4-2006

Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Lara E. Kuhnert

University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Follow this and additional works at: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj

Recommended Citation

Ever since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there has been a U.S. led, “war against terrorism.” Although terrorism has been around for centuries, it was the collapse of the towers in New York that brought this issue to the forefront of our defense policy. We have been waging this war for close to six years now and there really does not appear to be an end in sight. Also, as the process of globalization continues, we are presented with yet another obstacle to fighting terrorism- globalization itself.

As globalization has become a powerful force in society, it has had many positive and negative effects. The world is becoming more and more connected, or as Thomas Friedman says, “the world is becoming flat (Friedman, intro).” As this process happens, people and cultures around the world are becoming more connected. This has led to a backlash against the United States and the West, as extremists from some nations fight against the spread of Western culture and ideas. They view these ideas and ways of life as corrupting their customs and values, and see the West as evil. This connectedness has also led to the ability of nations to exchange goods and services at an unprecedented rate. As we have put more emphasis on trying to end terrorism, terrorists have become more innovative and have come up with new ways to accomplish their objectives. In this thesis, I plan to explore an issue of great importance to national security- maritime terrorism. Also, in this paper, I will examine the vulnerability of the maritime transport industry. I will also discuss the terrorist organizations that have the ability to wage maritime attacks. These groups want to disrupt the economic interests of the West, and therefore we must conclude that maritime terrorism is a threat to commercial ports and
shipments. This threat has increased over the last few years, especially since the attacks of September 11, 2001. I will also examine the consequences of a maritime attack, and offer some possible counter-measures to possibly combat this terrorism.

DEFINING TERRORISM

Terrorism is a distinct form of violence. It is able to provoke, "deep fear and insecurity," because unlike other forms of violence, we feel defenseless against it (Maxwell, 216). Terrorism has been an issue in the world community for over the last few decades. In the last few years or so, it seems that there has been a surge in terrorists' activity and in the efforts to combat it. However, terrorism is a very complicated issue. Therefore, there are a lot of different definitions of terrorism. To fully understand the point I am trying to make, I need to define some key. In what follows I use the following terms: terrorism, terrorist, terrorist group/organization, and terrorist attack. It is important to define these terms and explain how they will be used in this paper.

There are numerous definitions of terrorism. Yet it is difficult to find a universal definition (Rybakov, 78). The word "terrorism" comes from the Latin word terror, which means, "fear" or "horror." It can also be traced to the French verb terroriser, which means, "to frighten through the use of violence, to intimidate, to keep somebody in a state of permanent fear (Rybakov, 78)." Because there are so many variations of the definitions of, it is difficult to choose one. When you say terrorism, most people have a general idea of what they think it is. Most people's views are similar. However, experts have trouble coming up with a standard universal definition. To decide which definition of terrorism to use, I looked at different descriptions and compared them.
The United States State Department defines terrorism as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (State Dept. web, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/info/c16718.htm).” In another similar definition, the former deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, Paul Pillar, says that terrorism has four basic components: (1) It is premeditated, which means that it has been planned out in advance and is not just an impulsive act of madness; (2) It is political, not criminal in nature, which means that it is not like organized crime or the mafia; (3) It seeks to destroy the standing political system and is aimed at civilians instead of military targets or combat ready soldiers; (4) It is carried out by sub national groups that act independently of the country’s government or military (U.S. State Dept. web, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/info/c16718.htm) The shortcomings of both of these definitions is that to be a terrorist act, an act must be carried out by a group, not just one person, and that an attack can’t be directed at the military. I feel that these are two very important aspects that need to be included in the definition of terrorism.

The British antiterrorism law that has been in effect since February 2001 defines terrorism as,

...acts, real or threatened, that are undertaken for political, religious, and ideological motives and involve violence against individuals, risk to the health and safety of the population, serious property damage, disruption of electronic systems, and the like (Rybakov, 79).
I do not feel that this definition fully covers all the aspects of terrorism, primarily its psychological affect. I have chosen for the purposes of this paper to go with the definition I find the most reasonable and descriptive, and that I believe best describes the types of terrorism we see today. I have chosen to use the academic consensus definition, which states:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, ... the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population... Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (UN website on terrorism, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html).

I believe that this definition includes the main components of the purpose of terrorists' acts today. It is also important that I define some other terms that I use a significant amount throughout this thesis. I did not find as many variations on these definitions, but feel that the following descriptions adequately describe these terms for
the purpose of this paper. A terrorist is defined as, "a radical who employs terror as a political weapon; usually organizes with other terrorists in small cells; often uses religion as a cover for terrorist activities (WordNet, \texttt{wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn})." A terrorist group/organization is defined as, "a group which practices or which has significant subgroups which practice terrorism (Perl 4)." A terrorist attack is, "a surprise attack involving the deliberate use of violence against civilians in the hope of attaining political or religious aims (WordNet, \texttt{<wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn>})." Maritime terrorism is terrorism conducted on the seas or in connecting ports.

BEGINNING OF MARITIME TERRORISM

One of the first incidences of maritime terrorism is the hijacking of the \textit{Achille Lauro}, a cruise liner, by Palestinian terrorists in 1985 (Salinas, 5). Other attacks have been carried out on the U.S.S. Cole, the Limburgh, and on the Super ferry, which will be discussed shortly. It is important to note that although these attacks have been well documented, we are just starting to turn our attention to the implications that these attacks have for international maritime security.

