_{unrest}= var(\beta_2) + RT^2*var(\beta_3) + 2*RT*cov(\beta_2\ \beta_3)$
Again, this is reduced to $var(\beta_2) + var(\beta_3) + 2*\ cov(\beta_2\ \beta_3)$ as RT is dichotomous.

Hypothesis 1 to be greatest for personalist regimes, followed by military, democratic, and single-party regimes. The order in Table 5b does not mirror expectations, and is: military, democracy, personalist, single-party. Additionally, the marginal effect of unrest is only significant for military and democratic regimes. Comparing the estimated marginal effects of unrest in Table 5b to the estimated results in Table 5a, we see that the marginal effect of unrest for single-party regimes and its standard error reported in Table 5b are equivalent for the estimated coefficient for domestic unrest in Model 3 of Table 5a (where single-party is the base regime category). This comparison holds also for the marginal effect of unrest for personalist regimes in Table 5b, and the estimated coefficient for unrest in Model 4 of Table 5a (where personalist is the base category).

A more effective manner to evaluate the varying degree of the effect of unrest across regime types is offered in Table 5c, which shows the substantive effect of unrest on dispute initiation as unrest incidents increase for each regime type.[2] Reflecting Table 5b, the effect of unrest is strongest for military regimes, where the likelihood of dispute initiation increases by 267% when 15 domestic unrest incidents occurred from for when no unrest is present and increases by 827% when unrest incidents jump from zero to 25. There is also a large positive effect of unrest on dispute initiation as unrest increases for democratic regimes. The effect of unrest on dispute initiation is much lower for personalist regimes and single-party regimes

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The t-score presented is simply a division of the ME by the SE

[2] These results are generated using the CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) for ranges of unrest from 0-25 and regime type set 1. As regime type is set at 1, the interaction of unrest with each respective regime type also varies from 0-25. All controls are set at their mean value. The cutoff of 25 incidents is included in all analyses as this range of unrest encompasses more than 99.9% of all dyadic observations.

respectively, where increasing the number of domestic unrest incidents from zero to 25 increases the likelihood of dispute initiation by 72% for personalist regimes and 42% for single-party regimes. These initial results seem to indicate that unrest has a similar effect on the likelihood of dispute initiation for democracies and military regimes, whereas the effect on personalist and single-party regimes is negligible.

Figures 5a-5d show the estimated probability of dispute initiation as unrest increases for each regime type.[3] CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) is used to generate the expected probability of dispute initiation and the 95% confidence interval of this estimated probability for each regime type at values of unrest from zero to 25. Comparing Figures 5a-5d, the probability of dispute initiation increases as unrest increases for each regime type. This result is consistent with the marginal effect of unrest for each regime type presented in Table 5b. The confidence intervals are shortest for democratic regimes (Fig. 5c), which is also consistent with the results in Table 5b, where the marginal effect of unrest is highly significant for democratic regimes.

Figure 5e allows for an initial comparison of the effect of unrest on dispute initiation across regime types. Mirroring the estimated marginal effects in Table 5b, the slope of the line for military regimes is steepest, followed by the slope of the line for democratic regimes. The increase in the probability of initiation as unrest increases is slight for personalist and single-party regimes. Figures 5f-5h compare the probability of dispute initiation for each regime type at values of unrest zero, five, and fifteen respectively. In Fig. 5f, the confidence intervals for the estimated probability of dispute initiation by personalist, military, and democratic regimes do not

[3] All figures are in Appendix B.

overlap. The likelihood of initiation for single-party regimes is lower than the likelihood of initiation for personalist regimes, and higher than for democratic regimes. The confidence intervals for military regimes and single-party regimes do overlap. These results are consistent with the results presented in Model 2 of Table 5a, which shows a significant difference between single party regimes and democratic regimes and personalist regimes respectively, and no significant difference between single-party and military regimes.

Fig. 5g shows the estimates and confidence intervals for the likelihood of dispute initiation for all regime types when there are five domestic unrest incidents. Military regimes are now almost as likely to initiate disputes as personalist regimes, though the confidence intervals overlap. The only cases where confidence intervals do not overlap is for democracies when compared to personalist and military regimes and single-party regimes when compared to personalist regimes. At five unrest incidents, democracies are significantly less likely to initiate disputes than personalist and military regimes. They are also less likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes; however, this difference is not significant.

In Fig. 5h, the likelihood of dispute initiation is compared across regime type when unrest equals fifteen incidents. Military regimes are now most likely to initiate disputes, followed by personalist regimes, democratic regimes, and single-party regimes. However, the only significant difference among regime types is for the likelihood of dispute initiation by military regimes and democratic and single-party regimes.

The results of this initial analysis show that the effect of unrest initiation is highest for military regimes, followed by democratic regimes, personalist regimes, and single-party regimes. However, the effect of unrest is only significant for military and democratic regimes. Looking at

the substantive effect of increases in unrest on dispute initiation, initially at zero unrest incidents, the likelihood of dispute initiation is significantly different for personalist, democratic, and single-party regimes. At five unrest incidents, personalist regimes are significantly more likely to initiate disputes than democratic and single-party regimes. Additionally, military regimes are significantly more likely to initiate disputes than democratic regimes. When unrest incidents increase to fifteen, the only significant difference is for a higher likelihood of initiation by military regime than for democratic and single-party regimes. While these results are not supportive of Hypothesis 1, they are interesting. Whether looking at the effect of unrest or the likelihood of dispute initiation across the selected values, differences across regime type to emerge. Most importantly for future researchers, differences exist between both democracies and specific types of non-democracies *and* among non-democratic regime types.

Empirical Analysis II: Politically-Relevant-Dyads Analysis

As discussed in Chapter Four, there is concern among many conflict scholars that including all possible dyadic combinations results in a dataset that contains observations where the effective chances of a dispute are zero, leading to biased results that mask the effect of selected measures on conflict as a dependent variable. One way to overcome this issue, which is both a design problem and a conflict opportunity concern, is to select only "politically-relevant" dyads for analysis. These dyads are distinct in that they possess characteristics that make conflict "possible" though not necessarily likely. Others have argued that selecting politically-relevant dyads amounts to case selection bias. However, as noted in Chapter Four, Lemke and Reed (2001) find that while such a bias may be present, it does not damage the validity of results gained in politically-relevant-dyad analyses. In this analysis, politically-relevant dyads are those

containing at least one major power or are contiguous in terms of a land border or a separation of less than 25 miles of open water.

Table 5d includes four models estimated for the politically-relevant dyads analysis and is comparable to Table 5a. Model 1 includes only unrest and control variables. Model 2 includes unrest and regime type measures for all regimes except single-party, which is the base category. The coefficients for all regime types are all significant. The positive coefficients for personalist and military indicate these regimes are more likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes when accounting for the level of unrest (essentially a control variable in this model specification). The negative coefficient for democracy indicates that democracies are less likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes. Model 3 includes unrest, regime type, and interactions (excluding the base category, single-party). Unrest is insignificant, but unlike in Model 3 in Table 5a, is negative. This indicates unrest has a negative impact on the likelihood a single-party regime will initiate a dispute. Also unlike Model 3 in Table 5a, the coefficient on the unrest/personalist interaction is now significant, but remains positive; suggesting the difference between the effect of unrest on initiation for personalist regimes and for single-party regimes is significant. Differing from Table 5a, the coefficient for the unrest/military and unrest/democracy terms are now insignificant indicating the effect of unrest on initiation for single-party regimes is not different from the effect of unrest on military or democratic regimes. Model 4 replaces the base category, shifting from single-party to personalist. As in Model 3, there is a significant difference in the effect of unrest on initiation for personalist and single-party regimes. The results also suggest there is no significant difference between the effect of unrest on personalist regime dispute initiation and on democratic and military dispute initiation.

Again, the proper manner of interpreting the effect of an independent variable conditioned by another independent variable is to estimate the conditional marginal effect of this variable. The conditional marginal effect of unrest is presented in Table 5e. The results presented in Table 5e differ significantly from those in Table 5b. The effect of unrest on initiation by personalist regimes is now significant, and is now insignificant for military regimes. Another major difference is that the effect of unrest on single-party regime dispute initiation is negative in Table 5e, where it was positive in Table 5b. The rank-ordering of regimes also changes in the politically-relevant dyads analysis. The order of regimes from most positive to most negative effect of unrest on dispute initiation is: military, personalist, democracy, single-party. In the analysis of the full dataset, the order is: military, democracy, personalist, single-party. While the order in Table 5e does not match the expectations of Hypothesis 1 (personalist, military, democracy, single-party), it is closer in the politically-relevant dyads analysis than in the full-dataset analysis.

Table 5f illustrates the substantive effect of unrest on dispute initiation for all four regime types. The divergences from the all-dyads-analysis are again apparent. Unrest does not have anywhere near the effect on dispute initiation for democracies (at 25 incidents is +65% in politically-relevant-dyads analysis and +255% in all-dyads-analysis). The effect on personalist regimes at 25 incidents in the full-dataset analysis was +73% but is +353% in the politically-relevant dyads analysis. For military regimes, the effect at 25 incidents for military regime in the politically-relevant dyads analysis is +426%, dropping from +827% in the full-dataset analysis. What is most striking is the strong negative substantive effect of rising unrest on dispute initiation for single-party regimes, which are 13% less likely to initiate disputes at the high end

of reported unrest in Table 5f. The substantive effect of rising unrest on the probability of dispute initiation compared across regime types mirrors the reported estimates in Table 5f, and again illustrates a rank-ordering of regimes, which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1, but closer to theoretical expectations than the results in the full-dataset analysis.

Figures 5i-5l illustrate the effect unrest has on the likelihood of dispute initiation for each regime type, again reported with 95% confidence intervals. The estimated likelihood of dispute initiation for each regime type across the range of unrest, and the confidence intervals are again generated using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). As in the full-dataset analysis, the confidence intervals of the estimated likelihood of unrest are fairly large for all regime types except democracies. While the likelihood of dispute initiation increases as unrest increases for personalist, military, and democratic regimes rises, the likelihood of initiation as unrest increases for single-party regimes declines. This is consistent with the marginal effects reported in Table 5e.

Figure 5m presents the probability of initiation across zero to 25 domestic unrest incidents for each regime type, without confidence intervals. Again, this is not a direct test of Hypothesis 1, which argued the effect of unrest on the probability of initiation rather than the probability of initiation should follow a pattern of personalist, military, democracy, single-party. Despite this caveat, the results in Figure 5m are interesting. Personalist and military regimes follow a similar pattern in that the likelihood of dispute initiation rises quickly as unrest increases. In the full-dataset analysis (Fig 5e, the slope for military regime is similar to that in Fig. 5m, but the slope for personalist regimes is slight in Fig. 5e). The likelihood of initiation as unrest increases are similar for democratic and single-party regimes in that the effect of unrest is

relatively small when compared to the other two regime type. The difference, again, is that the likelihood of initiation rises for democratic regimes and declines for single-party regimes as unrest increases. After 11 incidents, the likelihood of dispute initiation for single-party regimes is lower than that for democratic regimes. This is particularly interesting as Model 2 in Table 5d showed that democratic regimes were significantly less likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes (when the effect of unrest was not conditioned by regime type by employing an interaction term.

Figures 5n-5p again show the estimated likelihood of dispute initiation with confidence intervals (using CLARIFY) for each regime type when unrest equals zero, five, and fifteen incidents respectively. As suggested by the results in Model 3 in Table 5d, the difference in the likelihood of dispute initiation for single-party regimes and for military and personalist regimes is not significant when unrest is at zero as the confidence intervals for these regime types overlap in Fig. 5n. There is, however, a significant difference in the likelihood of initiation at this level of unrest between democracies and all non-democratic regime types.

Fig. 5o indicates the importance of the interaction between the effects of unrest and regime type as they influence the likelihood of dispute initiation. This figure shows the confidence intervals surrounding the estimated likelihood of initiation for each regime type when unrest equals five. There is no significant difference between the likelihood of initiation between single-party regimes and democratic regimes, or between personalist regimes and military regimes. However, the likelihoods of dispute initiation for military and personalist regimes are significantly different from both the likelihood of initiation by democracies and by single-party

regimes as the confidence intervals for both personalist and military regimes do not overlap with those for single-party and democratic regimes.

Fig. 5p shows the likelihood of dispute initiation for each regime type at fifteen incidents. The likelihood of dispute initiation for democracies remains significantly different than the likelihoods for personalist and military regimes. Again, the likelihood of democratic initiation is not significantly different from the likelihood of single-party initiation. For single-party regimes, the confidence interval for the likelihood of initiation in Fig 5p now overlaps that for personalist regime, indicating insignificant differences between these regime types. However, the likelihood of initiation for single-party regimes remains significantly different from that of military regimes.[4]

The results of the politically-relevant dyads analysis do not match Hypothesis 1. The rank-ordering of regimes in terms of the marginal effect of unrest on regime type is: military, personalist, democracy, single-party. However, the rank-ordering in this analysis does come closer to matching theoretical expectations than the ordering found in the full-dataset analysis. Interestingly, the effect of unrest on single-party regimes is not only found to be lowest, but also is negative. This indicates that single-party regimes are increasingly less-likely to initiate as unrest increases, and suggests that leaders of these regime types are perhaps focusing their resources on options other than diversion to respond to unrest. Future research which assesses the effect of unrest on the likelihood of repression, resignation, or policy concessions is

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[4] In Fig, 5p, the intervals appear extremely close. The upper bound for single-party is 0.003307, and the lower bound for military is 0.038499. These values indicate the confidence intervals do not overlap.

necessary to make a stronger statement; however, the negative effect of unrest on dispute initiation in the politically-relevant dyads analysis was encouraging, if not unanticipated.

Interestingly, the marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation seems similar for military and personalist regimes in the politically-relevant dyads analysis. When looking at the probability of dispute initiation as unrest increases, significant differences exist between military and personalist regimes on the one hand, and democratic and single-party regimes on the other. This grouping of regimes reflects the theoretical distinction made between leaders of regimes possessing party institutions and those which lack these institutions, and in turn, differentiates regimes on opportunities and constraints faced by leaders in the pursuit of policy concessions as a response to unrest.

The results of the politically-relevant dyads analysis mirror those in the full-dataset analysis in one important manner. When looking at the likelihood of initiation across regime types as unrest increases, and when comparing at set values of unrest, two conclusions can be drawn which bolster the theoretical and methodological decisions to utilize a refined typology of regime type. In short, there are: (1) clear differences in the impact of unrest on dispute initiation across non-democratic regime types; and (2) clear differences in the impact of unrest on dispute initiation by democracies and by specific non-democratic regime types.

Summary

The results presented in this chapter are summarized in Table 5g. These results suggest some support may be found for Hypothesis 1 in future, refined analyses. While the expected rank-ordering of regimes does not emerge in either analysis, the results from the politically-relevant-dyads analysis come closer to matching theoretical expectations.

There are some interesting findings present in the analyses however. First, democracy seems to be most problematic for these findings. The conditional marginal effect of unrest for democracies is significant in both analyses and positive. This initial finding suggests that more attention should be paid to the conditions that lead democracies to divert than is contained in Chapter Three. It is encouraging; however, that the marginal effect of unrest for personalist regimes (where the effect is theoretically argued to be strongest) is significant in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis. While the marginal effect of unrest for military regimes remains higher than the effect for personalist regimes in both analyses, they are of similar magnitude in the politically-relevant dyads analysis and the effect of military regimes does come somewhat close to achieving statistical significance (t-score of 1.817). There may be some issues theoretically or methodologically with the treatment of non-democratic regimes in Chapters Three and Four that require further exploration. This possibility is covered extensively in Chapter Seven.

A second conclusion drawn from the analyses in this chapter is that there is some evidence that non-democratic regimes vary in the manner in which they address unrest through diversionary behavior. In the full-dataset analysis, military regimes were substantively different in their conflict patterns as unrest increased while the effect of unrest has little substantive effect on personalist and single-party regimes. In the politically-relevant analysis the distinction between military and single-party regimes suggested in previous literature (Lai and Slater 2006) is apparent as unrest increases the likelihood of dispute initiation for military regimes and has a negative effect on the likelihood of dispute initiation for single-party regimes. This distinction is also borne out by the statistically significant higher likelihood of dispute initiation by military regimes compared to single-party regimes shown in Figs. 5h (all-dyads analysis, unrest equals

fifteen) 5o, and 5p (politically-relevant dyads-analysis, unrest equals five and fifteen respectively). Again, these conclusions are somewhat tempered by the lack of statistical significance for the estimated marginal effect of unrest across these regime types.

Conclusion

Overall, these findings are encouraging. Hypothesis 1 is not strongly supported by the results, though the expected rank-ordering of regimes does come close to emerging in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis. Several other findings are notable. First, unrest does appear to be related to an increase in the likelihood democracies will divert. Second, while the conditional marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation is not consistently significant for non-democratic regime models, there is a suggestion from the results that certain nondemocratic regimes respond differently to unrest than their other nondemocratic counterparts. Single-party regimes in particular stand out as dispute initiation becomes less likely as unrest increases following the results of the second analysis in this chapter. Military regimes generally seem to be more likely to initiate disputes as unrest increases.

There is the suggestion that regimes separate among one another in a manner consistent with the arguments in Chapter Three. Additionally, findings that do not strongly support Hypothesis 1 are anticipated in Chapter Three. The analyses in this chapter are not a full test of the theoretical argument. The likelihood a leader will respond to unrest with diversion is conditioned in part by domestic factors that limit the availability of policy options other than diversion. However, the argument in Chapter Three indicates the likelihood of diversion is conditioned also by international factors related to the opportunity to engage in diversionary behavior. The analyses in this chapter do not account for the *opportunity* to divert, but only

explore the *willingness* of leaders to divert. In Chapter Six, Hypotheses 2-5, which account for the strategic behavior of potential target states, are tested. These hypotheses are included with the understanding that Hypothesis 1 may not be supported as the arguments focusing on domestic institutional constraints alone may not provide a comprehensive explanation of diversion. .

CHAPTER SIX INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS, AND DIVERSION

Introduction

Chapter Five tests the first hypothesis in Chapter Three that focused solely on domestic institutional constraints as an explanatory factor for diversion. This chapter tests Hypotheses 2-5, which include considerations of both domestic and international constraints. As in Chapter Five, the results presented below indicate, at best, limited support for the theoretical arguments in Chapter Three; however, there are interesting empirical findings present in the results. Similar to results in Chapter Five, the results of the politically-relevant-dyads analysis differ significantly from those generated using the full dataset. There are a few surprising results as well, particularly concerning military regimes. Chapter Seven includes a more thorough discussion of the results in comparing and contrasting the results in this chapter and the Chapter Five.

