Am I Stigmatized? An experimental examination of high-status experiences of stigma.

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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Christopher F. Silver entitled "Am I Stigmatized? An experimental examination of high-status experiences of stigma." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Psychology.

Michael A. Olson, Major Professor

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Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
Am I Stigmatized? An experimental examination of high-status experiences of stigma.

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Christopher F. Silver

December 2021
Dedication

For my son Jamison H. Silver, who is my continued inspiration for scholarship and teaching. He reminds me every day of the power of questions, curiosity, and deductive reasoning in understanding the human condition. Thank you, son, for giving me new life and finding my voice in the cacophony of inquiry, to my family who has unconditionally supported my endeavors and the teachers, professors, advisors, and mentors who have guided me on this long, arduous journey of discovery. Most importantly, this is dedicated to my students past, present, and future, who serve as my continued motivation to seek new knowledge. You inspire me to be a better educator and researcher.
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Abstract
Stigma is a highly researched aspect of social psychology primarily focusing on outgroup perceptions of stigma or the behaviors associated with high-status individuals toward low-status individuals. Two studies sought to explore high-status perceptions of perceived stigma, focusing on the common variables associated with stigma within low-status groups. This was to address a growing perception among high-status individuals that they experience stigma given their identity. As a focus, this study sampled White Males (Study One) and Christians (Study Two) from the United States. As part of experimental manipulation, we presented participants with three potential conditions. Condition one where participants read an article asserting their group would lose majority status in the future, condition two where participants read an article asserting, they would experience little to no loss of majority status, and condition three as control. This study then used a series of measures including a measure of individual and group stigma modified for the target group, the Quick Discrimination Index as a measure of prejudice, group with emotion self-report measures where participants indicated what groups they identified as being emotionally associated, a measure of individual self-esteem, measures of individual and group power, as well as moderators of social dominance orientation and collective self-esteem. For Study Two, we also included measures of concealment and disclosure, given that Christian identity can be concealed. Findings indicated that while the manipulations had little to no effect on the dependent variables, Social Dominance Orientation was most likely associated with perceptions of Stigma. Further, it appears there is a perception of lower collective self-esteem for those who perceive themselves to be more stigmatized and higher self-esteem for those with lower perceptions of Stigma.
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Study

The face of America has changed extensively since the turn of the 20th century. While racial tension between whites and blacks has continued, other ethnic and racial identities have emerged due to various waves of immigration to the United States. Currently, some whites perceive themselves as potentially losing majority status. In a recent poll, 55% of White Americans surveyed indicated that they believe white Americans face discrimination. Notably, 11% of whites reported experienced discrimination applying or participating in college. Further, as part of the NPR/Robert Wood Johnson Foundation/Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health study, 13% of white participants reported pay disparities in their jobs, and 19% of the overall white participant sample reported discrimination in applying for jobs (Gonyea, 2017). Indeed, this group may perceive themselves to experience discrimination, yet what may be driving this perception may be unclear. Is it the loss of power, loss of majority status, or a shift in the social value of identifying whiteness as the prototypical normal?

Some of the same groups of immigrants who have changed the racial and ethnic landscape of the US have had an equal impact on the religious landscape. Religious identity has also experienced similar waves of change due to immigration and the emergence of new religious traditions within the American religious landscape. Further, while it is difficult to conceal racial and ethnic identity, religious identity can be hidden (through clothing, social connections, language). At the turn of the 20th century, much of the competition for new members was among the majority of Christian groups throughout the United States, with some minor urban exceptions. Historically, many denominations held state and regional control, where the marketplace of ideology and identity between Christian and non-Christian groups has shifted extensively. Further, secularization and spirituality have shifted normative religious identity beyond the institution of religion toward a more individualized belief system (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009). From the perspective of US Christians, these shifts in ideology and identity have likely signaled
losses in membership and social representation during the late 1990s and early 2000s. For example, LifeWay Research (2015) observed that Christians believe that their religious liberty is in decline (60% in 2015 instead of 54% in 2013). LifeWay also reported that Christians believe that they experience increasing intolerance (63% in 2015 from 50% in 2013); a similar pattern is reported by the Brookings Institute (49% in 2016). The Brookings study also observed that many white Americans believe they are discriminated against (57%). Based on these correlational studies, it appears there is a growing concern about declining Christian influence (Smietana, 2016).

Groups have various levels of power and influence. For some, their group has social dominance over others, which could be called high status. In contrast, other groups have some or limited power, which could be called low status. One’s group status likely means they respond differently to situations of stigma or adverse events (Kahn, Barreto, Kaiser & Silva Rego, 2016; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Further, one’s group power may vary based on the social and geographical landscape. The correlational studies presented above demonstrate a rising concern among high-status groups that their representation or influence is declining. They also demonstrate that high-status individuals perceive an increase in stigma toward their groups. While there is extensive research on perceived stigma, nearly all (if not all) of this work has explored stigma among relatively low-status groups (e.g., Black Americans, women, those with disabilities). Conversely, studies related to white males has mainly focused on issues of regional poverty, including loss of industries such as coal, moving of factories out of rural America, industrial agriculture, and other influences related to globalization that has impacted those in blue-collar industries (Duncan & Lamborghini, 1994; Anglin 2002).

Further, from the perspective of religion, many secular groups have pushed to block the placement of the Ten Commandments in governmental spaces and the blocking of prayer at high school and college football games as well as ceremonies, and shifts in language toward more
secular greetings, such as seasons greetings becoming “Happy Holidays.” Many of these social shifts have been experienced as an attack on Christianity (Eberstadt, 2016). There is evidence that these social shifts have resulted in a perceived change in both white and religious perceptions of prejudice and their perceived loss of social status. From these examples, there appears to be evidence of a shift in appraisal among those who could be considered high status either from their social hierarchy in the form of power or their majority representation in society. Nevertheless, these data show that such individuals may experience a change in their social status. For some, they perceive this change in a variety of ways, including possible discrimination or prejudice. It is unclear if higher-status individuals also perceive themselves to experience stigma and, by extension, negative intergroup emotions similar to low-status groups. This study explores how one’s experience of stigma influences these variables as a function of the perceived change in group status.

**Overarching Research Questions for these Studies**

In the following section, we will discuss the origins of stigma theory and research. Beginning with the work of Goffman (1963), Katz (1981), and Bos et al. (2013), this discussion explores both the experience of the stigmatized as well as the stigmatizer as a transactional relationship within the perspectives of social psychological research as well as evolutionary theory (with some theoretical overlap between the two). How does stigmatization can occur in human relations. What are the various social and psychological structures promoting and sustaining such discrimination and identifying marks deemed a stigma? More specifically this dissertation is interested in the following general questions:

Do high-status individuals perceive themselves to be stigmatized when presented with data suggesting their group is losing majority status? Further, do high-status individuals have a personal experience of stigma or perceive their group to have been stigmatized even though they may not have experienced it personally?
If high-status individuals perceive themselves to be stigmatized at either the individual or group level, do they experience the same emotional reactions as low-status groups?

Does the importance of the group to its membership magnify the effects of stigma among high-status groups?

Essentially, we are interested in those who perceive themselves to be stigmatized and are also considered members of high-status groups (who are considered to enjoy privileges such as greater access to resources). Of particular interest are two groups of high-status individuals: White Males and Christians.

**Operational Definitions**

This study provides operational definitions of terms to provide greater clarity of design. These are as follows:

*Stigma* – is a mark or attribute that signals differences to others from social norms. Such a difference can infer devalued group membership or individual threats to others. This mark can occur at the individual or group level. This study will mainly focus on group-level stigma and include questions related to one’s own experience of stigma. Please note that while some stigma, such as a disability, can be consistent access cultures, other stigmas may be socially constructed and can vary based on one’s group power within a particular society (Goffman, 1963; Crocke, Major, & Steele, 1998). Stigma can be evaluated in two ways. One way is regarding group stigma, where an individual identifies as part of a group and is bound to the positive or negative implications of identifying with the group even if they personally have not experienced stigma. The second type of stigma evaluation is when the individual themselves is stigmatized either due to their group membership or a marker, which signifies their group membership to others (regardless of how accurate the appraisal is of their actual ability).
Prejudice – Generally, prejudice has been characterized as an overgeneralized incorrect assumption of a person based on their membership in a group. Allport (1954) described these attitudes as lacking flexibility as people are quick to make judgments. Samson (1999) suggested that these judgments are generally unjustified. However, they can be positive or negative. Further, these attitudes can be socially reinforced at the group level and individually subjective based on one’s experience (Glick et al., 2000). Prejudice is simply the automatic activation of discrimination based on snap judgement based on social or behavior cues.

Social Status – An individual or group’s station or rank in the overall hierarchy of society. One’s status or group membership can give them social benefits or influence over others. Status can be given at birth by their membership in a particular group or earned or lost as culture or society changes (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics 2000). One’s social status gives them perceived power over other groups who may not share the same level of power or influence. It also means they may have influence asserted over them if they are a lower status. In this case, we speak to the numerical status represented in the United States or, more specifically, White Male and Christian percentages of representation. One aspect that is unclear about status is the difference between representation and perceived group power. In some cultural contexts, these are not necessarily the same. However, for this study, high status is also a majority status within the United States social context.

- High Status – these are individuals who generally can assert themselves within society. For high status individuals, they have social or normative influence simply by their membership in their group. Those in high-status positions are more likely to speak and interrupt others in a discussion. They are more likely to respond in anger to interactions of conflict as indicated by facial responses (Tiedens & Ellsworth Batja Mesquita 2000; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics
2000; Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Keating, 1985; Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995).

- **Low Status** – These are individuals with diminished social influence related to their perceived group membership. They have relatively low power and are likely conscious of their social rank within a larger hierarchy. Low status has been associated with anxiety, performance issues, sadness and guilt, and low appraisal. Further, low-status individuals may also experience feelings of vulnerability and insecurity in interacting with high-status individuals (Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995; Yukl & Falbe, 1990). There is already evidence of potential outcomes related to one’s group rank in society (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998). Low status is a loss of or inadequate representation in the United States.

*Allegiant Religious Traditions* are religious traditions considered culturally normative and typical within a particular community. An Allegiant religious tradition has low social tension with the greater social and cultural community. If a religious denomination or faith tradition falls into the allegiant classification, it relates much to the broader community’s perception of that tradition to be culturally normative (Bromley, 1998)

*Contestant Religious Traditions* – generally participate within the larger social and cultural community. However, they have beliefs, rituals, practices, and/or traditions that seem culturally different from mainstream culture. These differences create some social tension within the broader culture where their tradition may be called into question, but they can continue to practice their faith (Bromley 1998).

*Subversive Religious Traditions* – are religious groups with the highest amount of social tension as they generally avoid interaction with the greater society (e.g. Amish, International Society for Krishna Consciousness or colloquially known as Hare Krishna) in place of their own cultural and
social order. They often fall within the definition of New Religious Movements, cults, or extreme beliefs (Bromley 1998; Streib et al., 2011). This aspect is not addressed in this paper.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

The Origin of Stigma Research

In his seminal work, Erving Goffman is one of the first to coin the term “stigma” (Goffman, 1963). Stigma has its origins in the ancient Greek language, which referred to brands or marks on the body that were used to expose those who were infamous or disgraced. From the perspective of culture, stigma serves as a mark or brand on the body that signals socially and contextually dependent differences. Stigma is reinforced socially through one’s group observing behavior and interactions with outgroup others, particularly when the outgroup has behaviors or physical characteristics which indicate their group membership. Further, specific contexts may also intensify the perception of one’s stigma. For example, an African American male walking through a white neighborhood might seem more threatening than an African American at the mall. Goffman notes three indicators of stigma. This first indicator (or mark) consists of physical attributes such as differences in one’s physical body or skin color. The first indicator can also include how one dresses or behaves as perceived as deviant beyond what is socially or culturally normative. A second indicator assumed by outside perceivers is that stigmatized individuals have deviant attributes. These attributes blemish the individual’s character and call into question their “otherness” or difference from the social or cultural norm. They also signaling some more in-depth insight regarding the person such as a variety of psychological disorders, criminal history, sexuality, or political behavior. The third aspect of stigma is the tribal assumption which assumes that group members who share the mark also bear similar attributes that are discrediting to the group as a whole (e.g., skin color, ethnicity, generational associations such as religious membership or subgroups such as gypsies) all perceived to be shared by the group (Goffman, 1963). These might also include negative behavioral expectations such as aggression or threat or positive behavioral expectations such as athleticism or scholarly acumen as well. Crocke, Major, & Steele (1998) summed up these characteristics as “the person is devalued, spoiled or flawed in
the eyes of others” (p. 504). Goffman’s work served as the foundation for research on stigma. However, he was by no means the only theorist to explain the psychological implications of stigma.

Katz (1979) further expounded upon Goffman’s work to suggest four dimensions of stigma. Those dimensions are visibility, threat, sympathy arousal and hostility (feeling sorry for the other or disliking the other), and perceived responsibility. Katz defined visibility as the awareness of difference, which could be a physical mark or outward-facing and signaling characteristics such as clothing, hairstyle, behavior. The second dimension of Katz’s theory is the threat that the stigma can signal to others. This assumption is applied to all with the stigmatizing mark or characteristic. The third dimension is reactive hostility. Hostility can manifest toward stigmatized individuals in various ways, from physical violence to subversively working against the stigmatized. The fourth and final dimension is the outsider perception of responsibility. In this aspect of Katz’s theory, outsiders perceive stigmatized individuals as responsible for their misfortune.

As Crocker et al. (1998) have asserted, many in-group individuals do not show sympathy toward outgroup members, while some outgroup members likely compare to other groups to ensure their status. These comparative experiences probably have detrimental psychological consequences for the stigmatized, as discussed later (Wright, 1983). Frable (1993) characterized stigma as marginal in the social landscape where stigmatized individuals or groups are statistically unusual from social norms yet these characteristics are centrally defining. Bos, Pryor, Reeder, & Stutterheim (2013) suggested a series of domains in which stigmatization exists where individual and group identity are much more tied to stigmatizing outcomes. Bos et al. (2013) characterize stigma as having four potential manifestations. Those four types of stigma are structural stigma (institutionalized stigma), public stigma (social awareness of stigma), stigma by association (one’s relationship to the group), and self-stigma (how one sees oneself as signaling
or confirming stereotypical behaviors of a particular stigma). Simply, stigma signals differences, and by extension, stigmatizers expect specific behaviors related to the stigmatized’s group. Those with public awareness of stigma may avoid contexts where others recognize their stigma. Some who experience stigma by association may seek to distance themselves from others with a similar stigma to show their “exceptionalism” and capitalize on how they diverge from that identity. Stigma appears to be cross-cultural. However, there are variations in how stigma is applied to low-status groups (e.g., religion, physical attributes such as skin color or ethnicity, or social outgroups such as gypsies). What is a consistent is the function stigma plays for behavioral expectancy and conversely the behavioral outcomes of those stigmas on the stigmatized (Croker et al., 1998)? Based on the type of stigma individuals experience, they likely have created methods for overcoming such types of stigma. For example, those who experience structural stigma sometimes believe they cannot change their situation, so they distance themselves from those institutions (e.g., African American boys disidentifying with school, evangelicals dissociating with mainstream denominations) (Steele & Aronson, 1995).

By contrast, when considering the stigmatizer, a question emerges: What drives high-status individuals’ discriminatory attitudes and behavior? To examine this behavior, we turn to one of the most influential theorists within prejudice and discrimination research, Gordon Allport (Katz, 1991). Allport proposed the least effort principle theory. The least effort principle suggests that people seek to make quick and effort-free judgments regarding others, mainly when the other appears different from the norm. The assertion is that social norms are code for one’s status, meaning that any difference from the high-status group can signal outgroup membership. Driven by stereotypes, those who signal differences can be deemed deviant and treated differently from the “norm.” They are continually and regularly reminded of their differences (Allport, 1954). Examples include discrimination in employee selection (Byrne & Nelson 1965; Fischer, Fischer, Arydin, & Frey, 2010) and classroom instruction preference for white children over minorities
(Steele, Spencer, Davies, Harber, & Nisbett, 2001; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson 2002). The least effort principle is convenient in that it allows people to make quick and adaptive decisions. Such automatic judgments on the part of high-status groups, as well as the experience of stigma, could not only be learned behaviors but rather an adaptive quality inherent to human social evolution. Some evidence suggests there may be an evolutionary component.

**Is Stigma Adaptive?**

From the perspective of evolution, stigma and the least effort principle may have been adaptive. When ancient humans were tribal, outward appearances might have served as signals when coming into contact with outgroup others or those perceived as different from tribal norms. Physical features such as larger and broader shoulders, facial or skin differences, and tribal symbols such as garb may have signaled potential threat or threatening dispositional characteristics between groups (Peterson & Wrangham, 1997; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). An interpretation of this type of perception is the least effort principle. The least effort principle could not only automatically signal intergroup differences quickly but also, by extension, potential intergroup threat. Regarding evolutionary cognition, Gutherie (2002) has argued that anthropomorphism serves as a function for human cognition in finding patterns in environments, including expecting other’s behavior quickly based on their outward appearance. This includes inter-human social interactions and ensuring one’s continued survival. Further, Boyer (2002) suggests that such fast distinctions and hypersensitivity to possible dangers give some humans a competitive advantage over other humans who may not be as sensitive to heuristics of potential dangers, either animal or human (also termed environmental agents).

An example of a perception of threat is the Smoke Detector Principle. In the Smoke Detector Principle, the costs of over-detecting threats are less than under-detecting threats (Nesse, 2001). However, as Nesse (2001; 2015) noted, this principle has potential detrimental consequences to the organism. Such fast judgments could cause individuals to react to threats
without careful consideration of the other’s intention. Conversely, the smoke detector principle can also be problematic when an individual is confronted with a real threat but discount the risk due to others being like them in some way (Nesse, 2005; Schaller, & Duncan, 2007). Hoehl, Hellmer, Johansson, and Gredebäck (2017) have demonstrated that humans may have an innate awareness of common threats such as serpents, indicating humans are automatically aware of such dangers. Such mechanisms may also serve to protect human beings from differences among people as well. Simply, such automatic judgments and behaviors could ensure the greater statistical probability of survival and, by extension, relative reproductive fitness (Humphrey, 1976; Caporael & Baron, 1997; Gigerenzer, 1997; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012; Kurzban and Leary, 2001).

What social benefit does stigma play across cultures? As an example, and from the within-group perspective, cultures have spoken and unspoken rules related to norms. Since perceived differences have the potential to be stigma, the rules may vary depending on the type of differences one is viewed to have. The assertion I would make here is that when someone was considered different enough, they likely had to supplicate to high status to ensure their participation within the group. One’s awareness of how the rules are applied to high versus low-status individuals likely gave them an adaptive edge over others with a similar stigma who lacked the expected behaviors. High-status individuals likely collectively monitored those who were different. Much of the shared attention on outgroup others’ behavior likely also ensured behavioral compliance with social expectations (Mundy, 2017; Shteynberg, & Apfelbaum, 2013; Shteynberg, 2010). As a result of these social norms, behavior likely became more coordinated within groups, resulting in the domestication of food and resources and a higher chance of groups surviving (Zeder, 2015). Stigma from the within-group context might have served to remind others of their duty to follow the tribal or kinship rules. In other words, within one’s tribal unit or kin, stigmatized individuals had to be aware and attend to exchanges of resources in trade.
(Trivers, 1971; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996; Phelan et al., 1997; Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, 2000). Some may have conformed to social norms by changing behavior, concealing their stigma if possible, and hiding marks such as clothing. For other stigmatized individuals, more permanent marks may have been difficult to conceal, requiring other adaptive behaviors in dealing with others.

While stigma may have served to control individuals perceived as different within the group, what about between-group differences? Stigma was likely pertinent to between-group exchanges as well where one’s tribal group likely lacked the warriors or technology to defend against another group should the exchange of goods violate intergroup fairness or if a group is perceived as threatening (Haselton, Buss, & DeKay, 1998; Haselton & Buss, 2000). Therefore, those without the ability to defend themselves likely had to yield and adapt to new social realities such as the enslavement of a group to aligning one’s group with another to ensure their continued survival. In either case, the low status or outgroup was likely hyper-aware of their behavior in negotiating exchanges. Such exchanges between groups likely ensured the survival of one’s group, mainly if that outgroup saw themselves as having lower status. In other words, people monitor their exchanges, providing their own familial and/or group-level reproductive (inclusive) fitness.

