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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Conny Sidi Kazungu entitled "A Tale of Grievance and Opportunity: Evaluating The Effects of Counterterrorism Policies, Marginalization of Groups and Irredentism on the Rise of Terrorism in the Horn of Africa." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Krista Wiegand, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

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Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Conny Sidi Kazungu
August 2019
Dedication

To my father Joseph Kazungu Katana
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As a woman of faith, I believe God has inspired and carried me along this journey. I am thankful for His grace and love along the way.

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Abstract

Scholars examining conflict studies have explored multiple explanations for causes of terrorism. The Horn of Africa shares the devastating effects of domestic and international terrorist attacks. Remarkably little is known about sub-regional factors and conditions which results in terror attacks within this region. What scholars have overlooked is how grievance and opportunity relate to terrorism. In addition, despite numerous counterterrorism funding why do we still observe a rise of terrorism in the Horn of Africa?

Motivated by the Horn of Africa, this study posits that three factors when combined increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack: heavy-handed counterterrorism policies, irredentist claims and the marginalization of groups. I utilize a qualitative approach to test these hypotheses. The findings should assist existing scholarship adopting a broader view of causes of terrorism including sub-regional factors in the analysis and study of terrorism in Africa.
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Chapter I

Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Africa; in fact, several countries in the continent have experienced some attacks over the years. However, in recent years, we observe an increase in terrorist acts, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Many states have been recognized as warranting special counterterrorism attention. Since the 1980s, sub-regional terrorist attacks in countries in Africa have resulted in the loss of multiple lives and significant destruction of property (Abrahamsen 2002; Cilliers 2003; Cilliers 2004). From 1974 and 2008, a total of 4,993 terrorism attacks took place in Sub-Saharan Africa and 261 groups claimed responsibility (Elu and Price 2012). Many scholars have attributed the sudden rise of attacks to low economic conditions, which is similar with the theory of deprivation and low levels of education attainment (Lund 2010).

Moreover, historical events such as ethnic conflicts have also been used to explain terrorism in Africa (Elu and Price 2014). Perhaps the likelihood of radical terrorism is higher in the region, only second to the Middle East, which is further propagated by the rise of Islamist terrorism (Elu 2012). The United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented changes and increased security to deal with international and U.S. based terrorism possibly catalyzed by radical Islamism. Nevertheless, transnational terrorism, and in particular domestic terrorism, continues to pose a challenge to counterterrorism policies. As (Elu and Price 2014) explain,
“the counterterrorism policy response of regional governments when combating terrorism and its economic effect on national and global security often fail to consider how religion, ethnicity, colonial legacy, and rational choice interact to condition why some individuals and groups in Africa employ terrorist acts as an approach to justify their mission and objective” (Elu and Price 2014).

Terrorism: Focus on the Horn of Africa

This study is about terrorism; however, it is motivated by the Horn of Africa, which thrusts itself onto Yemen and hence the heart of Arabia, the Persian and Arab Gulf. For geographic reasons and, in an era of terror, Yemen belongs to this greater Horn of Africa region, adding 20 million people, virtually all Muslims. Seven countries including; Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Yemen share a paucity of resources and unfulfilled desire for rapid socio-economic development (Rotberg, 2003).

More recently, they also share the devastating effects of domestic and international terrorist attacks. On the morning of August 7, 1998, two Al Qaeda terrorists drove a small track with a bomb to the rear entrance of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. In the next blast, the rear half of the embassy was extensively damaged, and an adjacent building was destroyed. Over 5,000 people were injured and, two hundred and fourteen people were killed, including forty-four American and Kenyan personnel in the building (Bushnell 2018; Carson 2002).

Four years later, on November 22, 2002, Al Qaeda terrorists struck again. In a well-
orchestrated attack, several terrorists drove an explosives-filled land cruiser in the lobby of the Paradise Hotel, an Israeli-owned beach resort in a small village just north of Mombasa. The attack coincided with the arrival of a group of Israeli tourists who had just flown in on a charter flight. The blast killed 16 Israeli and Kenyan citizens. At the same time as the bombing was taking place at the Paradise Hotel, two terrorists standing in a different location fired shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles at an Israeli flight returning to Tel Aviv from Mombasa airport with Israeli tourists from the Paradise Hotel.

On September 2013, al-Shabaab, a faction of Al Qaeda, attacked a premier mall in Nairobi with a siege lasting 80 hours resulting in 67 deaths. In April 2015, al-Shabaab militants attacked students at the Garissa University College in the northeastern part of the country resulting in 147 deaths (Berchinski 2007). More recently in Somalia, on October 14, 2017, al-Shabaab militants killed 300 civilians after two truck bombs went off in Mogadishu. While in April 2018, they attacked service members in the Jubaland area killing a US soldier and injuring several others. The mission was establishing a permanent combat post and expand the Somalian state’s reach in the area (Berchinski 2007). These numerous attacks had unexpected outcomes and were surprising. First, they confirmed the vulnerability of regions that share international borders, including the likelihood of terrorist attacks. Second, they reinforced the need for increased security in the region. Thus, as the security crisis persists in the Horn of Africa, the United States and other western countries have provided significant counterterrorism funding,
including policies in place to help combat terrorism in the area. Significant
developments such as the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),
the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) and the Transnational
Government (TNG) are all confirmation of the ascendance of counterterrorism
policies in the region. However, despite the numerous counterterrorism efforts in the
Horn of Africa over the past two decades, why do we still observe a rise of extremism
and terrorism in the region? Answering this question is important in understanding
terrorism in this area. These countries include; Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia,
and Kenya. Several of the countries in the Horn of Africa face numerous challenges
including issues of poor governance, limited political freedom, political instability and
economic progress wanting. All of these factors certainly contribute to the regional
insecurity. As an example, one of the most fragile areas is Somalia, which has been
deemed as a failed state. Crippled by radical Islamist organizations such as the Al
Itihad Al Islamiya (AIAI), provides a partner for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
movements.

Further, AIAI has been implicated on several attacks, including the 1999 killing of
an American aid worker near the Kenya-Somali border and the other attacks inside
Ethiopia (Rotberg 2003; 2005). Somalia’s extreme poverty has spawned
unemployment, desperation, and resentment, making the country an ideal site for
recruitment into terrorist cells. In Figure 1. we see an illustration of the Horn of
Africa region.
Further, multiple years of armed conflict and lawlessness have provided a ready corps of battle-hardened militias. Moreover, the rapid expansion of Islamic charities and schools, mostly funded from the Gulf, wins over hearts and minds of citizens and provides a convenient structure for recruitment of youth from marginalized groups to the cause. In Figure 2, we observe fragile states in the Horn of Africa.

Additionally, a rising anti-Western sentiment among marginalized groups, fueled in part by a sense of abandonment, in part by anger at various national governments in the region, as well as American counterterrorism policies, is easily exploited by extremist factions (Menkhaus, 2003).

