Consolidated Government, Urban Services Policy and Urban Development: A Case Study of Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County

Edward Howard Cole
University of Tennessee - Knoxville

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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Edward Howard Cole entitled "Consolidated Government, Urban Services Policy and Urban Development: A Case Study of Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Architecture.

Walter L. Shouse, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

James Spencer, Kenneth Kenney

Accepted for the Council:

Carolyn R. Hodges

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Edward Howard Cole entitled "Consolidated Government, Urban Services Policy and Urban Development: A Case Study of Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Planning.

Walter L. Shouse, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Vice Chancellor
Graduate Studies and Research
CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT, URBAN SERVICES POLICY
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Science in Planning
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Edward Howard Cole
August 1978
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No written acknowledgment is adequate nor appropriate for the sustaining support, comment and encouragement provided by Pat Cole. She gave life to the study. Erik Cole, as only a five-year old can, put things in their proper perspective with the continuing question: "what do those words mean?" A husband and father could ask for no more.
ABSTRACT

Urban planners continue to explore various ways of influencing the type, rate, location, quality and timing of urban development. The need for such influence is evidenced by the compounding of urban environmental and energy concerns with local government fiscal difficulties. This study examines two of the tools frequently identified as being useful in efforts to effectively manage urban development: consolidated urban government and the controlled extension of certain urban services, especially water service, sewerage service, fire protection and police protection.

These two tools are explored through a case study of the urban and general services district concept as it has evolved in Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee. The decision, with the establishment of consolidated government in 1963, to divide Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County into two service districts provides a setting for the examination of past, present and potential impact of these service arrangements upon Nashville's urban development. The following four research questions provide the focus of the study:

1. Was the creation of the service districts based upon a planning concern for the coordination of service provision with development objectives?
2. Has the existence of these districts permitted their use as vehicles for coordinated service delivery consistent with development objectives?
3. Given the history of these districts, do they appear to have potential in assisting Metro Nashville in meeting its future development objectives?

4. Does the Nashville experience with consolidated government and the service district concept provide planners with evidence of the validity of such arrangements for the implementation of development objectives in metropolitan areas?

Organized around these central questions, the study employs interviews with past and present planning officials, reviews of planning documents, and searches of literature on Metro Nashville to find its answers.

The principle findings of the study are:

1. A continuing group of professional planners and Nashville citizens were instrumental in the design and implementation of consolidated government in Nashville and Davidson County.

2. The creation of the Urban Services District and General Services District concept was a response to service delivery, political, fiscal and legal problems in Nashville; developmental concerns were secondary.

3. Since 1963, the continuing need to provide urban services to already-urbanized areas has precluded active consideration of using service policies to guide development; this fact has been reinforced by the general Metro political environment which supports the view that public planning for development should be limited to the maintenance of "minimum standards" of public health, safety and welfare.
4. The potential for use of Urban Services District expansion policies as developmental tools has been moderated by the erosion of the distinction between the Urban Services District and the General Services District.

5. Although Metro is currently reviewing three "general plan" alternatives, there is little evidence to suggest that a political climate is emerging which will support the use of service policies to influence urban development beyond the "minimum standard" level.

6. The expansion of the Nashville metropolitan area beyond the boundaries of Davidson County, the dominance of state and federal decision-makers in transportation decision-making, and the lack of consistent coordination between Metro agencies and departments seriously inhibits any effort to use Urban Services District extension to influence urban development.

The conclusions of the study are based upon these findings and are phrased as messages to planners who are interested in the potential impact consolidated government and the management or urban services might have upon urban development. The messages suggest caution in listing the virtues of consolidated government, particularly where such government is not truly metropolitan. It is further suggested that the use of urban service policies to influence development is dependent upon both the political capacity and the political will to effectively achieve development goals. Planners are encouraged to seek the development of each of these.
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CHAPTER I

URBAN DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND METROPOLITAN

NASHVILLE: AN INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a case study of the evolution of the Urban and General Services Districts from their conception prior to the birth of Metropolitan Nashville until the present. This evolution is discussed with the view that management of urban service policies can be an important component in the overall management of urban development. Equally important is the examination of the role played by a consolidated form of urban government in furthering such management. The existence, since 1963, of consolidated government in Nashville-Davidson County makes this unique inquiry possible.

Influencing the pattern of urban development continues to be at the heart of most urban planning efforts. Planners, in their attempt to assist urban areas in meeting established development goals, continue to explore various ways of channeling development pressures into actions consistent with such goals. Prominent among such methods are the controlled extension of urban services, the programmed expansion of urban boundaries, and the consolidation of government units throughout the metropolitan area. Although many other methods exist, these three offer an interesting package of potential development management strategies, particularly in a setting where some degree of metropolitan
government consolidation has occurred or is likely to occur.¹

Commonly known as "growth management," the process of managing development through programs and policies "intended to influence the rate, amount, type, location and/or quality of future development" has captured the widespread interest of planners and other local officials.² Since the term "growth" implies a rather limited concern for the accommodation of new urban residents and enterprises, the concept of "development," rather than growth, management perhaps better reflects the planner's concern for all forms of urban evolution, particularly those leading to changes in the physical environment and those placing new demands on the delivery of local government services.

One significant discussion of the management of development suggests that the primary characteristics of such management include all efforts to influence the types, rate, location and quality of urban development.³ The secondary characteristics of such efforts include the impacts of resulting development patterns on the environmental, fiscal, societal, and regional traits of the urban area.⁴ These secondary


³Godschalk et al., p. 161. ⁴Ibid.
characteristics underscore the dependence of any development management effort upon a statement of development goals and objectives. Although the explicitness and sequence of such statements may vary, the management of development, as an organized urban activity, is premised upon some form of public expression of urban development goals and objectives.

Various reasons are given by cities and towns for wishing to engage in some form of development management. The declining capacity of cities to meet their fiscal needs, the growing concern for protection of the urban environment, the increased need for energy conservation, the raising of questions of equal opportunity in housing, and new patterns of urban growth have all, in varying mixtures of emphasis, prompted some local governments to move from a general posture of "following" to one of "guiding" development. Although the shift may seem subtle, the change can be dramatic, particularly where a local government in the past has only paid lip service to long-range development goals and uncritically serviced the needs of development-oriented interests. This is probably the case with a great number of American local governments. Only with environmental crises, losses of inner-city revenues, inadequate housing opportunities, costly service extensions and other urban problems of major consequences has there been a growing

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5 Godschalk et al., pp. 187-9. See also the seminal study on many of the benefits to be gained from such a shift: Anthony Downs, The Costs of Sprawl (Washington: The Real Estate Corporation, 1974).

6 A useful case study of one such change, Fairfax County, Virginia, is: Grace Dawson, No Little Plans (Washington: The Urban Institute, 1977).
interest in developing urban goals, policies and programs aimed at more carefully managing urban development. It is in the context of this growing interest in managing urban development and the resulting search for effective management strategies that this study is prepared.

These management strategies must take into consideration both the establishment of urban development goals and the selection of appropriate implementation tools. The former can range from absolute population "caps" to a directing of high rates of growth into specified areas. Implementation decisions involve choices made from a number of regulatory, fiscal, cooperative and other devices geared toward the management of development pressures. Service policies, urban boundary modifications and urban government consolidation are implementation devices chosen for review in the case of Nashville.

I. CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT

Although the consolidation of governments in the urban area has been considered a type of urban reform for reasons extending far beyond a concern for management of development, it is nevertheless important to include consolidation as a possible means for implementing urban development objectives. Consolidated government, it has been argued, permits a regional, or at least county-wide, approach to the problems of metropolitan growth. According to many theories of urban reform, the "extremely atomized" urban areas suffer from governmental fragmentation which is dysfunctional to:

7 Einsweiler, pp. 10-31.
1. the efficient and economical delivery of public goods and services on an area-wide basis;
2. the elimination of social and economic disparities in the urban area; and,
3. the development of regional community and citizenship.  

The consolidation of governments in an urban area theoretically leads toward amelioration of these conditions by providing a structure for unified long-range planning, "rational" provision of urban services, coordinated capital investments, area-wide revenue mechanisms, singular focus of political identity, and so on. Ultimately, the pro-consolidation argument includes the claim that by merging the many governments in the metropolitan area into a single government, a vehicle is created for coherently preparing and implementing policies designed to encourage the development of the entire metropolitan area in a planned, rather than random, fashion.

Against this optimistic view of urban government consolidation, found throughout urban reform literature, must be raised at least three important questions. Each challenges the capacity for consolidation to be an effective means for implementing public development goals in the

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9Murphy and Rehfuss, pp. 236-7.

10"Consolidation" is used here to include city-county merger and absorption of city by county or vica versa; it does not include the "urban federation" pattern of intergovernmental relations such as found in Miami-Dade County, Florida, or Toronto, Ontario.
in the metropolitan area. Each question must be asked in any review of an existing consolidated government or in any consideration of potential consolidation by a metropolitan area. The questions deal with the political feasibility of consolidation, the issue of metropolitan and governmental boundaries, and the link between consolidation and efficiency in providing urban services.

There are relatively few consolidated urban governments in the United States. Since 1947, only 15 successful consolidations have occurred. About twice that number are estimated to have been under some form of consideration in the early 1970's. There is a strong argument that the infrequency of consolidation stems from the inverse relationship between "political feasibility" and the potential effectiveness of a proposed consolidated government in dealing with area-wide problems. Proposals for consolidation not only threaten entrenched political interests, but also often run counter to citizen preferences for the status quo, particularly in the suburban areas.

Reformers tend to forget that the symbols—efficiency, a bigger and better Zilchville, and the like—that they respond to with enthusiasm ring no bells for "hoi polloi." It is the latter, of course, which dominate the decision when a proposal is put to a popular referendum. Ordinary citizens are characteristically apathetic. If water flows from the tap and the toilet flushes today, they are not likely to ask whether it will do so tomorrow.

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12 Ibid.  
13 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, pp. 11-15.  
14 Adrian, pp. 220-1.
Although the number of such studies is limited, reviews of consolidation successes and failures agree that voter opposition and/or apathy is usually only overcome by "abnormal, unusual, or special" circumstances which lend a "crisis atmosphere" to the consolidation issue.\textsuperscript{15} Consolidation of urban governments has not been received by the urban citizenry as the simple, rational, long-term solution to their problems suggested by many reformers.

The second limitation of the consolidation solution to metropolitan problems centers on the usual lack of coincidence of such a government's boundaries with those of the metropolitan area.

Not only is city-county consolidation almost impossible politically, but it does not guarantee that the city-county will have sufficient powers to meet all metropolitan problems, and it causes even greater political difficulties if the metropolitan area expands beyond the county limits.\textsuperscript{16}

Whereas in 1960, over two-thirds of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas consisted of only one county, the 1980 census will indicate that less than half of all SMSA's consist of a single county.\textsuperscript{17} There is very little assurance that the boundaries of a consolidated government will coincide with those of the metropolitan area, however such an area is defined. This is particularly true given the fact that


\textsuperscript{16}Adrian, p. 214.

consolidation involving more than one county is even less likely than the traditional single county-city form.

This criticism of consolidation does not detract from the advantages gained within the consolidated government's jurisdiction, it simply points out that many problems of urban development are metropolitan in nature and cannot be dealt with in a unified way when significant independent local government units remain in the metropolitan fringe of an existing or proposed consolidated government. The strengthening of regional governments and growing interest in "two-tiered" metropolitan federations are partial responses to this, as well as the previous, limitation of consolidated government in coping with metropolitan problems. 18

Perhaps the deepest questioning of the capacities of consolidated government occurs when "the needed distinction is made between 'problems which exist in metropolitan areas' and 'problems which exist by virtue of the inadequacies of government structure in metropolitan areas'" and the latter are deemed to be relatively few. 19 Two critiques of consolidation can be extracted from this general view. The first builds on the descriptions of suburbia by Robert Wood, Thomas Dye and others. 20

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18 The best example of the regional approach is the Metropolitan Council in Minnesota. See Peggy A. Reichert, Growth Management In the Twin Cities Metropolitan Areas (St. Paul: Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities Area, 1976).


This view holds that the continued existence of many governments in the urban area properly reflects existing patterns of urban social integration. In addition, these many governments meet the American public's need for accessible, personal and localized government. In short, the "polycentric" nature of urban government reflects the polycentric nature of urban society.

Coupled with the challenge to the social validity of consolidated urban government is the challenge to the economic validity of such government. Ostrom and others have argued that a host of local governments and service districts are not necessarily less efficient in providing many urban services than are consolidated governments. Although this argument is conditioned by the type of service and the setting studied, it should be seen as a warning against uncritical acceptance of the conventional wisdom which suggests that in spite of all its other shortcomings, consolidated government certainly is more efficient and responsive in providing such urban services as sewers, water supply and public safety. A service-by-service analysis within specific urban settings is required before any conclusions can be reached on the "efficiency" pillar of the reformists' argument in favor of consolidated government. Likewise, the "polycentristic"

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23 Ibid.
alternative to consolidated government should not be discounted until the results of such studies are in.

The metropolitan area, feudal and balkanized as it may be, constitutes a viable social and political system in which interaction takes place among its parts and in which public policy emerges in one fashion or another... a metropolitan political system, functioning almost always within a governmentally fragmented structure, does exist here and now. Decisions do get made, local governments continue to operate, services and goods are provided, problems are solved or mitigated, expansion and development takes place, and the day to day life of the residents goes on. The process may be inefficient and costly and may rationally demand change to maximize output and citizen satisfaction...

Consolidated government, when established, may certainly provide a vehicle for coherently preparing and implementing policies designed to encourage the development of the metropolitan area in a planned, rather than random, fashion. Enthusiasm over such a prospect, however, should be tempered first by consideration of the likelihood that such a government can even be brought into being. An affirmative answer here still leaves the serious questions regarding the extent to which consolidated government would be truly "metropolitan" and whether such a government could more efficiently provide local government services than the existing matrix of local government structures. Any study of a consolidated government structure as a contributor to effective metropolitan management of development must consider each of these issues.

II. URBAN SERVICE POLICIES AND BOUNDARY EXTENSIONS

A significant fact of urban development is the dependence of nearly all forms of development upon minimal levels of urban service provision. Such dependence can form the cornerstone of a management strategy when urban governments require substantial service levels as a prerequisite for development to occur. An example is the commitment to the policy of "no sewers-no subdivisions." Where such regulatory-service policies are used to reinforce the commercial attractiveness of well-serviced land consistent with area development goals, undeniable incentives for proper development exist.

It has been widely accepted by planners that certain urban services can have a primary shaping influence upon urban development. The provision of accessibility, water, waste disposal and energy supply influence all forms of development. School facilities, police and fire protection, and other services have additional impacts upon specific types of development. Proper management of such services to implement existing development goals requires that local governments at least have:

1. the technical competence to understand and manage the linkages between services and urban development;
2. the political will and capacity to employ this knowledge in implementing development policies;
3. the financial skills and resources necessary to fund the appropriate service patterns; and
4. a governmental-organizational framework capable of supporting the resolution of these technical, political and financial questions.

These requirements are obviously interrelated, but each makes up a distinctive consideration in the evolution of a development management strategy based on service provision policies. Taken together, the four requirements, if successfully met, represent a definite shift from "accommodative" or "catch-up" planning to that of management and guidance.

Although urban service management strategies can take many forms, in general a distinction can be made between strategies including accessibility variables and strategies limited to the common "municipal service" package of water, sewerage, fire and police protection and so on. This distinction is required by the fact that transportation decisions, particularly interstate highway, freeway, and primary arterial location, are made and have been made by state and federal officials, often with little consideration of local developmental concerns. The likelihood that education facility and energy supply planning can be a part of either strategy depends as well upon local decision-making arrangements. Energy provision is often a private-sector activity while school location is frequently determined by autonomous school boards, many times under the guidelines established by court rulings on racial balances. In the case study which follows,

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26 Godschalk et al., p. 193.
decisions on the location of major transportation corridors, schools and energy services are not seen to be within the general authority of local government. Such a limitation upon the potential impact of even an aggressive local strategy for managing development needs to be kept in mind.

Within the limitations set forth above, the programming of both new services and improvements to existing services is the critical link between urban service policies and urban area development goals and objectives. The consistency of such programming with development objectives is dependent on the technical, political, financial and organizational resources mentioned earlier and can be quite instrumental in making the difference between "simply planning to influence growth and actually managing the characteristics of new development."\(^{27}\)

Closely tied to the question of using urban service policies to assist in managing development is the issue of urban governmental boundary determination. This has already been somewhat addressed in the discussion of consolidated government, but a broader consideration is in order. Traditionally, where expansion of urban governmental boundaries has occurred, various annexation procedures have led to extension of government boundaries into areas where substantial urbanization has already taken place. Important considerations in such expansion have generally been the city's determination of the costs of service extension and potential revenues in the annexed area. Where annexation

\(^{27}\)Godschalk et al., p. 195.
requires the concurrent approval of both annexor and annexee the conclusions of those in the area to be annexed often conflict with those of the annexing city. In such annexation disputes, the debate generally centers on the relative "costs" and "qualities" of services—be they measured in terms of the city's "fiscal health" or the taxpayer's perception of burdens on himself.

The possibility of the city extending extraterritorial service controls beyond its boundaries provides one means for resolving some of these issues without full annexation. The extent to which such a policy will meet development needs depends upon the package of services included in extraterritorial arrangements and the degree to which the city would have exclusive rights to provide such services in the specified areas beyond the city's boundaries.

The present concern for the management of urban development places a new light on this type of boundary dispute. The territory over which the city exercises control of service policies, if service policy management is to be a part of an urban development strategy, must include areas of potential as well as current urban development. Both unified planning and service authority need to exist throughout a metropolitan area if service policies are to be an effective tool for guiding development. The inclusion within a city's jurisdiction of areas

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28 A review of these issues is found in Adjusting Municipal Boundaries (Washington: National League of Cities, 1966).

29 For a summary of this conclusion see Marion Clawson, Suburban Land Conversion in the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 342-76.
which might be limited in their capacity for urban development suggests that service policy determination needs to include provision for "urban" and "non-urban" service areas within the city's boundaries. The basis for boundary extension, therefore, must be broadened from the "service to urbanized areas" of traditional annexation campaigns to include areas of potential development throughout the metropolitan region.

The service distinctions between "urban" and "non-urban" service areas and the manner in which the areas can be expanded or reduced in size are important considerations in tying urban boundary procedures with development management strategies. The determination of what urban services will be denied the "non-urban" service area involves both technical analysis of the impact of service denial on development and the legal requirements for services to developments already in such areas. Hovering above such concerns are the additional issues of equal protection (nondiscrimination) and the regional impact of metropolitan development policies. Obviously, the more the boundaries between the two areas become blurred, the less significant are service policies in limiting urban development. The allocation of the types and quality of services to these two areas is therefore an extremely important question.

30 Einsweiler, pp. 28-31.


32 The primary focus of Godschalk et al. is on these issues.
The scale of possible transition from "non-urban" to "urban" service areas raises another issue of boundary modification. Technical, political, financial and organizational considerations have already been suggested as being the basis for determining the link between service policies and urban development objectives. The flexibility to add very small areas to the urban service area might very well minimize many of the conflicts emerging from such considerations. On the other hand, technical considerations may suggest that addition of large areas is required. Although the distinction between "urban" and "non-urban" services needs to be substantial, the scale of transition from one category to the other needs to remain flexible, subject to technical, political, financial and organizational consistency with development objectives.

The preceding comments on urban service areas and urban boundaries make it clear that questions of annexation and/or urban government consolidation are important considerations in any effort to use service policies to manage urban development. Inherent in the argument favoring the use of service policies as one tool to implement development goals is the position that urban boundaries and governmental arrangements must permit consistent and coordinated actions throughout the metropolitan area.

III. THE NASHVILLE CASE STUDY

The birth and growth of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, provides an experience and
opportunity for examining many of the preceding arguments about consolidated government and the management of urban services. Not only has Metropolitan Nashville experienced nearly 15 years of consolidated government, but it has also gone through a relatively recent period of significant suburban growth. Between 1940 and 1970, the population of Nashville-Davidson County grew by some 75% (from 257,000 to 448,000). 33 Nearly 75% of all suburban housing stock in the county has been constructed since 1950. 34 Current projections suggest that this growth will continue, but primarily in the metropolitan counties surrounding Davidson County. 35 Many of the problems of regional metropolitan development continue to be experienced in the Nashville area.

Nashville offers an excellent opportunity to examine the issues emerging from the expansion of metropolitan problems beyond the boundaries of the consolidated government of Nashville-Davidson County. Table 1.1 clearly shows the extent of metropolitan population growth beyond Davidson County.

There is a more specific rationale for examining Metro Nashville's experience. The decision, with the establishment of consolidated government, to divide Nashville-Davidson County into two service

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### TABLE 1.1

POPULATION TRENDS, 1960-1970, MID-CUMBERLAND DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

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<th>1970</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Persons</td>
<td>Percent of Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>Davidson County</td>
<td>399,743</td>
<td>58.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Six Adjacent Counties</td>
<td>178,283</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Six Counties</td>
<td>103,554</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>681,580</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission.
districts (the Urban Services District and the General Services District) addresses clearly the capacity for Metro Nashville to use service provision as a development management device. The formation of these two districts permitted not only different levels of service delivery within the metropolitan government's boundaries, but allowed different tax and fee schedules as well.

The existence of these two service districts in the context of consolidated government coupled with Nashville's recent and current growth pressures lead to a series of research questions which form the basis for this case study:

1. Was the creation of these service districts based upon (to any extent) a planning concern for the coordination of service provision with development objectives?

2. Has the existence of these districts permitted their use as a vehicle for coordinated service delivery consistent with development objectives?

3. Given the history of these districts, do they appear to have potential in assisting Metro Nashville in meeting its future development objectives?

4. Does the Nashville experience with consolidated government and the service district concept provide planners with evidence of the validity of such arrangements for the implementation of development objectives in metropolitan areas?

The study of Metro Nashville which follows is a search for answers to these questions. Those answers will comment on the Nashville experience
in view of the general arguments just put forward which suggest that consolidated government and urban service policy management can, under certain conditions, become useful mechanisms for achieving metropolitan development objectives.

The study casts a highly rational, idealized view of planning and the management of development against the experiences of an American city which is in many ways typical of other moderately-sized and growing communities. It might be said that the study is unfair in that it probes Nashville's experience, or lack of experience, with the management of development during a history which preceded active consideration of this issue by the planning profession. Several responses to this view are appropriate. First, the study is not intended to be a criticism of any city, regime, or individual. It is an effort to compare a limited part of city activities—service planning and management—with an idealized planning and governing process. Nashville may well provide planners with many valuable lessons in these areas.

Secondly, the founders and early officials of Metro Nashville should not be denied potential credit for linking service policies with development objectives simply because significant professional attention to this relationship did not develop until the mid-1960's. Finally, even if it is found that the motives behind the establishment of Metro Nashville's urban service framework were not directly tied to the

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management of future urban development, these arrangements may well form the basis for such ties in the future.

The organization of the study follows both the historical development of the service districts in Metro Nashville and the relevance of this evolution to the theories of managed urban development. Chapter II explores the origins of the service district concept during the early thinking on consolidated government in Nashville and Davidson County. Commentary is offered on urban development objectives and provisions for urban services during two phases of this thinking. The first centers on the formulation of proposals for consolidated government (1951-1956) while the second deals with the two struggles for public acceptance (1956-1962). The chapter is developed as a response to the first of the research questions stated above.

Chapters III and IV outline Metro Nashville's experience with the service districts since the inception of consolidated government (1963). Chapter III surveys Metro's development goals and objectives during this period. Chapter IV compares the use of the Urban and General Services Districts with these objectives. Of particular importance in this chapter are service extensions which do not fit service district boundaries and efforts to modify the boundaries themselves. Both issues relate closely to the connection between service policies and development objectives. These two chapters combined respond to the second research question and provide a basis for the responses to the third and fourth questions.

The final chapter draws the Metro Nashville service district experience together with the theories of the management of urban
development. In responding to the final two research questions, the chapter offers conclusions on Metro Nashville's past and potential performance in using the service district structure, in the context of consolidated government, to meet its development goals. A very general extension of these findings to other urban areas completes the study.

The early portions of the study are based upon both interviews with several important actors during the evolution of Metro Nashville as well as the many documents and commentaries cited in the notes. Metropolitan Planning Commission documents and studies form the basis for the data presented in the latter part of the study. The conclusions reflect the interpretations of material from each of these sources in the light of the theories and research questions presented in this introduction.
CHAPTER II

ORIGINS OF THE URBAN AND GENERAL SERVICES DISTRICTS

It is impossible to discuss the creation of the Urban and General Services Districts without first reviewing the birth of consolidated government in Nashville and Davidson County. The origins of the urban services district concept are deeply imbedded in the planning which led to the establishment of Metro Nashville in 1963. Although the history of this planning and its ultimate impact have been told elsewhere, it is important to recount significant events in the tale in order to explore the forces behind the creation of the service districts.¹ As introduced in the preceding chapter, this question emerges from the research interest in the ties between development management strategies and the evolution of the service districts.