As is pertinent to this research, the question of stigma as defined by Crocker et al. (1998), as “some attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular social context” as related to high versus low-status groups is not in question (p. 505), but rather, what is the experience of believing one’s self or group to be stigmatized (i.e., subjective or perceived stigma) and what are the consequences of one feeling stigmatized depending on whether one is high or low in social status? Resource availability to a group likely gives that group higher transactional power and can influence others. Differences between groups likely signaled their access to resources and, by extension, how much power one’s group has.
As an example of such awareness of group resource differences, Relative Deprivation Theory describes the appraisal of one’s group’s access to resources compared with others (Crosby, 1984). If a person wishes to engage in transactions with other groups, they are likely aware of those group differences related to each group’s access to resources. Threat can simply be one’s group’s awareness and monitoring of their access to resources or the symbolic threat to cultural conventions and traditional norms within one’s society. Such concerns with cultural threats are particularly salient when groups enjoy high status and are concerned about losing such status (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Such a loss could be perceived in various ways, including the experience of stigma at an individual or group level or concern for one’s individual or group station in the social hierarchy (the details of this theory’s applicability are discussed later).

Considering these various themes discussed, one theoretical possibility to explain stigmatization comes from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. In this perspective, environmental stimuli or, in this case, the perception of one’s membership in a stigmatized group, could facilitate activation of phylogenetic behaviors that have their origins in ancient human social norms and intergroup relations. In other words, we are simply actors triggered by social experience and repeat similar behaviors found in our early human ancestry when we believe we are being pushed to the group's fringe and lack the influence and resources to respond to adversity. These behaviors might be automatic and yet adaptive. For example, behaviors such as sadness, self-esteem buffering, resource monitoring, fairness, and shared attention likely served to give our ancestors greater potential fitness for survival even when those ancestors lacked qualities seen as beneficial or optimal to the group.

In terms of human evolutionary theory, two distinct paths of inheritance exist. One is genetic with linear changes in lineage occur passed through genes from parent to offspring with variability in expression at the organism level. In other words, genetic adaptations are passed on
through generations. Another method of inheritance manifests through cultural and social learning through social networking with others within a community (Richarson, Boyd, & Henrich, 2010). In this case, cultural variation may provide fast adaptations to environmental stimuli through collective learning and social adaption. Genetic adaptations have the potential to be much slower in change. In this regard, what might have been classically seen as error or genetic drift could be explained in terms of cultural adaptions beyond simply the genetic influence (Findlay, Hansell, & Lumsden, 1989). In other words, cultural information transmission support more complex modes of delivery of information between humans where genetic transmission requires the presence of gene expression between related others (Ross, Richardson, & Rogers, 2013; Henrich & Boyd, 2002).

From a practical perspective, this infers humans have some potential benefits from cultural and social learning. Yet, cultural learning is less about randomly adaption and availability of information and behaviors which may influence gene expression beyond simple environmental pressures. In other words, humans can use their social networks to influence gene expression by altering their environment. As noted by Azumagakito, Suzuki, and Arita (2013), such social adaptations have larger impact on phenotype plasticity. This includes complex language processing, diet (or tolerance toward certain food such as lactase), and cultural knowledge of harvesting seasons and agriculture. These social adaptations provided opportunity for widespread migration, clothing development, societal development, and technological innovation. As a result, humans adapted to wider dietary tolerances, environmental temperature changes, collective survival, and eventual complex social order (Richerson, Boyd, Henrich, 2010).

Applying this same framework to stigma, it could be that stigma served as a method for ensuring cultural cohesion where those who were different might have either capitalized on the differences while others might have sought to appear as close to the cultural prototype of normal. For those with physical attribute which differed substantially from the prototype of normal, may
have used their differences to achieve status by appearing threatening as a method of protecting themselves. Early outgroup members may have needed to socially adapt to survive through submission to early authority accepting their outward differences, and therefore yielding power to others to avoid death or exile. In other words, outgroup members had a greater chance of survival living as an outsider, then on their own. So they may accept stigmatization to ensure greater reproductive fitness than being on their own.

Through the advent of globalization and secularization, humans are now more frequently in contact with diverse groups of people with changing social status related to migration and birth rates of minority groups. These changes result in a new age of inter-human interaction. Social and cultural plurality creates the environment for complex and diverse social interactions unseen in human history with a plethora of different kinds of people. Indeed, there is sociological as well as psychological evidence of competition for resources within intergroup relations. While these resources may have become more complex (social status, power, social capital, access to education), they still represent similar interpersonal dynamics that may have existed for thousands of years. Therefore, there may be a relationship between one’s loss of status and perception of stigma and one’s perception of losing resources and power. However, this premise does not address the potential psychological outcomes of one’s perception of loss of status. The following section discusses these in more detail.

**Identity, Stigma, and Self-Esteem**

To measure stigma alone does not address the complexity of the potential emotions, attitudes, and behaviors. Rather, there are likely a variety of correlations which may differ between high- versus low-status groups. Identity is powerful regarding cultural symbolism and social expectation. In other words, how we identify with others is value-laden and essential to our well-being and social status. To be stigmatized is to lose one’s potential social power. When one is stigmatized, various outcomes can be detrimental to groups and/or individuals. Since public or group stigma is rooted
in cultural normativity, stigmatizing behaviors can be consistent and even normative within society. Some of these outcomes include loss of resources, fear of intergroup competition for resources, buffering of self-esteem, intergroup prejudice, and situational framing effects. Poor performance is explained through their institutional or social stigma, not their ability. This section reviews some of the literature related to the experience of being stigmatized.

One central aspect of stigma is the role identity plays in connecting the individual with group identity. Individuals derive meaning from their membership in various groups and engage others based on their perceived group membership. In some cases, these identities are highly salient between groups and can include either positive or negative appraisals of differing others. Knowles and Peng (2005) demonstrated that white racial identity is automatically associated with the self and in-group evaluations and intergroup bias. The authors showed how identity extends from one’s group to the self in making group-level categorizations in their four studies. Knowles and Peng (2005) showed that these categorizations also included a negative emotional appraisal of the self, based on the acts of their group when presented with information regarding transgressions toward outgroups such as the lynching of African Americans. Further, when comparing one’s group to others, those with strong group identity may fear the encroachment of other groups as they may create ambiguity regarding group differences. Rubin & Paolini (2014) demonstrated that such encroachment is not only threatening but considered polluting of the group's perceived positive attributes (in other words, contamination of purity). From an applied research perspective, intergroup appraisals could also impact public policy, particularly when such groups perceive other groups as potentially threatening (Knowles and Peng, 2005; Phinney, 1990).

Stigmatized individuals may utilize various strategies that make their identity not readily apparent to outsiders. Those situations where one’s membership in a group is ambiguous to others may use multiple methods to hide their group identity. Kang, DeCelles, Tilcsik, and Jun (2016)
interviewed 29 black and 30 Asian university students seeking employment. Over 36% of interviewees reported whiting (removing language that indicates they are a minority) or changing the information on their resume to be more marketable. In the second study, the researchers asked participants to review job descriptions and adapt their resumes based on the descriptions. Interviewees applying to employers with an equal opportunity statement were less likely to modify their resumes than those applying to employers without the statement. Furthermore, in study three, researchers sent resumes with various levels of whiting to determine the number of real callbacks from employers. They found that whitened resumes received more callbacks than those resumes with wording that signaled the applicant might be a minority. These studies provide evidence that bias against minority groups does appear to exist in resume evaluations.

Once in a job, one’s perception of stigma could create a hypersensitivity to their work performance, expectancy for behavior (e.g., laziness, attendance, adversarial exchanges), and even termination (which is typical for LGBTQ), all resulting in employees being guarded regarding their identity (Woods, 1994). Such experiences have led many with concealed identities to withhold their identity from others who perceived themselves as better off (Jones et al., 1984). These coping mechanisms result in very calculated behavior and dyadic exchanges with fellow employees (Frable, Blackston, and Sherbaum, 1990). It is unclear if those in high-status groups perceive themselves to experience similar biases related to their identity and if so, respond in analogous ways.

An example might be a person who has the early stages of cancer. To ensure their continued employment, they may seek to withhold information regarding their medical condition from their employer to avoid layoffs or loss of insurance (Byrne & Nelson 1965; Solanka, L., 2017; Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990). Alternatively, being identified as a criminal or social delinquent may push an individual to conform to high-status norms or, in some cases, embrace such outgroup stereotyped identities (an example would be a someone who is gay
concealing their identity). This social influence may not be simply from the justice system's perspective but rather the social influences of the media, culture, friends, and family represent. For example, an individual who has grown up within a low socio-economic community with a high crime rate and high unemployment may choose to capitalize on their situation and embrace a life of crime as a means of feeling accepted among their peers and a means of gaining power. More simply, some stigmatized individuals may find themselves reinforcing high-status group stereotypes of low-status groups by exhibiting perceived expected deviant behavior such as criminal activity. From the psychological perspective, they incorporate their stereotype by acting out the expected behavior of their group. Their behaviors further reinforce negative group stereotypes at the group level even when such behaviors are present in high-status groups (Perry, Dovidio, Murphy, & van Ryn, 2015). Alternatively, those stigmatized may be aware of outsider perceptions of their group identity and work to show they do not conform to such social conventions or behavioral expectations. In some cases, identity can be concealed, while in others, where one’s identity is apparent, adapting to one’s stigma may require alternative coping methods.

Disengagement is when a stigmatized individual disengages their self-esteem from their performance, accepting that their situation is based on stigma, not one’s actual ability (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998). For many high school students, their GPA becomes a source of pride or anxiety as performance is generally seen as attributional versus situationally dependent. Steele and Aronson (1995) suggested that, particularly for blacks (characteristically visible stigma), their disengagement with school serves as a coping or buffering strategy to distance themselves from confirming negative stereotypes and, by extension, high-status rules and social expectations. These studies suggest the adaptive quality cultivated by low-status groups for addressing long-standing prejudice and stigmatization through institutionalized bias and discrimination due to stigma. Alternatively, another approach is
through disidentification. The individual can redefine themselves and their identity so that the performance in a particular domain is not pertinent to their membership in an identified group. In the case of African Americans or women, they may seek to more closely identify with the group to utilize novel ways of addressing negative stereotypes and stigma such as schematic or self-construal redefinition through overperforming to prove themselves or adopting adaptive views of intelligence (von Hippel, Hawkins, & Schooler, 2001). An example would be, an African American woman and engineer demonstrating she is the exception not the norm from her racial group.

Another perspective is the distinction between disengagement and disidentification related to one’s performance with a task and disidentification with one’s identity. As an example of disengagement, an African American student makes a poor grade on a test. Rather than internalizing what could be perceived as a failure, they recognize that the school as an institution is not fair to minorities. Therefore, the student can explain their grade as school-based prejudice. Recognizing the unfairness of institutions charged with serving these groups, outgroups may insulate themselves from the adverse psychological outcomes that come with their stigmas, such as low self-esteem or sadness (Steele et al., 2002). In the case of disidentification, some stigmatized individuals might seek to normalize their stigma by changing the perceptions of others. In this approach, the stigmatized individual self-discloses their invisible stigma to others and then works to show others they are as normal as those in high-status groups. This can cause them to work harder, positioning themselves to prototype how the stigma associated is false. By being open regarding their identity, they can attempt to control the social perception of themselves or their group (Joachim & Acorn, 2000).

The resulting benefits of disclosure management have been noted by Royer (1998) as emotional wellbeing, alienation management, and changing perceptions of stigma limitations. Of course, revealing one’s identity is not without cost and likely requires some degree of
reconnaissance by stigmatized individuals before disclosure. Nevertheless, if they are successful, there can have even greater self-confidence and self-esteem on the part of the stigmatized, particularly when they have continued experience with stigma.

Another consideration related to concealment as a protective mechanism of self-esteem is related to attributional ambiguity. *Attributional ambiguity* is when a person who identifies with a low-status group is unsure if feedback related to their behavior is performance based or prejudice-based. That ambiguity is centered on the objective evaluation of one’s ability or membership in a low-status group. As a result, the individual likely expends many cognitive resources in presenting themselves as an ingroup member. As a byproduct of these cognitively taxing social interactions, the individual likely experiences anxiety and stress in determining if the individual inadvertently signaled their stigma or not. Such exchanges can create emotions for the stigmatized as there could be many possible explanations for the behavior of others. Even for those who self-disclose their stigma, they still may not be able to determine if others are genuine in their exchanges, creating uncertainty (Crocker et al., 1991; Major & Crocker, 1993; Aronson & Inzlicht, 2004). Attributional ambiguity also need not be applied to the stigmatized. For example, those with wealth or power could perceive themselves to have attributional ambiguity. When people are kind to those with wealth, the wealthy are unsure if the kindness is genuine or motivated to take advantage of their wealth. This example demonstrates that humans regularly monitor others in an attempt to determine intention (e.g., the theory of mind), and sometimes such assumptions or appraisals of others are accurate or inaccurate (Astonington, 2003). Such experiences could result in stereotype threat.

Schmader (2002) explored stereotype threat within gender. Stronger gender identity had an influence on math test scores versus weaker identity. Women for whom gender was central to their identity performed worse on math-related tasks than those for whom their identity as a woman was less important (Schmader, 2002). In other words, when a person believes that their
group membership is predictive of their ability on a particular task, they perform more poorly when they closely identify with that group. Such group attributions can also be manipulated positively as well. Oyserman, Harrison, and Bybee (2001) found that young African American girls who believed that African American girls were highly proficient in achievement had the highest achievement efficacy compared with other groups. This finding further supported the assertion that people draw individual attributional information from those groups for whom they identify most closely and those assertions influence self-esteem. A similar pattern emerges related to religion and faith. Particularly, Rios et al. (2016) explored if differences in task-based performance would exist when the research participant’s Christian identity was made salient. Self-described Christians performed more poorly on tasks framed as science-based than tasks framed as intuition-based when their identity was made salient. In other words, if their Christian identity was made apparent, they are more likely to do poorly on science based task versus those whose Christian identity was not made apparent. While they may not endorse such stereotypes about themselves or their group, such assumptions seemed to influence their performance on scientifically framed tasks across multiple studies (Rios et al., 2016).

Crosby (1984) asserts that shared perception is likely one of the main drivers of the experience of stigma and discrimination from the perspective of one’s experience. Based on their observation of others within their group, these assumptions cause them to deduce shared experiences indicative of the group’s overall stigma. Crosby's research is of particular interest because some individuals have not experienced personal stigma as members of the group, but have either heard about it via hearsay or have observed it occurring with others in their group. This research shows that identifying with others who have perceived themselves to be stigmatized affects one’s perception of stigma. The high salience of one’s group membership can influence their perception of their group in the broader social hierarchy (Crosby, 1984). From this perspective, perceived stigma can potentially vary from individual to group level, and one’s
perception of the treatment of their group may or may not be reinforced by their particular experience (if they have experienced stigma, personally). However, their personal experience of stigma may reaffirm their group identity. To this end, this section discusses the individual’s motives and behavior in reacting to individual stigma and the potentially detrimental consequences of being identified as part of a stigmatized group. Some who have long experienced stigma may have various coping strategies, while those new to stigma may not be prepared for the psychological consequences.

Bos et al. (2013) proposed four types of stigma: structural stigma, public stigma, stigma by association, and self-stigma. Of particular interest here are the differences between stigma by association and self-stigma. One’s experience of stigma can be not only at the group level but as an individual member of the group. While one may not have personal experiences of stigma, they may know of others who have experienced stigma and therefore are sensitive to being categorized as a member of the same group. Conversely, if one sees themselves within a stigmatized group, they may have developed personal coping strategies to recognize and adapt to their group’s perceived limitations. Examples of such coping mechanisms are reflected within the just-world hypothesis as believing at some point perpetrators will receive punishment, experiential compartmentation where one’s opinions are sectioned off without drawing connections to related experiences, psychological disengagement where one detaches their self-esteem from a stigmatizing context, or system justification (Crosby, 1984; Shin, Dovidio, & Napier, 2013, Schmader, Major, Gramzow, 2001, Jost and Banaji, 1994). Even when a group believes themselves to be stigmatized, they may still benefit at some level from the social hierarchy. Of particular interest here is Jost and Banaji’s (1994) System Justification Theory, where individuals believe that while the institution works against low-status groups, there is a belief that such institutions are necessary even natural (status quo). For Jost and Banaji (1994), interpersonal identity is similar to ego justification, where one seeks to project themselves as positive and
favorable as part of the larger group narrative. This is known as “group justification,” where one needs to feel positive about themselves extends to the group. When the self or the group's motives exceed system justification, individuals question or challenge the social system.

One of the earliest assumptions of empirical research on stigma and self-esteem was that stigma was detrimental to the stigmatized, decreasing self-esteem or performance. This hypothesis failed to gain support (Crocker and Major, 1989), particularly with visible and non-concealable physical deformities (Clifford and Clifford, 1986), Obesity (Jarvie et al. 1983), or physical attractiveness (Brzezicki & Major, 1983). It appears that stigmatized individuals have various strategies for dealing with stigma, and resulting success can empower individuals with higher positive self-esteem versus self-esteem loss. Crocker and Major (1989) note that empirical evidence cannot confirm the linkage between stigma and self-esteem. For example, Hoelter (1982) observed no significant differences in the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale between Whites and African Americans or between males versus females by determining perimeter estimates through SEM. One possible explanation could also be that such feelings are suppressed and not self-reported. At the group level, stigma can result in blaming high-status groups for the cause of one’s suffering (Crocker & Major, 1989). Crocker (1999) noted that group perception creates shared reality, reinforcing devaluation and stereotypes of outgroups. Such devaluation can serve to remind targets of their stigma (Frable, 1993). However, given that stigma can be systematic and pervasive, stigmatized individuals may create coping strategies to address their experiences of stigma, mainly where such experiences are widespread. Simply, prejudice and, by experience, stigma keep low-status individuals from participating fully in society, and yet the stigmatized demonstrate self-protective attitudes and behaviors adaptive to their situation. This also leads to another question of how high-status individuals become a social prototype of normality for which any variation in identity is identified as different.
Danbold and Huo (2015) suggest that whites serve as a prototype ethnic group within the United States. They are generally the social reference group when other groups are perceived as different. High-Status individuals typically enjoy their position in the social hierarchy through social power and privilege (prototypical status). Unfortunately, social hierarchies can change, and those who have experienced high status can perceive themselves to lose influence. The result can be fear and intergroup threat. The authors call this perceived loss of their group status Prototypicality Threat. As part of their study one, Danbold and Huo (2015) recruited 149 white Americans (both male and female). They completed a series of modified questions related to support for assimilation, prototypical threat, realistic threat, and symbolic threat. They found that concerns with change of status mediated whites' concern about their continued prototypical status. The authors in their study two observed that when presented with false data showing loss of majority status, whites become more defensive of their group and higher on prototypicality threat and lower on diversity endorsement. Further, whites are less likely to see outgroups as prototypically American (Danbold and Huo, 2015). This current study will replicate the manipulation (loss of status) of the Danbold and Huo (2015) study to determine if white males or Christians would react to a perceived loss of status. It is unclear how high-status individuals with no experience in insulating themselves from stigmatizing events would cope with these experiences and what impact such perceived stigma would have on their self-esteem and intergroup emotions. Based on the literature reviewed here, it is more likely that those who have generally enjoyed power and status will likely lack the coping and behavioral modification strategies for dealing with stigma compared to their low-status counterparts. Those who can conceal their identity may choose to do so, while those who cannot may experience loss of self-esteem.
Stigma and Intergroup Emotion

Social psychologists have long been interested in intergroup prejudice and stigma, and by extension, intergroup emotions. Prejudice has various emotional correlations, including contempt, anxiety, fear, disgust, and sadness (Smith & Mackie, 2018; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Individual emotions are also present at the group level. However, these basic emotions frame between-group attitudes. Regarding fear and disgust, ingroups may avoid other groups, while contempt and anger might influence aggressive actions against other groups. According to Mackie, Devos, & Smith (2000), participants with higher reported anger were more likely to make between-group appraisals regarding intergroup differences. Further, those higher on reported anger would be more likely and willing to confront outgroup members. Also, the emotions experienced by the ingroup influence their level of interest in conflict with the outgroup. In other words, emotions serve as a functional mechanism to provide appraisals of others as well as context and experiences (Maitner, Claypool, Mackie, & Smith, 2008; Smith & Mackie, 2018). Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) suggest that group-level identification and appraisals are driven by social comparisons of the self, the individual’s group, as compared with other groups. Emotions provide evaluative feedback about the perceived status and comparison of one’s group with others. Shared experience and identity with others likely enhance their feelings regarding their group self-appraisals. Further research has also shown that emotional states also vary as a function of different group memberships. (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Seger, Smith, & Mackie, 2009; Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith 2008; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). Group level emotion also appears to be linked to group motivation, suggesting that some groups vary in collective motivation compared with other groups with different shared emotions. (Reyson & Branscombe, 2008). Further, Smith (1993) observed that stereotypes and prejudice could vary from how liked the outgroup is, even when that group is perceived to have positive attributes. In some cases, the outgroup may be seen to have positive attributes such as the stereotype of being a hard worker (e.g., Mexican immigrants) or having scholarly prowess (e.g., Asian students).
However, discriminating behaviors can exist just the same (e.g., fear of immigrants taking one’s job or the assumption that Asians are always good at taking tests and therefore taking scholarships from whites).