MARITIME TERRORISM AND THE UNITED STATES

The horrifying events of 9/11 had a profound impact on the lives of all Americans. In order to prevent future terrorists' attacks on the United States, we must learn from the events of that day and the circumstances that conspired to make such events possible. We need to protect the security of the American people (9/11, 1). The 9/11 Commission report alludes to the fact that ports and maritime transportation industries can be particularly vulnerable to future terrorists attacks. The introduction of a dirty bomb, or other massive amounts of explosives into one of our ports could have an
enormous effect. This would not only be catastrophic to the safety of the people, especially those living in coastal areas nearby, but it could also effectively halt the global transport of goods and materials (9/11, 1). One way for America to protect itself is to improve the Coast Guard’s capabilities to prevent future attacks. The Coast Guard has been, and is, the leading agency in charge of protecting our nation’s shores (9/11, 1).

They have identified maritime domain awareness as one of their major objectives (9/11, 2). The 9/11 Commission report called for system-wide improvement in the national intelligence community so that we may improve the quantity and quality and the integration of the information that is being collected. We must focus energy and resources to increase our intelligence capabilities on the high seas and our overseas ports. We must also be able to verify the lists of ports previously called on by vessels approaching the United States. We must enhance our ability to identify the individuals or groups that control interests in vessels and cargo, and track the long range movement of those vessels. Enhancing the collection and dissemination of maritime intelligence data is critical if the Coast Guard is to be successful securing America’s ports (9/11, 2).

Recently, we have made some improvements. For example, the Maritime Transportation Security Act allows for the boarding and inspection of thousands of foreign and domestic vessels. It has also led to security improvements in U.S. ports. Security needs are continually being identified and we still need to refine and continue to develop new ways to address these emerging needs (9/11, 2).

At a Congressional hearing on August 25, 2004, Mr. DeFazio, a Representative from Oregon said:
America is vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Our maritime transportation system is vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The United States has over 95,000 miles of coastline. We import more than 7 million shipping containers annually. Thousands of tankers carrying oil and hazardous materials enter our ports each year. Millions of vacationers enjoy their holidays on cruise ships (9/11, 3).

Eighty percent of the drugs shipped by water from Colombia to the U.S. penetrate our security and reach our shores. If it is not difficult for drug smugglers to get their drugs into the United States, it would not be difficult for someone to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the U.S. Less than four percent of the containers that enter the United States each year are fully inspected. Moreover, terrorist organizations have used suicide bombers to attack both civilian and military maritime platforms with small boats that explode on impact. This is the method that Al-Qaeda used to attack the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000, and the Limburgh in October 2002. Other terrorist groups used this method in the April 25, 2004 attack on the Basra Oil Terminal in Iraq. These tactics could also be used against cruise ships, offshore oil facilities, chemical tankers and other ships. The LOOP oil terminal off the coast of Louisiana is very vulnerable. This oil terminal handles 25 percent of our imported oil, and a small boat with explosives could attack the facility and severely cripple our economy (9/11, 3).

The world system is characterized by free flowing international trade in a globalized economy. The system has been modified over the years to be as open as possible. It was hoped this painless system of trade would lead to tremendous growth.
This system is dependent on large fleets of ocean faring vessels and reduced trade barriers. This was a system that was forever changed on September 11, 2001, as governments around the world rushed to see how susceptible they were to attacks by organized terrorist groups that were not hesitant to sacrifice thousands of lives to further their cause. The initial focus was on the air transportation industry; however, attention soon turned to the maritime sector.

"Efforts to combat terrorism are complicated by a global trend towards deregulation, open borders, and expanded commerce (Perl 5)." In this section of my thesis, I will explore how globalization has not only made it possible, but also easier for international terrorist organizations to work together from regions around the world to exploit the process of openness and global trade. I will examine the case study of Southeast Asia in this section to prove this point and explore how globalization has affected maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia.

MARITIME TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

As previously stated, maritime terrorism is terrorism conducted on the seas or in connecting ports. There are many instances of this type of terrorism being either planned or carried out in Southeast Asian waters. The geography of Southeast Asia makes it vulnerable area to these types of attacks. Water dominates Southeast Asia, as the sea covers around 80 percent of the area. This area is located between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which makes it a center for communication and commerce (Bradford). The bulk of international trade, around 80 percent of the total volume, is transported by sea. In 2002, maritime trade set a record with 5.9 billion metric tons (Richardson). Today, more than half of the world’s commerce travels through Southeast Asian waters each year. This
commerce is worth around $1,000,000,000,000 a year (Richardson). This has been beneficial and detrimental to the people of Southeast Asia. The benefit is that it provides a source of jobs for the citizens who live there. Over 60 percent of Southeast Asians live in or rely economically on maritime zones. The downside is that it comes with a variety of dangers that threaten the security of nations and the global market (Bradford).