As will be seen, the "service district concept" in Metro Nashville gave birth to two important features of Metro government. The first was the organization of all metropolitan area services into two packages: "general services" and "urban services."² The second was the incorporation of urban services into an expandable "Urban Services District" and extension of general services into a countywide "General Services District." The initial boundary of the Urban Services District

¹A number of sources have been used to prepare the historical material in this chapter. They will be cited where specifically used; all are listed in the Bibliography.

²A full discussion of these districts follows later in the chapter.
was the same as the old City of Nashville, at the time of the consolidation.\(^3\) The "service district concept," as outlined in the following historical review therefore includes both the packaging of all metro area services and the creation of two service districts, one areawide and one expandable.

A number of trends can be traced through the decision and events which ultimately came together to create Metro Nashville. These trends can be specifically tied in varying mixtures to specific features of the new government, including the creation of two service districts. Six of these factors have been chosen for particular attention. It is suggested that creation of the service districts can be attributed to a mixture of these factors, not necessarily a single one, thus permitting an answer to the question regarding the relative significance of development management concerns. The six influences on the decision leading to the service district features of consolidated government are:

1. **political considerations**—concern for the acceptability of consolidated government to those whose approval was required for its implementation;

2. **administrative considerations**—concern for the administrative feasibility of the proposed plan for service delivery governance;

3. **legal considerations**—concern for the constitutionality of the service districts, including the likelihood of drawn-out court challenges;

\(^3\)See p. 36.
4. fiscal considerations—concern for the impact of service districts on the new government's revenue, cost, and debt structure;

5. environmental-technical considerations—concern for the consistency of proposed service-provision arrangements with technical capacities for service provisions in the Davidson County environment;

6. developmental considerations—concern for the capacity of service provision arrangements to guide urban development.

Obviously, it is the degree to which the sixth consideration can be linked to the package of forces leading to the creation of the two service districts that will determine the response to the research interests underlying the study.

The interactions of these forces can be examined productively by reviewing the birth of Metro Nashville through two particular periods. The "proposal" period ends with the publication of the "Plan for Metropolitan Government"⁴ by the combined planning staff of the Davidson County and City of Nashville Planning Commissions in October 1956. The "acceptance" period ends with the final establishment of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson County on January 1, 1963. Within each period are found important contributions to the emerging service district concept.

⁴Plan of Metropolitan Government for Nashville and Davidson County (Nashville: Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions, 1956).
I. THE PROPOSAL PERIOD: 1950-1956

Nashville and Davidson County experienced an increased expansion of suburban development after World War II, as did many other American cities. This growth accompanied the release of pent-up housing demand accumulated during the war years and then was reinforced by the expansion of the national economy and the impact of the increase in the birthrate upon the continuing American preferences for single-family, detached homes. The availability of land for residential development within the City of Nashville was limited. Hence, in the early 1950's city growth rates began to stabilize while county and regional rates continued upward. As county growth rates increased and city rates stabilized, the accompanying problems of servicing new areas of growth with limited county service capabilities grew in significance. This area of urban development beyond the city's boundaries grew in significance due to the lack of any extension of the City of Nashville's boundaries since 1927. Additionally, Davidson County is characterized by layers of limestone on or near the surface of the land. This led to a near absence of sanitary sewers and the resulting continuing problems with septic tank performance. One estimate suggested that in 1950,

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5 Nashville's annexation problems are outlined in the opening chapter of A Future For Nashville (Nashville: Community Services Commission for Davidson County and the City of Nashville, 1952).

some 10% of all septic tanks in Davidson County had surface discharging and another 15% exhibited some additional "danger to public health."\textsuperscript{7}

Both the lack of expansion of city boundaries and the sewerage problem presented a unique environment of pressures faced by both the county and city as the 1950's began.

Politically, the city and county engaged in the typical "buckpassing" which effectively permitted the avoidance of many responsibilities for dealing with such suburban growth problems. Having not been reapportioned since 1905, the Davidson County Quarterly Court was not representative of the city's population. According to one study, the magistrates reflected "a 'rotten borough' system with a vengeance."\textsuperscript{8}

The absence of county or city home rule further compounded problems of political responsibility. Many local policy decisions required favorable action by the county delegation to the state legislature.

Administrative confusion was typified by the existence of dual public health agencies, hospitals, and welfare systems.\textsuperscript{9} Attempts to clarify the proper health services due non-city and city residents and then compute appropriate payment systems led to many complicated and controversial arrangements. The provision of other services was equally confusing and inefficient. Outside the City of Nashville, fire protection was provided by eight private subscription companies and a

\textsuperscript{7}Grant, p. 85. \textsuperscript{8}A Future For Nashville, p. 15. \textsuperscript{9}Grant, p. 90; A Future For Nashville, pp. 151-178.
fire protection district.\textsuperscript{10} Where water lines were available in these areas, they were generally two-inch and four-inch lines. While the city had a Class 3 fire rating, the non-city county had the lowest rating, Class 10.\textsuperscript{11} The mixture of utility districts and private companies supplying water to the county areas was described as a system "resembling scrambled eggs."\textsuperscript{12}

The financial arrangements for such service patterns were just as confusing. Both city and county residents suffered from the various inequities brought on by the existence of a growing area requiring urban services but without an urban government. These financial problems were four primary types:

1. City subsidization of services to non-city residents
2. Inequitable city share of county and state tax revenues
3. County expenditures primarily benefitting the city area
4. Duplicate expenditures by city and county governments\textsuperscript{13}

Probably the greatest public outcry came from city residents who saw their taxes supporting county residents. The use of city streets maintained by the city's Public Works Department, the use of city parks (70\% of the acreage was located outside the city with the county having no parks of its own) and the use of a proposed city auditorium by county residents particularly rankled city taxpayers.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10}A Future For Nashville, p. 86.  
\textsuperscript{11}Grant, p. 90.  
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{13}Based on Grant, Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{14}Grant, pp. 93-95.
The city's share of state collected, locally shared taxes (beer, alcohol, sales, stocks and bonds proceeds) was actually diminishing.\footnote{A Future For Nashville, p. 180.}
The allocation formula was based on the census and the city had not annexed any new areas in decades. Additionally, there was continued criticism of the formula whereby state aid-to-education funds appropriated to the county were passed on to the city.\footnote{Grant, p. 94.}

From the county's view, there was the charge that county services many times benefited only city residents. Common arguments pointed to the county's investment in the bridges over the Cumberland River and the fact that two-thirds of the patients in the county hospital were city residents.\footnote{Ibid.}

There was little doubt that city and county governments duplicated many services and functions. Dual systems of tax assessment and collection, funds investment, purchasing, training, personnel management, and so on existed. Problems of personnel duplication were particularly evident in the operation of two school systems. Although not the cause of the same level of outcry as the issues of taxes and services, this type of issue remained important.

Issues of land development patterns were made significant by the rapid growth of the urban fringes within the county. Although zoning, subdivision regulations and building codes existed in both city and county areas, lack of enforcement, ease of amendment and the absence of a
countywide comprehensive plan for development led to a virtual absence of planning and controlled urban growth.\textsuperscript{18} Although the planning staffs of city and county merged in 1939, there still existed City and County Planning Commissions as well as the separate legislative bodies. The absence of any countywide planning policy entity was a serious inhibition on any possibility for properly influencing the quality, location and rate of new development.

Mention has already been made of Nashville's sewerage problem caused by existence of extensive limestone deposits throughout the county. This environmental condition overshadowed other technical considerations related to urban service delivery. The very limestone deposits which made septic tank performance questionable also made the potential cost of sewer installation extremely high. A solution to the sewer problem was therefore seen as requiring the firmest of financial bases. The city was the only entity capable of such construction—and it would need jurisdiction over an area broader than its 1950 boundaries both to finance the project and to include all appropriate drainage areas.

The growing failure rate of septic tanks coupled with rapid suburban development beyond the city's boundaries prompted a number of city businessmen to approach the County legislative delegation about the establishment of some type of commission to investigate the multitude of problems associated with urban growth and service delivery in Davidson

Encouraged by the unified staff of both the county and city planning commissions, the 1951 State legislature, at the request of the Davidson County delegation, passed private legislation which established the Community Services Commission. The first section of the act made a summary reference to the broad array of political, administrative, financial, developmental and environmental problems facing the county and city and just reviewed:

... it is hereby found and declared that the great concentration of people and their homes, institutions and enterprises occupying the central portion of Davidson County constitute substantially one community and have a common need for those services and facilities customarily supplied by a local government formed for such purposes; that less than half of the area and less than two-thirds of the population comprising this community are served by such a local government, the remaining area and population being dependent upon the County Government which is not constituted nor intended to render such services; that there are many proposals and wide differences of opinion as to how a local government may be formed as existing government changed so as to most effectively, efficiently and economically provide for the convenience, health and prosperity of the people; that, in order to understand and solve these problems, the people are in need of the facts, analyses, and proposals which can be obtained only through specialized study; and that the creation of the Commission and the carrying out of its purposes as provided herein is in all respects for the benefit of the people of Davidson County and municipalities located therein, and is a public purpose, and the Commission will be performing an essential governmental function in the exercise of the power conferred upon it by this Act...

The act went on to provide for 15 Commissioners, including a permanent chairman. In order to guarantee a "blue ribbon" nature for

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19 Interview with Dr. Lee S. Greene, January, 1978.
21 Ibid.
the commission, 11 commissioners were specified by name with membership evenly divided between city and county residents. The chairman was a Nashville attorney, Edwin Hunt. Highly respected, both as a person and a legal professional, Hunt’s firm hand guided first the Commission and later the legal work on the actual proposals for consolidation. The Commission itself was funded by equal contributions of $25,000 from the city and county.

Recognizing the dominance of political, administrative and financial factors contributing to the service problems of the county and city, the Commissioners turned to two highly regarded experts in these areas for staff leadership. Dr. Lee S. Greene, political scientist and public administration expert from University of Tennessee-Knoxville was asked to become the Executive Director of the Commission. He accepted the position, took a leave from his university responsibilities, and arrived for work in the fall of 1951. Joining him as Assistant Director was another political scientist, Dr. Daniel Grant, of Vanderbilt University. With the appointments of Greene and Grant, it was apparent that the Commission, from the very outset saw governmental modification as the heart of any strategy for dealing with host of problems it was under mandate to investigate.

In June 1952, the Commission issued its final report. Given the ultimate impact which the report had in the formation of metropolitan

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22 Greene Interview.  
23 Ibid.  
24 A Future For Nashville.
government, it is useful to spell out first the major recommendations made and then outline the research topics investigated during the course of the Commission study.\textsuperscript{25} The principle recommendations were:

1. Annexation of approximately 69 square miles and 90,000 persons by the City of Nashville
2. Assumption of full County responsibility for the countywide functions of public health, hospital care for indigents, public education, and public welfare
3. Establishment of City and County home rule
4. Redistricting of Davidson County to equalize representation on Davidson County Quarterly Court.
5. Massive improvements in City services, once annexation completed (i.e., Class 3 fire protection, uniform water service and rates, sanitary sewer construction)
6. Unification of planning commission; requirement of unanimous Council or Court vote to override Planning Commission rezone recommendation; completion of countywide comprehensive plan; zoning of entire county

Study topics, upon which the recommendations were based, included

1. population patterns
2. governmental structures
3. urban planning
4. the Nashville Electric Service
5. water supply
6. sewers
7. refuge collection and disposal
8. public transportation
9. streets and roads
10. schools
11. police and fire protection

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.
12. libraries
13. public recreation
14. public housing
15. health services and hospitals
16. public welfare
17. local government finance

In many ways, the Commission's activities and report marked the beginning of the move toward government consolidation and the birth of Metro Nashville. The study was comprehensive, competent and remarkably free from political influence. It represented a statement on city and county problems by a group of planning-oriented citizens and academic resource persons. The Commission itself reflected a Nashville elite with the time to commit to such activities. According to the executive director, the Commission worked well together, clearly perceived its mission, and was productive to the point that the work was completed before the deadline imposed by the legislature and without spending all of the allocated funds. The Commission's work was carefully and positively reported in the Nashville press, particularly the Nashville Banner. County Judge Beverly Briley actively supported the work of the Commission while Mayor West, although more "standoffish" than Briley, did not impede Commission activities.

The principle recommendation that the city should engage in a massive annexation of county territory was recognition of the serious

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26 Greene Interview.
27 Ibid.
service deficiencies in the urban areas outside the city. It was a further testimony to the view that a solution to these problems lay only in a consolidation of service functions under a single government permitting efficient planning and administration as well as equitable financing. It should be noted that in recommending annexation the Commission did not pursue consolidation of city and county governments. At the time of the study there was no legal mechanism under Tennessee law for such government. In particular, the state constitution forbade the establishment of separate tax rates under a single government. This prohibition would have mandated a single tax-rate throughout a consolidated city area, therefore raising serious issues of equity should this area have included properties where service extension was a short-term impossibility. This tax problem was compounded by the absence of consolidation enabling legislation, therefore leaving the Commission with annexation as the only practical way to consolidate urban services under the City of Nashville.

The Commission's proposed annexation is presented in Figure 2.1. The primary method used by the Commission in drawing the boundaries for the proposed annexation was one of matching the need for providing urban services to urbanized areas within reasonable city cost-revenue guidelines. A summary of the general technique used in this process is outlined in Figure 2.2. Greene and Grant drew up the basic annexation

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29 Greene Interview.
Figure 2.1. Annexation Proposal, Community Services Commission, 1952.

Source: A Future For Nashville.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Consideration</th>
<th>Data Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanized?</td>
<td>Population; Density; Growth Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Costs?</td>
<td>City-County Department Projections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Potential?</td>
<td>Property tax projections and locally distributed state revenue projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated with Evolving Total Annexation Proposal?</td>
<td>Contiguity; relationship to existing municipalities; &quot;blend&quot; with evolving &quot;package&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Decision:** Include—Exclude

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**Figure 2.2.** Procedure for Decision to Include Area in Annexation Proposal, Community Services Commission, 1951-1952.

**Source:** A Future For Nashville.
boundaries, using this method relying heavily on the cost-revenue projections prepared by William Snodgrass of the Municipal Technical Advisory Service.  

Accompanying this description of the proposed annexation boundary was the recommendation that "upon the affirmative vote of a majority of those voting in the entire area, consisting of the City of Nashville and the suburban area taken together, the delegation should proceed to extend the city limits of Nashville by special act of the 1953 General Assembly." This was obviously intended to stack the deck in favor of annexation, taking the legislative delegation somewhat off the political hook. Annexation could only occur by act of the state legislature, the present procedure of city initiative not being established until 1955. Under the legislative determination procedure, there was no requirement for any guarantee of a schedule of city service provision to the annexed area. Although the Commission staff foresaw little "footdragging" by the City in providing services, the joint referendum was seen as a way to overcome suburban opinions which did not share such optimism.

Table 2.1 indicates the Commission's estimates of the financial impact of the annexation proposal, assuming their recommendations on transferring health, school, hospital and welfare functions to the county were followed. The property tax consequences included a slight

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30 Ibid.  
31 A Future For Nashville, p. 3.  
33 Greene Interview.
TABLE 2.1

FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF ANNEXATION PROPOSAL AND SERVICE REDISTRIBUTION, COMMUNITY SERVICES COMMISSION, 1951-1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City</th>
<th>County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Surplus</td>
<td>$1,550,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Deficit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$1,594,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Rate Impact</td>
<td>Reduce .41</td>
<td>Increase .68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

($ per $100 assessed)  

Source: A Future For Nashville.

reduction for city residents (due to the transfer of four functions to a countywide basis) and a slight increase for county residents. Residents of the annexed territory, of course, would have experienced a sharp increase in taxes. Assuming the Commission's estimates were correct, the annexation would have paid its way, given the transfer of health, hospital, school and welfare functions to the County.

Absent from the annexation proposal was any attempt to include "non-urban" territory. Both Greene and Grant would "like to have seen the City reach out and take areas which were not developed" thus giving better control over future development.³⁴ Politically, however, such a recommendation would probably not have been accepted by the Commission itself. The Commission did not generally share the staff view that annexation could move from "following" to a "leading" relationship with

³⁴Ibid.
urban growth. A legal obstacle was also present, in that the requirement of a uniform city tax rate would have placed unreasonable stress on the farmland which would have been included in such an annexation strategy. The staff wish to use the report of the Commission as a means for better guiding urban development was therefore concentrated on the recommendation for a unified planning commission, preparation of a comprehensive plan for the entire county, and tightened control of zoning administration. 35

At the time the Commission's report was presented to the public, there were many warm words of praise. 36 Both newspapers endorsed the recommendations, as did the Mayor and County Judge. The key recommendation of annexation, however, required the support of the county legislative delegation. The report was issued only two months prior to the 1952 legislative elections. The delegation finally elected that fall was committed to all of the report's recommendations except that of annexation. Although supportive of the proposed annexation in principle, the political risks were dominant when the proposal was blocked by at least one senator's unwillingness to engage in "any annexation by state legislation." 37 Even though the Commission had carefully and thoroughly documented the case for annexation, there were few political incentives to mount a campaign once the legislature failed to act. 38 It's ironic

35 A Future For Nashville, pp. 27-37.
36 Grant, pp. 98-99. 37 Grant, p. 98.
38 Interview with Charles Hawkins, Jr., December, 1977.
that opposition to the principle of legislative annexation blocked probably one of the most thoroughly prepared local annexation plans in the State's history.

Several other recommendations made by the Commission did lead to action. The City and County Health Departments were merged into a single County Department and certain welfare functions were transferred to the County. In general, however, Commission members and staff became quite gloomy over lack of action following the report's publication. This feeling was enhanced by the lack of any serious criticism or controversy over the data and conclusions upon which the recommendations were based. The Commission clearly had "told it like it was" and "like it would be" if the recommendations were not followed. As will be seen, subsequent impacts of their work erased much of this early disappointment, clearly underscoring the accuracy and extent of their vision of the future. As the Assistant Director of the Commission wrote two years later, "an opportunity still remains for a combination of vision and action." As a contribution to the "vision" portion of this mixture, the Commission's report was a monument. It was the first effort to spell out Nashville's development objectives and a specific means for achieving them.

It is important to keep in mind that the Community Service Commission, directed by two political scientists, had seen inadequate

service delivery as a symptom of the deeper problem of inappropriate governmental organization and boundaries in the Nashville area. Unable to deal significantly with the organizational problem, the Commission had placed its major emphasis on boundary adjustment. The subsequent failure to implement the annexation recommendation was perhaps a blessing in disguise for Commission members who shared in the vision of a need for some form of metropolitan consolidated government. A year after the report was published, a State Constitutional Convention was held and a recommendation to amend the Constitution to permit consolidated government was placed before the voters and subsequently ratified. This single event opened the doorway for a realistic consideration of consolidated government.

There are various accounts of how the 1953 Constitutional Convention came to recommend "Amendment 8" to the voters.\footnote{Frank I. Michelman and Terrence Sandalow, Materials on Government in Urban Areas (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1970), p. 966; Lee S. Greene, David Grubbs and Victor Hobday, Government in Tennessee, 3rd ed. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975), pp. 224-225; Grant and Greene.} In general, it is agreed that a prominent Nashville attorney, who had lost the Convention presidency by a single vote, placed the substance of a proposed article to permit consolidation before the body in its final days.\footnote{Greene Interview.} With the significant amendment which required that any consolidation must be approved by referendums in both the city and county areas, Amendment 8 became Article XI, Sec. 9, of the Tennessee
State Constitution following its ratification by the voters on November 3, 1953.

... The General Assembly may provide for the consolidation of any or all of the governmental and corporate functions now or hereafter vested in municipal corporations with the governmental and corporate functions, now or hereafter vested in the Counties in which such municipal corporations are located; provided such consolidations shall not become effective until submitted to the qualified voters residing within the municipal corporation and in the County outside thereof, and approved by a majority of those voting within the municipal corporation and by a majority of those voting in the County outside the municipal corporation. (As amended: Adopted in Convention—June 4, 1953; Approved at election November 3, 1953; Proclaimed by Governor, November 19, 1953).

Although no direct reference is made in the Article to the question of uniform taxation under consolidated government, most observers at the time assumed that a dual level of services and taxes was implied. In a subsequent court case the validity of this assumption was upheld:

To hold that the local taxes must be equal and uniform throughout Davidson County including the urban areas, would have the practical effect of rendering inoperative the consolidation of all city functions with county functions provided by the Eighth Amendment. This interpretation must necessarily have such crippling effect upon the "consolidation of functions" as to render meaningless the amendment. This amendment made consolidated government legally possible and financially feasible in Tennessee. At the same time it raised two political hurdles. First, it required the General Assembly to pass the appropriate enabling legislation. Second, and more significantly, it mandated that any proposed consolidation be approved by separate

43 Brett Hawkins, p. 37.

44 Lewis Frazier et al. v. Joe C. Carr et al., as discussed in Brett Hawkins, p. 143.
majorities voting in the city and county areas. This political constraint was made a part of the Amendment to allay the fears of both convention delegates and voters who saw threats to rural and suburban areas in the consolidation option.45

The first phase of proposing consolidated government ended with the publication of the Community Services Commission report and the ratification of Amendment 8. As 1954 began, planning officials and community business leaders interested in consolidated government had at their disposal two important new resources:

1. A careful documentation of the city and county's service deficiencies, both present and future (Future of Nashville); and

2. A constitutional means for bringing consolidation about.

The continuing pressure to deal with the sewer problem coupled with suburban growth beyond the City's boundaries led the joint staff of the two planning commissions to propose the creation of an "Advanced Planning and Research Division" early in 1954.46 The division was created with the explicit task of forging recommendations to deal with the array of service and financial problems facing both the county and city, as documented in the Community Service Commission report. The division's first-year work program included:

45 Greene Interview.

financial structure study; analysis of City and County revenues and expenditures; outstanding debt; scope and cost of services; capital improvements programming; fiscal relationships with State and Federal Governments. 47

Priority was given to the financial studies in order to prepare a recommendation for new governmental arrangements which would meet the pressing service needs on an equitable and sound financial basis. The options first spelled out for such arrangements included for the first time city-county consolidation, made possible by the recent constitutional amendment:

On the basis of that (financial study) information, consideration will be given to the financial implication and evaluation of each of the following and their possible application in meeting present and future needs:

1. bring the area of the urban community under one urban government by expanding the central city,
2. application of one metropolitan government within the limits of Davidson County through City-County consolidation,
3. transfer of specific governmental functions between the City and County, resulting in a consolidation of a particular function at one of the other level of government,
4. metropolitan utility district for specific functions; for example, water supply and distribution and sewage collection and disposal.

A primary objective of this work also is the formulation and application of an annual capital budget and long-range financial program for public improvements. 48

The investigation of these options was undertaken by a rather remarkable team on the joint planning commission staff. Put together by the Executive Director, Charles Hawkins, the team was headed by the new director of the Division of Advance Planning and Research, Irving Hand.

47 Planning Activities—1954, pp. 13-34.
48 Hawkins Interview; Planning Activities—1954, p. 20.
Brought in as a staff researcher was Robert Horton, who was completing graduate work in economics and political science at Vanderbilt University. A political scientist at Vanderbilt, Professor Dan Grant, was retained as a staff consultant. This team, which was to remain intact for the next nine years, quickly began to assemble material on the various options for dealing with metropolitan service problems. Hawkins arranged for federal planning grant funds to support the group's work and attempted to insulate the division from political pressures. Hand directed the day-to-day work program while Horton undertook a number of research projects, including reviews of governmental arrangements in other metropolitan areas. Grant provided commentary and advice throughout the entire range of discussions.

It is important to note that this group did not initiate any substantial new technical analyses of service provision in the city and county. They relied heavily on the work of the Community Services Commission for such information. The pressing sewer problem, however, did lead to a concurrent staff study of sewer extension into the urbanized areas adjacent to the City of Nashville. The extent of the need for sewers and the failure to extend the City's boundaries can be

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seen in Table 2.2. The study focused closely on the unsewered suburban area adjacent to the city. Just as the Community Services Commission had done, the planners made early reference to the reform of governmental organization needed to implement the engineering-based recommendations.

Courses of action available under existing laws and in terms of existing levels of governmental organization indicate that the two principle possibilities for dealing with this problem are annexation and contractual arrangements between the City of Nashville and Davidson County.52

In their report, the planners recommended that a program of sewer construction in the suburban area be undertaken by the county "in cooperation with the city." The plan involved contracting for sewage disposal with the City of Nashville and using both general obligation and revenue means of financing.53 Keeping in mind that Hand's Division was also investigating new forms of urban government, the sewer report was significant for two reasons:

1. It provided technical documentation of the sewer problem with a proposed program of sewer construction prepared by engineers and planners who were relatively free from political restraints; and
2. The soundness of the technical recommendation contrasted greatly with the complicated governmental arrangements required to finance, construct and administer the plan.54

52 Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System for the Nashville Metropolitan Area (Nashville: City of Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions, 1956), p. 12

53 Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System for the Metropolitan Area, p. 13.