Figure 2. Fragile States in Africa 1996-2001
Further, the inherent weakness in certain regions in the Horn of Africa have long unpatrolled coastlines, and unmonitored strips which allow for the free movement of foreign jihadists and illicit business transaction (Rotberg Carson 2003;2005). A classic example is in Ethiopia-where areas such as the Ogaden have experienced a substantial number of terrorist attacks, with the vast majority initiated by indigenous groups located in neighboring Somalia.

The potential activities of the Somali-based Al Itihad and Al Islamiya, whose goal is to create an Islamic Somali state that would incorporate Ethiopia’s Somali population, raises concern. More specifically, Ethiopia also shares a contested, porous borders with neighboring Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti, making it a backdoor to terrorism due to proximity to the Persian Gulf. This raises more concerns on the major external threat to Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and the issue of Somali irredentism (Shinn, 2003).

It is important to note that regional instability and concerns around the support of terrorist groups hinders the ability to fully combat attacks and suspects in the region. As an example, the Sudan has been accused of supporting suspects of terrorism, through its lax travel policies on Arab nationals including visa waivers (Carney Ijaz 2002; Roteberg 2005). On several occasions, the national government has been accused of providing suspects with passports and other lenient immigration procedures further increasing insecurity in the area.
Counterterrorism Efforts-Horn of Africa

With the support of the United States and its allies, countries in this region have established numerous counterterrorism resources. Counterterrorism initiatives are intended to scrutinize those citizens who might pose a security threat and alleviate the spread of extremism and attacks in the Horn of Africa (Carson 2003). To date, there is extensive collaboration especially in the military and intelligence areas, between the United States and countries in the Horn of Africa including; Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea and the Sudan.

For several years now, counterterrorism initiatives in the Africa have been praised as successful in the global war on terror (Davis 2007; Presholdt 2011). As an example, counterterrorism policies in Somalia has long depended on local groups and militia to be successful, often relying on local militia to monitor suspects and apprehend suspects. (Shinn 2003; Rotberg Carson 2003;2005). For example, in 2003, the United States established a $100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). Approximately $35 million of that amount has been allocated to Kenya to improve coastal, border, and airport security. The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based in Djibouti has also been actively engaged in helping to improve the capabilities of the Kenyan military along Kenya’s northern borders with Ethiopia and Somalia—which have been penetrated by insurgents and bandits from both of these neighbors.

In the case of Ethiopia, CJTF-HOA has provided training and skills against terrorism to the Ethiopian National Defense Forces at the Hurso training camp, northwest of
Dire Dawa. Ethiopia benefits from the $100 million U.S.-financed East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative. The U.S. terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) also operates at airports in Ethiopia (Shinn, 2003).

Djibouti has also achieved prominence as a center of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and is not a bastion of terror but a bastion against terrorism. It has continued to play a key role as a ‘frontline’ state, with Kenya and Ethiopia, and other countries in the region.

However, evidence from sub-regions in the Horn of Africa have challenged the success rate of these policies. For example, in Kenya, United States training aid has enabled Kenyan military personnel and security forces to apprehend terrorists. While some success has been achieved, there are several claims that counterterrorism practices have clashed with local laws, focused on minority groups such as the Islamic, Arab and Somali men in the Coastal and other border regions (Kresse 2009; Seesemann 2007). More importantly is that counterterrorism efforts in Kenya are largely misunderstood, often neglecting the long, tension-laden history between marginalized, minority groups in the region and the central government. The same applies to Ethiopia and its minority Somali population in its Eastern, Ogaden region and the amongst Somali clans within Somalia. Thus, the geopolitics of counterterrorism policies fused with the local level conditions in these sub-regions, has reinforced and expanded discriminatory practices to the extent that minority groups living in these spaces feel more excluded and marginalized than ever before (Presholdt 2011; David 2007; Kresse 2009; Seesemann 2007).
Local Level Conditions: Marginalization, Counterterrorism Policies and Irredentism

There are several studies in political violence and civil war which highlight the advantages of analyzing local level conditions that may increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks (Marineau Pascoe Braithwaite Findley and Young 2018). These conditions include the security of a target and exclusion. While terrorist attacks can occur in any region, there are some sub-regions more appealing to terrorist attacks than others. As Arce Sandler (2010) explain, ‘extremist groups gravitate towards specific locations that confer a number of strategic advantages. The locations typically targeted for notable attacks are referred to as ‘terrorist spectaculars’ (Arce Sandler 2010). Local level conditions may contribute to the volatility of the area, making it a more attractive target for attacks, thus evaluating local level conditions is a key component to understanding terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the impact of repression and the violation of human rights serve as significant predictors of terrorism, as communities may hesitate to work with counterterrorism officials, including local law enforcement and the military, while sympathizing with violent extremist groups (Uzonyi 2018; Piazza 2017; Walsh and Piazza 2010).

I argue that sub-regions in the Horn of Africa are targeted by extremist groups for several strategic reasons. Specifically, these areas face various forms of marginalization, including significant social, political and economic exclusion. This feeling of marginalization stemming primarily from counterterrorism policies, includes anger and resentment. In other words, they reflect a neglected, vulnerable and fragile part of the region thus acting as attractive targets.
In addition, these sub-regions also comprise of highly contested porous borders and territorial disputes. Some scholars have referred to geographic contiguity (Weeks 2014) and saliency over territorial disputes including maritime disputes (Wiegand 2010; Prins and Daxecker 2015) where regions that share geographic proximity are more likely to disagree over locations of borders causing hostilities. Specifically, border disputes and particularly irredentism, have been a constant source of friction, causing deep-rooted historical tensions and playing a crucial role in the political and security dilemma in the Horn of Africa. Irredentism has been referred to as the desire of a nation-state to incorporate territory inhabited by people of the same nation but under the suzerainty of a different state (Kromm 1967; Kum 1990; Silberman 1959). Extremist groups such as Hizb-al-Islam and the al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen (the most significant terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa) have penetrated the region while focusing these attacks along porous and contested borders, aiming to establish the validity of their agenda (Ramadane 2014). Most of the suspicion has centered around minority groups living in irredentist spaces. These groups face several socio-economic disputes, ethnic exclusion (particularly in the case of Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia), poverty due to economic exclusion by the national government, societal stigma including racism. They now also face marginalization through counterterrorism funding and the indiscriminate targeting of minority groups.

Furthermore, extremist factions realize the strategic importance of the breakdown of the social order, civil strife and political crisis to promote their territorial gain.
To date, extant literature stresses country level co-variates of transnational terrorism, and cross-national concentrations of terrorism in space and time (Enders and Sandler 2006; Li 2005; Piazza 2008). However, little is known about local-level conditions within regions that facilitate recruitment, extremism and terrorist attacks. Recent empirical work has explored the benefits of adopting sub-national level of analysis in studying terrorism including the advantages of data at the sub-national level (Gleditsch 2014; Verwimp 2009).

Using the sub-region as a level of analysis, this dissertation aims to contribute to this existing literature by exploring the role of local level conditions in the rise of violent extremism and terrorism in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa. In the next section, I will focus on alternative scholarly explanations relating to terrorism. I then argue that the interaction of three key factors i.e. irredentist claims and counterterrorism policies have increased marginalization through the indiscriminate targeting of groups, thus increasing recruitment and terrorism in the region. Therefore, theorizing a linkage between counterterrorism policies, marginalization, irredentism to the rise of recruitment and terrorism in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa.

