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THE POLITICAL ROLE OF NORTHERN IRISH PROTESTANT RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS

COLLEGE SCHOLARS/TENNESSEE SCHOLARS PROJECT

HENRY D. FINCHER

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INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Northern Ireland has understandably been the focus of considerable attention since the eruption of violence in 1969. Much has been made by journalists of religious influences upon politics in the province. On the other hand, academics have tended to dismiss this analysis by describing religion as merely the "shibboleth of the contending parties", or simply as "a manifestation of the divisions in Ireland, [and] not its cause." Thus, the religious views of the different communities in Northern Ireland have not received the large amount of attention that has been given to other aspects of the conflict. While the struggle has been roundly condemned in various ways as "a seventeenth-century religious war," very few researchers have given proper consideration to both the religious views of the different communities or to the way religious organizations contribute to the intransigence of the conflict.

While I agree with assertions that religion is not the single most important cause of the Irish "Troubles", I do believe that religion has a competing claim to be one of the major factors contributing to the intractability of the situation. There are a number of reasons behind this.

The groups at conflict are commonly distinguished as either "Protestant" or "Catholic." This is not a journalistic invention; it is the term preferred by the residents of the province when asked to identify themselves [in a neutral setting, of course]. Likewise, the sociologists Cairns and Waddell have found that:

In Northern Ireland there are in a sense two competing ethnopolitical identities, Irish and British, which are underpinned, to a large extent, by the Catholic and Protestant religions respectively.

By establishing the link between nationality and religion, they have recognized how political identification can be dependent upon faith in Northern Ireland. While critics would be quick to point out that religious identification in Ireland does not always imply an active faith, I would counter with the argument that, in a region where approximately 70% of the population claims regular church attendance, religious beliefs must contribute to the formulation of at least some of the believer’s political attitudes. Brooke, in writing about Ulster Presbyterianism, points out the fact that the rejection of religion as a political identification is a creation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; thus, one should be wary applying these relatively recent values to a four century old conflict. He says almost indignantly that:

... religion is a crucial element in the formation of
national identity. We still hear complaints that there is a conflict in Northern Ireland between "Protestants" and "Catholics" from those who would see nothing untoward in conflicts between "French" and "Germans". Being French or German is as much a matter of 'mere' opinion as being Protestant or Catholic, and the history of religion is largely the history of the process by which such 'mere opinions' were formed.\(^7\)

Another reason that I feel that understanding the religious views of the conflicting groups in Northern Ireland is important is because religion has been a divisive issue in Irish politics not only in the dim past but well into the twentieth century, and even to the present day. For example, by the early 1930s, when Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont had been established as a Unionist domain, Prime Minister William Craig, later Lord Craigavon, spoke of his motives and objectives:

I have always said that I am an Orangeman first and a politician afterwards; all I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant state.\(^8\)

In reply, Irish revolutionary leader Eamon deValera, who headed the Irish Free State and the Irish Republic as either Taoiseach [Prime Minister] or President for 50 years, replied more formally yet no less definitively that "Ireland remains a Catholic nation."\(^9\)

This adherence to the dominant religion in each part of the island is hardly empty rhetoric. The Bunreacht na hEireann, or the Irish Constitution of 1937, states that the Irish Roman Catholic church, though not the state church, would enjoy special status as the church of the bulk of the population of the twenty-six counties.\(^10\) The idea of religion being a crucial part of one's political allegiance has been used by some of Ireland's foremost politicians; it also is viewed in this way by many of the less exalted residents of the province. For example, an anecdote was told to me by the Member of Parliament (MP) for South Belfast, the Reverend Martin Smyth. It also illustrates how religion is viewed by at least some of those in the thick of the conflict in Northern Ireland:

I was in the street with this crowd of rioters—this was in the '69 riots—trying to pacify them. The drink was beginning to wear off, and they were beginning to recognize me as well. This fellow said, "I've no time for your Jesus!"
I said to him,"Why, what are you?"
He says,"I'm an agnostic."
I looked at the other ones and I said,"Did you hear that fellows? What this boy says? He's an agnostic!"
[They asked]"What's that, Mr. Smyth?"
I said,"Well, an agnostic is a person who doesn't know what he believes."
The fellow realized he'd put his foot in, and he said, "But I'm a Protestant agnostic!"
I said, "An agnostic is one who doesn't know what he believes."
The fellows who were staring at him said, "What are you doing here? This is a religious war!"
The fellow cleared off real quickly then...

While the violence in Northern Ireland is not caused by a dispute over such religious concepts as infant baptism or the truth of the Virgin birth, there is at least a prima facie case for studying the way religion influences political behavior in the six Ulster counties.

The primary focus of this study will be upon the Protestants of Northern Ireland, and specifically upon the denominational differences within this community. Of the studies that focus primarily upon Ulster Protestants, many have discerned a trait that Dr. A.T.Q. Stewart among others has called a "siege mentality." For convenience as well as for clarity, I shall use the synonymous term "garrisonism". The use of this term conjures up several images that I believe accurately describe Unionist political behavior. Later I will discuss more fully the sources of this siege mentality; here I shall content myself with a brief description of its characteristics. One of these images is of a defensive group of people who are assailed from a number of directions. Being on the defensive inherently implies feelings of insecurity; in this case, it is primarily an insecurity about the future of the province's link with Britain. "Garrisonism" also implies that there is a sense of being an outpost in a foreign land. Along these lines, the Ulster Protestants feel themselves to be an outpost of British culture on the overwhelmingly Gaelic, Roman Catholic island of Ireland. These differences have prompted one Ulster Unionist to write:

The (Irish Republic's) claim (to Northern Ireland) is bitterly resented by the Unionists because Unionists see the Irish Republic as differing fundamentally in ethos from the United Kingdom, and this ethos Unionists do not share.

The fact that Northern Ireland is a separate state from the Republic of Ireland means that part of this difference in "ethos," like a garrison, is that there is also a clearly defined territory to be defended as "British" from those who would make it "Irish". Of course, geographically speaking, there is no basis for the entire island not to be called Irish; the political border, however, is of interest in this case.

Being part of a garrison also implies that there are clear choices when deciding whether to be part of the British or the Irish cultures, as if it were a matter of opening a gate and crossing over to the other
side. For a considerable number of Ulster Protestants, the issues do seem clear-cut: "Ulster is British," as countless wall slogans attest, and there will be "No Surrender" to the Irish. Those who share these feelings either in spirit or out of acquiescence are wise to keep less stringent views to themselves, for political figures who have spoken out against these concepts even modestly (such as Terence O'Neill or Brian Faulkner) were branded "Lundies," or traitors, who would have opened the gates to the other side—in this case, the Catholic community. Indeed, the Ulster-Irish colloquialism "Lundy" illustrates this point. In 1688, the Lord Mayor of Londonderry, Robert Lundy, sought to surrender to the advancing armies of Catholic King James II rather than endure a siege of the city. Fearing tales of Catholic atrocities, a group of young apprentices closed the gates. This act is celebrated every year by a Protestant organization called the Apprentice Boys, who also burn the "traitorous" Lundy in effigy in front of large crowds of Ulster Protestants. The literality of the term garrisonism can be seen in the closing of the gates, and I contend that the annual reenactment is a symbolic recommitment to close the gates against future threats.15

There are a number of sources of this garrisonism of the Ulster Protestant community. One area of garrisonism concerns its relationship with mainland Britain. The difficulties Northern Ireland has caused successive British governments are no secret, and neither are the strong feelings amongst some in Britain who would prefer to be rid of the province. For example, when the Ulster Unionist Party sponsored a candidate in the 1985 London-Fulham by-election, he received less than 100 votes. This prompted one researcher to comment that:

While reliant upon British support, Ulster Protestants know well enough that, given the prevailing costs, at the end of the day the British people do not want them.16

Some reasons for this lack of sympathy should be fairly obvious. Northern Ireland costs Britain approximately £ 5.4 million per day, so it seems to many a financial drain on the British economy.17 Killings and bombings on the British mainland make the conflict uncomfortably real to many residents. In direct contrast to the reality of violence is the obscurity of the motives behind it, for the political cleavages in Britain are oriented differently from those in Northern Ireland. For example, the Conservative and Labour Parties that contest general elections in England, Scotland, and Wales are virtually non-existent in the north of Ireland. Deeper than this superficial political divergence lies a more fundamental dichotomy of
concepts. David Miller, a historian, describes the political aspects of Protestant garrisonism towards Britain:

The dilemma of the Ulster Protestant community derived from their conception of both their political obligation and their rights of citizenship in contractual terms. Lacking a genuine feeling of co-nationality with the British people, they could not entrust their fate to "safeguards" which depended upon the willingness of that people to intervene in Irish affairs to rectify abuses. Just as the guarantee of Ulster Protestant allegiance was their own fidelity to the contract of government, so the guarantee of their rights was the reciprocal faithfulness of the sovereign authority. But the sovereign authority was effectively no longer a single person, the monarch, but a parliament responsible to the people. The people are fickle, and it is a fundamental feature of the British constitution that Parliament is incapable of giving binding promises; any law enacted by one Parliament can be repealed by the next. That constitutional system simply lacks a concept of entrenched rights beyond the reach of the current Commons majority.

Thus, a concrete constitutional reason lies beneath the feelings of insecurity held by many Ulster Protestants concerning their relationship with Britain. The way the Protestants cling so fervently to the link with Britain is, again, similar to that of an outpost that fears being abandoned by the mother country to fend for itself. Evidence for this also comes from the conspicuous absence of a strong Ulster independence movement. Though the Ulster Protestants have a strong regional identity that allows them to feel fundamentally different from the denizens of either England, Scotland, or Wales, and even though there is evidence that they feel less in common with their geographically closer neighbors to the south than with their co-nationals in Britain, the Protestants have been reluctant to call for independence. Of the varied reasons for this, the economic situation of the province along with the small size of Northern Ireland seem to be the strongest motivations for this failure to actively seek autonomy.

Other sources of garrisonism lie in the past. As many have noted, references to history tend to crop up with amazing frequency in Irish political affairs. A.T.Q. Stewart writes that "Ireland, like Dracula's Transylvania, is much troubled by the undead." In a more serious vein, he develops the idea of the past asserting itself into today's affairs in Ireland. In doing so, he speaks of how past experiences of the Protestant community have produced these feelings of garrisonism:

The planters were frontiersmen, and naturally displayed frontier attitudes where their lands bordered
on those of the native septs. . . (They) developed over a long time a special kind of siege mentality created by the necessity of having always to test the loyalty of those within the settlement itself, both the "Irish" settled in pockets within the frontier and those whose steadfastness might have been undermined by constant day to day contact with them, as a countercheck to inevitable hibernicization. . . From the outset they faced the menace of a fifth column. This was and still is the essence of what is called the Ulster problem.22

Thus Stewart describes two focal points of Protestant garrisonism, namely fear of the "native" Irish population (meaning here the Roman Catholic citizens of both the Irish Republic and of Northern Ireland), and fear of those within the Protestant ranks who would compromise with these "natives"—the "fifth column" of Lundies. Strictly speaking, it is improper to speak of the differences between the Protestants and Catholics in Ireland as a problem between "settler" and "native." The Plantation of Ulster, a large-scale "homestead" plan which granted large tracts of Irish lands to Protestant settlers from Britain, occurred in 1607, and immigration from Scotland had undoubtedly gone on for centuries before that. However, the Plantation was distinct from previous types of settlement because it did not result in a mixing of the British and Irish. Though previous immigrants to the isle had been accused of being "More Irish than the Irish", the Plantation of Ulster caused bitterness between the settlers and the natives that led to the garrisonism of today. For example, Long noted this continuing separation of the two communities:

While there has been considerable intermarriage over the centuries. . . there has been no integration of the Protestant and Catholic communities.23

Thus, divisions between the two groups have remained to the present era. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to find, as Stewart did, correlations between settlers looking for signs of compromising behavior in their neighbors which might lead to dire consequences and present-day voters who fear a modern compromise having similar adverse results.

My primary focus is upon the garrisonism that is directed within the Ulster Protestant community itself. Tension seems to arise primarily between the Presbyterian churches and the Church of Ireland, and of course, these frictions come from a number of reasons. In a nutshell, though, I believe the essence of their quarrel is that religiously fundamentalist, working-class to lower-middle class Presbyterians fear "Lundies" coming from within the ranks of the religiously liberal, financially better-off Church of Ireland. This
concept has been propounded by both the historian Stewart and the sociologist Nelson, and may also be inferred from information collected by Moxon-Browne.²⁴

As it appears, this is an extremely broad generalization that requires further explanation. First I want to assert that these differences are subordinate to the other two areas of garrisonism that are directed outside the Protestant community towards Irish Catholics and mainland Britons. The overwhelming majority of Ulster Protestants, regardless of their denomination, support the continuance of the link with Britain. As has been noted by numerous observers, the Ulster Protestant community tends to close ranks when presented with a crisis that threatens this link. However, I believe that this characteristic has been over-emphasized. The Unionist community has too often been portrayed as a monolithic group of people with identical goals and beliefs which results in an almost telepathic consensus about political questions. This view is far too simplistic. As I have stated, the Ulster Unionist community has internal frictions that exacerbate existing fears about their present political situation. The same logic behind the American phrase "United we stand, but divided we fall" has prevailed in times of crisis for the Ulster Unionists. Despite the fact that these internal insecurities are secondary, they exist within the Ulster Protestant community and have implications for Protestant political behavior. By highlighting these differences, I hope to draw attention to an aspect of Protestant politics that previously has not received proper academic attention. However, I am definitely not implying that it is the most important political cleavage in Northern Ireland.

Also, it should be fairly predictable that Irish Presbyterians are not exclusively working and lower middle-class, nor are the members of the Church of Ireland all middle and upper-class. However, the Presbyterian churches do have proportionately more working-class than the Church of Ireland, and likewise the Church of Ireland has proportionately more upper-class believers than the Presbyterians. These characteristics have noticeable political ramifications—Presbyterians tend to gravitate towards the more openly intransigent, anti-establishment Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) while members of the Church of Ireland tend to belong to the less extreme Official Unionist Party (OUP), or to the only political party in Northern Ireland without a preponderance of members from one religious community, the Alliance Party.²⁵
### Reported Political Allegiances of Protestants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Denomination</th>
<th>% of DUP</th>
<th>% of OUP</th>
<th>% of Alliance</th>
<th>% of pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of Ireland</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterians</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Presbyterians</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodists</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptists</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*includes those who declined to state a religious preference

As these loyalties may be partially explained in economic terms, they also seem to be a political manifestation of the religious differences between the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland. In the course of this project, I plan to demonstrate how the fundamentalist, uncompromising theology of the Presbyterian churches makes rigid and uncompromising political behavior more acceptable to many Ulster Protestants, and, indeed, the above statistics seem to bear this out. Conversely, the more theologically liberal views of the Church of Ireland about religious differences translates into more liberal attitudes towards compromise on political differences. Thus, those who oppose religious and political compromise are distrustful of those who are more inclined to bend—and thus is born the fear of "Lundies".