**Trade Routes in Southeast Asia**

Southeast Asia is becoming the world's maritime terrorism hotspot. Terrorists are taking advantage of the frequency of piracy and using it as a cover for terrorism (Banlaoi). Also, according to a 1999 forecast by the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordinating Center, it is expected that there will be a large increase in commercial
shipping by the year 2020, which will increase the ability and opportunity to use maritime terrorism and thus, hinder world trade (Banlaoi). Michael Richardson, a visiting senior research fellow at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, said in an interview with Radio Free Asia that global trade has become concentrated around a network of around 20-30 large ports across the globe (Radio Free Asia). He says this is a problem because,

This network is increasingly interdependent. In other words, if terrorists managed to take control of a ship and exploded it or used it as an effective weapon in one of these major ports anywhere in the world, there would be instantly ripple effects that would affect the operations of all those ports... (Radio Free Asia).

I believe that this quote shows just how much disruption a maritime attack could cause. It is also very hard to track ships that are operated by terrorists because the shipping world is so secretive and vessel owners hide their ownership under a lot of different layers. A U.S. senior government official said about the shipping industry, “This industry is a shadowy underworld. After 9/11, we suddenly learned how little we understood about commercial shipping. You can’t swing a dead cat in the shipping business without hitting somebody with phony papers (Richardson).” This is just another difficulty in trying to end to maritime terrorism.

Four of the world’s busiest shipping routes are in Southeast Asia: the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar straits (Banlaoi). An attack here, especially in the Malacca Strait, which is located between Malaysia and Sumatra, would not only cause fear, but also slow down international shipping and damage global trade. Maritime insurers have
said that the Malacca Strait is the world’s busiest sea-lane and poses a shipping security threat (Bockmann). An estimated 50,000 ships pass through the Malacca Strait each year (Bockmann). Forty to fifty of these ships are tankers that pass through the Malacca Strait each day (Banlaoi). These 40-50 tankers carry over 10 million barrels of oil, and the number of tankers will rise to 60 tankers per day by 2010 (Richardson). Yearly, these ships carry a quarter of the world’s trade and half of its oil (Bockmann).

This is a crucial channel to world trade, but it is also a vulnerable spot to terrorists because it is narrow enough to be blocked and is only 25 meters deep at the shallowest point (Richardson). If it was to be blocked, there are three alternatives: the Sunda, the Lombok, and the Makassar Straits. However, these alternate routes would increase costs substantially (Richardson). In Southeast Asia, the region’s Sea Lanes of Communication are well known for their numerous, critical “chokepoints,” which are points of “convergence and focus” such as straits and narrow waterways. The “chokepoints” are formed by the archipelagos of the Philippines and Indonesia, and also by the numerous vessels that pass through these waterways (Lim, 2). In addition, over the last decade, this region has experienced the highest economic growth rate in the world (Jon, 66). A lot of this growth has been due to sea born, trade and this has led to an increase in container traffic in the regions waterways. The Malacca Strait sees more then three times the traffic of the Suez Canal and more then five times that of the Panama Canal (Jon, 66). The shipping routes have often been called the arteries of the regional economy and the economic growth and prosperity is dependent on the uninterrupted flow of this shipping.

PROBLEMS WITH FIGHTING MARITIME TERRORISM
Of all the international straits, the Malacca is the most vulnerable to attack, and the closure of this main trade route would disrupt commerce (Richardson). A former correspondent in Southeast Asia for the International Herald Tribune, Michael Richardson, emphasized that the Malacca Strait is a very exposed area that forms a “choke point” (Radio Free Asia). He continues:

These Straits are relatively narrow and relatively shallow. They are also increasingly congested, and the worry is that if terrorists were to use a ship or ships laden with explosive, inflammable, or polluting substances and use that ship as a weapon by sinking it in a narrow portion of the Strait or setting it ablaze, then it would at least for some time close the Straits . . . (Radio Free Asia).

It is not so much the sinking of a ship that would be so catastrophic, but the possibility of turning the ship into a floating bomb that has the capability to destroy ports or oil refineries (Banlaoi), turning the ship into a weapon of mass destruction. Another possibility is using a large ship to destroy major bridges or to block a shipping channel (Richardson) are of more concern.

Maritime transportation is particularly troubled at ports and in port facilities. South Asia is being discussed because it is home to the worlds most strategic Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) (Jon, 66). Maritime terrorism is a relatively new phenomena when we compare it to other violent activities that take place in a marine environment because most areas we have seen violence on the waters has occurred as a result of civil wars and usually only affects the one state. This means that the international naval
community has not really become that familiar with the threat of maritime terrorism (Jon, 66).

Seaports are very vulnerable. Ports are large and easily accessible by both water and land. Because of this accessibility, it is hard to implement the types of security measures that are needed and can be more easily applied at airports (Hecker, 6). They are also located in or near major metropolitan areas.