In sum, it is group-level appraisals and comparison that can influence the emotion and motivation of the individual. Simply, emotions can bind individuals closer to their groups and can serve as potential functional indicators among group members. Observing others who share group membership can reinforce attitudes regarding other outgroup experiences of contact and conflict. Sadness could communicate a group or individual’s inability or lack of power to confront high-status groups. At the same time, anger is a means for demonstrating that one has had successful conflict outcomes. Shared goals and/or perceived threat may heighten or damper one’s concern for their group. Further, those comparisons can also create concern for other groups. For example, those who are sympathetic to stigmatized individuals will show more emotional compassion. In contrast, those who fear or avoid stigmatized individuals may show more anger and act on such anger. In some cases, outgroups may exhibit emotional ambivalence (Dijker & Koomen, 2003). For those individuals whose stigma is perceived as dangerous, outgroups may elicit fear or avoidance not only from high-status individuals but even fellow group members (Bos, Kok, & Dijker, 2001; Feldman & Crandall, 2007).

Finally, one topic of particular interest here is related to intergroup conflict. As a demonstration of Smith’s theory (noted earlier in this section), Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) suggested that when individuals face an adverse event in their lives such as intergroup conflict, how they react to such conflict is dependent upon what resources or means they have to withstand conflict. Suppose the group generally succeeds in competition. In that case, they are likely to confront similar conflicts in the future, where if the group fails, then the group may avoid conflict in the future. Within this model, confronting outgroups in conflict is associated with higher anger, while avoidance is associated with sadness. Confrontation versus avoidance is a product of how
much collective support the group enjoys. Mackie et al. (2000) also demonstrated that anger could serve as a mediator in confronting outgroups and thus can be manipulated while sadness and defensiveness remain similar with no change in the confrontation. In other words, anger could provide the mechanism to energize and mobilize groups to action. At the same time, sadness serves to push groups and individuals to avoid adverse conditions in the sense of avoidance. More simply, intergroup emotions are the product of perceived intergroup relations within the broader social landscape, providing feedback within and between groups.

This section has discussed the intersections between the individual’s emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral domains from intergroup interactions. Outgroups may exhibit emotional ambivalence when they are aware of their status as an outgroup member. For those individuals whose stigma is perceived as dangerous, ingroups and outgroups may elicit fear or avoidance of the stigmatized (Dijker & Koomen, 2003; Bos, Kok, & Dijker, 2001; Feldman & Crandall, 2007). Based on these findings, high-status individuals have likely enjoyed successful outcomes in intergroup conflict in the past. They would likely experience higher anger at the loss of status as opposed to sadness. However, if one’s perception of sigma is similar to that of low-status groups, they may experience higher sadness, as demonstrated by previous studies on stigma and emotion.

**Relative Deprivation Theory and Intergroup Prejudice**

The differences between in-groups and outgroups are not simply prejudiced or stigma inherent to the individual but also include the power dynamics between these groups, and, by extension, access to resources by outgroups when controlled by ingroups. This is relative deprivation theory. More formally, *relative deprivation theory* proposes that individuals monitor their group’s access to resources. When these individuals perceive they have a disadvantage, they
experience anger and resentment and believe themselves entitled to receive similar benefits. For these individuals, they seek fairness and equity of resources. Smith et al. (2012) proposed that relative deprivation theory has four components. First, people compare themselves to others. Second, they form cognitive appraisals and opinions regarding if they or their group is disadvantaged. Third, individuals believe that being disadvantaged is unfair. Finally, individuals hold negative feelings and resent their disadvantages. Both the fields of psychology and sociology have extensive research on relative deprivation theory since the 1950s.

Keltner et al. (2003) suggested that power gives individuals the ability and potential capacity to modify the internal states of others. Inherent in Keltner et al.’s model is the regular reminder of resource differences. Particularly for the powerless, these reminders ensure conformity to dominant norms based on need and access, not a person’s motivation to change behavior or their ability to make decisions for themselves. Further, Keltner and colleagues suggest that powerlessness profoundly influences one’s threat sensitivity, behavior, and automatic responses. Comparatively, having little to no power negatively impacts one’s emotional state, influences the way low-status individuals focus on individual or group goals and alter their normal behavior (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating, 1988; Gruenfeld, 1995; Sutton & Davidson, 1997).

An awareness of their lack of power or status could make people more sensitive to any stimuli which might highlight their membership in their group, which in turn could result in some level of behavior or affective outcomes such as anxiety, avoidance, response inhibition, and environmental vigilance (being aware of others responses and behavior). This could cause cognitive load, and perceived unusual behavior from the perception of others (Buss, 1996; Gray, 1987, 1991; Higgins, 1997, 1998). Also, rather than considering power as dichotomous (such as the power or powerless), it varies by degrees, where different groups hold different types of power. Depending on one’s status, they may have more or less power. For example, the
connection between low power and negative affect has also been demonstrated among children of low socioeconomic status. Children were observed to exhibit depression, negatively sustained moods, and guilt, all varying by age and various stigmatizing identities (Dovidio et al., 1988; Hecht, Inderbitzen, & Bukowski, 1998). The research provided above demonstrates that there is plenty of research that has been conducted on low-status outcomes of stigma and discrimination. Nevertheless, there is little literature exploring outcomes of perceived stigma or prejudice among the high status. While cultural examples exist where smaller groups hold power over larger groups (e.g., Sunni Muslims in Iraq have the political power while Shia Muslims make up the majority), high status is associated with majority status in the American context. Moreover, access to resources is a primary concern for various groups in a diverse society. This might be particularly problematic for someone who feels stigmatized and yet has also enjoyed resource access in the past. Their perception could be based on seeing their group lose their influence in power loss, social status, resource access, or group representation within the larger society. Based on the premises of the previous sections, I proposed a study that examined the influence of perceived loss of status on a perception of sigma, intergroup emotion, particularly sadness or anger, self-esteem, and perception of power. The following section provides further detail in outlining the research design.

**Research Questions**

As suggested earlier in the introduction, the term stigma has been used by some high-status individuals to self-characterize their experiences. Still, is the use of the term “stigma” appropriate given it has generally been applied to low-status groups? This is not to say that individuals may not experience some form of adversity. However, many individuals who fit the definition of high status also claim to be stigmatized. While this is a simple research question, there are some potential variables to consider in light of the academic literature.
Experience of stigma can vary from individual to the group level. For example, one may not have a direct experience of stigma and yet is aware of the experiences of others in their group. For some, their experiences only further confirm their membership within the group. Therefore, this study examined the role of stigma at the group and individual levels.

Two types of identity also provide an interesting discussion. One example is of those identities which are difficult to conceal, and the other example is of identities that can be concealed. For instance, for white males, their identity is physically apparent, given the color of their skin, hairstyle, etc. Because this particular identity could be perceived as high status, they might view diversity initiatives as working against them. Depending on one’s perception, they may see this experience as socially empowering or discriminating.

For Christians, they can conceal their religious identity, assuming they understand the social norms and expectations. For example, Christians in an academic context may be aware of diversity language and science terminology and speak to their colleagues within those domains. If Christians self-disclose or areouted, they may be concerned about their authenticity as an academic or scholar. As an example, Gartner (1986) sent fake resumes to a variety of clinical psychology programs. Those resumes which were open regarding their Christian beliefs were less likely to be chosen than those who made no mention of religious beliefs.

While Christians serve as the most significant religious identity within the United States, some social domains could certainly place traditional Christians in being perceived as an outgroup. Academia is an excellent example. In 2010, Inside Higher Ed ran an article discussing Christian experiences in academia from students and faculty, suggesting there may be prejudice against believers in academia (Larsen, 2010). Even the popular movie series “God’s Not Dead” plays off of Frederick Nitzsche's famous declaration of “God is Dead,” adding the term “not” to indicate that God is still relevant in the modern world. The movies infer those social norms have turned against Christianity and that we live in an age where belief in God is actively suppressed.
As presented in the movie series, central to this thesis is that governmental and liberal institutions are working to destroy individual religious freedoms mocking some Christians' beliefs. Both the correlational and culturally anecdotal evidence point to a belief that Christians believe they experience discrimination.

Threat can take various forms; in one example, how high-status groups exhibit their influence can be threatening to low status groups should they lack agency to determine group level outcomes. In another example, it can be access to the dissemination of resources between groups. Based on these premises, it could be concluded that high-status individuals perceive detrimental social exchanges as related to their membership in a particular group. One possible example of detrimental exchanges is the perceived loss of power or social status. Loss of social status can also be the perception of the loss of resources. Therefore, this study will explore how high-status individuals perceive their group sustaining versus losing status over time due to their perception of losing majority status.

In predicting possible outcomes such as intergroup emotion, membership can have psychologically detrimental consequences for those individuals in stigmatized groups. Conversely, continued stigmatizing experiences can also provide buffering effects for stigmatized individuals when recognizing the structural stigma inherent within their society. It is unclear if the perception of stigma by high-status individuals is similar to that of low-status individuals in buffering their perceived experiences of stigma. Further, those who have had continuing failed confrontations with others will likely show more sadness. However, those who have had successful conflicts with outgroups will probably have greater anger. Given the assumption that high-status individuals have enjoyed privilege, they may have succeeded in confrontations with outgroups and would likely result in higher anger. Those who have experienced institutionalized stigma will likely have self-protective strategies in coping with their stigma. Those with little or no experience with institutional stigma may lack self-protective strategies in coping with their
perceived stigma. Another perspective is in buffering one’s self-esteem as a result of stigma. Those with regular experiences of perceived stigma likely have likely developed methods for buffering these experiences. White males or Christians likely also have relatively little experience with buffering their self-esteem in regards to stigma. Those who are white cannot conceal their identity. In contrast, those with a religious identity such as Christianity can hide their identity given, they can appropriately identify others’ perceptions of them and monitor and respond to others appropriately. Therefore, one potential outcome of managing one’s new role in coping with a perceived stigma would be reductions in individual self-esteem.

This experimental study explored high-status individuals’ perception of stigma to see if similar psychological patterns emerge compared with low-status stigmatized individuals. Our premises suggested two studies be conducted, both online. The first study explored white male perceived stigma. The second study will examine allegiant Christian perceptions of stigma. These groups are typically identified as high-status, yet some individuals within each group self-identify as stigmatized. Given the earlier premise that losing one’s majority status could result in perceived stigma and/or loss of power, the following hypotheses follow possible outcome variables with alternative hypotheses compared to the previous research findings. This study proposed the following hypotheses and provided an alternative hypothesis as a best practice, as Platt (1964) noted. Each number assigned is the hypothesis number to be tested. These are also represented in Table 1. with subsequent alternative hypotheses.

1. When white males/Christians are led to believe that their group is losing its numeric majority, participants will report higher group stigma than those who perceive their group majority to stay constant.
   a. Comparatively, those who perceive their group to lose a numeric majority may perceive their group also to lose social power but will show no differences in their perception of their group’s experience of stigma (indicating that the
perception of one’s changing status is perceived loss of power not the perception of group stigma).

2. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, we expect increased prejudice toward low-status outgroups compared to those who perceive their group majority to stay constant.
   a. Alternatively, those who perceive their group to lose a numeric majority will experience no significant difference in outgroup prejudice.

3. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose a numeric majority status but where they have likely had hierarchical and social power (were once high status) and, by extension, have probably enjoyed some successful confrontations with other groups, we expect higher anger than sadness.
   a. As a contrasting hypothesis, if high-status individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status and where they were thought to hold social power but believe their group to experience more stigma, they may experience higher sadness than anger, indicating that sigma has similar outcomes as to those experienced by low-status groups showing a similar pattern of affective reaction to stigma.

4. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they will show lower individual self-esteem.
   a. Alternatively, those perceiving themselves to lose numeric majority status may have similar buffering effects to those in low-status groups in protecting their self-esteem, much like a minority or low-status group.

5. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose majority status, they will perceive themselves to lose group power.
   a. It could also be that those who perceive themselves to lose majority status may continue to believe they will not lose power.
6. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they will perceive themselves to lose individual power measured by a measure of individual power.
   a. Contrasting this hypothesis, it could be that those who perceive themselves to numeric majority status may perceive themselves to continue to hold individual power.

7. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they will be more likely to conceal their Christian beliefs (study two).
   a. Alternatively, one’s identity as a Christian being socially normative; they are less likely to conceal their Christian beliefs.

8. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose `numeric majority status, they will be less likely to disclose their Christian beliefs to others (study two).
   a. Moreover, and in providing an alternative explanation, one’s identity as a Christian being socially normative will make them more likely to conceal their Christian beliefs.

9. In exploring possible moderating influences on the various dependent variables list in the above hypotheses, we are also examining how collective self-esteem and social dominance orientation may enhance or inhibit the various outcome variables. There are no formal projected hypotheses here for the moderating effects but rather explorative research for further insight.
Table 1 - Hypothesis Predicted Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Loss of Status $H_{\text{formal}}$</th>
<th>Loss of Status $H_{\text{alternative}}$</th>
<th>Same Status</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Stigma</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Stigma</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup Prejudice</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup Sadness</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup Anger</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Self-Esteem</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Power</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Power</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment (Study Two)</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosure (Study Two)</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC = no change
Chapter Three: Research Methodology

The following two studies explored high-status stigma. The first study examined white males, manipulating their perceived numeric majority status, either maintaining information regarding majority status or losing majority status over time. By manipulating perceived status, one’s group perceives that one’s group will be perceived as losing status as a function of a false report by condition. The second study replicated the methodological conditions, manipulations, and process of the first study that Christians served as the focus of the research, particularly traditional Christians. The latter fits the allegiant paradigm, as noted by Bromley (1998). In Bromley’s theory, Allegiant individuals are normative dominations within a particular community (considered the major denominations). In addressing the role of concealment within Christianity, we employed two scales adapted from the LGBTQQ literature, the first scale related to concealment and the second related to disclosure (Jackson, & Mohr, 2016; Mohr & Fassinger 2000). For study two, the Christian participants also responded to questionnaires related to identity concealment (hiding one’s identity from others) and disclosure (sharing of one’s identity with others). The manipulation in both studies presents a percentage of group membership (either as white males or Christians) within the broader American context, either as holding steady or losing representation. This serves as manipulation of group status. Both studies examined if any moderating variables may contribute to an enhanced effect on perceived stigma and the resulting dependent variables (in this case, emotion and intergroup prejudice). Those potential moderating variables included the percentage of group membership, Social Dominance Orientation, and collective self-esteem. This design tested the before-mentioned hypotheses, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 - Status-Based Stigma Research Conceptual Framework
Study One

Sample

As part of study one, we attempted to manipulate one's perceived majority status within American society as a white male, an apparent identity that is difficult to conceal. Data were collected from two sources. The first was collected through TurkPrime, a crowdsourced research participant platform. The second was collected through purposeful snowball sampling of self-identified white males via social media (Facebook and Twitter). A total of 246 participants were recruited via TurkPrime and 125 from social media for 371 total participants. In terms of demographics, participants were white male Americans. Combining the overall samples into a single study, the average mean age was 40, with a standard deviation of 13.23. The ages ranged from 18 to 85. The participants reported taking some college courses (n=111 or 30%). In comparison, others reported receiving a bachelor's degree (n=152 or 41%), and some reported completing a graduate or professional degree (n=73 or 19.7%). In terms of marital status, the largest reported groups were either never married (n=158 or 42.6%) or married (n=171 or 46.1%). Further, most participants identified as either an Atheist or Agnostic (n=171 or 46.1%) or Christian (n=147 or 39.6%). The demographics are similar to other convenience sample studies except for the self-reported religiosity, with a disproportionate number of atheists or agnostics participating. In terms of self-reported political affiliation, the most substantial majority of participants identified as a Democrat (n=170 or 45.8%) while the rest of the participants identified as a Republican (n=96 or 25.9%) or Libertarian (n=57 or 15.4%).

Procedure

White male participants were presented with an online survey utilizing Qualtrics through online solicitation via the TurkPrime research participant system and social media recruitment. Informed consents were provided digitally within Qualtrics, an online survey system including a description of the method with statements like “this survey is based on your attitudes toward
various world issues,” as well as a typical timeframe of completion and standard consent language informing the potential participant of their rights by participating in this study. Participants were able to download a PDF copy of the informed consent for their records following the end of the study. Further, participants were debriefed regarding the nature of the study, including the full disclosure of the research question posed and methods. All data and information were contained in an encrypted password folder. This study employed three conditions where two of the three conditions for each level serve as manipulations. Beginning the study, all participants completed measures related to demographics, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), and Collective Self-Esteem with SDO and Collective Self-Esteem randomly presented. Following these measures, participants were randomly assigned (evenly by the end of the study) to one of the three conditions.

Participants read a false cover story presented as an Urban Institute research brief in the first condition to manipulate the independent variable. The cover story gave deliberately inaccurate percentages of white males in the United States either as relatively holding steady with some minor loss for believability (condition 1) or majority loss status (condition 2) over time. Condition three, the participants received no information regarding the percentage of change of the group over time and proceeded to the surveys. Participants saw a report that depicts percentages of representation from 10 years ago, current trends, and projected statistics ten years from now for conditions one and two. Following the manipulations, participants were presented with randomized surveys to complete to avoid the potential for order effects (see Figure3). In cases where appropriate, items were randomized as well. Following the presentation of manipulations, participants completed measures of in-group prejudice, emotion-group associations such as anger and sadness, and individual and group power measures. Those measures are discussed in detail in the following subsection.
Figure 2 - Status-based White Male Stigma Research Experimental Design
Measures

Before receiving the manipulation conditions, the following measures will be used in determining individual differences.

Demographics. The demographics section asked commonly used questions related to the participants’ age, gender identity, racial/ethnicity identity, the subject’s level of education completed, household highest level of education, sexual preference and identity, household income, household composition, employment status, political identification, the candidate they would have voted for as an indicator of their political ideology, and religious/denominational identity. These questions are to determine if any individual differences might contribute to interactional effects within the data.

Moderated Variables

Given that we tested moderated variables, we expected that the moderating effects of perceived group status and power would be magnified by group importance (collective self-esteem) and social dominance orientation. This study implemented the following measures in the determination of any moderating effects. Those measures are:

A measure of Collective Self Esteem. In the measurement of Collective Self-Esteem, Luhtaen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale was used. This scale measures one’s self-esteem related to their social identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the positive effect of group membership. The scale includes four domains. Those domains are membership, privacy, public association, and identity. The domain of membership is defined as one’s worthiness and contributions to their group. Privacy relates to how much the person individually appreciates the group and its membership, in other words, one’s private view of the group and its value. The third domain, or public opinion, is how the group is perceived by the greater cultural context, particularly if they have positive attributes. The fourth domain is identity, or how much the
individual identifies personally with the group. These measures provide insight into one’s social identity and the self-esteem benefits or disadvantages that result from their association and identification with the group.

A Measure of Social Dominance Orientation. Social dominance orientation (SDO) measures the extent to which one group is perceived to be better than or to dominate other groups. The SDO measure is a difference between a preference for hierarchical versus equal group differences. Those who are high on SDO prefer policies and ideologies which benefit their group over others. This is due to their view that their group should have the authority and make decisions. SDO could serve as a moderator for those in high versus low-status groups. Those higher on SDO may be more likely to prefer dominance or over low-status groups and might see the loss of power as particularly detrimental to their hierarchy perceive themselves to be stigmatized.

**Manipulations**

For the manipulation, three conditions were implemented. In the first condition, participants read a cover story regarding the changing racial landscape in the United States. The language read as follows:

“As part of a nationwide demographic study of racial trends within the United States and working with the United States Census Bureau, the United States Department of Labor and the United States Department of Education, The Urban Institute triangulated a series of data sets to more accurately determine how racial identity has changed over time. Ten years ago, white males made up roughly 60% of the American Population. Currently, they make up 58% and are projected to be 56% (40% for condition two) by 2040, given current trends.”

In condition one, the participants read that their group is currently losing status, while in condition two, research participants read that there has been little change in representation. In the
third condition, participants did not read a story, serving as the control condition. Following the article, participants were asked to write a short qualitative answer explaining why they believe the data has trended. This manipulation explored if one’s perception of change in their group influence translates into a perception of stigma. Therefore, any potential changes within the dependent variables of perceived prejudice, intergroup emotions, individual self-esteem, and group power follow similar trends observed in the current literature.