Finally, I should explain why I have chosen to not examine other Protestant denominations in the province such as the Methodists or the Baptists. Numerically, these groups are tiny fractions of the Protestant population of the province, and thus statistically are not the major blocks of the Northern Irish electorate that are formed by the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland.

### Strength of Protestant Denominations in N. Ireland

- Church of Ireland: 35.6%
- Presbyterian: 46.5%
- Free Presbyterian: 1.6%
- Methodists: 8.0%
- Baptists: 1.8%
- Others: 6.4%

While not discounting the attitudes of these groups, it seems more fruitful to explore the differences between the main Protestant denominations.

What are the results of this Ulster Protestant garrisonism? One obvious ramification is that it stands directly in the way of
consensual progress towards a peaceful resolution of the massive problems that engulf Northern Ireland. Of course, there are a mind-boggling number of factors that seem to interact almost in Brownian motion that also stand in the way of "resolving" the situation. Thus, Ulster Protestant garrisonism is both a cause of these factors and an effect of them. For example, by clinging so reflexively to the link with Britain, the Unionists are effectively standing in the way of any progress towards a solution to the conflict. Conversely, they cling to the union so tightly precisely because virtually all of the proposed solutions seem to involve its ultimate abolition.

Thus, the specter of Irish annexation combined with the ever-present possibility of British infidelity makes a solid, united Unionist front an imperative for the continued existence of Northern Ireland. However, more extreme loyalists, contained primarily within the ranks of the Presbyterian churches, tend to question the resolve of those more inclined to compromise, who seem most likely to appear in the Church of Ireland. This distrust leads to greater insecurity within Unionist ranks and thus to increased garrisonism, for not only must the more vehement Unionists be wary of the maneuverings of the Irish Republic and the intentions of the British mainland, but they also must watch for those Lundies within their own ranks who would leave the gates open to compromise over Northern Ireland's ultimate constitutional status. This means that virtually any compromise or attempt to establish working dialogues between the two communities is fiercely resisted by a considerable portion of the Protestant community and viewed as the proverbial "foot in the door." This resistance would assuredly include members from all the main Protestant denominations, but I would contend that it would have a higher proportion from the Presbyterian community than those from the Church of Ireland. Developing this concept will be a major part of this paper, but it is not the sole purpose. I also feel that a concise history of Ulster Unionism, along with a brief examination of the relevant characteristics of the parties that attract more than negligible support in the Unionist community (i.e., the DUP, the OUP, and the Alliance Party) will be helpful. Also, the interesting case of the Reverend Ian Paisley (a Free Presbyterian minister) provides an example of a paragon of Ulster garrisonism who is additionally the most popular political figure in the province. An examination of how his theology influences his political beliefs is helpful as a case study of a figure that embodies the fear of Catholicism, the distrust of Britain, and the ever-present search for Lundies that pervades so much of Ulster Unionism. Also, a study of the ecumenical movement in Northern Ireland, along with its
conspicuous sluggishness, helps show the dividing lines within the Protestant community between Anglican and Presbyterian.

In conclusion, I want to point out that many of these theories have been developed from personal examination of the province, and thus I have been forced to assemble from diverse sources the documentation for this theory, sometimes at great distances. To my knowledge, the book about this aspect of Northern Irish Protestant political behavior has yet to be written. Thus, there will be areas that are less-fully documented than I would prefer, and there will be times that the conclusions drawn seem controversial. I again want to emphasize that my purpose in preparing this project is to shed light on a relatively unexplored area of Irish politics, and my aim is to bring interesting facts and possible conclusions to the attention of those who might otherwise overlook them.

1Stewart, The Narrow Ground, p.180; Bell, Protestants of Ulster, p.13.
2Bell, Protestants of Ulster, p.12.
5Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class, and Creed in Northern Ireland, p.89.
6Brooke, Ulster Presbyterians, p.201.
7Ibid., p. ix-x.
8Quoted in Bell, Protestants of Ulster, p.40.
10Article 44, as quoted in Chubb, Government in Ireland, p.68.
12Stewart, the Narrow Ground, p.48.
13Bruce, God Save Ulster!, p.124.
14Smith, Why Unionists Say No, p.3-4.
15Stewart, The Narrow Ground, p.67.
17David McKittrick, The Independent, 12 August 1989, p.16.
18Miller, Queen's Rebels, p. 103.
21Stewart, The Narrow Ground, p.15.
22Ibid., p.47.
23Long, Orangeism in Canada, p. ix.
24Stewart, Narrow Ground, p.162-3.

26 Ibid., p. 89.
HISTORY OF ULSTER UNIONISM

In the previous chapter, some basic observations about the political behavior of the Ulster Protestants were made and a few conclusions drawn. One is that the Protestants of Northern Ireland behave politically in a manner I feel is best described by the term "garrisonism". That is, they are extremely defensive about their constitutional status as a part of the United Kingdom. A second is that within this Protestant community, there are internal frictions that occur primarily along denominational lines, although economic and social differences accompany these religious demarcations between the major denominations of the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian churches. Third, these frictions inside the Protestant community, though often overshadowed by externally directed conflicts (such as those with the Roman Catholic community), heighten the sense of garrisonism amongst many in the Protestant community by destabilizing the oft-observed "solidity" of the Ulster Protestants in defending the link with Britain. In order to better understand the first observation concerning the garrisonistic behavior of Ulster Protestants both today and in the past, it is necessary to examine the history of Ulster unionism. In the process, basic knowledge about the Unionist community may be gained that is crucial to later assessment of the validity of the second and third observations.

The present deployment of Unionist political forces can be traced back to a little over one hundred years ago with the rise of the Irish Home Rule movement. The Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone made Irish causes a cornerstone of his 1885 manifesto, and giving the Irish their own parliament was a fundamental goal. While warmly welcomed by much of the Irish population, the prospect of Home Rule aroused dark fears in many Irish Protestants. Since the overwhelming majority of Ireland's Protestants lived in the nine Ulster counties, the hotbed of opposition to the home rule movement lay in the northern province. In 1885, Ulster citizens concerned about the prospect of home rule hastily organized to muster their opposition to Home Rule. Because the crisis had caught many Protestants off-guard, no formal machinery existed to facilitate political activity. As a result, the framework of the Orange Order, a fraternal lodge dedicated to the aggressive and provocative assertion of Protestantism, was used as an organizational basis. The Order was also a major vehicle for the formation of the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC), in 1886. These two facts help show that Unionism was from the beginning almost exclusively a Protestant movement. Like
the Order, Ulster Unionism had a distinct democratic flavor that was notable for a time well before universal suffrage had appeared in the United Kingdom. Chronicler of the Ulster Unionist Party John Harbinson has written that:

...the Ulster Unionist Council developed as an umbrella under which Unionists of all classes and depth of conviction took shelter from the chill wind of anti-partitionism...the fundamental exercise of maintaining Protestant power, and hence the union, was best achieved by this loose federal structure.

He has also drawn attention to one of the major factors motivating Protestants to oppose dismantling of the constitutional link with Britain—they saw it as detrimental to their political and economic interests. Particularly at the end of the nineteenth century, Irish Protestants were on the top of the island's socio-economic ladder. Because they benefitted from the union in a number of ways, they sought to maintain it. It should not be construed that all Protestants were wealthy or even well off. Still, being a Protestant in Ireland at this time meant for many the benefits of being in a special category. Historian David Miller has written that in nineteenth-century Ireland:

Social change might put one's class in jeopardy but one could never lose the status which attached to being a Protestant, except by some unthinkable act, such as marrying a Catholic...In many situation his essence was still his social position, i.e., his Protestantism.

Thus, it seems that what loss of the Union meant socially and economically to the bulk of the Irish population in 1885 was that Protestant privileged status would be suppressed by the 90% Roman Catholic population of the island. While this was unsurprisingly welcomed by Irish Catholics, it was also resisted by Ulster Protestants. Religious fears also played a significant role in this early Protestant opposition to Home Rule. The rhetorical phrase that enjoyed considerable popular currency in both islands at the time was that "Home Rule means Rome Rule," referring not only to the strong ultramontanist characteristics of the Irish Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, but also to the high level of political control at even the parish level. This, combined with the strongly anti-Protestant stance of the Vatican at the turn of the century, led many Ulster Protestants to the conclusion that they might not only lose their socio-political hegemony, but might even lose their "right" to be Protestant. It was assumed that the elimination of divorce and other restrictions would be incorporated into any government that
depended solely upon support from the Catholic population of the island, and this would suppress Protestant freedoms, perhaps even those of the freedom to worship. As one woman reminisced about the Home Rule issue, she described a song that her father had taught her:

Sir Edward Carson had a cat
that sat upon a fender,
And every time it caught a mouse
it shouted 'No Surrender!'

She went on to state that, "There was never any doubt in my mind that the surrender dreaded was to the powers of Rome." While this Protestant/Catholic dichotomy is often cited, less noted has been the historical animosity between the Anglican Church of Ireland and the more fundamentalist Presbyterians. When presented the possibility of both Protestant faiths being miniscule minorities in a Catholic Ireland, however, old wounds healed rather quickly. As Brooke, a historian of Ulster Presbyterianism has written:

The Unionist Party was, of course, a mass-based party which fulfilled at least one of the historical purposes of the British political parties—to override religious differences (in this case, as principally in the British parties, the differences among Protestants) in favour of a great national secular cause.

The secular cause was, of course, to defeat Home Rule. Though united in times of crisis, the Anglican/Presbyterian split did not disappear; it was only made less apparent in light of a greater crisis.

In these early days of Unionism can be found the same reasons given today by Ulster Unionists for their rigid, unyielding commitment to the Act of Union. Fear of a loss of their favoured socio-economic status combined with religious opposition to Roman Catholicism made the majority of Ulster Protestants side with the Conservative and Liberal Unionists in Britain to defeat the first Home Rule Bill in 1886.

The Second Home Rule Bill of 1893 seems in retrospect to have been doomed to failure. The same coalition of parliamentarians that had combined to defeat the bill seven years before regrouped and were again victorious despite the fact that the Ulster Unionist Council had further strengthened its organizational framework. Some researchers have discerned a decided regional autonomy developing about this time in the relations of the Ulster Unionists with their fellow Unionists to the south. Though the thought of home rule for only part of Ireland (i.e., partition) was far from a topic of open discussion in orthodox Unionist circles at this time, one can see the
beginnings of a subtle shift of the focus of Ulster Unionist deliberations to their own backyards.

After the turn of the century, a string of Liberal successes under the stewardship of Herbert Henry Asquith brought Irish Home Rule back into the political limelight. As Home Rule began to seem more and more of an inevitability, Ulster Unionists began to talk of a separate dispensation from the rest of Ireland. Here is where partition was born. Possibilities of nine-county, six-county, and even four-county exclusion (Londonderry, Antrim, Down, and Armagh) were bandied about for some time. Though the Unionist leader, Dubliner Sir Edward Carson, was opposed to any partition, the Ulster Unionists began to seriously search for any possible way to opt out of Home Rule. Partition seemed the only means of doing this, and six-county partition in particular seemed the best way to insure Unionist hegemony in the years to come, for the high percentage of Roman Catholics in the three western Ulster counties of Donegal, Cavan, and Monaghan would make Protestant electoral majorities much less certain. 12

After the Parliament Act of 1911 significantly reduced the powers of the overwhelmingly Conservative and Unionist House of Lords by removing their powers of veto, nothing seemed to stand in the way of the combined forces of the Liberal Party and the Irish "Home Rulers," often inaccurately dubbed the Irish Parliamentary Party, of bringing home rule to the island of Ireland. 13 Committed to their opposition of Home Rule, the Ulster Unionist Council made use of an obscure constitutional clause to form the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Not to be confused with today's urban paramilitary group of the same title, the UVF of 1912 was a province-wide organization that was committed to "defending the constitution of the United Kingdom as it now stands". 14 Though in the early days they trained with wooden guns to the mirth of many Home Rulers, matters took a serious turn when the Larne gun-runnings of early 1914 brought thousands of German rifles to the UVF. In that year, the delaying powers of the House of Lords expired, and the enactment of the Third Home Rule Bill seemed certain. Thus, in the name of King and Country, Ulster Unionists ironically stood ready to rebel.

It is perhaps prudent to examine this paradoxical stand by the Ulster Unionists, for it is typical of attitudes today that lead observers to dub them the "voice of illogicality". 15 While claiming to be "Loyalists," the Ulster Protestants, either through acquiescence or active support, were behaving in a positively mutinous manner. Thus it seems that Unionists were in the perplexing situation of being
ready to rebel in order to remain loyal to Britain. At the heart of this confusing situation is what Miller has identified as a contractarian view of politics. He points out that:

Loyalty is quite different from nationality... The Ulster Protestants are Irishmen, Ulstermen, and British at the same time. By remaining loyal to the crown (and not necessarily the Crown in Parliament) they are being honest, faithful to a contract entered into hundreds of years ago.\textsuperscript{16}

The contract he refers to is the agreement of the late seventeenth century between King William III (of England) and the Protestants of the realm that they would remain loyal as long as the monarch was a Protestant. Miller points out a crucial factor: Ulster Protestants are loyal not to the prevailing elected Government at Westminster but to the constitutional source of all authority in British politics, namely the reigning monarch. This leads to serious misunderstandings, particularly when, as in 1912, Unionists and the Government in Westminster are at loggerheads as to which course to take. For example, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees bitterly complained of the Unionists that, "Loyalty to the UK was supposed to be their creed but only as long as it suited them."\textsuperscript{17}

Perhaps a more understanding view was voiced by Nelson:

If (Protestants) acknowledged loyalty it was as something reciprocal. To propose [mutiny]... was not disloyal if Britain had already shown disloyalty to Ulster Protestants.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus, it must be remembered that there is a complicated logic behind such an apparent paradox as Ulster Unionists rebelling to remain loyal.

At about the time it seemed certain that the Ulster Unionists were preparing to fight the Irish Nationalists who were also arming, the First World War provided a foreign outlet for tensions in the British Isles. While it possibly helped defuse a civil war in Britain itself, political violence became a reality in Ireland with the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin. Though the surviving participants of the rising were spit upon by the populace of Dublin as they were led through the streets, the harsh British reaction that culminated in the execution of such men as Patrick Pearse and James Connolly turned renegades into martyrs. The simmering trouble in Ireland erupted with a vengeance in the fall of 1918. Sinn Fein, which won every seat outside Ulster with the exception of the four Trinity College-Dublin seats, established the Dail Eireann, or Irish Parliament, in Dublin after the December elections. The heavy-handed attempts of the British government to restore order led to even fiercer resistance
in the three southern provinces of Connacht, Munster, and Leinster. Faced by such an unstable situation, the Coalition Government under Lloyd-George passed the Government of Ireland Act (1920) that called for the establishment of two separate parliaments in Belfast and Dublin that were still tied to the United Kingdom. The Republican forces did not accept the compromise attempt. The violence in Ireland continued, and public outcry in Britain forced Lloyd-George to negotiate a treaty that left virtually no one satisfied.\(^1\) As civil war flared up in the new twenty-six county Irish Free State about whether to accept partition of Ireland, sectarian violence spread throughout Northern Ireland. The Northern Irish Parliament at Stormont (a district in south Belfast) was established along the lines called for in the Government of Ireland Act (1920). Thus, the "Protestant parliament for a Protestant people" (though Northern Ireland was at this time almost one-third Roman Catholic) was established in an atmosphere of sectarian violence and civil war. These extreme conditions were to manifest themselves in the political behavior of Stormont Unionist parliamentarians for the next fifty years.