54 Hawkins Interview.
Table 2.2

Estimated population using various facilities for disposal of sewage—Davidson County, 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (Sq. Miles)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Using Sewers</th>
<th>Using Septic Tanks</th>
<th>Using Outdoor Privies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Nashville</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>174,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewered Area Outside of Nashville</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsewered Suburban Area Adjacent to City</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>129,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsewered Potentially Suburban Area</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Area</td>
<td>380.0</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>533.0</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>191,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System, p. 22.
The engineer's response to this latter problem was the creation of a special sewer district—a prospect which Hand's group saw as only further complicating the problem of coordinated urban service provisions.\(^{55}\) The stage was therefore set for the publication of the second major report from the Advance Planning and Research Division, *A Plan for Metropolitan Government*.

In March 1956, after nearly two years of intensive staff preparation, the preliminary draft of *A Plan for Metropolitan Government* was presented to the two planning commissions for action. As the product of Hawkins, Hand, Horton and Grant's combined efforts, the draft was the first formal outline of consolidated government for Nashville and Davidson County.\(^{56}\) The document began with a statement of "our metropolitan problems" which followed the general approach of the earlier Community Services Commission:

1. A large part of the Nashville Metropolitan Area is provided with none of the customary urban services, or, at best, has an unsatisfactory makeshift arrangement for partial service;
2. There is no existing government able to cope with area-wide problems;
3. The existence of separate City and County governments is not only wasteful to the extent that there is duplication of government but it also tends to divide the loyalties of community leadership and the authority of local government at times when unity of action is urgently needed;
4. The dispersion and dissipation of citizens' control of their government is perhaps the most serious result of the existing governmental structure in the Nashville Metropolitan Area.

The plan went on to point out that while these problems were common to most urban areas of the United States, Nashville and Davidson County are

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\(^{56}\) Hawkins Interview.
now only in the "early stages of this metropolitan disease."\textsuperscript{57} What followed was a rejection of annexation, functional service consolidation, special utility districts formation, municipal federation, extension of extraterritorial municipal powers, expansion of county functions, establishment of contractual agreements and city-county separation as solution to the problem.\textsuperscript{58}

The research of Robert Horton had generally bolstered Hand and Grant's view that city-county consolidation was the only workable solution. Annexation, even under Tennessee's recently enacted procedure for annexation by ordinance, did not solve the problems of governmental overlays and duplication. In a more threatening way there was the fear that the potential for unilateral annexation would force the incorporation of many "unviable" towns around Nashville's periphery.

The other "less than comprehensive" alternatives were rejected on the grounds that they would be stop-gap in nature and, in some cases, might even impede future consolidation efforts. Expansion of county services in the suburban area, for instance, was seen as permanently separating the government of the central city from that of the rest of the urban area; the "federation" model (typified by Toronto) was rejected due to the absence in Davidson County of any significant city government other than that of Nashville.

Following the discussion of "the metropolitan problem" and the rejection of non-consolidation solutions, the Plan presented both a

\textsuperscript{57} Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. i.

\textsuperscript{58} Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 13.
detailed recommendation for consolidation of Nashville and Davidson County as well as a proposed schedule for bringing such a government into existence. This latter proposal reflected both legal and political realities. Legally, it was shown that nearly two years would be required to implement consolidated government under the constitutionally appropriate process. The general schedule outlined was:

October 1956—Publication of Plan for Metropolitan Government;

Early 1957—passage of required enabling act by Tennessee General Assembly;

May 1957—creation of Metropolitan Government Charter Commission, as authorized by enabling act;

February 1958—completion of draft of consolidated government charter;

May 1958—referendum on adoption of charter;

August 1958—election of officers for new Metropolitan Government;

September 1958—installation of new Metropolitan Government. 59

Politically, the planning staff recognized that active support by both Mayor Ben West and County Judge Beverly Briley was required if Metropolitan Government were to come into being. Each official was closely tied to one of Nashville's two newspapers—West with the Nashville Banner and Briley with the Tennessean. In order to accommodate West's assumed preferences for annexation (and to also allow certain service extensions to get underway prior to 1958), the planners

devised the strategy of recommending that annexation of highly urbanized areas take place first, to be followed by the consolidation of county and city as per schedule. It was anticipated that this two-step implementation of governmental reform would satisfy both the Mayor and the Judge (each hoping, no doubt, that the "other half" of the plan would never be carried out!).

The plan for consolidated government itself was highlighted by the abolishment of both city and county governments and the creation of an entirely new government—the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. Only several constitutionally-required county offices remained. The basic structure of the proposed new government was briefly outlined in the plan. It consisted of "a representative" metropolitan council to serve as the single legislative body for the entire area. The issues of size and constituencies were left open with the suggestion that some members represent wards and others be chosen at-large. A single "elective chief executive" with "administrative authority commonly possessed by a mayor" was recommended. This person would sit atop an executive structure of merged departments and agencies with only a few "independent authorities, boards, commissions, and committees." The organization charts which accompanied the text outlined a streamlined form of government, one which obviously would have to be reviewed by the careful eyes of the proposed Charter

60 Hawkins Interview; Brett Hawkins, pp. 39-40.

Commission which would have to undertake the delicate task of merging city and county functions, officials, and employees.

Following the overview of the structure of the proposed government, the staff presented a critical feature of the new government: the creation of two "service districts." These districts would outline both the provision and financing of public services throughout the county. The entire county would comprise the "General Services District." This district would receive "all of those general services which are required on an area-wide basis . . . ." 62 A second district "the Urban Services District," was created to initially include the "urban area" of the City of Nashville at the time of the creation of consolidated government. This district would receive additional services "normally required in urban areas." 63 Tax levies in each district would reflect the unique package of services delivered. An important feature of the Urban Services District proposal was the "expandable" nature of the District:

As areas within the General Services District come to need urban services and the new government becomes able to provide such services in a reasonable period, the Urban Services District would be expanded to include such areas. Such expansion would be accomplished through action of the Metropolitan Council, either by petition and referendum or on its own initiative in accordance with specified criteria and policies. 64

The plan proposed the following allocation of services between the two districts:

62 Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 31.
63 Ibid.
64 Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 33.
General Services District (countywide)

General Administration  Hospitals  Airport
Police  Streets and Roads  Public Housing
Fire Protection  Traffic  Urban Development
Courts  Schools  Planning
Jails  Parks and Recreation  Zoning
Assessment  Library  Building Code
Health  Auditorium  Plumbing Code
Welfare  Fair Grounds  Electrical Code

Urban Services District

Police (Class I)  Street Lighting
Fire Protection (Class III)  Street Cleaning
Water  Refuse Collection and Disposal
Sewers—Sanitary  Wine and Whiskey Supervision
Sewers—Storm  Taxicab Regulation

Three important features of the proposed government were closely tied to the method of delivering and financing urban services: (1) the creation of the two service districts, (2) the allocation of services between the districts, and (3) the expandable character of the Urban Services District. Given the research interest outlined in the opening chapter, the origins of each of these features require elaboration and examination.

The Origin of the Service-District Concept Itself

The fact that the members of the Community Services Commission had rejected a recommendation for consolidated government underscored their view that since all public services could not be delivered countywide and since the constitution required a countywide tax rate, annexation

65 Plan of Metropolitan Government, Appendix D.
was the only way to preserve an urban service-and-tax area (the City of Nashville). As previously discussed, the 1953 Constitutional amendment permitting consolidated government implied the legality of a dual tax-rate under such a government. After considerable discussion, planning staff members, in 1955, also rejected any effort to extend all public services countywide. The staff also rejected the possibility of financing "high-density" services purely through service charges and user fees. Such an alternative raised serious questions of long-term financial stability. Staff analysts had difficulty in predicting the long-term consequences of such a fee system. Instead, they decided to take advantage of the apparent legality of a dual-tax rate in a consolidated area and create an "urban service area" overlaid on a portion of the county. This area would provide a "service package of all things which cannot be done with general, countywide taxes." It was clear that such services would be those normally provided by cities but not by counties, especially those containing a significant rural area. This view was primarily based upon the financial and administrative considerations of providing urban services to urban areas. The creation of an urban services district, complete with its own tax rate, permitted urban service planning and financing within consolidated government. It did not raise the problems of responsibility and coordination associated with "special service districts" which would have remained autonomous from consolidated government control. It is

66 Hawkins Interview.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.
significant to note that the planners specifically mentioned their concerns with such service districts. They addressed head-on the need for an ultimate elimination of these districts, first in the Urban Services District and then in the General Services District.

A second rationale was also used for the creation of the urban services district. The Constitutional amendment permitting consolidation required a separate referendum on consolidation in both city and county areas. It took little imagination to see the political need for a way of assuring voters in county areas that their taxes would not be raised to pay for services they felt they would not receive in a short period of time. The recent (1955) passage of the annexation by ordinance law tended to heighten these concerns. Although they cite financial consideration as the prime rationale, planning staff members of the time readily concede that creation of two service districts with two tax-rates had the potential for placating suburbanite and rural residents. In the four-page review of the Plan carried in the Tennessean, the political attractiveness of the service-district concept was highlighted.

1. Question: How is it possible to avoid taxing parts of the metropolitan area for urban services long before such services are received?

   Answer: By creating two service districts . . . . The tax levy in the two service districts would be in direct ratio of the cost of the urban services to the cost of general services, taking into consideration all sources of revenue and their application.70

69 Horton Interview; Hawkins Interview; Hand Correspondence.

70 The Tennessean, October 30, 1956.
Although reference to a "timetable" of Urban Services District expansion in the Plan related to the problems of taxes paid and services received, it also suggested a third rationale of the service district concept. As highlighted in the first chapter of this study, the scheduled extension of urban services can be a mechanism for managing urban development. Interviews with several members of the planning staff who developed the service district concept suggest that this consideration was present in their discussions, but the issues it raised were considered to be nearly moot given the vast service deficiencies in areas already urbanized. The thought of managing new urban development with service extension policies was academic at best and irrelevant at worst. The Executive Director of the joint planning staff at the time pointed out that subdivision controls were actively used to control the quality of residential developments, but that any thought of tying residential growth in the county to the provision of such urban services as sanitary sewers was ridiculous when one considered the 130,000 suburban residents who were already dependent on potentially hazardous septic tank sewage systems. In a way analogous to Dr. Greene's feelings four years earlier, the planners could dream of their service district creation as a device for managing development, but, in practical terms, it was devised to serve financial, administrative and political ends within a framework of consolidated government.

71 Hawkins Interview; Horton Interview.

72 Hawkins Interview.
The Allocation of Services

As previously stated, the primary function of the Urban Services District was to provide and finance those services required in the more densely populated urban area. Staff studies, based mainly on the earlier Community Services Commission report, were conducted to determine those services which could be "reasonably financed and administered" on a countywide basis. The services remaining were then allocated to the Urban Services District. Certain services presented no real problem once the assumption of a single metropolitan government was made. The obvious candidates for the General Services District were: health, welfare, hospitals, courts, jails, streets and roads, schools, parks and recreation, auditorium, planning and zoning, codes enforcement. Likewise, there was little debate over the "urban services" nature of street lighting, street cleaning, and storm sewer provision. The issues emerged over the allocation of police, fire, refuse collection, water and sanitary sewers provision. In the case of sanitary sewers, there was little debate over the need for an "urban service" classification. The difficult issue became the means of financing their construction, given the tremendous backlog of needs in the suburban areas. The existence of a maze of water systems in the suburban area raised a similar issue for water service. The combined response was to classify each as an urban service and leave open the issue of financing for future determination. In the case of water service, it was anticipated that water districts existing within the G.S.D. could contract with or be taken over by the consolidated government.
Police and fire protection raised the more fundamental issue: exactly what is meant by "urban service"? The existence of an over-extended sheriff's office and subscription security forces in the county area had been often cited as a major deficiency of county government. Consolidation required some form of countywide police protection, but staff studies by Robert Horton revealed that the cost of countywide police protection equal to that required in the urban areas would be prohibitive. The staff finally recommended the splitting of police protection into two levels—"Class 1" (U.S.D.) and "general" (General Services District). Factors such as patrol intensity and reaction time were used to make the distinction.

The fire protection issue also was reflected in a confused pattern of private subscription companies and districts in the county area. The existence of few water lines greater than 2" in diameter throughout the county compounded the issue and linked it to the consideration of water supply. The staff finally recommended that Class 3 fire protection be considered in the Urban Services District while General Services District fire protection be provided on a "rural" level (generally Class 10).

Refuse collection and disposal was made an urban services function. Although there were extensive private garbage collection firms in the county it was decided to maintain garbage disposal as an Urban Services

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73 See A Future For Nashville, pp. 97-108.
74 Horton Interview; Hawkins Interview.
District function, allowing the private collectors to use government facilities on a fee basis.

It is important to note that the Plan, in allocating these services, stressed the need to "package" all services ultimately deemed as "urban." Only in the case of water supply was there provision for extension of any one urban service beyond the U.S.D. boundary. The planners emphasized that the financial and administrative soundness of the service district concept depended on the maintenance of two distinct service levels the boundaries of which would be determined by the level of urbanization. 75

U.S.D. Boundaries and Provision for Extension

The 1956 Plan stressed that the boundaries of the Urban Services District should "consist of that part of the General Services District that requires urban services." 76 Although the planning staff theoretically included in this area not only the City of Nashville but also the urbanized area around the city, they realized the practicality in defining the initial U.S.D. boundaries as being identical with those of the city at the time of consolidation. They anticipated that some annexation would occur between the publication of the Plan and the installation of consolidated government. 77 Further, they assumed that

75 Ibid.
76 Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 31.
extension of the Urban Services District would occur as rapidly as the new government could provide the appropriate services. 78

Although the initial Plan left the actual method open, it suggested that extension of U.S.D. boundaries would occur "through the action of the Metropolitan Council either by petition and referendum or on its own initiative in accordance with specified criteria and policies." 79 As has already been suggested, the rationale for expansion of the U.S.D. was anticipated to be the need for servicing existing urban development. Such services would be provided according to a "timetable" made clear at the time of U.S.D. expansion. Although legal requirement for the implementation of such a "timetable" was later attached to the proposal for consolidated government, the Plan followed the flavor of the new Tennessee annexation law in remaining vague on the precise requirements for tying urban service delivery schedules to expansion of the U.S.D. Nevertheless, the authors of the Plan, in providing for an expandable district receiving a distinctive package of urban services originated a concept which "was rational, made sense, seemed fair and was expected to be cost-effective." 80 Their judgment seems correct in view of the fact that during the seven years following the publication of the Plan, the U.S.D.-G.S.D. scheme remained basically intact while consolidated government was debated and finally implemented.

78 Hawkins Interview; Horton Interview.
79 Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 33.
80 Hand Correspondence.
II. IMPLEMENTATION: 1956-1963

Most accounts of the consolidation of Nashville and Davidson County place greatest emphasis on the period following the publication of the Plan in 1956. This study, in focusing on the service district concept, deviates from that pattern. After the publication of the Plan, the service district idea remained at the heart of the proposed form of government. Although the questions of services and taxes were central in the two referendum campaigns, the governmental mechanism for handling them was repeated in both proposed Charters with little change. The dynamics of the two campaigns were provided by the behavior and alignment of the Mayor, the County Judge, the two newspapers and various voting groups. The proposed structure of the new government remained remarkably intact.

1957 Enabling Legislation

Some debate exists regarding the reactions of Mayor West and Judge Briley to the 1956 Plan. The Executive Director of the Joint Planning Commission staff described the initial response of each as positive. He recalled that West, after his first exposure to the Plan, waited until the publisher of the Banner indicated his support to give a positive response. At the same session, Briley and the Tennessean expressed their long-standing commitment to consolidated government. Dan Grant, in reviewing the same period, pointed out that although the

81 Hawkins Interview.
Mayor and Judge weren't exhuberant in their support for the Plan, they did not oppose it. 82 He went on to suggest that either Briley or West, at this point, could have blocked the move to consolidated government by obstructing the process of obtaining and implementing the required enabling legislation. That they did not, he claimed, was "something of a political miracle," proving the success of the planners' strategy for including both annexation and consolidation in the Plan. 83 It should also be noted that both Briley and West, at this time, had reason to believe that they might become the Mayor of the new consolidated government.

In order to secure the appropriate enabling legislation, the planning staff retained the highly regarded attorney who had headed the Community Services Commission, Edwin Hunt, to draft the required bill. Hunt, together with Charles Hawkins and other planners then met with the Davidson County delegation in November 1956. The legislators presented "good objective questions" but raised "no serious objections" to the proposed legislation. 84 Since the enabling legislation had to be general, not private, it was necessary to engage in some logrolling to secure passage in the legislature. This done, the 1957 Tennessee General Assembly passed legislation implementing the 1953 Constitutional

82 Grant, "Professional Political Leadership: The Case of Nashville," p. 77.
83 Ibid.
amendment provision permitting consolidated government. The Act specified a procedure for creating a charter commission through action by the county and city legislative bodies in passing identical resolutions. The Act then went on to spell out certain features which were required in any proposed charter, including the provision for two service districts as first outlined in the 1956 Plan. The Act provided:

(c) For two (2) service districts within the geographical limits of the metropolitan government, to wit, a general services district and an urban services district, as to both of which districts the metropolitan government shall have jurisdiction and authority. The general services district shall consist of the total area of the county. The urban services district shall consist originally of the total area of the principal city at the time of the filing of the proposed charter with the county commissioners of election . . .

(f) That the area of the urban services district may be expanded and its territorial limits extended by annexation whenever particular areas of the general services district come to need urban services and the metropolitan government becomes able to provide such service within a reasonable period. Such annexation shall be under provisions and limitations specified in the charter, consistent with those provided by §§6-308-6-312.

(g) For the functions of the metropolitan government which shall be performed throughout the entire general services district and the government services which shall be rendered in said district.

(h) That the tax levy for the general services district shall be set so as to be sufficient, with other available funds and grants, to defray the cost of all governmental services which are provided generally throughout or on behalf of said district.

(i) For the functions of the metropolitan government which shall be performed within the urban services district and the governmental services which shall be rendered in said district.

(j) That the tax levy for the urban services district shall be set so as to be sufficient, with other available funds and grants, to defray the cost of municipal-type governmental services which are provided within said district.

85 Tennessee, Public Acts of Tennessee, 1957, Chapter 120.
(k) For a metropolitan council, which shall be the legislative body of the metropolitan government and shall be given all the authority and functions of the governing bodies of the county and cities being consolidated, with such exceptions and with such additional authority as may be specified elsewhere in this charter.86

In drafting this enabling legislation, Hunt presented the General Assembly a carefully prepared expression of the Plan's service district concept which was consistent with existing state law and acceptable to most legislators. The creation of an "Urban Council," for instance, retained the "municipal corporation" for purposes of establishing the U.S.D. tax rate and insured that allocation of state-collected taxes, such as the gasoline tax, would distinguish between the urban and non-urban areas of any consolidated metropolitan government.

1958 Charter Commission and Referendum

Both the County Quarterly Court and the City Council moved swiftly to establish a Metropolitan Charter Commission.87 It has generally concluded that the Commission they created was representative of most area interests, including blacks. It has also been accepted that the Commission was hardworking and attempted to avoid petty political concern.88 Staff assistance was provided to the Commission by the Advance Planning and Research Division of the joint Planning Commissions (the same staff who had prepared the 1956 Plan). This support was

86Michelman and Sandalow, pp. 966-967.
87From this point on in the text, "Metro" refers to either the proposed or actual consolidated government of Nashville and Davidson County.
88Brett Hawkins, p. 44.
underwritten with federal urban planning assistance funds, as had been the preparation of the 1956 Plan. Edwin Hunt, who became legal consultant to the Charter Commission, oversaw the drafting of the proposed charter itself. He, along with the planners under Charles Hawkins and Irving Hand and with the continuing advice of Dan Grant, guided the Commission into the preparation of the proposed charter which differed very little from the 1956 Plan. Changes were in the nature of refinement, not substantive revision.

One issue faced by the Commission and not dealt with in the Plan was the size and districting of the proposed Metropolitan Council. The 1958 Commission emphasized the need for a "workable size" and the guarantee of black representation. They proposed a Council of 21 members (6 at-large, 15 from districts) with district boundaries guaranteeing at least two black seats. The fact that the size of this proposed Council was less than one-third that of the combined Quarterly Court-City Council became an issue in subsequent events. In addition, a considerable amount of the Commission's time was devoted to the tedious but critical question of civil service and pensions, reallocation of city and county bonded indebtedness, the merger of the city and county school systems and so on. As two close observers concluded, "the Charter seemed to be free of flagrant pitfalls of the type that might have detracted from the basic issue of city-county consolidation."
The proposed charter's provisions for two service districts remained basically identical to those presented in the 1956 Plan. An important refinement included the requirement that expansion of the U.S.D. not only be tied to the need of particular areas for urban services, but also to the capability of Metro "to provide such service within a reasonable period, which shall not be greater than one year after ad valorem taxes in the annexed area became due"[92] (Sec. 1.04 Proposed Metropolitan Government Charter).

With the exception of fire protection and solid waste services, the allocation of services between the two service districts remained the same as that presented in the 1956 Plan. The Charter Commission resolved the continuing dilemma over urban and rural fire service levels by simply omitting fire protection as a G.S.D. function. This, in effect, left G.S.D. residents dependent on the private and fire-district fire services already present in the area. Similarly, refuse collection was made a U.S.D. function while refuse disposal was made a G.S.D. function. Private garbage collectors were therefore left as the primary means for refuse collection outside the U.S.D. Table 2.3 indicates the full allocation of functions and services described in Section 1.05 of the Proposed Charter. The Commission left open the possibility of shifting this allocation:

Nothing in the section shall be deemed to limit the power of Metropolitan Government to exercise other governmental functions in either U.S.D. or the G.S.D., or to provide new

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### TABLE 2.3
PROPOSED SERVICE ALLOCATION, URBAN AND GENERAL SERVICES DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Services District</th>
<th>Urban Services District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Administration</td>
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<td>Airport</td>
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<td>Public Housing</td>
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<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>Urban Redevelopment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Streets and Roads</td>
<td>Urban Renewal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Sanitary Sewers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional Police Protection</td>
<td>Storm Sewers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire Protection</td>
<td>Street Lighting</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Street Cleaning</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refuse Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wine and Whiskey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervision</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
and additional governmental services in either the U.S.D. or the G.S.D.\textsuperscript{93} (Proposed Charter, Sec. 1.05, p. 3)

The politics of the 1958 referendum on the proposed charter have been told elsewhere.\textsuperscript{94} Following a campaign led by both Mayor West and Judge Briley together with business leaders, planners and other community elites, the voters of the city voted in favor of Metro while the county voters rejected it. Although a number of theories have been advanced to explain this outcome, it seems clear that the proponents of Metro were not able to overcome the fear of "higher taxes without better services" among county residents.\textsuperscript{95} These fears were encouraged by private service companies, county employees and others who perceived a threat to their position by the proposed metropolitan government.

A review of all available accounts of the 1958 referendum finds no evidence of substantial structural criticism of the proposed arrangement for the two service districts. Opponents simply ignored the protection against inappropriate urban taxation provided by the service district concept and preyed upon the fears of higher taxes imposed by a "dictatorial city regime." Although the plan for Metro nurtured by the planning staff since its origin with the Community Services Commission report was supported by a broad cross-section of city and county elites and organizations, its promotion failed to overcome the typical fears of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{93}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{94}Brett Hawkins; Elazar; David Booth, Metropolitics: The Nashville Consolidation (East Lansing: Michigan University, 1963).
\item \textsuperscript{95}Elazar, p. 100.
\end{itemize}
residents outside the city. The 1958 vote seemed consistent with the fate of such proposals in other cities during the same period.\footnote{Brett Hawkins, p. 57.}

The Annexation Period

The events of the four years following the 1958 referendum were significant both in that they set the stage for the success of the 1962 proposal for consolidated government and that during this period the boundaries of the City of Nashville changed dramatically. The former relates to the politics of Metro's birth, while the latter is of significance in that the size of the U.S.D. proposed in the 1962 Metro Charter was much larger than that of 1958.

Immediately after the defeat of the Metro proposal in June 1958, Mayor West and the City Council utilized Tennessee's 1955 annexation law to bring into the city some seven square miles of primarily industrial territory (with a population of 2,000). Two years later the city annexed another 42 square miles of primarily residential areas containing 80,000 residents (see Figure 2.3). The effect of these two annexations was a tripling of the area of the city and an increase in population from 173,000 to 254,000. West's own comments on these two annexations reflect the city's continuing concern for the failure to expand city boundaries as urban growth occurred:

That question (proposed Metro Charter) had been submitted to the people by vote in 1958 . . . and the people of the community turned it down. . . . Following that, this was the first annexation, it being anticipated as part of the Metropolitan Government Plan that the Urban Services District would be the
Figure 2.3. Annexations, City of Nashville, 1958-1962.

Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission.
present City and that annexations would proceed immediately to encompass in the U.S.D. all that is developed and urban. We have a principle in municipal government, which we think has been accepted generally, that everything that's urban should be municipal.97

In the same statement, West went on to outline and defend his annexation scheme:

... it was thought by the Executive Branch of the Government and members of the Legislative Branch, after the failure of the Metropolitan Plan proposal, that the existence of this City, future existence, its health and welfare depended on an orderly program of annexation, and that the first ... being commercial and industrial ... should precede any residential annexation. Furthermore, it was thought that in order to have a properly balanced community, this should proceed without a vote of the few residents who were in the industrial area, because we didn't feel the future of the whole community should depend upon the vote of a few who lived in the industrial area. It was also thought that subsequently the residential area should be annexed and that is where the City Council and I had a division of opinion as to the method of procedure. It has been my opinion as to the people should, and in my opinion, would have voted themselves in if the matter had been explained to them ... The Council, however, felt that the matter was so urgent that they proceeded on a second step of annexation and annexed 42 square miles and 80,000 residents ... essentially residential.98

There has been much discussion of the depth of West's sincerity in wanting a referendum in the residential area, but the outcome was clear: 82,000 persons, whether they liked it or not, were brought into the city.

Probably the most important consequence of these two annexations was the reversal of suburban attitudes toward Metro—especially in the areas annexed. The anger at being brought into the city without any vote contributed to significant "anti-West" sentiment. Likewise, county

97 Planned Progress Through Annexation (Nashville: Public Relations Department, City of Nashville, n.d.), p. 6.
98 Planned Progress Through Annexation, p. 15.
residents feared that the city would "reach out again" and bring them into the city without any guarantee of urban services. Supported by the continuing pro-Metro orientation of Judge Briley and The Tennessean, this sentiment, many observers have argued, added county voices, previously anti-Metro, to the pro-Metro cause. It should also be noted that Mayor West and the City Council had further angered suburban residents through the strict implementation of a "green sticker" law which required all motor vehicles using Nashville's streets for thirty days or more to pay what amounted to an auto tax. West again justified the act on the basis of the city's expensive "subsidizing" of suburban residents who commuted into the city.

Committed to annexation rather than consolidation, West, a majority of the City Council, and the Nashville Banner therefore focused primarily on the problem of extending city services to the urbanized areas of the county. Although planning staff members recognized the validity of annexation as one means for dealing with the service needs of these areas, they still were committed to a long-term policy of consolidation which would not only better serve urbanized areas but also deal with city-county friction, duplicate services and functions, complex city-county financial relationships, control over potential growth areas, and so on. The planning staff was in an awkward position. The Mayor needed staff support to develop an annexation strategy while the staff, along with Judge Briley and others, were still committed to the creation of Metro. The Executive Director was frequently placed in extremely
stressful situations.\textsuperscript{99} In spite of the annexations, it was clear that the Metro issue was not dead.

The second consequence of the annexation period was the dramatic change in the boundaries of the City of Nashville. Relying heavily on planning staff data (much of which originated with the Community Service Commission report of 1952) the Mayor himself helped draw the boundaries included in the two annexation resolutions.\textsuperscript{100} The 1958 resolution brought in extremely valuable industrial territory, particularly on Cockrill Bend, the current Metro-Center area, and the commercial areas near Murfreesboro Pike and Spence Lane. Each of these areas have subsequently become well-developed, contributing significant urban service taxes. Not only did the Mayor claim that these areas were already developed to the point that they should be included in the city, but he also stressed the city's need to replace the tax losses created by the conversion of over 6,000 parcels of land into the area's interstate highway system, the extensive urban renewal program, and the growth of governmental, religious and educational institutions in the city.\textsuperscript{101} Politically, it is obvious that annexation of the commercial and industrial areas first was intended to ease the pain expected with any residential annexation by ordinance.

The boundaries of the second annexation drew heavily on residential density, service patterns and likelihood for immediate development.

\textsuperscript{99}Hawkins Interview.

\textsuperscript{100}Hawkins Interview; Horton Interview.

\textsuperscript{101}Planned Progress Through Annexation, p. 7.
Most of the area annexed had also been included in the earlier annexation recommendation made in the Community Services Commission report. (It is important to note that the Tennessee State Supreme Court, in upholding the validity of the City annexation, cited the 1952 Community Service Commission report.) With the exception of the remainder of Cockrill Bend, the City Airport, the Radnor Railroad Yards, Tennessee State University, and the Cornelia Fort Airport-East Nashville areas, the second annexation drew in well-developed suburban neighborhoods, most without sanitary sewers. In March 1961, the city extended police, fire and garbage collection services to the entire annexed area. During the same year, some $5.5 million worth of general obligation bonds were sold to begin construction of trunk sewer lines. Still, there remained bitter issues of proper tax rates, school zoning, and water system consolidation. While Judge Briley, The Tennessean, and other pro-Metro forces used these issues to point out the absence of a "plan of services" for the newly annexed areas, it remained that any new attempt to install consolidated government would face a much-expanded city with a commitment to provide urban services to an under-serviced area of some 40 square miles and 80,000 people.

**The 1962 Charter Commission and Referendum**

The commitment of Mayor West and the city to a strategy of annexation rather than consolidation altered drastically the alignment

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102 Michelman and Sandalow, pp. 967-969.

103 Brett Hawkins, p. 65.
of forces in the second attempt to install Metro. Judge Briley, *The Tennessean*, a majority of the County Quarterly Court, and most of the community business leaders pressed for consolidation. Blocked by the refusal of the City Council to participate in the formation of a new Charter Commission, pro-Metro forces were able to convince the County Legislative Delegation to secure passage of a private act permitting the formation of a charter commission by referendum in both the city and county areas. In August 1961, voters in both areas easily approved the formation of a new charter commission.

The 1962 charter commission consisted of almost the same membership as the 1958 commission. Staff assistance was again provided by the Advance Planning and Research Division of the joint Planning Commissions. Edwin Hunt again provided his valued legal leadership. An important issue quickly addressed by the Commission was that of the proposed Metro Council's size and districting. There was strong feeling that the first Metro proposal sharply limited the political opportunities of the many members of the City Council and County Quarterly Court. Sensitive to the political implications, the second commission proposed a 41-member Metropolitan Council, with six members being elected at-large. 104

This recommendation for a larger council coupled with the greatly enlarged population and area of the city offered the commission an opportunity to inhibit the development of a "we-they" U.S.D.-G.S.D. schism on the proposed new Council. In preparing the proposed

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104 Horton Interview.
councilmanic districts, the staff not only again preserved black representation but they also created a majority of districts to include both U.S.D. and G.S.D. areas. The proposal was also intended to give a majority of councilmen a significant constituency of U.S.D. residents in the newly annexed area—a move designed to prompt Council support for rapid servicing of this area. The enlargement of the city through the West annexations made this arrangement quite feasible and necessary, from the planners' perspective.

The Charter Commission made other minor changes, but none which affected the urban services provisions or general planning arrangements. Again, the soundness of the original conceptualization coupled with the consistency of staff advice was significant. Although the method for expanding the U.S.D. provided in the 1962 Proposed Charter was the same as that of 1958, the entire procedure received much more attention during the second referendum campaign. This was the obvious consequence of the issues raised by the 1958 and 1960 annexations. The commission felt that the provision requiring service deliveries "within one year after ad valorem taxes in the annexed area became due" was far more protective of suburban interests than the current annexation law which, at that time, did not require even a plan of services for the area to be annexed. It was common knowledge that the city had prepared no plan of services prior to the 1958 and 1960 annexations.

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105 Horton Interview; Hawkins Interview.
106 Ibid.
107 Brett Hawkins, p. 75.
109 Ibid.; Hawkins Interview.
The 1962 referendum campaign differed from the 1958 campaign in at least three significant ways. First, there existed some 82,000 residents brought into the city through annexation by ordinance. Second, the Mayor and a major newspaper, the Nashville Banner, now opposed consolidation. Third, the pro-Metro forces, remembering the failure of 1958, more carefully and intensively organized a grassroots campaign in favor of the proposed charter.

The impact of the West annexations served to provide a new, active group of Metro supporters within the city. It also heightened the fears in the county of future unilateral annexations. The Metro proposal was perceived by many as the only way to "have a voice" in the extension of both urban services and taxes to these areas. The proponents' strategy, developed by the Nashville Tennessean and a group of community leaders, the Citizens for Better Government, stressed the fact that under Metro, decisions on service extension and the accompanying urban service district taxes would be made by the Metropolitan Council, representative of 35 districts and an at-large constituency.\textsuperscript{110}

The opposition of Mayor West prompted the proponents to charge that he was indulging in politics due to the fact that he probably had little chance of being elected Metro Mayor.\textsuperscript{111} This charge was given some validity by virtue of the minor differences between the 1962 proposed charter and that of 1958, which West had supported. West, in turn,

\textsuperscript{110} Brett Hawkins, pp. 78-80.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.: Hawkins Interview; Horton Interview.
focused his campaign on the city. His alleged use of city employees in this effort further contributed to charges of politics in the campaign. Ultimately, the campaign boiled down to the West-dominated city political machine supported by the Banner, versus the well-organized pro-Metro forces, led by the Citizens for Better Government, community elites, the Tennessean, supported by Judge Briley and the planning group who originally designed the Metro proposal. 112

The outcome of both referenda is presented in Table 2.4. The anger over past and fears of future annexations carried the vote for Metro. 113

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2.4</th>
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<tr>
<td>VOTES IN 1958 AND 1962 REFERENDA ON METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT IN NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY</td>
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Although there have been various minor differences in interpreting the outcome of the 1962 referendum, there is little doubt that Metro came into existence because of fears of "taxation without representation" and "services promised but not delivered." 114 The irony is that these same


113 Brett Hawkins, pp. 78-80.

fears led to the defeat of Metro in 1958! It seems clear that many voters who had accepted the general arguments favoring Metro in 1958 continued to support Metro in 1962. What the authors and proponents of Metro had failed to do in 1958—mobilize apathetic voters and moderate votes of fear—was done in 1962, both by their own campaign and by the reaction to the annexations of 1958 and 1960.

In Chapter I, reference was made to the general view that sufficient votes in favor of consolidation could not be mustered through appeals to the "rationality" of consolidation alone. "Unusual circumstances" were generally required to foster a positive vote.115 In the case of Nashville, it seems clear that the impact of anger and worry over city taxes and urban services provided the "unusual circumstance" in 1962. To the extent that this "reactive" vote supplemented the base of those positively committed to Metro, the theory seems confirmed.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The rationale for this retracing of Metro's birth was presented at the outset of the chapter: what led to the creation of the service district concept, and more specifically, what were the developmental dimensions of these origins? The history just reviewed suggests several responses to the questions.

1. The service district concept originated not through political or technical evolution but came from an early and consistent

conceptualization held by a cohesive group of governmental planners.

2. The primary rationale for the service district concept was a clustering of financial, administrative and legal considerations bolstered by an absence of political ignorance. Although present in the hearts of most of these planners, long-term developmental concerns were of secondary significance. Environmental-technical considerations likewise were supportive, but not primary.

3. Although lip service was paid to "long-range management of urban development," the prevailing development environment throughout Metro birth was one of "catching up and keeping up" with urban growth. This orientation prompted the very idea of a consolidated government and guided the implementation of the urban services concept.

Any reading of the previous pages and accounts of the events they describe makes it clear that the planning group associated with the Advance Planning and Research Division of the joint planning staff fathered the services district concept. Building on the service patterns outlined in the 1952 Community Services Commission report, Charles Hawkins, Irving Hand, Robert Horton, Dan Grant and their legal facilitator, Edwin Hunt, created the proposal for an expandable U.S.D. and a countywide G.S.D. This proposal, first appearing in the 1956 Plan, remained intact through both charter commissions and was implemented with the installation of Metro in 1963. The positive ties between these
planners and area elites facilitated the continued integrity of their scheme. The unity of their commitment was demonstrated by their loyalty to consolidation during the 1958 and 1960 annexations when Mayor West pressed for an alternative method of supplying and financing urban services.

Interviews with several members of the planning team have drawn the feeling that the service district scheme was just plain "common sense." To this group that was perhaps the case. Under consolidated government, however, there were other options including the continued use of special purpose districts, a system of contracting with private service providers, extension of all services countywide, creation of several urban service areas, and so on. Early staff studies focused on the best way to finance and administer services under a consolidated government. The early pages of this chapter point out the heavy reliance on the financial and administrative findings in _Future of Nashville_. Once the legal hurdle of a required uniform tax rate was overcome, the logic of financing a package of urban services with one revenue area (the U.S.D.) and financing the remainder on a countywide basis (the G.S.D.) was compelling. It is significant that the director of the Advance Planning and Research Division cited the "cost-efficiency" of the scheme as a primary consideration. An important part of this financial rationale was reflected in the expandable nature of the U.S.D. Although administrative convenience suggested drawing the original U.S.D.

116 Hand Correspondence.
boundaries consistent with the old City boundaries, there was the expectation that these would expand quickly to encompass "the urban area."¹¹⁷

The group of planners were well aware of the constitutional requirement that any proposed consolidation be approved both in the city and non-city county areas. The service district scheme, with its attachment—a package of services with an urban tax rate, made good political sense. This link between service improvement and tax increase was seen as an attraction particularly to suburbanites who would fear consolidation much as they would annexation by ordinance. The history reviewed here suggests that this political consideration was seen primarily as a bonus flowing from the more important financial and administrative rationale.

The environmental impediments to sanitary sewer construction and the existence of steep slopes in much of the northwestern part of the county supported the view that urban services be limited to an urban services district. The presence of a large, unsewered urban area reinforced the significance of financial factors in planning for urban services. The growing failure rate of septic tank systems made it imperative that planning for urban services give priority to sewer construction, no matter how costly. The service district concept, by avoiding administrative confusion and unifying revenue sources, met this requirement. Likewise, the unified service district concept provided a

¹¹⁷Hawkins Interview.
way of preventing any obligation to provide urban services to areas capable of supporting little urban growth.

Throughout the chapter mention has been made of the overriding concern for allowing urban services to "catch up" with urban development. In one sense, this view describes the general position taken by many planners and other officials toward "the management of development."

This view held that growth and expansion of the Nashville urban area was going to continue as in the recent past therefore requiring a planning posture which would properly service new development while at the same time attempting to meet the needs of existing areas not yet fully serviced. In a preliminary draft of the 1956 Plan, this view was reflected in the listing of "standards for extension of urban services":

1. areas of "urgent need"
2. areas likely to be subdivided
3. more densely populated areas
4. incorporated suburbs, if they so wish
5. taxable resources of areas of lesser significance
6. administrative and engineering, and other technical planning criteria.

This is clearly a "catch up and keep up" view of tying service policies to developmental considerations. It should also be pointed out that throughout this entire period both the city and the county actively sought economic growth through industrial and commercial expansion.

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As the service district concept emerged under the proposed Metro Charters, the criteria suggested for expansion of the U.S.D. continued to reflect the "keeping up" orientation. The Metro Charter, as installed in 1963, states that U.S.D. expansion:

As sections of the general services district come to need urban services and the new government becomes able to provide such services in a reasonable period, the urban services district should be expanded to include such areas. Such expansion should be accomplished through the action of the metropolitan council, on its own initiative and in accordance with specified criteria and policies, or by petition and referendum.119

To support the use of urban service district expansion to keep up with urban growth, a strong metropolitan planning mechanism was recommended along with the service district concept. Although the previous review of the history of Metro has focused on the two service districts, it should be pointed out here that both proposed charters included strong provisions for mandatory capital budgeting, mandatory referral, zoning and subdivision control and long-range comprehensive planning. 120 Together with the power to expand the U.S.D., these provisions tied the Planning Commission and the Council together in a theoretically coherent arrangement to plan for future growth. "Keeping up," to put it another way, involved "pre-growth planning" which not only would anticipate areas of urban growth, but also facilitate the marshalling of public resources to guarantee that such growth would meet

119 "Preliminary Draft, Proposed Plan of Metropolitan Government," pp. 20-21
120 Bolin, pp. 144ff.
proper standards of "health, safety and public welfare." The tools, as the Executive Director of the Planning Commission staff saw them, were a good comprehensive plan and accompanying zoning ordinance, good subdivision regulations and design standards, capital budgeting and a relationship of trust between public officials and private developers. Given the proper use of these tools, growth would occur which would then become suitable for inclusion in the U.S.D. Perhaps this view of the developmental application of the service district concept can best be described as "anticipatory keeping up."

The degree to which such "anticipatory" planning can actually modify development pressures is the heart of the "management of development" issue raised in the first chapter. The preceding comments are intended to suggest that in creating the service district portion of Metro's design, the Advance Planning and Research team foresaw changes in U.S.D. boundaries as a response to urban growth which had been anticipated, monitored and regulated through such traditional planning tools as zoning and subdivision controls. That U.S.D.-G.S.D. policies were not identified with guiding future development should not seem surprising given that Metro faced a 30-year backlog on providing urban services to urbanized areas.

Although more will be said on the subject in the following pages, there was also an awareness that control of Metro's development, by whatever means, could not deal with growth throughout the region. Dan

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121 Hawkins Interview. 122 Ibid.
Grant, in responding to his own questioning of Metro's development objectives, wrote the following just after Metro came into existence:

The prediction of a "truly progressive" solution to the perplexing problem of guiding urban growth in the suburban and rural fringe is already being borne out in certain limited respects under Metro, but the bulk of evidence pro or con still lies well in the future . . . . There is one haunting question which needs to be mentioned in any attempt to evaluate the prediction . . . . What can Metro do if Nashville's six projected expressway spokes hurl much of the City's new population growth out into the six adjoining counties?123

Grant correctly anticipated the impact of interstate construction upon urban growth in the Nashville area. Later material will show the tremendous growth which has occurred in the counties surrounding Davidson, facilitated greatly by the easy access provided between non-Davidson suburban residential areas and Davidson County employment and retail centers.

The remainder of this study certainly does not ignore the extent to which issues of development in Metro Nashville are imbedded in the developmental pattern of the region. However, in view of the fact that Metro's political boundaries are not likely to be changed in the near future, the study concentrates on the management of development within the unquestioned jurisdiction of the government of Metro Nashville.

This historical review suggests that the origin of the two service districts in Metro lay with a concern by Metro's founders for a workable

way to provide urban services to already urbanized areas. The extent to which their design has succeeded and the degree to which their vision might be expanded is taken up in the pages which follow. Perhaps this chapter can be best concluded by suggesting that, at its birth, Metro was faced with a hierarchy of frameworks within which urban service policies could be employed to guide future growth. At the broadest level existed the array of national, state and aforementioned regional pressures which could influence both the extent and character or urban growth. Metro's impact on these forces was minimal. A second-order framework for managing development, however, had been provided by the creation of consolidated government and gave Metro unquestioned municipal authority throughout Davidson County. Within this context the new Metro charter not only provided for an expandable urban service district, but also outlined significant Planning Commission authority for capital budgeting, mandatory referral of city projects, comprehensive zoning and long-range planning. Both the home-rule status of the new government and the charter's attention to these planning mechanisms make it clear that within Metro's jurisdiction a structure for managed development existed.

For purposes of this study, the narrowest framework for development provided Metro in 1963 was the provision for expanding the urban services district. Although evidence in previous pages suggests that Metro's founders saw U.S.D. expansion as primarily a response to developmental

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124 Bolin, pp. 144ff.
pressures, they did not preclude that such expansion might ultimately be used as one method to guide development. Although it has been argued that the initial decisions on service allocations between the G.S.D. and U.S.D. were made primarily on financial and political criteria, the resulting significant distinction between the two districts left open the following possible courses of action for the new Metro Government:

1. The absence of U.S.D. services such as sewer, water and fire protection could be used as means for limiting development in G.S.D. areas.

2. Capital budgeting in the G.S.D. could emphasize the "preparation" of specified areas for inclusion in U.S.D.

3. The maintenance of a significantly lower tax rate in the G.S.D. would contribute to lessened holding costs of G.S.D. properties, therefore minimizing pressures for development in G.S.D. areas.

Each of these possible strategies depended upon two important prerequisites:

1. That Metro executive and legislative decisionmakers saw U.S.D. expansion policies as one means for guiding development, and

2. That service (and tax rate) distinctions between the U.S.D. and G.S.D. remained significant to developers and development interests.

The degree to which these prerequisites existed and possibly led to the Metro's use of such a framework for managing development (U.S.D. expansion) is the subject of the next two chapters.
CHAPTER III

URBAN DEVELOPMENT GOAL FRAMEWORKS IN METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE

The frameworks for the consideration of the management of urban development in Metro, referred to at the end of the preceding chapter, require that some attention be given to the existence of development goals themselves. As outlined in the initial statement of this study's research interests, it is important to determine whether and how goals related to Nashville's development were related to service policies. Accordingly, this chapter is a broad survey of urban development goals present within Metro from its inception through the middle 1970's. The following chapter proceeds to consider service district policies in light of this survey.

A simple but useful method for analysis of Metro's development goal-setting framework is provided by conceptualizing the broad "ideal-type" conditions under which urban development goals might be determined. For purposes of such a typology (and for this study) it is assumed that "urban development goals" refer to those goals related to the physical dimensions or urban development. In this sense "urban development" includes patterns of land use, transportation, urban service delivery, housing patterns and so on. As mentioned previously, urban "development" is considered to be a broader concept than urban "growth."¹ Growth is a significant component of development, but

¹See Chapter I, pp. 1-3.
development implies change, but without an assumption of the direction of change.

Probably the easiest two "ideal-type" urban development goal-setting scenarios to visualize are those where, on the one hand, there is practically no public (i.e., governmental) involvement whatsoever. The development "marketplace" operates without significant public intervention. This might be called a pure "laissez faire" setting for urban development decision-making. At the opposite extreme is a condition where public (i.e., government) intervention is extensive and continuing. In such a setting, public officials "manage" urban development with private interests operating within publically established development criteria.

In between these extreme types can be located a "minimum standard" framework, somewhat near the laissez-faire type and a "partnership" framework, closer to the management framework. Although the distinctions between the framework-types may be subtle, they provide a basis for describing the origination of development goals in Nashville during particular periods.

Three dimensions of the current status of any system of urban development goals have been considered in the development of this typology: time-orientation, private-public orientation, and comprehensive-functional scope. These dimensions are summarized in Table 3.1. Time-orientation considers the extent to which short-, medium- and long-range development concerns are addressed. Short-range goal concerns generally include present to two or three year scenarios.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework Attribute Categories</th>
<th>&quot;Laissez-faire&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Minimum Standard&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Partnership&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Management&quot;</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Time-Orientation</td>
<td>Present and Short-Range</td>
<td>Present and Short-Range and Some Medium-Range</td>
<td>Short-, Medium- and Some Long-Range</td>
<td>Medium- and Long-Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public vs. Private Sources</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Private and Some Public</td>
<td>Private and Public</td>
<td>Public</td>
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</table>
Medium-range moves from three to 10 or 15 year scenarios. Long-range goals refer to those with scenarios further in the future. The rationale for such categories is based upon observations of the time-periods generally important to the individuals, firms, or agencies who traditionally formulate urban development goals. Private investors in urban development have short-range concerns for cash flow, tax-oriented depreciation credits and deductions, market opportunities, and so on. Government agencies generally exist within budget-cycle constraints which emphasize short-range considerations. Capital budgeting and project planning and review, however, push such agencies to medium-range time period considerations. Homeowners, as well as other private investors, consider medium-range factors of investment return along with short-term considerations of convenience and cash availability. Long-range goals moving beyond 15 years generally are the domain of sellers and investors in long-term securities, especially municipal bonds, along with planners, environmentalists and others either trained or conditioned to think with such a focus.

The private-public orientation of an urban development goal structure reflects the origins of the goals judged to be most significant in influencing developmental patterns. Although a determination of significance may be arbitrary, it is fairly easy to determine the source of goal articulation: public agencies or private interest groups. The fact that many public agency goal statements are simply aggregations of certain private interests does not deny the significance, for this typology, that public, not private, sources may have authored certain urban development goals.
The final characteristic accommodated by the typology is the comprehensive versus functional nature of articulated urban goals. Such a distinction departs little from the planner's normal use of these terms: comprehensive goals contain considerations of the interrelated facets of urban development while functional goals are concerned with specific elements of urban development. Implied in the distinction is the assumption that comprehensive goal statements are based upon a comprehensive view of urban development while functional goals are composed from a specialized, limited vision of urban development.

As mentioned, the typology extracted from these attributes is one of generalized ideal-types. The arbitrary types are not mutually exclusive. In a broad sense they should be seen as a continuum. The "laissez faire" setting for urban development goals is the least conducive to a management of development orientation while the "minimum standard," "partnership" and "management" settings are progressively more oriented in this direction. The "laissez faire" setting suggests a goal-setting scenario where urban development policies emerge from the political struggles among private interests over present-day and short-term concerns for specific municipal projects. Laissez faire urban development "goals" are simply the summation of daily struggles over private, short-term interests. Government officials are, at best, frustrated referees or, at worst, proxies for private interests actively involved in the fray.