Purpose of this study

The United States and its allies have many tactical advantages in Africa. As a matter of fact, the noble intent to curb terrorism in Africa has been somewhat successful, but these strategies remain largely ephemeral with questionable success. Today, we still observe a rise of violent extremism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa. This study is
important as it analyzes the challenges faced with implementing long-term counterterror practices.

Specifically, I blend insights from different theories in international relations, particularly theories on civil war and grievance, where groups may resort to terrorism when their basic needs go unaddressed or to gain attention from their national governments or to achieve a specific objective. The resulting framework examines linkages across three thematic phenomena. Therefore, I theorize a linkage between irredentism, marginalization of groups and counterterrorism policies, to explain the rise in terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

First, I argue that heavy-handed counterterrorism policies affect the likelihood of a terrorist incident. In particular, I claim that foreign counterterrorism funding has allowed governments in the region to access previously inaccessible remote areas due to economic limitations, thus facilitating various types of discriminatory practices, and so counterterrorism policies are a key driver of the likelihood of attacks occurring in the region.

Second, I argue that marginalization of groups in the region increases the likelihood of a terror attack, as aggrieved ethnic groups resort to violence as means of addressing their concerns. In particular, increased tensions amongst national governments and groups in the region who feel alienated and excluded economically, socially and politically. Thus, exclusion of groups increases grievances, making the chance of an attack more likely.

Third, I argue that irredentism shapes the likelihood of a terrorist attack.
Specifically, areas with proximity to international borders are more likely to be targets due to accessibility and the porous nature of the borders along the Horn of Africa, including maritime areas. In making this argument, I build on the robust terrorism literature that shows the factors leading to terrorism. What is unique about my study is demonstrating the effect of ostensibly three interactive factors on transnational terrorism, thus shedding light to a relatively unexplored area of the role of opportunity and territory on terrorism. Building on grievance theory and the theory of relative deprivation, this study highlights the salient issue of opportunity in explaining conflict, which is still a novel area in international relations studies and is the major point of this dissertation.

Outline of the Dissertation

I begin with an introduction with a brief background of terrorist attacks in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa, counterterrorism measures implemented, as well as irredentism and the role it plays in the region. I also highlight the research question which explores why there is still an increase in violent extremism, recruitment and terrorism in the Horn of Africa despite numerous counterterrorism measures. In chapter two, I will move into the in depth literature review. I will discuss the causes for terrorism as a whole, including transnational terrorism, which most extant literature stresses. I will also discuss domestic terrorism including the role of civil conflict, rebellions and maritime security on terrorism. I will explain the gaps and how my research aims to contribute to the literature.
In chapter three, I will present the theory itself presenting the contribution of local-level factors in explaining terrorism. I include the combination effect of marginalization caused by the marginalization of groups, counterterrorism policies, as well as the role of irredentism in explaining the rise of violent extremism and terrorism. Chapter four will introduce my data and methods, including the various data sets and information that I will use to empirically testing my three key hypotheses. I confine my research to the Horn of Africa, specifically looking at sub-regions in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan. These areas are selected due to the presence of a large –N study, homogeneity on varying degrees including unstable governments, minority exclusion of groups. Almost all these countries are volatile falling outside the ‘stable’ range in the Fragile State’s Index. If my three hypotheses are correct, I should see that counterterrorism policies increase the marginalization of groups and chance for attacks, therefore not meeting their intended purposes of ‘winning the hearts and minds,’ proving to be fundamentally failing in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa. This would demonstrate my hypotheses to be impactful. I will also highlight a host of control variables as supported by the literature including regime type, economic wealth, and geographic size. In chapter five I will present my findings and conclusions that I expect to be consistent with my aforementioned hypothesis, proving to be impactful. I will also discuss policy implications, and areas for future research.
Chapter II

Previous Research on Terrorism

A wide range of literature has appeared over the years on terrorism-- definitions, terrorist acts, the methods they use, and how governments and society have responded. As Thomas Schelling (1966, 3) argues,

‘terrorist violence induces irrational responses to convince people that you are serious and, it is not the damage itself, but the impact on one’s behavior which matters. Therefore, it is the expectation that more violence will obtain the desired behavior.(Schelling 1966).

In this chapter, I will review literature pertaining to the origins of terrorism, definitional concepts of the term, terrorism’s dimensions, domestic and international explanations of terrorism, and the growth of international terrorism. I will attempt to define and review the extant literature on terrorism. I shall also provide a critique from the reviewed literature. This chapter also explains literature on the causes and impact of terrorism in different parts of the world and, in particular, the Horn of Africa-which is the overall focus of this study.

Origins of Terrorism

Historically, terrorism has faced humankind for ages. The Middle East gave birth to the precursors of modern terror. One of the earliest campaigns was that of the Jewish Zealots against the Romans in ancient Palestine (A.D. 6-135). The Zealots’ first uprising was prompted by a Roman census implemented for purposes of taxation.
This was the same census mentioned in the New testament as coinciding with the birth of Jesus. Roman occupiers responded vigorously to local protest, crucifying 2,000 Zealots (Gabriel Weimann; Conrad Winn, 1994).

Between the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Assassins emerged as an offshoot of the Ismaili sect of Muslims. Walter Laqueur has remarked on the increasing fascination with them among contemporary Western authorities (Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, 1994). It is because “some of the features of this movement remind one of contemporary terrorist movements (Weldenfeld and Nicolson, 1997).

Targets included prefects, governors, caliphs, and Conrad of Montferrat, the crusader of Jerusalem. *Fadaiin* was the name given to those prepared to undertake political murder as their religious duty (B. Lewis, 1967).

Violence by terrorist groups grew sporadically in Europe during early years of the twentieth century. It emerged in Ireland (Dynamitters), Turkey (Armenians, Macedonian IMRO), Poland, Hungary (Red Arrow), and Romania (Iron Guard). The Croatian Stacha and the German Freicorps resorted to terrorism on a small scale, as did French fascist groups (Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, 1994).

After World war II, liberation movements in Africa and Asia found that simple acts of violence against their colonial masters could demoralize the imperial order out of proportion to the strictly military significance of the violence (Frank Fanon, 1967). Revolutionaries learned the value of a careful scripting of both action and location (Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, 1994). In the international arena, meanwhile, acts of violence led to pressure on the European powers by the United States, the
Soviet Union, Canada, and other nations without a tradition of overseas empire (B. Jenkins, 1975).

Rapport (1971) has delineated three major periods of modern terrorism: an early period extending from 1879 to the first World War, a mid-period beginning in Ireland after World War I and concluding with colonial guerrilla and terrorist activity twenty years after World War II, and the current period, which began in the 1960s.

Defining Terrorism

The “Reign of Terror” was formalized under a decree of September 5, 1793, declaring that “terror is the order of the day” (D.M. Schlagheck, 1988). Rapport had delineated three major periods of modern terrorism: an early period extending from 1879 to World War 1, a mid-period beginning in Ireland after World War I with colonial guerrilla and terrorist activity in the two decades after World War II, and the current period, which began in the 1960s (David C. Rapoport, 1971).