The new Northern Irish Parliament was not independent; it was an experiment in "devolved government," with ultimate power residing in Westminster, particularly in such areas as revenue disbursement. In practice, however, the House of Commons paid little attention to the operation of the Stormont parliament, and allowed the Ulster Unionists virtual autonomy. Nelson has discerned a number of traits that marked the years of Unionist dominance (1921-1972): one, that democracy to many in the Northern Irish state meant majority rule was absolute; two, constitutional issues (i.e., whether Northern Ireland would continue to exist as part of the UK or not) were crucial, and all other matters (such as socio-economic reform) were secondary; three, as a result of this, politics came to be viewed as a zero-sum game where someone's gain implied someone else's loss; four, the predictability of political outcomes in the province meant that there were shared expectations/frustrations on both sides; and five, that refusal to compromise quickly became "a sign of integrity.\(^2\)

What this meant for politics in the province was that the "Unionists were the winners in 1920, they made the rules after that, and did their best to enforce them."\(^3\) The Unionists were guilty of gerrymandering, perhaps most notoriously in the case of the city of Derry/Londonderry,\(^4\) and even the official chronicler of the UUC has admitted that some Party Secretaries "knew every trick that was in
the book, and some that were not" in order to assure Unionist electoral victories.\textsuperscript{23}

It should be pointed out that as the immediacy of the Home Rule "threat" receded and became a memory, the Unionist Party, as it was now beginning to be called, began to show signs of fragmentation. Such a diverse coalition as the UUP had to have considerable political inertia to remain cohesive in calmer times, and from time to time there were challenges. Typical of these challenges was the Independent Unionist Party. Nelson has captured the paradoxical significance of the Independent Unionists:

> The Independent Unionist tradition is more significant than internal party divisions (in the Ulster Unionist Party 1920-1969). . .It is not really socialist because its adherents have not shared conventional socialist assumptions about class structure and class conflict. . .Nevertheless the Independent Unionist tradition sustained, and gave a focus for, Protestant working-class hostility to traditional (middle-class) leaders and policies--especially in certain areas of Belfast, like the Shankill."\textsuperscript{24}

While tangential to Ulster Unionism as a whole, the Independent Unionist tradition, along with other splinter Unionist groups such as the Progressive Unionists, betray the complex nature of Unionist politics—while undoubtedly united in support of the link with Britain, Ulster Unionism should not be considered single-minded to the exclusion of all else. Though geographically isolated, Northern Ireland does not live in isolation, and many of the same issues that cropped up in European politics caused tension at Stormont not just along the traditional cleavages of Unionist/Nationalist but within the major parties themselves. However, the continued dominance of the Ulster Unionist Party throughout these years testifies to the accuracy of Nelson's recognition of the primacy of constitutional issues in the politics of Northern Ireland from the 1920s until the 1960s, and for the majority of voters in Northern Ireland, up to the present-day.

From the 1930s to the 1950s, these frictions were held in check through a near-autocratic party leadership that was also in direct contact with the sectarian attitudes of the grassroots of the party. Tensions quickly came to a head in the 1960s when the leadership began to attempt mild reforms. In 1963, Captain Terence O'Neill became leader of the Ulster Unionist Party and thus Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. His goal was to gradually change Northern Irish political life to more closely resemble that of the British mainland.\textsuperscript{25} He began to appear openly with such obviously Roman Catholic figures as nuns and priests, which, while hardly considered improper by the majority of Unionists, did raise some eyebrows. O'Neill caused
himself further trouble when he invited Irish Taoiseach Sean Lemass to visit, thus breaking an unwritten rule of the Ulster Unionists that at least subtle hostility must be shown towards the Republic at all times to avoid any misconceptions about the weakening of Ulster Unionist resolve. It was at this time that Ian Paisley, ever on the extreme fringe of Protestant politics, began his famous chant of "O'Neill must go!" While at this time still in the decided minority, the numbers repeating this incantation began to grow because of a movement that was expanding independently of the traditional groups of Northern Irish political life.

As in most of the western world, the 1960s brought unrest to Ulster. The foundations of it began innocuously enough in the form of a group inspired by the successes of Martin Luther King that sought to give greater civil rights to the Roman Catholic population of the province. The Civil Rights Movement sought to redress some of the glaring sectarianism of the Northern Irish police force, most notably in their demands for the disbandment of the "B Specials", a large group of Protestant police reservists, as well as espousing such social goals as equality in public housing for Catholics and Protestants. It was from the beginning a predominantly Roman Catholic movement, and when they began to march through the streets demanding equal treatment, the old, predictable parameters of Stormont politics that Nelson described began to crumble. Here was a rapidly growing group for whom the old constitutional issues were not paramount. They were denying the right of the majority to rule as it saw fit; indeed, they were forwarding the claim that had received only sporadic support in the 1920-1960 period that the majority not only ought to seek equality, but had a moral imperative to do so. In short, the Civil Rights Movement was a challenge to many of the postulates of Protestant politics of the previous forty years.

This challenge from outside the Unionist community was thus paralleled by new uncertainties within the Unionist leadership. Even the modest reforms and gestures of Terence O'Neill were too much for increasing numbers of Protestants. With every march, more Protestants began to feel threatened and the siege mentality reasserted itself. The numbers of Protestants clamoring for O'Neill's removal grew. In the fall of 1968, a civil rights march was stoned at Burntollet Bridge by a Protestant mob under the eyes of the overwhelmingly Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The old lines began to be drawn yet again, and soon there was no room for compromise in the Unionist ranks. In the spring of 1969, a rash of bombings at power stations across the province provoked demands
for order that O'Neill could not provide. He resigned in the fall of 1969, and shortly after his resignation, it became clear that it was the Protestant paramilitary group, the UVF, which had been nominally reformed in 1966, which was responsible for the bombings, and not the IRA. The reasons one portion of the Unionist community would use such methods to depose a leader are fundamentally the same as those which led to the formation of the old UVF in 1912: loyalty is conditional, and if one contractor breaks the faith, as many felt O'Neill had done, it was indeed time for him to go, and, to some at least, any means of effecting this removal was justified.

A succession of Unionist leaders followed, and none were able to quell the ever-increasing violence that raged from 1969, when British troops had been sent into the streets, to 1972. The Stormont government resorted to internment, a device used intermittently to detain without positive proof those people suspected of participating in republican activities. This time, they attempted wholesale internment that embittered the vast majority of the Roman Catholic community. The series of demonstrations continued, and on January 30, 1972, a detachment of British paratroopers shot 13 protesters dead in what became known as "Bloody Sunday." As a result, Stormont's authority was revoked by the British government, and Westminster assumed direct rule of Northern Ireland.

Unionism splintered into many different branches for the first time in its history. Arthur and Jeffery, in their capsule history of the recent conflict, have described the state of Unionist politics at this time:

A consequence of this division was that it left the way open for someone or some party to exploit the divisions in Unionism in an attempt to claim leadership of all unionists. The intensity of this battle led to such acrimony and exaggerated pledges that rational debate became impossible within the camp. As a result unionists tried to outbid each other in their claims to be the true loyalists. In turn, this induced unrealistic expectations of what they might secure from the government in terms of their political future and it made them incapable of negotiating a meaningful compromise with their political opponents.

With the benefit of hindsight, it becomes clear that despite this multiple fragmentation of the unionists, there were still some clearly divisive issues between the Protestant and Roman Catholic communities, particularly in the 1973 General Election. In Northern Ireland, the main issue was whether the British governments plan
for "power-sharing" between Protestants and Catholics (the Sunningdale initiative) was to be put into force. Battle lines were drawn between the pro-Faulkner Unionists, who backed the titular head of the UUP, Brian Faulkner, in his approval of Sunningdale, and the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC), a coalition of the rest of the Unionists who opposed the plan. The main points of contention most Unionists had with Sunningdale were that it would give Northern Irish Catholics a numerically disproportionate voice in the governing of the province, and particularly that it called for the establishment of a Council of Ireland, that provided for representatives of both the northern and southern parliaments to meet to decide matters of common concern. To many Unionists, this seemed to be an acknowledgement by the Westminster government that the Republic of Ireland had a legitimate right to influence Northern Irish affairs. Thus, the "Irish Dimension," which seemed so logical to consensus oriented British politicians, was anathema to much of the Ulster Protestant population. The result of the election was a resounding "No" from the protestant population, for the UUUC received 51% of the total vote in the province, meaning that roughly 80% of the Protestant community voted for the UUUC.29

This blow to the legitimacy of Sunningdale was followed up by the 1974 Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) general strike. For ten days, Protestant workers in crucial industries (particularly those who manned the power stations) combined with strong-armers in the Protestant paramilitary groups to virtually shut down Northern Ireland. Strategical and military concerns tied the hands of the Labour government, and the stipulations of Sunningdale were revoked. A notable point about this strike is that it defied common perceptions of what motivates workers to a general strike. Rather than some orthodox Marxian expression of proletarian outrage, the UWC strike of 1974 was a conservative strike that was consciously organized to maintain the political status quo of direct rule from Britain. While many protestants saw direct rule as perhaps the "lesser of two evils", they preferred it to taking steps towards the loss of the constitutional link with Britain. This working-class political initiative was singular, and instead of heralding a "new age" of proletarian politics in Northern Ireland, it paved the way for a return to the old political struggle for the mantle of leadership of the Unionist party. In 1977, another strike was announced. However, it was a failure, and it also resulted in the breakup of the UUUC.

By the early 1980s there seemed to be two main contenders for the Unionist throne—the Official Unionist Party (OUP), direct descendant of the Ulster Unionist Party, headed by the quiet James
Molyneaux, and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which had been created by the vociferous Ian Paisley in the early 1970s. The UUP's electoral support was somewhat battered from the leadership struggles of the previous decade but it still claimed the largest percentage of the Unionist vote. The DUP, on the other hand, had gone from being a "minor irritant on the unionist periphery" to being the second-largest party in Ulster unionism. A glance at Table 1 will show how the two have fought elections in the past decade often within close margins of one another. Generally it can be said that the UUP fares better in Westminster elections than the DUP, and that the bulk of the DUP's representation is at the local level. While in the past few years the DUP seems perhaps to have reached a plateau in its growth of support, it remains a vibrant and extreme voice of Protestant Unionism.

Table 1

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The moderate end of Protestant politics is contained within the Alliance Party. Though it can only loosely be classed as a 'unionist' party, the religiously-mixed Alliance deserves mentioning, for the fact that this rather moderate, consensus-oriented party attracts support from both communities. The Marxist historian Michael Farrell has described it as:

A non-sectarian moderate Unionist party. Committed to maintaining the link with Britain but reforming the Northern state. Set up in April 1970 and has substantial Catholic membership as well as Protestant membership. Its support and membership is overwhelmingly middle-class.

As the persistence of the conflict in Northern Ireland will attest, the tolerant message of the Alliance Party has largely gone unheeded, and those subscribing to the party are only a fraction of the total Protestant population. Their electoral base has been evaluated by Arthur and Jeffery:

[The Alliance Party] did not seem to relate to the emotions of the combatants, and it was this self-conscious thrust towards reason and reasonableness which appears may have made it redundant. . . When intercommunal tensions rise Alliance support dips. . . While it can hope to muster about 10% of the total vote, it cannot, however, hope to form a government at some future date.

Their views are significant, however, because the Alliance party is the often disparagingly described "mythical center" in Northern Irish
politics that seeks a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland through mutual compromise. This sort of consensus politics, however, is the sort of "creeping Republicanism" that the most garrisonistic of Ulster Protestants fear—the politics of Lundies, in other words. Indeed, there seems to be evidence for this contention in the electoral patterns of Alliance. If, as asserted in the above quote, Alliance support fades in times of crisis, it seems entirely logical that this is substantially due to increased garrisonism amongst Ulster Protestants, for if the communal dichotomies are sharper than normal, it seems that the majority of Protestants would be even less disposed to seek compromise.

In summation, we can see that there were four broad stages in the development of present-day unionism. The first parallels the rise and semi-fruition of the Irish Home Rule movement in the late nineteenth century. Here the links between Protestantism and unionism were forged and given political expression. The second stage was the Stormont years of 1922-1972, called "Fifty years of Unionist misrule" by civil rights marchers but looked on as the "Golden Age of Ulster Unionism" by many Protestants. The turbulent O'Neill years that preceded the current conflict brought about the first insurmountable fissures in the Unionist Party's history, and the dogfight that followed to be the flagship of unionism, compose the third stage. Finally, the present situation finds the UUP and the DUP cautiously trading barbs but neither actively seeking the destruction of the other, and this is the fourth stage of Unionist development. In the next chapter, I plan to examine how the differences between the Protestant denominations provide at least a plausible explanation for these divisions in Ulster Unionism, and to draw a few conclusions about the parallels between religious and political behavior in the Ulster Protestant community.

1 Counties Antrim, Down, Tyrone, Armagh, Londonderry, Fermanagh, Donegal, Cavan, and Monaghan. The first six counties make up present-day Northern Ireland; oftentimes, Unionists will use "Ulster" as a synonym for Northern Ireland.
2 Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 290-2.
3 Harbison, Ulster Unionist Party, p.38.
4 Sheane, Ulster's British Connection, p.174.
5 Miller, Queen's Rebels, p. 64.
6 Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p.20-3.
7 Ibid., p.292.
8 Nevin, Irish Dimension, p.8. Though not exactly contemporary to the 1886 Home Rule bill, this philosophy seems to have been alive and well at the time.
9 Ibid., p.8.
For example, in the 1967 council elections, Derry's 14,429 Catholic voters (61% of the total Co. Londonderry electorate) were only able to elect eight out of twenty council members. Arthur and Jeffery, *Northern Ireland Since 1968*, p.5.

As one's religion is not asked when one is about to vote, this is by necessity a rough estimate. Assuming that this 51% was Protestant, this percentage equals a total of 510,000 Protestants who voted for the UUUC. At this time, there were approximately 660,000 Protestants in the province. A little math shows that 77.3% of these Protestants voted for the UUUC.
Having outlined the basic history of the Ulster unionism and briefly discussed its role in the Northern Irish political environment, I will now describe what I consider to be the major cleavage dividing the Protestant community: the differences between the major denominations in Northern Ireland. The two primary Protestant denominations in Northern Ireland are the Church of Ireland and the various Presbyterian churches. Between them, they claim 82% of the Protestant population of the province. Despite the fact that they appeared in Ireland at approximately the same time, these groups have different theological beliefs and their memberships have noticeable geographic and socio-economic characteristics. These differences call into question the conventional wisdom that holds the Protestants of Northern Ireland to be a monolithic group.