The "minimum standard" setting suggests a modest public intrusion into the urban development policy process under the shield of protection
of "public health, safety and welfare." The consequences of "laissez faire" development policies many times include direct threats to public health and safety, easily perceived and experienced by an urban population. Legislatures, courts and executives traditionally have responded with laws, judgments and standards influencing the broad limits within which urban development can occur. The original rationale for zoning, building codes, public health standards, highway construction standards and so on reflect this orientation. Public intervention in the decisions leading to urban development policies is guided by enforcement of such standards—primarily a reactive posture. Policies are functional and, although short- and middle-range considerations obviously underlie the establishment of development standards, remain the present and short-range-oriented products of private interest.

Whereas laissez faire urban goal-setting is rare in American communities, especially due to the involvement of federal and many state agencies in defining the "public health, safety and welfare," minimum standard goal determination is quite common.

An additional expansion of the public role in protecting "public health, safety, and welfare" has given rise to the third scenario, that of "partnership." This expansion not only reflects new legal interpretations of the "public interest" but also growing technical comprehension of the interconnected nature of urban social and physical

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environments. Along with legislative and judicial pressures for greater public involvement in urban development policies have come the recognition of urban systems and sub-systems. Comprehensive urban development planning, in such a setting, becomes a means of overcoming the many conflicts and costs caused by dissonant and non-reinforcing functional plans. Likewise, the goal-setting process becomes more middle- and even long-range than the the previous two settings.

The "management" setting for urban development goals represents the fullest expression of public participation in the goal formation process. Although private interests are certainly not excluded from the process, public officials, responding to comprehensive and long-range interpretations of the public interest, dominate the goal-setting process. In so far as goal-setting is considered, the maximum form of "management of development" occurs in this setting.

Without further expanding the discussions of the four scenarios the typology remains rough and suggestive. Not discussed, for example, are the various forms and structures for public and private decision-making. Missing is a classification of urban development policy issues. Absent is a breakdown of functional planning areas. To fill out the presentation of the typology in these ways would, however, move beyond the utility of the typology for this study: a means of analysis of the development goal-setting structure in Metro after consolidation. For this purpose, the discussion thus far is most useful.

Table 3.2 depicts an application of the typology to the framework for development goal formulation in Nashville prior to 1963. The
TABLE 3.2

PLACEMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY ALONG URBAN DEVELOPMENT GOAL FRAMEWORK CONTINUUM

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&quot;Laissez-faire&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Minimum Standard&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Partnership&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Management&quot;</th>
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<td>Nashville and</td>
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application is based only on the general historical review presented in the preceding chapter. Prior to the establishment of the Community Services Commission, Nashville and Davidson County each fit the general laissez faire framework for urban goal development. Although a unified planning staff was created in 1939 and some functional plans were produced particularly for streets and highways, development of the Nashville urban area was consistent with the priorities and resources of private investors. For purposes of this study's interest in urban service policies, the critical movement toward the minimum standard framework occurred with the emergence of the forces which led to the creation of the Community Services Commission. The conversion of private interests into public action to respond to the functional issue of sewerage service provision and ultimately the full range of urban service provision was reflective of the recognition that medium- and even long-range goals were required to develop the solutions to present-day and short-range problems. Although the significance of the Commission's early work has generally been recognized as its analysis of government structure and boundaries, it should not be overlooked that its technical analyses helped secure broader acceptance for public


4 Others might argue that the Capitol Hill Urban Renewal Project, early thoroughfare planning, or other functional planning efforts were earlier indications of this shift; the focus here, however, is upon broad urban service and development planning.
participation in setting development goals for Nashville and Davidson County, albeit at the minimum standard level.

The creation of the Advance Planning and Research Division in 1954 provided another indication of Nashville's shift away from the "laissez faire" period. Although their hearts may have felt otherwise, the planners who designed Metro operated from the perspective that private present-day and short-term interests would continue to dominate development goal setting in Nashville. Their process of governmental design was in many ways an effort to guarantee that minimum development standards would be present throughout the urban area. Their concern for providing and financing adequate urban services to urbanized areas or "areas likely to be urbanized" clearly dominated their work. The attention given in the proposed charters to such planning tools as capital budgeting, mandatory referral and land-use regulations reflect more their attempt to establish sound methods for servicing rather than managing development. The Executive Director of the Planning Commission staff clearly summarized the planners' dilemma: "we never lost sight of the need to guide development, but the burden of catching up was so great . . . ."5

I. DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 1963-1970

The need to address the problems of future development as well as remedy the deficiencies of the past was expressed by the joint planning

5Interview with Charles Hawkins, Jr., December, 1977.
commission staff just prior to the second referendum on governmental
consolidation. In March 1961, the Advance Planning Division published
its "Preliminary Land Use Plan for Davidson County, Tennessee." The
final paragraphs of that document pointed to the absence of clearly
articulated development goals for Nashville:

The Nashville-Davidson County Metropolitan Area needs a
Metropolitan Policies Plan to guide and coordinate its growth
and development. This Policies Plan should express the
intended general goals and objectives of the total community.
Specific plans and functional programs should be examined
against a background of a general policy for urban growth and
change.

The Policies Plan would involve the bringing together, in
one place, of the physical plans and schedules, coordinating
time relationships, financial relationship and proposed
activity programs of each governmental unit within the
community. Maps, schedules and texts also would set forth
the physical, economic and social facts, assumptions and goals
underlying proposed governmental policies within the total
community.

The very act of gathering the materials for this
Metropolitan Policies Plan would identify unintended inconsis-
tencies, inadequacies and interferences among the various
plans. A process of mutual adjustment of unnecessary conflict
in goals could then be found.

Decisions about land use, development and control, as
well as the design and location of community facilities, must
relate these environmental aspects to the local government's
programs of public services and to their operating and
capital budget.

Contained between the lines of this statement is the obvious hope that
the probability of such a plan coming into being would be enhanced with
the adoption of metropolitan government. The coordinative strengths of

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6 Preliminary Land Use Plan (Nashville: Nashville and Davidson
County Planning Commissions, 1961).

7 Preliminary Land Use Plan, p. 37.
such a government were seen as crucial in uniting the various "plans and schedules" already in existence.

The "plans and schedules already in existence" upon Metro's birth consisted of functional plans in areas such as transportation, sewerage and the aforementioned preliminary land use plan. As suggested earlier, Metro inherited the "minimum standard" goal framework which placed the preponderance of development goal-setting in the hands of private investment and development interests. As one account has stated, in Nashville "while the general public's interest in land-use policy is ad hoc and ephemeral, however, that of financiers, developers, realtors and builders is constant and pervasive." From this political perspective, the coming of Metro brought very little change. Although the charter established a prominent role for the Planning Commission in capital budgeting, mandatory referral of public projects, zoning, "coordination of urban services" and "long-range planning," Commission priorities were diverted elsewhere.

First, technical staff energies were employed to assist the new administration of Metro Mayor Briley literally set up a new government. The Advance Planning and Research Division was called upon to give continuous administrative advice. Illustrative of this priority was

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9 "Executive Order #1," (unpublished memorandum from Mayor Beverly Briley to Director, Advance Planning and Research Division, Metropolitan Planning Commission, April, 1963).
Mayor Briley's very first Executive Memorandum—written to the Director of the Division—asking for detailed assistance in organizing the day-to-day procedures of Metro Government.\(^\text{10}\)

A second limit on the Planning Commission's capacity to respond to long-term development goal-setting needs was the staff attention required to meet the service needs of the already urbanized area, particularly the Urban Services District. Table 3.3 broadly summarizes the key service deficiencies, particularly those in the portion of the U.S.D. annexed following the defeat of the first referendum on consolidation. Mayor Briley, in commenting on these deficiencies, stressed that "need and engineering feasibility" must override any other planning consideration when such large urban areas were so poorly serviced.\(^\text{11}\) The Executive Director of the Metropolitan Planning Commission reinforced this priority when he established staff responsibilities in functional areas in order to "catch-up and then keep-up" with service demands.\(^\text{12}\) (The following chapter will discuss these service problems in more detail.) Even if the Metropolitan Planning Commission staff had been able to concentrate on long-term developmental issues, no matter how related they might have been to current service problems, their recommendations would have been bypassed in favor of the more expedient task of servicing residents guaranteed services they

\(^{10}\) Ibid.


\(^{12}\) Hawkins interview.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Sanitary Sewer</th>
<th>Fire</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Storm Sewer</th>
<th>Solid Waste</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Services District, City of Nashville</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prior to 1958</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Poor; Construction Underway</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Poor; Mix with Sanitary Sewers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Services District, Newly Annexed Areas</td>
<td>Poor; Water Supply Problems</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Critical; Construction Needed</td>
<td>Poor</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Services District, Outside U.S.D.</td>
<td>No Metro Obligation</td>
<td>No Metro Obligation</td>
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weren't yet receiving from the government they had voted into existence. Both Mayor Briley and the new members of the Metro Council had substantial constituencies thinking in these terms.  

A final limit on Metropolitan Planning Commission's capacity to articulate Metro development goals early in Metro's life has already been suggested: private interests dominated the urban development process. Although the "minimum standard" framework for development planning had included the implementation of city and county zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations and building codes, most observers, if honest, would probably agree with the essence of the statement that "there's probably not an area in the United States where the developers, real estate men, and bankers have had greater opportunities than in Nashville." Officially, the Mayor spoke of "economic growth and development in order to assist Metro in meeting existing service needs." Little was said about meeting the service needs created by growth of the urban area. As will be discussed in the following chapter, maintenance of minimum development standards, particularly sewer policies, forced acceptance of some future-oriented planning recommendations. In 1964, far more restrictive sewer requirements were made a part of the subdivision regulations. As one might expect, however, the

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13 In drawing up Councilmanic Districts, it should be recalled, members of the Charter Commission had intended to place just such pressure on Metro by including in a majority of districts some territory from the 1958-1960 annexations; see Chapter II.

14 Salamon and Wamsley, p. 141

15 Murphy and Rehfuss, p. 247.
"minimum standard" scenario gave birth to ways of circumventing the rules. Exceptions to the rules were permitted and, more crucial to the argument of this study, the power of Metro to control service extension was diluted when special utility districts were allowed to expand within the General Services District. 16

Although it is being argued that a framework for the preparation of urban development goals in Metro existed only at the "minimum standard" level, "development" was certainly taking place. From 1960 to 1970, the population of Davidson County grew from 399,743 to 447,877. 17 More important, this growth took the form of dispersed urban development. Figure 3.1, taken from an MPC study, compares the "urbanized" areas of the county in 1950 and 1970. If urban development is narrowly limited to the process of converting raw land to residential, industrial, commercial and community uses, then development in Metro during this period (and the following seven-year period as well) was relatively unrestrained by public policies. The availability of relatively cheap land, suited for development, in the outer fringes of the county (with the exception of the northwestern portion) attracted private investment interests. The expansion of the interstate highway network within the county guaranteed access to the central business district along several radial corridors. Where private investors saw fit to maximize these


Figure 3.1. Urbanization of Nashville-Davidson County, 1950 and 1970.

Source: Analyzing Suburban Development.
conditions, political interests were supportive of construction of public facilities to service such development at a "minimum standard."\textsuperscript{18} Such services in many cases were easier to acquire along Metro's fringe where utility districts were operating. The developmental "skip" over the areas where service districts did not operate and where Metro's Urban Services District was not extended was a common occurrence.\textsuperscript{19} (This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.)

Partial documentation of the absence of articulated developmental goals during this period can be obtained by reviewing the principles adhered to in the preparation of various planning studies and procedures by the Metropolitan Planning Commission. Of special significance are zoning practices, subdivision regulations, capital budgeting and functional planning studies.

Zoning during this early part of Metro's history has been described as "primitive Euclidean" in nature.\textsuperscript{20} Although the description was primarily aimed at the existence of traditional zoning hierarchy of uses found in both the city and county zoning ordinances (each being continued after consolidation), the description also applies to the development goals underlying the ordinances. These assumed goals dealt with general concerns for incompatible uses, not staging or timing of growth.\textsuperscript{21} As is to be expected in the "minimum standard" environment,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{18}Analyzing Suburban Development, pp. 55-63.
\textsuperscript{20}Salamon and Wamsley, pp. 157-158.
\end{flushright}
the impact of the ordinances was to open for development far more land than was required in the market place.\textsuperscript{22}

The breadth of development patterns allowed by the zoning ordinances was further extended by the way in which the ordinances were implemented. Even the requirement that successful challenges to Planning Commission decisions on zoning matters required a two-thirds vote of the Metropolitan Council was sidestepped through the emergence of "councilmanic courtesy" in such matters.\textsuperscript{23} The very composition of the Council, Board of Zoning Appeals, and Planning Commission suggested that development-investment interests would prevail in most zoning matters.\textsuperscript{24} At the risk of belaboring the point, the concluding statement of a thorough study of zoning and urban development during Metro's early years is illustrative:

What this all adds up to so far as the impact of public policy on urban development, therefore is inevitably mixed. Urban land policy in Nashville, at least as reflected in zoning, operates within a relatively narrow range of discretion. Private business and household decisions clearly retain the initiative in the development process. But within a limited range of discretion, public policy does have a tangible effect . . . . More than anything else, therefore, land-use policy in Nashville resembles a ship with numerous leaks moving generally in the right direction, but slowly. When the winds and atmospheric conditions are right, everything seems to work according to plan. But when severe headwinds and turbulence interfere, the vessel has no reserve engines or fuel to help hold its course. For the rest, the crew spends its time valiantly fending off potential disaster while the passengers frolic unawares up on the deck. Until something interferes with their revelry, this pattern is likely to persist.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23}Salamon and Wamsley, p. 177.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25}Salamon and Wamsley, p. 190.
Equally significant is the statement in the Land Use Policy Plan, published in 1970: 

As early as the 1940's, separate Zoning Ordinances were adopted for the City of Nashville and Davidson County. These Ordinances remain in effect today despite the consolidation of the two governmental entities. Even more significant is the fact that new problems and issues confronting current community development have generated the need for developing more comprehensive land use policies to resolve these issues. Consequently, this Land Use Policy Plan cites specific policies which were not applicable in 1940. Therefore, adaptation of the current Zoning Ordinance to policies stated herein is not entirely possible. 26

In commenting on the inadequacies of the zoning ordinances in facilitating the implementation of even broad development goals, officials and observers also point to the "problem" of the seven incorporated municipalities within Davidson County recognized by the Metropolitan Charter (see Figure 3.2). The continued existence of these "shell-cities" was the consequence of compromises made to insure favorable support for consolidation from residents of these primarily residential areas. 27 Each city is a part of the General Services District but has the option of contracting for provision of urban services. Of importance is the prerogative given these municipalities to establish their own zoning ordinances along with other policies with potential developmental consequences. "... The municipalities have not generally utilized in-depth analytical studies as a basis for formulating public policies ... consequently, issues arise concerning


27 Interview with Robert Horton, January, 1978; Hawkins Interview.
Figure 3.2. Incorporated Municipalities in Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County.

Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission.
the impact of adopted municipal policies on the overall development of the metropolitan area." The fact that five of these cities are primarily residential in nature (excepting Goodlettsville and Berry Hill) and have been interested in limiting nonresidential growth coupled with the absence of significant Metro development objectives makes the issue of freestanding cities within Metro nearly moot. Few problems were created by the fact that "MPC tended to ignore them." Such a comment would not be accurate had urban development goals and objectives been a serious Metro priority.

Mention has already been made of the 1964 revision of the subdivision regulations. The requirement that subdivision developments include sanitary sewer services was an expression of "minimum standard" concerns by the planning staff. The fact that the provision has been regularly bypassed or that non-Metro service districts have been allowed to expand underscores the absence within the regulations of development controls based upon anything other than broad minimum design standards. Dan Grant, in his discussion of predictions regarding Metro, noted that continued approval of subdivisions without adequate sanitary sewers and with water service through mains less than 6-inches

28 Land Use Policy Plan, p. 12. 29 Horton Interview.
30 Hawkins Interview.
31 Analyzing Suburban Development, p. 48.
32 An "Urban Planning Area" was made a part of the Subdivision Regulations adopted in 1964, including all but the western reaches of the county. It is in this area where, technically, the sewerage requirements apply.
in diameter would prove to be obstacles in any future effort to guide urban growth in the suburban and urban fringe. 33

Capital budgeting during Metro's first years, as with zoning and subdivision regulation, provided little if any evidence of the existence of development goals. Although the potential for a capital budgeting process to be useful in "preparing for and directing urban growth" certainly exists in the theories of modern planning, the failure to make such use of it in Metro can be attributed to two factors. 34 First, the capital budgeting process was frequently circumvented by operating departments. 35 The acceptance of capital budgeting procedures, let alone principles, was minimal throughout Metro. Second, and perhaps most important, the resources for capital investments were almost entirely committed to projects that either were servicing existing development or matching federal funds, such as thoroughfare construction grants, which made no provisions for controlling the sequencing and timing of development. The capital budgets of the period, as indeed the operating budgets, reflected the political priorities of the time—and these included servicing developed areas and capturing federal dollars. The management of development was not a part of either consideration. 36

33 Dan Grant, "A Comparison of Predictions and Experience With Nashville and Davidson County," Urban Affairs Quarterly (September, 1965), pp. 34-54.


35 Bolin, pp. 143 ff.

36 Gary L. Wamsley and Lester M. Salamon, "The Operating Budget as a Steering Device," in Blumstein and Walter, Growing Metropolis.
It has been previously pointed out that the planning activities of the Metropolitan Planning Commission during this period consisted almost entirely of functional planning efforts. Reasons have already been given for the agency's priorities in areas other than comprehensive planning for urban development. Both the Preliminary Land Use Plan of 1961 and the Land Use Policy Plan of 1970 contained pleas for action in preparing comprehensive development policies.\textsuperscript{37} The planners' concern for such policies was also expressed in the 1965 document, Handbook of Standards for Urban Development:

The growth of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County obviously will continue with or without greater citizen awareness of desirable environmental qualities. However, increased awareness and subsequent community choices concerning development patterns could allow more meaningful participation in development efforts by citizens, developers, designers, public officials and other involved persons. Development efforts based on more knowledgeable participation might further the optimum use of land for a range of urban activities, and a greater inclusion of appropriate community services and facilities, and promote greater citizen identification and pride in community appearance. Urban development in less appropriate forms may create additional costs to the community in terms of uneven use of land resources, greater costs in the provision of services and facilities, increasing traffic congestion, and decreased amenities. Overcoming costs such as those could consume a great part of the resources of the community.\textsuperscript{38}

The planning staff response to the outdated zoning ordinances and absence of urban development policies was to slowly begin building the base for some future time when perhaps the minimum standard framework

\textsuperscript{37}Preliminary Land Use Plan, p. 37; Land Use Policy Plan, pp. 1-5.

\textsuperscript{38}Handbook of Standards for Urban Development (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1965), p. 3.
could be transcended. Initially, this effort consisted of describing physical development principles which not only represented the "best minimum standards" but also pointed out the economic and social benefits to be gained from better planned urban development. The revised subdivision regulations, the Handbook of Standards for Urban Development, and the 1970 Land Use Policy Plan each dealt with desirable physical development characteristics. Issues such as density patterns, lot development requirements, amenities and land use compatibilities were addressed. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the specific stress given each development issue, but it is significant to note that the staging and timing of urban development was not addressed from a recommended policy perspective during this period. Although earlier quotes from planning staff studies clearly show a concern for some orchestration of development, staff energies were concentrated on improving the physical qualities of developments insofar as that could be accomplished without any real control over whether the development would actually take place—or when it would take place.  

As Metro's first seven years came to an end, it seemed clear that urban development was taking place with a minimum of guidance from Metro itself. Preoccupied with providing services in already urbanized areas and responsive to a political climate dominated by investment and development interests, planners took their stand by holding out for better minimum standards and filling the prefaces and conclusions of

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39 Ibid.  
40 Salamon and Wamsley, pp. 159-165.
their studies with pleas to view Metro's development in a more comprehensive, goal-oriented fashion.

II. DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 1970-1977

Nothing dramatic occurred in 1970 to change the environment in which urban development decisions were reached in Metro. Symbolically, the publication of the 1970 Land Use Policy Plan represented an escape from the restraints of the principles prominent in the two existing zoning ordinances. The policy plan was prepared as a part of a staff-citizen effort to create a new Comprehensive Metropolitan Zoning Ordinance (COMZO). Practically, the plan was prepared not only to provide a land use policy basis for zoning, but also to meet growing federal pressures on Metro to adopt a single comprehensive plan. Urban planning funds, transportation funds and other forms of federal income required a comprehensive planning effort greater than the sum of Metro's functional plans and the planners' wishful thinking of the 1960's. Metro had been receiving Section 701 urban planning funds from the federal government since its inception. Although the Plan for Metropolitan Government itself was prepared with 701 money, comprehensive planning since 1963 had produced little in the way of the published plans expected by federal officials. By 1970, therefore, comprehensive planning within Metro was receiving a boost both from the need to implement a Metro-wide zoning ordinance and a federal incentive to produce some type of comprehensive plan.

41 Hawkins Interview.
After lengthy discussions and much controversy, the Comprehensive Metropolitan Zoning Ordinance (COMZO) was adopted in 1973. The regulations and the accompanying map established in law some of the broader physical development principles discussed in the 1970 Land Use Policy Plan. Particularly significant were the addition of flexibility in zoning matters, the encouragement of higher residential densities, and environmentally-based restrictions on development, especially in floodplains. Performance standards were also introduced as a partial replacement for the pure-districting concept underlying the previous ordinances. As a regulatory device, COMZO reflected a move toward establishing higher standards of development. The fact that earlier comments on limited enforcement of zoning principles applied as well to the period after COMZO was adopted suggest, however, the COMZO was not a vehicle whereby Metro could move beyond the "minimum standard" framework for managing urban development. This condition was, and is, reinforced by the fact that COMZO, like most current zoning ordinances, is not useful in influencing significantly the timing and staging of development.

Toward the end of this period MPC staff began a review of existing subdivision regulations. While most of the conclusions of the review

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42 Bill Number 73-650, June, 1973 (Metropolitan Council); Zoning Regulations of Metropolitan Government (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1976). It required nearly ten years to draft and enact COMZO.

43 Ibid.

44 Salamon and Wamsley, pp. 159-165.

dealt with procedural issues and upgraded design standards, some attention was given to a new role for the subdivision regulation process in influencing the timing of urban development in the suburban and rural fringe.

Premature approval of a subdivision causes problems such as inadequate access to the subdivision; lack of and pressure for public services which will be expensive to provide to remote development, and inconsistent with adopted budgets and programs; inadequate essential services such as sewers and fire protection; and possibly the precedent of an unplanned type of development that may be inconsistent with the development recommended for the area in the general plan. . . . The present Subdivision Regulations do not contain any specific criteria against which subdivision proposals can be judged to determine whether the timing of development is appropriate or premature. The lack of such criteria leaves the door open for arbitrary decisionmaking which may lead to developments that are contrary to the interests of taxpayers, consumers, and the local government. At issue is whether criteria regarding timing of development should be provided and what those criteria should be.45

The issue was left open, with the interesting comment that the Public Works Department favored the inclusion of some type of timing criteria. Although new subdivision regulations may not reflect such criteria, it is important, given the concerns of this study, that at least two Metro agencies raised the issue of extending the normal minimum standard framework for subdivision regulation to include the more long-term and comprehensive concerns for the timing of particular developments. By 1978, MPC staff had developed an initial draft of new subdivision regulations for Metro which were intended to upgrade subdivision standards to include issues of compatibility with succeeding and adjacent

46 Ibid.
development. There is little evidence, however, that the subdivision regulations are being revised with a view toward their potential use in guiding or managing urban development. Tougher sewer and water requirements, for example, are not undergirded by a philosophy of manipulating service locations to manipulate development. The tougher standards may very well have that impact—but only if service policies are based upon such developmental considerations. Also open to question is the extent to which new subdivision regulations will be forcefully implemented, should they be adopted.

A review of Metro's capital budgeting process since 1970 suggests that, even though modest, some increased attention has been given to the fiscal framework for planning urban development. As has been pointed out previously, the Charter's requirement for capital budgeting had not led to achievement of the coordinative and developmental objectives usually associated with theories of capital improvements budgeting. Such objectives, as spelled out in the 1969-1970 capital budget document were:

1. To consolidate and coordinate all the various departmental requests with the purpose of reducing delays and coordinating individual improvements programs;
2. To establish a system of procedures and priorities by which each proposal can be evaluated in terms of the public need, the comprehensive plan of the metropolitan area, and the interrelationship of projects and cost requirements;
3. To schedule the proposals over a six-year period according to their priority evaluation; and,
4. To set forth a financing program for the six-year period whereby the Capital Improvements Program and be achieved.47

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Achievement of these objectives required both departmental adherence to the capital improvements budgeting procedures and a commitment by Metro Council and the Mayor to reply on the Capital Improvements Budget and Program in making capital investment decisions. During the early 1970's some growth in meeting the first requirement took place. MPC staff efforts concentrated on the "consolidating and coordinating" of departmental requests, leaving each department somewhat free to assign its own priorities to projects. The absence of a "comprehensive plan of the metropolitan area," both in the sense of a planning document and in the minds of Metro executives and legislators, continued to contribute to the weakness of the Capital Improvements Budget and Program to be an accurate statement of Metro development priorities. It remained a departmental and planning staff "wish list."