Contemporary international terrorism is a structural response by liberation movements and old-fashioned imperialism has been largely terminated, bringing to an end an important structural basis for international terrorism. Hence, it would seem as if the growth of postcolonial international terrorism is at least partly a case of contagion, whereby a pattern of warfare has diffused around the planet and has been adopted more and more widely even though its original raison d’etre has largely subsided (Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, 1994).
Defining terrorism is a challenging question, and terrorism has evolved. Throughout the years, scholars have explored a parsimonious theory which clearly defines terrorism. However, a consensus is yet to be achieved both amongst scholars and policymakers alike. There is no single definition of terrorism, instead the majority of the empirical work consists of multiple ways to broadly define terrorism.

Today, terrorism has become almost a mundane word often used in daily dialogue without much need to go into detail. Nonetheless, defining terrorism is a work in progress, and a clear theoretical definition remains pending. Extant definitions of terrorism vary to some capacity and are widely debated. As Hoffman (2006) observes, terrorism is quite difficult to describe. It has been so insidiously intricate into vocabulary, with most people having a vague idea or impression of what it is, but lack a precise and true explanatory definition, often labeling a range of violent activities as terrorism.

As Laquer (2000) posits, the lack of consensus on a uniform definition on terrorism is not due to discord amongst scholars, rather terrorism as a tactic is continually evolving, often changing its motives, actors and means of implementation. To date, scholars still attempt to describe terrorism, how it differs from other forms of violence and its causes and effects in our world today.

Accepted historiography holds that the first large-scale application of terrorism took place during the “popular” phase (1792-1794) of the French revolution. The “Reign of Terror” was formalized under a decree of September 5, 1793, declaring that “terror is the order of the day” (D.M. Schlagheck, 1988).
Laqueur (1976) argues that the indiscriminate use of the term “terrorism” not only inflates the statistics, but it also makes understanding the specific character of terrorism and how to cope with it more challenging. Schmidt and Jongman (1988) also posit that due to the ambiguity of defining the term, multiple definitions exist, thus making a single explanation almost unattainable.

From a policy angle, most U.S. government agencies hold their definition of terrorism, with no two being similar (Carr 2007). The variation in definitions further complicates the process of resolving and combating terrorism. Nonetheless, as Hodgson Tadron (2013) suggests, it is well agreed upon by policymakers and scholars alike, that a legal definition of terrorism holds high importance as it may serve as a basis of who is a terrorist and what actions constitute as terrorism.

**Historical and Contemporary Definitions of Terrorism**

Schmidt and Jongman (1988) undertook a quantitative content analysis of 109 published definitions and found many common themes. The most frequent references were to violence or force (83.5%), political content (65%), fear or terror (51%), threat (46%), and psychological effects (41.5%). The next most common reference was to the fact that the victims and ultimate targets of violence are often unrelated (37.5%), while the least common reference was to terrorist demands on third parties (4%). From these samples, Schmidt came up with a definition of terrorism as a means of combat where random or symbolic persons are targeted with violence.
Bonanate (1979) argues that terrorism is the result of verdict rather than the establishment of a fact. Several quantitative definitions of terrorism help clarify for an attack to be ‘terrorist’ in nature, it must be political (Kaye Wehrey Grant Stahl 2008). This view is shared by Weimann and Winn (1994) who argue that some of the definitional disagreements among scholars has ideological roots. Scholars have sometimes sought to surmount the definitional dilemmas in the field by avoiding definitions and developing typologies instead. For example, Wilkinson (1974) produced a two-layered typology. At a higher level of construction, he distinguished among (a) criminal terrorism conducted for profit, (b) psychic terrorism on behalf of a religious cult, (c) war terrorism as an adjunct to conventional military strategy, and (d) political terrorism in order to achieve political goals.

Sederberg (1989) also proposed a two-step typology. He first distinguished between establishment or pro-regime terrorism and dissident or anti-regime terrorism. Despite their disagreements, scholars share a certain understanding of the phenomenon. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (RAND-MIPT) defines terrorism as “violence which is calculated to create an environment of fear in order to coerce others into actions they are unwilling to undertake (MIPT, 2002).

This distinction between terror and violence is not absolute. There may be violence linked with terror, in which the intention is to harm the direct victim, but the assault is linked to an act of terror preceded or followed by it. There also is violence linked to terror in cases such as the freeing of a terrorist. Freedman (1974) posits that terrorism is a pattern found in seemingly non-terrorist political contexts and
throughout the world. In this way, the trait which often characterizes this sort of terrorism, is a sense of absolutism felt by the terrorist. Thus the perpetrator’s action is premised on an assumption of the existence of an absolute value. This view is shared by John W Crayton (1979), who defines terrorism as an attempt to acquire or maintain power control by intimidation, by instilling a fear of destruction or helplessness in the objects of the terrorism. Terrorists usually operate in groups or under the banner of a cause. The group or its cause usually is highly idealized, and an air of absolute conviction is held about the truth or rightness of the group's aims.

Crayton further argues that the terrorist unit tends to envelop out of a situation of deprivation, be it poverty, minority status, disenfranchisement, or prejudice. All of these characteristics are typical of exaggerated group narcissism. Furthermore, terrorists have the impression, rightly or not, that they cannot achieve their goals by legal means; in other words, they feel that they lack access to a responsive social system.

Schlagheck (1988) posits that terrorism is the intended or actual use of violence against victims of strategic importance in order to cause a psychological impact and attain political objectives. Therefore, symbolism and psychological effects are essential. Freedman (1974) defines terrorism as the use of violence when the result is not the physical effect on the direct victims, but the psychological and mental effect produced on another person. Thus terrorism involves, in addition to the act, the emotion and the motivation of the terrorist.
Moghaddam Moghaddam & Marsella (2004) build on similar points that terrorist acts are typically directed toward civilians, as a means to cause changes in people’s socio-political positions. Thus terrorism thrives in environments of humiliation, poverty, political oppression, and severe human rights abuses; it also flourishes in atmospheres of conflict and foreign occupation, and it profits from weak state capacity (Icelandic Human Rights Center 2004).

The terrorist unit tends to develop out of a situation of deprivation, be it poverty, minority status, disenfranchisement, or prejudice. All of these characteristics are typical of exaggerated group narcissism. Terrorists usually operate in groups or under the banner of a cause. The group or its cause usually is highly idealized, and an air of absolute conviction is held about the truth or rightness of the group's aims. Furthermore, terrorists have the impression, rightly or not, that they cannot achieve their goals by legal means; in other words, they feel that they lack access to a responsive social system (John W Crayton 1979).

Stanton (2013) posits that terrorism has a goal to convey a message to a wider audience beyond those directly targeted with violence. This perspective aligns with the view that terrorism is designed to have long-term psychological effects---in other words, it is meant to instill fear (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefer 2004). Moreover, researchers have demonstrated the degree of psychological distress caused by terrorism including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For example, terrorist gas attacks in Tokyo resulted in approximately one thousand injuries with an additional four thousand victims who were uninjured physically but endured
considerable psychological distress including anxiety and confusion (Takasu et al. 1997).