**Dependent Measures**

This study employed measures of individual and group stigma, individual self-esteem, intergroup prejudice, and a measure of emotions using items related to controversial groups and one’s perception of emotion toward these groups.

An internalized stigma measure was used. This measure consists of 29 items employing the Ghanean, Ritscher et al., (2003) measure of Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness except that the adjectives and sentence phrases of mental illness were adapted to highlight white maleness. The measure has five subdomains. Those domains are alienation, stereotype endorsement, discrimination experience, social withdrawal, and stigma resistance. Alienation refers to the experience of isolation from others, particularly those considered normative within society. Stereotype endorsement refers to one’s view that they embody commonly held stereotypes regarding their reference group. Discrimination experience measures are the extent to which people have perceived and felt stigmatized concerning others. In social withdrawal measures, the participant’s perceived experience of withdrawing from social experiences results from their salient stigma. The final domain of stigma resistance measures the person’s ability to be unaffected by internalized stigma regardless of environmental signals, highlighting the person’s differences. The stigma items were presented twice. One group of questions presented related to one’s experience as an individual who has personally experienced stigma as a white male. At the same time, the second set of items explored one’s belief that their group has experienced stigma.
as white males. This comprehensive measure has been used in various clinical settings; however, the questions can be shifted to other stigmatizing situations, including white male identity.

A Measure of Individual Self Esteem. To measure individual self-esteem, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was used. This is a unidimensional ten-item measure. This scale is a measurement of state self-esteem. We can determine to what degree stigma is related to individual self-esteem for high versus low-status groups by including this measure.

A measure of Intergroup Prejudice. For a measure of intergroup prejudice, the Quick Discrimination Index was used. This measure is a 30-item index of two domains related to multiculturalism and women’s equality. Items include attitudinal and effective themes related to racial diversity and women’s equity from social policy and opinion. This scale is of particular use here as the domains would serve as the reference group for which high-status individuals may have an intergroup prejudice (Ponterotto et al., 1995).

A Measure of Intergroup Emotions: To measure emotional reactions (similar to Mackie, Devos, & Smith 2000 but modified to simplify language about groups), a series of questions asked participants about their emotional attitudes toward outgroups. We asked participants to think about the emotions they immediately feel when thinking about each group if they associate any emotion with the group at all. They were then asked to select an emotion from the list. We then summed the number of emotions related to each group and compared the frequency of emotions by the group. Those groups identified are Democrats, Lesbians, Liberals, Conservatives, Republicans, Black Lives Matter, women’s equality, NAACP, American Civil Liberties Union, white males, right-wing militias, and alt-right (Gendron, Roberson, Marietta van der Vyver, & Feldman Barrett 2014). The emotions provided in the list were happiness, sadness, emotionally torn, interest, anger, fear, indifference, and “not familiar with this group.”
A Measure of Power. Given that perceived power might moderate the effect of stigma and the specific dependent variables, two power measures were employed for this study. The measure of power used was Anderson et al. (2005)’s Generalized Sense of Power Scale, which measures perceived individual power in relationships with others and social settings. We modified this version to ask questions about group power. Both the group and individual measures of power reference the participant’s white male or religious group identity as part of each item. This study attempted to determine if perceived stigma varies as a function of perceived power or perceived loss of power by including these different measures. In other words, is stigma seen as a loss of power as a group or one’s membership in a group, or is stigma the concern with a mark on their individual or group identity?

Manipulation Checks

Following the presentation of the manipulation conditions, participants were asked to recall the instructions given to them and respond to items to ensure attention and understanding of the instructions. Participants responded to nuance multiple choice questions regarding the instructions given to them. They were asked, “have you personally ever been discriminated for being a white male?”

Study Two

Sample

For demographics, all participants were Christians. Again, we combined the two samples into a single study. The average age of the participants was 47.2, with a standard deviation of 14.82 with an age range of 19 to 85. Further, n = 95 (29.1%) of our participants identified as male with n = 230 (70.3%) identified as female. In terms of education, participants reported completed high school n = 21 (6.4%), some college n = 218 (66.7%), and graduate education n = 86 (26.3%). In terms of marital status, n = 75 (22.9%) identified as never married, and n = 188 (57.5%) indicated
being married. In terms of self-described political association, n = 176 (53.8%) identified as some type of conservative with n = 132 (40.3%) identifying as liberal. Further, we asked participants which of the Bromley definitions best identify their religious tradition. Those who indicated either contestant or subversive religious types were removed via case-wise deletion. These two categories likely experience some degree of stigma due to the perceived cultural tension of their religious identity. Examples of subversive traditions are Jehovah’s Witnesses or the Twelve Tribes where their beliefs constitute cultural tension. Utilizing TurkPrime, we recruited participants from the United States. Informed consents were provided digitally within Qualtrics, an online survey system including a description of the method with statements like “this survey is based on your attitudes toward various world issues,” as well as a typical timeframe of completion and standard consent language informing the potential participant of their rights by participating in this study.

The sample was collected from TurkPrime and various social media platforms. Informed consents were provided digitally within Qualtrics, an online survey system including a description of the method with statements like “this survey is based on your attitudes toward various world issues,” as well as a typical timeframe of completion and standard consent language informing the potential participant of their rights by participating in the study. Participants were able to download a PDF copy of the informed consent for their records following the end of the study. Further, participants were debriefed regarding the nature of the study. Participation was voluntary. TurkPrime workers were paid for their time, and social media participants were asked to volunteer to complete the survey. While we initially collected emails for participants during the study, all data was contained in an encrypted password folder.

**Procedure**

Just as in study one, similar online data collection strategies were employed. This study utilized Qualtrics and online solicitation through social media. This study applied an experimental three
condition design where two of the three conditions serve as manipulations. Beginning the study, all participants completed measures of demographics, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), and Collective Self-Esteem, with SDO and Collective Self-Esteem randomly presented.

As part of the experiment, one of the three conditions was presented. In the first condition as manipulating the independent variable, participants read a false cover story presented as an Urban Institute research brief, giving inaccurate percentages of Christians in the United States either as holding steady (condition 1) or decreasing (condition 2) over time. Condition three, the participants received no information regarding the percentage of change of the group over time. Participants saw an article that depicted percentages of representation from 10 years ago, current trends, and projected statistics ten years from now for conditions one and two. Participants were asked to write a response to the article to allow them to reflect on the manipulation. Following the manipulations, participants were presented with randomized surveys to complete to avoid the potential for order effects. In cases where appropriate, items were randomized as well. Following the presentation of manipulations, participants completed measures of in-group prejudice, emotion-group association measures including such emotions as anger and sadness, and measures of individual and group power. Those measures are discussed in detail in the following subsection. Each level of the 3x3 will be counterbalanced in detecting ordering effects.

**Measures**

The measures were employed in previous research with tested and validated psychometric properties. The following scales were used to explore the various aspects of stigma and correlated constructs.

Demographics. The demographics section asked the same questions as presented in study one. However, this study also included religious/denominational identity (coded later for the Bromley typology), religious services attendance, and a single item measure asking about the participant’s view of their tradition within the Bromley (1998) typology. Of particular interest here is the
Figure 3 - Status-based Christian Stigma Research Experimental Design
Bromley categories both as research codes and participant self-declaration in measuring cultural tension, which might exist by identifying with a belief system. Further, the demographic section included a question regarding the participant's conversion from faith or lack thereof. This question ranged from their childhood and how many years have passed since their religious conversion. The questionnaire also asked a single-item question regarding the participant’s identity related to “spiritual but not religious, spiritual and religious, religious but not spiritual, and neither spiritual, not religious,” all from of Streib et al. (2009). Moreover, participants were asked what percentage of the population of Christians (not a particular denomination) constitute the whole of their current town or community. This question was divided into three parts, the first percentage of the representation ten years ago, their percentage of representation now, and the percentage of representation ten years in the future.

**Moderating Variables**

A measure of Collective Self Esteem. In the measurement of Collective Self-Esteem, Luhtaen, and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale was be used.

A measure of Social Dominance Orientation. Social dominance orientation (SDO) measures how one group is perceived to better or dominate other groups. SDO measure is a difference between a preference for a hierarchical versus equal group differences.

**Manipulation**

In the second set of independent factors (second level), three conditions were presented. In the first condition as a manipulation of the independent variable, participants read a false cover story presented as an Urban Institute research brief with inaccurate percentages of Christians in the United States either as holding steady with a small loss for realism (condition 1) or a clear decreasing trend (condition 2) over time. Condition three, the participants received no information regarding the percentage of change of the group over time. Participants read an
article that depicts percentages of group representation from 10 years ago, current trends, and projected statistics ten years from now for conditions one and two. Following the manipulations, participants were presented with randomized surveys to avoid the potential for ordering effects. In cases where appropriate, items were also be randomized as well. Following the presentation of manipulations, participants completed measures of in-group prejudice, emotion measures such as anger and sadness, and individual and group power measures, all as included in study one. Those measures are discussed in detail later.

A measure of Individual Self Esteem. To measure individual self-esteem, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was used.

A Measure of Intergroup Emotions: In measuring emotional reactions (similar to Mackie, Devos, & Smith 2000 but modified to simplify language about groups), a series of questions asked participants about their emotional attitudes toward religious outgroups. We asked participants to think about the emotions, what they immediately feel when thinking about each group, and if participants associate any specific emotion with the group. They were then asked to select an emotion from the list. We then summed the number of emotions related to each group and compared the frequency of emotions by the group. Those groups used in this study are Atheists, Agnostics, Jews, Protestant Christians, Humanism, Buddhism, Catholics, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Nation of Islam, Muslims, Scientology, Church of Satan, Pagans, Spiritual Individuals, and Westboro Baptist. These groups served as those of like type such as protestant Christians and those of unlike type such as humanists, Church of Satan, Pagans and others. We included the following emotions or categories, happiness, sadness, emotionally torn, interest, anger, fear, indifference, and not familiar with this group (Gendron, Roberson, Marietta van der Vyver, & Feldman Barrett 2014).

A Measure of Power. As noted earlier, power could moderate the effect of stigma and the specific dependent variables. Two measures of perceived power were employed for this study. The
measure of power used was Anderson et al. (2005)’s Generalized Sense of Power Scale, which measures perceived individual power in relationships with others and social settings. We modified this version to ask questions about group power. The group and individual power measure reference the participant’s religious group identity as part of each item stem. This study attempted to determine if perceived stigma varies as a function of perceived power or perceived loss of power by including these different measures.

Measures of Concealment and Disclosure. Given that Christianity is a concealable identity and if such an identity could be stigmatized, two additional measures were employed for study two. The first measure is adapted from the Jackson and Mohr (2016) Sexual Orientation Concealment Scale. This measures an individual’s active concealment of their sexual identity and status through various behavioral strategies of concealment. Items include “In the last two weeks, I have concealed my sexual orientation by telling someone that I was straight or denying that I was LGB” In this case, the item was reworded to “In the last two weeks, I have concealed my Christian identity by telling someone I was not religious or denying that I was Christian.” Another modified example is, “In the last two weeks, I have allowed others to assume I am not religious without correcting them.” In the measurement of participant outness, the study used the Outness Inventory adapted for Christian participants. The Outness Inventory developed by Mohr & Fassinger (2000) asks questions related to their identity. This question includes “how open you are about your sexual orientation to the people listed below” and include parents, siblings, extended family, new friends, work peers. Some items will be excluded as they pertain only to the LGBTQQ community and not Christians (e.g., “my old heterosexual friends,” “members of my religious community,” “leaders of my religious community”). If Christian identity is stigmatized, then there should be similar patterns of concealment and disclosure, as observed within the LGBTQQ community.
Manipulation Checks

Following the presentation of the manipulation conditions, participants were asked to recall the instructions given to them and respond to items to ensure attention and understanding of the instructions.

A measure of Stigma. Using an internalized stigma measure of 29 items, this study used Ghanean, Ritscher et al. (2003)’s measure of Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness except that the adjectives and sentence phrases of mental illness were adapted to target allegiant Christians. The stigma items were presented twice. One group of questions were related to one’s experience as an individual who has experienced stigma as an Allegiant Christian. The second set of items will explore one’s experience with stigma as a group. This comprehensive measure has been used in various clinical settings; however, the questions can be shifted to other stigmatizing situations, including Allegiant Christian identity.
Chapter Four: Results

This research explored two aspects of Stigma. The first study investigated the extent of stigma related to race or, in this case, being white. The second study examined a concealable stigma or, in this case, being Christian. Therefore, this chapter will explore each study in detail, providing analysis for each research question and explorative analysis of correlates of these identities and the relationship to experimental manipulation of perceived loss of status. Each research question will be addressed individually for both studies with complementary analysis related to the specific question. Study two includes additional measures of concealment and disclosure not pertinent to study one, given race is a physical trait and likely challenging to conceal. Between the two studies, a total of n=118 participants were excluded from analysis for either not completing the survey or failing the attention check.

Study One

As part of study one, we attempted to manipulate one's perceived majority status within American society as a white male, an apparent identity that is difficult to conceal. Data were collected from two sources. The first was collected through TurkPrime, a crowdsourced research participant platform. The second was collected through purposeful snowball sampling of self-identified white males via social media (Facebook and Twitter). Before the study, a power analysis was conducted assuming small effect sizes (α = .05, two-tailed) with an expected beta of β ≥ .14 and $f^2 ≥ .02$ per recommended effect size thresholds (Cohen, 1988). A total of 246 participants were recruited via TurkPrime and 125 from social media for 371 total participants. However, while literature exists related to minority or low-status experiences of Stigma, this research
project tested similar assumptions of high-status individuals. It, therefore, served as a new area of exploration. Assuming a medium effect size, the estimated required sample size was 150 in detecting the effect. Moreover, all moderators were mean-centered before running the model. All measures were near or within acceptable limits for reliability (see Table 2). The only exceptions are the Membership Self-Esteem ($\alpha = .694$) and Private Collective Self-Esteem ($\alpha = .677$), near the acceptability threshold. The overall distribution of scores was first tested to determine if this study met the parametric assumption (Tukey, 1977). The initial general tests for normality were violated based on the Shapiro Wilks test initially, all violating measures violating the parametric assumption ($p < .05$).

The results are reported utilizing the following stepped process. First, the normality of the sample was determined to reduced hypothesis testing error. This was done using preliminary assessments of normality for the general sample and comparison groups where appropriate. If those tests were violated, one of two solutions was deployed. The first was to attempt to address outliers a reduce the tails of a distribution utilizing transformation calculations as noted from the psychometric literature. To adjust for the extreme outliers and based on Hoaglin & Iglewicz (1987), we estimated outliers using 2.2 multipliers to determine two standard deviation numerical thresholds above and below the mean for each averaged score. This provided the criteria for the removal of extreme outliers. While the parametric assumption is still violated, the effect can be detected using general linear modeling in comparing main effects and interactions (Hoaglin. Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986).
Table 2 - Reliabilities of Measures Used for White Males

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective Self Esteem</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership self-esteem</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private collective self-esteem</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public collective self-esteem</td>
<td>0.709</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to Identity</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Dominance Orientation</td>
<td>0.938</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Discrimination Index</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Power</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Power</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion Measure</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma Measure White</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>0.938</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second solution was to shift to nonparametric tests in lieu of parametric tests. For those where the parametric assumption was met following data transformation or where the distribution was already normal, the study tested for homogeneity of variances and homoscedasticity of error variances before testing the overall effect and any influence observed by moderators. Further, we used mean-centered values of moderators to test interaction effects.

H1: When white males are led to believe that their group is losing its numeric majority, participants will report higher group stigma as compared to those who perceive their group majority to stay constant.

To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we first tested the overall main effect of Condition on Stigma. No significant main effect was detected by condition at $F(2, 345) = 1.044, p = .353$, partial $\eta^2 = .006$. Further, as a test of the interaction between the moderator of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the condition variable, homogeneity of regression slopes was tested. Homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, $F(2, 342) = .926, p = .397$, partial $\eta^2 = .005$. As an additional test of normality for within-group residuals, normality was tested for each condition. As expected, based on our earlier checks of normality, all three conditions violated normality for group residuals ($p < .05$). While we did not meet the assumption of random assignment, the proportions of observations are similar enough that analysis can continue given the extreme variables were removed. We examined the normality of within-group residuals, and while they violated normality, they were within ±3.5 standard deviations. Therefore, any outliers did not exceed that threshold of the standardized 2.13 value (Huitema, 2011). General Linear Modeling assumes that the
variance of the residuals is equal for all groups of the independent variable. If the variances are unequal, this can affect the Type I error rate. Further, we tested the overall homogeneity of variances, which was confirmed ($p = .845$).

There was homoscedasticity, as determined by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values, as seen in Figure 4. Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis one was conducted. There was no main effect of condition by White Stigma, $F(2, 342) = .625, p = .536$, partial $\eta^2 = .004$. There was a main effect of Social Dominance Orientation, $F(1, 342) = 80.099, p = .000$, partial $\eta^2 = .190$. Furthermore there was no significant two-way interaction for condition, SDO $F(2, 342) = .926, p = .397$, partial $\eta^2 = .005$ (see Figure 5). Based on these findings, it appears that SDO has a main effect on Stigma in that as SDO increased, perceived Stigma increased but did not moderate one's stigma score when manipulating their perceived loss in status. Essentially, in each condition, as SDO increases, so too does perceived stigma.

In addition to SDO, we examined the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on perceived white Stigma. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we examined the normality of within-group residuals. While they violated normality, they were within $\pm 3.5$ standard deviations, and therefore any outliers did not exceed that threshold of the standardized 2.13 value. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 6).
Figure 4 - Simple Scatter of Standardized Residuals for White Stigma

Figure 5 - Model Fit Scatterplot for Social Dominance Orientation for White Stigma
We conducted a test of homogeneity of variances utilizing Levene's test \( p = .605 \). Again in testing the hypothesis, there was no main effect by condition, \( F(2, 342) = 1.698, p = .185, \text{ partial } \eta^2 = .010 \). There was a main effect for collective self-esteem, \( F(1, 342) = 23.667, p = .000, \text{ partial } \eta^2 = .065 \) where perceived white stigma increases, overall collective self-esteem decreases. There was no significant 2-way interaction for condition by collective self-esteem, \( F(2, 342) = .157, p = .855, \text{ partial } \eta^2 = .001 \) (see Figure 7).

Mainly, this analysis seems to indicate that our experimental manipulation did not have an effect. However, some individual differences correlated with perceived white Stigma (SDO and Collective Self Esteem).

\( H_2: \) To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, we expect increased prejudice toward low-status outgroups compared to those who perceive their group majority to stay constant.

We first examined the main effect of Condition on the Quick Discrimination Index (QDI) Score. As a reminder, a higher score on the QDI indicates lower discriminatory attitudes toward outgroups. We observed an overall main effect of condition on QDI, \( F(2, 343) = 5.619, p = .004, \text{ partial } \eta^2 = .032 \). We further decomposed the effect by condition to determine which condition contributes to the predictive variance through pairwise comparisons and posthoc analysis using Tukey's B. The "loss" condition \( (M = 3.66) \) was a statistically higher average QDI score than the other two conditions of the "almost no loss" condition \( (M = 3.3294) \) as well as the "control" condition \( (M = 3.4304) \). There were no significant differences observed between the "almost no loss" and "control" conditions. This would seem to indicate that the loss condition may have had an effect on perceived Stigma.
Figure 6 - Simple Scatter of Standardized Residuals for Stigma by Predicted Value by Condition for White Stigma

Figure 7 - Model Fit Scatter Plot for Moderated Collective Self Esteem for White Stigma
Further, we examined the moderating effects of SDO and Collective Self Esteem. We first included SDO within the model. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we first tested the homogeneity of regression slopes to ensure no relationship. It was observed that there was no significant relationship between the regression slopes as indicated, $F(2, 340) = .750, p = .473$, partial $\eta^2 = .004$. Further, we conducted a test of the normal distribution of residuals. The residuals were normally distributed as assessed by Shapiro-Wilks ($p > .05$). In plotting the standardized residuals as a test of homoscedasticity. We plotted the observed versus the predicted residuals (see Figure 8).

It would appear that the assumption of homoscedasticity has been met. Additionally, we conducted a test of equality of variances. The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances ($p = .009$). Based on this finding, we adjusted QDI as the dependent variable using a "reflect and logarithmic" transformation (Osborne & Overbay, 2008). This approach allows the tightening of extreme skews in the data or, in our case, a negative skew. After transforming QDI using this approach, variances were homogeneous, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variance ($p = .276$). Given we transformed QDI, we tested again for outliers. While SPSS detected some outliers were among the standardized residual values (n=9), they were close enough to the three standard deviation thresholds that we can proceed with parametric predictive analysis (Judd et al., 2009; Osborne & Overlay, 2008).

Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis two was conducted. To test the full model and main effects using the Log adjust QDI scores, we observe that condition approaches significance, $F(2, 340) = 2.655, p = .072$, partial $\eta^2 = .015$. Again SDO is a significant predictor of QDI, $F(1, 340) = 387.414, p = .000$, partial
\( \eta^2 = .533 \) which is a significant effect as indicated by the eta score. There is not a significant two-way interaction for condition by SDO, \( F(2, 340) = 1.732, p = .178, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .178 \) (see Figure 9). This indicates that as SDO increases, QDI decreases across condition.

Further, we examined the moderating influence of Collective Self-Esteem on QDI between conditions. First, we tested to determine if there was a linear relationship between QDI and Collective Self Esteem. There was homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, \( F(2, 240) = 1.732, p = .178. \) Continuing to use the reflect and logarithmic adjusted QDI variable, we tested the standardized residuals. The conditions were normally distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk’s test \( (p > .05) \). There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values.

In an examination of outliers, no cases with standardized residuals greater than \( \pm 3.5 \) standard deviations were included. Having met all prerequisites for analysis, we examined the main effect and 2-way interaction. When including Collective Self-Esteem in the model, there was a main effect for condition, \( F(2, 340) = 3.639, p = .027, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .021. \) Further, there was a main effect of Collective Self-Esteem, \( F(2, 340) = 40.516, p = .000, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .106. \) Conversely there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition and Collective Self-Esteem, \( F(2, 340) = .250, p = .779, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .001. \) To further interpret the main effects, there was a significant difference between the conditions for QDI using pairwise comparisons (see Figure 11).
Figure 8 - Simple Scatter of Standardized Residuals for Quick Discrimination Index by Condition for White Stigma

Figure 9 - Grouped Scatter of Standardized Residuals for Log Adjusted Quick Discrimination Index by Social Dominance Orientation Mean Centered by Condition for White Stigma
Figure 10 - Standardized Residuals for Log Adjusted Quick Discrimination Index by Predicted Values by Condition for White Stigma

Figure 11 - Log Adjusted Quick Discrimination Index Scores as Moderated by Collective Self-Esteem for White Stigma
There was a significant difference between the Loss Condition (M = .339) compared to Almost Loss Condition (M = .385) as well as Control (M = .376). No significant difference was observed between the "Almost no Loss" Condition and the "Control" condition. When including collective self-esteem in the model, it appears there are main effects of Condition for QDI with the loss condition showing the greatest significant increase where Collective Self-Esteem increases, so too does QDI.

H3: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose a numeric majority status but have likely had hierarchical and social power (were once high status) and by extension have probably enjoyed some successful confrontations with other groups, expect higher anger than sadness.

We asked participants to report on which groups they associated with specific emotions. Many of the participants skipped these items leaving this study with some incomplete data. The following data reported are for those who reported and the group's participants associated with specific emotions. We summed the number of groups by the associated emotions using a frequentist approach to analysis. To examine the differences between group identity with emotion frequencies, we utilized a nonparametric test of difference. Given this design and the variability of the number of groups associated with each emotion, we used The Kruskal-Wallis H test (sometimes called the "one-way ANOVA on ranks").

While we tested which groups were associated with anger and sadness the most, we also included other emotion variables. Those include happiness, emotionally torn, interest, fear, as well as "not familiar."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null Hypothesis</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Happiness is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Happiness is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Sadness is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Sadness is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Emotionally Torn is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Emotionally Torn is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Interest is the same across categories of condition.</strong></td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td><strong>0.016</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reject the null hypothesis.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Interest is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Anger is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null Hypothesis</td>
<td>Test</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Anger is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Fear is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Fear is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Not Familiar is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Not Familiar is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Indifferent is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Indifferent is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .050.
Neither anger nor sadness was significantly different between conditions within our study (see Table 3). We did detect a significant difference in self-reported interest between groups for Liberal Groups, particularly between the loss condition and the almost loss condition and control. While the Conservative Groups by Anger comparison did not meet the critical value to reject the null, it did appear to approach significance, $\chi^2(2) = 4.798, p = .091$. This is likely due to the overall distribution variability between conditions (see Figure 12). Therefore, based on the original hypothesis of anger or sadness toward outgroups, we must retain the null hypothesis as neither anger nor sadness was statistically significantly different between conditions.

H4: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they will show lower individual self-esteem.

Returning to parametric analysis and moderation, we examined the main effect of condition on individual self-esteem. We first examined the main effect of the condition on Rosenberg's Individual Self-Esteem. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, the initial normality tests were well within the acceptable thresholds for parametric testing for Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances for the overall mean ($p = .348$). However, there was no main effect for condition on individual self-esteem, $F(2, 346) = 1.332, p = .265$. Further, as a test of the interaction between the covariate of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the condition variable, homogeneity of regression slopes was tested. The homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, $F(2, 343) = .364, p = .695$, meaning we have met the assumption
of homogeneity of regression slopes permitting additional normality testing before conducting further parametric analysis (see Figure 13).

Further, we tested the normality of the within-group residuals by condition. As assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test, standardized residuals for the conditions were normally distributed ($p > .05$). Next, we tested for homoscedasticity of error variances within each group, and the error variances are equal between groups. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 14).

We also checked for extreme outliers in our data for Individual Self-Esteem. Fifteen participants exceeded standardized residuals higher than ±3.5 standard deviations. Nevertheless, the values were close enough to the standard deviations beyond the mean that parametric analysis can proceed without any type of data transformation (Figure 14). Having met all prerequisites for parametric analysis, we examined the main effect and 2-way interaction. When including SDO in the model, there was no main effect for condition, $F(2, 343) = .898, p = .408$, partial $\eta^2 = .005$ in predicting Individual Self-Esteem. Further, there was a main effect of SDO $F(1, 343) = 6.694, p = .010$, partial $\eta^2 = .019$. Conversely there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition and SDO, $F(2, 343) = .364, p = .695$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$. Therefore, it appears that the only predictive variance in the model is related to SDO but not by Condition by SDO in predicting Self-Esteem. Therefore, it appears that SDO has a main effect on individual self-esteem. Still, there is no main effect by the condition or a 2-way interaction between SDO by Condition on Individual Self-Esteem. We further explore if collective self-esteem overall influenced the model.
**Figure 12** - Overall Distribution frequency of reported Anger for Conservative Groups by Condition for White Stigma

**Figure 13** - Social Dominance Orientation by Condition for the Rosenberg Individual Self-Esteem Scale for White Stigma
Figure 14 - Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals for Rosenberg Individual Self-Esteem Scale by Condition for White Stigma
Exploring the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on Individual Self-Esteem, we first examined if there was homogeneity of regression slopes. There was homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, $F(2, 343) = .558, p = .573$. As assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test, the conditions were normally distributed for the standardized residuals ($p > .05$). We tested for homoscedasticity to ensure we met the assumption of homoscedasticity of error variances within each group. Homoscedasticity was assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values, as indicated in Figure 15. Further, we met the threshold of Equity of Error Variances ($p = .269$).

When including Individual Self-Esteem in the model, there was no main effect for condition, $F(2, 343) = .848, p = .429$, partial $\eta^2 = .005$ in predicting Individual Self-Esteem. Further, there was a main effect of Individual Self-Esteem, $F(2, 343) = 7.347, p = .007$, partial $\eta^2 = .021$. Conversely there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition and Individual Self-Esteem, $F(2, 343) = .558, p = .573$, partial $\eta^2 = .003$.

Therefore, it appears that the only predictive variance in the model is related to Individual Self-Esteem but not by Condition by Individual Self-Esteem in predicting Self-Esteem (see Figure 16). This means that as collective self-esteem increases, so does individual self-esteem. Overall, there was no significant effect by condition even when including either SDO or Individual Self-Esteem in the model.
Figure 15 - Scatterplot of Standard Residuals for Rosenberg Individual Self-Esteem by Condition for White Stigma

Figure 16 - Scatterplot of Collective Self-Esteem by Rosenberg’s Individual Self-Esteem Scale for White Stigma
H5: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose majority status, they will perceive themselves to lose group power.

Using the Measure of Perceived Group Power, we explored the main effect of condition on group power and the moderating influence of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Overall Collective Self-Esteem on Perceived Group Power. First, we examined only the main effect of Condition on Group Power. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we tested the overall Equity of Error Variances using Levene's and met the threshold ($p > .05$). Yet there was no overall main effect for Condition by Perceived Group Power, $F(2, 348) = 2.185, p = .114$, partial $\eta^2 = .012$. We again explored the moderating effect of Social Dominance Orientation and Overall Collective Self-Esteem on Perceived Group Power. We first tested for homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, $F(2, 345) = .002, p = .998$. This allowed us to continue with the assumption of linearity. Moreover, standardized residuals for the interventions were normally distributed for the Almost no loss Condition or Control, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p > .05$). However, the loss condition did not meet the normality threshold; however, still acceptable to proceed with the parametric analysis. Further, there was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 17). At least eight small value outliers were assessed in the data, as assessed by standardized residuals greater than $\pm 3.5$ standard deviations. Yet, given the small number of outliers, they did not extend beyond the three standard deviations. Given we were either close or within acceptable limits of normality testing, we proceeded with the overall analysis of the main effect of condition with the main effect of SDO on Perceived Group Power.
In testing the hypothesis, there was no main effect for condition by group power, \( F(2, 345) = .746, p = .475, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .004 \). There was a significant main effect for SDO on Perceived Group Power, \( F(1, 345) = 135.988, p = .000, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .283 \). Moreover, there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition by SDO for Perceived Group Power \( F(2, 348) = .002, p = .998, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .000 \). Essentially, we see the main effect of SDO on the dependent variable, similar to the other research questions addressed in this study. Nevertheless, again, condition had no main effect on group power. We shifted to examine the influence of overall Collective Self-Esteem on Group Power (see Figure 18).

Further, as before, we included Overall Collective Self-Esteem in the model to determine if it influenced the relationship between our independent variable of condition on our dependent variable of Group Power. We first tested for homogeneity of the regression slopes, \( F(2, 345) = .268, p = .765 \) indicating the interaction was not statistically significant. When testing for normality among the standardized residuals for each Condition by Collective Self Esteem were normally distributed as indicated by Shapiro-Wilk's test \((p > .05)\). Further, we tested for homoscedasticity before testing the complete model (see Figure 19).

As can be observed in Figure 19, all three conditions appear to have homoscedasticity. Yet, the control condition does approach a decreasing funnel shape in the data distribution and yet falls within a similar pattern to the other conditions. Therefore, the data does not require a data transformation to proceed.
Figure 17 - Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals for Perceived Group Power by Condition for White Stigma

Figure 18 - Scatterplot by Condition by Social Dominance Orientation for Perceived Group Power
Having met all preassessment of normality and homogeneity, we proceeded with the overall test of the model between Condition by Collective Self-Esteem in predicting Perceived Group Power.

In testing the overall model, there was no significant main effect for condition, $F(2, 345) = 2.404, p = .092$, partial $\eta^2 = .014$. Additionally, Collective Self-Esteem did not contribute to the main effect in predicting Group Power, $F(1, 345) = .981, p = .323$, partial $\eta^2 = .003$. Moreover, there was not a significant 2-way interaction for Condition by Collective Self Esteem in predicting Group Power, $F(2, 345) = .268, p = .765$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$, (see Figure 20).

Therefore, based on this model, the condition did not contribute significant overall variance in predicting Perceived Group Power. Additionally, Collective Self Esteem neither significantly strengthens nor weakened the relationship between Condition and Group Power. Therefore, we would accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant main effect for Perceived Group Power.

H6: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they will perceive themselves to lose individual power.

In exploring a Measure of Perceived Individual Power, we explored the main effect of condition on individual power and the moderating influence of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Overall Collective Self-Esteem on Perceived Group Power. We tested only the main effect of Condition on Individual Power.
Figure 19 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Standardized Residuals for Perceived Group Power for White Stigma

Figure 20 - Scatterplot of Group Power as Predicted by Condition and Overall Collective Self-Esteem for White Stigma
To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we tested the overall Equity of Error Variances using Levene's and met the threshold ($p > .05$). Yet there was no overall main effect for Condition by Perceived individual Power, $F(2, 345) = .902, p = .402$, partial $\eta^2 = .005$.

In continuation of our inclusion of the potential moderating influence of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Collective Self Esteem, we again examined if these measures contributed to predicting the overall model and two-way interactions within the model. We first tested for homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, $F(2, 342) = .266, p = .766$. This allowed us to continue with the assumption of linearity. Moreover, standardized residuals for the interventions were normally distributed for the Almost no loss Condition or Control, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p > .05$).

At least twelve small value outliers were assessed in the data, as assessed by standardized residuals greater than ±3.5 standard deviations. Yet, given the small number of outliers, they did not extend beyond the three standard deviations. Given we were either close or within acceptable limits of normality testing, we proceeded with the overall analysis of the main effect of condition with the main effect of SDO on Perceived Individual Power. Variances were homogeneous, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variance ($p = .231$).

Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis one was conducted. No main effect was observed for condition by individual power, $F(2, 342) = .525, p = .592$, partial $\eta^2 = .003$. There was a significant main effect for SDO on Perceived Individual Power, $F(1, 342) = 10.005, p = .002$, partial $\eta^2 = .028$. Indicating
overall, as SDO increased, perceived Individual Power Scores decreased. Moreover, there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition by SDO for Perceived Individual Power, \( F(2, 342) = .631, p = .533, \text{ partial } \eta^2 = .004 \). Essentially, we see the main effect of SDO on the dependent variable, similar to the other research questions addressed in this study. However, again condition had no main effect on group power. We shifted to examine the influence of overall Collective Self-Esteem on Individual Power (see Figure 22).

Further, as before, we included Overall Collective Self-Esteem in the model to determine if it influenced the relationship between our independent variable of condition on our dependent variable of Group Power. We first tested for homogeneity of the regression slopes, \( F(2, 345) = .268, p = .765 \) indicating the interaction was not statistically significant. When testing for normality among the standardized residuals for each Condition by Collective Self Esteem were normally distributed as indicated by Shapiro-Wilk's test \( (p > .05) \). Further, we tested for homoscedasticity before testing the complete model (see Figure 23). As shown in Figure 24, all three conditions appear to have homoscedasticity requiring no data transformation to proceed.

Having met all preassessment of normality and homogeneity, we proceeded with the overall test of the model between Condition by Collective Self-Esteem in predicting Perceived individual Power. In testing the overall model, there was no significant main effect for condition by Perceived Individual Power, \( F(2, 342) = 1.833, p = .162, \text{ partial } \eta^2 = .011 \). Additionally, Collective Self-Esteem did contribute to the main effect in predicting Individual Power, \( F(1, 342) = 31.618, p = .000, \text{ partial } \eta^2 = .011 \).
Figure 21 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Perceived Individual Power Scale by Condition by Social Dominance Orientation for White Stigma

Figure 22 - Scatterplot of Perceived Individual Power by Condition and Social Dominance Orientation Scale Mean Centered for White Stigma
Figure 23 - Grouped Scatterplot by condition of Perceived Individual Power by Condition for Collective Self Esteem for White Stigma

Figure 24 - Scatterplot of Individual Power as Predicted by Condition and Overall Collective Self-Esteem for White Stigma
However, Higher Collective Self-Esteem scores were inversely related to Individual Power Scores. Moreover, there was not a significant 2-way interaction for Condition by Collective Self Esteem in predicting Individual Power, $F(2, 342) = .266, p = .766$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$, (see Figure 24).

Therefore, based on this model, the condition did not contribute significant overall variance in predicting Perceived Individual Power. Additionally, Collective Self Esteem had a main effect on Individual Power. Nevertheless, there was no significant 2-way interaction between the conditions and perceived individual power as moderated by overall collective self-esteem. Therefore, we fail to reject the null. Throughout the analysis of this study, there was no main effect of condition, yet there were individual difference moderators that predicted many of the dependent variables. This likely indicates that the condition had little to no effect overall.

**Study Two**

For study two, we examined a high-status group, which is also concealable. For this study, we explored mainstream Christians, given their identity may not be apparent when interacting with outgroup others. Therefore, we included two additional measures, including an outness inventory, which asks participants to share their identity and beliefs with non-Christians. As in study two, we again manipulated one's perceived majority status as a Christian in the American context. The first sample was collected through TurkPrime, while the second sample was collected through social media purposeful snowball sampling of Christians. Power Analysis was conducted before the study assuming small effect sizes ($\alpha = .05$, two-tailed) with an expected beta of $\beta \geq .14$ and $f^2 \geq .02$ per the effect size thresholds (Cohen, 1988). Again, literature exists related to
minority or low-status experiences of Stigma. This research project tested similar assumptions of high-status individuals and therefore served as a new area of exploration. Assuming a medium effect size, the estimated required sample size was 150 in detecting the effect. Power analysis was conducted utilizing G Power. We used mean-centered values of moderators to test interaction effects.

The overall distribution of scores was first tested to determine if this study met the parametric assumption (Tukey, 1977). All measures were near or within acceptable limits for reliability (see table 4). To adjust for the extreme outliers and based on Hoaglin & Iglewicz (1987), we transformed outliers using a different process observed in study one. This approach takes the highest value and makes a mathematical adjustment by tightening the distribution tails and extreme outliers. While we may still violate normality by tightening the tails, we can proceed with the parametric assumption in our analysis, assuming each test is evaluated for normality and linearity (Osborne & Overbay, 2008; Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986). We removed 13 partially completed cases to ensure no miscalculation or odd outliers as we proceed with the analysis. We continued with analysis with the adjusted scores following the case wise deletion.

H1: When Christians are led to believe that their group is losing its numeric majority, participants will report higher group stigma as compared to those who perceive their group majority to stay constant.

As is the case in Study One, we replicated the same statistical tests except in Study Two; we have most measures mathematically adjusted to address some of the extreme skewness in observed measurement, both positive and negative.
Table 4 - Inter-item Reliabilities of Measures Used for Christians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective Self Esteem</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership self-esteem</td>
<td>0.777</td>
<td>0.776</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private collective self-esteem</td>
<td>0.803</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public collective self-esteem</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to Identity</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Dominance</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.934</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>0.919</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Discrimination Index</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.930</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Power</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td>0.879</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Power</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion Measure</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.793</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma Measure Christian</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>0.957</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outness (Christian Only)</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment Scale (Christian Only)</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There was no significant main effect of condition on perceived stigma, $F(2, 313) = .220$, $p = .803$, partial $\eta^2 = .001$. We further explored a 2-way interaction between Stigma by Condition and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO).

To test preliminary parametric assumptions, homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, $F(2, 310) = 2.644$, $p = .073$, partial $\eta^2 = .017$, it did approach statistical significance. As an additional test of normality for within-group residuals, normality was tested for each condition. As expected, based on our earlier checks of normality, all three conditions violated normality for group residuals ($p < .05$). While we did not meet the assumption of random assignment, the proportions of observations are similar enough that analysis can continue given the extreme variables were removed (Huitema, 2011). Each condition was slightly positively skewed following the case-wise deletion and transformation. General Linear Modeling assumes that the variance of the residuals is equal for all groups of the independent variable. If the variances are unequal, this can affect the Type I error rate. This requires a final test of the overall homogeneity of variances was conducted and confirmed ($p = .845$), as noted in Figure 25. There was homoscedasticity, as determined by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values, as seen in Figure 25. We also tested for Equity of Error Variances using Levene’s, which met the threshold ($p > .726$).

To test the hypothesis and including Social Dominance Orientation in the model, we first tested the main effect of the condition. There was not a significant main effect, $F(2, 310) = .084$, $p = .920$, partial $\eta^2 = .001$. Moreover, there was a main effect of Social Dominance Orientation on Stigma, $F(1, 310) = 5.171$, $p = .024$, partial $\eta^2 = .016$. This indicates as SDO increases, Stigma scores increase overall. Regarding the 2-way, we
observed the same F-statistic as observed with the homogeneity of regression slopes, $F(2, 310) = 2.644, p = .073$, partial $\eta^2 = .017$, which was not statistically significant (see Figure 26).

These findings suggested that SDO has the main effect on Stigma but does not moderate one's stigma score when manipulating their perceived loss in status. In addition to SDO, we examined the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on perceived Christian Stigma. We conducted a test of homogeneity of variances utilizing Levene's test ($p = .605$). Again there was no main effect by condition, $F(2, 310) = .366, p = .694$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$. There was a main effect for collective self-esteem, $F(1, 310) = 5.702, p = .018$, partial $\eta^2 = .018$. There was no significant 2-way interaction for condition by collective self-esteem, $F(2, 342) = .109, p = .897$, partial $\eta^2 = .001$ (see Figure 28).