Another reason that we are so vulnerable to maritime attacks is that even with the latest X-ray facilities, there is too much entering ports to inspect it all. Due to these huge quantities of cargo, only around 1-5 percent of imported sea cargo containers are inspected (Brew, 5). The containers in which cargo is transported are another security challenge. By the year 2010, there will be an expected increase of 66 percent in total container traffic (Shipper Nation), and there are already around 200 million containers traded annually (Cozens, 2). While the use of containers helped the shipping industry, it now means that the handlers of this cargo never actually see it, all they see are the containers. This means that the only information on what is inside the container comes from the shippers' declaration (Saunders, 4). Even if the shipper is not involved, there are ample opportunities for the containers to be tampered with, and access to the container is usually easy (Saunders, 4). According to a report by the OECD,

The container begins its journey at the manufacturer's premises where it is loaded with the cargo. It is then transported by road or rail to a port. While in transit, the container may be stationary for various periods of time as trucks are stopped on the roadside and/or container carrying
trains are being assembled in freight yards. Once in port, the container is sent to a staging area before it is placed immediately next to the vessel at quay. Even within the port area, a container may be moved several times as required by the port operator and/or customs. After being placed on board a ship, the container can be removed and trans-shipped in another port onto another vessel before arriving at its destination port. Here again, the container may be moved several times... (Maritime Transport Committee, 23).

This clearly shows that the system has many flaws and it is vulnerable to activities that are not legit shipping purposes.

A different problem that faces the maritime industry is certificate fraud. This means that it is possible to get the legal documents that are required to control a vessel without any proof or qualifications. This is seen clearly in the case of phantom ships, in which the ships are hijacked, repainted, the crew dumped or killed, the cargo sold, and then the ship sails into a port with false names and papers, and the original ship is never seen again (Saunders, 4). Also, the crew that makes up the workforce on these commercial ships are of all nationalities and there can be up to 60 crew members on any given voyage. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), it is impossible to verify the authenticity of the identity of the crew. This is similar to the previous problem because forged and/or falsified seafarer certificates are available and identity documents can be bought on the black market. Actually, the IMB said it discovered more than 12,000 cases of forged certificates in a survey of 54 maritime administrations (Saunders,
4). In short, it is easy for people to use false documents to board ships without being identified.

Securing vessels in transit is another challenge. These ships are exceptionally susceptible to a breach of security as they make their slow passage through waterways such as the Malacca Straits. The traffic here moves at a slow pace and it would be an ideal spot for terrorists to carry out an attack because the ships cannot avoid the threat and can also unintentionally provide cover for the assault. Tankers are especially easy targets because they move three times slower than boats with outboard motors (The Ships that Died of Shame). Also, the geography of the area favors terrorists because there are many hidden launching spots in the jungle-covered islands that border the Straits (The Ships that Died of Shame). There is also not really any visible law enforcement in the area to serve as a deterrent to terrorists.

Flags of convenience also pose a security problem. The majority of the ships in the Southeast Asian waterways fly them, with the most common being the Panama flag. The reason for using flags of convenience is to be able, "to avoid heavy taxes and stringent inspections... the owners hide behind a wall of secrecy created by dubious ownership structures... (The Ships that Died of Shame P#)." This is also correlated with illegal activity, as most people who use the flags have something to hide (The Ships that Died of Shame). Terrorist can use flags of convenience to their benefit. U.S. officials have said that Al-Qaeda uses a shipping fleet that is flagged in the Pacific island of Tonga and is owned by the company known as Nova to carry out this horrifying acts (Mintz, 1).

TERRORIST GROUPS INVOLVED IN MARITILE TERRORISM
Monitoring container ships is extremely difficult. The steel containers that carry cargo across the world are a security nightmare (Richardson). Inspecting all of these containers on all of the ships that travel the world’s seas and oceans and then enter the various 2,800 ports across the world is almost impossible. It is also easy to hide harmful items within a container of legitimate materials or to just lie about the entire contents of a container (Richardson). This is a “made-to-order” recipe for terrorists to ship and receive the materials they need to fund and carry out attacks (Richardson). An estimate from an OECD report says that as many as 15 million containers are in circulation and that more than 230 million containers move through ports around the world each year (Richardson). We also believe that Al-Qaeda owns 15 cargo ships that could be used for terrorist purposes (Banlaoi), and U.S. intelligence has evidence that Al-Qaeda has been buying ships since as early as 1994 (Richardson). The U.S. maintained list of suspected Al-Qaeda ships that was begun in 2001 has varied on the number of ships Al-Qaeda owns from 12 to 50, which shows how hard it is to keep up with ships (Mintz, 1). In fact, documents written in Arabic were seized from a senior aid to Osama bin Laden, and showed how Al-Qaeda had planned to use cargo shipping containers packed with sesame seed to smuggle extremely radioactive material into the United States (Richardson).

What makes this even more chilling is the fact that Al-Qaeda knows what the impact of maritime terrorism could be and its operatives are aware of the affects it could have on the global economy. Another problem we face is the growth of cross-national links among different terrorist organizations. They are combining to provide military training, funding, technology and information transfer and advice (Perl 0). Terrorists in the area are thought to have connections with Al-Qaeda, and Al-Qaeda is suspected of
trying to strengthen its worldwide web of operations. This seems even more likely since Ayman al-Zawahiri, the next in command to Al-Qaeda after Osama bin Laden, called for a jihad against the U.S. and our allies (Cheow).