As I have previously mentioned, these variances have not received the attention given other, more glaring differences in Northern Irish politics, particularly those between the Protestant and Roman Catholic communities in the province. Though hardly the decisive factor in Northern Irish politics, the differences between the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterians serve as divisive factors within the Unionist community for two major reasons: one, the Church of Ireland's history of advantage, both economic and political, is mirrored by a history of Anglican discrimination against the Presbyterian churches; and two, the theologies of the two bodies lead to friction between the fundamentalist Presbyterians and the more liberal Anglicans of the Church of Ireland. The political ramifications of this are that, one, the Church of Ireland has developed in relative security, and thus is traditionally more amenable to compromise, and two, the relatively liberal theology of the Church of Ireland makes its members more tolerant of the religious differences between it and the Catholic church, thus removing a major barrier to compromise with the religious community. That is, since its views are at least formally similar to the Catholic church's, it is more difficult for Anglicans to view the Roman Catholic community as spiritually wayward or in danger of eternal damnation. Thus, these Anglican qualities lead to mistrustful feelings amongst a substantial portion of the Presbyterian membership. Their history of rugged defiance in the face of persecution combined with their strict, fundamentalist, Calvinistic religious views make them much more intolerant of differences and much more unlikely to compromise on any issue with the Roman Catholic community.
Though this chapter is primarily concerned with examining the differences between the memberships of the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterians, it must also be noted that they share one important characteristic that overshadows many of these other frictions: when one looks at the island as a whole, both of these denominations are tiny minorities compared to the Irish Roman Catholic population. This Catholic numerical superiority frightens both Anglicans and Presbyterians into unison on the all-important issue of the union with Britain. This issue takes precedence over virtually all internal tensions within the Ulster Protestant community, particularly in times of crisis. Thus, when examining the differences between these two major denominations, it must not be forgotten that they remain cohesive on this one burning and, in Northern Ireland, supreme issue. Having made this clear, it is possible to proceed with the study of the divisions that do divide the Protestant community.

The first major difference between the Church of Ireland and the Irish Presbyterian churches lies in the historical legacy that has been handed down to each denomination. The history of the Church of Ireland during its early years differs from that of its English progenitor. The mutual martyrdoms of individuals from either the Church of England or the Catholic church (depending upon the winds of political fortune) did not occur with such frequency or fervor in Ireland. Rather, it seems that the Gaelic chieftains under the nominal control of Henry VIII quietly submitted to conversion while their subjects and even their households remained practicing Catholics. However, in this age of wars between Protestant and Catholic states, such a strategic island as Ireland had to be firmly under Protestant control in order for England to be secure from attack from England's ever-present Catholic rivals, France and Spain. A major step towards this end occurred when Queen Elizabeth I made the Church of Ireland the "Church, established by law" by issuing the Act of Supremacy and the Act of Uniformity through the Irish Parliament in 1560. Protestant control of Ireland was consolidated by the Williamite wars of the late 1680s and early 1690s. As the established church, the Church of Ireland was the only religious body officially recognized by the government for almost two and a half centuries. Membership was required before one could vote, own more than a certain amount of property, or hold any political office. The effect of this was to give a virtual monopoly on the economic and political leadership of the island at least until the closure of the Irish Parliament by the 1801 Act of Union, which ironically was resisted
by the "Protestant Ascendancy," as this socio-political dominance of the Church of Ireland's membership has been referred to.

The Union with Britain did not greatly diminish the Anglicans' near-stranglehold on power, but the first tidings of its loosening was the 1829 "Catholic Emancipation"—the climax of Daniel O'Connell's successful fight to allow Irish Catholics the right to become Members of Parliament (MP's). Though the United Kingdom's voting requirements still effectively excluded much of the poorer Catholic population of the island from using the suffrage, this event heralded the beginning of the end of Anglican control of Ireland. The Church of Ireland was formally dis-established in 1869, meaning in theory that all the privileges and advantages enjoyed by its members might be enjoyed by all regardless of their faith. However, the inertia of prolonged influence continued only slightly diminished into at least the early twentieth century. For example, one researcher has noted that compared to their percentage of the population, members of the Church of Ireland were strongly and thus disproportionately represented in the business and professional classes. It is also interesting to note a fact that was unsettling to many Protestants in the latter part of the nineteenth century: the early leaders of the Irish Home Rule movement, Isaac Butt and Charles Parnell, were both members of the Church of Ireland, a fact which also is a precedent for Presbyterian doubts about the resolve of Anglican church members to cling to the union with Britain.

Compared to this early history of powerful political and socio-economic influence, the Presbyterians in Ireland were an oppressed group. Though Protestant, they suffered almost as greatly as Catholics for their adherence to their faith. Brought over from Scotland most dramatically by the Plantation but also from the inevitable immigration that occurs between two lands of such proximity, the Presbyterian encountered at best indifference and at times open discrimination from their Anglican lords, particularly under the post-Williamite Penal Laws that were instituted to help establish the dominance of the Anglican church. As one recent Unionist MP has written of this time:

> The Presbyterian found himself, or felt himself, at odds both with Popery and with the resented predominance of Anglican Squire and Parson. Anglican and Dissenter (as all non-Anglican Protestants were known), all must pay tithes to the Church of England.

This assumed Freudian slip on the part of the Presbyterian author implies that the Anglican church was somehow "foreign" to the Presbyterians, for, mistakenly or otherwise, he refers to the Church of Ireland as the Church of England. Given Protestant garrisonism
towards Britain and particularly towards the English, there is probably a deeper meaning to his phraseology than a simple misprint. At any rate, the payment of tithes to the established church was not the only restriction imposed upon the Presbyterians in Ireland. For a time, Presbyterian marriages—and thus the children of these marriages—were not recognized as legitimate by the government. Likewise, Presbyterian religious meetings were sometimes banned, and the rigorously faithful were driven to such acts of defiance as rowing over the twelve-mile stretch of choppy water that separates Ireland and Scotland in order to take the Presbyterian communion. Still more lost substantial amounts of property for their adherence to their faith. Presbyterian disgruntlement with this state of affairs was quite violently expressed in the often examined United Irishmen Rebellion of 1798. Though a military disaster for the rebels, it is especially memorable because Irish Presbyterians briefly united with the Roman Catholics of the island in the hopes of gaining Irish independence. Though this alliance quickly dissipated, Presbyterian distaste for the Protestant Ascendancy was amply registered by this insurgency. What is important about these historical facts is that persecution had the double effect of leaving the Presbyterian pews peopled by only the staunchest believers while at the same time creating a heritage of strong-willed resistance to temporal tampering into either religious or political affairs important to Ulster Presbyterians. Hence Presbyterians were self-selected by history as those who voluntarily took the more difficult path of commitment to a fervently followed set of beliefs, and a resignation to the persecution that entailed. This contrasts with the tendency for the relative complacency of the membership in an established church (here the Church of Ireland), as I shall later elaborate upon. 

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Penal Laws were repealed and open discrimination against Presbyterians became more the exception than the rule. Still, as one author has delicately phrased it, "relations between the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland were anything but cordial." In the 1840s, there were also schisms in the Presbyterian church that led to the creation of the Non-subscribing and Non-conforming branches of the church. Though considered extremely important at the time of the break, the actual theological disputes are relatively inconsequential to the focus of this paper. Still, this tendency to split is representative of the powerful insistence upon personal interpretation of scripture that is a basic part of the inherent fundamentalism of the Presbyterian church. It also shows to what lengths some strong-willed
Presbyterians are prepared to go in order that their personal beliefs will be satisfied, for it is deemed better to dissociate than to risk "spiritual contamination" as a result of compromise about firmly held beliefs.

To change focus, it is helpful to examine the political behavior of both Anglican and Dissenters in the nineteenth century. Even at this time there was a decided difference between the political behavior of the two groups. Part of this difference was the traditional association of the established church in both England and Ireland with the Conservative Party. Often called the "Tory Party at prayer," the Anglican Church of Ireland shared this connection with its English progenitor. Conversely, the Presbyterians tended towards the opposing political viewpoint of the Liberal Party. Describing both this condition as well as the ramifications of the 1798 rebellion upon Presbyterians, Stewart has written that:

If the Presbyterians ceased to be nationalists, they did not cease to be liberals, and they instinctively chose the opposite side politically from the Tories of the Established Church. Although conservative Presbyterians and Anglicans grew closer together, especially after Catholic Emancipation, Liberalism (with a capital 'L') was still strong in Ulster until 1886.6

Thus, the Home Rule issue took precedence over fundamental Presbyterian opposition to the religious and political views of many of the members of the Church of Ireland. In a less tumultuous political landscape the existing political cleavages would in all likelihood have caused readily noticeable factional infighting. This did not occur during the fight against the Home Rule bills. Thus, contentious rivalries were subordinated in the face of the rise of a greater threat: Irish Home Rule and the resulting growth of the Roman Catholic power in Ireland. As has already been stated many times, the prospect of Roman Catholic power forced Protestants to resolve their differences or lose their combined political influence. Though the political history of the two groups from this point onwards is basically that of unionism, it should not be inferred that the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland became one homogenous group. They created a political coalition, and were thus a group formed from diverse interests who shared the defeat of Home Rule as their primary political goal.

These different historical heritages have produced a number of current distinctions between the Presbyterians and the Anglicans in the north of Ireland. For example, the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterians differ demographically from one another. Most of
Ulster's Presbyterian population is contained in the two Belfast counties of Antrim and Down, and they tend to be more populous in Northern Ireland's two cities, Belfast and Londonderry/Derry. Church of Ireland members, on the other hand, tend to reside in the more rural areas—for example, in the two least populous counties in Northern Ireland, Fermanagh and Tyrone, the Church of Ireland claims the largest percentage of the Protestant population; in Fermanagh alone, they outnumber Presbyterians almost 10 to 1. To these elements of urban/rural tension are added socio-economic tensions, for while there seems to be little difference in the actual amounts earned by Presbyterians and Angli cans, employment that requires "connections"—such as the civil service or the diplomatic corps—is predominated by those from the Church of Ireland. For example, 15% of those Church of Ireland members who have jobs are employed by the government in the civil service, while only 5% of the Presbyterian work force finds itself in these sought-after positions. In the diplomatic service, differences are even more dramatic; Church of Ireland employees outnumbers the Presbyterians almost 3 to 1. Though these economic distinctions are not quite as sharp as the geographical differences, the apparent difference in influence would support the contention that it is still possible for Presbyterians to feel like outsiders. In this way, the legacy of the history of Anglican privilege still affects political relations within the Ulster Protestant community in two ways: subjectively, for the Presbyterians remember the way their forefathers suffered for their faith almost as fondly as they recall the founding of the UVF or the 1690 Battle of the Boyne; and objectively, particularly when the differences of demography and apparent influence are taken into consideration. Though not as noticeable as the differences between Protestants and Roman Catholics in the province, these differences and their resulting tensions contribute to and exacerbate the garrisonism of the Ulster Protestant community.

In addition to having different histories and thus different membership compositions as a result of this dissimilar past, the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian church also differ theologically. I contend that the primary difference between the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland lies in the area of scriptural interpretation. In short, the Presbyterians tend towards a more fundamentalist view of scripture while the Church of Ireland subscribes to a more liberal interpretation of the Bible. According to the religious scholar Roger Schmidt, this conflict between liberal and fundamentalist views is the "primary division within Christendom today". His definition of scriptural fundamentalism is a belief in
the Bible as God's revealed word, thus making it either totally inerrant or at least literally correct about doctrinal matters. On the other hand, a liberal view of scripture is marked not only by a critical view of the historical context of these writings, but also by beliefs and practices which are shaped by church traditions and secular knowledge. These traits can be observed in the organization of the churches and in their different practices, and this in turn highlights the fundamental/liberal dichotomy existing between the theologies of the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian churches.

The primary difference in the organization of these two denominations is the concept of the source of authority regarding church matters. In the Church of Ireland, the Archbishop of Dublin has final authority on most issues, with only some deference to the Archbishop of Canterbury. Thus, power in the Church of Ireland flows from the top to the bottom. On the other hand, the source of power for Presbyterians resides in the individual congregations, or Presbyteries. Delegates (usually elders or ministers) are sent to a synod, which in turn sends delegates to the General Assembly of the Irish Presbyterian Churches, where matters of widespread concern are decided by majority vote. The resemblance to modern legislatures is clear.

The charts help illustrate the general organizational structure of the two denominations. Though structurally similar, the power flow within the bodies is the most revealing characteristic. An example of these differing concepts of the source of authority in matters of church existence is well illustrated by the manner in which ministers come to their respective congregations. In the Church of Ireland, pastors are ordained and then assigned to a congregation. In the Presbyterian churches, however, ministers are first invited to appear before a congregation for a "test" sermon, and,
if the Presbytery approves, he may then be "called" by that congregation to be its minister. The difference in these two procedures is that the Presbyterian mode of choosing both elders and ministers comes straight from Paul’s letter to Timothy regarding this topic.\textsuperscript{12} These passages describe the appointment to either of these positions as a communal decision of the individual congregation and set forth guidelines to be considered. On the other hand, the Anglican church continued the practice established by its immediate predecessor, the Roman Catholic church, which called for pastors, priests, and the rest of the church hierarchy to be appointed by the Archbishop. Thus, the Presbyterians established their practice on scriptural admonition which is a decidedly fundamentalist practice, while the Church of Ireland followed church tradition, thus taking a liberal view of the passages in question.

Likewise, the Presbyterian church tends to shun religious practices which are not expressly called for by the New Testament. For example, the use of liturgy—set prayers and responses—is decidedly absent from Irish Presbyterian services. In fundamentalist faiths prayers are meant to be spontaneous expressions of worship and supplication to God. Contrarily, the Church of Ireland, along with other Episcopal churches, practices liturgy, embodied in the \textit{Book of Common Prayer}. Contrasting the practice of the two denominations, the Anglican use of liturgy is a strong example of a church tradition becoming a crucial part of the worship service. Since the New Testament has only one stylized prayer—the Lord’s Prayer—[some fundamentalists argue that even this is only meant as a general guide], it can easily be seen that the Church of Ireland is more liberal in its interpretation of scripture than the Presbyterians.

I contend that these two types of Christianity affect the voting behavior within the Protestant community of Northern Ireland. The fundamentalism of the Presbyterians leads to a greater emphasis on personal actions and responsibilities in their religious life; this in turn leads to a greater tendency towards personal intransigence and activism in these people’s political lives. The large number of Presbyterians who support the extremist Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) provides an excellent example of how this religious stubbornness translates into uncompromising political attitudes (see table next page). The members of the Church of Ireland, on the other hand, with their relatively accommodating views in religious matters, are marked by more flexible views in the political world. Again, their political affiliations represent this liberality, for as can be seen there are greater percentages of Anglicans in the two moderate
unionist parties, the Alliance and the OUP, than the more numerous Presbyterians.