Based on these findings, it appears that SDO has a main effect on Stigma but does not moderate one's stigma score when manipulating their perceived loss in status. In addition to SDO, we examined the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on perceived Christian Stigma. We conducted a test of homogeneity of variances utilizing Levene's test of homogeneity of variance ($p = .613$). There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values. (see Figure 27).

Returning to hypothesis testing, again there was no main effect by condition, $F(2, 310) = .366, p = .694$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$. There was a main effect for collective self-esteem by Christian stigma, $F(1, 310) = 5.702, p = .018$, partial $\eta^2 = .018$. 

Figure 25 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Stigma Transformed with Social Dominance Orientation for Christians

Figure 26 - Scatterplot of Stigma by Social Dominance Orientation (Transformed) for Christians
This would indicate that as collective self-esteem increases, so too does perceived stigma. There was no significant 2-way interaction for condition by collective self-esteem, \( F(2, 310) = .109, p = .897, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .001 \) (see Figure 28).

**H2:** To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, we expect increased prejudice toward low-status outgroups compared to those who perceive their group majority to stay constant.

In examining the main effect of the condition by the Quick Discrimination Index (QDI), a high score on QDI suggests lower discriminatory attitudes toward outgroups. No main effect was observed for Condition by QDI, \( F(2, 316) = .162, p = .850, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .001 \).

We first included the SDO Mean Centered values in the analysis. To ensure the parametric assumption was met, we first tested the homogeneity of regression slopes to ensure no relationship. It was observed that there was no significant relationship between the regression slopes as indicated, \( F(2, 313) = .291, p = .748, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .002 \). Further, we conducted a test of the normal distribution of residuals. The residuals violated normality, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilks (\( p < .05 \)). Yet, the variability of the residuals approached the threshold and can still be analyzed utilizing linear parametric analysis in plotting the standardized residuals as a test of homoscedasticity. We plotted the observed versus the predicted residuals (see Figure 29).

There was heteroscedasticity, as observed in Figure 29. This is a natural pattern with more restricted variability for higher scorers (Judd et al., 2009; Osborne & Overbay, 2008), and the data has already been transformed.
Figure 27 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Standardized Residuals of Stigma for Christians

Figure 28 - Scatterplot of Christian Stigma by Condition for Collective Self-Esteem for Christians
Therefore, we examined any extreme outliers within the data. While SPSS detected some outliers among the standardized residual values (n=10), they were close enough to the three and a half standard deviation threshold to proceed with the analysis.

Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis was conducted. There was no significant main effect for condition for QDI, \( F(2, 313) = 1.546, p = .215 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .010 \). Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is a significant predictor of QDI, \( F(1, 313) = 220.264, p = .000 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .413 \). This finding indicates that as SDO scores increase, QDI scores decrease. There is not a significant two-way interaction for condition by SDO, \( F(2, 313) = .291 , p = .748 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .002 \) (see Figure 31).

Further, we examined the moderating influence of Collective Self-Esteem on QDI between conditions. First, we tested to determine if there was a linear relationship between QDI and Collective Self Esteem. There was homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, but at the threshold for significance, \( F(2, 313) = 3.027, p = .050 \). We tested the standardized residuals. The conditions were normally distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test \( (p > .05) \). There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (Figure 31).

At least ten participants had extreme values with standardized residuals greater than ±3.5 standard deviations in examining outliers. We selected those who were between 3.2 standard deviations above or below the mean. Returning to the test of the hypothesis, we examined the main effect and 2-way interaction. When including Collective Self-Esteem in the model, no main effect was observed for condition, \( F(2, 303) = 2.646, p = .073 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .018 \).
Figure 29 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Social Dominance Orientation by the Quick Discrimination Index for Christians

Figure 30 - Scatterplot of the Quick Discrimination Index by Condition and Social Dominance Orientation for Christians
Further, there was a main effect of Collective Self-Esteem, $F(2, 303) = 6.657, p = .011$, partial $\eta^2 = .027$. Conversely there was a significant 2-way interaction between condition and Collective Self-Esteem, $F(2, 303) = 4.105, p = .017$, partial $\eta^2 = .027$. To further decompose the main effects via pairwise comparisons, there were no significant differences between conditions by Collective Self Esteem ($p > .05$). A significant negative correlation was detected within the Almost No Loss Condition ($r = -.374, p < .001$) but for the other two conditions, there were no significant relationships detected. Further, the pairwise decomposition of the conditions did not rise to the threshold of statistical significance ($p > .05$). We then shifted to testing emotion as the independent variable in the model.

**H3:** To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose a numeric majority status but where they have likely had hierarchical and social power (were once high status) and by extension have likely enjoyed some successful confrontations with other groups; we expect higher anger than sadness.

We asked participants to report on which groups they associated with specific emotions. Many of the participants skipped these items, as observed in study one. The following data reported are for those who indicated which groups they associated with specific emotions. We summed the number of groups by the associated emotions. To examine the differences in the group with emotion frequencies, we utilized a nonparametric test of difference. Given this design and the variability of the number of groups associated with each emotion, we used The Kruskal-Wallis H test (sometimes called the "one-way ANOVA on ranks").
Figure 31 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Quick Discrimination Index by Collective Self-Esteem for Christians

Figure 32 - Scatterplot of the Quick Discrimination Index by Condition and Collective Self-Esteem for Christians
While we tested which groups were associated with anger and sadness the most, we also included other emotion variables listed in Study One. There were no significant differences detected for most comparisons of conditions for emotion by target group (see Table 5). The only exception was the differences between conditions for liberal groups by sadness, where the loss condition experienced a floor effect compared to the control condition. This rank comparison was significant (see Table 6 and Figures 33).

These figures suggest that the loss condition showed minimal variability, while the control condition showed a large degree of variability, both including extreme outliers in the model. While there appeared to be a significant difference between conditions for conservative groups for perceived indifference (meaning they experience no emotion one way or another), further decomposition of differences only approached significance (see Table 7). Therefore, we fail to reject the null for the variable of emotion by condition, indicating that the manipulation had little to no effect on perceived emotions toward political groups, either liberal or conservative. In the next section, we explored the differences between conditions for individual self-esteem.

H4: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they will show lower individual self-esteem.

Again, returning to parametric analysis, we explored the main effect of condition on individual self-esteem as measured by Rosenberg's Individual Self-Esteem Scale. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, the initial normality testing observed that the conditions of almost no loss condition and control were normally distributed as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p > .05$) while violating normality for the loss condition ($p < .05$).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null Hypothesis</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Happiness is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Happiness is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Sadness is the same across categories of condition.</strong></td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td><strong>0.041</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reject the null hypothesis.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Sadness is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.777</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Emotionally Torn is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.668</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Emotionally Torn is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Interest is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Interest is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Anger is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null Hypothesis</td>
<td>Test</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Anger is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Fear is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Fear is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Not Familiar is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Not Familiar is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The distribution of Liberal Groups by Indifferent is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td><strong>0.024</strong></td>
<td>Reject the null hypothesis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The distribution of Conservative Groups by Indifferent is the same across categories of condition.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>Retain the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 - Pairwise Comparisons of Condition for Christians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample 1-Sample 2</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Std. Test Statistic</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Adj. Sig. a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss Condition-Almost no loss condition</td>
<td>-15.256</td>
<td>10.469</td>
<td>-1.457</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Condition-Control</td>
<td><strong>-24.051</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.585</strong></td>
<td><strong>-2.509</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.012</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.036</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost no loss condition-Control</td>
<td>-8.796</td>
<td>10.315</td>
<td>-0.853</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each row tests the null hypothesis that Sample 1 and Sample 2 distributions are the same.
Asymptotic significances (2-sided tests) are displayed. The significance level is .05.
a. The Bonferroni correction for multiple tests has adjusted significance values.

Figure 33 - Boxplot by Condition for Sadness Toward Liberally Affiliated Groups for Christians
Table 7 - Pairwise Comparisons of Condition for Christians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample 1-Sample 2</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Std. Test Statistic</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Adj. Sig.(^a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control-Loss Condition</td>
<td>26.797</td>
<td>11.570</td>
<td>2.316</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control-Almost no loss condition</td>
<td>29.158</td>
<td>12.452</td>
<td>2.342</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Condition-Almost no loss condition</td>
<td>-2.361</td>
<td>12.637</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each row tests the null hypothesis that Sample 1 and Sample 2 distributions are the same.
Asymptotic significances (2-sided tests) are displayed. The significance level is .05.
a. The Bonferroni correction for multiple tests has adjusted significance values.
The normality was violated due to extreme outliers below the mean and one above the mean. This is due to positive kurtosis, yet only one value exceeded the outlier threshold. However, given the variability still follows a parametric distribution, we continued with our analysis to make adjustments later based on extreme outliers as moderators.

However, there was no main effect for condition on individual self-esteem, $F(2, 312) = .133, p = .875$. Based on this finding, there is not a significant main effect for condition by individual self-esteem. Further, as a test of the interaction between the covariate of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the condition variable, homogeneity of regression slopes was tested. There was homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, $F(2, 343) = .089, p = .915$, meaning we have met the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes permitting additional normality testing before conducting further parametric analysis.

Standardized residuals were generated to test for normality of within-group residuals. As observed in our initial normality test, two of the three groups met the normality assumption of within-group residuals as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p > .05$). At the same time, the loss condition exceeded the limits for a normal distribution due to the same outliers observed before. Given the small number of residuals and the robust nature of a One-Way ANCOVA, we proceeded with the analysis (Osborne & Overbay, 2008). Further, we explored the homoscedasticity of error variances for each group. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 35).

Thirteen cases exceed ±3 standard deviations, while four are extreme values. Based on the odd variability of these scores, we opted to delete each of these cases to pull
the tails of the distribution toward the mean and what appeared to be some missing responses in other measures. Once these four cases were removed, we proceeded to test the moderating influence of SDO on Collective Self-Esteem by Condition. The one-way ANCOVA assumes that the variance of the residuals is equal for all groups of the independent variable. We tested for homogeneity of variances was assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variance. There was homogeneity of variances ($p = .420$).

Having met all prerequisites for analysis, we tested the hypothesis through the main effect and 2-way interaction. When including SDO in the model, there was no main effect for condition, $F(2, 305) = .072, p = .930$, partial $\eta^2 = .000$ in predicting Individual Self-Esteem. Further, there was no main effect of SDO $F(1, 305) = 1.250, p = .265$, partial $\eta^2 = .004$. Conversely there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition and SDO, $F(2, 305) = .580, p = .561$, partial $\eta^2 = .004$, (see Figure 35). Therefore, SDO appears not to predict individual self-esteem as a main effect or when including the conditions.

In exploring the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on Individual Self-Esteem, we tested if there was homogeneity of regression slopes. Again, the parametric assumption was tested. Testing preliminary parametric assumptions, there was homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, $F(2, 305) = .580, p = .561$. Standardized residuals for the interventions were normally distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p > .05$) for the almost no loss condition and the control condition.
Figure 34 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale for Christians

Figure 35 - Social Dominance Orientation by Condition and Rosenberg’s Individual Self Esteem Scale for Christians
However, the loss condition was not normally distributed, similar to SDO. However, while eleven outliers were observed, none were excessive, and therefore we kept the cases for this analysis given the robustness of the two-way ANCOVA. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 36). Homoscedasticity was assessed by inspecting the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values, as indicated in Figure 36. Further, we met the threshold of Equity of Error Variances ($p = .600$).

Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis was conducted. There was no main effect for condition by Individual Self-Esteem, $F(2, 305) = .381, p = .684$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$. There was a significant main effect for Collective Self-Esteem on Individual Self-Esteem, $F(1, 305) = 1.391, p = .012$, partial $\eta^2 = .012$. This finding indicates as Collective Self-Esteem increases, Individual Self-Esteem slightly decreases. Moreover, there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition by Collective Self-Esteem for Individual Self-Esteem, $F(2, 305) = .800, p = .450$, partial $\eta^2 = .005$ (see Figure 37). Primarily, we see the main effect of Collective Self-Esteem on the dependent variable. Nevertheless, again condition had no main effect on Individual Self-Esteem. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for research question four.

H5: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose majority status, they will perceive themselves to lose group power.

As in study one, we explored participant perceptions of group power, asking participants to reflect on their Christian group identity. We explored the main effect of condition on group power and the moderating influence of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Overall Collective Self-Esteem on Perceived Group Power.
Figure 36 - Group Scatterplot by Condition for Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem for Christians

Figure 37 - Scatterplot of Collective Self-Esteem by Rosenberg’s Individual Self-Esteem for Christians
We first conducted an initial analysis of the overall main effect of condition on group power. The initial test of equity of error variances met the threshold using Levene's at \( p > .05 \) to test preliminary parametric assumptions. There was no initial overall main effect of condition on group power, \( F(2, 308) = .026, p = .975, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .000 \). We further explored the moderating influence of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) between condition and group power. In testing for homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term, the statistical term was not significant, \( F(2, 305) = .083, p = .921 \).

Having met the linearity assumption, we further explored any significant divergent residuals from the predictive model to ensure we have met all parametric assumptions before proceeding. Standardized residuals for the interventions were normally distributed for all conditions, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test \( (p > .05) \). Moreover, we explored homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 38).

To assess the normality of the residuals of the overall model, the Shapiro-Wilk test was conducted, including all residuals together. The overall model met the threshold for normality \( (p > .05) \). At least eleven small value outliers were assessed in the data, as assessed by standardized residuals greater than ±3.5 standard deviations. Yet, none were extensive, and due to the robustness of the two-way analysis of variance, we continued with the outliers in the model when including SDO. We then proceeded to the overall analysis of the main effect of Condition by SDO in predicting Group Power.

In testing the hypothesis, no main effect of condition was observed when predicting group power, \( F(2, 305) = .110, p = .896, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .001 \). There was a significant main effect of SDO on Group Power, \( F(1, 305) = 27.996, p = .000, \text{partial } \eta^2 \)...
= .084. These findings indicate as SDO increases, perceived Group Power decreases which may challenge the current trends in the literature. There was no significant interaction between condition by SDO for prediction of Group Power, \( F(2, 305) = .083, p = .921, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .001 \). As observed in study one, SDO predicts perceived group power while condition had no main effect or significant interaction when including SDO as a moderator (see Figure 39).

Further, we explored the moderating influence of Collective Self-Esteem on perceived Group Power. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we ran an initial test for the homogeneity of the regression slopes, \( F(2, 305) = .567, p = .568, \) indicating the interaction was not statistically significant. When testing for normality among the standardized residuals for each Condition by Collective Self Esteem, the data were normally distributed as indicated by Shapiro-Wilk's test \( (p > .05) \). We then tested for homoscedasticity before testing the complete model, including Collective Self-Esteem as a moderator (see Figure 40). Homoscedasticity was determined through a visualization assessment of Figure 40. Following tests of linearity and normality, we further explored the main effects of the condition and collective self-esteem on perceived group power. Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of the hypothesis was conducted. There was no main effect of condition by perceived group power, \( F(2, 305) = .268, p = .765, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .002 \). Further, collective self-esteem had no effect on group power, \( F(1, 305) = .006, p = .939, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .000 \) nor was there a significant interaction between collective self-esteem by condition in predicting group power, \( F(2, 305) = .567, p = .568, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .004, \) (see Figure 41).
Figure 38 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Perceived Group Power for Christians

Figure 39 - Social Dominance Orientation and Perceived Group Power by Condition for Christians
Therefore, based on the findings of the test of these three models, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. From group power, we shifted to test perceived individual power. This was to determine if individuals personally feel empowered based on their group membership instead of the individual's perceived power within the group overall.

\( H_6 \): To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they will perceive themselves to lose individual power measured by an individual measure of power.

We first explored the main effect of conditions on perceived individual power. We tested to ensure the parametric assumption was met. We initially tested the overall Equity of Error Variances using Levene's. All conditions met the threshold at \( p > .05 \). There was no overall main effect for Condition by Perceived individual Power, \( F(2, 305) = 1.082, p = .340, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .007 \). In continuation of examining the potential moderating influence of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Collective Self Esteem, we again examined if these measures contributed to the prediction of the overall model and two-way interaction per each moderator within the model. We tested for homogeneity of regression slopes.

The interaction term was not significant for individual power, \( F(2, 305) = .375, p = .687 \). We further examined if the standardized residuals were normally distributed. The standardized residuals were normally distributed for the control and loss conditions, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test \( (p > .05) \). In contrast, the almost no loss condition did not meet the threshold for normal distribution.
Figure 40 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Perceived Group Power for Christians

Figure 41 - Scatterplot of Perceived Group Power by Collective Self-Esteem and Condition for Christians
This was partially due to a negative distribution of the almost no loss condition. Six total outliers were observed, but given the distribution did not exceed ±3.5 standard deviations, we continued with those cases in the subject pool. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 42). Given we were either close or within acceptable limits of normality testing, we proceeded with the overall analysis of the main effect of condition with the main effect of SDO on Perceived Individual Power. Variances were homogeneous, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variance ($p = .378$).

To test the hypothesis, there was no main effect observed for condition by perceived individual power, $F(2, 305) = 1.168, p = .312$, partial $\eta^2 = .008$. Further, in exploration of SDO on perceived individual power no main effect was observed, $F(1, 305) = 3.310, p = .070$, partial $\eta^2 = .011$. Additionally, there was no significant 2-way interaction between for condition by SDO in predicting perceived individual power, $F(2, 305) = .375, p = .687$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$. It is important to note that with a larger sample, we might have detected the main effect of SDO on perceived individual power (see Figure 43).

Additionally, as a test of our second moderator, we examined if Collective Self-Esteem overall would moderate a relationship between condition and perceived individual power. To test the parametric assumption, we conducted a homogeneity of the regression slopes, $F(2, 305) = 3.934, p = .021$ indicating a significant interaction. Given that homogeneity was violated, we were unable to proceed with parametric/linear analysis using ANCOVA.
Figure 42 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Perceived Individual Power for Christians

Figure 43 - Scatterplot of Perceived Individual Power by Social Dominance Orientation and Condition for Christians
Shifting to nonparametric ANCOVA testing of the overall moderating influence of Collective Self-Esteem, Quade's test of nonparametric ANCOVA was used. This test uses assigned ranks derived from residuals when including non-normal or correlated slopes (Garcia, Fernandez, Luengo, & Herreram, 2010; Quade, 1979).

There was no significant interaction in testing the hypothesis, $F_q(2, 308) = .587, p = .556$ between the conditions when including overall Collective Self-Esteem as a moderator. Therefore, different decomposition by condition was not warranted. Based on these findings, it appears there is no main effect of condition on individual power even when including the moderators of SDO or Collective Self Esteem.

For Study Two, and unlike Study One, which focused on White Male Identity, Study Two explored the concealment and disclosure of Christian Identity, which can be hidden if one so chooses. Therefore, we included two additional research questions related to concealment and disclosure.

$H7$: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they will be more likely to conceal their Christian beliefs.

Our seventh hypothesis addresses one's motivation to conceal. We first tested for the normality of the conditions for which all violated the normality assumption. This was due to a significant number of extreme outliers, $(n = 21; p < .000)$. Therefore, to examine the primary main effects were determined using Kruskal Wallis-H, a nonparametric ranks-based analysis. No significant differences were observed, $H(3) = .736, p = .692$ among the conditions (See Figure 44).
Given that normality was violated, we conducted two tests of Quade's Test of Nonparametric ANCOVA was used, $F_q(2, 311) = .328, p = .721$ between the conditions when including Collective Self-Esteem as a moderator. Given that there is no significant interaction, we did not conduct an additional decomposition analysis for CSE. We further examined if Collective Self-Esteem moderates the relationship between Condition by Concealment. Utilizing the same test for Collective Self-Esteem, there was no difference between conditions, $F_q(2, 311) = .528, p = .590$ between the conditions when including Collective Self-Esteem as a moderator. Again, decomposition was not warranted for this study. Therefore, it appears that condition had little to no influence on one's perceived need to conceal their Christian identity from others. We then shifted to self-disclosure as the dependent variable.

$H_3$: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they will be less likely to disclose their Christian beliefs to others.