Although Metro's capital improvements budgeting process failed to transcend the policy-impact threshold, better coordination of departmental priorities at least allowed MPC staff to project various fiscal scenarios given various capital investment options. While politics in the Council and the Mayor's office tended to often override such evaluations, MPC staff gained greater ability to analyze Metro's long-term revenue-capacity to finance various capital investment packages. This ability was significant in the discussion of the various service extension proposals outlined in the next chapter.

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48 This observation is based upon informal comments by MPC staff.  
Perhaps the strongest indication of a subtle shift toward an urban development goal orientation beyond the "minimum standard" framework is found in MPC staff writing after 1970. Staff studies and reports reflect the decision reached at the end of the 1960's to develop a comprehensive plan for Metro. The publication of the Land Use Policy Plan in 1970 was followed by documents on developmental problems and issues found both in the inner city and on the suburban fringe. These inquiries represented the first stage of a planning process designed to produce Metro's first formal "comprehensive plan." In essence, this planning effort was recognition of the existing "minimum standard" basis for Metro's view of future development since its inception. In beginning a process of analysis of problems and issues associated with urban development in Metro, the MPC staff consciously addressed the possibility that more comprehensive and long-term considerations could provide the basis for a development-goal framework closer to the "partnership" rather than "minimum standard" type. The preface to one of the more significant initial studies in the effort is indicative of this:

For the last several years a major objective of the Metropolitan Planning Commission has been the development of a unified long-range comprehensive plan for Nashville-Davidson County, rather than separate functional plans limited to land use or community facilities alone. Because of the nature of previous Commission activities and commitments this objective

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51 Proposed General Plan for Nashville, pp. 10-12.
has not been fulfilled . . . . The study attempts to identify and analyze the broader social, economic, and physical problems and issues associated with suburban development. These considerations are frequently overlooked in making specific short-range decisions. The report will have fulfilled its purpose if it provides some understanding of suburban development and presents a useful array of suburban problems and issues which may serve as a point of departure for generating optimal developmental policies in the future.52

A new tension between advocates of "development as usual" and those seeking a framework of goals and policies to guide development was emerging in Metro.

Briefly, two somewhat separate efforts to develop the basis for more managed development can be identified. The first was that of the MPC staff already referred to. Although federal pressures for comprehensive planning were significant, especially during the period discussed, the Director of Planning and many of his staff were trained in and professionally committed to a comprehensive planning thrust, albeit a physically-oriented one. The Director of the Comprehensive Planning Division, appointed in 1970, was a recent graduate of a planning school with a strong comprehensive planning emphasis. The scope of their concern for comprehensive planning included the environmental, fiscal, social and economic costs of continued development without increased public guidance based upon well-established goals. Running throughout their studies of this period are discussions of the environmental consequences of unrestrained suburban development, the fiscal costs of service demands made by land conversion in rural areas,

52 Analyzing Suburban Development, p. ii.
social inequities inherent in certain patterns of suburban housing, and the consequences for the Metro and regional economies of continued patterns of development. 

A second, more specific thrust toward management of development was provided by a Ford Foundation-funded project to "... introduce into Metro a task-focused, interdisciplinary, interfunctional, interinstitutional management process to develop the capacity to manage growth and arrest pollution." The primary objective of the project was to create an "environmental management team" from officials of the MPC, the Department of Water and Sewerage Services, the Health Department and the Department of Public Works. A special focus was placed on solid waste management. Although growth management was included as an objective in this effort, the primary thrust became a functionally-oriented study of solid-waste issues in the environmental setting of Davidson County. The longer-term connections between the Environmental Planning and Management Project and development management in Metro have yet to be realized.


55 Ibid.
This chapter opened with presentation of a general scheme for classifying the frameworks within which urban development goals might be generated. It was argued that urban development objectives in Nashville and Davidson County up to the time of Metro's birth were produced in an environment dominated by private development interests, with public officials providing only minimal standards for such development. Although only one of several goals, increased public involvement in urban development was seen by the founders of Metro as an important consequence of consolidated government. The thrust of this chapter, therefore, has been to review the general evolution of the framework for urban development goal-setting since Metro's birth. The conclusion reached suggests that a subtle shift in this emphasis has occurred at the staff-level in Metro, particularly within the Metropolitan Planning Commission. No evidence, however, has been given to suggest that planning documents which argue for a shift to "partnership" development goal-setting will find a receptive audience elsewhere within Metro or in the private sector. A fuller discussion of the likelihood of a shift in this orientation occurs in Chapter V, where additional discussion of MPC's work to develop a comprehensive plan will be offered.

The purpose of this chapter was to respond to an initial research question: was there a framework of Metro development goals toward which the urban services district provisions of consolidated government could be employed? The response developed in the preceding pages is: no. The existence of a "minimum standard" orientation toward public
involvement in Nashville's development ruled out such use of service policies just as it did use other developmental guidance mechanisms. The political sense of Metro's designers emerges even more significant. In rejecting their hearts' desire for guided metropolitan growth, they settled for a government more capable of coping with growth and development as it occurred. It is with this view, rather than that of managed development, that the following chapter examines in more detail the service district concept and the delivery of urban services since Metro's birth.
CHAPTER IV

URBAN SERVICE DELIVERY AND URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT EXPANSION

The backdrop of the previous two chapters places the discussion of urban services delivery under Metro in a context of relatively unrestrained urban development. The answers to the first two of the study's four research questions suggest that the services district arrangement for delivery of urban services in Metro was not created primarily to manage development, nor did a general framework for even partially managing development evolve during Metro's 15 years of existence. This chapter, therefore, reviews the delivery of Metro services through the services district structure in view of the "minimum standard—catch-up and keep-up" service objectives present during this time. Such a review permits both evaluation of service delivery policies vis-a-vis Metro's limited development goals and consideration of service policy potential for serving broader, more comprehensive development goals should a new development goal framework be established. The evaluation of service extension and the services district concept during the first 15 years of Metro centers therefore on the questions of service coordination and fiscal benefit with developmental concerns left to the speculation contained in the final pages of the study.

Following a conceptual review of the General Services District (G.S.D.) and the Urban Services District (U.S.D.), a summary of Metro service delivery since 1963 will be presented. The second half of the chapter will then contrast proposed and actual modification of the
U.S.D. boundaries and comment upon the patterns observed. The concluding discussion considers the potential development impact U.S.D. and G.S.D. policies are likely to have in the future.

I. METRO SERVICES AND THE TWO SERVICE DISTRICTS

As will be recalled from Chapter II, the Metro Charter established two service districts and allocated Metro service delivery and tax collection functions among them. A critical feature of this division was the creation of separate budgets and funds to accompany separate service and revenue-raising responsibilities. Provided for in the Charter were five funds:

1. G.S.D. General Fund
2. G.S.D. Debt Service Fund
5. School Fund

An equitable sharing of the financial burden in providing Metro services was the prime reason for the creation of these distinct funds, each being tied both to specific service provisions and revenue sources.

Specifically allocated U.S.D. service functions were:

1. water and sewerage
2. fire protection

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1See Table 2.3, p. 68.
3. "increased" police protection
4. garbage collection and refuse control
5. storm water control
6. certain alcoholic beverage regulation and licensing
7. taxicab regulations and licensing

The remainder of Metro's service functions were allocated to the G.S.D. For both political and administrative reasons, the School Fund was created, although public education was a G.S.D. function.³

The designers of Metro had clearly intended to maintain a significant distinction between the G.S.D. and the U.S.D. as long as there remained both urbanized and non-urbanized portions of the county. As previously suggested, they foresaw extension of U.S.D. boundaries as a way to accommodate "both the development of the county" and "Metro's capacity to finance and supply the U.S.D. service package."⁴ In April 1963, therefore, the U.S.D. consisted of an overlay on the county (the G.S.D.) with boundaries the same as the City of Nashville at the time of consolidation (see Figure 4.1). Within the first year of Metro, plans were prepared and adopted to provide the full range of U.S.D. services throughout the U.S.D., with the exception of storm sewers.⁵ These plans

³The politics of school consolidation were complex; the existence of capital investments coupled with public concern over the school budget led to special treatment of school matters in the creation of Metro, including establishment of the School fund.


⁵Coomer and Tyer, pp. 68-69.
Figure 4.1. Urban Services District, 1963.
Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission.
were developed individually by the Metro government departments responsible for the particular service. (The significant departments were Water and Sewerage Services, Public Works, Fire and Police.) In the case of the sewer plan, a large engineering consulting firm was engaged.

Problems of consolidating county and city services were pronounced throughout the G.S.D. There is general agreement, however, that Mayor Briley, with the help of many officials (including the Planning Commission staff as noted in the preceding chapter) was not wrong when he stated that, during its first year, the consolidation of G.S.D. services had:

1. Saved $1,000,000 in school construction costs;
2. Permitted establishment of competitive bidding;
3. Permitted establishment of land acquisition and disposal policies;
4. Permitted the establishment of a motor pool and fleet purchasing;
5. Permitted the establishment of uniform personnel policies; and
6. Permitted the establishment of a central data processing unit. 6

Each of these accomplishments, of course, contains a story unto itself. For purposes of this study, it is important to keep in mind that many of the service provision benefits claimed to be possible under consolidated government did, in fact, occur even though they are not discussed in the following review of the extension of U.S.D. services under Metro.

The stated goal of the founders of Metro that consolidated government would bring about a more equitable financing of urban

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services can be evaluated in light of the information in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Table 4.1 compares the property tax burdens of city and county residents before and after Metro. Table 4.2 extends the data on tax rates through 1977. From the perspective of the property tax alone, it can be seen that all Metro residents (i.e., G.S.D.) assumed a greater burden in financing the G.S.D. service package. As will be discussed, it should be noted that a major U.S.D. service package, water and sewerage, was placed upon a user charge rather than property-tax financial basis.

Table 4.3 presents the growth of expenditures for the G.S.D. service package since Metro's inception. Although the service "packages" remained unchanged throughout the period, the cost of G.S.D. services grew, both as a function of population growth outside the U.S.D. and the cost increases of G.S.D. services. Police protection, initially "more intensive" within the U.S.D., virtually became a G.S.D. function.\(^7\) The difficulty in distinguishing between police protection requirements in U.S.D. and G.S.D. areas led, by 1972, to nearly 98% of the police department local fund requirements being allocated from G.S.D. sources.\(^8\) In 1963-1964, only 59% of local police funds came from the G.S.D. The police department was the only Metro department, however, which was given the task of performing a similar service at different levels of intensity for the areas within and beyond the U.S.D.

Since the emphasis of this study is upon the extension of urban services as related to urban development issues in Metro, attention must

\(^7\)Horton Interview  
\(^8\)Coomer and Tyer, pp. 55-56.
TABLE 4.1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City Tax Rate</th>
<th>County Tax Rate</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td>$2.32</td>
<td>$5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.D. Tax Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td>$3.70</td>
<td>$5.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Tax rates are $100 of assessed valuation.)

### TABLE 4.2

**COMPOSITION OF RATES OF TAX LEVIES, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Period</th>
<th>General Services District</th>
<th>Urban Services District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>$3.70</td>
<td>$1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
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<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1973</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Tax rates are per $100 of assessed valuation.)

### TABLE 4.3


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Period</th>
<th>General Services District</th>
<th>Urban Services District</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>$30,073,129 (71%)</td>
<td>$12,111,008 (29%)</td>
<td>$42,184,137 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>32,256,977 (71%)</td>
<td>12,597,125 (29%)</td>
<td>44,854,102 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>38,863,788 (74%)</td>
<td>13,131,044 (26%)</td>
<td>51,994,832 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>37,753,508 (74%)</td>
<td>13,297,791 (26%)</td>
<td>51,051,299 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>39,146,600 (74%)</td>
<td>13,382,455 (26%)</td>
<td>52,529,055 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>43,630,483 (75%)</td>
<td>14,286,741 (25%)</td>
<td>57,917,224 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>42,908,700 (74%)</td>
<td>14,831,946 (26%)</td>
<td>57,740,646 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>47,318,561 (74%)</td>
<td>15,977,993 (26%)</td>
<td>63,296,554 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>57,048,217 (77%)</td>
<td>16,893,433 (23%)</td>
<td>73,941,650 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1973</td>
<td>64,344,839 (78%)</td>
<td>17,668,691 (22%)</td>
<td>82,013,530 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>71,341,449 (79%)</td>
<td>18,912,650 (21%)</td>
<td>90,254,099 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>81,573,736 (79%)</td>
<td>22,042,908 (21%)</td>
<td>103,616,644 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>87,639,850 (77%)</td>
<td>26,083,372 (23%)</td>
<td>113,723,222 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>97,707,949 (78%)</td>
<td>28,090,458 (22%)</td>
<td>125,800,407 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

be placed upon those services provided in the U.S.D. and available in
the remainder of Metro either through expansion of the U.S.D. or through
extra-U.S.D. arrangements. Much could be said about the evolution of
G.S.D. services, particularly schools, streets, health care and welfare,
but this would direct attention away from the main thrust: the
evolution of the U.S.D.-G.S.D. distinction. It can be noted, though,
that two traditional "priming services," schools and streets, although
as developmentally significant in Metro as in other urban areas, have
been strongly impacted by forces beyond Metro. The Federal District
Court-supervised school zoning and construction since 1970 has
effectively removed much basic school facility planning flexibility from
Metro's hands. 9 Major arterial, freeway and interstate highway planning
has been a joint state-Metro enterprise, with the state playing a
predominant role. Additionally, the pattern of Metro's thoroughfare
system was cast well in advance of Metro's birth. 10 As suggested in
each of the preceding chapters, the developmental consequences of these
decisions have been felt as much beyond Metro's boundaries as within.
The same can be said about the court order to integrate Metro's schools.
To pursue these issues, however, would expand the study to a regional
focus, an expansion for which there is regretfully not enough time or

9 The court ordered plan was vastly different than the existing
school plan, Schools for 1980 (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning

10 See Interstate Controlled-Access Highway System for Nashville
(Nashville: City of Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions,
1955).
II. SERVICE PATTERNS

Water and Sewerage Services

It has been pointed out that Nashville and Davidson County's greatest urban service deficiency has been sanitary sewerage. The existence of limestone layers near the surface of the land in the otherwise ideal urbanization setting along the Cumberland River has plagued both septic tank performance and the efforts to install sanitary sewer systems. This problem was instrumental in the organization of the Community Services Commission in 1951 and led to the preparation of the major sanitary sewer plan by the Advance Planning and Research Division of the Planning Commission in 1955.\(^\text{11}\) Figure 4.2 represents the existing city sewer system in 1955 and the "proposed system" under the "immediate program" recommended in the 1955 report. It can be seen that the study identified the need to properly sewer areas within the existing city limits and in those areas "urbanized and adjacent to the city." Recalling that this recommendation was prepared along with the plan for metropolitan government, it should be noted that the staff concentrated on the engineering requirements for sewering existing development. Governmental and financial arrangements were sketched out with the stated hope that "a single metropolitan government" would ultimately implement the sewer plan.\(^\text{12}\) It was recommended that

\(^{11}\text{Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System for the Nashville Metropolitan Area (Nashville: City of Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions, 1956).}\)

\(^{12}\text{Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System, p. 92.}\)
Figure 4.2. Sewered Areas, Existing and Proposed, 1955.

Source: Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System.
financing of trunk construction be by general obligation bonds and
collector construction be by service fees.\textsuperscript{13}

Implementation of the sewer plan was immediately caught up in the
conflicts between city and county. Not only were sewer needs in the
urban area not met adequately by either government, but several
counter-productive facilities were nearly constructed, including a
county proposal to construct a sewerage treatment plant just upstream
from the Cumberland River intake for the city water system.\textsuperscript{14}

By 1963, not only had sewer construction lagged within the old
city, but Metro was faced with the need to sewer the 49 square miles
added to the city, comprising the initial U.S.D., during the annexations
prompted by Mayor West (see Figure 2.3, page 71). No plan existed for
sewering these areas other than the 1955 plan. The Metro Council, in
its first year, therefore, authorized both the preparation of a U.S.D.
sewer construction plan and subsequently established a water and
sewerage fee-basis for financing sewer extension into the planning area.
In a remarkable effort, sewer extension throughout the U.S.D. was nearly
completed by 1970, as shown in Figure 4.3.

This effort to extend sewerage throughout the U.S.D. was planned
and executed according to engineering and financial considerations
related almost entirely to the goal of servicing the existing U.S.D. as

\textsuperscript{13} Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{14} Coomer and Tyer, p. 68.
Figure 4.3. Sewered Areas, 1970.

Source: Analyzing Suburban Development.
determined by the Department of Water and Sewerage Services. Although consideration was allowed for treatment capacity to service future development within drainage areas already undergoing urban growth, sewer planning considerations during the entire period since 1963 did not include a concern for influencing the staging and timing of development. Where growth was underway, particularly subdivision development, and where drainage and other engineering considerations were more suited to sewer construction than other areas of the suburban fringe, there was a greater likelihood that sewer construction would occur earlier. Where expansions of the U.S.D. had not occurred, such construction was undertaken by either sewer districts or by developers under arrangements whereby facilities were deeded to Metro when Metro trunks became accessible. With the exception of the modest efforts to use subdivision regulations to require sewer facility installation within the "urban planning area," these arrangements for providing sewers beyond U.S.D. boundaries resulted from decisions to develop based on criteria viewed as important by private developers, not any consideration of comprehensive planned development. This situation contributed heavily to the fact that in 1972, 72% of the developed,


non-U.S.D. land was not served by sanitary sewers. The public cost of this ordering of priorities included large-scale, low density suburban development in areas where ultimate provision of sewer services would prove to be very costly; development in areas where other services, such as transportation, would be less than adequate; and development which would be crisscrossed in succeeding years with construction projects providing services to newer developments for which service capacity had not been provided.

A sweet and sour ingredient in sewer service within Metro has been the provision for the existence of public and private service districts within the G.S.D. to provide "special services" where they are "needed" and cannot be provided as a package of "substantial urban services (i.e., U.S.D. expansion)." The revision of the original Metro enabling legislation to permit such districts proved beneficial in that it provided a means for constructing sewer lines and self-contained treatment facilities in rapidly growing and well-established suburban fringe areas where immediate U.S.D. extension was not feasible. Figure 4.3 indicates the location of these districts circa 1972, prior to extensions of the U.S.D.

At least three significant problems can be related to these non-Metro service districts. First, the existence of the districts

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reduced the impact of any attempt to manage Metro development in the suburban fringe through subdivision regulations requiring extensive service provisions, especially sewer connections. Second, the standards used during the installation and maintenance of service facilities provided by the districts may well have been below those of Metro, requiring Metro, in future years, to undertake large-scale upgrading and renovation of services in areas ultimately brought into the U.S.D. Finally, U.S.D. expansion into areas served by such districts raises tedious and costly legal issues. Acquisition of assets and liabilities of such districts plagues U.S.D. expansion in the same way it does any city annexing an area including such districts. 20 In summary, the existence of these service districts within the G.S.D. provided short-range benefits and long-range problems. From the developmental perspective of this study, the latter were more significant than the former.

Much of what has just been said is also true of water service throughout Metro since its beginning. Although water service was available throughout far more of the G.S.D. than was sewer service, much of it was provided through 2-inch mains, which limited both fire-protection potential and the capacity for system growth to meet new demands. 21 Following consolidation, some 569,340 feet of 2-inch

20 See The Tennessean, March 1, 1978, for a statement by Farris A. Deep, Executive Director, Metropolitan Planning Commission, making this point.

21 Analyzing Suburban Development, pp. 28ff.
water line had to be replaced with larger mains within the "new" U.S.D. for fire protection reasons alone. Figure 4.4 indicates the extent of water service as well as the location on non-Metro water systems. The expansion of water service by the private districts raises the same developmental issues pointed out in the case of non-Metro sewer systems. With the exception of some increased expense in laying water line through areas of near-surface limestone, water supply throughout Metro has not been plagued with difficult engineering or source problems. Shortages in supply have been related to treatment facility capacities, not the Cumberland River source.

As has already been stated, water and sewer services throughout Metro have been financed by revenue-bond issues sustained by user charges. The service charge system of finance not only separated the massive construction effort from Metro's general obligation bond structure but it also dealt with the question of equity—particularly since such a large portion of the U.S.D. required servicing and obviously could not receive services within "reasonable" time had ad valorem taxation been used. Politically, the user charge method was acceptable as long as sewer and water service extension was rapid, extensive, and generally in moderately dense areas with little skip-development. This certainly was the case in the 10-year, 150 million dollar effort to service the U.S.D. with sewers after consolidation. As trunk lines were extended into lower density areas,

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22 Coomer and Tyer, p. 69. 
23 Hawkins Interview. 
24 Coomer and Tyer, pp. 68-71.
Figure 4.4. Water Services, 1970.

Source: Analyzing Suburban Development.
particularly as a consequence of the U.S.D. expansions after 1972, residents already receiving U.S.D. sewer services began to resist the increased water and sewer charges necessary to fund expansion into areas with less revenue potential. Among the solutions promoted were greatly increased connection fees. As so many times occurs, a plan to avoid one set of political problems eventually opened the way for another set of public concerns.

The existence of a user-charge financial base for water and sewer construction reinforced the potential for such services to be extended with little coordination with other developmental considerations. Concern for this potential is clear in a letter written by Irving Hand and included in one of the first studies of the impact of water and sewer services upon urban development:

With the establishment of Metropolitan Government last April (4/1/63), immediate steps were taken to examine the entire policy framework and rate structure concerning the provision of water and sewer service. This study is presently under way, under the auspices of the Water and Sewerage Services Department. A third party contract was entered into with the Chester Engineering Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for this work. The Planning Commission is serving in an advisory capacity.

It is important that the policy framework within which the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Services Department operates be coordinated with the planning considerations of the overall community. Even in Nashville, this requires constant attention and consideration. We are using the Capital Improvements Budget and Program as an additional vehicle to effect this coordination. However, this relationship could be considerably tighter.

Water and sewer services are key elements in land development in this community. A "bullish" operating department can play hell with the urban form. By using revenue bonds and service charges, the illusion is rendered that these facilities become self-supporting. Perhaps so. But the impact on the community can be in terms of other costs of significant proportion.
We generally require the approval of the Metropolitan Health Department as to individual water supply facilities. Lot areas of 40,000 square feet or less, to be served by private sewage disposal facilities, similarly require the approval of the Metropolitan Health Department. This worked for awhile, but developers soon learned to go over that minimum for land that did not percolate. As a result, we have mile after mile of low density residential development for which other community services must be made available. This is confronting Metropolitan Government with some very varying levels of service to be formulated in relation to varying densities of development. Street lights, sidewalks, storm drainage, schools and their service areas and parks and recreation areas are among those involved.

I feel that water and sewer extension policies are crucial to decisions concerning land development and the urban form. I feel that this approach has met with limited success. This result is not necessarily the fault of limited use of such policies alone but rather the extent to which planning as such has not received meaningful application. A strong planning program, in all of its aspects, will provide an atmosphere within which appropriate water and sewer service policies may be formulated and applied. 25

Each clause in Hand's final sentence emphasized the concerns for coordinated and planned service extension shared by planners in the 1950's as well as those of the 1960's, and later in the 1970's, as will be seen throughout the pages of this study.

Other U.S.D. Services

Most Metro observers would probably agree that provision of storm sewers throughout the U.S.D. has been the Metro service goal most seriously neglected. Even with the construction of new sanitary sewers throughout the "new" portion of the U.S.D., some 340 miles of combined

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sanitary and storm sewers remained in the "old" U.S.D. Planning studies of U.S.D. expansion conceded that storm sewer objectives in new U.S.D. areas would have to be limited to "major stream improvements" and correction of problems were "major nuisances" and/or "major damage" potential existed. The fact that storm sewer provisions would have to have been financed by property tax revenues coupled with the high cost estimates of providing storm sewers throughout the U.S.D. supported the consensus that the U.S.D. could not afford a massive extension of storm sewers. Attention to storm drainage, therefore, was limited to those areas where serious flooding problems existed or to locations where outside funding was available, such as urban renewal and urban redevelopment areas.