**Politico-Religious Affiliation in Northern Ireland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>% in DUP</th>
<th>% in OUP</th>
<th>% Alliance</th>
<th>% of Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of Ireland</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Presbyterian</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Protestant*</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*includes those who declined to state a religious preference

The statistics show that as one progresses from the more extreme DUP to the most flexible unionist party, Alliance, (evidenced by the proportion of Catholics), the percentages of Presbyterians drop while those of the Church of Ireland increase. It thus seems clear that there are connections between a Protestant's denomination and his/her political orientation. Likewise, these numbers correspond with my assertion that fundamentalism produces uncompromising unionism. Though it should again be clearly stated that these differences are extremely broad and serve only as general indicators of the political atmosphere of the Ulster Protestant community, one can plainly discern the trends I have been discussing.

In assessing the political ramifications of these historical and theological differences between the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian churches, two primary conclusions may be drawn. One is that the Presbyterian history of discrimination under the Anglicans makes the Presbyterian of today acutely aware of both this heritage of oppression and their defiant resistance of it. Two, the Church of Ireland's role in this discrimination combined with their less-fundamentalist theological stance makes Presbyterians suspect both the Anglicans' steadfastness as well as their political motives. Thus, the Grand Master of the Orange Order, who is also a Presbyterian minister, can speak with subtle pride that his "Presbyterian forbears knew something of the wrath of the Penal Laws," and in this example of stubborn adherence to principles find an example to guide him in both his religious and political behavior of the present. The eminent Irish historian A.T.Q. Stewart comments on this point:

The Presbyterian is happiest when he is being a radical. The austere doctrines of Calvinism, the simplicity of his worship, the democratic government of his church, the memory of the Martyred Covenanters, the Scottish refusal to yield or dissemble—all these incline him to that difficult and cantankerous disposition which is characteristic of a certain kind of political radicalism. His natural instinct is to distrust the outward forms of civil government unless...
they are consonant with his religious principles. On the other hand, his situation and his history in a predominantly Catholic Ireland have bred in him attitudes which seem opposite to these, making him defensive, intolerant, and uncritically to traditions and institutions.\footnote{15}

The paradox of an intense desire for religious liberty leading to an oppression of others' right to enjoy the same thing lies at the heart of Protestant garrisonism; likewise, the heart of garrisonism lies in Ulster Presbyterianism. To them, the stakes in the political game of the province are too high to allow for any compromise, be it religious or political—indeed, the two are often treated as equivalent issues in the political dialogue (or lack thereof) in Northern Irish circles.

If the heart of garrisonism is Presbyterianism, then it follows that the Church of Ireland will be less staunchly "Unionist," in the general sense of the term, extending to such related issues as economic concessions to Ulster's Catholic population. These concessions are precisely what is feared by many Presbyterians, and thus gives rise to the concerns of many Presbyterians that the Church of Ireland is more likely to produce "Lundies," and influential Lundies at that, who could potentially betray all the civil and religious liberties enjoyed by the Ulster Protestants. As irrational as this might sound to those familiar with the use of consensus politics as the best way forward, it is symptomatic of the zero-sum political environment in the province. One writer has described this fear that haunts, even peripherally, the decisions of many Presbyterian Unionists:

The professional and managerial classes to be found in the Church of Ireland...tend to view politics in the rationalistic and pragmatic terms common to most societies. For them, Ulster's troubles are resolvable through balance, compromise, and mutual toleration resolving conflict. They would make substantial concessions to Catholics to rationalise a disrupted political environment.\footnote{16}

In other words, Anglican loyalty to the union, to Protestantism, and, by association to Ulster, stands the greatest chance of waversing—because their religious liberality is often translated into a political liberality (in the Northern Irish context), and they are perceived to be the most likely to become "Lundies" by many of the Ulster Presbyterians. This adds a special meaning to Unionist fears of the Anglican O'Neill's reforms, for any move towards consensus on his part was more liable to be suspected by Presbyterians of traitorous intent than if he had been of Presbyterian stock. Though it would be absurd to say that it was solely O'Neill's religion that made him
suspect in the eyes of many Unionists, it would be equally mistaken to merely ignore this aspect of the struggle.

To conclude, it seems that the differences between the two main Protestant denominations influence Northern Irish politics in three ways. One is that the history of rivalry and animosity between Presbyterian and Anglican has resulted in demographic and economic differences in the present day that lead to tangible friction within the Ulster Unionist community. Two, the theological differences between the two denominations arise from a conflict of fundamentalist and liberal interpretations of scripture. This in turn translates into varying degrees of political garrisonism represented by the inverse proportions of membership in the three main Unionist parties. Three, it seems that the heart of Ulster Protestant garrisonism lies in Ulster Presbyterianism, for its unyielding theology and practice produce parallel political qualities that make compromise over apparently secular issues equally difficult.

Having examined the basic reasons and ramifications of this dichotomy between the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterians, two case studies from both ends of the fundamentalist/liberal spectrum in Northern Ireland need to be examined in order to illustrate the scope of these differences: the special case of the Reverend Ian Paisley, and Protestant division over the nature of the ecumenical movement. These two studies will help to further highlight the denominational split within Northern Irish Protestantism, one with a predominantly political focus—the Rev. Paisley—and one with primarily a religious focus—the ecumenical movement.

12. I Timothy 3:1-9; Titus 1:6
13. Moxon-Browne, *Nation, Class, and Creed in Northern Ireland*, pp. 66, 84, 89, 96, and *Northern Ireland Census 1981*, p. 50. The statistics on the OUP had to be interpolated from affiliation tables of the DUP and the Alliance along with general denominational population statistics from the census.
15 Stewart, Narrow Ground, p. 83.
16 Wallis et al. "Ethnicity and Evangelism . . .", p. 300.
"THE BIG MAN": IAN PAISLEY

Lord, we pray this night for this land! Save us from all our enemies! Defeat the IRA and all its evil machinations! . . . We pray that thou wouldst work in our land, and keep us pure, and keep us uncompromising [shouts of amen] in our Protestant convictions, and in our stand for Christ. . . . Turn Ulster back to God! Back to the right paths of righteousness! Smash Popery in our land, and all its deceptions! Deal with the ecumenical deceivers, the peddlers of false gospels. We pray that Thou would expose them for what they are!1

Appearances can often deceive. What might initially appear to be the ramblings of a street-corner preacher are words that were fervently prayed by the man who is "the most popular politician in Ulster in recent years," and who has been Northern Ireland's only elected representative to the European Parliament since elections have been held for the position (1979).2 The Reverend Doctor Ian R.K. Paisley MP, is perhaps the most controversial figure in Protestant politics in Northern Ireland. One fellow Unionist called him the "Demon Doctor", and a pair of his biographers have said that he "dominates the Northern Irish scene like a malign colossus." To his devoted following, however, his dire warnings and predictions seemed to be proven when Northern Ireland was plunged into political chaos in 1969, thus making him a prophet in the eyes of some. One ardent supporter has said that Paisley "is a man raised up by God in Ulster's hour of need."3 Paisley's divisive message has made him famous in the British Isles as perhaps the most strident of Ulster Unionists; however, this extremism does not relegate him to the fringes of Northern Irish politics. Examining this paragon of Protestant garrisonism is important as a case study of the "siege mentality", for his political influence in the province is massive.

There are three primary characteristics of Ian Paisley's influence upon Northern Irish Protestant politics. One, his religious views are characteristic of a theologically uncompromising Calvinism that often equates religious issues with political issues. For example, its virulent anti-Catholicism leads to garrisonism because, in Irish politics, a fear of Roman Catholicism automatically implies a fear of Irish Nationalism. Likewise, its emphasis upon individualism leads to an ultra-activism that frustrates attempts at compromise. Two, though his theology and his politics are extreme within the Unionist spectrum, the fact of his electoral success shows that even though all his views may not be held by his political supporters, he strikes the most vibrant chord of any Northern Irish politician amongst Ulster
Protestants. Third, the group represented by Paisley is perhaps the most active, vocal, and uncompromising within the Protestant community, and they stand firmly in the way of any political moves that seem accommodating of the Roman Catholic community.

Before discussing the characteristics of this influence, it is helpful to first relate some features of Paisley's personal background. Ian Robert Kyle Paisley was born in the staunchly Protestant town of Ballymena, County Antrim, the son of a Presbyterian minister who was also a member of the original UVF. His childhood was surrounded by the political violence that occurred with the founding of Northern Ireland in the 1920s. In his mid-twenties he entered the Presbyterian ministry, but soon thereafter left to form his own church—the Free Presbyterian Church—where his ultra-fundamentalism could flourish as he saw fit. His political activism dates back to his teen years when he was a member of the Orange Order. Paisley emerged as a political leader, however, in the mid-1950s when the Irish Republican Army's "Border Campaign" was at its peak. The Border Campaign was a series of raids and bombings primarily of army installations on the Northern Ireland-Republic of Ireland border primarily in 1956, but which continued sporadically until 1961. Paisley founded an extremist group called Ulster Protestant Action (UPA), which, among other things, demanded the wholesale internment of Roman Catholics suspected of Republican activities. The fairly swift resolution of this outbreak of violence and the fact that O'Neill's mildly reformist program met apparent initial acceptance within the Protestant community meant that Paisley's warnings of Catholic subversion made him a voice in the political wilderness. He formed the Independent Orange Order, and the UPA was transformed into the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV), another group that was decidedly against any concessions to the Roman Catholic minority in the province. Though the group's following increased as the tide of Unionist popular opinion turned against O'Neill, it still remained a fringe group at the outbreak of violence in August 1969. In many Protestants' eyes, however, Paisley had been at the very least proven more accurate than other Unionist politicians by the events of that summer. Paisley also contributed to the downfall of Terence O'Neill by competing against him in O'Neill's home seat of Bannside in a 1969 general election. Though O'Neill won the election, it was only by a margin of 1,414 votes. This was a considerably smaller margin than had been predicted for the previously 'safe' seat and many took this to be an overall Unionist rejection of O'Neillite reforms.
Paisley's shouts of "O'Neill must go!" changed to "Chichester-Clarke must go!" and ultimately into "Faulkner must go!" as the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) struggled to find a leader. The Unionists opposed to the Sunningdale Agreement formed the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC). Paisley took a leading role in this organization. Ironically, his popular standing seems to have taken a fall during the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike of 1974. Paisley initially opposed the stoppage, but as the popular will seemed to support it, he jumped on the bandwagon. This U-turn made him seem less of a prophet and more of an opportunist in the eyes of many Protestants. For example, one UWC pamphlet has said of this campaign that, "Paisley...scarcely raised a ripple of concern in the Protestant community...he was never so isolated politically as in the month after Sunningdale."

The Reverend Doctor may have been down, but he was hardly out. While the Unionists groped for a strong leader, Paisley's voice carried, and indeed, still carries, a consistent message that upholds beliefs firmly rooted in the minds of many Ulster Protestants.

Foremost in this message is a denunciation of attempts at compromise with the Roman Catholic community, primarily for three different reasons. One, the "zero-sum" political culture of the province means that similar to an athletic contest, if the Roman Catholics win, then the Protestants must lose. Logic implies, and such researchers as Nelson, Moloney and Pollak have claimed, that there is an obvious motivation to deny the Catholic community any "wins."

Two, any "win" thus gained by the Roman Catholic community additionally adds momentum to the IRA, who, Paisley claims, find in this perceived victory legitimation for further acts of terrorism. Thus, it is logical to say that Paisley feels that any unforced compromise with the Roman Catholic community will be interpreted as weakness by the IRA, who would then be emboldened to increase their efforts. Three, Paisley's religious views include a fierce opposition to the Papacy on a theological basis. Though I will later elaborate upon the specific aspects of this, suffice it to say that though his religious views do not have numerically that strong a following, his political message rings true to many Ulster unionists. As has been noted, by the early 1980s the Unionists were divided into two main camps: the OUP, headed by Molyneaux, and the DUP headed by Paisley, and these remain the two main camps within Ulster Unionism at the present time.

Ian Paisley's theological beliefs have a number of interesting characteristics. One of these is an uncompromising hatred of the Roman Catholic church with a ferocity reminiscent of the
Reformation. Bell has said that "when Paisley thundered against the Catholic Church he was not criticizing a religious institution or an erroneous interpretation of the Bible; he was taking on the Devil himself." By saying this, Bell means that Ian Paisley literally believes that the Pope to be the Antichrist. Indeed, there is considerable self-testimony to this effect. For example, Paisley wrote in a tract denouncing the Papal visit to the United Kingdom in 1982 that:

The Popes of Rome for centuries have, under the title of Vicar of Christ, been masquerading as Christs. Ever since the Bishop of Rome got a taste for power early in the Christian era, he yelled,"I am Christ", and right down to Pope John Paul II they have been yelling it, shouting it, trumpeting it, and parroting it. ..This is the confession of the Antichrist. Thank God we recognize him.

Likewise, Paisley has written the following passage in a tract unsurprisingly titled Antichrist:

The Pope, the Vicar of Christ, is the Man of Sin(prophesied by the Scriptures). He has invented sin, he has taught sin, he has enacted sin, established iniquity by law, he trades in sins and has grown rich through the sins of Christendom. Sin is the Pope's work. Sin is the Pope's being. Popery is the incarnation of sin as the Gospel is the incarnation of holiness. The policy of the Pope as Antichrist is not to deny truth but to pervert truth.

Besides revealing the fact that Paisley believes the Pope to be the Antichrist, this passage also shows two other important aspects of Paisley's theology. By saying the Pope perverts truth, Paisley is automatically wary of the initiatives of the Roman Catholic Church, for by this test, no matter how logical a Catholic initiative might appear, it is fundamentally evil according to Paisley's theology, and thus he opposes it. Furthermore, by calling the Gospel the "incarnation of holiness", Paisley gives the reader some idea of the depth of his fundamentalism.

When these dimensions of Paisley's theological beliefs are acknowledged, his extreme garrisonism begins to make more sense. If a united Ireland means a rise to power of the Catholic Church, then Paisley's homeland would be controlled by the Antichrist, and that would be unthinkable. This view of Roman Catholicism as evil incarnate makes compromise with the Roman Catholic community virtually impossible. This opposition to the Papacy is also a prime example of how religion and politics overlap one another in the figure of Ian Paisley, and by association, the politics of Northern Ireland.
The Reverend's justification for his view of the Pope as Antichrist is dependent upon a strict reading of the Book of Revelations and passages from Matthew 24:5, along with a sprinkling of Old Testament prophecies. This strict interpretation of scripture is a salient point of Paisley's ultra-fundamentalism that pervades all of his preaching and political proselytizing. For example, Paisley has written that the "three most important duties of religion" are private prayer, Bible reading, and meditation upon these passages. The personal, individualistic nature of these tasks are fairly obvious in light of both his insistence upon scriptural literalness and the primary responsibility of the individual to actively pursue this "divinely revealed" course, Paisley clearly fulfills the definition of a fundamentalist.