Summarizing Hypotheses 2-5

As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the potential for strategic conflict avoidance limits the opportunities for leaders to divert even if they possess the willingness to do so. The same factors that are indicators of a willingness to divert are also signals to other states. These potential targets recognize the willingness of a potential diverter to engage in risky foreign behavior for domestic political gain, and act strategically to limit the opportunity this leader has to divert. Following the strategic conflict avoidance argument, the factors that increase the willingness of a leader to engage in aggressive foreign policy simultaneously constrain the level of opportunity for diversion. This argument explains the lack of consistent empirical support in the diversionary literature and suggests that evidence for diversion should be found in

environments that are relatively unchanging as opportunity-rich. In Chapter Three, rivalry is offered as a potential opportunity-rich environment where states are less-able to act strategically to avoid conflict with potential diverters. Given rivalry is an opportunity-rich environment, and other contexts may be opportunity-poor, the following hypotheses are offered:

Hypothesis 2: There is no effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation in non-rival dyads, regardless of regime type.

Hypothesis 3: The effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation will be largest for personalist regimes, followed by military regimes, democratic regimes, and single-party regimes in rival dyads.

The theoretical arguments and empirical analyses of Mitchell and Prins (2004) guide the decision to select rivalries as contexts where diversion is more likely to occur. Their explanation includes a secondary focus on democratic transparency as a factor that may allow potential targets to more easily identify potential diverters and therefore avoid entanglements with democratic states experiencing deteriorating domestic conditions. Their findings suggest that nondemocracies are more likely to divert in rival contexts, and little or no evidence of diversion is found among democratic regimes. Combining this expectation with the domestic constraints argument in Chapter Three yields two final hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4: There is no significant effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation for democratic regimes in rival dyads.

Hypothesis 5: The effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation by non-democratic regimes will be largest for personalist regimes, followed by military regimes, and single-party regimes in rival dyads.

Empirical Results I: All-Dyads Analysis

As in Chapter Five, and discussed in Chapter Four, all models are logit models with robust standard errors, employing initiation-year cubic splines following Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). These results for analyses using the full dataset from 1946-1992 are presented in Table 6a. Model 1 includes only domestic unrest, rivalry, and control variables. The estimates for this model indicate that unrest and rivalry both have a positive and significant impact on dispute initiation. However, the effect of rivalry on initiation appears much larger than the effect of unrest. In Model 2, unrest, rivalry, and regime type variables are included (with single-party omitted as a base category). Again, unrest and rivalry are positive and significant. The coefficient for personalist is positive, indicating these regimes are more likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes, and this difference is significant. Military regimes are also more likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes, though not to a statistically significant degree. Finally, the coefficient for democracy is negative and significant, indicating democratic regimes are less likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes. These results are comparable to the full-dataset analysis in Chapter Five (Table 5a, Model 2).

The four hypotheses offered for testing in this chapter suggest that both regime type and rival context condition the effect of unrest on diversion. This requires the use of a triple interaction term, where there are now two conditioning variables (and all constitutive terms).

These terms are included in Model 3 for Table 6a, with single-party regimes again excluded as a base category. Domestic unrest is negative and insignificant and rivalry is positive and significant, indicating the partial effect of these variables on initiation by single-party regimes. As there are multiple conditioning variables, the effect of each of these variables cannot be assessed without calculating the marginal effect of unrest in both rival and non-rival contexts. There are a few other results in Model 3 which are interesting however. The personalist and democratic regime measures are again significant. Interacting unrest alone with regime type, the coefficients are positive for all three regime types, though significant only for military and democratic regimes. Looking at rivalry interacted with regime type, the coefficients for military and personalist regimes are negative and significant, and positive and insignificant for democratic regimes. The triple interaction term for each regime type is negative for each and insignificant. Model 4 is a supplemental model which replaces the base category, switching from single-party in Model 3 (expected least effect of unrest) to personalist in Model 4 (expected highest effect of unrest). The results are used primarily for the generation of results used in tables and figures later in this chapter.

Again, the proper manner in which to assess the relationship between unrest and dispute initiation given the use of interaction terms is to calculate the conditional marginal effect of unrest and its standard error. Table 6b shows the conditional marginal effect of unrest and standard error for each model in rival and non-rival contexts.[1] My primary interest is in the effect

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[1] The basic function is:
Y (Probability of Dispute Initiation) = $\beta_0+\beta_1 DU+\beta_2 Riv+\beta_3 RT+\beta_4 DU*Riv+\beta_5 DU*RT+\beta_6 Riv*RT+\beta_7 DU*Riv*\mathrm{RT}+\beta_i CTRLS+\varepsilon_i$

of unrest on the effect of unrest on initiation in rival environments. The marginal effect of unrest is highest for military regimes, followed by personalist regimes, democracies, and single-party regimes. This is the same pattern found in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis in Chapter Five.[2] However, the marginal effect of unrest in rival environments is only significant for democratic regimes.

Looking at the marginal effect of unrest on initiation in non-rival contexts, the rank-order matches that found in the full-dataset analysis in Chapter 5: military, democracy, personalist, single-party. The effect of unrest is significant for democratic and military regimes alone. This result is unsurprising as a high proportion of dyads in the full dataset are non-rival dyads. Comparing the effect of unrest on initiation for each regime type in rival and non-rival environments leads to some interesting results. Most notably, the effect of unrest on dispute initiation is positive for personalist and single-party regimes in rival contexts, and *negative* for these regimes in non-rival contexts. While the effect is not significant for either regime type in either international context, this result suggests that leaders of personalist and single-party regimes may take advantage of existing interstate tensions when deciding how to respond to

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Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder, the calculation of the marginal effect of unrest is:
$ME_{unrest} = \beta_{1+} \beta_4 * Riv + \beta_5 * RT + \beta_7 * Riv * RT$

The SE of the ME is calculated as the square root of the variance, following the equation:
$Var_{unrest} = var(\beta_1) + Riv^2 * var(\beta_4) + RT^2 * var(\beta_5) + Riv^{2*} RT2 * var(\beta_7) + 2 * Riv * cov(\beta_1 \beta_4) + 2 * RT * cov(\beta_1 \beta_5) + 2 * Riv * RT * cov(\beta_1 \beta_7) + 2 * Riv * RT * cov(\beta_4 \beta_5) + 2 * RT * Riv^2 * cov(\beta_4 \beta_7) + 2 * Riv * RT^2 * cov(\beta_5 \beta_7)$

The t-score presented is simply a division of the ME by the SE

[2] This makes sense intuitively as states which are in close proximity are by definition "politically-relevant" and much more likely to have the opportunity to become rivals than states that are geographically distant from one another. Therefore, we should expect a large proportion of rival dyads to also be "politically-relevant".

unrest. This is consistent with the arguments underlying Hypotheses 3 and 5. Contradicting this conclusion, the effect of unrest is much larger on initiation by military and democratic regimes in non-rival contexts than for these regimes in rival contexts. Further, the effect of unrest is significant in non-rival contexts for military regimes and in both environments for democratic regimes. For military and democratic regimes, it appears that the effect of unrest is much larger on initiation not in the opportunity-rich rivalry environment, but rather the non-rival environment perceived as opportunity-poor.

As in Chapter Five, the effect of unrest is presented to offer a clearer picture of the impact unrest has on dispute initiation for each regime type. Again, these results are generated using predicted probabilities calculated in CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). Figures 6a-6d show the effect of unrest on dispute initiation by each regime type as unrest increases. For each figure, the likelihood of initiation is shown with 95% confidence intervals. Comparing Figs. 6a-6d, we see that the likelihood of initiation increases as unrest increases for each regime type. As should be expected from the results in Table 6b, where only the effect of unrest in democratic regimes is significant in rival contexts, the confidence intervals are narrowest for democratic regimes (Fig. 6c).

Figure 6e shows the probability of dispute initiation as unrest increases for each regime type in one table, to allow for a closer comparison of the effects of unrest in this context across regime type. At zero incidents, the likelihood of initiation by personalist regimes and single-party regimes against a rival are similar, with personalist regimes marginally more likely to initiate against rivals. Democratic regimes are less likely to initiate against a rival at zero incidents than either personalist or single-party regimes, though more likely to initiate than

military regimes. This order holds until 18 incidents or so, where military regimes are more likely to initiate disputes against rivals than democracies. At the far range of Fig. 5e, military regimes almost overtake single-party regimes in terms of the likelihood of initiation in a rival context. Confidence intervals are not included for aesthetic reasons. However, I have conducted a comparison of the estimated likelihood of initiation in rival contexts across regime type at zero, five, and fifteen incidents (Similar to Figs. 5n-5p). These graphs are available upon request.[3] The results show overlap between confidence intervals for all regime types at each selected value (zero, five, fifteen).

While the primary results of interest are for the effect of unrest in rival contexts, the results also allow us to look at the effect of unrest in non-rival environments. Figures 6f-6i compare the likelihood of initiation in rival versus non-rival environments for each regime type. Fig. 6f shows, as we would expect from Table 6b, that the effect of unrest on initiation is much higher in rival contexts than non-rival contexts for personalist regimes. Interestingly, the likelihood of initiation by personalist regimes in non-rival environments increases slightly over the included range of unrest. This is surprising given the effect of unrest is reported as negative in Table 6b for personalist regimes in non-rival contexts.[4] Fig. 6g is perhaps the most interesting. Showing the effect of unrest on military regime initiation, the likelihood of initiation in rival contexts is actually lower at the high end of the included range of unrest than in non-rival contexts. Fig 6h shows that while unrest increases the likelihood of initiation for democratic regimes in each environment, a large gap remains between rival and non-rival contexts. Fig. 6i

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[3] Figures are omitted due to space constraints as they are not particularly interesting or informative.
[4] This is discussed later in this section.

illustrates that the effect of unrest on the probability of initiation by single-party regimes is negative in non-rival contexts and positive in rival contexts, as expected from the results in Table 6b.

Figure 6j compares the likelihood of initiation in non-rival dyads as unrest increases across regime type. Initially, when unrest is at zero incidents, personalist regimes are most likely to initiate disputes, followed by military, single-party, and democratic regimes. After five incidents or so, the pattern established is military, personalist, democracy, single-party. As the results are interesting and relevant, the estimates of the likelihood of initiation in non-rival contexts (with confidence intervals) for each regime type when unrest is set at zero, ten, and fifteen are presented in Figs. 6k-6m.

Fig 6k. shows at zero incidents of unrest, personalist regimes are significantly more likely to initiate disputes against non-rivals than military, personalist, and single-party regimes. Military regimes are also significantly more likely to initiate disputes against non-rivals than democracies. Democracies are less likely to initiate against non-rivals than all non-democratic regime types. Following logically, single-party regimes are significantly less likely than personalist regimes to initiate against non-rivals and significantly more likely than democracies to initiate against non-rivals.

The likelihood of dispute initiation across regime types at five domestic unrest incidents is shown in Fig. 6l. Personalist regimes are significantly more likely to initiate against non-rivals than democratic or single-party regimes. This also is true of military regimes. There is no significant difference between the likelihood of initiation against non-rivals by single-party and democratic regimes. Fig. 6m illustrates that at fifteen incidents, the only significant difference

across regime types is a higher likelihood that military regimes will initiate against non-rivals than democratic and single-party regimes.

The substantive effect of unrest across regime types in both rival and non-rival environments is shown in Table 6c. There are several notable results in Table 6c when looking at the change in the likelihood of initiation as unrest increases from zero to 25 incidents. For military regimes, initiation is 914% more likely at 25 incidents than at zero incidents in non-rival contexts. This is much higher than the 197% increase in rival contexts for military regimes. For democracies, a rise to 25 domestic unrest incidents in non-rival contexts increases the likelihood of initiation by 212% compared to a mere 52% in rival contexts. The impact of international context is most clearly illustrated by comparing the effect of unrest between rival and non-rival environments for single-party regimes. Increasing the level of unrest to 25 incidents, single-party regimes are 78% more likely to initiate disputes in rival contexts compared to a decrease of 43% in non-rival contexts.

Looking deeper into Table 6c, two other conclusions may be drawn that are initially puzzling. First, the marginal effect of unrest on personalist regimes in a non-rival context is shown in Table 6b to be *negative*; however, the effect of increasing the number of incidents to 25 from zero in a non-rival context is a 17% *increase* in the likelihood of dispute initiation for personalist regimes in non-rival environments. One also can note moving from zero to five incidents, there is a 1% *decrease* in the likelihood a personalist regime will initiate in a non-rival context. The second puzzling result is that for rival environments in Table 6b, the effect of unrest on initiation is shown to be higher for democratic regimes than for single-party regimes. However, looking at an increase from zero to 25 incidents, the likelihood of initiation increases

by 52% for democracies and 78% for single-party regimes. Note, however, that at fifteen incidents, the increase on the likelihood of initiation is 28% for democracies and 22% for single-party regimes, the order one may intuitively expect when looking at Table 6b.

Understanding the seemingly contradictory results in Tables 6b and 6c requires a little more information on the interplay between domestic unrest, rivalry, and regime type. As a first step, remember that the effect of unrest in rivalry contexts is only significant for democratic regimes. In neither environment is the effect of unrest significant for personalist and single-party regimes. Also, the effect of rivalry appears significant and large from the results in Table 6a. Fully understanding the impact rival context has on dispute initiation requires a comparison of the marginal effect of rivalry as unrest increases across regime types, which is presented in Figs. 6n-6q.

Fig. 6n indicates the marginal effect of rivalry on dispute initiation increases for personalist regimes as unrest increases. Further, the marginal effect of rivalry is significant until unrest reaches 21 incidents or so. Fig. 6o is very interesting. The marginal effect of rivalry decreases as unrest increases for military regimes. The marginal effect of rivalry actually becomes negative around 17 domestic unrest incidents. Further, the effect of rivalry is only significant until about 6 unrest incidents. This is consistent with the results presented so far for military regimes. For democratic regimes (Fig. 6p), the marginal effect of rivalry decreases as unrest increases, though it remains significant throughout the reported range of unrest. Again, this is consistent with previous results. For single-party regimes, the marginal effect of rivalry increases as domestic unrest increases (Fig. 6q).

A comparison of Figs. 6p and 6q explain why the increase in the likelihood of initiation as unrest moves from zero to 25 incidents is higher for single-party regimes than democratic regimes. The marginal effect of unrest on initiation in a rivalry context (rivalry =1) may be higher for democracies than for single-party regimes; however, as unrest increases (from 0 to 25), the marginal effect of rivalry (shifting rivalry from 0 to 1) on initiation decreases for democratic regimes and increases for single-party regimes. In short, as unrest increases, the static[5] difference in the marginal effect of unrest (0.001 for single-party and 0.017 for democracy) is outweighed by the changing[6] marginal effect of rivalry. The marginal effect of rivalry decreases for democracies while it increases for single-party regimes. Therefore, as unrest increases, the predicted probability of initiation for democracies rises more slowly than it does for single-party regimes in rival contexts.

The second puzzling issue is the initial decrease in the likelihood of initiation as unrest increases, followed by an increase in this likelihood. The marginal effect of personalist is

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[5] The full functional form is ME for democracies= coefficient for unrest+((coefficient for unrest*rivalry)*rivalry)+((coefficient for unrest*democracy)*democracy)*((coefficient for unrest*rivalry*democracy)*rivalry*regime type).

This is static as the marginal effect of unrest is calculated using the range of values regime type and rivalry, which is by definition 1 or zero. For rivalry context, the ME of unrest for democracies is calculated with democracy and rivalry at "1" where the ME of unrest = coefficient for unrest+ coefficient for unrest*rivalry+ coefficient for unrest*democracy+ coefficient for unrest*rivalry*democracy

[6] This is changing as the ME of rivalry for democracies, for example = coefficient for unrest+((coefficient for unrest*rivalry)*unrest)+((coefficient for rivalry*democracy)*democracy)*((coefficient for unrest*rivalry*democracy)*unrest*regime type).

As unrest ranges from 0-25 in the presented range, the ME of rivalry varies as the value of unrest varies.

calculated as -0.005, and the expectation is that the likelihood of initiation should continue to decrease as unrest increases. This seems to be a consequence of running the CLARIFY program to arrive at predicted probabilities. Using the less-preferred mfx command in Stata 10.0, the generated likelihood of initiation does continuously decrease in a regular manner. As a check for errors in the code used to generate predicted probabilities through CLARIFY, I also ran Model 3 from Table 5a in Chapter Five with only non-rival dyads (when rivalry=0). The results of this analysis are available upon request, and are consistent with the results reported in this chapter for personalist regimes. The marginal effect of personalist regime type as unrest increases in non-rival contexts may also be causing this effect on predicted probabilities. Fig. 6r shows that the marginal effect of personalist is positive and rises as unrest rises, and the effect of personalist is significant until fifteen incidents or so.

Summary

Taken with the results of the analysis in Table 5b, among all dyads the finding of a statistically significant relationship between unrest and dispute initiation conditioned by regime type found for military regimes and democratic regimes in the all-dyads-analysis in Chapter Five only seems to hold for non-rival rather than rival contexts. This is incompatible with Hypothesis 2. In short, the finding of a significant and positive effect in non-rival contexts, in conjunction with its absence in rival contexts (except for democracies), does not support the underlying theoretical arguments that suggest diversion is less likely in these opportunity-poor environments compared to the opportunity-rich environments of rival dyads. Leaving concerns of statistical significance aside, following the rank-order of regime types for rival contexts in terms of most positive to least negative, military regimes demonstrate the greatest effect of unrest on dispute

initiation, followed by personalist, democratic, and single-party regimes. This does not mirror the expectations in Hypotheses 3 and 5. Hypothesis 4 is not supported by these results as the effect of unrest on initiation by democracies in rival contexts is significant and positive.