We first examined the overall main effect of condition on disclosure or one's willingness to share their identity with others, close, familiar individuals to strangers. The initial tests of normality violated the normality assumption; however, only six cases were detected as outliers across conditions, with three observed in the almost no loss condition and three detected in the control condition, indicating a positive skew within each. However, these values were not extreme for detecting an overall main effect of the condition. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we also tested for homogeneity of regression slopes for which the interaction term was not significant, $F(1, 306) = 1.202, p = .302$, allowing us to proceed with qualification tests of normality and linearity.
Figure 44 - Kruskal-Wallis Test for Condition by Concealment for Christians
The standardized residuals also violated normality, as indicated by Shapiro Wilk's test ($p < .008$). As a result, we removed four extreme outliers to address this skewness and continued with our analysis. These values exceeded residuals greater than ±3.5 standard deviations. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 45). We further met the Equality of Error Variances threshold as indicated by Levene’s ($p = .550$). This led to the overall testing of the model, including SDO as a moderator.

In testing the hypothesis, no significant main effect was observed by condition for the measure of disclosure, $F(2, 311) = 3.140, p = .152$, partial $\eta^2 = .012$. We further tested the moderators of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) as well as Collective Self Esteem. When predicting disclosure including SDO within the model by condition there was no main effect of condition when controlling for SDO, $F(2, 311) = .504, p = .605$, partial $\eta^2 = .003$. There was no main effect for SDO when controlling for condition, $F(1, 311) = .631, p = .428$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$. Further, while Figure 46 seems to indicate an interaction, there is no significant statistical interaction present in the model, $F(2, 311) = 1.202, p = .302$, partial $\eta^2 = .008$, (see Figure 46).

We further tested for Collective Self-Esteem as a moderator of disclosure. There was homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant, $F(2, 302) = .144, p = .866$. Additionally, four outliers were detected, creating a negatively skewed distribution. The values are around ±3.5 standard deviations, and therefore we can proceed with the analysis. Further, homoscedasticity was observed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 47).
Figure 45 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Social Dominance Orientation for Christians

Figure 46 - Disclosure by Condition for Social Dominance Orientation for Christians
Variances were homogeneous, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variance ($p = .567$). We were, therefore, able to test the model of the influence of Collective Self-Esteem's influence on the relationship between Condition by Disclosure. There was no significant main effect observed for condition, $F(1, 302) = 1.688, p = .187$, partial $\eta^2 = .011$.

There was a significant main effect of Collective Self-Esteem on Disclosure when controlling for condition, $F(1, 302) = 14.000, p = .000$, partial $\eta^2 = .044$. Further, there was no significant interaction between condition by Collective Self-Esteem in predicting disclosure, $F(1, 302) = .144, p = .866$, partial $\eta^2 = .001$. Therefore, it appears that collective self-esteem does predict or influence one's willingness to disclose to others. In other words, those with higher collective self-esteem are more likely to disclose to others ($r = .224, p < .000$) (see Figure 48). Based on the findings of Study Two, it appears that condition had little to no effect on people's perceptions of Stigma, power, collective self-esteem, or concealment or disclosure. While individual differences exist related to these trends indicated by the moderated effects, we fail to reject the null for all hypothesis testing.
**Figure 47** - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Disclosure by Collective Self-Esteem for Christians

**Figure 48** - Scatterplot of Disclosure by Condition and Collective Self-Esteem for Christians
Chapter Five: General Discussion and Conclusion

This study explored whether high-status individual perceptions of stigma can be influenced by perceived loss in status through a presentation of a false article that showed a loss in one condition, almost no loss in the second condition, and control with no display of the article. The measures either met or exceeded inter-item reliabilities, had potentially enough of a sample per study to measure medium to small effects, and utilized a series of individual tests of the dependent variables. This discussion section will examine both studies together as comparisons between non-concealable versus concealable groups.

The study focused on two specific targeted stratified convenience samples, White Males and Christians, for studies one and two. It is important to note that the data was collected in the 2018 calendar year following the election of US President Donald J. Trump. Before the 2020 US Presidential Election events, this saw extensive and divisive social tension, particularly in the southeastern US. The findings presented should be considered within the sociological frame of those events of the time. As part of this design, we carefully considered the use of a comparison group of low-status groups. However, given the extensive research on low-status experiences of stigma, we purposefully delineated our sample given the limited research on high-status perceptions of stigma and the related correlates explored in this study. We could have never expected the incredible changes in the social landscape of America before, during, or even following the study. Nevertheless, such tensions appeared to exacerbate social tension beyond anything we could have expected. The reader should be aware of the study's
social, temporal, and cultural context in reviewing the findings to avoid misconceptions or view the conclusions through the social-political lens following the 2021 presidential election cycle.

In both studies, we attempted to manipulate individuals' perceptions of stigma. In condition one, we presented an article that suggested that the reader's racial or religious group was projected to lose majority status over time. In condition two, we indicated that there would be little to no change in their majority status, and in condition three, no false article was presented. Following those conditions, participants completed a series of randomized questionnaires on individual stigma, group stigma, perceived intergroup prejudice, emotional reaction to various in and outgroups, individual self-esteem, perceived group power, perceived individual power, and in study two measures of identity concealment, and identity disclosure based on the current stigma literature. Reliabilities were generated for all measures and all within acceptable thresholds for inclusion in the study.

Goffman (1963) noted that stigmas are marks or indicators of difference, separateness, or deviance from social or cultural norms. However, since Goffman's early work, research has demonstrated the various ways stigma is applied to outgroups. For example, some stigmas are apparent, while others are concealable. Inter-group comparison is a common evaluative social cognitive process that infers and reinforces personality and behavioral attributes simply based on outgroups' perceived normative behavior regardless of individual differences (Crocker et al., 1998). Given this complexity, we explored whether hierarchical thinking and collective self-esteem might affect the perceived stigma of high-status or ingroup identity.
In the test of hypothesis one, when white males are led to believe that their group is losing its numeric majority, participants will report higher group stigma. It was determined there was no main effect by condition. There was a main effect of social dominance orientation on perceptions of stigma with no statistically significant interaction detected. This appears to be a positive association between higher perceived stigma with higher social dominance orientation scores. There was a negative association between higher perceived stigma with higher collective self-esteem scores. In conducting the same test for Christians in study two, we observed a similar trend: condition had no main effect on perceived stigma. There was a main effect of social dominance orientation on perceived stigma where higher perceived stigma scores were correlated to higher social dominance orientation scores. The was a main effect of self-esteem on perceived stigma scores; however, while visually there appeared to be an interaction, it was not a statistically significant interaction by condition.

Given that these were high-status individuals, we also examined prejudicial attitudes of high-status groups on outgroups as a potential dependant variable. If individuals perceive themselves to be stigmatized, we explored if such perceived stigma might enhance or inhibit prejudicial attitudes toward outgroups (Buss, 1996; Gray, 1987; Higgins, 1997, 1998). Hypothesis two suggested that if individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, we expected an increased prejudice toward low-status outgroups compared to those who perceive their group majority to stay constant. We used the Quick Discrimination Index (QDI) measure for this research question, where high scores indicate more awareness, sensitivity, and receptivity to racial diversity and gender equality, and lower scores indicate greater prejudice toward women and racial diversity.
For study one, while not statistically significant, the QDI was close in meeting the appropriate p-value for the main effect by condition. There was a significant main effect of Social Dominance Orientation with QDI with a negative relationship between SDO and QDI. When including Collective Self-Esteem in the model, the main effect for condition indicated a potentially moderating influence on the model. Further, there was also the main effect of Collective Self-Esteem on QDI as well. This positive relationship indicated that the higher one's Collective self-esteem, the higher the QDI score. The loss condition was significantly lower than the other two conditions indicating that perceived loss may be more likely to influence their prejudicial attitudes toward others, particularly when including collective self-esteem as a moderator. We replicated the same measures and conditions for QDI for Christians. Again, there was no main effect of condition with QDI. We again replicated a similar yet more pronounced effect for SDO with QDI. Whereas SDO increases, QDI decreases. One difference between the two studies occurred when including Collective Self-Esteem in the model with the condition by QDI. There was no main effect observed for condition by QDI when including Collective Self-Esteem in the model for white males. We observed that the main effect of collective self-esteem on QDI was in the loss condition as collective self-esteem increased, so too did QDI scores, while in the almost no loss condition and control was negatively associated for Christians. While these differences were not statistically significant, a significant positive association was detected in the loss condition. This was confirmed by a significant two-way interaction as well.

Previous literature has shown there is an association between emotion and experiences of stigmatization. Emotions serve as a reactive yet functional non-verbal of
one's inner state (Maitner, Claypool, Mackie, & Smith, 2000). Further group-level comparisons appear to drive appraisals between one's ingroup and outgroups. Moreover, emotions provide a group signal of members' inclusivity and offer insight into how groups find synergistic attitudes toward each other and outgroups. Therefore, studying group level, emotional associations offer potential in understanding group cohesion, particularly when others stigmatize the group outside of the group. Anger is associated with successful outcomes of conflict, while sadness is associated with unsuccessful outcomes of conflict (Mackie et al., 2000; Dijker & Koomen, 2003; Bos, Kok, & Dijker, 2001; Feldman & Crandall, 2007). In testing hypothesis three, we predicted that if individuals perceive themselves to lose a numeric majority status but have likely had hierarchical and social power (were once high status), we expect higher anger than sadness given their former high status. In exploring white males, neither anger nor sadness was significantly different between conditions within our study. This was replicated for Christians where neither anger nor sadness was significantly different. We did observe at least in the control condition that sadness perceptions toward liberal groups showed greater variability overall than the other two conditions, meaning that variability differed by condition for sadness where the scores were low with little to no variability in comparing the other two conditions. However, while an interesting finding, the statistical thresholds were not met for reporting, and therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for emotion.

Another replicated finding from the literature on stigma is that low-status groups generally have lower self-esteem when primed with their identity prior to completing various tasks. When a study participant is reminded of their group identity, which is a
stigmatized group, they are more likely to do more poorly on knowledge tasks than those who are not primed by their identity, particularly when the task is stereotypically associated with negative outcomes for that particular group. As noted, many individuals derive self-value from group membership, and therefore stigma can potentially impact one's individual and group self-esteem. Based on this current literature, we tested hypothesis four that explored if individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status or show lower individual self-esteem. For white males, there was no main effect of condition on individual self-esteem. There was a main effect of SDO on Individual Self-Esteem, indicating higher SDO scores are correlated with lower individual self-esteem. Additionally, one interesting finding was that there was a main effect of collective self-esteem on individual self-esteem but negatively, meaning that as collective self-esteem increased, individual self-esteem slightly decreased. This is counter-intuitive as one might expect both to increase linearly, but a decrease was observed. Differences between the two studies were observed. While we replicated the finding for Christians of no main effect of condition on individual self-esteem, we did not observe a main effect of SDO on individual self-esteem. We did replicate a similar main effect negative trend for Christians on Collective Self-Esteem with Individual Self-Esteem.

Another potential variable of interest in this study was a perceived loss of group and individual power. From a theoretical perspective, as one loses power and resources, they are more likely to perceive other competing groups as threatening. One's perceived power can change their inner state as well as the inner states of others. Powerless individuals see their perceived loss of power as reminders to ensure conformity to dominant norms based on need and access, not a person's motivation to change behavior
or their ability to make decisions. If one perceives themselves to have limited power, they are more prone to threat as well as have more variable emotional states (Keltner et al., 2003; Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating, 1988; Gruenfeld, 1995; Sutton & Davidson, 1997). This premise leads to hypothesis five, which proposed that if individuals perceive themselves to lose majority status, they will perceive themselves to lose group power. For white males, there was no main effect of condition on perceived group power. There was a significant main effect of SDO on perceived group power indicated by a negative relationship. This would suggest that those with higher group power would be more likely to show lower SDO scores which is the inverse of what one might predict. In other words, if one perceives themselves to have higher perceived group power, they are less likely to score higher on SDO. There was no main effect of collective self-esteem on perceived group power. For Christians, there was not the main effect of condition on perceived group power. There was a main effect of SDO on perceived group power with a negative relationship similar to the trend observed with white males. There again was no main effect of Collective Self-Esteem on Perceived group power. A similar trend to that observed with white males.

In addition to group power, we also asked participants to complete a similar measure adapted for their perceived individual power as part of a group. Therefore, we proposed in hypothesis six that when individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they are more likely to perceive themselves to lose individual power. For White Males, again, there was no main effect of condition on perceived individual power. There was a main effect of SDO on perceived individual power. Whereas SDO increases perceived individual power decreases. This could indicate those who prefer hierarchy
may do so as a reaction to loss of power. There was no main effect of Collective Self-Esteem on perceived individual power for white males. In testing the same hypothesis in study two on Christians, there was no significant main effect of condition on perceived individual power. Unlike white males, there was no main effect observed among Christians on SDO on individual power or collective self-esteem's main effect on perceived individual power (see Table 7).

For study two, two additional measures were included, given that Christians can conceal their identity compared to white males. Another distinction made in the stigma literature is between concealable and non-concealable stigmas. While some markers of one's group identity are difficult to conceal, others are less so. For example, a Jewish individual may hide their ethnic identity more given the ambiguity of the physical attributes that constitute Jewish identity. Therefore, those in concealable stigmatized groups might have methods for controlling how outsiders perceive them and potentially control how they are perceived. This provides a protective mechanism for outgroup self-esteem and individual benefit. How one chooses to disclose their identity gives some insight into how stigmatized they might perceive themselves or their group (Crocker et al., 1991; Major & Crocker, 1993; Aronson & Inzlicht, 2004).

We first tested to determine if individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they would be more likely to conceal their Christian beliefs. This served as hypothesis seven in Study Two. Given the nature of the distributions observed, we conducted a non-parametric analysis to detect differences and any moderating influences of SDO and Collective self-esteem. No main effects of SDO or Collective Self-Esteem were observed. Therefore, we failed to reject the null hypothesis. As a second focus of
analysis, we tested hypothesis eight, which tested if individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status, they would be less likely to disclose their Christian beliefs to others. We shifted back to parametric analysis for this test of the hypothesis. Using a measure of identity disclosure adapted for Christians, we observed no main effect of condition. Nor were main effects observed for SDO on disclosure or collective self-esteem on disclosure. Therefore, given these findings, it appears that neither concealment nor disclosure is related to one's perceived loss of status (see Table 8).

Implication of Findings

While there were little to no findings regarding the experimental manipulation, what was clear were the correlational and associational relationships between the moderators and the various dependent variables included in the study for each question. Of particular interest here was the use of Social Dominance Orientation, which correlated both negatively and positively with the various dependent variables depending on the direction of the summed Likert items of the scale. It appears the higher the perceived Stigma scores, the more likely participants were to score higher on SDO. Conversely, if participants scored higher on Stigma were more likely to score lower on Collective self-esteem. This finding indicates that high-status individuals who are white males or Christians who perceive themselves as stigmatized are more likely to prefer hierarchical social structures with power distributed to the upper socio-economic status and less power given to lower social identity. Further, it appears there is a perception of lower collective self-esteem for those who perceive themselves to be more stigmatized and higher self-esteem for those with lower perceptions of Stigma, which would be expected.
Table 8 - Hypothesis Testing Study One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Condition Main Effect?</th>
<th>Social Dominance Orientation</th>
<th>Direction of Effect</th>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Collective Self-Esteem</th>
<th>Direction of Effect</th>
<th>Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stigma Measure White</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Discrimination Index</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion Measure</td>
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<td>Non-Parametric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Parametric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Power</td>
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<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Power</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>
**Table 9 - Hypothesis Testing Study Two**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Condition Main Effect?</th>
<th>Social Dominance Orientation</th>
<th>Direction of Effect</th>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Collective Self-Esteem</th>
<th>Direction of Effect</th>
<th>Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stigma Measure White Quick Discrimination Index</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Almost</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion Measure</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Power</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Power</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outness (Christian Only)</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concealment Scale (Christian Only)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Therefore, high-status white males and Christians who believe they are stigmatized prefer social hierarchy and experience issues with collective self-esteem, which might explain their need to rally and organize when traditional social hierarchies appear challenged.

This study also discovered a slight negative relationship between QDI (where higher scores indicate less prejudice toward outgroups) and SDO but a large positive linear association between Collective Self-Esteem and QDI. This would suggest that higher SDO participants are more likely to be prejudiced while also exhibiting lower self-esteem. Again, traditional values and changes in the social landscape could be a factor in their responses. This finding replicates previous research on the correlations between SDO and prejudice, but the findings of collective self-esteem might explain some of the antidotal trends of polarization in the United States before and following the elections.

As our emotional questions showed minimal to no effect through analysis, this may be for two reasons. First, the design of the emotional questions may have proved confusing for the research participant as they were first to associate which emotions they associated with these groups. The odd variability of responses could mean that the affective associations may be mixed given the complexity of perceptions about these groups and individual experiences with outgroups either directly or through media representations. In exploring individual self-esteem as a dependent variable, higher SDO scores were negatively associated with lower individual self-esteem scores.

Counterintuitively, there was a negative relationship between Collective versus Individual Self-Esteem. This could mean that high-status individuals are struggling with their role in the perceived social changes in society; therefore, the negative correlation might demonstrate the role ambiguity given the changing landscape of social norms.
Further, preference for social hierarchy as measured by SDO may be one method for keeping the status quo and push back on social and cultural reforms, indicating a need for traditional hierarchical structure in the demographic landscape. The findings of collective self-esteem may also be an indirect measure of collective affective synergy among high-status members, which the individual may not fully comprehend or agree with the changes in society.

In measuring perceived power, both group and individual power, we found that higher SDO Scores are negatively associated with perceived group power. This would further add support to the premise that loss of status may be felt collectively. High SDO participants may see themselves as losing group power overall for both white males and Christians, yet we observed no significant findings of collective self-esteem on group power; therefore, additional research would need to explore this question of collective affect and its role on group identity and cohesion when considering outgroup influence. When considering individual perceived power, White Males showed a significant association where higher SDO scores were associated with lower perceived individual power. Yet, for Christians, no main effect was observed, and it is unclear why a difference occurred between the two studies and warrants further examination.

Finally, given that Christian identity is concealable, we examined concealment and one's willingness to disclose their identity to outgroup others. No significant main effects were observed for concealment or disclosure. While we used online samples, it could be that Christian identity does not create enough social tension to warrant concealment or disclosure; therefore, these findings deviate from those observed with low-status groups.
Limitations and Future Directions

Therefore, based on these findings, it appears that the manipulation had little to no effect on the various dependent variables tested independently for each research question. Further, Social Dominance Orientation and Collective Self-Esteem influenced many dependent variables, meaning there are individual correlative differences that account for perceptions of Stigma, prejudice, perceived power, and study two, disclosure. Further research should explore what other potential correlates might impact one's perception of stigma and related variables. Researchers should consider a more realistic experimental manipulation when replicating or modifying this study. Alternatives to the false article could include a video of a newscast staged to replicate the conditions. Another possibility is to have a formal talk recorded and represented to participants replicating the content of each of the fake articles.

While a controversial topic, it was selected as a common theme prevalent at least in our cultural context of the Southeast United States was related to high-status individuals' perceptions of Stigma based on their high-status identity. By better understanding high-status perceptions on topics such as perceive Stigma, we can better understand how these attitudes translate into their worldview and perception of outgroups and the changing landscape of American politics. Moreover, as the political landscape continues to change, a better understanding of high-status perceptions would help us better address new challenges as they arise.
References


Richardson, P. J., Boyd, R., & Henrich J. (2010). Gene-culture coevolution in the age of genomics. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 107 (Supplement 2) 8985-8992; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0914631107


Zeder, M. A. (2017). Domestication as a model system for the extended evolutionary synthesis. Interface Focus, 7(5).
Appendices

Appendix A – Demographics

1. What is your age?
2. What sex were you assigned at birth, on your original birth certificate?
   a. Male
   b. Female

3. When considering the concept of gender, do you believe there are more than two possible genders?
   a. There are only two natural genders
   b. There are many gender identities to pick from as it depends on how you feel and identify

3a. What is your gender <Display logic for Question 3 if A is picked>?
   c. Male
   d. Female

3b. What is your gender identity <Display logic for Question 3 if B is picked>?
   e. Cisgender Male or Born and Currently Identify as Male
   f. Cisgender Female or Born and Currently Identify as Female
   g. Agender or a person without gender.
   h. Genderfluid or gender is expressed as felt
   i. Genderqueer or may identify as male or female, between or beyond genders, or a combination of genders
   j. Intersex or the condition where a person was born with some combination of physical gender attributes (may have some degree of mixed biology between the traditional gender binary).
   k. Gender Non-conforming or one who refuses to participate in the social expectations of the Gender binary.
   l. Transgender Male (born female but now identifies as male)
   m. Transgender Female (born male but now identifies as female)

4. How do you describe your current gender?
   a. Male
   b. Female
   c. Other [Text Enter]
5. Do you identify as Hispanic or Latino - A person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race. Please select from the answers below.
   a. Hispanic Latino
   b. Not Hispanic Latino
   c. I don't wish to answer

6. Of the racial identities listed below, which best represents you?
   a. White (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa.
   b. Black or African American (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A person having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa.
   c. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A person having origins in any of the peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific Islands.
   d. Asian (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian Subcontinent, including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam.
   e. American Indian or Alaska Native (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A person having origins in any of the original peoples of North and South America (including Central America), and who maintain tribal affiliation or community attachment.
   f. Two or More Races (Not Hispanic or Latino) - All persons who identify with more than one of the above five races.
   g. Other [Text Entry]
   h. I don’t wish to answer

{BRANCH LOGIC WHEN NOT WHITE STUDY ONE}

7. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
   a. Less than 9th grade
   b. 9th to 12th grade, No diploma
   c. High school education or equivalent
   d. Some college, No degree
   e. Associate Degree
   f. Bachelor's degree
   g. Graduate or Professional degree

8. Current marital status
   a. Never married
   b. Married - 1st marriage
c. Married - 2nd marriage  

d. Married - 3rd marriage  

e. Cohabitating/Unmarried partner  

f. Domestic Partnership  

g. Separated  

h. Annulled  

i. Divorced  

j. Widowed  

k. Other [Text Entry]  

9. What is your current employment status?  

a. Employed full time (40 or more hours per week)  

b. Employed part-time (up to 39 hours per week)  

c. Unemployed and currently looking for work  

d. Unemployed and not currently looking for work  

e. Student  

f. Retired  

g. Homemaker  

h. Self-employed  

i. Unable to work  

j. Other [Text Entry]  

10. What is your annual household income of you and your family? By definition, a family is a group of individuals who are related by birth, marriage or adoption. This can include parents, stepchildren, and/or siblings sharing household income. It also includes unmarried partners who do have a child in common and live under the same household. This excludes roommates who are not in some type of coupled relationship.  