Having noted this, it is prudent to examine Paisley's relationship with mainstream Presbyterianism. His general relation to Presbyterianism has been assessed by Brooke, who described it as both "overlapping" yet "independent" from Ulster Presbyterianism, with the primary difference being both an emphasis upon individual conversion and a strong commitment to their "new Life" as one born again. McSweeney more directly states that: . . .Northern Ireland's mainstream Presbyterianism differs from the fundamentalist evangelical Presbyterianism typified by Ian Paisley only in fervour and intensity of belief. Thus Paisley's Free Presbyterianism is a focused, extreme brand of Presbyterianism that takes the inherent fundamental qualities of Irish Presbyterianism (i.e., scriptural literalness and individual responsibility) and emphasizes them nearly to the point of fanaticism.

This emphasis upon the individual, both through personal commitment and the pursuance of an active faith extends into the political arena. Paisley and his DUP are perhaps the most vocal and outspoken party in the Northern Irish political landscape. For example, Paisley went to the European Parliament to denounce a visit by the Pope so vociferously that he was almost forcibly removed from the chamber. Likewise, when a Roman Catholic priest addressed an ecumenical gathering in the Church of Ireland's St. Anne's Cathedral in Belfast, a group of Paisleyite demonstrators stood outside chanting "No Pope Here", among other things. When speaking about the IRA hunger strikers in 1981, Paisley stated that, "We have a choice to make. Shall we allow ourselves to be murdered by the IRA or shall we kill the killers?" After the OUP MP for South Belfast, the Reverend Robert Bradford, was assassinated by the IRA,
memorial speeches were made in the House of Commons. During these speeches, felt to be "hypocritical" by many Unionists present, Paisley made "heated interventions" that led to his being suspended from the chamber.18

Is Paisley conscious of how his views, both political and religious, are viewed by the outside world? Most definitely; this is another important aspect of Paisleyite and indeed, Presbyterian, activism—one is required to suffer if he is proclaiming a truth of which the world, blinded by sin and Satan, does not approve. For example, Paisley has written in one religious tract that:

The voice of the [Protestant] martyr is heard in heaven. The text describes it as a 'loud voice' to which the Lord gives immediate attention. The voice of the martyrs is stifled and muffled by men on earth and those who would draw attention to their principles and sacrifices and indict the Roman murriness are discredited. In heaven, however, their voice is heard and their faithfulness rewarded. Yes, and let it be remembered their illustrious roll is not yet completed. More of God's choice people will fall prey to the beast of Rome before God hurls His final anathema upon the whole Hellish system of Popery. The killing times and martyr pyres will shortly be again the experience of those who stand up for Christ against the Roman Antichrist.19

The clear implication is that those who are "standing firm" today in the face of a world calling for consensus are following in the footsteps of those martyrs venerated by Ulster Protestants. It is equally clear that Paisley believes that those committed to God's work are certain to be persecuted, and, like the early Christians who beseeched the Emperor Nero to feed them to the lions, Paisley seeks controversy and demands his followers to take an actively uncompromising, obstructionist stance both religiously and politically.

Though Paisley's Free Presbyterian church claims the allegiance of 11,000 Northern Irish members (around 2% of the Protestant population of the province), his DUP has consistently received a larger proportion of the total vote than Free Presbyterian numbers alone could provide; this has already been outlined in the previous chapter on Unionism.20 For example, one survey of Democratic Unionists found a large percentage of mainstream Presbyterians and other Protestant denominations (Methodists, Baptists, etc.) with a number of Anglicans as well.21 This should not be surprising, for I have emphasized all along that the Presbyterian/Anglican dichotomy is a relative one. There are decided differences, but these are not so strong that they can in any way be considered to be absolutes. Thus
it seems that Paisley's religious views do not greatly hamper his political popularity. One researcher has assessed this quality:

Paisley's dual role as leader of a church and political party is one ingredient of his success. Although not all his political supporters would subscribe to his doctrinal views, there seems no doubt that Paisley's own brand of Protestantism provides an ideology that bears the same relation to the DUP's political tactics as Marxism does to a Communist party in Eastern Europe. The ideology serves to legitimize political actions, it serves as a unifying force, but it is flexible enough to be adapted to alternative policies in the pursuit of broadly similar goals.22

Thus it seems that while theology is a foundation for Unionist extremism, the actual number of those subscribing to Paisley's particular sect paradoxically make up only a small portion of his political organization, the DUP. Bell has commented upon this state of affairs:

Protestant evangelists do not make up the majority of Protestants in Northern Ireland and it is not the defence of the social morality and the Protestant ethic which motivates the majority of the Protestants, but there are enough evangelists and enough moral outrage to have given Paisley a hearing and a following, and when he turned his brilliant oratory, his destructive wit, and his political attention to Unionist traitors, many more listened and followed. What the 'Big Man' promised was salvation: salvation from heretical faiths, and from political compromisers.23

If anything, Paisley and his followers pose a formidable barrier to compromise in Northern Ireland.

What explains the political attraction of a man who virtually anywhere else (excepting the American South) would be considered a religious fanatic? There are a number of reasons that have been forwarded, but there are three that seem to have more validity than others. One holds that Paisley's rhetoric is simply a new twist on the old, traditional Ulster Unionist message: "No Surrender." As Nelson has pointed out, Paisley has combined tradition, recurring strands in Ulster political life (i.e., "the vital link between religion and politics", limited legitimation of Protestant political violence, and social conservatism) with a new and dynamic focus for political socialization—the DUP.24 She has written that Paisley:

... expressed the beliefs of Protestants who saw a vital link between religion and politics, who viewed Protestantism as under constant threat from a monolithic and aggrandising Catholic Church.25
Thus it seems that this explanation holds Paisley's electoral success to be rooted in the past and in the old fear that "Home rule means Rome rule."

In the same vein, another observer has felt that it was this commitment to traditional "Ulster values" that is the key to Paisley's popularity:

Ian Paisley has achieved his very considerable degree of success among Ulster Protestants because he has been able in both manner and message to project the traditional image and identity of conservative Ulster Protestantism. In the absence of a clear national consciousness, an identity formulated in terms of evangelical Protestantism is ultimately the only viable one for defending the continued social and cultural autonomy and dominance of Ulster loyalists, even for many working-class Protestants who have long since ceased to be religiously observant.26

In effect, these researchers are saying that evangelical Protestantism is the only basis that supports the continued separation of Northern Ireland from the rest of the island. This quote also seems to support the idea that religion serves as the foundation of Unionist extremism. While religion is not the primary reason for Protestants' strident support of the link with Britain, it provides a basis for maintaining the siege mentality. Those who are not religiously active but share the same political garrisonism of their pious neighbors join with them in the face of the common threat of Catholicism, embodied in the possibility that Northern Ireland might become part of the Irish Republic. While it is extremely simplistic to argue that fear of Catholicism as a religious entity is the primary motivation guiding Ulster unionists, it is equally important to not dismiss entirely the importance of religion as a political rallying point for the Protestant community.

Similar to the previous description of the origins of Paisley's popularity, some attribute Paisley's success to the inherent garrisonism of many Ulster Protestants. Moloney and Pollak contend that:

The real key to Paisley's power is that he mirrors the insecurity that lurks deep within all Northern Ireland Unionists, the belief that everywhere there are enemies conspiring against them. Paisley feeds that paranoia with one hand but with the other calms it with his own certainty.27 That is, Paisley stirs up extremism, but his faith that unionism will triumph in the end helps to reassure unionists who subscribe to this pinnacle of garrisonism. These somewhat unsympathetic biographers go on to elaborate upon this point:

One of Paisley's greatest strengths is his intimate knowledge of the peculiarly politico-religious
paranoia of Loyalism. He is as skillful as any fanatical Muslim leader in whipping it up in his people. And his methods are similar. 'He has brainwashed them into believing that protecting Ulster is a holy crusade', says one prominent ex-follower. 'They are fighting for God, and God's a Protestant and an Orangeman, as everyone knows, and so he must want Ulster to stay as it is. Anybody who says anything else is the enemy.'

It seems that they feel Paisley's activism to the possible point martyrdom is a major component of Protestant garrisonism, at least for the supporters of the DUP. This is what is usually implied when one "fights for God". Such narrow views lie at the heart of Paisley's support, and they are perpetuated by his unyielding commitment to them.

The religious aspects of Paisley's politics are emphasized most clearly by the sympathetic biographer Smyth. He draws comparisons between Paisley and the "politically fundamentalists in the United States", particularly in four areas. One, he observes that they both share a patriotic idealism that borders upon chauvinism for the homeland; two, that there is an inherent distrust of government particularly of the motives of mainstream politicians; three, there the perception that personal liberties are threatened by outside forces, be it from communism or Irish nationalism (Paisley felt both); and four, Paisley's rigid determination to resist changes which promote "liberalisation in moral attitudes" is extremely similar to the campaigns of such fundamentalist watchdogs as the Moral Majority. Part of Smyth's reasoning behind this claim undoubtedly the fact that Ian Paisley received his doctorate from Bob Jones University in Greenville, SC. He summarized Paisley's political absorption of these qualities:

This ideology has been shaped by Scottish seventeenth century Presbyterian political theory with its emphasis on a form of contractual allegiance, and by twentieth century American Fundamentalist revivalism with its strong populist appeal and love of country. Paisley's particular talent has been to graft onto the political principles of his covenanting forefathers all the energy, financial acumen, and brashness of the Fundamentalist Protestant sects of the US.

It should be noted that this reference to the contractual theory of governmental relationships is identical to Miller's assertion in Queen's Rebels that a major reason for Ulster Protestant garrisonism is that their still rely upon a contractual theory of politics [oriented primarily between the regent and his/her subjects] while mainland Britain has moved onto to a Parliament-dominated form of
government that makes the constitutional position of Northern Ireland inherently unstable.\textsuperscript{31}

As a result of this fiery style of religio-political motivation that is readily observable in Paisley's background, the DUP responds by being one of the most vocal and activist groups in the province. One of the primary reasons for this is Paisley himself. As the founder and leader of Democratic Unionism, he is the natural initiator of his party's political actions. Since he believes so fervently in both individual responsibility and the necessity of individual activism in religious matters, and since he also frequently fuses religious and political issues, the DUP follows his lead and tends to participate in more vocal and noticeable forms of protest, such as the aforementioned "No Pope Here" demonstration outside of St. Anne's. Studies of the background of those who are presumably the most activist DUP members (the politicians themselves) have also shown a larger proportion of Free Presbyterians than make up the DUP electorate.\textsuperscript{32} Even those who are not members of the Free Presbyterian Church tend to be evangelical Christians from other denominations such as the Methodists and the Baptists. This tends to support the concept of Paisley's ultra-fundamentalist, ultra-activist theology being representative of the essence of Protestant garrisonism as well as upholding the validity of the contention that religious fundamentalism frequently gives rise to political garrisonism.\textsuperscript{33} Bruce has noted this similarity of religious and political activism, as well as the phenomena of the non-religious voting for Protestant fundamentalists:

\ldots even non-evangelicals recognize that evangelicalism symbolizes the heart of their Unionism, and that political goals are best pursued by evangelicals.\textsuperscript{34}

That is, since the theological fear of Catholicism is so strong, and the tradition of individual dedication and activism is so long, it seems evident that the religio-political activists of the DUP are the more inflexible of the two Unionist parties, and thus are the "safer bet" for the more garrisonistic voters that compose a considerable portion of the Ulster Protestant electorate.

There seem to be three main conclusions that may be drawn about the way that Ian Paisley influences Protestant politics in Northern Ireland. One is his religious extremism; Paisley's theology is such that it directly affects the way political issues are debated in the province. He believes the Pope to be the Antichrist, and this makes Catholics either dupes in the hands of Satan or active soldiers in the army of the Antichrist. This obviously makes Paisley, and by association his followers, reluctant to compromise with the Roman
Catholic community. Two, despite the fact that Paisley himself is extreme within Unionism both theologically and politically, he enjoys widespread electoral support. This suggests that a considerable bulk of Ulster Protestant society is affected by a sense of garrisonism, for even though they might feel Paisley to be more extreme in many ways than themselves, he is a "safe bet" who can be counted upon to not allow the IRA to scare him or British politicians to sway him into supporting anything that might in any possible scenario lead to a united Ireland. Three, the group represented by Paisley, the DUP and the Free Presbyterian Church, are perhaps the most activist groups involved in Northern Irish politics short of the paramilitaries. Their activism may be accurately perceived as a potent expression of fundamentalist religio-political behavior that is inherent in the heritage and theology of mainstream Ulster Presbyterianism. Thus, it can be said that Ian Paisley glaringly personifies the fundamentalism that serves as a basis for Ulster Protestant garrisonism.

The example of Ian Paisley shows the vital link between religion and politics in the Ulster Protestant community, and shows how it is paradoxically both a unifying and a divisive factor. Even though he enjoys immense political popularity, there is hardly unanimity about his theological rhetoric or political tactics. In the next chapter I will discuss the ecumenical movement, which shows that there are those in the Ulster Protestant community, again distinguished primarily by denomination, who feel the divisiveness of a leader like Paisley to be both outdated and unnecessarily inflammatory.

1Paisley, "Why No True Ulster Protestant Would Swallow the Ecumenical Pill", sermon, Martyrs Memorial Recordings, Belfast.
4Ibid., p.29-30.
5For a more detailed description of the Border War, see Mallie and Bishop, Provisional IRA, pp.40-5.
6Bruce, God Save Ulster, p.23.
8Moloney and Pollak, Paisley, p. 176. "Paisley's name for speaking out—saying publicly and loudly what many Protestants thought privately was, and is, one of the key reasons for his political success."
9Nelson, Ulster's Uncertain Defenders, p.36-39
10Bell, Protestants of Ulster, p.42.
11Paisley, No Pope Here, p.94; Paisley, Antichrist, p.16.
12Ibid., p.63.
13Ibid.,p.57.
14"Many shall come after me, saying 'I am Christ'". For the interested, the telling number "666" is found to be on the Pope's tiara. According to Paisley, the words VICARIVS FILII DEI—God has told us—is written upon it. If one adds up the Roman numerals contained within this passage, it equals 666. I=1, V=5, L=50, C=100, D=500.
15Brooke, Ulster Presbyterianism, p.212.
17Smyth, Paisley, p.176.
18Ibid., p.181.
19Paisley, No Pope Here, p.53.
21Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class, and Creed in Northern Ireland, p.96.
22Ibid., p.96.
23Bell, Protestants of Ulster, p.44.
24Nelson, Ulster's Uncertain Defenders, p.56-7.
25Ibid., p.56.
28Ibid., p.431.
31In this case, the contract was between the King of England (at the time, William III) and the Protestants of Ireland. It held that as long as the monarchy remained Protestant, the Protestants would remain loyal to it; by being ceded to the Irish Republic, the Protestants would thus be unable to follow the orders of the English Crown.
32Bruce, God Save Ulster, p.294.
33Ibid., p.296-7.
34Ibid., p.297.
THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT IN IRELAND

Much of this project has thus far focused upon the divisions and denominational distinctions between the most influential Protestant churches. We have examined the differences between the mainstream Presbyterian churches and the Church of Ireland, and have just concluded a study of perhaps the most religiously and politically divisive figure in Northern Irish politics, the Reverend Ian Paisley. The frictions between the more fundamentalist elements contained primarily within the Presbyterian churches and the more theologically liberal members of the Church of Ireland arise from a number of factors we have already examined. The history of Anglican advantage and present apparent social influence combined with their critical approach to scriptural interpretation make the more fundamentalist, historically rugged and uncompromising Presbyterians fearful that the Anglicans are liable to seek some sort of political and religious compromise with the Roman Catholic community. These compromises are not simply politically undesirable to many Presbyterians. They represent a palpable threat to the Presbyterian style of worship, they seem inherently immoral to the more extreme.