The non-democratic regimes are interesting in that the direction of the effect changes across contexts. In Chapter Five, both models indicate unrest was positively, if not significantly related to dispute initiation for personalist regimes. The results in Table 6c suggest this is effect is driven primarily by behavior in rival dyads. In non-rival dyads the effect of unrest on dispute initiations is negative, which is interesting and not inconsistent with expectations in Chapter Three. If personalist regimes are selecting conflicts with rivals under deteriorating domestic conditions, the overall likelihood of initiation in non-rival dyads should decrease due to this effect. While a positive effect is found only in the full dataset for single-party regimes (negative in politically-relevant) in Chapter Five, again this effect in the full dataset seems to mirror that of personalist regimes—an increasing though insignificant likelihood of dispute initiation in rival contexts and a decreasing likelihood of dispute initiation in non-rival contexts as unrest incidents increase in number.

Perhaps the most interesting findings are for military regimes. In Chapter Five, both analyses suggest unrest leads to higher likelihoods of dispute initiation for military regimes. As with single-party and personalist regimes, the inclusion of rival contexts demonstrates that analysis of the full dataset in Chapter Five masks conflict selection effects. The effect of unrest on initiation is much higher, and is significant in non-rival contexts compared to rival environments. This result suggests military regimes somewhat counter-intuitively select conflicts against non-rivals (or in opportunity-poor environments). Further indications of the

robustness of this finding for military regimes (equivalent effects are found in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis) require an extended discussion in Chapter Seven.

Finally, the results indicate that the international environment (measured by rivalry) is a much stronger determinant of dispute initiation than domestic unrest. For personalist, single-party, and democratic regimes, the marginal effect of rivalry is significant over most or all of the reported range of unrest. The marginal effect of rivalry is only significant for military regimes at low levels of unrest however. More interestingly, there are clear differences across regime types in the influence domestic unrest has on the effect of rivalry on dispute initiation. For personalist and single-party regimes, the marginal effect of rivalry increases as unrest increases. For military and democratic regimes, increases in domestic unrest lead to a decline in the marginal effect of rivalry on initiation. For military regimes, at high levels of domestic unrest, the marginal effect of rivalry on dispute initiation is actually negative, though insignificant.

Empirical Analysis II: Politically-Relevant Dyads

In Chapters Four and Five, it is suggested that restricting the analysis to politically-relevant dyads helps overcome case selection bias. The potential source for selection bias is a large number of observations included in the all directed dyads dataset where there is little or no chance of dispute initiation. The extremely low probability of initiation in this subset of dyads is a function of power and geographic characteristics in these dyads. Further, the concern over whether selecting politically-relevant dyads poses a selection bias risk that damages the validity of estimated results is dismissed by Lemke and Reed (2001). Additionally, the politically-relevant dyads analysis in Chapter Five has thus far been the most suggestive in terms of offering support for the arguments in Chapter Three.

The models in Table 6d show the effect of domestic unrest, rivalry, and regime type on dispute initiation. In Model 1, unrest and rivalry are included with control variables. Unlike Model 1 in Table 6a, the coefficient for unrest is no longer significant, but does remain positive. Rivalry is again positive and significant. Model 2 includes personalist, military, and democratic regime type with single-party excluded as a base category. Domestic unrest is positive and now significant. Rivalry remains positive and significant. Personalist regimes are significantly more likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes when controlling for the level of unrest and rivalry environment, as in Table 6a. Military regimes are more likely to initiate than single-party regimes, however, this effect is significant in Model 2 of Table 6d, while it is insignificant in Table 6a. As in Table 6a, the coefficient for democracies is found to be significantly less likely to initiate than single-party regimes.

Model 3 includes the unrest, rivalry, the three regime types, and their interactions. Again, single-party regime type and the interaction of this measure with rivalry and unrest is excluded in Model 3 and replaces comparable measures for personalist regime type in Model 4. The results in Model 3 indicate that unrest is negatively and insignificantly related to initiation (by single-party regimes). The coefficient for rivalry is positive and significant, and the interaction of rivalry is positive, but insignificant. Personalist and military regime type remain positive and significant, indicating these regimes are more likely to initiate than single-party regimes, while democracies are significantly less likely to do so. The interactions of unrest and each regime type are positive and significant for all three types. The coefficients for rivalry interacted with regime type are insignificant and positive for democracy, insignificant and negative for personalist regime type, and negative and significant for military regimes. Finally,

the interaction of all three variables (regime type, unrest, and rivalry) is negative and insignificant for all three included regime types.

Again, the proper manner in which to present the effect of an independent variable conditioned by other independent variables on a dependent variable is to calculate the conditional marginal effect following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006). Table 6e shows the conditional marginal effect of unrest in all five models in Table 6d in both rival and non-rival contexts. The only statistically significant conditional marginal effect coefficients is for domestic unrest in democratic regimes (positive) in non-rival environments. The marginal effect of unrest is close to attaining significance and is negative for single-party regimes[7] in non-rival contexts. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, there is only a statistically significant effect of unrest in non-rival environments (for some regime types) rather than in rival environments.

Comparing the results in Table 6b to those in Table 6e shows the influence of restricting analysis to a politically-relevant dyads construction from a full dataset construction, as was seen in Chapter Five. For personalist regimes, the effect of unrest is now positive in both rival and non-rival contexts. As in Table 6b, the effect of unrest on dispute initiation is higher in non-rival contexts than rival environments for military regimes, reinforcing this interesting if problematic finding from Table 6b—though this effect is no longer significant in non-rival contexts. The results for single-party regimes in Table 6e are similar from those in Table 6b. The effect is

[7] This is extremely close to the 1.96 cutoff for t-score significance at the 95% level using two-tailed distribution.

positive in rival contexts[8] and negative in non-rival contexts, though now the effect of unrest in non-rival contexts approaches significance.

As in Table 6b, the effect of unrest on dispute initiation for democracies is higher in non-rival contexts than rival ones, though the effect is significant only in non-rival environments. Hypothesis 4 posits there would be no effect of unrest on democratic dispute initiation in rival contexts. This is conditionally supported as no statistically significant effect is found. However, the underlying argument is that non-rival environments are opportunity-poor; therefore, diversion is less-likely to occur in non-rival dyads. Additionally, democratic transparency allows for greater strategic conflict avoidance by targets of potential targets of democratic leaders with diversionary preferences. This argument does not explain the positive and statistically significant effect of unrest on democratic dispute initiation in non-rival environments.

Leaving these issues aside, organizing the marginal effect from most positive to least negative, the rank ordering in rival contexts is personalist, military, democracy, and single-party. This is, in fact, the expected rank-order of regimes in Hypothesis 3, and excluding democracies, the order of non-democratic regimes expected by Hypothesis 5. Stronger statements of support cannot be made for these hypotheses due to the lack of statistical significance illustrated in Table 6e. However, it is encouraging that the expected pattern does emerge in this analysis. It is also encouraging that the interaction terms for unrest and military, personalist, and democratic regime type respectively are positive and significant in Model 3 in Table 6d. This is tempered by the

[8] It should be noted, that this effect is exceedingly small. Reported in Table 6e, the effect is 0.000. The actual estimated effect (not rounded to three decimal places is 0.0004034).

negative and insignificant coefficients on the rivalry*unrest*regime type measures in Table 6e for all three included regime types.

Looking at the substantive effect of unrest on initiation in rival contexts is, again, useful. Figs. 6s-6v show the impact increases in domestic unrest incidents has on dispute initiation in rival contexts for each regime type, using results generated with CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). As with the full-dataset analysis, and consistent with the results in Table 6e, the likelihood of initiation increases as unrest increases for each regime type. As in the earlier analysis in this chapter, the confidence intervals are narrowest for democratic regimes.

Figure 6w shows the effect of increased unrest on the likelihood of initiation across regime type, without confidence intervals. As Table 6e indicates, the increase in the likelihood of initiation is similar (the slope of the line) for personalist and military regimes, with the likelihood of initiation rising slightly faster for personalist regimes. Somewhat unexpectedly, the impact of unrest appears higher for single-party regimes when compared to democratic regimes. Again, as will be shown later in this section, this effect is driven largely by differences in the marginal effect of rivalry as unrest increases between these two regime types. At the far end of the reported range, an order from most-to-least likely to initiate emerges as: personalist, military, single-party, democracy. As in the full-dataset analysis, supplemental figures were generated comparing the likelihood of dispute initiation in a rival environment when unrest equals zero, five, and fifteen incidents. These figures are not particularly illustrative, and are excluded as the confidence intervals for the likelihood each regime type will initiate at these values overlap.[9]

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[9] They are available upon request.

The results generated in Model 3 of Table 6d and marginal effects reported in Table 6e are also useful in comparing the effect of unrest in rival and non-rival contexts for each regime. To clearly illustrate the differences and similarities in the effect unrest has on initiation in each environment, the likelihood of initiation in each dyadic contexts is shown for each regime type in Figs. 6x-6aa. The much higher likelihood of initiation in rival dyads compared to non-rival dyads by personalist regimes is presented in Fig. 6x. As in the full-dataset analysis, Fig. 6y shows that as unrest increases in military regimes, they become more likely to initiate against non-rival states than rival states. Fig. 6z shows the narrowing gap between initiation in rival environments and non-rival ones for democracies suggested by the results in Table 6e. Finally, Fig. 6aa illustrates the expected growing gap between initiation in rival contexts and non-rival ones for single-party regimes. The likelihood of initiation against non-rival states by single-party regimes decreases markedly as unrest increases.

Fig. 6ab compares the effect of unrest on initiation in non-rival dyads across regime types, without confidence intervals. Initially, at zero unrest incidents, military regimes are more likely to initiate a dispute against a non-rival state than personalist, single-party, and democratic regimes respectively. As the number of unrest incidents rises above five or so, the order from most-to-least-likely to initiate against a non-rival emerges as military, personalist, democracy, single-party. As in the full-dataset analysis earlier in this chapter, three additional figures are presented to show the distinct differences between these regime types at selected values of unrest.

Illustrated by Fig. 6ac, when unrest is absent, personalist regimes are significantly more likely to initiate against non-rival states than democratic regimes. Military regimes are

significantly more likely to initiate against non-rivals than democracies and single-party regimes. Democracies are significantly less likely to initiate disputes against non-rivals than all non-democratic regime types. As unrest increases to five incidents, as shown in Fig. 6ad, Personalist regimes and military regimes are both more likely to initiate disputes against non-rivals than democratic and single-party regimes. There are no substantive differences between either personalist and military regimes or democratic and single-party regimes. Fig. 6ae shows that as unrest increases to fifteen incidents, the only significant difference among the initiation patterns against non-rivals is a lower likelihood of initiation by single-party regimes compared to personalist and military regimes.

An alternative manner to present the substantive effect of an increase in unrest is offered in Table 6f, which is comparable to Table 6c. As with Table 6c, comparison of the calculated marginal effects of unrest to changes in the likelihood of initiation calculated in CLARIFY show some apparent discrepancies. As a reminder, for rival contexts, the rank-order identified in Table 6e was personalist, military, democracy, single-party. However, looking at the first half of Table 6f, this pattern is only evident until unrest is at fifteen incidents. As in Table 6c, at twenty-five incidents, the increase in the likelihood of initiation (compared to zero incidents) is greater for single-party regimes than democracies. A similar discrepancy is found in the lower half of Table 6f. In Table 6e, the order in non-rival contexts was military, personalist, democracy, and single-party. However, the pattern that emerges in Table 6f is military, democracy, personalist, single-party; though the increases for personalist and democracy are comparable.

Again, to more fully understand the interplay between unrest, rivalry, and regime type, the marginal effect of rivalry on initiation as unrest increases is presented for each regime type in

Figs. 6af-6ai. In Fig. 6af, the marginal effect of rivalry decreases, but remains positive, as unrest increases for personalist regimes, and is significant only until 12 incidents. In the full-dataset analysis, the marginal effect of rivalry in personalist regimes increased as unrest increased, and was significant for most of the reported range. In short, as unrest increases, the effect of rivalry on initiation decreases in terms of magnitude and significance. The marginal effect of rivalry decreases, approaches zero, then turns negative as unrest reaches 11 incidents for military regimes (Fig. 6ag). However, unlike in Fig. 6o, the marginal effect of rivalry is never significant for military regimes. Mirroring Fig. 6p, the marginal effect of rivalry remains positive and significant though decreases as unrest increases for democratic regimes (Fig. 6ah). Finally, the marginal effect of rivalry is similar as unrest increases for single-party regimes in the politically-relevant-dyad analysis (Fig. 6ai) and full-dataset-analysis (Fig. 6q). In both analyses, the marginal effect of rivalry increases as unrest increases and remains significant across the reported range of unrest.

As in the full-dataset analysis, the discrepancy between the rank-ordering of regimes in terms of the marginal effect of unrest and the substantive effect of unrest is explained in part by looking at the marginal effect of rivalry as unrest increases. The higher increase in the likelihood of dispute initiation for single-party regimes compared to the increase for democratic regimes in rival dyads at 25 unrest incidents may be driven by the increase in the marginal effect of rivalry on initiation for single-party regimes as unrest increases coupled with the decrease in the marginal effect of rivalry on initiation as unrest increases for democratic regimes. Understanding why the likelihood of democratic initiation against non-rivals increases so significantly in Table 6f despite the low marginal effect of unrest reported in Table 6e, requires

looking at the marginal effect of democracy as unrest increases in non-rival environments. As Figure 6aj illustrates, the marginal effect of democracy is negative until six incidents, after which it turns sharply positive as unrest increases. While the marginal effect of domestic unrest alone may be modest, the impact unrest has on the marginal effect of democracy may explain the steep rise in the likelihood of democratic initiation against non-rivals as unrest increases.

Summary

The results of the politically-relevant-dyads analysis are encouraging. As the results reported in Table 6e show, the expected rank-order of regimes in terms of the effect of unrest on initiation in rival contexts matches the expected order in Hypothesis 3, and by extension Hypothesis 5. However, when looking at the substantive effect of unrest on the likelihood of dispute initiation as unrest increases, the order changes. The first indication that the impact of unrest on initiation may be different from what is reported in Table 6e is the results comparing the likelihood of each regime type to divert in rival contexts (Fig. 6w). As is borne out by the results presented in Table 6f, the order of regimes in terms of the highest percent increase in the likelihood of initiation as unrest increases from zero to twenty-five incidents is personalist, military, single-party, democracy. Looking closer at the effect unrest has on rivalry, the other conditioning variable, provides an explanation for why this effect is found. Unrest has an effect not only on initiation, but also on the relationship between rivalry and initiation. The results of the politically-relevant dyad analysis are consistent with those in the full-dataset analysis in showing that the marginal effect of unrest on initiation is small in comparison to the effect of rivalry on initiation. Rivalry is a much stronger determinant of dispute initiation. This holds for all regimes except military regimes, where the marginal effect of rivalry is not significant across

the range of unrest. The interesting finding in this section, which is supported by the results in the full-dataset analysis, is that unrest conditions the effect rivalry has on the likelihood of initiation, and the effect of unrest on the marginal effect of rivalry on initiation varies widely across regime types.

Conclusion

In Chapter Five, initial results are offered that fail to confirm Hypothesis 1, which encompasses the domestic constraints argument in Chapter Three alone. Chapter Six reintroduces the possibility of international constraints, by including rivalry as an additional variable. As there is a great deal of material to summarize in this chapter, the results are fully summarized in Table 6g. There are several interesting findings in this chapter. First, the expected rank-order of regimes does emerge in the politically-relevant dyads-analysis. However, strong statements of support for Hypotheses 3 and 5 are not possible. The marginal effect of unrest is not significant for any regime type in rival environments for the politically-relevant dyads analysis, and only for democracies in the full-dataset analysis. In addition, the rank-ordering of regimes does not hold when looking at the substantive effect of unrest on initiation in rival contexts across regime types. This seemingly inconsistent result leads to a second interesting finding. While rivalry is a strong predictor of initiation for all regime types except military regimes, the effect of rivalry on initiation is conditioned by domestic unrest. A final unexpected finding was the influence of international context on military regime initiation. Contrary to what is expected by the theoretical argument in Chapter Three, as unrest rises, military regimes are increasingly less likely to initiate against rivals and increasingly more likely to initiate against non-rivals. While the non-rival context is viewed as opportunity-poor

compared to rival environments, it seems military regimes are more likely to initiate against non-rivals than rivals when unrest has reached high levels.

Combined, the results of Chapters Five and Six suggest that some tentative conclusions can be drawn. There does seem to be variation across regimes in terms of the effect of unrest on dispute initiation. Following the politically-relevant-dyads analysis in both chapters, differences both across the democratic/non-democratic divide and among non-democracies are present. Rivalry appears to matter in understanding dispute initiations by states; however, unrest has little discernible direct effect in these environments. An unanticipated finding is that the effect of rivalry varies across regime types. More importantly there is an indirect effect of unrest on initiation against rivals as rising levels of unrest influence the marginal effect of rivalry in unique manners for specific regime types. Interestingly, there is some evidence of diversion for some regime types in non-rival contexts, which is unexpected by the strategic conflict avoidance literature. In Chapter Seven, these interesting results from Chapters Five and Six will be discussed.

CHAPTER SEVEN EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Introduction

Unfortunately, the results of analyses in Chapters Five and Six do not support the hypotheses in Chapter Three. The first sections of this chapter summarize the findings in reference to the five hypotheses offered for analysis in Chapter Three. The results from the politically-relevant dyads analysis in Chapter Five come close to matching theoretical expectations. However, a rejection of Hypothesis 1 is anticipated as the likelihood a leader responds to unrest with diversion is expected to be conditioned not only by domestic factors but also international factors. Based on the results from the politically-relevant dyads analysis in Chapter Six, Hypothesis 3 is given conditional support. As the marginal effect of unrest is not significant in a rival environment for any of the regime types in the last analysis in Chapter Six, stronger statements of support cannot be made. Additionally, looking at the substantive effect of unrest on initiation in rival contexts as unrest increases from low to high levels leads to a different rank-order of regimes. The bulk of this chapter is an explanation for why the results do not strongly support the hypotheses and a discussion of theoretically interesting findings in the results from Chapters Five and Six.

Despite some concerns, the results are a cause for optimism in some ways. First, a generally robust finding of a positive relationship between domestic unrest and democracies is found that supports diversionary theory generally, and democratic diversion explanations more narrowly. Second, while the results for non-democracies are not as strong as one would hope, the findings do suggest differences that have previously been unaccounted for exist. Further, that the results do bear out at least a “shadow” of the expected pattern in Hypothesis 3 is encouraging

given methodological problems faced when employing the Geddes typology (discussed below). The results in Chapter Six do show that while the effect of unrest may be difficult to observe directly, the effect of unrest on the marginal effect of rivalry on initiation is clear. Finally, the results of analyses in Chapters Five and Six indicate that theoretical argument in Chapter Three represents a strong starting point for studying comparative diversionary behavior.