A new form of maritime terrorism seems to be emerging. In August of 2003, The U.S. Department of Homeland Security warned that terrorist groups from around the globe were developing the capability to strike from under water. This would be done by using scuba divers to come up from underneath the ship or port to plant a bomb or explosive, act as a suicide bomber or even sneak aboard the ship and then use it to wage an attack (Richardson). In fact, Omar al-Faruq, who was head of terrorists operations in Southeast Asia until his capture in late 2002, told U.S interrogators that he planned scuba attacks on U.S. Warships in Indonesia (Richardson). This is not a far-fetched idea in today’s times, as we saw on September 11th. These attacks made the United States and other nations aware of how vulnerable the unregulated and secretive global maritime industry is to the exploitation of terrorists. We know that attacking a prominent U.S./Western target for economic and symbolic reasons can have a worldwide impact.

Some terrorist organizations that are known to have maritime capability are the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Polisario, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Palestinian groups, The Contras, anti-Castro organizations, Al-Qaeda, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Chalk, 9). Maritime attacks can take different forms. They can be committed on board vessels or fixed platforms, or the vessel itself may be used as a weapon. We saw this latter form in the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 by suicide bombers who used a small boat to drive straight into the Navy ship. Another mode of
attack is to engage in violence against ports or other coastal facilities. Moreover, maritime attacks can be carried out from land, sea, or air in a variety of ways. Attackers could go into a port and attach an explosive to the ship, use divers to attack crafts from underneath, or set up sea mines. The technologies they use are all available on the open market and range from scuba diving equipment, sea scooters, speedboats, and GPS (Gunaratna).

The globe has not yet experienced a large-scale terrorist attack using ships or containers, but many believe it is only a matter of time. Al-Qaeda translates to “The Base” and is a terrorist network that has worldwide reach (Military Periscope). The goal of Al-Qaeda, “is to work with other Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems ‘non-Islamic’ and establish a global Islamic religious movement (Military Periscope).” It is the religious and ideological similarities that bond these extremist groups and give Al-Qaeda international reach. It is the first multinational terrorist group of the twenty-first century (Gunaratna, 1, Inside...). This type of terrorism is new and unique because it is global and there is a “shared fanatical zealouenss” among these groups (Richardson). They also have a desire to, “cut the economic lifelines of the world’s industrialized societies (Bradsher, 1).” The network doesn’t rely on a large membership base, but instead works through other groups by providing money, training and other operational support. Al-Qaeda provides planning, training, leadership, communications and other support to terrorist networks throughout the world. This has allowed groups that initially committed small-scale attacks to directly benefit from Al-Qaeda and plan more sophisticated attacks. Because so many terrorist groups have connections to Al-Qaeda, it is difficult to determine what attacks are directly caused by
the network. We do believe that Al-Qaeda is responsible for some maritime attacks already. Two examples are the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole stationed in Yemen in 2000, in which 13 American soldiers were killed, and the attack on the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002 (Banlaoi). On October 13, 2002, a communiqué issued by Al-Qaeda’s political bureau after the attack on the Limburg, said, “If a boat that didn’t cost U.S. $1,000 managed to devastate an oil tanker of that magnitude, so imagine the extent of the danger that threatens the West’s commercial lifeline, which is petroleum (Richardson).” There was also an earlier attack planned against the U.S.S. Sullivans, an American destroyer in January of 2000. This attack was abandoned when the attack boat, overloaded with explosives, sank. The boat was restored and was then used in the attack on the U.S.S. Cole (Richardson).

Another group that has the capability to wage these types of attacks is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which means “bearer of the sword” in Arabic. The Abu Sayyaf group is said to have historical and financial ties with Al-Qaeda. The original founder, Ustadz Janjalani, is said to have developed a close friendship with Osama Bin Laden in the early 1980s (Banlaoi). Abu Sayyaf was once primarily land-based, but is becoming more and more maritime to escape the mainly land-based Philippine military. There is evidence that this group works closely with another group in the region, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which is another Philippine group who the ASG split from in the late 1980s (Gunaratna, 174, Inside...). MILF is supposedly the largest Islamic fundamentalist group, with 15,000 members (Moro Islamic..., www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=92). The ASG group captured a maintenance engineer from a resort in east Malaysia, and upon his release in 2003 he told authorities
that his captors were interested in his skills as a diving (Richardson). In 2003, the Philippine Department of National Defense reported 117-armed engagements with Abu Sayyaf (Banlaoi). One of the first attacks carried out by the ASG was a maritime attack. It was the bombing of the Doulons on August 10, 1991. The Doulons was a foreign missionary ship and the attack killed 2 Christian missionaries. This demonstrated that the Abu Sayyaf Group has the capability to wage maritime terrorism. Another illustration of how serious this could become comes from a statement by Abu Soliman, an ASG spokesperson after the explosion of the Super ferry 14, which killed 116 people (Bradford). He is quoted as saying, “Still doubtful about our capabilities? Good. Just wait and see. We will bring the war that you impose on us to your lands and seas, homes, and streets. We will multiply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people (Banlaoi).”