Other scholars like Sinai (2008) argue that there is no universal definition of terrorism, rather in some cases society, both disenfranchised and disadvantaged persons have utilized terrorism in different ways. Some utilize it as an avenue either to voice their dissatisfaction with the status quo or to maintain their advantageous position within the society.

For Crenshaw (1985), terrorism is a purposeful and pre-meditated action. This definition is further explained by Enders and Sandler (2002), who posit that terrorism is a planned act which is not spontaneously executed but often requires meticulous planning. It is a definition shared by Primoratz (1990) who contends that terror (the extreme of fear) is intended to cause others to act in ways they would otherwise not, as individuals are forced to alter everyday life routines---and in that sense, terrorism has achieved its goal of intimidation. Terrorism is thus defined as coercive intimidation often employing violence indiscriminately (Primoratz; Wellman 1990).

Another related definition has focused on terrorism as the use of violence by clandestine non-state actors to convey a political message, influence or attract attention (Lacquer 1977; Schmidt and Jongman 1988). In this context, terrorism is explained as the result of rational decision makers attacking civilians for political motives. This definition focuses on terrorism as an attempt to acquire or maintain power through intimidation, hopelessness, destruction and instilling fear to its victims.
Enders and Sandler (2002) define terrorism as the premeditated use of violence by groups to achieve an objective. Through intimidating an audience uninvolved in the policymaking process, terrorists make them seek to exert influence to obtain their religious, political or ideological objectives. In addition, terrorism in part, is a breakdown of bargaining among actors, and is used as a tool for manipulating the negotiation process and to shape the outcome of a peace process (Fearon Laitin, 2003; Sandler, 2014; Findley Young 2012; Crenshaw 1986; Borum 2004). This definition explores terrorism as the result of a process which slowly pushes an individual or groups towards violence over time.

Other studies define terrorism at a very basic level as different from other forms of conflict. First, terrorism is violent in nature, with terrorists often committing time into the process, in order to increase the chance for successful execution---in this way, it is inherently violent. This perspective clearly defines terrorism as the exploitation of fear by using violence in the pursuit of political change. In other words, terrorism is a tactic to advance political objectives. Second, terrorism involves tactic, and is not a spontaneous event, rather one that is purposeful and planned in advance (Hoffman 2006; Crenshaw 1983; Enders and Sandler 2002).

Further, McCormick (2003) and Hoffman (2006) define the tactic of terrorism as using violence as a threat, targeting property a national government or civilians with the intent of creating fear, in order to change the status quo. This definition highlights terrorism as a tactic in which state and non-state actors alike can employ to achieve
an end goal, explaining that terrorism is the creation of fear through the threat of violence in pursuing political change.

Still, some scholars have simply defined terrorism in a brief direct manner, as the threat of violence, or violence, then it constitutes as terrorism. Moreover, a terrorists’ goals may be religious or social, however, they typically have a political objective, and are often conducted by sub-national groups and individuals (Sinai 2014; Richard 2007). A similar definition by Kruger (2007) posits that terrorism can be a state-sponsored affair, but typically individuals and sub-national groups conduct attacks—therefore the participation of non-state actors is the clear distinction between terrorism and other acts of war.

Another explanation necessitates to define terrorism and its components i.e. the individual conducting the attack, the victims of the violence who are often time non-combatant and the target audience of the attack (Young Dindley 2011). In this context, a terrorist group can be defined as, “one consisting of two or more individuals that engage in terrorist-related violence”. The debate remains that the focus of most definitions, which is either ‘to coerce’ or ‘to influence’ must include broader, and more recent trends of inflicting mass damages on a property and massive casualties on targets (Sinai 2008). As an example, the 9/11 attacks in the United States produced massive physical destruction as well as casualties. The use of indiscriminate targeting against civilians by terrorist groups is an essential strategy (Frieden 2009).

Although a single agreeable definition is lacking, at a basic level, the existing and diverse definitions do share certain salient features, which are widely accepted from
academics and even non-profit organizations such as the United Nations. For example, the United Nations (2005) panel clearly defined terrorism as “any acts with an intention to cause serious bodily or to cause death to noncombatants with the intention of intimidating a population, international organization or government from abstaining or engaging in any act” (UNODC 2005). Another similar policy-oriented definition by the United States Department of State (DOS 1983) put forth a widely used definition of terrorism which explains it as, ‘a premeditated, politically motivated violence carried out by subnational groups against noncombatants with an intent to influence an audience’. (United States Dept. of Defense 2004). This includes civilians, unarmed or off duty military personnel.

Albeit widely used, the definition by DoD has received criticism from on various levels. For example, the National Research Center (NRC) found no analytically sufficient nor precise definitions of terrorism exist. Moreover, it is unclear from the definition, whether an attack against armed military personnel would be considered terrorist in nature (Sinai 2008). Nonetheless, the DOS’s and other such explanation of terrorism does provide a legal basis for the arrest and indictment of perpetrators.

Sinai (2008) has suggested amending the definition to include ‘a tactic of war which involves premeditated or politically motivated violence against any citizen of a state, whether military or civilian by subnational groups or clandestine actors to influence, cause casualties and physical destruction to their targets’. In other words, this definition highlights that terrorism can be discriminate or indiscriminate with the end goal of making a change to policy.
Other scholars argue that terrorism has simply been inappropriately explained on all levels. In particular, political issues have come into play and pundits from unrelated disciplines including anthropologists, sociologists and legal scholars qualify as interpreters of terrorism making any definition null (Carr 2007). Therefore, any definition of terrorism must come from those who deal with its effects, specialize in conventional and unconventional strategies, including military historians. This argument also thinks of a broader definition of terrorism in its essence, as a tactic which is belligerent in nature including slavery, piracy and genocide. It also argues that almost every nation at one point practiced a form of warlike behavior (Carr 2007). Therefore, it moved away from the political descriptions of terrorism to a more comprehensive definition. In sum, the multiplicity of definitions that exist have some shared similarities—specifically, terrorism being a form of violence.

*Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism*

It is important to mention that there are different types of terrorism that can occur. First, terrorism that occurs within a state, with local targets belonging to that country is referred to as domestic terrorism. Second, terrorism can also occur across different countries with targets being cross national, often referred to as international terrorism.

Historically, conflict scholars focused primarily on transnational terrorism for many reasons, including the basic fact information was more readily available. In other words, there were simply more data on transnational attacks in comparison to
domestic attacks. It is not until the past two decades that scholars are highlighting the significance of defining terrorism as a whole, while distinguishing between domestic and international attacks. Multiple data sets now exist which scholars may use to obtain information including data sets such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which includes information on both domestic and transnational incidents, including the number of attacks by state or transnationally.

Young Findley (2011) argue that distinguishing domestic versus transnational terrorism is consequential in the field. First, the causal mechanisms and motivations may be similar in both types of terrorism. However, the structural factors leading to both differ. In the case of domestic terrorism, the factors leading to the attack are within the state experiencing the attack, while transnational terrorism involves a target country outside of the attacker’s origin. (Young and Findley 2011).