[Text Entry]  

11. What statement below best identifies your beliefs?  

a. I am more religious than spiritual  

b. I am more spiritual than religious  

c. I am equally religious and spiritual  

d. I am neither religious nor spiritual  

12. What best identifies your beliefs?  

a. Atheism  

b. Agnosticism  

c. Buddhism
d. Christian
e. Hinduism
f. Islam
g. Jewish
h. Pagan
i. Unitarian
j. Wicca
k. Other [Text Entry]

13. {If Christianity} Which type of Christianity do you identify most closely with?
   a. Catholic
   b. Protestant
c. Orthodox
d. Church of Latter Day Saints
e. Jehovah’s Witnesses

14. {If Christianity} What form or denomination of Christianity do you identify most closely with?
   a. Anabaptist
   b. Anglican/Episcopal
c. Apostolic
d. Apostolic Pentecostal in the Historically Black Tradition
e. Assemblies of God
f. Baptist
g. Christian Reform Church
h. Church of Christ
i. Church of Christ, Scientist
j. Church of God
k. Church of the Nazarene
l. Disciples of Christ
m. Four Square Gospel
n. Holiness
o. Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod
p. Lutheran Church, Wisconsin Synod
q. Mennonites
r. Methodist
s. Methodist Episcopal Church
t. Moravians
u. Nondenominational
v. Presbyterian
w. Quakers (Friends)
x. Seventh-Day Adventist
y. Wesleyan
z. Other [Text Entry]

15. Think about your beliefs (religious, spiritual, atheistic, agnostic, or otherwise). Please review the definitions below. Which belief definition best represents you in relation to the majority of people where you live. If you belong to a religious denomination, think about the definitions below in relation to your membership in the denomination.
   a. My beliefs are considered culturally normal and common where I live. When I share my beliefs with others, I experience little to no social tension with others. My beliefs are common and/or accepted where I live.
   b. I have beliefs, rituals, practices, and/or traditions which seem culturally different than the mainstream culture where I live. These differences create some social tension with others. While accepting of me as a person, they may misunderstand my beliefs or think they are strange. Yet, I still regularly interact with others where I live.
   c. My beliefs dictate that I must avoid others where I live, and I attempt to do so where appropriate. My beliefs connect me with a completely different culture of others who share similar beliefs. This can include beliefs, rituals, clothing, cultural practices, and/or community commitments. Some outsiders where I live might perceive my beliefs or my community’s beliefs to be extremely different from the norm.

16. Given the three categories of beliefs, is there any additional feedback about yourself or this question you would like to share.

17. Regardless of how you registered to vote, which political description most closely matches your political leanings?
   a. Tea Party
   b. Libertarian
   c. Republican Christian Right
   d. Republican Moderate (Fiscal Conservative without Religious Influence in Government)
   e. Right-Leaning Independent
   f. Left-Leaning Independent
   g. Democratic Moderate
   h. Democratic Socialist
   i. Green Party

18. Based on the last election, who would you vote for?
   a. Gary Johnson
   b. John Kasich
c. Ted Cruz
d. Marco Rubio
e. Ben Carson
f. Jeb Bush
g. Carly Fiorina
h. Donald Trump
i. Bernie Sanders
j. Martin O'Malley
k. Hillary Clinton
l. Jill Stein
m. Evan McMullin

19. My political orientation is an important part of who I am. (Strongly Disagree to Agree Strongly)
Appendix B – Collective Self Esteem Scale

Instructions We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your memberships in those particular groups or categories and respond to the following statements by how you feel about those groups and your memberships in them. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from 1 to 7

I am a worthy member of the social groups I belong to.
I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do.
Overall, my social groups are considered good by others.
Overall, my group memberships have very little to do with how I feel about myself.
I feel I don't have much to offer to the social groups I belong to.
In general, I'm glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to.
Most people consider my social groups, on the average, to be more ineffective than other social groups.
The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.
I am a cooperative participant in the social groups I belong to.
Overall, I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are not worthwhile.
In general, others respect the social groups that I am a member of.
The social groups I belong to are unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.
I often feel I'm a useless member of my social groups.
I feel good about the social groups I belong to.
In general, others think that the social groups I am a member of are unworthy.
In general, belonging to social groups is an important part of my self-image.
Appendix C – Measure of Social Dominance Orientation.

Please choose the answer that best fits 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if groups could be equal. (reverse scored)
10. Group equality should be our ideal. (reverse scored)
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. (reverse scored)
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. (reverse scored)
13. Increased social equality is beneficial to society. (reverse scored)
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. (reverse scored)
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. (reverse scored)
16. No one group should dominate in society. (reverse scored)
Appendix D – Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

Instructions Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.

1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

2. At times I think I am no good at all.

3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.

5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

6. I certainly feel useless at times.

7. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.

8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.

9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

Scoring:

Items 2, 5, 6, 8, 9 are reverse scored. Give “Strongly Disagree” 1 point, “Disagree” 2 points, “Agree” 3 points, and “Strongly Agree” 4 points. Sum scores for all ten items. Keep scores on a continuous scale. Higher scores indicate higher self-esteem.
Appendix E – Quick Discrimination Index

This survey, called the Quick Discrimination Index, is designed to assess sensitivity, awareness, and receptivity to cultural diversity and gender equity. Because this is a self-assessment inventory, it is essential that you respond to each item as honestly as possible. This inventory is designed to assess subtle racial and gender bias. You can use this inventory to become more aware of your attitudes and beliefs pertaining to these issues.

Directions: Remember there are no right or wrong answers. Please circle the appropriate number to the right.

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Not Sure
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree

1. I do think it is more appropriate for the mother of a newborn baby, rather than the father, to stay home with the baby (not work) during the first year.
2. It is as easy for women to succeed in business as it is for men.
3. I really think affirmative-action programs on college campuses constitute reverse discrimination.
4. I feel I could develop an intimate relationship with someone from a different race.
5. All Americans should learn to speak two languages.
6. It upsets (or angers) me that a woman has never been president of the United States.
7. Generally speaking, men work harder than women.
8. My friendship network is very racially mixed.
9. I am against affirmative-action programs in business.
10. Generally, men seem less concerned with building relationships than women.
11. I would feel OK about my son or daughter dating someone from a different race.
12. It upsets (or angers) me that a full racial minority person has never been president of the United States.
13. In the past few years, too much attention has been directed toward multicultural or minority issues in education.
14. I think feminist perspectives should be an integral part of the higher education curriculum.
15. Most of my close friends are from my own racial group.
16. I feel somewhat more secure that a man rather than a woman is currently president of the United States.
17. I think that it is (or would be) important for my children to attend schools that are racially mixed.
18. In the past few years, too much attention has been directed toward multicultural or minority issues in business.
19. Overall, I think racial minorities in America complain too much about racial discrimination.
20. I feel (or would feel) very comfortable having a woman as my primary physician.
21. I think the president of the United States should make a concerted effort to appoint more women and racial minorities to the country’s Supreme Court.
22. I think white people’s racism toward racial-minority groups still constitutes a major problem in America.
23. I think the school system, from elementary school through college, should encourage minority and immigrant children to learn and fully adopt traditional American values.
24. If I were to adopt a child, I would be happy to adopt a child of any race.
25. I think there is as much female physical violence toward men as there is male physical violence toward women.
26. I think the school system, from elementary school through college, should promote values representative of diverse cultures.
27. I believe that reading the autobiography of Malcolm X would be of value.
28. I would enjoy living in a neighborhood consisting of a racially diverse population (Asian, blacks, Latinos, whites).
29. I think it is better if people marry within their own race.
30. Women make too big a deal out of sexual harassment issues in the workplace.

Scoring for the QDI

The total score measures overall sensitivity, awareness, and receptivity to cultural diversity and gender equality. Of the 30 items on the QDI, 15 are worded and scored in a positive direction (high scores indicate high sensitivity to multicultural/gender issues), and 15 are worded and scored in a negative direction (where low scores are indicative of high sensitivity). Naturally, when tallying the total score response, these latter 15 items need to be reverse-scored. Reverse scoring simply means that if a respondent circles a “1” he or she should get five points, a “2” four points, a “3” three points, a “4” two points, and a “5” one point.

The following QDI items need to be reverse-scored: 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 25, 29, 30.

Score range = 30 to 150, with high scores indicating more awareness, sensitivity, and receptivity to racial diversity and gender equality.
Appendix F – Measure of Intergroup Emotions

Part One – Study One Outgroup Emotion Association Assessment

There are many types of national groups and movements which are present in mainstream or popular media. Some are more familiar than others. You may find the common arguments of these groups as persuasive and others as unreasonable.

Now for these same groups please think about the emotions you immediately feel when you think about them. Please select the emotion that most comes to mind if any emotion at all.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Happiness</th>
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<th>Torn</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Fear</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
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<tr>
<td>Black Lives Matter</td>
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<td>American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)</td>
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<td>Right Wing Militias</td>
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</table>
Part Two – Outgroup Emotion Association Assessment

There are many types of national groups and movements which are present in mainstream or popular media. Some are more familiar than others. You may find the common arguments of these groups as persuasive and others as unreasonable.

Now for these same groups please think about the emotions you immediately feel when you think about them. Please select the emotion that most comes to mind if any emotion at all.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Happiness</th>
<th>Sadness</th>
<th>Torn</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Fear</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Black Lives Matter</td>
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<td>Women’s Equality</td>
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<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)</td>
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<td>White Males</td>
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<td>Right Wing Militias</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F – Generalized Sense of Power Scale

Instructions: In rating each of the items below, please use the following scale:

1 Disagree Strongly – 7 Agree Strongly

Given my own experience as a White Male /Christian individual and in my relationships with Others.

1. I can get people to listen to what I say.
2. My wishes so not carry much weight.
3. I can get others to do what I want.
4. Even if I voice them, my views have little sway.
5. I think I have a great deal of power.
6. My ideas and opinions are often ignored.
7. Even when I try, I am not able to get my way.
8. If I want to, I get to make the decisions.

<New Screen>

1 Disagree Strongly – 7 Agree Strongly

Given my membership in the group as a White Male /Christian and my relationships with Others.

1. I can get people to listen to what I say.
2. My wishes so not carry much weight.
3. I can get others to do what I want.
4. Even if I voice them, my views have little sway.
5. I think I have a great deal of power.
6. My ideas and opinions are often ignored.
7. Even when I try, I am not able to get my way.
8. If I want to, I get to make the decisions.
Appendix G – Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness (Adapted for White Males and Christians)

For each question, please mark whether you strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3), or strongly agree (4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I feel out of place in the world because I am a White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. White Males /Christians tend to be violent.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. People discriminate against me because I am a White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I avoid getting close to people who are not White /Christian to avoid rejection.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I am embarrassed or ashamed that I am a White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This Question was Removed</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. White Males /Christians make important contributions to society.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. I feel inferior to others who are not White Males /Christians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I don’t socialize as much as I used to because my race/religion might make me look or behave “weird.”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. People who are White Males /Christians cannot live a good, rewarding life.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. I don’t talk about myself much because I don’t want to burden others with my concerns with race/religion.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Negative stereotypes about White Males /Christians keep me isolated from the “normal” world.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Being around people who are not White Male /Christian makes me feel out of place or inadequate.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. I feel comfortable being seen in public with other White Males /Christians.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. People often patronize me or treat me like a child, just because I am a White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. I am disappointed in myself for being White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Being a White Male /Christian has spoiled my life.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. People can tell that I am a White Male /Christian by the way I look.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Because I am a White Male /Christian, I need others to make most decisions for me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>I stay away from social situations in order to protect my family or friends from embarrassment.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>People who are not White Male /Christian could not possibly understand me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>People ignore me or take me less seriously just because I am a White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>I can’t contribute anything to society because I am White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Being White Male /Christian has made me a tough survivor.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Nobody would be interested in getting close to me because I am a White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>In general, I am able to live my life the way I want to.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>I can have a good, fulfilling life, despite me being a White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Others think that I can’t achieve much in life because I am White Male /Christian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Stereotypes about White Male /Christian apply to me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ISMI contains 29 items which produce five subscale scores and a total score. Each score is calculated by adding the item scores together and then dividing by the total number of answered items. If any items are not answered, the total number to be divided by is reduced. The resulting score should range from 1-4. For example, if someone answers 5 of the 6 Alienation items, the Alienation score is produced by adding together the five answered items and dividing by 5.

**Alienation (6 items)**
1. I feel out of place in the world because I am White Male /Christian
5. I am embarrassed or ashamed that I am White Male /Christian
8. I feel inferior to others who are not White Male /Christian
16. I am disappointed in myself for being White Male /Christian
17. Being White Male /Christian has spoiled my life
21. People who are not White Male /Christian cannot possibly understand me

**Stereotype Endorsement (7 items)**
2. White Males/Christian people tend to be violent
6. White Male/Christian people shouldn’t get married
10. White Males/Christians cannot live a good, rewarding life
18. People can tell that I am White Male /Christian by the way I look
19. Because I am White Male /Christian, I need others to make most decisions for me
23. I can’t contribute anything to society because I am White Male /Christian
29. Stereotypes about White Male /Christian apply to me

Discrimination Experience (5 items)
3. People discriminate against me because I am White Male /Christian
15. People often patronize me, or treat me like a child, just because I am White Male /Christian
22. People ignore me or take me less seriously just because I am White Male /Christian
25. Nobody would be interested in getting close to me because I am White Male /Christian
28. Others think that I can’t achieve much in life because I am White Male /Christian

Social Withdrawal (6 items)
4. I avoid getting close to people who are not religious or white to avoid rejection
9. I don’t socialize as much as I used to because I am a White Male /Christian and afraid it might make me look or behave “weird”
11. I don’t talk about myself much because I don’t want to burden others with my White Male /Christian
12. Negative stereotypes about White Male /Christian keep me isolated from the “normal” world
13. Being around people who are not White Male /Christian makes me feel out of place or inadequate
20. I stay away from social situations in order to protect my family or friends from embarrassment

Stigma Resistance (5 items – reverse code before including in total score)
7. People who are White Male /Christian make important contributions to society
14. I feel comfortable being seen in public with a White Male /Christian
24. Being White Male /Christian has made me a tough survivor
26. In general, I am able to live my life the way I want to
27. I can have a good, fulfilling life, despite being White Male /Christian

As they are shown in the questionnaire, higher scores on these questions indicate more resistance to stigma and therefore less internalized stigma. If you wish to include them in the total score, you must reverse the scores before doing so. To reverse the scores, subtract them from 5. Thus, a score of 1 becomes a 4 and a score of 4 becomes a 1.

Total Score (29 items)
Add together all the answered items and divide by the total number of answered items. (If the person answered every question, divide by 29). Make sure to use reverse-coded Stigma Resistance items.

**Total Score without Stigma Resistance (24 items)**
Same as above, but do not include the Stigma Resistance items. You may choose to interpret these items separately or to leave them out altogether (Lysaker et al., 2007).

**Interpretation of scores**

- **4-category method (following the method used by Lysaker et al., 2007):**
  - 1.00-2.00: minimal to no internalized stigma
  - 2.01-2.50: mild internalized stigma
  - 2.51-3.00: moderate internalized stigma
  - 3.01-4.00: severe internalized stigma

- **2-category method (following the method used by Ritsher & Phelan, 2004):**
  - 1.00-2.50: does not report high internalized stigma
  - 2.51-4.00: reports high internalized stigma
Appendix H – Outness Inventory (adapted for Christians)

Use the following rating scale to indicate how open you are about being a Christian to the people listed below. Try to respond to all of the items but leave items blank if they do not apply to you. If an item refers to a group of people (e.g., work peers), then indicate how out you generally are to that group.

1 = person definitely does NOT know you are a Christian
2 = person might know you’re Christian, but it is NEVER talked about
3 = person probably knows you’re a Christian, but it is NEVER talked about
4 = person probably knows you’re a Christian, but it is RARELY talked about
5 = person definitely knows you’re a Christian, but it is RARELY talked about
6 = person definitely knows you’re a Christian, and it is SOMETIMES talked about
7 = person definitely knows you’re a Christian, and it is OPENLY talked about
0 = not applicable to your situation; there is no such person or group of people in your life

1. mother
2. father
3. siblings (sisters, brothers)
4. extended family/relatives
5. my new straight friends
6. my work peers
7. my work supervisor(s)
8. strangers, new acquaintances
9. my non-believer friends

Openness Inventory Scoring
Out to Family = average of items 1, 2, 3, and 4
Out to World = average of items 5, 6, 7, and 10
Overall Outness = average of the above two subscales

Why is Overall Outness scored by averaging subscales rather than items?
The factor analyses used to develop the scale suggested that outness has a hierarchical factor structure, where overall outness is represented by lower-level domains of outness (e.g., outness to family, outness in one’s religious institution). Thus, from a conceptual
and measurement perspective, it makes the most sense to average the subscales rather than the individual items. There is also a practical reason to score Overall Outness in this manner. If Overall Outness were calculated by averaging together individual items, then one would end up with a score that gives less weight to domains associated with fewer items.
Appendix I – Sexual Orientation Concealment Scale (adapted for Christians)

The following six items concern behaviors Christians sometimes use to hide their beliefs or identity. Please rate each item to complete the following phrase:

In the last two weeks, I have...

Not at all
A little bit
Somewhat
Very much
All the time

1. concealed my Religion by denying that I was Christian.
2. concealed my Religion by avoiding contact with other open Christians.
3. avoided the subjects of theology, the Bible, worship or prayer.
4. allowed others to assume I am not religious without correcting them.
5. altered my appearance, mannerisms, or activities in an attempt to “pass” as not Christian.
6. remained silent while witnessing Christian remarks, jokes, or activities because I did not want to be labeled as a believer by those involved.
7. Hid religious activities such as prayer, church attendance, or bible study.
8. Wanted to proselytize to others but felt fear of rejection or concern for your safety.
9. Concealed symbols or clothing of my faith
10. Spoke ill of fellow believers to prove I was not an insider or believer.
Vita

Christopher Frank Silver grew up in Dunlap, Tennessee, USA. Following high school, Silver attended the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (UTC) his undergraduate education, where he received a Bachelor of Science in Psychology and a Bachelor of Arts in Religious Studies in 2001. Silver continued his graduate education by completing a Masters of Science degree in Research Psychology at UTC in 2003. He moved to Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, where he completed as Masters of Arts degree in Religion and Culture from Wilfrid Laurier University in 2006. Following his masters work, Silver reenrolled at UTC in the Doctorate in Learning and Leadership (Ed. D.), completing his degree in 2013. Upon completing that degree, Dr. Silver joined the Ph.D. Program in experimental psychology with a focus on social. His research interest includes the psychology of religion and spirituality, secular studies, individual differences psychometrics and measurement, and diversity work focusing on stigma. Dr. Silver is currently an assistant professor at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga in Learning and Leadership. He is appreciative and humbled by the support of friends, family, colleagues, and fellow graduate students.