It is this fear of compromise that brings us to the next part of this study. Here we will examine the divisions within the Ulster Protestant community that have arisen because of the greatest theological compromise to be seriously considered since the Reformation: the ecumenical movement. Again, these differences tend to be ones of degree. All the Protestant churches in Northern Ireland are a bit leery of ecumenical union with the Roman Catholic church. However, the differences between the Protestant denominations that manifest themselves in both religion and politics show themselves clearly in the varied denominational responses to the ecumenical movement. The Anglican Church of Ireland is the major church in the province that supports the ecumenical trend, while the Presbyterian church seems primarily opposed to even considering such a union. Of course, Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church is decidedly and actively opposes the ecumenical movement in any form.

Before pursuing a more detailed discussion of the evidence supporting this claim, it would first be appropriate to examine the wider ecumenical movement, and then proceed to a close-up of the movement in Northern Ireland. The ecumenical movement arose from Pope John XXIII's calling of the Second Vatican Council in the mid-1960s, more commonly known as Vatican II, which sought to
re-evaluate Roman Catholic doctrines and teachings. While important for such internal changes as relaxing some of the stricter papal doctrines, the main thrust of these reforms seemed to be an attempt to bring centuries of Christian separation and discord to a close. As one Ulster ecumenist has written:

Vatican II brought to an end the 'icy wind' of Pius IX's Syllabus Errorum and Pius XI's Encyclical Mortalium Animos 1928...with Vatican II the door of hope for better understanding and reconciliation opened.1

By relaxing the Papacy's theological stance towards other churches, Vatican II began to take steps to achieve the Christian unity summed up in the Nicene Creed's vision of "one holy, catholic, and apostolic church."2 Indeed, a number of encouraging precedents existed for the pursuance of such a vision. For example, the World Council of Churches had been formed in 1948 from organizations representing four million Christians who:

... confess the Lord Jesus as God and saviour according to the Scriptures and therefore seek to fulfill together their common calling to the glory of one God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.3

Such cooperation was encouraging to those Christians who were distressed by the apparent contradiction between a messiah who had said "All those who call on my name shall be saved" and the existence of thousands of separate churches, each of whom called upon Christ's name but who also often felt that their particular brand of Christianity was the only 'true' way to be saved. Though the dream of uniting all the Christian churches has a history that dates back to the Reformation writings of Martin Luther and John Calvin, the opposition of the Roman Catholic church had previously been an insurmountable barrier.4 However, the Second Vatican Council changed this state of affairs quite dramatically, and it opened the door to further inter-Christian dialogue and ecclesiastical cooperation.

By receiving this Papal blessing, the latent ecumenical movement, which before Vatican II consisted primarily of informal, personal meetings between various church officials, began to expand. It was, and continues to be, generally directed towards uniting the three main branches of Christianity, namely the western Protestant churches, the Roman Catholic church, and the Eastern Orthodox churches.5 Soon after the Second Vatican Council there began to be conspicuous official interaction between these three branches. For example, in 1966 the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury flew to
Rome to meet with Pope Paul VI in order to establish meaningful communication between the two churches.\textsuperscript{6}

In Ireland, there was an initially encouraging acceptance of these ecumenical developments. Indeed, tentative gestures with decided ecumenical overtones had been begun in 1964, which predated the enactment of the Second Vatican Council. A Church of Ireland abbot [note his denomination] founded the Glenstal Ecumenical Conference, which was made up of individuals from the various churches who met for "full, free, frank discussion" where "no findings are drawn up. The aim is [personal] enlightenment."\textsuperscript{7} Though this might sound quite cautious to outside observers, in Ireland it was seen as a significant development by many members of both the Protestant and Catholic communities. The primary disagreement within these groups was whether these steps were to be supported or opposed. Two years later the Greenhills Ecumenical Conference was established. Held during the annual Week of Prayer for Christian Unity, this was a one-day meeting of individuals regardless of their Christian denomination. Both of these were unofficial ecumenical gatherings; that is, they were not expressly called for by the leaderships of the various churches. However, it seems that the connections made at these various gatherings set the stage for the official ecumenical meetings held at Ballymascanlon beginning in 1973.\textsuperscript{8} These talks were attempts to clarify the theological differences existing between the various main churches in Ireland, and their product was a series of reports that detailed both agreements and points of contention concerning topics such as baptism, the Eucharist, and marriage, as well as more abstract subjects like the relationship between the church, scripture, and the source of ecclesiastical authority. The talks, while perhaps leading to greater understanding amongst the various church leaderships, seem to have stopped at this point. For example, one commentator has had this criticism of the Ballymascanlon meetings:

The weakness of these talks is that no procedure has been laid down for the implementing of its findings, or effective provision made for bringing the results of its work to the attention of the Churches, especially the laity.\textsuperscript{9}

In evaluating the ecumenical movement in Ireland as a whole, then, it seems that it has enjoyed only modest success and has had little results beyond establishing the fact that some members from the various church administrations are on friendly terms with one another. When one confines his ecumenical examination to the borders of Northern Ireland, it becomes painfully obvious that overall, the ecumenical movement has, as one observer understated...
the case, "made only disappointing headway". Quite simply, this seems due to the enormous obstacles presented by both the present conflict in the province and the socio-political factors such as Ulster Protestant garrisonism that contribute to the intractability of the situation.

Many of these barriers are those that have been mentioned at various points throughout this paper. The Protestant and Catholic communities are virtually segregated from one another. They go to different schools, they live in different neighborhoods, they participate either in different athletic games or in different leagues of the same sports. Thus, because they simply do not know each other, ecumenism is even more difficult than in areas such as the United States or on the European continent where Catholics and Protestants tend to mix freely. The conflict of the last twenty years has further emphasized the differences between Catholic and Protestant, and this means the ecumenical movement seems extremely strange to residents of a province where a religious dividing line between two conflicting communities has been etched in stone for centuries. Perhaps the greatest barrier on all sides to the ecumenical movement is the fact that religious loyalties usually predispose a particular political orientation. In this light, ecumenism becomes illogical to the more extreme: by destroying the differences between the Protestants and Catholics, one would either be accepting the link with Britain or facilitating the absorption of Ulster in the Irish Republic. Here the fear of religious compromise leading to political betrayal is at its strongest. Because "Protestant" and "Catholic" are terms having numerous political implications in any Northern Irish context, attempts to join the two together is seen as not simply a religious or ecclesiastical matter. As one author has stated, "Ecumenism in Northern Ireland is not just about the Churches and their creeds and worship;" it would touch virtually every facet of their lives. The perceived political implications of ecumenism have been specifically noted by one researcher:

... on the Protestant side, enough people are persuaded that ecumenism undermines the political union with Great Britain, by minimizing the difference between Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants, to make the further outreach or popularisation of ecumenism a near-impossibility.

As I have consistently argued throughout the course of this project, generalizing about the Northern Irish Protestants does not tell the whole story about their political situation, and this statement, though useful as a starting point, does not reveal much about the divisions within the Ulster Protestant community. The Protestant
denominations in Northern Ireland have responded in varying ways to the ecumenical movement. Predictably, the Church of Ireland has responded the most favorably to ecumenism of all the Protestant denominations. On the other hand, the Presbyterians have generally been either reluctant or openly opposed to ecumenical overtures. Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church is diametrically and vociferously opposed to any form of ecumenism which entails an acceptance of the Roman Catholic Church. Before elaborating upon their positions, it is first necessary to examine the theological premises of the overall ecumenical movement, for only then does the reasoning behind each church's stance become clear.

It is quite difficult to find one coherent view about what the ecumenical movement actually entails or what its exact final objective might be. Church leaders' views of ecumenism seem rather similar to the ways different European leaders view the European Economic Community. Some are quite visionary, and see the movement as a means to bring about unity in administration and policy. Thus, just as some people envision a single, clear European voice, some hope that a single Christian organization might result from the culmination of the ecumenical movement. Opposed to these conceptions are those people who are reluctant to participate in the movement at all. Though their reasons vary, these conservatives are agreed that if any change should occur at all, it must be modest and extremely gradual. The majority of people, both with regards to the EEC and the ecumenical movement, however, seem to fall somewhere in between these two poles. Theirs is a rather vague commitment to finding the best mix of unity and independence: the fabled "golden mean". However, regardless of the degree of support, there seems to be a theological view common to those supporting ecumenical developments. This view is grounded in a theological method that has been described by an ecumenist from the Lutheran tradition:

(I propose) an explanation of ecumenism by the description of a theological method that is characterized by the following:

1. The recognition of the ambiguity of all theological statements because of the inadequacy of human language to comprehend the transcendent.
2. The acknowledgement of the need to find new language and concepts to express Christian belief.
3. The acceptance of a view of relative emphasis that certain doctrines from the past may no longer be as crucial to the essentials of the Christian message.
4. The approval of legitimate diversity in the interpretation of doctrine so that the same mystery of faith can be differently expressed.
5. The willingness to hear the Gospel afresh and clarify or modify denominational traditions in view of that gospel.

It should be fairly clear that these characteristics describe a liberal view of scripture. The first point elaborated is clearly non-fundamentalist; indeed, accepting that all theological statements are ambiguous is in direct opposition to the view that the Bible is "totally inerrant", which is a primary characteristic of fundamentalism. Likewise, the second point is not of fundamentalist origin, for the fundamentalist has no "need" for "new language" in Christianity; the authors of the New Testament provided all the writings needed for the Christian faith. Again, the third point refuting the need to emphasize past doctrines diametrically opposes the Christian fundamentalist ideal of "back to the Bible"; Paisley's adherence to Reformation concepts of the Pope as the Antichrist is a powerful example of this from a Northern Irish context. The fourth point elaborated is fairly ambiguous and thus does not directly or powerfully present an opposition to fundamentalism, although the tendency of Christian fundamentalist denominations to see themselves as the exclusive "elect" (to borrow a term from Calvin) seems to deny any concept of "legitimate diversity." Finally, the last elaborated characteristic's "willingness to hear the Gospel afresh" is in opposition to fundamentalism, for Christian fundamentalists believe the texts of the Gospels to have the same meaning today as they did when Christ's Apostles transcribed them. Thus, if we adhere to Schmidt's definition of a Christian liberal as elaborated in chapter 3, pages 30-1, then it is clear that the ecumenical movement may be classed as a product of liberal Christian theology.

Recognizing this reveals the barriers to accepting ecumenism for those with more fundamentalist theological views. The ecumenical movement is based on a view of scripture that depends upon critical analysis that does not immediately assume it to be directly transmitted from God to the reader—it emphasizes that the author must be also considered. As a result, fundamentalists, with their literalistic interpretation of the Holy Bible's message, seem excluded from participation in this movement almost by definition. Ecumenism, in its more extreme forms, seeks to basically "overhaul" Christianity by eventually doing away with denominational distinctions altogether, or at least to reduce differences between the denominations through compromise about contentious theological issues. This in turn would blur the very real, if stylistic, distinctions represented by the names of the varying denominations. To fundamentalists who agree with the uncompromising stubbornness
of their particular denomination's founder(s), who broke with the main body of the church in days past rather than accept such compromises on any number of issues, the ecumenical movement represents not "socialism coming in through the back door" through the unification of Europe feared by political leaders like Thatcher, but rather is seen by many fundamentalists as Satan coming in through the back door via ecumenism, for the movement is grounded in an alternative perception of the Christian faith. It is not that Christian unity does not seem a worthy goal to these people, but that unity is not worth the risk to the soul entailed by compromising on matters of doctrine that have for many congregations been extolled as the reason they have the "truth" and not some other group. With these implications in mind, it should only require a brief survey of the various Protestant churches for their positions on the matter of ecumenism to be understandable.

As has been previously mentioned, the Church of Ireland has been more favorable to ecumenism than other Protestant denominations in the province. This is substantially attributable to the close relations with the Church of England, which has taken a leading role in advancing the ecumenical movement. In the early 1980s, for example, the Church of England participated in a series of discussions with the Roman Catholic church that produced a joint report, which the Times of London described as placing the Anglican body on a "convergent course with the Roman Catholic church."16 Nor should it be assumed that the Church of Ireland was dragged reluctantly into its support of the ecumenical movement, for Anglicanism in general has been a major moving force in ecumenism. As one author has written:

Any history of the church in the twentieth century makes clear the commitment of Anglicans to the ecumenical movement. Anglican churches and their members have played key roles in international, national, and regional ecumenical efforts throughout this century.17

This support for the ecumenical movement should not be surprising, particularly given the fact that the liberal Christian theology which is the basis of the ecumenical movement is shared by a considerable number of Anglicans, as was argued in the third chapter.