**Domestic Terrorism**

Domestic terrorism entails violence by no-state actors within their home country, for example the kidnapping of heiress Party Hearst or the executions of dovish West Bank leadership by hawkish Palestinian groups (Weimann & Win, 1994). According to the Global Database on Terrorism (GTD), terrorism can be domestic with the casual logic focusing on domestic individuals or groups using terrorism to advance political objectives or change (Young Findley 2011; LaFree Dugan 2006). Moreover, home grown terrorism typically has ramifications for the host country, its inhabitants, policies and the institutions limited to that particular country. In other
words, the implications are directly related to that given country and the absence of foreign interests, foreign persons or institutions differentiates domestic terrorism from transnational terrorism. As an example, the overwhelming number of terrorist attacks in parts of Africa are against national governments and at times domestic targets. The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda focused on local targets and the Eritrean Islamic Jihad group operated exclusively in Eritrea (Shinn 2016). Further, during the pre-independence era many nationals engaged in acts during the struggle for independence. Many times these acts were designed to gain political concessions by groups fighting for a cause from their native governments. For example, the Islamic terrorism by the People Against Gangsters and Drugs (PAGAD) in South Africa perpetrated violence against its national government, with PAGAD attacks centered against domestic targets. Another example includes the attacks by local freedom fighters to liberate South Sudan. Many of the acts against the national government were conducted by South Sudanese nationals in their fight for independence. Another illustration consists of terrorist attacks in the Horn of Africa. The al-Qaeda linked Al-Shabaab group often conducts domestic attacks against the Somali national government. Other examples of domestic targets particularly in Africa include the Boko Haram group on civilian targets in Nigeria, although more recently, the group (akin to Al-Shabaab) has expanded its calculus to include attacks on some neighboring countries.
**Transnational Terrorism**

Terrorism can also be transitional when it involves two or more countries, foreign institutions, foreign persons, property or policies. If a terrorist attack involves victims, targets or institutions of another country then it is considered transnational terrorism (Enders Sandler 1999;2000; Koch Cranmer 2007).

In sub-Saharan Africa for example, acts of international terrorism are increasing, with numerous attacks in the last two decades. Some examples include the August 1998 al-Qaeda backed bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the 2015 attack on top hotels in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and Bamako, Mali (Shinn 2016); the 2002 twin bombings by Al-Qaeda targeted at an Israeli-owned hotel facility in Kikambala, near Mombasa, and a missile fired at a plane carrying Israeli tourists at the Moi International Airport in Mombasa (Carson 2006).

Other more recent attacks in Kenya include the Westgate mall in 2013 and the Dusit D2 hotel in Nairobi, in 2019. All these al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab affiliated terrorist attacks yielded massive casualties and extensive damages to human life and property. Figure 3. illustrates domestic and transnational death incidents from the year 1970-2005 and Figure 4. shows transnational incidents from 1968-2007.
Figure 3. Domestic and transnational death incidents. Source: https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.utk.edu/stable/pdf/23035430.pdf?refreqid=search%3A5f14af5b96f848ca2cb0c0b6102e43

Figure 4. Transnational incidents from 1968-2007. Source: Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Source: https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.utk.edu/stable/pdf/23035430.pdf?refreqid=search%3A5f14af5b96f848ca2cb0c0b6102e43
Moreover, in addition to locals, they targeted western and Israeli citizens and business interests, and US foreign policy in the Horn of Africa. For example, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the 2019 Dusit D2 Hotel attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, citing opposition to U.S counterterrorism policies in the Horn of Africa as motivations for the attack (Post 2019).

In sum, scholars and policymakers alike do agree that terrorism is a form of violence aiming to intimidate, hurt or injure audiences in some capacity. Even though a universal definition is a work in progress, scholars have enough of a base to explore a more salient issue---what are the root causes and implications of terrorism. Therefore, in addition to attempting to define terrorism, it is important to explore its causes and effects on other forms of conflict in our world today.

*Causes of Terrorism*

As Freeman and Alexander (1985) have asked: What do terrorists want? The impact of terrorism compared to other forms of violence has monumental effects, thus understanding factors that lead to terrorism is crucial. Extant literature exploring terrorism has significantly changed since the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. Particularly since scholars must be able to provide sound empirically-backed counterterrorism recommendations to policy makers.

Until recently, only a small number of scholars empirically analyzed terrorism, its root causes and applications, but there is still a lack of agreement on the exact causes of terrorism (Abadie 2004; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Piazza 2008). In fact, Lum, Kennedy
and Sherley (2006) found that only 3% of articles empirically explored terrorism with much of the explanations limited to a small number of scholars such as Ender, Crenshaw, Sandeler et al. (Silke 2004; Lum 2006). Nevertheless, things have changed since terrorism has increased overall across the globe. Today terrorism has been considered to be one of the most salient security issues today with several scholars exploring its causes and effects.

A first possibility explaining terrorism is the role of foreign policy on transnational terrorism (Mansfield, Milne; Regan 2000). This argument debates that certain foreign policy attributes may encourage terrorists or increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Savun and Phillips (2009) argue that some benign foreign policy attributes such as security aid, development aid, promoting democracy, intervention in civil wars and disputes may create ideal environments for terrorism. In other words, terrorists are not especially driven by the absence or presence of democracy, rather may be more likely to attacks states which they perceive as domineering in their foreign policy (Gause 2005).

Another possible explanation is the role of democracy. To an extent, studies have found a nexus between terrorism, democracy and the political process, thus exploring the relationship between democracies versus the amount of terrorism experienced (Savun Phillips 2009). This argument is supported by scholars like Eubank and Weinberg (1994, 2001) and (Li, 2005; Pape 2003) who contend that democracies are easier targets and more prone to terrorist attacks. Scholars such as Kegley and Hermann (1997) posit that democracies tend to be more involved in
international politics than non-democracies. Thus the foreign policy a state may pursue may be highly controversial, causing resentment and varying reaction abroad. This ultimately makes states a target due to their behavior in the international system (Savun Phillips 2009).

This argument is shared by Schmid (1992) and Savun Philips (2009), who argue that democracies are more likely to experience transnational terrorism compared to other regime types because democracies have certain liberties such as free press, political participation and significantly more executive constraints, and thereby providing an ideal environment for terrorists to easily thrive. Thus, political and civil liberties are linked to terrorism mainly due to the openness of democratic systems, freedom of movement and opportunities for extremist groups, to act against their national governments. Further, Pape (2003) contends that terrorism follows a logic centered around coercing liberal democracies to make concessions.