No Support for Hypothesis 1 in Chapter Five

The analysis in Chapter Five is designed to test Hypothesis 1. This hypothesis is drawn from the domestic constraints arguments in Chapter Three, and suggests the effect of unrest on dispute initiation is greatest for personalist regimes, followed by military, democratic, and single-party regimes. There are two sets of analyses conducted. The first employs a full dataset of all directed dyads in the international system from 1946-2000 and the second restricts the analysis to politically-relevant dyads in this time period. Table 7a is a comparison of the results of these analyses to the expected pattern in Hypothesis 1. Table 7a shows that when looking at the conditional marginal effect of unrest, the ordering of regimes comes closer to matching Hypothesis 1 for the politically-relevant-dyads analysis. However, the conditional marginal effect of unrest is only statistically significantly related to dispute initiation for military and democratic regimes in the full analysis and personalist and democratic regimes in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis.

Comparing the statistically significant differences in the likelihood of initiation at set values of unrest across regime types demonstrates that unrest has an impact on dispute initiation.

In the full-dataset analysis, when unrest reached five incidents,[1] personalist and military regimes are more likely to initiate disputes than democracies and personalist regimes more likely to initiate than single-party regimes. At fifteen incidents,[2] the likelihood of initiation is significantly higher for military regimes than single-party and democratic regimes. In the full-dataset analysis, the similarities and differences among regimes reflect the division of regimes made in Chapter Three when discussing constraints on policy concessions. At zero unrest incidents,[3] personalist and military regimes are more likely to initiate than democracies alone. However, at five[4] and fifteen[5] incidents, a clear division emerges where regimes with parties (democracies and single-party regimes) are significantly less likely to initiate disputes than regimes lacking these institutions (military and democratic regimes). The results do seem to indicate that domestic unrest has an impact on dispute initiation. Further, the evidence suggests the effect of unrest does vary across regime type, and largely as expected by portions of the theoretical argument in Chapter Three.

Limited Support for Hypotheses 3 and 5 in Chapter Six

The analyses in Chapter Six test Hypotheses 2-5. As in Chapter Five, analyses are conducted for a full universe of cases and for politically-relevant dyads only. Due to the availability of rivalry data, the results only cover the 1946-1992 time period. These analyses employ a triple interaction term as the effect of unrest on dispute initiation is argued in Chapter

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[1] Fig. 5g.
[2] Fig. 5h.
[3] Fig. 5n.
[4] Fig. 5o.
[5] Fig. 5p.

Three to be conditioned by regime type and rival context. In Table 7b, the results of the analyses are summarized. In this table, the ordering of regimes in terms of the conditional marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation is divided into results from the full and politically-relevant-dyads analyses in Chapter Six and between rival and non-rival environments. Three results stand out in Table 7b. First, the rank-order of regimes found in Table 5a for each analysis in Chapter Five is mirrored by the rank-order in non-rival conditions. This is expected as these dyads make up a large majority of the observations. Second, the marginal effect of unrest in rival environments is significant only for democracies in the full-dataset analysis. Finally, and most importantly, the expected rank-order of regimes in terms of the effect of unrest on initiation against rivals does emerge in the politically-relevant dyads analysis.

Table 7c provides a brief summary of the consequences of the results for these final four hypotheses. According to Hypothesis 2, there should be no effect of unrest on dispute initiation in non-rival contexts regardless of regime type. The strategic conflict avoidance literature suggests that potential targets will reduce their interactions with or become more conciliatory towards states they believe have a willingness to initiate militarized disputes. This yields an opportunity-poor environment for potential initiators. Focusing on rival conditions, which are conceived of as always opportunity-rich in comparison to non-rival conditions is one manner in which the possibility of strategic conflict avoidance has been addressed in previous literature. A quick look at the results from Chapter Six illustrates that the conditional marginal effect of domestic unrest is not statistically significant for any regime type in rival environments in the politically-relevant dyads analysis. Additionally, the conditional marginal effect of unrest is positive and statistically significant in non-rival contexts for military and democratic regimes in

the analyses employing the full dataset. This result holds for democracies alone in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis. These results do not offer support for Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3 adds the presence of a rival for a potential diverting state as a conditional factor for the rank-ordering of regimes in terms of effect of unrest on dispute initiation expected by Hypothesis 1. As the discussion above suggests, and the results presented in Tables 7b and 7c illustrate, this hypothesis is only given limited support by the results of the politically-relevant dyads analysis. Again, there is no significant effect of unrest on dispute initiation for any regime type in rival environments in the politically-relevant dyads analysis while the expected order of regimes does emerge. In the full-dataset analysis, the effect of unrest is significant only for democracies, and the expected rank-order does not emerge.

Hypothesis 4 introduces the possibility of regime transparency as a factor that may influence the strategic conflict avoidance behavior of potential target states. Following Mitchell and Prins (2004), democracies are considered to be qualitatively different from their non-democratic counterparts in terms of regime transparency. Democratic transparency is argued to lead to a higher level of information available to potential targets of democratic leaders with diversionary incentives, and therefore a greater likelihood of successful strategic conflict avoidance by these states even in rival contexts. The results presented in Table 7b suggest that this hypothesis is not supported. In the full-dataset analysis, there is a significant impact of unrest on initiation for democracies in rival environments. There is no statistically significant relationship between domestic unrest and dispute initiation for democracies in rival environments in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis. However, the positive and significant effect of unrest on dispute initiation for democracies in non-rival contexts is a result that

undermines the theoretical argument on strategic conflict avoidance literature. The argument, in short, expects diversion to be unlikely in democratic regimes under rivalry conditions as transparency increases the degree to which the rival environment is opportunity-rich. However, a focus on rival environments is predicated upon a view of non-rival environments as opportunity poor. Convincing support for strategic conflict avoidance arguments would include findings in support of the implicit argument that diversion is unlikely to be seen in opportunity-poor environments. A statistically significant effect of unrest on dispute initiation in non-rival contexts for democracies undermines this underlying argument.

Finally, Hypothesis 5 accounts for domestic constraints on leaders selecting options other than diversion, strategic conflict avoidance through focusing on rival environments, and the possible effect of democratic transparency even in rival contexts. The expected rank-order of regimes based on the effect of unrest on dispute initiation in rival contexts according to this hypothesis is personalist, military, single-party. Again, there is no non-democratic regime type for which the marginal effect of unrest is significant in rival environments; however, the rank order in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis is personalist, military, and single-party. This hypothesis is not strongly supported as the effect of unrest is not significant. More damaging are the results from the full-dataset analysis. Support for Hypothesis 5 requires Hypothesis 4 to be supported; there should be no significant effect of unrest on initiation by democracies against rivals. The significant effect of unrest in rival contexts for democracies in the full-dataset analysis contradicts this underlying assumption in Hypothesis 5. Therefore, the hypothesis is not supported.

Explaining Problematic Results: Methodological Concerns

Coding Regimes

One explanation for the lack of a statistically significant relationship between unrest and dispute initiation in my analyses is the treatment of "hybrid" regimes in the dataset. Geddes (1999) classifies many non-democratic regimes as possessing characteristics of more than one type (e.g. personalist/single-party). In these instances, a single regime is coded as more than one type in the dataset. There are qualitative differences in terms of decision-making authority and the constraint on leaders between personalist, single-party, and personalist/single-party regimes. The problem of hybrid regimes in Geddes' coding is not unknown to previous scholars. Lai and Slater (2006) handle personalist regimes by dropping the category and classifying personalist regimes as either single-party or military depending on the source of their infrastructural power (civilian vs. military institutions). While it is not entirely clear how Pickering and Kisangani (2010) deal with hybrid regimes, there is the suggestion in their article that they drop hybrids from their analysis (Pickering and Kisangani 2010, 479, ftn. 2). They indicate 23.7% of the state-years in their sample are coded as hybrid regime-types. Geddes' (1999) classification is used in my analysis as I side with Pickering and Kisangani as the tripartite classification allows for

> …a more nuanced understanding of autocratic diversionary behavior…(and) also has the advantage of being used in the majority of the studies of comparative autocratic conflict to date, making our findings more broadly comparable to extant research (Pickering and Kisangani 2010, 479).

For the analyses in Chapters Five and Six, these hybrid regimes are eliminated prior to model estimation. This leads to a large number of eliminated dyadic observations where a non-democracy is present in state A. Table 7d shows the large impact deleting observations has on the dataset. The choice to delete observations where more than one regime type is included costs 33% of the possible single-party regime observations, 37% of possible personalist observations, and 61% of military observations. Overall, 12% of observations are deleted from the full-dataset, all within the non-democratic category. This results in a dataset where 56% of the observations have a democratic regime in state A and only 44% where state A possesses a non-democratic regime.

Compounding the problem presented by dropping so many observations on the non-democratic regime side of the dataset is the relatively rare event of dispute initiation (see Appendix A) and dispute initiation under conditions of rivalry, and rivalry and unrest together (Table 7e). Part of the reason for why a stronger effect of unrest on initiation is not found consistently across non-democratic regime types may be the number of deleted observations for each non-democratic regime type where initiations did occur. In Table 7e, the number of initiations in the full and politically-relevant dyads dataset is presented. What is striking about Table 7e is the rapid decrease in the number of events of interest as conditions are layered. Initially, outcomes of interest are those where an initiation occurs in conjunction with unrest. Less than half of the initiations in the full-dataset and politically-relevant dyads dataset occur when unrest is also present. The proportion of initiations occurring when unrest is also present is even lower for non-democratic regime types than democratic regimes. In the full and politically-relevant dyads dataset there is no non-democratic regime category where the number of unrest

incidents in conjunction with unrest is more than 75. In Chapter Six, initiations against rivals where unrest incidents occur are the primary outcome of interest. As Table 7e illustrates, there are no more than 20 initiation events which occur in conjunction with unrest against a rival state for any non-democratic regime type in either the full or politically-relevant-dyads datasets.

Finally, Table 7e shows that the problem of rare initiations is most apparent for the full dataset. While moving from the full dataset to a politically-relevant dyads dataset does cost some observed initiations, the proportion of eliminated initiations is much smaller than the proportion of dyads eliminated as non-politically-relevant. This suggests that moving from a full dataset to a politically-relevant dataset may reduce the problems introduced by the rarity of outcomes of interest rather than compounding them. Therefore, the estimates from the politically-relevant dataset may be more illustrative of the impact my primary independent variables have on initiation.

The alternative approach would be a model that includes all possible "pure" and hybrid regime types. Such a design would be overly-burdensome, poses difficulty for the theoretical explanation, and would be of little use empirically or theoretically. In addition to the four regime types included, variables for the following would also be necessary: personalist/military, personalist/single-party; personalist/military/single-party; and military/single-party. This would in effect double the number of regime type categories. For the current research question, this division only muddles the theoretical explanation. This categorization would only be useful if one were interested in exploring the infrastructural power arguments of Lai and Slater by analyzing the differences between personalist/military and personalist/single-party (with the aim of refuting or supporting their overall argument and/or their decision to collapse the personalist

category). While such a research question is interesting, it lies outside the scope of the current inquiry. In Chapter Eight, a potential fruitful way to classify all regimes is offered, and is based on Slater's (2003) categorization of non-democratic regimes with the inclusion of divergent democratic regime types.

There is also some concern with the decision to code all democracies into a single category. The policy constraints approach selected for use in the theoretical explanation in Chapter Three relies heavily on the democratic diversion literature, particularly policy availability research focused on the US case. Variation in the availability of policy concessions is a potential factor that influences the likelihood a democratic leader will select diversion as a response to deteriorating domestic conditions. Democracies can be divided into presidential and parliamentary executive types. Further distinctions can be made among democracies along the lines of legislative party composition. Policy concessions may only be available if the executive's party enjoys a majority in the legislature or be based on the degree of party cohesion in the executive's party. Policy concession availability may be influenced by whether the executive's party possesses an outright majority, is part of a majority coalition, is part of a minority coalition, or is a minority party in the legislature. The nature of domestic problems, in conjunction with the party composition of the legislature and/or the left-right orientation of the executive's party, may also influence the availability of policy concessions as a response strategy for democratic leaders.

Chapter Three treats policy concessions as regularly available for democratic leaders despite acknowledging the contributions of the democratic diversion literature to the policy constraints approach. An assumption is made in Chapter Three that the presence of a party

infrastructure alone would suffice to make policy concessions a viable alternative. Additionally democratic leaders are expected to generally have policy concessions available as a strategy despite the dynamic constraints democratic leaders may face due to the changing nature of domestic problems and legislative composition over time within this regime category. The most consistent finding in previous chapters is that domestic unrest is significantly related to dispute initiation for democracies (in general and in non-rival environments regardless of the dataset employed). In light of these results, the above assumptions may need to be revisited. One of the major goals of this research project is to highlight the utility of disaggregating non-democratic regime types. In this process, variation across democratic regimes is largely ignored aside from the discussion in Chapter Two. In Chapter Eight, this decision is revisited and democratic regime variation is reintroduced in a classification of regimes that encompasses both variation among nondemocracies and variation among democracies.

Concerns with the Unrest Measure

One question I pondered early in the research design process was whether or not to lag domestic unrest by one time period. As previous diversionary research suggests, time may be an issue in extant diversionary literature (Ostrom and Job 1986; Meernik and Waterman 1996). Some (Ex. Morgan and Bickers 1992) address time by employing quarterly increments rather than selecting crises. Pickering and Kisangani (2010) choose to lag elite and mass unrest by one and two years in their models. Their finding that mass unrest is unrelated to military intervention is based on results from a measure of unrest lagged by one year. Their models do indicate, however, that mass unrest lagged by two years is positively and statistically significantly related to military intervention in a given year. Theoretically, this statistical relationship is puzzling on

its own. Two years is a long time for an embattled leader to wait in responding to unrest. In my analyses, domestic unrest is not lagged as the time unit for available data is the year. The window between the appearance of unrest and the response to unrest should be relatively small. One may assume (as those who employ a one-period lag with quarterly units in studies of US diversionary uses of force) that leaders are likely to respond to unrest in the same state-year. A lag of one or two years may mask the causal connection between unrest and conflict. The other side of the argument is that operating without a lag may lead to the inclusion of cases where the initiation of a dispute was the primary reason for unrest. My design choice reflects a decision to knowingly risk this latter issue; however, should cross-national quarterly unit data become available models, which lag unrest by one quarter, it may be interesting to employ in a directed-dyad-quarter analysis in the future.

More importantly, the decision to include overt demonstrations of dissatisfaction with political leadership does present a comparison problem. In some regimes (particularly democracies) citizen demonstrations of their preferences are encouraged. In the United States, for example, public protest is considered not only a right but also a signal of citizen engagement and evidence of a well-functioning democratic system. In many other states (including some but not all autocratic regimes) public demonstrations occur when either approved by or organized by the government. Additionally, demonstrations may occur in defiance of government regulations banning public assembly and demonstration. The level of dissatisfaction that triggers overt unrest may be higher in these closed societies compared to more open societies. In short, a measurement of twenty incidents of political unrest incidents in the United States may have very different influences on leadership than twenty incidents in North Korea. This same number may

represent a well-functioning democracy in the first instance and a regime on the brink of collapse in the second. In early statistical analyses, Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) measures were employed as potential controls; however, the inclusion of such controls did not substantively alter the results. Additionally, the inclusion of the polity score in models may create estimation problems when analyzing the connection between unrest and dispute initiation when the democratic regime variable is included. For these reasons, the control was eliminated from analyses presented in the previous chapters.

Unrest, Rivalry, and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

There is a concern over the use of overt unrest incidents as a measure for domestic unrest in diversionary research that employs strategic conflict avoidance arguments. Selecting overt unrest incidents as a domestic unrest variable over the use of economic indicators as proxies for deteriorating domestic conditions may produce problems for testing strategic conflict avoidance arguments. A potential target state may be somewhat uncertain over (a) the economic conditions in another state and (b) the impact economic conditions have on the public's perception of its government. However, potential targets are given a clear signal of the public's perception of government through the number and intensity of overt demonstrations directed at a regime's policy and leadership. Selecting overt demonstrations of unrest may model environments where strategic conflict avoidance behaviors are most pronounced, and could be a possible explanation of the findings in Chapter Six, which demonstrate no connection between unrest and dispute initiation in the presumed opportunity-rich rival environment.

The inclusion of overt demonstrations of unrest and the use of rivalry as a measure of opportunity-rich environments together may also explain why there is a significant effect of

unrest on dispute initiation for democracies—and to a less-robust extent—military regimes in non-rival contexts. Rival states have regular, though contentious, interactions with one another. Based on this high level of interaction and competitive relationship, these states are likely to keep a closer eye on one another and be more sensitive to changing conditions in their counterparts. They are more likely to actively seek out information on their counterparts. Following this argument, they are more likely to detect changes in the domestic political conditions of one another and more likely to respond quickly to these changes. Alternatively, non-rival states may be less "on guard" than rival states and as a result are more available as targets.

While such an argument goes against the body of literature, which views rivalry as an opportunity-rich environment, it may be the case that selecting overt unrest as a measure leads to estimating the relationship between unrest and dispute initiation in a subset of rival environments that are actually opportunity-poor. As non-rival states are likely less-attentive and less-responsive to changes in a state than that state's rivals, the opportunity to initiate disputes may be more present in non-rival contexts than rival contexts when domestic conditions have deteriorated to the point of overt demonstrations against government leadership. Explaining the findings in Chapter Six in such a manner does not further the theoretical argument in Chapter Three but does provide a possible explanation for these unexpected findings and suggests a closer look at the dynamics of strategic conflict avoidance at varying levels of domestic turmoil, and the influence alternative measures of both domestic turmoil and international environment may have on estimated results.

Finally, the results presented in Chapter Six demonstrate that the relationships between unrest, rivalry, regime type, and dispute initiation are complex. The results of the final analysis initially appear to show no significant effect of unrest on initiation against rival states for any regime type. Looking at the substantive effect of unrest on initiation across regime type offers the first suggestion that some other effect of unrest is occurring. Ordering regimes in terms of increases in the predicted likelihood of initiation against rivals as unrest rises from zero to 25 incidents does not match the ordering of regimes in terms of the marginal effect of unrest on initiation against rivals in the politically-relevant dyads analysis.[6] This seemingly inconsistent result is also found for non-rival environments and across both analyses in Chapter Six.