Nor should it be surprising that Paisley's Free Presbyterian church actively opposes the ecumenical movement. His fiery fundamentalism expressly denounces liberal Christian theology, and his views of the Roman Catholic church hardly lend themselves to ecumenism. A sampling of his views should suffice to establish this point:

...today the leaders of the now apostate reformed(Protestant)
churches are tripping over one another to slapber on the Pope's slippers. The World Council of Churches (WCC) has become the vestibule of the Vatican. 18

If the ecumenical WCC is the "vestibule of the Vatican", then in Paisley's theology it is the domain of the Antichrist. Paisley does not confine his criticism of the ecumenical movement to vague denunciations. He expressly condemned the Church of Ireland for its role in expanding the movement:

For years I have been warning that the ecumenical churches were simply going down the Roman road. The ecumenists have vehemently denied this. Now the real truth is surfacing. The Anglicans are now prepared to acknowledge the Pope as the Head of the Universal Church and to yield submission to him even though the official teaching of Rome is that they are a bunch of imposters. The Church of Ireland is deeply involved in this betrayal of our Reformation heritage because the Joint Anglican Chairman of the Anglican-Roman Catholic Commission is no less than Dr. McAdoo, the Church of Ireland Archbishop of Dublin, (and) the Primate of Ireland. 19

In this quote lies much of what we have been discussing throughout this project. Protestant garrisonism is exhibited quite strongly: even discussing compromise with the Roman Catholic church about religious matters is "going down the Roman road," which implies a complete "sell-out" to the other side—also note that any concessions that may have been made by the Vatican were not mentioned. Also, fundamentalist religion is a primary source of this garrisonism, and it is directed not only at the Roman Catholic church, but at the fellow Ulster Protestants in the Church of Ireland who do not share these fundamentalist views to such an extent. In this way, the Free Presbyterian view of the ecumenical movement brings the often elusive conflict between Presbyterian and Anglican into sharper focus. As was mentioned in the chapter about Ian Paisley, it is possible to extrapolate some views of the mainstream Irish Presbyterian churches from those of the Free Presbyterian church. 20

As one author has written:

...Northern Ireland's mainstream Presbyterianism differed from the fundamentalist evangelical Presbyterianism typified by Ian Paisley only in fervour and intensity of belief. 21

Though the Presbyterians are hardly as vocal as the Reverend Paisley upon the matter of ecumenism, they have been reluctant to participate in the movement, particularly when compared to the Anglicans. For example, they withdrew from the World Council of Churches when that ecumenical body expressed support for South African liberation movements. 22 Despite the existence of liberal Presbyterians who feel ecumenism a proper way to progress, it
seems that the bulk of the Presbyterian laity are extremely reluctant to join the ecumenical movement. One observer has justified this contention by commenting upon the organizational structure of the churches. Noting that in the Anglican church, the hierarchy has a considerable amount of power regarding the direction taken by the church, the more democratic (in the literal sense of 'government by the people') organization of the Presbyterian church could not move towards ecumenism without the consent of the laity, and this consent simply does not exist within the ranks of the Presbyterian church. Loughlin has written that:

It is only in the last twenty years or so with the widespread destruction and death caused by the Troubles that the Church leaderships have been jolted out of these 'frozen' theologies. Contacts of an ecumenical and theological nature have been developed, and the leaders of the main Churches have often spoken together on various issues, while (still) retaining their basic political orientations. This has been easier for the Catholics and the Anglicans. whose leaderships are 'freer' institutionally from their flocks. The Presbyterians, on the other hand, are more under the control of the grass-roots.23

The basic fundamentalism of the Presbyterian faith combined with the political barriers to ecumenism make the ecumenical movement seem to be another form of compromise with the Catholics, and thus something which would ultimately weaken the position of Ulster Protestants as part of the United Kingdom. The behavior of the Church of Ireland seems to more extreme Presbyterians a form of religious "Lundyism", a sell-out of the entire "garrison" of Ulster Protestants to the Roman Catholics. It is in this light that the ecumenical movement should be viewed in relation to Northern Irish Protestant religion and politics. It is a form of compromise that highlights the various positions of the denominations within the Protestant religious and political community.

In summation, we find that the Anglicans are arrayed closest to ecumenical compromise. Their overtures to the Roman Catholic church on a religious level, the church's history of discrimination against the Dissenters, and their long-time economic dominance make them a likely target of Presbyterian animosity. On the other side of the ecumenical fence are the Presbyterians, the largest Protestant denomination in Northern Ireland. They are more garrisonistic in their behavior towards the Roman Catholic community than the Anglicans, and thus are wary of the Church of Ireland's motives in promoting any form of unity with the Roman Catholic church. This in turn causes the Presbyterians to question the political resolve of individual Anglicans to not yield to the
Catholic community on the all-important issue of Northern Ireland's constitutional link with Britain. Feeding these fears is the tall and vocal figure of Ian Paisley, a theological leader with a massive political following in the province. By examining the ecumenical movement, one can see this disposition of religious forces most clearly, and it dramatically represents what I see to be the topography of Protestant politics in Northern Ireland.

3Rusch, Ecumenism, p.59.
5Rusch, Ecumenism, p.65.
6Ibid., p.70.
8It is interesting to note that each of these conferences occurred in the Irish Republic, which is off-limits to Paisley by the Reverend's personal choice. Barkley supports the contention that the informal talks facilitated the official ecumenical meetings, Ibid., p.226.
9Ibid., p.227.
12Ibid., p.229.
13Rusch, Ecumenism, p.95.
14Rusch has written that the final stage of ecumenism would be "...communion. Now it no longer makes sense to think of (Christian) fellowship as consisting of two or more separate entities. Rather, all separation is overcome in the appropriate wholeness and singleness of the body of Christ." Ecumenism, p.117. 15Ibid., p.48-9.
16Times, October 10, 1983, p.16.
17Rusch, Ecumenism, p.95.
18Paisley, No Pope Here, p.82.
19Ibid., p.93.
21McSweeney, quoted in Ibid., p.56.
22Loughlin, "Role of the Churches II", Month, Jan. 1990, p.17. The similarity between the position of the Afrikaans in South Africa and the Protestants in Northern Ireland is one that has been noted by a number of observers [see Crawford, Loyal to King Billy]. This results in almost automatic partisan support or rejection of the cause of such groups as the ANC. For example, at a recent Belfast City Council meeting, a Sinn Fein councillor suggested that Belfast officially celebrate the release of Nelson Mandela. One councillor for overwhelmingly Protestant East Belfast denounced this move, stating that Nelson Mandela was "nothing but a black Provo" [slang for the Provisional IRA].
23Loughlin, "Role of the Churches II", Month, Jan 1990, p.17.
CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the course of this study I have tried to emphasize three major points about the political role of Ulster Protestant religious organizations. One is that the Ulster Protestants are a diverse political coalition, and thus are not the monolithic group they are so often portrayed to be. Another is that the differences that divide them can be observed to fall broadly along denominational lines, primarily between the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland. These differences manifest themselves theologically, historically, and, to a lesser degree, economically and demographically. Almost paradoxically, however, these groups also share characteristics that unite them in opposition to other, more dangerous threats, such as submersion in an overwhelmingly Catholic Ireland, or the fear of a "sell-out" originating at Westminster. Unfortunately, in many studies of the province, these very real cleavages within the Ulster Protestant community have been either glossed over or ignored. They exist, and the primary aim of this study has been to bring them to light.

Finally, these denominational differences, which seem to arise primarily from a fundamentalist/liberal theological conflict, increase the political and social garrisonism exhibited by the Ulster Protestants. Traceable to the days of the Plantation of the seventeenth century, this tendency of the Ulster Protestant community to assume a combative, defensive posture in times of crisis has been modified to include such more recent "attacks" as the Irish Home Rule movement, which the overwhelming majority of Ulster Protestants opposed for a variety of economic and religious reasons, and the more direct threat posed by Irish republicanism, most dramatically represented by the Provisional IRA. The fact of divisions within the Protestant community makes this defensive posture appear and perhaps become unstable in the face of these "threats" leads those on the Unionist extremes to become even more garrisonistic in their attitudes and behavior.

The paragon of Protestant extremism in Northern Ireland is the Reverend Ian Paisley. By combining the tradition of Ulster Protestant garrisonism (both religious and political) with the fervor and vigor of American religious fundamentalism, Paisley gives a new expression to old fears of the Protestant population of the province of Northern Ireland, and this expression heightens Protestant garrisonism and blocks the way towards any consensual resolution of the troubles that plague Ulster. His Free Presbyterianism seems a
concentration of those features in mainstream Presbyterianism that divide it from the more liberal Church of Ireland.

The different attitudes of the churches towards the ecumenical movement presents these differences between Protestant religious bodies, and additionally supports the argument that their theological differences arise from a fundamentalist/liberal split. The Church of Ireland is the most supportive of this movement, though political considerations make it less progressive than its English counterpart. Diametrically opposed to any union with the Roman Catholic church is the Reverend Paisley, who believes the Pope to be the Antichrist. In the middle, though still extremely reluctant to even discuss ecumenical union with the Church of Rome, are the mainstream Irish Presbyterians.

In conclusion, religion seems to play a Janus-faced role in Ulster Protestant politics. On one hand it is a cohesive cultural factor. Being a Northern Irish Protestant implies a shared history and theology that binds virtually the entire Ulster Protestant population behind an uncompromising political rhetoric and activism directed against both Irish Republicans and British politicians. On the other hand, it also is a source of dissent within this community. The varying degrees of opposition to the Catholic church and attitudes towards scriptural interpretation make the more fundamentalist and uncompromising within Unionist ranks fearful that the resolve of those who would accommodate the Roman Catholic population is not strong enough to ensure the survival of Northern Ireland as a political entity. Because of their heightened garrisonism, they see any form of compromise as a form of "Lundyism," an act of betrayal against the entire Unionist population, and oppose it to the full of their strength. It is this intransigence of a significant proportion of Ulster Unionists which is a major contributing factor to the enduring nature of the "Troubles." Unfortunately, the reasons for its existence are factors that are not readily changed or forgotten, and its continuation seems assured.
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STEAM CURED CONCRETE:
VARYING THE RATE OF TEMPERATURE RISE

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ABSTRACT

The precast concrete industry uses steam curing procedures to quickly produce structural members. The rate of temperature rise in the steam chamber is critical to the steam curing process. This investigation examines the effect of varying rates of rise on the compressive strength of the concrete.

A 6000 psi mix design was used to test three separate rates of temperature rise. The specimens were fabricated in standard 6 x 12 in. molds, and each batch was tested at 24 hours, 3 days, and 28 days.

The control (moist cured) specimens, the 40°F/hr rise specimens, and the 50°F/hr rise specimens had comparable strengths at all ages. Similar early age strengths for all rise rates cause the batches to appear equal initially. However, the 60°F/hr rise specimens showed a considerably lower 28-day strength than the moist specimens. Higher rates of temperature rise were found to be detrimental to the development of 28 day compressive strength values.
1. INTRODUCTION

The recent growth in the use of precast, prestressed concrete members throughout the construction industry has placed a tremendous demand on production facilities. To meet this demand, the prestressing plants are forced to expedite the curing of concrete and mass produce the members. Steam curing has become a popular method of accelerating the gain of compressive strength in precast concrete members. This process minimizes plant cycle time and maximizes output by reducing the time that the concrete must remain in the forms.

A typical plant cycle includes casting, initial set, steam curing, stripping the forms, and cleaning the forms (Hanson, 1963). The concrete is first placed in reusable forms and then allowed to begin its initial set. A few hours later, the members are subjected to steam at atmospheric pressure for a specified length of time. When the concrete develops sufficient strength, the forms are removed and cleaned.

A critical factor in the success of the steam curing procedure is the rate at which the temperature in the curing chamber is increased from room temperature to a specified maximum temperature. This study examines the relationship between three practical rates of rise (40°F/hr, 50°F/hr, and 60°F/hr) and the compressive strengths of the concrete.
2. EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE

The experiment procedure consisted of fabricating the specimens, curing the specimens, and testing the specimens.

2.1 Fabrication of Specimens

Three batches were cast to test the three separate rates of rise. All batches were laboratory mixes prepared in a 7.5 ft$^3$ mixer. The test specimens were fabricated using a mix designed to produce an approximate 28-day strength of 6000 psi. Standard 6 x 12 in. molds were used in compliance with ASTM C470, and the specimens were molded by methods described in ASTM C31. The coarse aggregate used was ASTM Number 67, and the fine aggregate was crushed limestone. The mix design for one c.y. is as follows:

- Type I Portland Cement: 752 lb.
- Coarse Aggregate: 1,730 lb.
- Fine Aggregate: 1,242 lb.
- Water: $\approx 292$ lb. (Oluokum, 1990). The water content varied ±1% because the slump for each batch was held constant at 2-3/4 inches.

2.2 Curing of Specimens

Each batch consisted of six moist and six steam-cured specimens. The twelve cylinders for each batch were cast at the same time and allowed an initial set period of five hours. Next, six of the specimens were placed in the steam chamber. The temperature was increased at a particular rate to the maximum temperature of 160 °F in the steam chamber (See Figure 1). Each batch of concrete remained in the steam
chamber for a total of 16 hours. The three different rise rates are demonstrated in Figure 2.

After the total curing time had elapsed, the specimens were removed. At the age of 24 hours, the samples were stripped and placed in the moist room where curing continued at 73°F in compliance with ASTM C192.

2.3 Testing of Specimens

Four specimens from each batch, two steam cured and two moist cured, were tested for compressive strength values at the ages of 24 hours, 3 days, and 28 days. Prior to testing, the specimens were capped with a sulfur compound (ASTM C617). The tests were conducted in uniaxial compression until failure. A total of 36 cylinders were tested.

3. TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

From the basic test data (Table 1), average values were obtained representing each data point (Table 2). The moist-cure values represent the overall averages of the moist cured specimens.

The first graphic data display (Figure 3) shows the average strength values for each data point (psi) versus age of the concrete (days). In this graphic, the values used to represent the moist cure samples are the averages of all three batches. As expected, the strengths of the moist-cured specimens are significantly lower than the strengths of the steam-cured specimens at early ages. Thus, steam curing is needed to develop the compressive strength required to remove the forms promptly without damaging the concrete.
However, the actual strength of the steam-cured concrete may be shadowed by the early strength. The three groups of steam-cured specimens representing the different rates of rise have essentially the same strength at early ages (Figure 3). This property may be desirable to precast plant operators, but the similar early strengths may actually give the impression that the three batches have equal strengths regardless of the rise rate. Thus, the similar early strengths impair quality control because the various rise rate conditions are undetectable at early ages.

The compressive strengths of the batches at 28 days are not as comparable as the early age strengths (Figure 3). The 40°F rise and 50°F rise batches have practically the same strength, and all are above the design strength of 6000 psi. However, the compressive strength of the 60°F rise rate at 28 days is below the design strength of 6000 psi. This noticeable decrease is perhaps caused by the formation of microcracks in the concrete when it is subjected to higher rise rates in the steam chamber.

Plotting the strengths (psi) versus the rise rates with three data points on one vertical line representing one batch vividly reveals the degradation of the 28-day strength of the 60°F rise batch (Figure 4). The one-day and three-day compressive strengths of all steam-cured specimens are essentially the same. On the other hand, the 28-day curve vividly reveals degradation over time in the development of ultimate strength capacity. Although the moist, 40°F rise,
and 50° rise values are consistent, the 60°F rise value is considerably lower and is below the design strength of 6000 psi.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The results discussed in the preceding section show that high rise rates of temperature in the steam curing chamber may cause microcracking in the concrete. This phenomenon noticeably reduces the rate of development of ultimate strength in steam cured concrete members. For the rate of rise of 60°F/hr, the 28-day compressive strength is below the 6000 psi design strength.

Furthermore, the effect of the high rise rates does not become evident until the concrete has aged. For many precast members, this flaw may not be easily detected. In order to avoid this situation, plant operators must give more attention to controlling the rate of temperature rise in the steam chamber. The rise must be closely monitored to produce precast members that possess the necessary design strength.
REFERENCES


# TABLE 1:
BASIC TEST DATA

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FIGURE 1: TYPICAL THERMAL EXPOSURE OF STEAM CURED SPECIMENS
FIGURE 2: DETAIL A
FIGURE 3: STRENGTH V. TIME