Other similar studies have demonstrated that countries which have civil liberties and are economically superior are preferred targets for transnational terrorist attacks. Wilson Piazza (2003; 2013) argues a direct relationship between democracy and terrorism explaining that democratic regimes (which are often tolerant of political opposition, views and participation) increase the likelihood of alternative political interests including terrorism. Since autocratic regimes extend fewer civil liberties, extend fewer rights and have fewer restrictions on the authority in power, these regimes are more likely to contain threats of terrorism and are useful in conducting counterterrorism measures (Wilson Piazza 2013; Lai 2007).
Conversely, some scholars have presented the challenges of promoting democracy in areas that experience significant terrorist attacks. Since 9/11 there is an existing assumption that terrorism thrives in autocratic, totalitarian and dictatorial regimes. Also, the impression is that terrorists mainly come from less democratic, repressed societies with low levels of political rights—therefore becoming springboards of terrorism (Krueger Laitin 2008).

Thus, democratization is perceived by many policymakers, as the best means to deter terrorist behavior (Crotty 2005). In other words, the lack of democracy is an underlying cause of terrorism. For example, in the 9/11 aftermath, the United States escalated the role of democratization (particularly in the Arab world) as paramount and an issue of national security. Democratization thus became a new logic and important security interest. President Bush (2003) argued the lack of freedom, the presence of repression and extremism in the Middle-East is a threat to the safety of those living in the western world—thus introducing democracy in this part of the world became a top priority.

Subsequently, the United States has intervened in many civil wars and continues to do so today. As an example, during the U.S. led invasion on Iraq in 2003, the democratization of the region was considered a key policy objective (Carpenter 2008; Cook 20007; Kaye Wehrey Grant and Stahl 2008). Countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria face increasing pressure by the United States to democratize. The assumption is that the democratization of non-democracies will help curb terrorist activity. Another similar view by Gerecht (2005) contends that supporting regional
dictators results in more extremism and terrorism and that freedom and democracy would contain the spread of terrorism. This argument has been countered by others who explain the decision a state makes in its involvement in with other countries even through democratization, may cause anger, frustration or resentment, and a target for terrorism (Gause 2005).

Furthermore, some scholars criticize the role of democracy in reducing terrorism, arguing the lack of data demonstrating a direct relationship between the absence or reduction of terrorism. This democratic backlash is evident in the Middle-East where democracy has been impressed by the United States on some countries, but the local conditions have not improved. Instead they are perceived as making matters worse. An example is the war in Iraq which experienced democratic backlash from the region. Several across the political spectrum questioned the prudence in promoting democracy in the area. Furthermore, the difficulty in stabilizing Iraq years after the war, including conflict after elections are classic examples of democratic backlash.

Gause (2005) argues that democracy in this region would likely produce new Islamist governments that are less likely to cooperate with western governments. Some examples include the development of regional opposition to democracy such as the expansion of HAMAS, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hizballah in Lebanon(Kaye Wehrey Grant and Stahl 2008).

More importantly, reform processes in parts of the Arab world have varied results. In some cases, democratization has moderated potential for radicalization and extreme violence, while in other cases it has destabilizing effects. The new wave of
reform in the middle east from the early 1980s to the present have not necessarily led to to the emergence of democracies and the elimination of authoritarian rule in this region-rather we observe a significant variation in the Arab world ((Kaye Wehrey Grant and Stahl 2008).

Even though terrorism is more likely to occur in democracies, Kaye Wehrey Grant and Stahl (2008) argue that it is more important to note that non-democracies are springboards to terrorism –which is often overlooked in the linkage between democracies and terrorism. This argument contends that terrorist targets are usually more economically developed societies that are democratic in nature. It also argues that perpetrators of terrorism seem to come from less democratic regions in the world. In other words, democracies in their nature aren’t targets of attacks, rather, how states behave in the international arena to other state actors makes it more or less vulnerable to terrorism (Eyerman 1998; Hamilton and Hamilton 1983; Ross 1993).

Another explanation on terrorism lies within the context of civil wars. Although most of the focus by scholars is transnational terrorism, there is an increasing amount of domestic terrorism mainly carried out by rebel groups against national governments. Scholars have found evidence of an overlap between civil war and terrorism (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickinson 2007; Hultman 2009; Stanton 2013; Kalyvas 2004; Kydd Walter 2006).

There is sufficient evidence that terrorism is used as a tactic in civil war (Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev 2011; LaFree Dugan 2007; Fortna 2015). Using the
PRIO/Uppsala data on conflict zones (Findley Young 2011) explores the relationship between civil war across six countries during three periods (before, during and after the war). They find the percentage of war-related terrorism as 63% and 56% further demonstrating the prevalence of terrorism in the context of civil war. The study demonstrated that more than 50% of terrorist attacks occur during ongoing civil war, confirming terrorism as a tactic during war.

Further, a comprehensive case study of Argentina shows that during the pre-war years of 1970-1972, the country experienced 44 terrorist attacks and during the war, Argentina experienced roughly 209 attacks between 1973-1977 (Findley Young 2011). During civil wars, actors may use violence against civilians to control the outcomes of political behavior or to gain compliance. Often the targets of the violence are the population and the rival political actor who may have ties with the victims Kalyvas (2004). Accordingly, rebel groups may strategically use terrorism—targeting civilian constituents to assess the impact of civilian losses on their government opponents. The assumption is the national governments will be sensitive to the losses thus concede to meet the demands of the rebel groups. Stanton (2013) observes that rebel groups may choose whether or not to use terrorism depending on the political end goal. This view states that if a group is concerned about population support, they may fear backlash from the public thus impose costs without impacting a large number of civilian casualties. Conversely, if a group is not as concern with backlash, they will use terrorism as a tactic. One example is the PKK in Turkey with a concentrated base of civilian support. The PKK used terrorism attacking high levels
of civilian targets. The IRA in Northern Ireland, and MILF in the Philippines also used terrorism for political objectives.

Using data on African civil wars, Stanton(2013), observes rebel groups conducting numerous terror attacks. These rebel groups are more likely to be afforded an opportunity to participate in negotiations, which confirms that groups are likely to use terrorism as a means to an end. It is therefore evident that political actors use violence to achieve different outcomes-both mutual or contradictory. The perception is that terrorism offers rebels the power to hurt governments when civilians are attacked, thereby helping groups make gains in war. One example is the case of Nigeria-the Boko Haram group has utilized terrorism hurting civilians to demonstrate the government’s inability to prevent large scale violence. In July 2013, Boko Haram killed 44 people in a mosque and another 12 closes by. The Nigerian government’s response confirmed Boko Haram’s perceives success and unintentionally promoted the group’s strategy with its inability to contain the attacks and its continual indiscriminate crackdown on civilians (Stanton 2013). Another argument is that rebel groups have a collective advantage over non-state actors, as they possess the knowledge required to target individuals such as government supporters (Neumann 2007;Wilkinson 2006). Most agree the first reaction from governments is to reject compromising with their opposition. Despite strong incentives not to negotiate with groups that use terrorism in civil war, many governments do so more often than not. Figure 5. illustrates the percentage of claimed terrorist incidents by region.
Studies show that between 1989 and 2010 of the 106 rebel groups in Africa, 36 have made demands for negotiations with the state (Stanton 2013). An example demonstrating negotiations between governments and rebel groups is the Israeli government negotiated a peace deal with the rebel group HAMAS after a string of attacks (Bruiliard Londono 2012).