During the same period that sewer and water services were being extended throughout the initial U.S.D., fire protection at a Class III level of service existed. While 2-inch mains were being upgraded, tanker service was available. By 1971, one study pointed out that full fire protection services were available throughout the U.S.D. with an average response time of 3.2 minutes. The extension of Metro fire protection into areas of potential U.S.D. expansion, however, was


28 Ibid.

limited by the availability of water. Figure 4.5, based upon a 1972 Metropolitan Planning Commission study, indicates fire protection provided by non-Metro services as well as areas of deficient water supply for fire fighting needs.\(^{30}\) The inadequacy of fire protection outside the U.S.D. became a growing political issue, particularly as U.S.D. services became complete toward the end of Mayor Briley's second term (1971). The perception in urbanized, non-U.S.D. areas, that Metro's service "catch-up" period in the U.S.D. was ending, coupled with periodic fires in the G.S.D. where it was felt that, had Metro responded, damage would have been less, gave rise to growing pressure for Metro fire protection extension. The tempting political response was to promise Metro fire protection throughout the G.S.D., but without U.S.D. expansion. This modification in the U.S.D.-G.S.D. service package was initially resisted successfully by Metropolitan Planning Commission and others who pointed first to the deficiencies in water supply throughout much of the G.S.D. and second to the fact that less than full fire protection in the non-U.S.D. areas might threaten the existing Class III rating in the U.S.D.\(^{31}\) Although not publicly discussed, planners also were concerned that transfer of fire protection to the G.S.D. service package would lessen the distinction between the U.S.D. and G.S.D., therefore limiting any future efforts to manage urban development


\(^{31}\) Ibid.
Figure 4.5. Fire Services, 1972.

Source: Expanding Urban Services.
through control of U.S.D. expansion. Metropolitan Planning Commission's major recommendation linked the expansion of Metro fire protection to expansion of the U.S.D. The 1972 study of fire protection emphasized engine company expansion tied to U.S.D. expansion priorities published about the same time.

The political pressures for Metro fire protection throughout the G.S.D. grew, however, and when Richard Fulton ran to succeed the retiring Briley as Mayor in 1975, he grasped the issue and promised the extension of Metro fire protection throughout Metro. Although significant expansion of fire protection service was already mandated due to expansions of the U.S.D., as noted below, there remained difficult fire service planning issues in providing Metro service in areas with inadequate water supply. Nevertheless, on July 1, 1978, Metro implemented G.S.D. fire protection with a mixture of new fire stations, temporary fire stations, tankers and equipment purchased from previously existing private and public fire service districts. This action represented the only formal shift in the allocation of Metro services between the G.S.D. and U.S.D. since Metro's inception.

Although "more intensive" police protection was allocated to the U.S.D. in the Metro Charter, it has already been pointed out that both

32 Interview with Robert Paslay, Planning Director, Metropolitan Planning Commission, September, 1977.


34 The Tennessean, July 1, 1978.
service-wise and budget-wise, Metro police protection has become a G.S.D. function. Initial attempts to define U.S.D. police protection as including "more intensive traffic patrols, walking patrols and crime prevention efforts" were recognized by city officials as less than accurate. By the mid-1970's, Metro police protection had become a "de facto" G.S.D. service with additional U.S.D. service existing only in a "de jure" sense.

Solid waste collection was quickly extended throughout the U.S.D. upon Metro's birth. Both regular garbage collection and residential "chipper truck" (yard refuse disposal) services have been provided throughout the entire U.S.D. Financed by U.S.D. property taxes, the services have been performed with relatively little controversy. U.S.D. expansion proposals, however, have raised the issue of garbage pick up in several ways. The inadequacy of many private garbage services has been a rallying point for many non-U.S.D. residents to demand U.S.D. services. Second, the legal problems of acquisition of private garbage collection investments, upon U.S.D. expansion, have posed intricate issues for Metro. U.S.D. expansion in 1975 and 1976 resulted in at least one lawsuit, finally settled when Metro agreed to purchase the assets of eight private garbage haulers. Third,

35 Horton Interview; Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 7; Expanding Urban Services, p. 7.
36 Horton Interview; Paslay Interview.
increasing costs of solid waste disposal, a G.S.D. function, have caused sometimes controversial increases in fees charged to private garbage haulers for dumping privileges at Metro land-fill sites as well as the Thermal Transfer Corporation facility, a Metro-based solid-waste-energy production operation.

The remaining U.S.D. services, such as street lighting and various regulatory functions, have posed few problems during Metro's evolution. The low relative cost of such services coupled with the speed with which they have been extended throughout the U.S.D. minimize their significance in the developmental considerations surrounding U.S.D. expansion.

III. U.S.D. EXPANSION: PLANNING PROPOSALS

The cumulative impact of the preceding comments on the condition of U.S.D. services during the first few years following Metro's birth reinforces the view that Metro was preoccupied with the "catch-up" service requirements within the U.S.D. Toward the end of the 1960's, a condition quite similar to that of the 1950's began to emerge: a relatively well-serviced urban area (the U.S.D.) was surrounded by an increasingly urbanized area with significant service deficiencies, particularly sewer and fire protection. In recognition of these deficiencies, MPC, in 1967, published the first formal proposal to expand the U.S.D. Prompted by both political pressures to service urbanized G.S.D. areas and planning staff recommendations to press on with actions to consolidate and centralize service delivery throughout the urbanized area (first articulated in the Community Services
Commission report in 1952), Mayor Briley initiated the planning study in 1966.

In their first study of U.S.D. extension, MPC staff operated within the following U.S.D. expansion framework:

1. "Most of the urban services now provided in the present Urban Services District are at a sufficient level to permit expansion" (with the exception of storm drainage and assuming a 1970 completion of sanitary sewer expansion);\textsuperscript{39}

2. Urban Services will continue to follow, not lead development; "one of the primary objectives of local government is to provide appropriate services to the urbanized sections of the community . . . unfortunately, areas become urbanized and have need of services well before government is able to supply them . . . ";

3. A continuing issue of U.S.D. expansion will be service and revenue equity—both within the expansion area and between the expansion area and the existing U.S.D.; and

4. Some reasonable variation in the level of U.S.D. service delivery can be related to the type and extent of development being served.\textsuperscript{40}

The same planning issue-areas thus faced MPC in 1966 as faced the framers of the original U.S.D. concept: financial, legal, administrative,

\textsuperscript{39}Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{40}Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 14.
political and engineering priorities had to be ranked and distilled into a recommended plan of action. As concluded in the second chapter of this study, the U.S.D. concept was conceived from a mixture of financial and engineering considerations accompanied by administrative reorganization (consolidation) and adequate doses of legal and political savvy. The first attempt to implement U.S.D. extension carefully dealt with the financial, engineering, administrative and legal details contained within the four-point framework, but fell short in consideration of the political details.

The first point of the expansion framework was the conclusion that, at least by 1970, and with the exception of storm sewers, the existing U.S.D. was to have been adequately serviced. The preceding pages have summarized the basis for this conclusion. One implication of this conclusion was that financially, the U.S.D. could be expanded within a context of predictable debt service. Administratively, Metro had consolidated service delivery throughout the U.S.D. into the appropriate agencies, such as the Department of Water and Sewerage Services. From an engineering perspective, provision of services throughout the U.S.D. had partially raised Metro's capacity to expand services. Although not fully adequate, sewerage treatment and water supply capacities had increased significantly between 1963 and 1967.\footnote{Urban Services District Expansion Study, pp. 18-19.} Legally, the issue of equity between existing and proposed U.S.D. areas was diminished. Finally, it appeared logical to assume that political opposition from
existing U.S.D. areas would be minimal, given the relative high levels of satisfaction with Metro services that were continually reported. Not fully entered into the political calculus, however, was the potential impact of U.S.D. expansion upon tax rates and user charges.

Several planners and engineers would certainly liked to have reversed the second expansion assumption, but recognized the futility of pursuing the notion that U.S.D. expansion policies might significantly influence future development patterns. There was certainly no political mileage in this perspective, and there were strong fiscal and legal arguments to support the "following" strategy.

The final two issues, those of equity and service variation received much attention. The legal consequences of U.S.D. expansion based fiscal and physical service provision criteria was a continuing concern. The timing of service provision with the first due date of new taxes was of concern. Although less pressing, the timing of user-free financed water and sewer services was also significant. Although it might be said that legal concerns for service and tax inequities would also involve political and administrative considerations, such is not necessarily the case. MPC's general methods in its first attempt to plan U.S.D. extension made this quite clear.


43Urban Services District Expansion Study, pp. 16-17.
The method used by MPC in the 1967 U.S.D. expansion study can be roughly outlined as follows:

1. Identification of urban service need by documenting stage of urbanization and service provision in relatively large planning units adjacent to existing U.S.D.;
2. Combining of areas in need of urban services according to drainage area and fire service (engine company) criteria; and
3. Recommended sequencing and timing for inclusion of areas into U.S.D. according to fiscal, administrative and legal criteria.

Phases one and two resulted in a list of 11 areas recommended for inclusion in the U.S.D. (see Figure 4.6). Phase three led to an outline of a "fast schedule" (four year) and a "slow schedule" (eight year) of expansion. Following a review of the fiscal impacts of each schedule, the study concluded that the three (3¢) cent increase in the U.S.D. property tax rate projected from the "fast schedule" was a small price to pay for the more rapid servicing of the existing development adjacent to the U.S.D. at that time. Table 4.4 summarizes the 11 proposed expansion districts according to the characteristics developed during each phase of the expansion study.

It is important to underscore the point that in this first U.S.D. expansion study the MPC staff was not responding to some hidden political agenda. They simply explored the various U.S.D. expansion alternatives

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44 Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 25.
Figure 4.6. Recommended Annexation Areas, 1967 Study.

Source: U.S.D. Expansion Study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Map Code</th>
<th>Dwelling Units per Gross Acre</th>
<th>D.U. per Gross Acre on Septic Tanks</th>
<th>Proposed Year of Inclusion</th>
<th>Cost/Revenue Impact</th>
<th>Proposed Year of Inclusion</th>
<th>Cost/Revenue Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$-241,600</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>$-238,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haynes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>-154,900</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-129,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkwood</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>-204,300</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>-204,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>-183,250</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-179,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglewood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>-215,350</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>-215,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donelson-West</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>-90,200</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>-64,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donelson-East</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>-171,800</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>-169,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tusculum</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>-149,800</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-137,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crieve Hall</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>-54,750</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-54,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brookmeade</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>+ 42,600</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>+ 42,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

within the existing service and development framework—that of servicing already urbanized areas. In this context, the staff only loosely held to the "packaging" of their recommendation implied by the sequencing of expansion according to a "fast" or "slow" program. The study, however, was not received with the same flexibility.46 The Metropolitan Council member from the Inglewood area opposed the expansion and was able to block the proposed Inglewood inclusion into the U.S.D. His action, in response to his constituents' concerns over the potential U.S.D.-caused tax increase, was generally interpreted as blocking further action on the remainder of the proposed extensions. As one planner involved in the issue stated, "there was no organized force actively pushing extension," so the misperception of the "packaged" nature of the proposal was allowed to block any further action once the initial obstacle had been encountered.47 With no real force in the Council to bolster the MPC recommendations, the plan died with the defeat of the ordinance tied to the Inglewood expansion. The Mayor, whose general interest in extension of urban services had prompted the initial study, was unwilling to spend any specific political capital to press for particular extensions once the Council had defeated the first proposal. Thus, because of the political forces (or lack of them) which surfaced in the first attempt to extend the U.S.D., the boundaries were not changed.

46 Interview with Joseph R. Haas, Director, Research Division, Metropolitan Planning Commission, June, 1978; Paslay Interview.

47 Haas Interview.
In 1971, several things did change. The need for urban services, especially sewer and fire protection, in the belt around the existing U.S.D., emerged as issues in Council and Mayoral elections. Acting on general campaign promises, the reelected Briley again requested MPC to prepare an expansion study of the U.S.D. In March 1972, MPC produced its second such study, Expanding Urban Services. In conveying the study to the Council, Briley was forceful:

... A similar expansion program was prepared five years ago, and an ordinance putting that program into effect was unsuccessful. The fact that no appreciable expansion of urban services has occurred since the inception of Metropolitan Government is most disappointing. The backlog of need for urban services continues to grow, making the delay in Urban Services District expansion less tolerable. 48

In preparing the 1972 study recommendations, MPC both relied on updated census and land use data and altered its strategy of presentation. 49

The more recent data increased MPC's perception of the extent of service need in the urban belt around the U.S.D., leading to enlarged expansion areas, particularly Bordeaux, Parkwood, Old Hickory and Hermitage. Figure 4.7 presents the 1972 expansion study recommendation. Table 4.5 describes the areas recommended for U.S.D. expansion. It should be noted that the "percent developed" refers to gross land development. No consideration is given to the "developable" portion of each area. It is difficult to determine the extent to which undeveloped but developable land was to be included in these extensions.

48 Letter, Mayor Briley to Vice-Mayor David Scobey, March 27, 1972.
49 Expanding Urban Services, pp. 1-2.
Figure 4.7. Recommended Annexation Areas, 1972 Study.

Source: Expanding Urban Services.
# Table 4.5

**Urban Services District Expansion Area Characteristics, 1972 Proposal, Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Percent Developed</th>
<th>Percent Residential Acres/Developed Acres</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Gross Residential Density</th>
<th>Total Annual Operating Costs*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>1 36.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>11,905</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>$682,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkwood</td>
<td>2 39.2</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>11,745</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>518,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pages Branch</td>
<td>3 54.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>5,478</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>284,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglewood</td>
<td>4 72.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>18,967</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>392,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>5 63.4</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>20,943</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>1,080,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Hickory</td>
<td>6 49.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>4,554</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>286,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermitage</td>
<td>7 22.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>9,592</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>488,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donelson West</td>
<td>8 61.1</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>16,192</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>734,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donelson East</td>
<td>9 49.6</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>6,174</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>459,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crieve Hall-Tusculum</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>29,653</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1,114,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Meade-Brookmeade</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>12,368</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>608,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fire Protection; Refuse Collection; Street Lights; Storm Drainage.

MPC's altered strategy of presenting its recommendations is partially reflected in Table 4.5. No attempt was made to "package" the sequence and timing of extension. Further, revenue projections from increased U.S.D. tax collections were not explicitly included in the report. The staff view was that a large area of urban, primarily residential, development existed, and was growing without adequate urban services, particularly sewerage, fire protection and garbage collection. They wanted the 1972 report to simply be a breakdown of this area by sewer drainage and fire service criteria with no overt suggestion of sequence of expansion. "The differences in need were not as great as the need to get started." They, in effect, gave the Council a "shopping list," hoping that political realities might produce a buyer (or two). In fact, pressures in Bordeaux, particularly, had been building for solutions to septic tank failures. It is perhaps more than ironic that the map makers started their numbering of the expansion areas with Bordeaux. After receiving assurances that U.S.D. tax supported services could be extended within one year after the first taxes fell due, as required in the Charter, and being exposed to the Water and Sewerage Services Department's need to expand into new revenue areas, the Council backed the Bordeaux representative's request for inclusion and, on December 24, 1972, "Bordeaux-Haynes" became the first major addition to the U.S.D. (see Figure 4.8).

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50 Haas Interview
51 Ibid.
52 Paslay Interview.
53 Metropolitan Ordinance 72-308.
Figure 4.8. Urban Services District Expansions, 1972-1978.

Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission.
As a proposal for extension of the U.S.D., the 1972 study in many ways was an ongoing extension of the urban services reports going back to the Community Services Report of 1952. It was a "minimum standard" document outlining already developed areas, primarily residential, where urban services were deficient. Politically, the planners had to wait for the proper mixture of public concern for service problems and willingness to pay both additional property taxes (the U.S.D. rate) and water and sewer charges. The mixture was influenced by the residents' perceived offsets from these taxes and charges caused by previous private and service-district charges, higher fire insurance rates and so on. From the Council's perspective, Council members with substantial U.S.D. constituencies had to be certain that political, as well as legal, equity in service delivery would exist after expansion. This was particularly important since few, if any, of the proposed expansions would pay their own way.\textsuperscript{54} In the case of Bordeaux-Haynes, the critical mixture was finally reached.

IV. U.S.D. EXPANSION: ACTUAL

Figure 4.8 and Table 4.6 present the growth of the U.S.D. in the five years following the publication of the 1972 study and the first significant expansion of the boundaries since Metro's birth. Ultimately, the expansion doubled the area of the U.S.D. and increased the population by some 50%. Pressure for expansion emerged in much the way it had in Bordeaux. The second extension, Crieve Hall-Tusculum,

\textsuperscript{54}Horton Interview.
TABLE 4.6

URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT EXPANSIONS, METROPOLITAN
NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Map Code</th>
<th>Expansion Date</th>
<th>Population (1970 Census)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bordeaux-Haynes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dec. 24, 1972</td>
<td>14,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crieve Hall-Tusculum</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nov. 21, 1973</td>
<td>37,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Valley</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aug. 20, 1975</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beacon Square</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>May 7, 1976</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Bordeaux</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>June 24, 1976</td>
<td>1,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison-Inglewood</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jan. 1, 1977</td>
<td>28,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donelson</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jan. 1, 1977</td>
<td>24,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillwood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jan. 1, 1977</td>
<td>13,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opryland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Dec. 29, 1977</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of U.S.D. Growth

- U.S.D. Area Prior to 1972: 72.0 square miles
- Area Added by U.S.D. Expansion: 78.7 square miles
- U.S.D. Area, Jan. 1, 1978: 150.7 square miles

- Population Added by U.S.D. Expansion: 121,408
resulted from particular concerns over fire service in the area. The area was also the location of rather active subdivision development along with apartment complex construction. Existing and potential health and safety problems were perceived by a significant segment of the residents to create pressure for U.S.D. extension. The near absence of fire protection and the continuing performance problems of the First Suburban Utility District (water and sewer) were of greatest concern. As with the Bordeaux addition, the Department of Public Works and the Fire Department provided guarantees of services within a year after the first U.S.D. tax payments were due (which worked out to be 1975). The Department of Water and Sewerage Services was still in a search for revenue and indicated a capacity to upgrade and expand the limited sewerage service provided by the First Suburban District.

The remaining U.S.D. extensions can be lumped into three categories. First, there were three relatively "little extensions" after the Crieve Hall-Tusculum addition. The Golden Valley and Beacon Square additions resulted from developer requests for urban services to serve proposed apartment complexes in each area. Given the likelihood that U.S.D. extension would ultimately occur, the developers saw fit to press for the timing of services with development to permit high density housing for which there were no existing sanitary sewers or fire protection. Subdivision development in the North of Brodeaux area provided similar pressures for U.S.D. extension there. It is interesting to note that in

55 Analyzing Suburban Development, p. 31.
all three cases, absence of critical services at even a "minimum standard" level for high density development forced the developers to seek Urban Services District boundary modification before proceeding with their plans. The potential revenue impact of such extension was appealing to the Council, especially given the fact that adjacent low density residential areas either had or would soon have U.S.D. services. If there were any concerns for "managing" such development, they certainly didn't surface before the Council.56

The second group was typical of the type of annexation recommended in the 1972 study and was begun in the case of Bordeaux: relatively well-developed residential areas with varying overlays of relatively poor urban services. The ultimate boundaries of each of the three expansions were determined by the general boundaries in the corresponding 1972 recommended areas modified by the "normal political zig-zagging and line-drawing" by Council members as they responded to various constituent interests.57 The Madison-Inglewood area did not extend as far north as initially projected in 1972, but the Donelson and Hillwood (West Meade-Brookmeade) additions generally did conform. Some Metro sewer services already existed but septic tanks were predominant in each area. Metro water supply existed in most of the areas, with the exception of that portion of Madison-Inglewood supplied by the Madison Suburban Utility District. Private fire services were scattered throughout the areas.

56 Haas Interview. 57 Ibid.
Positive Council action on the three extensions was facilitated by the continuing view that service extension into these areas was needed and, perhaps more significantly, could be provided by Metro without negatively impacting the existing U.S.D. Indeed, as Table 4.2 (page 132) outlines, U.S.D. tax rates were not increased as a consequence of these annexations. (This should not be taken to mean that the extensions were self-supporting; the previously-mentioned shift to increased G.S.D. expenditures combined with new non-tax U.S.D. revenues from fees, federal funds and state tax allocations contributed to the stability of the U.S.D. rate.\textsuperscript{58} Although precise data has not been found, it is generally accepted that only the middle-to-upper income area of Hillwood provided a net increase in U.S.D. property tax revenues, as first suggested in the 1967 U.S.D. expansion study.)

The third, and most recent, U.S.D. expansion category is occupied solely by the Opryland extension. Of all the U.S.D. extension proposals, this became the most controversial. Beginning in the late 1960's the northwestern portion of Pennington Bend had been undergoing development as a theme park-tourist complex, primarily by the National Life and Accident Insurance Company in the Opryland Complex. Claiming that it had been assured that the area would remain only in the G.S.D., National Life provided its own internal fire protection, sewerage and solid waste disposal systems.\textsuperscript{59} (Opryland was excluded from the 1972 West Donelson

\textsuperscript{58}Horton Interview.

\textsuperscript{59}Interview with staff attorney, National Life and Accident Insurance Company, March, 1978.
U.S.D. extension area.) By 1975, however, the revenue potential of including Opryland in the U.S.D. combined with a desire not to have a non-U.S.D. island should the Donelson area be brought into the U.S.D., placed pressure on both planners and Council members to include Opryland in the U.S.D. 60 Opryland was therefore included in the package to be brought into the U.S.D. on January 1, 1977. Upon favorable Council action, National Life attorneys filed suit, claiming that the "annexation" was "unreasonable," in that Opryland already provided the services that were a part of the U.S.D. service package. 61 The suit was filed pursuant to Tennessee's annexation law, which, as will be recalled from Chapter II, governs the basic procedure for expansion of the U.S.D. The Tennessee law is very much oriented toward the municipality (in this case, the U.S.D.), and any doubt over "reasonableness" is decided in favor of the annexing city or town. It was not at all surprising, then, when the court ruled in favor of Metro and Opryland was ordered to become a part of the U.S.D. on December 29, 1977. 62 The same law which extends the city an advantage in annexation, however, also declares that while an annexation case is undergoing adjudication, any taxes associated with annexation cannot become due, nor can they become due until one year following judicial settlement of the issue, as required

60 Haas Interview.

61 National Life and Accident Insurance Company Interview.

in the normal arrangement for a schedule of services. In the case of Opryland, as with the other U.S.D. extensions, this schedule of services was actually an amendment to the six-year capital budget document listing and scheduling the appropriate capital investments required to service the area. It seems fairly clear that National Life's suit was filed primarily to save at least one year of U.S.D. tax payments, not to attempt to remain outside the U.S.D. 

V. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has reviewed the evolution in Metro of the delivery of those services contained in the initial U.S.D. service package. The approach taken has included both an examination of specific services and a discussion of proposed and actual extensions of the U.S.D. boundaries. Two conclusions drawn from the former form the basis for the conclusions made from the latter. The first is not surprising, given the contents of the preceding two chapters: delivery of urban services in Metro has been a continual case of following and trying to catch-up with development in the urban-rural border area. Even the review of the U.S.D. service most widely available prior to or concommitant with development, water, suggests that (1) little or no coordination between water line location and other planning concerns existed, and (2) the 

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64 This conclusion has been drawn by the author from the interviews cited above.
bulk of the water mains put down beyond city or U.S.D. boundaries were inadequate for fire protection services. For other U.S.D. services, the time lag between development and service delivery was significant.

The second conclusion to be drawn from the review of services is that only modest coordination of service planning and delivery has existed within Metro. Using Irving Hand's terms, the capital budgeting process has "tightened up" only a little and the primary planning for water and sewer extension has been carried out almost entirely by the Department of Water and Sewerage Services with the assistance of engineering-oriented, third-party consultants. Even where MPC had been active in attempting to relate service extension to a range of urban development issues, political considerations intervened. Such was the case with the recent decision to extend Metro fire protection countywide.

The pattern of relatively non-coordinated service extension following urbanization logically meshes with the way in which U.S.D. boundary extension issues have evolved. A "rationally-prepared" plan for U.S.D. expansion failed for lack of significant political interest. Only when a second version of the plan was incrementally relevant to political interests of both residents and service-supplying departments did extension take place. As one of Metro's designers stated, "I was disappointed that U.S.D. expansion was not handled in a more positive way." His view was shared by another participant in Metro's birth, "the biggest failure of Metro has been the failure to expand the U.S.D.]

65 Hawkins Interview.
until just recently. In both cases, the views expressed were not based on an idealized vision of "growth management" in Metro. They were, rather, built on the initial hope that "U.S.D. expansion be used to time and coordinate the extension of urban services in order to save money and raise the standard of urban development." What appears as a rather simple statement contains within it all the issues which have been struggled with by Metro-oriented planners since 1952 and which reflect the tension between a planning dream of seriously influencing the shape and efficiency of Metro's physical development and yet working within an environment where few political resources for such a perspective exist.