Further exploration of the results in Chapter Six reveals that unrest is an important factor in understanding initiation, and the perceived strong effect of rivalry on initiation does not hold either across regime types or across the range of unrest. The marginal effect of rivalry on initiation as unrest increases is never significant for military regimes in the last analysis of Chapter Six. For democratic and military regimes, the marginal effect of rivalry consistently decreases as unrest increases. Again, though insignificant, the marginal effect of rivalry turns *negative* for military regimes as unrest increases. For personalist and single-party regimes, the marginal effect of rivalry increases along with unrest, and is significant for all reported values of unrest for single-party regimes, and at low levels of unrest alone for personalist regimes. Exploring the predicted likelihood of initiation as unrest increases in non-rival contexts in a limited fashion (for the sake of brevity), the marginal effect of regime type on initiation is shown

[6] This is also a reminder for researchers to react with curiosity, not consternation, when results of analyses appear inconsistent!

in a pair of instances to vary as unrest increases. This variation is in terms of both the magnitude of the effect of regime type and the significance of this effect. In short, the message of Chapter Six is not that domestic unrest does not influence initiation, but rather that unrest influences initiation through its influence on the other major explanatory factors.

Interesting Empirical Findings: Domestic Unrest by Regime Type

The above sections attempt to explain these problematic findings and highlight areas in which research on comparative diversionary behavior may be improved upon in the future. Further development of these suggestions is undertaken in Chapter Eight. Despite these issues, there is much that can be drawn from the empirical results in Chapters Five and Six. A summary of the direction and significance of the marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation across all regime types for these analyses is presented in Table 7f.

Personalist Regimes

Methodological concerns with the measurement of the personalist regime category (and other non-democratic regime categories) have already been addressed above. The arguments in Chapter Three indicated that the effect of unrest on diversion should be highest for personalist regimes in Chapter Five analyses and in rival contexts in the Chapter Six analyses. This expectation holds only when looking at the marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis in Chapter Six. The marginal effect of unrest is only significant for personalist regimes in the politically-relevant dyads analysis in Chapter Five. The reader may expect this finding to carry over to the non-rival environment in the politically-relevant dyads analysis in Chapter Six. A potential explanation for this seemingly inconsistent

result is the shifting time-period covered as analyses move from Chapter Five to Chapter Six. Due to right-censoring of the rivalry data, the Chapter Six analysis only covers 1946-1992 rather than 1946-2000 period covered in the Chapter Five analysis. One additional finding for personalist regimes reported in Table 7f is interesting. In the politically-relevant-dyads analysis, the marginal effect of unrest is positive in rival environments and negative in non-rival environments. This result is consistent with theoretical expectations as it indicates personalist regimes select disputes with rivals (an opportunity-rich context).

Military Regimes

The influence of domestic unrest on dispute initiation is expected to be second-greatest for military regimes. Among the non-democratic regimes, the marginal effect of unrest is significant only for military regimes and only in the full-dataset analysis in Chapter Five and non-rival contexts in the full-dataset analysis in Chapter Six. Military regimes are argued to be constrained from selecting policy concessions due to the absence of party infrastructural institutions. In short, this leaves military leaders with the option to respond to unrest with repression, diversion, or resignation. Resignation is least preferred as leaders are assumed to value holding office and military leaders all the more so due to the potential for unfortunate post-tenure fates. The choice that matters for military leaders is between repression and diversion. Military regimes are unique in the unification of military and political leadership. Military leaders may additionally be distinguished from civilian leaders by the culture imposed on the officer corps by the military as an institution. Military leaders undoubtedly also employ repressive techniques as responses to domestic opposition; however, they may select diversion over repression to a higher degree than assumed in Chapter Three due to this cultural bias.

Military leaders may be prone to interstate conflict at a higher rate than leaders of other regime for several reasons according to Sechser (2004). Parochial biases lead military leaders to select military action as this route provides officers with opportunities to obtain battlefield experience (which assists officers in their careers) and allows militaries to justify calls for higher budgets. Perceptual bias in the military lead soldiers to perceive all national security issues as military problems, rather than exploring diplomatic and economic components of overall national security. Perceptual bias also leads officers to overestimate the probability of success and the value of first strikes while underestimating expected casualties and the duration of conflicts.

The best argument Sechser (2004) presents in favor of the militarism argument centers on decision-making biases and dovetails nicely with the focus of the dissertation—leader decision-making in situations of domestic unrest. This strain of the militarism thesis explains the conflict-proneness of military leaders as a function of the manner in which military leaders make decisions. First, officers are frequently urged to make quick, often "gut" decisions rather than spending long periods of time contemplating actions in the battlefield environment. The stronger argument cited by Sechser comes from Brecher (1996):

> Violence is normal behavior for the military in power, for the military generally achieves and sustains power through violence and tends to use this technique in all situations of stress, internal or external…even if alternative techniques are available (Brecher 1996, 220).

Sechser (2004) does find support for the militarism hypothesis, including his analyses that (using the Banks data) test for diversionary uses of force. Supporting this, Weeks (2012) finds that

military regimes (strongmen and juntas) are more likely to initiate conflicts than their respective civilian counterparts (bosses and machines) when comparing non-democracies.

The most interesting aspect of military regimes is the influence of rivalry on initiation as unrest increases. Military regimes are unique in that rivalry has the least significant impact on initiation for these regime types as unrest increases. Additionally, at high levels of unrest, military regimes are more likely to initiate against non-rivals than rivals. This finding is particularly interesting given the magnitude (and in one analysis significant) positive effect of unrest on dispute initiation in non-rival contexts. This finding contradicts the theoretical expectations in Chapter Three. A detailed explanation of what may be occurring for military regimes is required.

While the rivalry measure used in these analyses does not rely solely on the dispute history of a dyad, the rivalries coded by Rasler and Thompson (1998) do include those that were coded based on dispute histories alone (Rasler and Thompson 2000). Repeated disputes with a specific state over a small period of time may indicate that military options have not successfully resolved the underlying issue. Military leaders are likely more aware of the reasons for and possess a greater level of information on the likely success of a military action against a state that they have already actively engaged. Given this, military leaders may be more sensitive to the idea that a military action against a rival is less likely to result in a success, and therefore, less likely to improve their domestic standing than civilian counterparts (and in fact a costly draw may undermine their position further). Preferring military victory over stalemates for political (and logical) purposes, military leaders may select targets they have not fought before or those they view as targets they may be more likely to defeat. Coupled with the military culture

environment, this explanation would indicate that engaging rivals becomes less likely for military leaders under deteriorating domestic conditions, but dispute initiation should be more likely overall, driven by initiations against non-rival states. Testing this explanation could be done in future research by further exploring the conflict patterns of military regimes under conditions of unrest, identifying characteristics of likely targets, and the results of military disputes initiated by military regimes.

Democratic Regimes

The effect of unrest on dispute initiation is expected to be third-highest for democratic regimes. Table 7f indicates that the findings in Chapters Five and Six are most robust for this regime category. Additionally, democratic regimes occupy third place in the rank-order from most-positive to most-negative in all analyses, with the exception of the all-dyads analysis in Chapter Six for non-rival environments. In all analyses the conditional marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiations for democracies is positive. The effect of unrest on initiation by democracies is only insignificant for rival contexts in the politically-relevant dyads analysis in Chapter Six. The significant impact of unrest on initiation by democracies under non-rival conditions in both analyses in Chapter Six further undermines Hypothesis 4.

These results support proponents of democratic diversionary explanations. The potential issues with the democratic regime category have already been explored at length. To re-state the argument, insufficient attention to potential variation in the subtypes of democratic regimes may explain why unrest is significantly related to initiation in most analyses. These differences may yield variation in the availability of policy concessions as an option for democratic regimes. Under conditions where policy concessions are constrained as an option, and given that elections

and constitutional laws exist as barriers to repression, the finding of a strong effect of unrest on dispute initiation for democracies is not unexpected or particularly controversial for the extant literature.

Single-Party Regimes

The effect of domestic unrest on dispute initiation is expected to be lowest for single-party regimes. As Table 7f illustrates, the conditional marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation is lowest in all analyses for single-party regimes. While this effect fails to achieve statistical significance in any model, it comes close to attaining statistical significance in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis in non-rival environments. Further the effect of unrest on initiation by single-party regimes is negative in the politically-relevant dyads analysis and in non-rival contexts for both analyses in Chapter Six. The lack of a statistically significant effect of unrest on the likelihood of dispute initiation for single-party regimes is not inconsistent with the theoretical argument in Chapter Three. That no statistically significant effect is found is consistent with the expectation that unrest has limited effects on the dispute initiation patterns of single-party regimes. The consistently negative direction of the conditional marginal effect in non-rival environments is also not inconsistent with expectations, and was a welcome and interesting finding in these analyses. If single-party regimes are able to respond to unrest with policy concessions and repression as well as diversion, then the likely selection of these strategies and the time, focus, and resources spent pursuing these other options should reduce the frequency of dispute initiation under conditions of unrest. Single-party regimes are unique in that the barriers to both policy concessions and repression are low, and similar to democracies as the costs of losing office are low. The negative effect of unrest on initiation in non-rival

contexts, coupled with the positive (if modest) effect of unrest on initiation in rival contexts is also consistent with theoretical expectations.

Summarizing the Good News

The empirical findings in Chapter Five in particular are not supportive of the theoretical explanation developed in Chapter Three. In the previous sections, issues with the typology of regimes selected for theoretical development and empirical analysis are identified as one possible complication. Additionally, problems surrounding the relative rarity of initiation, compounded by the layering of additional conditions defining initiations of interest and the decision to eliminate hybrids are also discussed. Finally employing an overt demonstrations measure for domestic political unrest combined with the decision to control for strategic conflict avoidance by isolating rival environments is also suggested as one source of issues in the analyses in Chapters Five and Six. In this section, interesting findings are highlighted.

The expected rank-ordering of regimes in terms of most positive to most-negative marginal effect of unrest was found in one analysis. In Chapter Six, the order is personalist, military, democracy, single-party in rival environments for the politically-relevant-dyads analysis. While this pattern does not hold for the other analyses, it was present in at least one analysis. Discussed above, a theoretically interesting distinction between the behavior of military regimes in rival and non-rival environments is unexpected but interesting. Exploring this finding further in future work may be fruitful. The consistent finding of a positive and in most analyses, significant, relationship between unrest and dispute initiation for democratic states is a cause for celebration among proponents of the democratic diversion literature. Finally, single-party regimes behave as expected theoretically in most analyses as the relationship

between unrest and dispute initiation is consistently negative and insignificant. Aside from these bright spots, there are a few other encouraging conclusions that may be drawn.

A major goal of this project is to further the development of the comparative autocratic conflict literature by providing a comparative autocratic diversion explanation. Previous research has suggested that military regimes are more likely to initiate disputes than single-party regimes (Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2012). The first true comparative autocratic diversion test in recent literature (Pickering and Kisangani 2010) did not find any statistically significant variation across nondemocratic regimes when employing elite or mass unrest as independent variables. Their conclusions for the variation across nondemocratic regimes were drawn from the effect dispute initiation has on subsequent elite unrest. Additionally, they find that all nondemocratic regimes initiate military interventions to similar degrees when experiencing elite unrest. The findings in Chapters Five corroborate those of Lai and Slater (2006) and Weeks (2012) rather than those of Pickering and Kisangani (2010). Military regimes have a significantly higher likelihood of dispute initiation than single-party regimes as unrest increases.

Other conclusions may be drawn that bridge the democratic/non-democratic divide. Comparing the predicted likelihood of initiation in the politically-relevant dyad analysis in Chapter Five shows that personalist and military regimes are significantly more likely to initiate disputes when unrest is at five and fifteen incidents than single-party and democratic regimes. This division mirrors the division of regimes made in Chapter Three when discussing the role of political parties in determining opportunities and constraints for policy concessions. The regimes for which statistically significant conditional marginal effects of unrest were found are democracies (in all cases, with the exception of rival context in the politically-relevant dyad

analysis in Chapter Six), for military regimes (full dataset analyses in Chapter Five, and for non-rival environments in the full dataset analysis in Chapter Six), and personalist regime (politically-relevant dyads analysis in Chapter Five). For all three regime types the effect of unrest is positive.[7] Following these findings, single-party regimes—where the effect of unrest is often negative—are the true outliers in terms of leader response to unrest with diversion.

Finally, the results in Chapter Six demonstrate that the effects of unrest, regime type, and rivalry on initiation are not as clear-cut as they initially appear. This is perhaps the most interesting finding in Chapter Six. While unrest does not appear to have a significant impact on initiation in rival contexts, looking at the marginal effect of rivalry (as well as the marginal effect of selected regime types in non-rival contexts) as unrest increases offers a different picture of the effect unrest has indirectly on dispute initiation. Rivalry is a strong predictor of initiation across the range of unrest for democratic and single-party regimes in both sets of analyses. However, as unrest increases, the magnitude of the effect of rivalry on unrest decreases for democratic regimes and increases for single-party regimes. For personalist regimes, the effect of rivalry on initiation also increases in tandem with unrest, but is not significant at the high end of the range of unrest. For military regimes, the marginal effect of rivalry on initiation is insignificant for the entire range of unrest in the politically-relevant dyads analysis and for most of the range of unrest in the full-dataset analysis. In both analyses, the marginal effect of rivalry on initiation is initially positive, then decreases and turns negative as unrest intensifies. For democracies, the

[7] Only half-jokingly, this may mean that other states, including Israel may think twice about the consequences of democratic transitions in the Middle East given unrest has persisted throughout the transition period in many of these states.

marginal effect of rivalry on initiation is significant across the range of unrest, but decreases in magnitude as unrest increases in both sets of analyses.

Conclusion

The results from the analyses in Chapters Five and Six fail to strongly support the hypotheses offered in Chapter Three. However, the evidence in Chapter Six represents a closer match of expected results to theoretical expectations. While attempting to understand a seeming inconsistency between the rank-order of regimes in terms of the calculated marginal effect of unrest in rival environments and the generated likelihood of initiation against rivals, the full dance between the factors of rivalry, unrest, and regime type as they influence dispute initiation is revealed.

Several potential problems with the theoretical explanation and research design are discussed in this chapter. Excluding a discussion of the cultural differences between civilian and military leaders is offered as an explanation of the findings for military regimes in Chapter Six. The possibility for either a barrier to repression among military leaders or a predisposition for the external use of force can be conceived as either a psychological barrier or a psychological bias, which is incongruous with the overall theoretical explanation focused on structural constraints in Chapter Three. Design decisions made in Chapter Four are also isolated as potential explanations for results that failed to support the hypotheses. In particular, concerns over hybrid regimes, a failure to disaggregate the democratic regime category (related to theoretical misspecification), and issues with the use of unrest as an indicator of domestic conditions (particularly in the influence such events may have in rival environments) are mentioned as possible complicating issues.

The results summarized in this chapter are interesting and suggest future research topics. The results of the analyses in Chapter Five are strongly suggestive of variation in the conflict patterns of military and single-party regimes. This finding is relevant to the competing explanations, expectations, and findings of Lai and Slater (2006) and Weeks (2012) on the one hand, and Pickering and Kisangani (2010) on the other. The results offer limited support for Lai and Slater's and Weeks' work. The findings in Chapter Six suggest that the relationships between unrest, regime type, rivalry, and unrest are not direct and straightforward. An increasingly positive effect of rivalry on dispute initiation as unrest increases is consistent with theoretical expectations; however, this is found only for personalist and single-party regimes. A greater understanding of why the marginal effect of rivalry on dispute initiation decreases as unrest increases in military and democratic regimes is worthy of future exploration.

Building on the conclusions drawn in this chapter and the potential issues identified, the discussion in Chapter Eight paves a path forward for new research in diversion and comparative conflict behavior more generally.

CHAPTER EIGHT DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Introduction

Chapter Seven discusses the theoretically interesting findings of the analyses in Chapters Five and Six, and places these findings in the existing literature. Additionally, Chapter Seven highlights some potential problems with the research design. This chapter offers a way forward for future research programs. There are two major recommendations made for future research based on the lessons learned over the course of completing this dissertation. First, the move away from a simple division of regime types into democratic and non-democratic regimes types is a theoretically and empirically fruitful shift in the literature on international conflict behavior. However, researchers should not be satisfied with the useful, though problematic, regime typologies currently available. Second, diversion should be explained theoretically as one of several potential options leaders possess when facing unrest. Advancement of the diversionary literature will benefit from a greater theoretical discussion and empirical understanding of the options other than diversion leaders may select as a response to unrest.

Rethinking Regime Typology: A Universal Model

Improving Regime Type Classifications in Two Directions

Recent empirical work in the international conflict literature has highlighted the utility of disaggregating the non-democratic regime type. Weeks (2012), Pickering and Kisangani (2010) and Lai and Slater (2006) all find variation in the conflict behavior patterns among non-democratic regime types. The results in Chapters Five and Six support the decision of previous researchers to disaggregate non-democratic regime type. The results in Chapters Five and Six

are suggestive of differences among the four regime types included in the analysis; however, one cannot state that there is strong support for the hypotheses tested. If these recent findings are substantiated in future research, they will greatly improve the understanding of social scientists on the link between regime type and conflict. Further, these findings would improve the available evidence foreign-policy decision makers may reference when encountering regimes experiencing unrest. This, in turn, may reduce international conflict by educating decision-makers on the types of regimes and specific circumstances where conflict initiation is likely, allowing them to guide their state away from these risky environments. Reaching these goals, however, requires improving upon the current research design in the hopes that design changes will improve the strength and robustness of the presented results in this initial inquiry.

Two major shortcomings of the research design in the dissertation highlighted in Chapter Seven are a failure to disaggregate democratic regimes and potential problems of "hybrid" non-democratic regime coding. The division of democracies into separate types has also been shown to be empirically useful in diversionary research (e.g. Prins and Sprecher 1999; Brule and Williams 2009). Democratic leaders enjoying legislative majorities do face lower barriers to addressing unrest through policy reforms than their counterparts whose party does not hold a majority in the legislative branch. This division of policy powers is unique to democracies. This also suggests a full modeling of the institutional constraints on leader decision-making requires a further revision that accounts not only for variation across nondemocratic regimes, but also across democratic regimes. The failure of my argument and research design in Chapters Three and Four respectively to disaggregate democracies is mentioned as a potential explanation for the higher-than-expected effect of unrest on democratic dispute initiation in Chapter Seven. This

decision is made with the knowledge of previous research discussed in Chapter Two, and I assume that variation across democracies would have little substantive effect. One characteristic that would indicate an improved regime typology is the ability to clearly distinguish among different types of democracies.