Another terrorist group that can use ships to conduct terrorist activities is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The most high profile terrorist group involved in maritime terrorism is the LTTE. They have been actively engaging in maritime terrorist operations since the 1980s in their war with the Sri Lankan government. Moreover, since July 1990, they have carried out over 40 suicide sea-borne attacks against the Sri Lankan navy. The LTTE is at the forefront of maritime terrorism and they could serve as role models for other groups to potentially copy (Chalk, 12). The LTTE and Al-Qaeda also have a relationship and have benefited from one another in planning and carrying out attacks (Richardson). The LTTE have exploited commercial shipping for years and do so to transport weapons as well as to make a profit. One difference between the Tamil Tigers and Al-Qaeda is that the Tamil Tigers have the
capability to cause attacks outside of their home base in Sri Lanka, but do not choose to do so. On the other hand, Al-Qaeda is a global group with global targets. The Tamil Tigers also train other groups in seaborne guerilla tactics. There are reports that members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian terrorist group with past ties to Al-Qaeda, have been trained in these tactics (Richardson). Moreover, the Tamil Tigers have a network of ships that they use to make money. In 1999, the group procured a highly secretive shipping network that has advanced technology (Richardson).

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a terrorist organization operating in Southeast Asia. It was reorganized in 2002-2003, but officials expect similar attacks to the bombing in Bali because the similarities, “in style and modus operandi (Cheow).” Jemaah Islamiyah is said to be Al-Qaeda’s closest ally in Southeast Asia since AL-Qaeda penetrated this group in the 1990s, and it is widely believed that the group is collaborating with Al-Qaeda on the planning of more terrorist attacks in the region. The two of these groups are suspected of planning the Millennium bombings in Indonesia on Christmas Eve 2000 in which 30 churches were targeted (Gunaratna, 10, Inside). These groups are also very resilient. Despite efforts to disrupt and disband them, they appear to have been able to effectively continue to maintain command and operational structure or to have renewed themselves within a different form (Richardson).

Southern Thailand may soon become a terrorism hot spot. The Thai Premier, Thaksin Shinawatra, admitted that Thailand was involved in arms trafficking, smuggling, and terrorism (Cheow). In fact, the JI terrorist group met two times in this area to arrange the attack in Bali and possibly other attacks in Indonesia. The area of Southern Thailand also is suspected of having close ties to the MILF terrorist group, as well as the Abu
Sayyaf terrorist organization. This is an area where the terrorist can operate under some secrecy and this is a region that has wanted to succeed from “Buddist Bangkok” to form a Muslim state for decades (Cheow). This is a perfect climate for terrorists to breed more terrorists. Wong Kan Seng, Singapore’s Minster for Home Affairs, said recently in a speech:

However, the terrorist threat remains. This is because the JI as an organization is only disrupted. It is by no means eliminated. We continue, therefore, not only to live in troubled times but to also expect that such troubled times are going to last for a long time. Moreover, there is a web of relationships that link the various militant Muslim groups within Southeast Asia and also connect them to Al-Qaeda. These international connections give the Southeast Asian militants greater reach and resilience.

There are also other terrorist groups known to have maritime terrorist abilities as well. Since 2000, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Islamic Liberation Front, Kumpulan Militan Malaysia and Laskar Jihad terrorist groups, as well as Al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf Group, the Tamil Tigers and Jemaah Islamiyah have all been suspected of planning/executing maritime attacks and of using the seas to transport weapons and forces, and to raise funds for future attacks (Bradford). Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah and Kumpulan Militan Malaysia are collaborating to conduct large-scale operations against the U.S Navy and global trade (Bradford). About half a dozen plots to attack American military ships within Southeast Asian waterways have been uncovered and disrupted by regional security forces since 2000 (Bradford).
Al-Qaeda and its many affiliate terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia have shown that they understand the significance and impact of maritime terrorism. They know where the weakest and most vulnerable maritime trade routes are and how to most effectively use them to their advantage to disrupt international trade and hinder the global economy. U.S. officials have warned repeatedly that, “shipping and trade are among Al-Qaeda’s prime targets and that a terrorist attack on the maritime transportation system would have a devastating and long-lasting impact on global shipping, international trade and the world economy (Richardson P#).” So far, the only planned methods of attack that have been carried out are the bombing attacks against ships. However, the frequency of piracy has shown us that vessels are vulnerable to boarding and seizure by armed groups, including terrorists (Richardson). Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong stated recently:

One major challenge to the marine industry is global terrorism. The 9/11 attacks, and subsequently the discovery of the Jemaah Islamiyah group in Singapore, showed that terrorism is a problem of global scale. Terrorists are operating through international networks. There is a growing concern that their next attack may be via ships and shipping containers. This would not only inflict heavy casualties and damage to property, but also disrupt the wheels if international commerce. This can potentially cripple international trade... (Richardson).

One thing to keep in mind is that to be a threat to international security, it is not necessary for a terrorist group to have carried out or planned a maritime attack, or even to
have thought about attacking ships, ports, and port facilities. Moreover, there are so many connections in the Southeast Asian region between terrorist organizations that is nearly impossible to credit an attack to just one group. However, it is obvious that the terrorist groups in the region have the desire and capability to carry out a maritime attack on both a regional and international level.

SOLUTIONS

I would first like to say that this paper cannot offer an answer on how to prevent maritime terrorism from occurring. It is an intricate problem that cannot be fixed with a few changes here and a few changes there because the nature of this terrorism is unpredictable and follows no rules. I will however offer some possible suggestions on some ways that may decrease the threat of terrorism.