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66 Interview with Dr. Lee S. Greene, January, 1978.
67 Hawkins Interview.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE EXPERIENCE: MESSAGES FOR PLANNERS

As is often true in drawing conclusions from a case study, two levels of summary are in order. The first, and more obvious, considers the interplay of consolidated government, the Urban and General Services District distinction, and the evolving framework for urban development in Metropolitan Nashville. The second, and more difficult, relates the conclusions drawn from the Metro study to the broader interests of planners in the management of urban development with which the study opened. The planning issues raised in this context include the possible ways in which consolidated government, urban service delivery and urban boundary adjustment might be a part of efforts to influence the type, rate, location, timing and quality of urban development. The final pages of this chapter and study will search for possible messages for the planners and others who share such interests. The first part of the chapter, however, will address the need to summarize and speculate on the Nashville story.

Four research questions were initially provided to give focus to the study of urban service delivery in the Metro setting:

1. Was the creation of these service districts based upon (to any extent) a planning concern for the coordination of service provision with development objectives?
2. Has the existence of these districts permitted their use as a vehicle for coordinated service delivery consistent with development objectives?

3. Given the history of these districts, do they appear to have potential in assisting Metro Nashville in meeting its future development objectives?

4. Does the Nashville experience with consolidated government and the service district concept provide planners with evidence of the validity of such arrangements for the implementation of development objectives in the metropolitan area?

The summary of the study of Metro is organized as a response to the first three of these questions, with the fourth providing a transition to the broader final comments.

I. THE URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT CONCEPT

In the final pages of Chapter II, it was argued that the U.S.D.-G.S.D. concept was created essentially as a financially, administratively and politically sound way to assist consolidated government in meeting Davidson County's massive backlog in providing urban services to urbanized areas, particularly sanitary sewers and fire protection. To argue that Metro's service district concept was born from some embryonic scheme to use urban services provision to guide urban development would simply deny the historical circumstances encountered first, by those who convened the Community Services Commission and, later, by the many forces active in bringing about consolidated government.
The first research question also makes reference to the existence of "development objectives" toward which service delivery arrangements might have been directed during the designing of Metro. As conceptually developed in the pages following the historical review, such "objectives" were found to exist almost entirely within the private development sector, dominated by developers, investors, home buyers and so on. When translated into public demands, these objectives became rapidly increasing needs to service urbanized areas which, in many cases, received little more than two-inch water lines in the way of commonly accepted urban services. In a way quite typical of their sense of realism, the early planners of Metro invented the U.S.D. and G.S.D. as servicing and political, much more than as planning, tools. Servicing rather than shaping urban development was an important distinction. Their recognition that the existing service needs of urbanized areas effectively prevented the allocation of near-future Metro fiscal and political resources towards any effort to manage new development was fortified by their knowledge that the extension of the transportation system and other shaping factors would heavily influence metropolitan growth in and beyond Davidson County. Nevertheless, the context of consolidated government coupled with the hope that the service backlogs could eventually be reduced at least allowed some anticipation that the U.S.D.-G.S.D. distinction together with the expandable nature of the U.S.D. boundaries might become useful in some future setting where the management of development would receive some level of community support.
II. URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT PERFORMANCE

The implementation of Metro's service district concept has been reviewed both from the perspective of the general frameworks for development which have existed in Metro since 1963 (Chapter III) and the accounts of actual U.S.D. service and boundary extensions. The first perspective was required by the study's research interests in the developmental consequences of public policies, including those influencing the distribution of the services allocated to the U.S.D. package. The presentation of a typology for classifying the varying impacts of public policy-making upon urban development was used to suggest that during Metro's first years, few public decisions were made to consciously influence the character, direction, staging or timing of Metro development. Where such decisions were made, they generally fit the "minimum standard" pattern and experienced varying degrees of successful implementation. It is not unexpected, then, that any conclusion regarding the impact of U.S.D. service policies and boundary extensions is preempted by the absence of any significant public effort to influence development beyond the "minimum standard" level of action.

Within the setting just presented, the discussions in Chapter IV shifted to a more specific review of the evolution of U.S.D. service delivery and U.S.D. boundary extensions. Delivery of the package of U.S.D. services was undertaken by functional Metro departments with relatively little coordination. This was seen as a function of both the aggressive strength of such departments, especially Water and Sewerage
Services, and the absence of an early and persuasive comprehensive planning effort receiving strong political support.

Recent studies continue to illuminate the consequences of the absence of planned, coherent U.S.D. service extension. One study, which sampled several developed areas with initial development dates ranging from 1953 to 1972, concluded that minimal water was generally present at the time of development but that average time between initial development and supply of other U.S.D. services was 11 years for sewers and 19.5 years for fire protection.\(^1\) Another report mentions that development in Metro continues to absorb far more land per capita than the median for cities of the same size (231 acres per 1,000 persons for Metro as compared with 67 acres for cities over 250,000).\(^2\) Service problems are not diminished through such land-intensive development. In its recent, and first, effort to develop a comprehensive plan, the Metropolitan Planning Commission cited "disruptive and inefficient development processes" and "the inability of local government to provide adequate services" as two of the seven major problem areas facing Metro.\(^3\)

From 1960 to 1970, 37,397 acres of land were developed for residential purposes outside the inner city portion of Davidson County. The low level of existing public services


\(^2\)Untitled Staff Draft Memo (Metropolitan Planning Commission, July, 1978).

in outlying areas together with the high cost of improved services placed constraints upon the intensity of suburban development. As a result, a dispersed and sporadic pattern of suburban development has prevailed in the county with a resultant detrimental effect on the efficient and timely provision of public services. However, when services, particularly sanitary sewers, are finally provided in suburban areas, a significant demand for higher density development occurs. Subsequent higher density development proposals submitted after suburban areas are serviced by community facilities frequently generate significant conflict among long established neighborhood residents desiring to preserve low densities and land developers desiring more intensive development . . . . a major problem facing Metropolitan Government regarding the provision of community facilities and services is the lack of adequate fiscal capacity to meet even current needs . . . . There are currently several areas throughout the county where extension of urban services has not kept pace with the level of development. As a result local government has not realized the savings in public expenditures possible with the installation of public utilities during the initial stages of the urban development process. It now will become necessary to disrupt relatively mature areas in order to provide public facilities long after these facilities were originally needed. Furthermore, other areas have reached the development stage that makes urban services feasible and would create effective long-term costs savings, in addition to promoting further development.4

Although perhaps lengthy for a concluding chapter, these recent observations have been included to stress the point that many of the developmental issues faced by Metro in 1963 remain in the late 1970's. Urban Services District services are still being extended into urbanized areas and significant urbanized areas remain outside the existing U.S.D. boundaries.

The existing U.S.D. boundaries themselves only came into existence after awareness of the previous failures to expand reached political proportions. Although the mechanisms for U.S.D. expansion and the

maintenance of a U.S.D. package of services existed within the Metro Charter, previous discussion has shown that political support within the Metro Council for expansion was late in emerging and that the "package" was diluted, first with the placement of sewer and water services on a user charge basis, then with the allowance of continued non-Metro service districts, and, finally, the extension of Metro fire protection throughout the G.S.D.

Lest the opinion remain that, even within the context of limited public participation in development decision-making, the failure of U.S.D. service policies to impact development patterns be attributed to inadequate management of U.S.D. potential, several additional concluding points need to be made. First, it seems obvious that one goal of the U.S.D.-G.S.D. concept has been achieved—to the possible detriment of objectives associated with managed development. The goal achieved has been the relatively even distribution of G.S.D. services throughout the county. Much of the unevenness in school, road, police, parks and recreation, health and welfare services common prior to consolidation have nearly disappeared. Although fiscal burdens upon the G.S.D. have grown accordingly, the developmental consequence has been to make urbanization beyond the U.S.D. more attractive relative to urbanization in the county prior to 1963. The erosion of the U.S.D.-G.S.D. distinction combined with accessibility improvements in the county fringes will continue to lessen the incentives for development in the existing U.S.D.

Also contributing to some lessened impact of development control has been the continuing existence of the seven satellite cities.
Conventional wisdom regarding the presence of incorporated municipalities within a consolidated form of government tempts one to overestimate their role in Metro. With the exception of Goodlettsville and the semi-commercial island of Berry Hill, these cities are low-density, residential areas whose primary objective is to capitalize on the political bargain which created them and use zoning controls to keep nonresidential development out. As parts of the G.S.D. and able to contract with Metro for U.S.D. services, the cities provided a strong attraction for development beyond the U.S.D. boundaries. Presently, however, little undeveloped developable land remains in these areas—and where it does, its zoning is generally compatible with approaching Metro policies (especially Belle Meade, Oak Hill and Forest Hills). The only existing issue of consequence between the satellite cities and Metro development is the refusal of Goodlettsville and Berry Hill to allocate the discretionary half of their state sales tax allocation to the Metropolitan Board of Education. As a matter of policy, Metro and the other five satellite cities commit all of their state sales tax allocation to education.

A final caveat in discussing the impact of U.S.D. policies on Metro development concerns the impact of the transportation network, both within Metro and regionally. There is little doubt that the pattern and sequence of suburban-residential as well as industrial and commercial development has been influenced by the extensions of the seven radial transportation corridors out from the center of Metro. Although a full discussion of this influence is beyond the scope of this study, it is
certainly recognized that transportation decisions have had significant shaping influences upon Metro. The conceptual emphasis on the "minimum standard" framework in which development of Metro occurred perhaps obscured the point that, although private interests may have been a part of the decisions, nevertheless the commitment of federal, state and local resources to expand the streets and highways within Metro not only impacted upon internal development, but contributed to the phenomena and issues of regional growth raised by Dan Grant in the remarks presented in the final pages of Chapter II. Again, the issues are complex, but they need to be noted, even though the general conclusion is still valid: the potential for use of the U.S.D. service package and boundary extension to influence development in Metro remained latent.

III. URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT POTENTIAL

A unique opportunity currently exists to engage in some speculation about the possible impact of U.S.D. service policies and boundary extensions on future development in Metro. As mentioned previously, the Metropolitan Planning Commission, around 1970, began to undertake its first truly comprehensive planning effort. Although other planning priorities have intervened on occasion and slowed the comprehensive planning activity, the staff released, in July 1976, three "general plan options" for Metropolitan Nashville. At the same time it was announced

that the three plan options would be placed before citizens, groups, organizations and institutions of Metropolitan Nashville for discussion and refinement. Following this period, it was suggested that there would be a period of aggregation and incorporation of this public discussion into the options. The Planning Commission would then select from or combine features of the options and officially adopt Metro's first general, comprehensive plan. As of this writing, no formal action of plan adoption has occurred. However, as a basis for considering the potential roles U.S.D. policies may play in influencing Metro development, the activities associated with this comprehensive planning thrust offer at least two opportunities for speculating about the future. The first is provided by the technical discussions in each of the plan options which assess potential U.S.D. service roles. The second is broader and probes at the heart of Metro's capacity to influence its future development: of the three options, two propose a much greater public role in managing the sequence, timing, location and quality of Metro's physical development. Using the terms introduced in Chapter III, these two options, "Residential Livability" and "Public Economies" clearly require a "partnership" between public and private development interests as an ingredient in the environment which would support their implementation. The third option, "Economic Development," assumes an urban development environment not too different from that found throughout Metro's history.

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6Interview with Robert Paslay, Planning Director, Metropolitan Planning Commission, September, 1977.
It is beyond the purposes of this study to fully explore each of these plan alternatives. For the reasons stated above, however, it is useful to briefly review the approach toward the urban service-development relationship taken in each alternative. If one assumes that the "economic development" alternative is basically an incremental extension of Metro's past framework for development, then the contrast between its treatment of the U.S.D. and that of the other two alternatives offers some commentary on the range of potential relationships between urban service policies and development in Metro's future.

The three alternatives were prepared from a common review of seven problem areas found to be significant in examining Metro's history and future need. Two of these problems relate directly to issues developed in this study and have already been mentioned: "disruptive and inefficient development processes," and "the inability of local government to provide adequate services." The other problem areas include lack of housing opportunities, lack of a balanced transportation system, adverse impact of transportation upon residential areas, inadequate educational and recreational opportunities, and environmental degradation. Each of the alternatives addresses these problems—with transportation, environmental, educational, and recreational policies varying little among them. The shape, quality, location, timing and sequencing of urban physical development along with urban service policies, however, vary considerably.

The "economic development" alternative seeks the "maximum development of economic activities and employment opportunities" by encouraging "sufficient flexibility in the development process to enhance private investment opportunities and to stimulate growth."\textsuperscript{8}

Accordingly, "the overall pattern of residential development in Davidson County under this plan will be continued decentralization, although most growth is expected to occur in concentrations of development rather than in a dispersed manner. A residential development strategy is proposed which is designed to accommodate the bulk of new growth stimulated by economic development and to assure an adequate level of essential public services in both existing and emerging residential areas."\textsuperscript{9} Although recommendations are made, as in the other options, for more mixed densities, more diverse low and middle income housing opportunities, better development design standards and so on, the essential feature of the "economic development" option is the promotion of relatively unrestrained residential development which will accommodate the growth requirements of an expanding economy and not place significantly increased financial demands upon the private sector.

Accordingly, the "economic development" alternative contains the recommendation that U.S.D. expansion should occur "in areas which have urbanized sufficiently to be serviced without requiring a major increase in the U.S.D. taxes."\textsuperscript{10} In addition, it is recommended that fire

\textsuperscript{8}Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{9}Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{10}Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 80.
protection services be extended countywide.11 This, as discussed in the preceding chapter, has already taken place. In mapping out projected U.S.D. expansion areas, those identified were already developed areas in need of U.S.D. services, primarily Bellevue, Madison, Antioch and Old Hickory-Hermitage.12 The essence, therefore, of this alternative's vision of the U.S.D.-development relationship is one of continued "catching up" with the hope that "keeping up" may ultimately occur. The heart of the "economic development" approach to development planning is the assumption that basic urban service planning (as embodied in the U.S.D. package) should facilitate the implementation (albeit at a high level of minimum standards) of development objectives determined by private interests.

The "residential livability" and "public economies" alternatives are based upon a different planning assumption. They assume, in differing degrees, that a public interest in urban development exists beyond the simple establishment of minimum development standards, and that some means must be established to reconcile this public interest with sometimes competing private interests. One way of conceptualizing this process of reconciliation has been the transition from "minimum standard" planning for urban development to "partnership planning." The "residential livability" alternative assumes a public interest oriented toward "the achievement and maintenance of a highly desirable

12 Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 81.
residential environment.\textsuperscript{13} The "public economies" alternative is based upon a more demanding sense of public interest: "cost effectiveness in the provision of public facilities and services (through) \ldots defining the least expensive way of accommodating growth within the community while still maintaining acceptable levels of service."\textsuperscript{14}

Both of these options propose the use of the U.S.D. service package as an important means for implementing development patterns consistent with the public interest portion of Metro's future development goals. The "residential livability" option recommends that, once the backlog of servicing developed areas is met, the "full-range of services, including U.S.D. expansion" should be provided "to desired growth areas."\textsuperscript{15} The areas programmed for U.S.D. extension are more extensive than in the "economic development" alternative, including, eventually, all land within Metro where residential growth is to occur.\textsuperscript{16} Of crucial importance is the timing of U.S.D. extension. It is proposed that extension of services will precede or accompany growth. Although the issue is now moot, the alternative proposes that fire protection not be extended countywide since "it is felt that (this) would detract from the service package incentive proposed by the plan strategy. This would weaken the directed growth incentive proposed by the alternative."\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13} Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{16} Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{17} Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 87.
Whereas the "residential livability" alternative assumes a greater increase in the U.S.D. tax rate to finance its capacity to extend desired residential services, the "public economies" alternative assumes that a desire to reduce public expenditures will modify demands for desired residential patterns. It, too, proposes tightly controlled extension of the U.S.D. area together with the regulatory devices necessary to prevent development where such services are not available. Its motive, however, is the containment of public expenditure. "Further expansion is tied to service capabilities and financial ability to schedule expansion. Areas held in reserve and not scheduled for expansion have regulatory controls applied to discourage development until extensive development becomes economical to serve." The fiscal evaluations of urban service extensions would become primary criteria in decisions to "open up" certain areas for development. Under this alternative, development decision-making would fall near the line between the "partnership" framework and that of "management," where the public sector is dominant.

Although these reviews of the development options currently before Metro have been brief, they have suggested two basically different roles for U.S.D. policies. As a link between this study's review of the history of these policies and the need to at least comment on the potential for certain future policies, the real choices offered between the alternatives are significant, particularly if a distinction is drawn

18 Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 83.
between the technical capacity for U.S.D. policies to influence development and the political likelihood that the requisite U.S.D. policies will be implemented.

There is little question that continuation of the U.S.D. service package combined with guided boundary modification, perhaps even in small, block-by-block increments, could influence the nature of urban development in Metro. Although the extension of fire protection countywide has somewhat diminished the differences between U.S.D. and non-U.S.D. areas in terms of services delivered and taxes due (which impact market values and holding costs), the tight control of U.S.D. services together with interrelated building codes, subdivision regulations, zoning requirements and capital improvements scheduling of other services could significantly impact development decision-making.

The real issue, however, is the extent to which there will be political resolve within Metro to engage in any form of "partnership" planning whatsoever. That is the critical distinction between the "economic development" alternative and the other two alternatives. It's the same distinction which has been raised throughout this study. In 1952, as in 1978, planners, faced with Metro's problems, have had to weigh technical judgments against political realities. Where their insights, skills, and sense of timing led to some form of synthesis of these perspectives, progress was achieved. Where a critical mass for action did not exist, problems simply accumulated. In the current age of diminishing resources, environmental consciousness and public outcry against perceived governmental costliness, it may be easier to achieve consensus on a
public-private partnership for Metro's development. Both the "residential livability" and "public economies" alternatives are built on this hope. If one extends a trendline through the pages of this study's particular focus on Metro's experiences with the U.S.D. concept, however, the future of service extension and its impact on Metro's development would appear to be more closely linked to the scenario portrayed in the "economic development" alternative.

IV. MESSAGES FOR PLANNERS

This study evolved from the issues surrounding the perceived need to manage or guide development in many urban areas. In particular, it has drawn on Metropolitan Nashville's experiences with consolidated government, urban service packaging, and urban service boundaries to develop a case study which might be of interest and utility to planners and other interested persons struggling with the problem of urban development. It is appropriate, therefore, to conclude the study by returning to the initial concerns of the opening pages: the potential for consolidated government and controlled urban service packages and areas to become productive components in efforts to manage urban development.

The Nashville story offers planners a complex message. As a response to the three questions about consolidated government posed in the first chapter, the experiences of Metro suggest that:
1. The "political feasibility" of consolidation is dependent upon a "critical mass" of consistent planning, consistent leadership, publicly perceived problems, public support, and patience;

2. The "metropolitan" problem is not solved by consolidation; and

3. Consolidated government does not necessarily bring about "efficiencies" in the delivery of urban services although many economies do result.

The combined impact of these observations is that consolidated government may conceptually exist as a means for better influencing urban development, but the obstacles for bringing the concept into reality are formidable. The proper conditions for implementing consolidated government finally fit together in Nashville only after 10 years of work by a remarkably consistent group of planners and community leaders. Still, it required a public reaction to the decision by the City to proceed with annexation before consolidation was ratified. A number of events could easily have prevented Metro's birth. If the planners associated with the Advance Planning and Research Division had left Nashville after the defeat of first referendum; if school integration had been the issue it became only several years later; if the allocation of federal funds had penalized metropolitan governments as they now do; if any number of factors had changed, Metro might never have come to exist.

Metro has never been a metropolitan government. The scope of this study has not permitted a full evaluation of the impact of the extensive
suburban ring which exists beyond the Davidson County boundary. Regardless of any future success in managing its own development, Metro will be faced by the fact that only through the complex and difficult procedures and politics of regional councils, state government, and federal agencies will truly metropolitan problems be addressed. On the other hand, planners should not miss the fact that Metro has jurisdiction over a significantly greater portion of the metropolitan area than would have been the case had Metro not been formed. Regardless of how Metro has used its own authority to influence development, it's important to note that the countywide extension of the G.S.D. removed school, transportation, health care, and other service issues from the areas of inter-governmental combat.

Finally, planners need to recognize that consolidated government has not meant "coordinated" government in the case of Metro. In this study's examination of Metro's experiences in use of the U.S.D. to influence development, it has been seen that service coordination within the U.S.D. package was not generally achieved. The absence of a strong comprehensive planning effort coupled with at least one aggressive service-providing Metro department contributed to the lack of coordinated service delivery and extension. This observation does not deny the significant economies and levels of coordination which have been achieved by Metro in many areas, as cited in earlier pages. Is is simply intended to show that consolidated governments are as subject to internal conflicts and inconsistencies as are any other forms of government. Although in Metro, the conflicts have not been geographical
and citizen support for Metro has been generally consistently high across neighborhood areas, the arguments for "polycentric local government" seem as valid as do those for "consolidated government." Using Metropolitan Nashville as an example of consolidated government, it could probably be argued that certain examples of federated local governments have been more successful in achieving the efficiencies and coordination of service delivery required for strategies aimed at influencing development. Planners need to pay attention as much to the boundaries between departments, agencies and commissions as they do to those between cities, towns and counties.

A second group of messages is based upon the experiences of Metro in packaging and extending urban services within the framework provided by the Metro Charter. The evolution of the Urban Services District and the General Services District can be summarized with the message that the original ingredients hypothesized to be necessary in the effective use of urban service policies remain valid. Technical skill, financial resources, the proper governmental framework, and political will are required if urban services are to be used as a means for influencing urban development. From the initial Community Services Commission report in 1952 until the present documents on Metro's comprehensive plan options, there has been little question of the technical competence of Metro plans for service policies and extension. There has been little disagreement over the technical status of Metro services planning or of the validity of forecasts for future need. The issues in conflict have emerged from differing goals toward which forecasts and projections
should be made. On a relative basis, technical competency has not been a Metro problem.

The tremendous cost of servicing the underserviced developed areas has certainly limited the flexibility with which U.S.D. service extension was planned, regardless of political considerations. As reflected in earlier statements, the very thought of using U.S.D. service extension to influence urban growth when significant areas of the existing U.S.D. were not being fully serviced raised serious questions of political and legal equity. Even the ambitious "residential livability" alternative for a comprehensive plan stresses the need to service existing areas of development before engaging in a program of selective U.S.D. expansion. The reason is, and has been simple: Metro has been forced to spend valuable resources simply to catch up with service demands. Technical competence and money are important. Metro has had the former and lacked some of the latter. The partial message is to discount neither. The full message, however, requires a look at the final ingredients in a process of planning urban services and development: governmental arrangements and political will.

It has already been suggested that Metro's consolidated form of government has not prevented the emergence of problems in attempting to manage urban service delivery. The regional issue and departmental independence have been cited as problems. The key feature in Metro's governmental arrangement has been the division of urban services between the U.S.D. and the G.S.D. The initial wish of the designers of Metro was that the two service packages would remain distinct until such
time as the entire county became urbanized. As discussed at various points throughout this study, the reasoning was that a package of urban services suited to highly urbanized areas and attached to an urban services district together with its own revenue-raising authority would not only solve problems of service equity, it would also provide a coordinated means for extending urban services. In their hearts, Metro planners hoped that this packaging of services into an expandable district might eventually become a tool for influencing urban development. (The "residential livability" and "public economies" alternatives might also be considered "plans from the hearts of planners.") The message for planners is that the Metro test of the urban services district model should be a warning that pressures can emerge which will dilute the service package, both through assignment of services on a countywide basis (like fire protection) or through placement of services on a user fee basis permitting service extension beyond the district. Allowing the existence and expansion of "special service districts" has the same effect. To be effective, the service package must be distinctive, predictable and its absence from an area should be an effective deterrent to development.

It is not just coincident that the final message and comment of this study deals with "political will." Regardless of the formal arrangements for delivery of urban services, their capacity to influence the nature of urban development will ultimately depend upon the mixture of political willingness within the urban area to permit such an impact. As a recent review of a series or urban growth management systems
concluded, the "capacity to execute" a growth management plan is meaningless unless that capacity includes a political capacity. 19 In many ways, the story of Metro is a story of "capacity-in-waiting." In the 1950's, planners, engineers, lawyers and others proposed a solution to Nashville's service problems. They then both worked hard and were lucky. Ultimately, only the politicians and the voters could give life to their plan for metropolitan government. The use of the U.S.D. to influence development didn't fare so well. The potential was there, but received little political support. The environment of the "minimum standard" was too pervasive. It may well be that the tool has now lost its usefulness. Nevertheless, Metro planners, true to their predecessors, have again put forward a plan. Whether they will be as successful—and lucky—as the earlier planners were, only some future study will be able to say. The message offered by this study is that only when the citizens, interests and officials of an urban area are willing to accept a greater role for local government in influencing the development of their urban area will proposals to use urban service policies to such an end be successful. The extent to which planners can help bring this political consensus into being obviously varies from city to city. In Metropolitan Nashville, even though the odds for success may not be great, there exists a legacy for making the effort.

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