The problem of hybrid regimes is encountered by anyone using the typology and dataset developed by Geddes. There are several objections to the use of "hybrid" regime typologies. First, coding a regime that shares characteristics of several ideal types as "1" on several type categories does not account for effective differences between an ideal type and a "hybrid" type. For example, a leader who heads a "pure" single-party regime is likely to face higher constraints in his decision-making than a leader heading a regime that is personalist/single-party. In the "pure" case, the leader is effectively accountable to the party to a great degree as there is greater dependence of the leader on the party for his continued tenure. In the "hybrid" case, the party is an instrument of the leader, and is far-less dependent on the party for his continued hold on office. As the relationship is skewed more in the leader's favor, the ability of the party to act as a constraining force on leader decision-making is much lower. Similarly, a "pure" personalist leader who does not underpin his rule with either the military or a party institution is far less constrained by other regime institutions than personalist/single-party or personalist/military regime leaders. This distinction should matter theoretically, and a coding of non-democratic regimes that does not adequately address the issue of hybrids may not effectively measure true differences in regime types.

Empirically, the problem of hybrid regimes is much clearer to illustrate. If a researcher chooses to code "1" for each regime type present in a hybrid regime (For example, "1" for both

personalist and single-party in the personalist/single-party case), the dataset used to test hypothesized relationships does not include measures that correspond directly to the concepts included in hypotheses. More directly stated, hypotheses offered that indicate differences between ideal types of nondemocratic regimes are tested using measures that are "polluted" by the inclusion of hybrids. The personalist category contains not only cases that closely fit the ideal or "pure" type, but also personalist regimes whose leaders are more accountable to single-party or military institutions than the theoretical argument suggests. The single-party category includes not only "pure" single-party regimes but also personalist regimes with single-party characteristics. This is similar for military regimes. The expected effect of including hybrids coded across two or more categories is a dataset where the actual differences between the ideal types offered in hypotheses are blurred in the estimated results. Otherwise stated, when the effect of single-party regime type on the relationship between domestic unrest and dispute initiation is tested with hybrids included, what we are really testing is the effect of regimes with single-party characteristics (these include single-party, personalist/single-party, personalist/military/single-party and military/single-party cases) on the relationship between domestic unrest and dispute initiation. The inclusion of hybrids coded in multiple categories therefore taints the estimated effect of single-party regimes by including cases where the effects of personalist and military regimes are also included in the estimated relationship due to this coding decision.

In short, results presented when hybrids are not excluded may represent estimates drawn where the lines between these regime types are blurred by coding decisions. Improved measures,

which eliminate the problem of hybrids, may in fact lead to results that are more supportive of the hypotheses offered in Chapter Three.

As mentioned in Chapter Seven, one remedy is to drop all hybrids, however this leads to the exclusion of more than a 12% of the cases, which are all non-democratic observations. This exclusion, further, is not distributed equally across non-democratic regime types, as more than 60% of military regime observations are dropped in my dataset, and 33% and 37% of single-party and personalist observations respectively. Dropping the personalist category altogether, as Lai and Slater (2006) suggest, is problematic as this results in single-party and military regime measures including both the ideal type and the personalist hybrid—two theoretically distinct regime types. Accounting for differences in these ideal types and hybrids is a necessary factor for an improved regime typology measure.

To summarize the above sections, future researchers interested in the possibility of variation across regime type in terms of conflict behavior should seek to use a regime typology that accounts for variation among democracies as well as democracies. Additionally, problems of coding hybrid regime types on the non-democratic side should be avoided if possible. An improved regime typology should include clear and distinct categories. The following section serves as a starting point for a new regime typology that could be used in future research.

Developing a New Typology for Use in Future Research

As a first step, the problem of hybrid non-democratic regime types is addressed using a typology already present in the literature. The Slater (2003) typology provides a foundation in the development of an improved regime type classification. Slater separates non-democracies on two dimensions: (1) despotic power (who decides? –Oligarchic or Autocratic decision-making)

and (2) infrastructural power (who executes?—Civilian or Military institutions). This yields four potential types: (1): Machines—oligarchic, civilian; (2) Juntas—oligarchic, military; (3) Bosses—autocratic, civilian; and (4) Strongmen—autocratic, military. This is shown in Table 8a. Again, the decision to use the Geddes typology was driven by two factors: (1) this typology is most widely-used in the comparative autocratic conflict literature to date and (2) data availability.

The Slater typology is helpful in distinguishing states' domestic and foreign policy decision-making institutions and resulting outcomes by dividing policy decision-making on two simple dimensions. These dimensions are extremely useful in understanding how a leader's decision-making is influenced by (1) decision-making power-sharing and (2) the manner in which the institutions possessed by a regime influences the implementation and likely success of a decision. As a result, empirical analyses using this classification of regimes are well-suited to testing hypotheses derived from arguments centered on leader decision-making. This classification also fits nicely with the policy constraints approach to explaining diversion as a function of institutionally-based constraints, a version of which was presented in Chapter Three.

The full Slater typology does not suffer from the same issues as the division of regimes in Lai and Slater (2006). Lai and Slater argue only infrastructural power differences matter. The despotic power dimension may matter as well, as Weeks (2012) illustrates. Lai and Slater's decision to collapse personalist regimes into the other two categories leads to a dataset where each non-democratic regime category contains regimes that are distinctly different in substantive ways. Personalist regimes, whether underpinned by parties or militaries, are qualitatively different from pure single-party and military types when the constraints placed on a leader are of

theoretical interest. Weeks (2012) disaggregates personalist regimes on the basis of their supporting institutions, following the full Slater typology. This classification allows researchers to retain the theoretically and empirically useful distinctions drawn on each dimension of leader power.

The decision to use the Slater classification also does not require the abandonment of the rich data collected by Barbara Geddes, data that underpin the most frequently used typology in comparative autocratic behavior. Weeks (2012) uses Geddes' raw data on non-democratic regimes to classify non-democracies into the Slater categories in her dataset. While she discards the widely-used Geddes typology, she is able to bolster the legitimacy of her dataset by (1) employing a classification previously included in the literature; and (2) where regimes are coded based on the data underpinning the most widely-used typology in the literature. The Slater typology, and the coding of regimes by Weeks (2012) into the Slater classification using Geddes' (1999; 2003) raw data, improves upon the Geddes classification used in the dissertation and addresses one of the two issues identified earlier—overcoming the problem of hybrid regimes.

Classifying regimes in this manner only allows for a typology that includes non-democratic regimes. Weeks (2012) includes democracies as a base category in her analyses. However, a full classification of regime type would more clearly abolish the dominant and increasingly uninteresting democratic/non-democratic divide. Democracies could conceivably be inserted into this two-dimensional framework by adding a third category to the despotic power dimension, as shown in Table 8b.

The typology in Table 8b does not address the second major issue with the current regime typology however. Previous research has indicated that empirical differences in conflict

behavior may exist across democracies as well, particularly when assessing divided government and/or party system characteristics. An improved design may include a division of regimes as shown in Table 8c. In the revised regime typology based on the two dimensions of power, the infrastructural power dimension remains unchanged. Infrastructural institutions underpinning a regime can be either civilian or military. The despotic power dimension does undergo some revisions however from Table 8b. In this new classification, despotic power is divided into three categories: (1) Non-monopolized pluralistic (divided government, no majority in legislature for democratic executives), (2) Monopolized pluralistic (old oligarchic—includes single-party regimes and democratic regimes where the executive's party enjoys a majority in the legislature), and (3) Solitary (old autocratic). These categories are listed from most to least constrained. This classification of regimes is seen as an improvement upon that in 8b, and is the typology suggested for use by future researchers.

The new typology of regime types improves upon the existing ones in several manners. First, it does not focus on disaggregating only democracies or non-democracies, and therefore can include all modern political regime types. Second, while the number of categories increases, the division of regimes is relatively simple. While some may argue the disaggregation of regime type into six categories rather than two or four may be less elegant and overly-burdensome, this criticism may be misplaced. At its core, the division of regimes relies on only two dimensions; therefore, the theoretical classification is relatively simple in practice. Third, it accounts for variation in the personalist regime type, which was assumed away by Lai and Slater (2006) but shown to be empirically useful by Weeks (2012). Fourth, it acknowledges the variation among democracies as well as variation among non-democracies, combining empirical findings on both

comparative autocratic conflict and comparative democratic conflict into one typology. Finally, it suggests that some democracies may behave similar to some non-democracies. In short similarities and differences are apparent across the old democracy/non-democracy division. This in itself is theoretically interesting.

On this final point, the new classification also allows for further testing of two of Weeks' (2012) contributions. First, she finds that democracies and machines are relatively similar in their conflict propensities. Importantly, her results indicate that while the likelihood of initiation is lower for democracies than for juntas, bosses, and strongmen, it may be marginally higher than for machines. This may be due to the treatment of all democracies operating in a similar environment. A future test could indicate whether the similarity for democracies and machines holds for all democracies, or for democracies where the leader's party in the legislature enjoys a majority (as I would theoretically expect) alone. Theoretically, the two regime types share similar levels of constraints on the pursuit of policy concessions.

A second area in which this categorization may add to Weeks' contribution is the exploration of the degree of impact the two dimensions of power have on dispute initiation. Does infrastructural power matter more than despotic power (as Lai and Slater argue), do both matter (as I argue), or are the effects of each dimension redundant (as Weeks argues). Looking at variations across these six categories may provide some greater insight into the relationship between despotic and infrastructural power.

Further Exploration of Non-Diversion Response Options

The argument in Chapter Three asserts that the probability a leader decides to select diversion may be influenced by the constraints presented by different regime types in the pursuit

of alternative options to address unrest. Generally, the arguments made in Chapter Three on the expected likelihood leaders of various regime types select options other than diversion are assumptions drawn from logically following the theoretical argument. A first step in improving our understanding of diversion from a policy constraints approach would be to assess the validity of these assumptions by empirically testing the likelihood leaders select each option other than diversion across regime types.

There are several additional areas where the theoretical explanations of these options may be improved upon. First, there is the possibility of response options that were not considered. At the present time, these four options seem to comprise the full set of options, although more options to deal with unrest may exist. Second, the theoretical argument presented in Chapter Three does not rank-order these four options in terms of leader preference were leaders operating in an environment where no constraints exist. The case may be that a rank-order preference is: policy concessions, repression, diversion, and resignation.[1] In short, leaders look first to offer

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[1] As a short aside, a simple allegory can be offered to more clearly explain this point. Imagine a man has a brain tumor and is experiencing debilitating headaches as a result. The tumor is unknown to him, so he reports to his four doctors that he is experiencing headaches. The doctors can choose several options to treat this man. The first doctor orders a battery of tests to find out the cause of the man's headaches, finds the man has a tumor, and treats the tumor. A successful treatment will eliminate the tumor, and therefore the headaches. This is the "policy concession" approach. The second doctor addresses these headaches by prescribing painkillers to reduce the intensity of the man's headaches. This "repression" approach treats the symptom but not the underlying cause. The third "diverting" doctor addresses these headaches by severely breaking a nurse's leg. The man is for a brief time oblivious to his headaches as his focus is entirely on panicked shrieking of the nurse and his moral repulsion of the doctor. The fourth doctor will hear the man's history of headaches, and rather than attempt to treat either the headaches or the tumor declares the case a medical mystery and passes the man off to a different doctor. If you were a doctor (or a leader facing unrest), which approach offers you the greatest possibility of a long-lasting medical career (or term in office)?

concessions. If this option is barred, they look next at repression, if concessions and repression are barred, only then do they look to divert. If all other options are perceived by a leader to be barred, he begins to negotiate his resignation. Table 8d illustrates the potential explanation.

An initial look at Table 8d suggests that the response option considered first based on constraints is policy concessions for democratic and single-party leaders and repression for personalist and military leaders as they are constrained from policy concessions. If some other factor than structural constraints (say, dynamic constraints) pushes leaders to reject policy concessions, democratic leaders select diversion as they are constrained from repression, while single-party leaders are free to repress. As single-party leaders are unconstrained on the first two options, they are least likely to divert. Democratic leaders, military leaders, and personalist leaders are similar in that all three share diversion as a second-most-likely option if their first preference is rejected as an option for reasons other than structural constraints (such as the type of demands or refusal of the military to follow orders to repress). This explanation, in its limited form, only explains the finding that single-party regimes are not likely to respond to unrest with international dispute initiation. Accounting for the potential that some responses may be preferable to others under unconstrained conditions is a potentially useful addition to the theoretical explanation in Chapter Three, and should be explored in full in future research projects.

Another important suggestion for future research is a closer look at the options other than diversion. In general, the literature on policy reforms, repression, and resignation is underdeveloped when compared to that of diversion. The problem is most acute in the study of resignation, where few if any comprehensive studies have been undertaken. A greater

understanding of, and improved measures of the other options available to leaders, may be as beneficial to diversionary researchers as improved measures of regime type.

Policy concessions may be risky for a leader to offer and implement. The focus of policy is different across events. Policies by states address economic redistribution, social policy, leadership selection, and political participation among other issue areas. The issue that policy reforms are expected to address may matter for leaders. Meeting reform demands is particularly risky if these reforms alter the rules of leader selection. Even marginal alterations to the rules of leader selection introduce uncertainty to a leader's hold on office. A leader who has attained office under a specific set of institutionalized rules for leader selection may not be confident that he will remain victorious over potential political rivals when the rules of the game have changed. In general, concessions over issues related to leader selection, the expansion of political participation, and the balance of decision-making across a regime's institutions may be less likely to occur than concessions on social or economic issues. Concession on "political" issues may represent in themselves a threat to leader survival that is greater than that posed by unrest.

The likelihood leaders are faced with protesters demanding alterations to the policy-making apparatus, including leader selection, may however be related to regime type. Democratic leaders are least likely to face unrest driven by demands for reform over leader selection rules or leader powers. Democracies possess regime institutions that allow the greatest proportion of the population to participate in leader selection. Single-party regimes may have the second-largest proportion of regime inhabitants participating in leader selection. Further, given the widespread cooption of groups by single-party regimes compared to military and personalist regimes, they may be second-least likely to face such demands. Military and

personalist regimes are most likely to experience public unrest driven by demands for political reforms. It may be the case that not only are these types of regime most constrained from pursuing policy concessions due to the institutional makeup defining these regimes, but also the most constrained based on the likely reform demands they may face. As military leaders frequently rely on the implicit approval of the military rank-and-file as well as the military elite for their continued hold on office, the proportion of inhabitants with a voice in leader selection and policy-making may be marginally higher than the proportion of inhabitants with a voice in leader selection and policy-making in personalist regimes.

A major obstacle in the quantitative analysis of policy concession is a lack of data. At the time of writing, there is no known time-series, cross-sectional measure of policy reforms. This poses a significant challenge for scholars interested in this outcome. Future work on policy concessions as a response should take the possibility that different demands require different types of policy concessions into account. The study of policy concessions should seek out cases where policy demands were voiced in a state, then measure the nature of demands, whether those demands were met or not met, and if what sort of policies were offered as a response if any.

The literature on repression is more developed than the literature on policy concessions. Within the comparative politics literature and some international relations literature, repression is widely-discussed in conjunction with diversion (e.g. Miller 1995; Gelpi 1997; Enterline and Gleditsch 2000) or alone as an outcome of interest. The vast majority of research on repression, however, employs either formal modeling or qualitative analysis. While there are available measures for repression, the two most commonly-used measures suffer from serious deficiencies, which call into question the validity of quantitative results generated through their use. The PTS

(Political Terror Scale) dataset of Gibney, Cornett, and Wood (2012) relies on scores assigned for states by the US State Department and Amnesty International. The US State Department measure omits a key state (the US) and has a considerable amount of missing data, both across the population of states and for the states included, across years. Additionally, given these data come from the US State Department, there are some questions of coder bias. The Amnesty International Scores suffer from the same issues.[2] The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database (Cingranelli and Richards 2010) is likely a stronger dataset for researchers interested in repression. The major benefit of this dataset are the inclusion of both an overall measure and the component parts, allowing researchers to select what they believe are the most central state actions comprising repression. These data do have some limitations however. First, the component parts are ordinal numbers based on coder decisions rather than raw statistics on repression incidents. Second, the time period covered is somewhat limited. Finally, the CIRI data do have issues with missing data points.[3]

Future researchers of repression would be well advised to develop new measures of repression based on either the number of repressive incidents per year, the total casualties as a result of repression per year, or the total number of individuals affected by repression per year

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[2] If you are in need of some humor (or alternatively want to be depressed depending on your mood) after reading all of this, look up the US scores for recent years and see the state-years with similar scores.

[3] In previous work, I have used changes year-to-year in the CIRI component physical integrity score as a measure for repression. This coding also has limitations. First, the scores do not vary considerably over time within panels. Second, regimes previously coded as repressive may not have far to move if at all on the index from year-to-year- in spite of the occurrence of a fresh wave of government violence against the population. In general, using these measures indicated democracies were most likely to respond to unrest with repression. This is counterintuitive given many democratic regimes have constitutional barriers to repression (Gelpi 1997), and may indicate this measure is problematic.

(include deaths, injuries, imprisonment, displacement, etc.). Effective controls, such as the presence of paramilitary groups as domestically-focused security forces, and the size of these groups should also be measured. Existing data on defense expenditures may provide a rough control, but measures emphasizing the development of organizations whose purpose is the suppression of domestic opposition would be improvements. Repression is not only morally reprehensible but is also much more frequent than interstate conflict in the current international system, as such it is a useful area of inquiry not only for researchers of diversionary conflict, but also of researchers of international conflict more generally, as well as for researchers interested in domestic conflict and human security. It is a political outcome that deserves a much greater role in the literature and improved measures for effective quantitative analysis.