Although this is a complicated issue with many facets, there are some things that can be done to curtail and decrease the incidents of maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia. This is not traditional war, but a network war. To defeat this terrorism we must take a different approach in fighting it (Margelov). Some ideas for solutions include: better security, more cooperation, more monitoring of the busiest waterways in Southeast Asia, the freezing of terrorist assets to stop the flow of funds and to prevent the financing of attacks, and new initiatives and policies aimed at increasing shipping security. Other policy options include international cooperation and pressure, covert action, physical security enhancement and military force (Perl). However, before any of this is done, the countries of Southeast Asia need to make sure they have trained maritime police and adequate boats and equipment to deal with this threat (Holleran, 1). The seas are transnational and cannot be divided into specific territories. Because of this, it is
imperative to have international cooperation (Bradford). Since September 2001, America and its allies have undertaken one of the largest naval sea hunts and shipping surveillance operations since World War II (Richardson). The United States Pacific Command in Hawaii wants to come up with a surveillance agreement for the Pacific, Southeast Asian, and Indian Ocean waterways. This would help in extending and expanding knowledge about how to make these waterways the most secure. This awareness would be particularly important in Southeast Asia where there are overlapping jurisdictions, lots of water to protect and a fertile breeding ground for terrorism (Richardson). This agreement would allow a clear picture of the maritime domain. It would provide the ability to share real time information and allow the proper authorities to fight back against illicit activities (Richardson).

Because the Southeast Asian Straits are susceptible to maritime terrorism, three coastal states, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, have agreed to conduct joint naval patrols to protect commercial shipping from attacks (Radio Free Asia). This coordinated patrol is known as operation MALSINDO and went into effect in July 2004 (Ward). This is a step in the right direction and there needs to be an increased willingness to give up some national sovereignty over the waters to provide better maritime security (Bradford). These countries need to conduct coordinated patrols that are more than symbolic (Dire Straits). After the bombings in Bali, Indonesia and other ASEAN members in the region have taken serious steps to deal with both, "indigenous and international terrorist threats" by adopting more stringent anti-terrorist laws and seeking more regional coordination (Cheow).
The nations of Southeast Asia need to come up with a multilateral cooperative arrangement that will provide security for all the countries (Bradford). Also, nations need to strengthen their intelligence networks to make them more efficient and able to prevent attacks (Banlaoi).

Another step in the right direction is in 2002, the International Maritime Organization adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which was made mandatory by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at SEA (SOLAS). This code covers all, “cargo vessels that are over 500 gross tones on international voyages, port facilities serving ships on international voyages, passenger ships and mobile offshore drilling units (SOLAS, 2).” It may help reduce maritime terrorism because ships have to carry out security assessments, create ship security plans, appoint ship security officers, appoint company security officers, and carry security equipment. Ports are responsible for having port facility security plans, appointing port facility security officers, and having security equipment (SOLAS, 3). This will be a beneficial step if it can be enforced and if the suppliers of the goods transported also adopt security measures.

A concern of U.S. policy makers is how to condemn and fight Islamic fundamentalist groups and their violent ideology without being seen as anti-Islamic in general (Perl, CRS-6). Unless the United States is willing to address the reasons--social, political and economic--that allowed Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to gain prominence, then we will not be able to win the “war on terror” (Sterba, 15). Policy options to combat terrorism range from, “diplomacy, international cooperation, and
constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force (Perl, CRS-4).”

One way that the United States can curtail terrorism without using violence is through economic sanctions. This is a tool that is used the most by U.S. policy makers (Perl, CRS-5). Moreover, Edward Gresser, a trade expert, has said that to end fundamentalism, we need to remove the root causes of the anger and hostility that cause it. He says that these causes are mostly economic stagnation and unemployment and that, ..the West needs to make its trade policy fairer for majority-Muslim countries (Gresser). The Muslim world has seen a decline of 75 percent in their share of the global economy in just a generation. Their population is also increasing, but with no more opportunities than there were 30 years ago. This leaves young people fighting for employment. Unemployment, along with other local factors such as regional conflicts, ethnic feuds, and religious tensions, makes the situation even worse (Gresser).

An additional way to decrease this terrorism is to stop the flow of money that finances these attacks. Two tools that can be very effective in combating terrorism financing are the freezing of assets of and the use of information about financiers to disrupt terrorist organizations (U.S. State Dept.).

Daniel L. Glaser, acting assistant of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, has said:

It is vital to recognize that the financial mechanisms we use to facilitate international economic growth, deliver aid to those in
need, and carry out day-to-day financial transactions, are the same mechanisms that terrorist financiers have sought to abuse in pursuit of their illicit activities. We must protect our financial systems from such abuse, and exploit the financial vulnerability of terrorist organizations and their support networks, by adopting and implementing effective anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism. As members of the financial community, not only are we charged with the responsibility to ensure the movement of capital around the world in pursuit of investment and development, but also to protect that capital from use and abuse by terrorists (Press Conference).

This is a preventative measure because if terrorist groups do not have the funds to buy materials for an attack, an attack cannot occur. If we want to break the supply chain to terrorists we need to control the flow of capital and end secret bank accounts (Margelov). This will allow for the seizure of assets that belong to terrorist or their associates.