Like policy concessions, resignation is an outcome for which quantitative data were found to be absent. While not used in the analyses of the dissertation, I have collected data on resignations using the Archigos 2.9 (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) list of leaders. The impressions gained while collecting these data and some preliminary findings based on these data are worth mentioning. The first conclusion drawn on resignations is that this phenomenon is a political outcome understudied in the literature. Few, if any, studies exist that focus on resignation as a key dependent or independent variable. Second, despite the high degree to which leaders are assumed to value retaining office stated either explicitly or implied by diversionary research, leader resignation is a fairly common event. A preliminary look at the data reveals over 120 resignations by leaders since World War II. Additionally, resignation seems to occur most frequently in democracies. This suggests that expectation of post-tenure fate is a core component on the likelihood leaders resign. This also suggests that a focus on the

regular replacement mechanism (elections) found in democracies does not lead democratic leaders to hold on throughout a term and explore diversion as a possibility to boost sagging electoral chances.

While the literature on resignation is underdeveloped, the argument developed in Chapter Three does seem to match a preliminary look at the data, and uses the available research on leader fate and regular replacement mechanisms to reconcile these two points. Democratic leaders are relatively unconstrained in the decision to resign as the presence of regular replacement mechanisms lowers the expected costs of losing office (measured as post-tenure fate), and in fact appear much more likely to resign.

The real puzzle those interested in resignation have to address is why leaders of regime types where the cost of losing office is high (personalist and military regimes) choose to do so. A step in the right direction would be an explanation that accounts for the presence or absence of leader replacement mechanisms, the related post-tenure fate of leaders who are replaced either regularly or irregularly, and domestic bargaining. Such an argument may look something like the following. The public or other political elites have a desire to remove a leader from office and replace him with a preferable alternative. Additionally, the public has the potential and perhaps the desire to punish a leader severely (exile, imprisonment, death) once he is removed. A leader desires to retain office, but also his wealth, freedom, and life. As violent removal likely involves steep costs in blood or treasure, both sides have an incentive to reach an agreement that satisfies all sides before violence breaks out (similar to Fearon's (1995) explanation of interstate war as an *ex post* inefficient outcome).

The public (or other political elites) bargain with a leader to remove him for office (resign rather than being forced out violently) in return for guarantees of a leader's safety or immunity from prosecution post-removal. Essentially, leaders and publics know that removing a leader by force (irregularly) is a costly and risky proposition. The leader knows taking a gamble that he can survive a coup or other violent removal attempt also carries high risks. Leaders of regimes lacking regular replacement mechanisms are therefore expected to reach an agreement to resign under certain conditions. Understanding these conditions could be a fruitful direction for future researchers to move towards. A greater understanding of these conditions could also be relevant for policy-makers who would prefer peaceful leader removal in autocratic regimes to the recent examples of Libya and Syria. Referencing the Libya example, the West's decision to refuse Gaddafi's alleged plea for immunity at the ICC in return for his resignation could then be seen as bad policy if the true interests of NATO were the return of peace and stability to Libya.

Future research on diversion that includes theoretical explanations of diversion as one of several response options will be greatly aided by further identification and exploration of all potential options in the response set. In addition, future research that improves our understanding of the conditions under which each of these options is likely to be selected will improve our knowledge of the conflict patterns of regimes experiencing deteriorating domestic conditions. Finally, improving our knowledge of leader preferences for each of these options under conditions where response option selection is unconstrained may also enhance our understanding of diversionary behavior by states.

Conclusion

To conclude, two general suggestions are offered. First, researchers should seek out improved regime typologies. Based initially on the Slater (2003), the presented alternative typology includes both democracies and non-democracies. Importantly, this typology divides regimes on two dimensions of power, recognizes potentially important distinctions within both democratic and non-democratic regime types, and relies on the same dimensions to separate out various types of democracies as well as various types of nondemocracies. Second, an improved understanding of the options leaders possess as responses to domestic unrest is recommended. There is comparatively little empirical work present in the literature on repression, resignation, and policy concessions. Improving our understanding of where and when leaders are likely to pursue such strategies should provide greater illumination of the conditions where and when leaders select diversion.

The question of when leaders are likely to divert is of considerable interest to policy-makers. Understanding when and where diversion is likely educates international political actors on the conditions where they should tread carefully in their interactions with other states. Additionally, the related question of how leaders respond to unrest, and where and when all of these options are expected to be selected, provides the international community with greater information that may be used to prepare for and possibly prevent outcomes damaging to human security such as repression and diversion. Finally, answering the related questions of what conditions are likely to lead to diversion, and what conditions are likely to lead to options other than diversion are highly salient at all times in the international system. Domestic unrest is present at some level in many states in the international system each year. This is a chronic

event in the population of states comprising the international system as recent events in the Middle East dramatically illustrate. Consideration and understanding of the likely fall-out—domestically and internationally—of rising domestic unrest is therefore incredibly relevant for international political actors, populations of states experiencing waves of domestic unrest, and the populations of states interacting with unstable neighbors.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Tables Referenced in Dissertation Text

Table 1a: Examples of Each Regime Type Included in the Dissertation

Personalist	***Military***
Dominican Republic, 1966-1977	Guatemala, 1963-1965
Nicaragua, 1936-1978	Ecuador, 1972-1978
Paraguay, 1948-1953	Peru, 1968-1978
Spain, 1939-1977	Brazil, 1964-1985
Guinea-Bissau, 1980-1998	Thailand, 1958-1972
Ghana, 1981-2000	South Korea, 1961-1986
Central African Republic, 1966-1978	Syria, 1949-1953
Libya, 1951-2011	Chad, 1975-1978
Yemen, 1990-2012	Nigeria, 1966-1978
Afghanistan, 1973-1978	Greece, 1967-1974
Single-Party	***Democracy***
Mongolia, 1924-1989	United States, 1789-present
Grenada, 1979-1982	Chile, 1989-present
Mexico, 1929-1995	Ireland, 1922-present
Guyana, 1966-1979	Benin, 1960-1962
Albania, 1946-1990	Uganda, 1962-1965
Senegal, 1960-1999	Somalia, 1960-1968
Sierra Leone, 1968-1991	Turkey, 1960-1970
Rwanda, 1962-1972	Comoros, 1996-1998
Cambodia, 1975-1978	Uruguay, 1967-1972
Soviet Union, 1917-1990	Liechtenstein, 1921-present

Table 3a: Post-Tenure Fate of Leaders in the Dataset, by Regime Type

	Regime Type			
	Democracy	Single-Party	Military	Personalist
Fine, 6 months after leaving office	688 88.66%	97 63.82%	111 52.36%	65 40.37%
Exile	46 5.93%	27 17.76%	44 20.75%	45 27.95%
Imprisonment (including house arrest)	30 3.87%	18 11.84%	38 17.92%	25 15.53%
Death	12 1.55%	10 6.58%	19 8.96%	26 16.15%
Total	776	152	212	161

Table 3b: Institutional Constraints on Each Alternative Option,

Effects on Probability of Diversion

	Policy Con.	*Effect on Diversion*	**Repression**	*Effect on Diversion*	**Resignation**	*Effect on Diversion*	*Overall Effect*
Democracy	Low	-	High	+	Very Low	- -	- -
Single-Party	Low	-	Low	-	Low	-	- - -
Military	High	+	Lowest	- -	High	+	0
Personalist	High	+	Low	-	Very High	+ +	+ +

Note: Positive and negative signs indicate the direction of the effect constraints for each option (and the combined effect in the final column) has on the probability of diversion. The number of positive or negative signs indicates degree or magnitude of this effect. This representation is a rough approximation of the expected effect based on the theoretical argument. The "overall effect" is the aggregate positive or negative effect of constraints on the probability of diversion where positives and negatives cancel out.

Table 5a: Domestic Unrest, Regime Type, and Dispute Initiation: All Dyads 1946-2000

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Domestic Unrest	***0.044****	***0.048****	0.011	0.016
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Personalist		***0.406****	***0.397****	.
		(0.081)	(0.084)	
*Unrest*Per*			0.005	
			(0.026)	
Military		0.151	0.02	**-0.377***
		(0.122)	(0.136)	(0.135)
*Unrest*Military*			**0.073***	*0.068**
			(0.027)	(0.030)
Democracy		***-0.248****	***-0.303****	***-0.699****
		(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.076)
*Unrest*Democracy*			*0.040**	0.035
			(0.016)	(0.021)
Single-Party				***-0.397****
				(0.084)
*Unrest*Single-Party*				-0.005
				(0.026)
Capabilities	-0.113***	-0.092***	-0.091***	-0.091***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Distance	-0.190***	-0.210***	-0.207***	-0.207***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Contiguity	3.261***	3.220***	3.234***	3.234***
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Initiation Years	-0.228***	-0.232***	-0.232***	-0.232***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
_spline1	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
_spline2	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
_spline3	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-4.168***	-4.035***	-4.027***	-3.630***
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Chi-squared	6619.76	6789.79	6772.94	6772.94
N	844046	844046	844046	844046

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Logit analysis. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5b: Marginal Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Each Regime Type:

All Dyads 1946-2000

	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
ME	0.016	0.084	0.051	0.011
SE	0.021	0.021	0.003	0.016
t	0.783	***3.951***	***16.611***	0.683
Pos. to Neg.	Military	Democracy	Personalist	Single-Party

Table 5c: Substantive Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation at Selected Values of Unrest: All Dyads, 1946-2000

		Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
Domestic Incidents	*0*	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001
	5	+9.1%	+52.6%	+28.8%	+5.9%
	15	+34.3%	+267.7%	+113.7%	+21.2%
	25	+72.6%	+827.0%	+254.9%	+42.5%

Estimated probability of dispute initiation is reported for unrest value of 0; percent change from base estimate is reported for 5, 15, 25 incidents of unrest.

Table 5d: Domestic Unrest, Regime Type, and Dispute Initiation:

Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-2000

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Domestic Unrest	***0.015****	***0.019****	-0.009	*0.055**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Personalist		**0.263***	0.194	
		(0.097)	(0.101)	
*Unrest*Pers.*			*0.064**	
			(0.027)	
Military		*0.357**	0.249	0.055
		(0.139)	(0.157)	(0.161)
*Unrest*Mil.*			0.066	0.002
			(0.035)	(0.038)
Democracy		***-0.269****	***-0.307****	***-0.500****
		(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.092)
*Unrest*Dem.*			0.029	-0.035
			(0.017)	(0.022)
Single-Party				-0.194
				(0.101)
*Unrest*Single-Party*				*-0.064**
				(0.027)
Capabilities	-0.352***	-0.339***	-0.338***	-0.338***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Distance	-0.215***	-0.205***	-0.205***	-0.205***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Initiation Years	-0.243***	-0.242***	-0.241***	-0.241***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
_spline1	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
_spline2	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
_spline3	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-0.384*	-0.428*	-0.400*	-0.207
	(0.175)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.186)
Chi-squared	1702.08	1775.41	1794.5	1794.5
N	87045	87045	87045	87045

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Logit analysis. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5e: Marginal Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Each Regime Type:

Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-2000

	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
ME	0.055	0.057	0.020	-0.009
SE	0.022	0.031	0.004	0.016
t	***2.498***	1.817	***5.504***	-0.550
Pos. to Neg.	Military	Personalist	Democracy	Single-Party

Table 5f: Substantive Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation at Selected Values of Unrest: Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-2000

		Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
Domestic Incidents	*0*	0.007	0.008	0.004	0.006
	5	+32.3%	+34.6%	+10.4%	-4.0%
	15	+140.0%	+158.5%	+34.7%	-9.8%
	25	+353.0%	+425.7%	+64.5%	-13.1%

Estimated probability of dispute initiation is reported for unrest value of 0; percent change from base estimate is reported for 5, 15, 25 incidents of unrest.

Table 5g: Summary of Results

Hypothesis 1	All Dyads, + to -	Politically-Relevant, + to -
Personalist	Military*	Military
Military	Democracy*	Personalist*
Democracy	Personalist	Democracy*
Single-Party	Single-Party	Single-Party

*****Indicates conditional marginal effect found to be significant.

Table 6a: Domestic Unrest, Rivalry, Regime Type and Dispute Initiation;

All Dyads, 1946-1992

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Domestic Unrest	***0.029****	***0.034****	-0.029	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Rivalry	**1.730****	**1.697****	***1.901****	***1.224****
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.176)	(0.163)
*Unrest*Rivalry*			0.029	0.028
			(0.050)	(0.045)
Personalist		***0.560****	***0.722****	
		(0.092)	(0.108)	
*Unrest*Pers.*			0.024	
			(0.039)	
*Rivalry*Pers.*			**-0.677***	
			(0.220)	
*Riv.*Unrest*Per.*			-0.001	
			(0.067)	
Military		0.174	0.226	**-0.497***
		(0.134)	(0.164)	(0.161)
*Unrest*Mil.*			***0.116****	*0.092**
			(0.033)	(0.038)
*Rivalry*Mil.*			*-0.787**	-0.11
			(0.365)	(0.361)
*Riv.*Unrest*Mil.*			-0.093	-0.091
			(0.072)	(0.069)
Democracy		***-0.285****	***-0.450****	***-1.172****
		(0.085)	(0.106)	(0.107)
*Unrest*Dem.*			**0.074***	0.05
			(0.025)	(0.031)
*Rivalry*Dem.*			0.342	***1.019****
			(0.208)	(0.203)
*Riv.*Unrest*Dem.*			-0.058	-0.057
			(0.051)	(0.046)
Single-Party				***-0.722****
				(0.108)
*Unrest*Sin.-Par.*				-0.024
				(0.039)
*Rivalry*Sin.-Par.*				***0.677****
				(0.220)
*Riv.*Unrest*S.-P.*				0.001
				(0.067)

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Logit analysis; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6a, cont.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Capabilities	-0.008	0.015	0.019	0.019
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Distance	-0.176***	-0.182***	-0.194***	-0.194***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Contiguity	2.753***	2.754***	2.749***	2.749***
	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Initiation Years	-0.197***	-0.202***	-0.204***	-0.204***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
_spline1	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
_spline2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
_spline3	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-4.633***	-4.665***	-4.584***	-3.862***
	(0.375)	(0.378)	(0.377)	(0.386)
Chi-squared	5783.73	5946.59	5961.40	5961.40
N	588725	588725	588725	588725

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Logit analysis; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6b: Marginal Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation

for All Regime Types in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts; All Dyads, 1946-1992

	Rival			
	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
ME	0.023	0.024	0.017	0.001
SE	0.033	0.047	0.008	0.043
t	0.704	0.519	***1.968***	0.020
Pos. to Neg.	Military	Personalist	Democracy	Single-Party
	Non-Rival			
	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
ME	-0.005	0.088	0.045	-0.029
SE	0.030	0.023	0.003	0.024
t	-0.158	***3.823***	***13.033***	-1.169
Pos. to Neg.	Military	Democracy	Personalist	Single-Party

Table 6c: Substantive Effect of Domestic Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for All Regime Types; All Dyads, 1946-1992

		Rival			
		Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
Domestic Incidents	*0*	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004
	5	+13.8%	+12.2%	+8.3%	+1.7%
	15	+60.8%	+65.6%	+27.7%	+22.1%
	25	+154.2%	+196.6%	+51.6%	+77.9%

		Non-Rival			
		Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
Domestic Incidents	*0*	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001
	5	-1.4%	+55.4%	+25.5%	-13.1%
	15	+2.8%	+288.5%	+97.7%	-31.5%
	25	+16.9%	+913.5%	+211.7%	-42.7%

Estimated probability of dispute initiation is reported for unrest value of 0; percent change from base estimate is reported for 5, 15, 25 incidents of unrest.

Table 6d: Domestic Unrest, Rivalry, Regime Type, and Dispute Initiation;

Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Domestic Unrest	0.008	*0.013***	-0.048	0.055
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.025)	(0.031)
Rivalry	***1.544****	***1.494****	***1.532****	***1.276****
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.171)	(0.184)
*Unrest*Rivalry*			0.049	-0.019
			(0.046)	(0.047)
Personalist		**0.306****	*0.326**	
		(0.113)	(0.145)	
*Unrest*Pers.*			**0.104****	
			(0.040)	
*Rivalry*Pers.*			-0.256	
			(0.241)	
*Riv.*Unrest*Per.*			-0.067	
			(0.066)	
Military		*0.383**	**0.600****	0.274
		(0.155)	(0.192)	(0.207)
*Unrest*Mil.*			*0.117**	0.013
			(0.046)	(0.050)
*Rivalry*Mil.*			**-1.047****	*-0.792**
			(0.383)	(0.391)
*Riv.*Unrest*Mil.*			-0.092	-0.025
			(0.076)	(0.076)
Democracy		**-0.244****	***-0.424****	***-0.750****
		(0.092)	(0.118)	(0.143)
*Unrest*Dem.*			*0.065**	-0.039
			(0.025)	(0.032)
*Rivalry*Dem.*			0.382	**0.638****
			(0.215)	(0.229)
*Riv.*Unrest*Dem.*			-0.055	0.012
			(0.047)	(0.048)
Single-Party				*-0.326**
				(0.145)
*Unrest*Sin.-Par.*				**-0.104****
				(0.040)
*Rivalry*Sin.-Par.*				0.256
				(0.241)
*Riv.*Unrest*S.-P.*				0.067
				(0.066)

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Logit analysis; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6d, cont.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Capabilities	-0.236***	-0.229***	-0.217***	-0.217***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Distance	-0.137***	-0.118**	-0.127***	-0.127***
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Initiation Years	-0.179***	-0.180***	-0.181***	-0.181***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
_spline1	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
_spline2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
_spline3	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.749***	-1.858***	-1.791***	-1.465***
	(0.250)	(0.264)	(0.265)	(0.267)
Chi-squared	1722.12	1771.01	1757.39	1757.39
N	62189	62189	62189	62189

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Logit analysis; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6e: Marginal Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation for All Regime Types in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992

			Rival	
	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
ME	0.037	0.025	0.010	0.000
SE	0.035	0.045	0.008	0.039
t	1.052	0.552	1.212	0.010
Pos. to Neg.	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
			Non-Rival	
	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
ME	0.055	0.068	0.016	-0.048
SE	0.031	0.039	0.005	0.025
t	1.768	1.757	***3.188***	*-1.946*
Pos. to Neg.	Military	Personalist	Democracy	Single-Party

Table 6f: Substantive Effect of Domestic Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for All Regime Types; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992

		Rival			
		Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
Domestic Incidents	0	0.031	0.019	0.028	0.029
	5	+20.1%	+13.2%	+4.7%	+1.1%
	15	+86.6%	+66.1%	+15.3%	+14.8%
	25	+205.9%	+178.9%	+27.6%	+46.8%
		Non-Rival			
		Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
Domestic Incidents	0	0.009	0.012	0.004	0.006
	5	+32.3%	+40.7%	+33.6%	-20.4%
	15	+147.8%	+204.8%	+155.8%	-47.3%
	25	+395.6%	+598.3%	+430.4%	-62.8%

Estimated probability of dispute initiation is reported for unrest value of 0; percent change from base estimate is reported for 5, 15, 25 incidents of unrest.

Table 6g: Summary of Relevant Results for Hypotheses 2-5

Hypothesis 2	Hypothesis 3	Hypothesis 4	Hypothesis 5
No Effect For Non-Rival	**Ordering**	*No Effect for Democracy in Rival*	**Ordering**
Significant	*Personalist*	*Significant*	*Personalist*
Military (All dyads)	*Military*	Rival (All dyads)	*Military*
Democracy (both)	*Democracy*	Non-Rival(both)	*Single-Party*
	Single-Party		

Order of Effect of Unrest Conditioned by Regime Type and Rival Context

All Dyads, ME	All Dyads, Substantive Effect	Politically-Relevant, ME	Politically-Relevant, Substantive Effect
Military	Military	**Personalist**	Personalist
Personalist	Personalist	**Military**	Military
Democracy*	Single-Party	**Democracy**	Single-Party
Single-Party	Democracy	**Single-Party**	Democracy

*Indicates the marginal effect of unrest is significant

Table 7a: Results from Chapter Five Compared to Hypothesis 1

		Hypothesis 1		
Expected Order	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
Order in All-Dyads Analysis				
	Military	Democracy	Personalist	Single-Party
Significant?	Yes	Yes	No	No
Order in Politically-Relevant-Dyads Analysis				
	Military	Personalist	Democracy	Single-Party (neg.)
Significant?	No	Yes	Yes	No

Table 7b: Results from Chapter Six

		All-Dyads Analysis		
Order Under Rival Conditions				
	Military	Personalist	Democracy	Single-Party
Significant?	No	No	Yes	No
Order Under Non-Rival Conditions				
	Military	Democracy	Personalist (neg.)	Single-Party (neg.)
Significant?	Yes	Yes	No	No
		Politically-Relevant-Dyads Analysis		
Order Under Rival Conditions				
	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
Significant?	No	No	No	No
Order Under Non-Rival Conditions				
	Military	Personalist	Democracy	Single-Party (neg.)
Significant?	No	No	Yes	Close

Table 7c: Assessing Support for Hypotheses 2-5 Based on Results in Chapter Six

<u>*Hypothesis 2*</u>	*There is no effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation in non-rival dyads, regardless of regime type.*
Supported?	No. there is variation across regime types in the magnitude and direction of the effect of unrest on dispute initiation in non-rival environments. For some regime types this effect is significant. This holds in both sets of analyses in Chapter Six
<u>*Hypothesis 3*</u>	*The effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation will be largest for personalist regimes, followed by military regimes, democratic regimes, and single-party regimes in rival dyads.*
Supported?	Somewhat. In the full-dataset analysis in Chapter Six, the order was military, personalist, democracy, single-party. In the politically-relevant-dyads analysis, it was personalist, military, democracy, single-party. Further, the conditional marginal effect of unrest is insignificant for all regime types in rival contexts in the politically-relevant-dyads analysis and significant for democracies alone in the full-dataset analysis.
<u>*Hypothesis 4*</u>	*There is no significant effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation for democratic regimes in rival dyads.*
Supported?	No. The marginal effect of unrest on democratic dispute initiation was significant in rival contexts in the full-dataset analysis. Additionally, the results do not match expectations implied by the theoretical argument. In both analyses in Chapter Six, the conditional marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation in non-rival contexts was positive and significant for democracies.
<u>*Hypothesis 5*</u>	*The effect of increasing domestic unrest on the probability of interstate dispute initiation by non-democratic regimes will be largest for personalist regimes, followed by military regimes, and single-party regimes in rival dyads.*
Supported?	No. In both analyses in Chapter Six, the conditional marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation in rival contexts was insignificant for all non-democratic regime types. For the full-dataset analysis, the order was military, personalist, single-party. For the analyses restricted to politically-relevant dyads, the order was—as expected—personalist, military, single-party. However, the significant effect of unrest on initiation against rivals by democracies in the full-dataset analysis contradicts the underlying argument for Hypothesis 5. If Hypothesis 4 is not supported, Hypothesis 5 is not supported either.

Table 7d: Non-Democratic Regime Type and the Problem of Omitting Hybrid Regime Types; Full Dataset

		Personalist	Military	Single-Party
# of obs. coded as Hybrids	**131745**			
# of obs. coded as Non-hybrid†	**895623**			
% coded as hybrid	*12.82%*			
Prior to Hybrid Exclusion		257149	131745	271238
After Hybrid Exclusion		161973	51970	182382
Difference		95176	79775	88856
% Excluded		*37.01%*	*60.55%*	*32.76%*

†Includes non-democracies and democracies, and represents the full number of observations in the full dataset.

Table 7e: Initiation as a Rare Event

	All	Personalist	Military	Single-Party	Democracy
			Full Dataset		
Total dyads used in Chapter Five analysis	**844046**				
Total dyads used in Chapter Six analysis	**588725**				
Dyads with Initiations	1338	356	91	307	584
% Chapter Five obs.	*0.16%*	*0.04%*	*0.01%*	*0.04%*	*0.07%*
Initiations and Unrest	562	73	45	66	378
% Chapter Five obs.	*0.07%*	*0.01%*	*0.01%*	*0.01%*	*0.04%*
Initiations, Rivalry, Unrest	130	20	10	20	80
% Chapter Six obs.	*0.02%*	*0.00%*	*0.00%*	*0.00%*	*0.01%*
			Politically-Relevant-Dyads Dataset		
Total dyads used in Chapter Five analysis	**87045**				
Total dyads used in Chapter Six analysis	**62189**				
Dyads with Initiations	1031	213	74	271	473
% Chapter Five obs.	*1.18%*	*0.24%*	*0.09%*	*0.31%*	*0.54%*
Initiations and Unrest	459	52	31	64	312
% Chapter Five obs.	*0.53%*	*0.06%*	*0.04%*	*0.07%*	*0.36%*
Initiations, Rivalry, Unrest	122	18	10	20	74
% Chapter Six obs.	*0.20%*	*0.03%*	*0.02%*	*0.03%*	*0.12%*

Table 7f: Summarizing Direction and Significance of the Marginal Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation Across All Models

	Personalist	Military	Democracy	Single-Party
Chapter Five				
Full	Positive	**Positive**	**Positive**	Positive
Politically- Relevant	**Positive**	Positive	**Positive**	Negative
Chapter Six				
Rival, Full	Positive	Positive	**Positive**	Positive
Rival, Politically-Relevant	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
Non-Rival, Full	Negative	**Positive**	**Positive**	Negative
Non-Rival, Politically-Relevant	Positive	Positive	**Positive**	*Negative*

Note : Bold indicates the marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation is statistically significant. Italics indicates the marginal effect of unrest on dispute initiation approaches but does not reach statistical significance.

Table 8a: Slater (2003) Typology of Non-Democratic Regimes

		Despotic Power	
		Oligarchic	*Autocratic*
			Least Constrained
Infrastructural Power	*Civilian*	Machine	Boss
	Military	Junta	Strongman

Table 8b: A New Regime Typology I

		Despotic Power		
		Pluralistic	*Oligarchic*	*Autocratic*
		Most Constrained		Least Constrained
Infrastructural Power	*Civilian*	Democracy	Machine	Boss
	Military		Junta	Strongman

Table 8c: A New Regime Typology II, A Universal Model

			Despotic Power	
		Non-Monopolized Pluralistic	*Monopolized Pluralistic*	*Solitary*
		Most Constrained		Least Constrained
Infrastructural Power	*Civilian*	Democracy w/o Leg. Majority Party	Machine Democracy w/ Leg. Majority Party	Boss
	Military		Junta	Strongman

Table 8d: Response Options Reconsidered

		Structural Constraints by Regime Type			
		Democracy	*Single-Party*	*Military*	*Personalist*
Most Favored	*Policy Concessions*	Low(1)	Low(1)	Barred(4)	Barred(4)
	Repression	Barred(4)	Low(2)	Low(1)	Low(1)
	Diversion	Low(2)	Low(3)	Low(2)	Low(2)
Least Favored	*Resignation*	Lowest(3)	Low(4)	High(3)	Highest(3)

Likely Response Ordering in Parentheses

APPENDIX B: Figures Referenced in Dissertation Text



Figure 5a: Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation for Personalist Regimes, with Confidence Intervals: All Dyads 1946-2000

Figure 5b: Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation for Military Regimes, with Confidence Intervals: All Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5c: Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation for Democratic Regimes, with Confidence Intervals: All Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5d: Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation for Single-Party Regimes, with Confidence Intervals: All Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5e: Probability of Dispute Initiation as Domestic Unrest Increases, Comparing Regime Types: All Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5f: Probability of Dispute Initiation at Zero Domestic Unrest Incidents, Comparing Regime Types: All Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5g: Probability of Dispute Initiation at Five Domestic Unrest Incidents, Comparing Regime Types: All Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5h: Probability of Dispute Initiation at Fifteen Domestic Unrest Incidents, Comparing Regime Types: All Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5i: Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation for Personalist Regimes, with Confidence Intervals: Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5j: Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation for Military Regimes, with Confidence Intervals: Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5k: Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation for Democratic Regimes, with Confidence Intervals: Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5l: Effect of Unrest on Probability of Dispute Initiation for Single-Party Regimes, with Confidence Intervals: Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5m: Probability of Dispute Initiation as Domestic Unrest Increases, Comparing Regime Types: Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5n: Probability of Dispute Initiation at Zero Domestic Unrest Incidents, Comparing Regime Types: Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5o: Probability of Dispute Initiation at Five Domestic Unrest Incidents, Comparing Regime Types: Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-2000



Figure 5p: Probability of Dispute Initiation at Fifteen Domestic Unrest Incidents, Comparing Regime Types: Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-2000

Figure 6a: Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Personalist Regimes in Rival Context, with Confidence Intervals; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6b: Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Military Regimes in Rival Context, with Confidence Intervals; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6c: Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Democratic Regimes in Rival Context, with Confidence Intervals; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6d: Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Single-Party Regimes in Rival Context, with Confidence Intervals; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6e: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival Contexts across Regime Type; All Dyads, 1946-1992

Figure 6f: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for Personalist Regimes; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6g: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for Military Regimes; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6h: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for Democratic Regimes; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6i: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for Democratic Regimes; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6j: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Non-Rival Contexts across Regime Type; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6k: Likelihood of Dispute Initiation against Non-Rival State for Each Regime Type at Zero Unrest Incidents; All Dyads 1946-1992



Figure 6l: Likelihood of Dispute Initiation against Non-Rival State for Each Regime Type at Five Unrest Incidents; All Dyads 1946-1992



Figure 6m: Likelihood of Dispute Initiation against Non-Rival State for Each Regime Type at Fifteen Unrest Incidents; All Dyads 1946-1992



Figure 6n: Marginal Effect of Rivalry across Limited Range of Unrest for Personalist Regimes; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6o: Marginal Effect of Rivalry across Limited Range of Unrest for Military Regimes; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6p: Marginal Effect of Rivalry across Limited Range of Unrest for Democratic Regimes; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6q: Marginal Effect of Rivalry across Limited Range of Unrest for Single-Party Regimes; All Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6r: Marginal Effect of Personalist Regime Type in Non-Rival Context as Unrest Increases; All Dyads 1946-1992



Figure 6s: Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Personalist Regimes in Rival Context, with Confidence Intervals; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6t: Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Military Regimes in Rival Context, with Confidence Intervals; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6u: Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Democratic Regimes in Rival Context, with Confidence Intervals; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6v: Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation for Single-Party Regimes in Rival Context, with Confidence Intervals; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6w: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival Contexts across Regime Type; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6x: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for Personalist Regimes; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992

Figure 6y: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for Military Regimes; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6z: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for Democratic Regimes; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6aa: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Rival and Non-Rival Contexts for Democratic Regimes; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6ab: Comparing Effect of Unrest on Dispute Initiation in Non-Rival Contexts across Regime Type; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6ac: Likelihood of Initiation against Non-Rival State at Zero Unrest Incidents for Each Regime Type; Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-1992



Figure 6ad: Likelihood of Initiation against Non-Rival State at Five Unrest Incidents for Each Regime Type; Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-1992



Figure 6ae: Likelihood of Initiation against Non-Rival State at Fifteen Unrest Incidents for Each Regime Type; Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-1992



Figure 6af: Marginal Effect of Rivalry across Limited Range of Unrest for Personalist Regimes; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6ag: Marginal Effect of Rivalry across Limited Range of Unrest for Military Regimes; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6ah: Marginal Effect of Rivalry across Limited Range of Unrest for Democratic Regimes; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6ai: Marginal Effect of Rivalry across Limited Range of Unrest for Single-Party Regimes; Politically-Relevant Dyads, 1946-1992



Figure 6aj: Marginal Effect of Democratic Regime Type as Unrest Increases; Politically-Relevant Dyads 1946-1992

APPENDIX C: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Analyses with Full Dataset

Table C1: The Dependent Variable, Dispute Initiation

Dispute Initiation	
Freq(0)	864298
Freq(1)	***1338***
Mean	0.002
Percent of Dyads with a Dispute Initiated by Ccode 1	***0.155%***

Table C2: Descriptive Statistics for Regime Type of Ccode1

	Democracy	**Single-Party**	**Military**	**Personalist**
Freq(0)	396325	713241	843653	733650
Freq(1)	499298	182382	51970	161973
Mean	0.557	0.203	0.058	0.181
Total	895623	895623	895623	895623

Table C3: Descriptive Statistics for Domestic Unrest, All and by Regime Type

		Regime Type			
	All	Democracy	Single-Party	Military	Personalist
Number of Dyads	895623	499298	182382	51970	161973
Number of Dyads with Unrest in Ccode1	259686	170818	33664	21735	33469
%of Dyads With Unrest in Ccode1	29.00%	34.21%	18.46%	41.82%	20.66%
Min	0	0	0	0	0
Max	85	85	40	28	34
Mean	1.201	0.817	0.150	0.100	0.133

Table C4: Descriptive Statistics for Rivalry, All and by Regime Type

		Regime Type			
	All	Democracy	Single-Party	Military	Personalist
Number of Dyads	895623	499298	182382	51970	161973
Number of Rivalry Dyads	2963	1149	794	286	734
% of Rivalry Dyads	0.33%	0.23%	0.44%	0.55%	0.45%
Mean	0.005	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.001

Table C5: Descriptive Statistics for Bivariate Controls

	Contiguity
Freq(0)	870419
Freq(1)	***25204***
Mean	0.028
Percent of dyads Where Coded "1"	***2.81%***

Table C6: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Controls

	Ln(Capabilities)	Ln(Capitol Distance)
Min	0	1.609
Max	12.028	9.421
Mean	2.569	8.259

APPENDIX D: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Analyses with Politically-Relevant-Dyads Dataset

Table D1: The Dependent Variable, Dispute Initiation

Dispute Initiation	
Freq(0)	87617
Freq(1)	1031
Mean	0.012
Percent of Dyads with a Dispute Initiated by Ccode 1	1.16%

Table D2: Descriptive Statistics for Regime Type of Ccode1

	Democracy	**Single-Party**	**Military**	**Personalist**
Freq(0)	36365	68316	88134	81587
Freq(1)	55119	23168	3300	9897
Mean	0.602	0.253	0.036	0.108
Total	91484	91484	91484	91484

Table D3: Descriptive Statistics for Domestic Unrest, All and by Regime Type

		Regime Type			
	All	Democracy	Single-Party	Military	Personalist
Number of Dyads	91484	55119	23168	3300	9897
Number of Dyads with Unrest in Ccode1	44942	30365	7728	1385	2097
%of Dyads With Unrest in Ccode1	45.45%	55.09%	33.36%	41.97%	21.19%
Min	0	0	0	0	0
Max	85	85	40	28	34
Mean	2.637	1.982	0.517	0.058	0.079

Table D4: Descriptive Statistics for Rivalry, All and by Regime Type

		Regime Type			
	All	Democracy	Single-Party	Military	Personalist
Number of Dyads	91484	55119	23168	3300	9897
Number of Rivalry Dyads	2606	1026	719	252	609
% of Rivalry Dyads	2.85%	1.86%	3.10%	7.64%	6.15%
Mean	0.050	0.016	0.011	0.004	0.010

Table D5: Descriptive Statistics for Bivariate Controls

	Contiguity
Freq(0)	70466
Freq(1)	21018
Mean	0.230
Percent of dyads Where Coded "1"	**22.97%**

Table D6: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Controls

	Ln(Capabilities)	Ln(Capitol Distance)
Min	0	1.609
Max	12.028	9.392
Mean	3.844	7.811

APPENDIX E: Missing Data

Table E1: Missing Data For Full Dataset

Total Observations in Dataset	**895623**	
	Observations coded	% Missing
Dispute Initiation	865298	3.39%
Regime Type	895623	0.00%
Domestic Unrest	875556	2.24%
Rivalry†	606731	32.26%
Capabilities	893212	0.27%
Distance	895623	0.00%
Contiguity	895623	0.00%

†Note: Data only available to 1992.

Table E2: Missing Data for Politically-Relevant-Dyads Dataset

Total Observations in Dataset		**91484**
	Observations coded	% Missing
Dispute Initiation	88648	3.10%
Regime Type	91484	0.00%
Domestic Unrest	89940	1.69%
Rivalry†	63612	30.47%
Capabilities	91386	0.11%
Distance	91484	0.00%
Contiguity	91484	0.00%

†Note: Data only available to 1992.

Vita

Norris Feeney is a native Memphian and graduate of Memphis University School. Norris received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio in 2002. Following several years pursuing a diverse series of alternative careers, his experiences at Kenyon, admiration and respect for his professors, and a life-long love of learning led him to pursue a PhD in Political Science with the goal of impacting lives as an instructor at the university level. His primary research interests are in the subfields of international relations and comparative politics. Much of his energies are focused on exploring how domestic political events, including unrest and regime transitions, influence interstate relations. His research, therefore, typically bridges the gap between these two subfields in the discipline. Following graduation, he intends to focus on employing previously-developed and working datasets on regime age and leader resignation to explore failed states, terrorism, civil wars, regime transitions, and state repression.