Other strategies to win the, “war on terror,” include: investing in the education and development in Islamic nations, have individual strategies for individual countries, try and get rid of the Islamic hatred for the United States, improve intelligence services around the globe, make sure our ports, trains, and chemical and nuclear plants are secure, and reduce U.S. dependence on oil (Clarke, The Century Foundation). By educating and developing Islamic nations, it is believed that we can reduce terrorism by making the people less disenfranchised and giving them a sense that they belong to the rest of the
world. This would also improve the lives of the people who are a main source of support for terrorism and they may decide to no longer be supporters of something that does not benefit them. One size does not fit everyone and we need to remember this when coming up with strategies to deal with terrorism. It is going to be more beneficial to come up with strategies to combat terrorists in specific countries or regions because what is needed in Southeast Asia may be completely different than what is needed in the Middle East (Clarke, The Century Foundation). We also need to work on making Islamic nations not hate us. It is also important to make sure that our law enforcement and security agencies are working together. They need to be able to share information and restructure their organizations until they are able to do so at an effective level. It is also very important to be able to secure our airports, sea ports, trains and chemical and nuclear plants. This is an obvious way to combat terrorism because these are things that should already be happening. These are important infrastructures and they need to be protected and the national security risks they pose have already been discussed in depth in this paper. (Clarke, The Century Foundation). Moreover, by reducing the dependence we have on oil, we make ourselves less exposed to the problems that arise when there is an oil shortage. It also makes us less susceptible to the will of terrorists and other nations. The United States can be a more stable country if we are not worrying about if we are going to get oil and how much it is going to cost (Clarke, The Century Foundation). It is important to use multiple strategies to fight against terrorism and these are some that I feel would be the most beneficial.

The turf wars within the Department of Homeland Security need to end and each agency needs clear objectives (9/11, 3).
CONCLUSION

We, as the international community, need to adopt a unified approach to this problem. The old quote by Aesop, a Greek slave and fable author who lived from 620-B.C. to 560 B.C., goes, “United we stand, divided we fall,” and I believe it is time honored proof that we must work together. When there is public disagreement between nations it makes the terrorists think they have a better chance at victory because the world is divided and they think they have a better chance defeating a broken coalition. If we will stand united together in the fight against maritime terrorism, we will have a much better chance in at least suppressing it.

In conclusion, it is somewhat ironic that the very thing the United States and Western countries advocate for is the same thing that threatens this process the most. Globalization has serious implications for the entire globe and there are some groups that seek to disrupt or exploit globalization. International terrorist groups are becoming more and more connected and Al-Qaeda’s reach has spread across the globe. These organizations use this link to support each other and to pool their resources to become more efficient. If these organizations are going to band together to improve their chances of success, then the international community also needs to pull together to combat these efforts.

September 11, 2001 not only changed the way we view terrorism, it also had implications for the transportation industry. The attack on the Twin Towers and Pentagon set new precedents; the scale of the attack, its extraordinary coordination, and the determination of the hijackers was unlike anything ever seen before. The attacks demonstrated that ordinary means of transportation can be used as deadly weapons in the
hands of dedicated terrorists. The events of 9/11 made it clear that terrorists groups have broadened their range of targets and now seem to be focusing more on economic targets (Ressa). Al-Qaeda recently released a statement saying, “We, the fighters of the holy war, in general are hoping to enter the next phase... It will be a war of killings, a war against business, which will hit the enemy where he does not expect us to (Lim).” This is a problem because trade and commerce will not flourish in an environment where there is no confidence in the security system in which it operates. Companies do not go into unstable countries and set up business ventures because they do not want to take the risk of having the instability affect their business. This would lead one to believe that companies will begin to look for ways to stabilize the maritime industry because they really have no option in how they are going to ship their goods and they want to be able to ship them in an environment that will not negatively affect their pockets. September 11th also shows that just because a certain method of attack has not been carried out before, it does not mean it will not be. Before the use of commercial planes as weapons the scenario was unthinkable and there was no way to know what the implications of such an attack would be. This means that maritime infrastructure is a possible target. The devastating effects of this relationship can be seen in the case study of maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia. As the world becomes more connected, we can see many benefits, but there are also some issues we need to address. Victories over terrorism are rarely easy. The characteristics of terrorism make it hard to infiltrate and hard to find out who top leaders are. Since terrorism is usually symbolic, it is sometimes hard to know what the attack will be, when and where it will occur, and who it will be against. It also makes it difficult to disrupt plots because the terrorists’ network is fragmented with
different groups cooperating on an assortment of tasks all around the world. There are many threats that can be launched through our transportation system and we need to work together to make sure that we can prevent another attack on the U.S. using the transportation system as a weapon (9/11, 4).

It will be a challenge to safeguard trade and commerce from terrorist groups. Yet it is a challenge we need to face. If the world will work together in solving this problem, we will have a much better chance at winning the battle against maritime terrorism and the war on terrorism in general. However, we cannot be naïve and think that a maritime terrorist act will not occur. Maritime terrorism has existed for many years and the growth of development and trade has only made this threat increase. Terrorists are unpredictable and should not be underestimated and this was proven on 9/11. The threat from maritime terrorism and the likelihood that a successful attack against the maritime industry will occur have increased significantly in recent years. Even as we are trying to find ways to protect ourselves, maritime terrorism will most likely continue to be a threat to national security for countries around the world.