Another explanation for terrorism is the critical role of state strength. Most advanced democracies have the general perception that poorly governed states, particularly in the developing world, remain an active threat to international security while exacerbating terrorism. Support for this argument is demonstrated by scholars who
explore the challenges of poverty, pandemic diseases, environmental degradation, regional conflict and instability, crime and poverty all as key contributors to terrorism (Crocker 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Rice 2006). Consequently, most policymakers in countries such as the United States, continue to emphasize the significant relationship between failed states, and terrorism. As an example, Al-Qaeda operations in the Middle-East, specifically in Afghanistan and the volatility of the Somali government in the Horn of Africa, have been attributed to dysfunctional and failed states, allowing a vacuum to which terrorist groups may thrive. As a result, many western governments have focused on state-building as a viable solution to counteracting terrorist activity in developing countries. The assumption is that building state capacity in these environments then allow such countries to increase their security progress (National Security Strategy of the United States 2006).

Similar arguments on state strength highlight that a weak state is likely to have conflict in the form of insurgenacies and civil war. Although accommodating minority groups may remove the root cause of political violence, thus strengthening state capacity is nearly always recommended. A strong state can prevent intense conflict, extract taxes, and allocated resources for public goods. Thus, in turn, alleviates grievances from the uneven and distribution of public goods if the state has the willingness to accommodate marginalized populations (Prins et al. 2015).

A similar argument links poverty to terrorism since poor economic conditions within a state increase the likelihood of coups and rebellion. Collier and Hofferman (2004)
argue that economic conditions are strong predictors of terrorism. This is because terrorism is the manifestation of conflict which is propagated by severe economic conditions (Alesina 1196; Abadie 2006).

On the other hand, recent studies have challenged the poverty and terrorism perspective with a number of terrorist actors originating from economically developed countries. Abadie (2006) and Krueger and Meckova (2003) found little correlation between poverty and terrorism. Using the example of the Middle-East in the 1980s, the study explored the educational level and income of members of the Israeli Jewish community, Hizbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian bombers. The results found that Israeli Jews as highly educated, with adequate economic means, challenging the poverty and terrorism linkage.

Another similar study found that more middle to upper class actors were perpetrators of terrorism in parts of Latin America, Northern and Western Europe and Asia. The revolutionary groups included the Irish Republican Army of Northern Ireland, the Red Army in Japan and the Red Brigades in Italy (Russell and Miller 1983).

Looking at characteristics at the country level, Krueger and Meckova (2003) found that terrorism is more related to repression, infringement on civil liberties rather than economic development. It is an argument that is supported by Boylan (2010) who also finds no statistical significance between less economically developed countries that experience terrorism and advanced economies.

Another argument by Matt Qvortrup and Arend Jijphart (2013:472) contends that terrorism is indeed about grievance. They explain that people “will calculate the
utilities of engaging in domestic terrorism or electoral politics, with terrorist attacks being the last resort for people who cannot be represented through the legal, political system (Matthiis 2018). Fearon and Laitin (2003) see opportunity structures created by weak state capacity to be a cause of civil war onset. They find that ethnicity, religion or cultural characteristics do not necessarily have a significant relationship with civil war.

The marginalization of groups as a determinant of terrorism is fairly recent. (Piazza 2012) argues that both political and economic discrimination increase the number of terror attacks experienced in a country. Furthermore, discrimination can serve as a significant source of grievance against a state while political openness offers the geographic and political space required for mobilization. (Prins et al., 2015) suggests that generally, highly institutionalized democratic countries of Europe and North America are less likely to be victims of domestic terrorism. However, these countries may experience domestic terrorism if significant grievances exist in the form of state-sponsored discrimination. For example, the United Kingdom, has suffered from terrorism by its Irish nationalist groups despite its higher level of political openness. Thus democracy typically helps minimize group grievance, but when it does not—and significant group discrimination remains within democratic states—the transparency provided by the institutions enables dissatisfied groups to launch terror attacks (Prins et al., 2015).

Other scholars have emphasized the role of greed and grievance on civil war and terrorism. The "greed versus grievance" theory provides arguments on causes
of civil war. Proponents of the greed argument posit that a combatant’s desire for self-enrichment causes armed conflict. However, many times, these motivations are manifested in different ways, including gaining economic control of resources or by increased power within a given state. Therefore, conflicts which begin through greed are often seen in countries with negative economic growth. Moreover, there is a high likelihood of the absence of an effective military or police apparatus to contend with those seeking economic resources.

The security threat over unchartered waters continues to grow with concerns by the United States and other western countries over the shift of terrorism by extremist groups from purely land-based to the coast. Thus a seemingly unexplored literature on non-traditional security threats by non-state actors, specifically the effects of maritime piracy and increased terrorism in failed and weak states (Daxecker Prins 2013; Bradford 2008).

Moreover, the limited efforts by the international community in combating piracy have resulted in the volatility of many maritime regions, which fall into the hands of pirates and insurgent groups, who use piracy to fuel their terrorist agenda. Insurgent groups capitalize on weak institutional environments, lack of labor opportunities and state weakness which provides environments that allow pirates to flourish since there is limited control over territorial waters (Daxecker and Prins 2013). Albeit concentrated primarily in the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia and the Gulf of Guinea, terrorism and maritime piracy are demonstrated to operate in sync with each
other (Coggins 2012 Chalk 2008 Goldwyn and Morrison 2005 Mak 2006 Murphy 2010).

**Existing Gaps in the Literature**

The research on terrorism over the last decade boasts theoretical robustness. It entails key developments which have aided many scholars and policy makers alike to make informed decisions. Progress on the front of available data sets such as the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD), the International Terrorism Attributes of Terrorism Events (ITERATE) data set. The ITERATE data quantifies data based on the characteristics of terrorists groups, the activities to which they engage and have an international impact and their environments they conduct their attacks, amongst other valuable attributes. Such readily accessible data sets have allowed scholars to deconstruct terrorism, breaking it down to transitional versus domestic terrorism (Gaibulloev 2011; Piazza 2011; Enders Sanders 2012). Scholars have also used the Minorities-at-Risk (MAR) and RAND datasets to identify determinant of terrorism such as economic policies and foreign policy (Piazza 2011). Further, game theory has recently been used a tool in the study of terrorism, and other hypotheses continue to be tested in exploring determinants of terrorism (Savun & Phillips 2009). Nonetheless, there are existing gaps in the literature, and major new developments in the study of terrorism that must be addressed. As (Li Schaub 2004; Blomberg Hess 2008) indicate, the gaps in literature apply to both transnational and domestic terrorism. In particular, terrorism has been described as a monolith, with little
distinction between types of terrorism, which makes it challenging for scholars to adequately explore cases. When it comes to domestic terrorism, the gap is more evident on terrorism literature, as domestic attacks are not clearly differentiated from transnational attacks.

One existing gap is the effect of terrorism on economic growth as it is unclear how impactful terrorism remains to be on fiscal growth. With terrorism literature, there is insufficient scholarly agreement upon the exact role of social, political and economic factors as predictors of terrorism. Prominent scholars in the field such as Piazza(2011;2013) have indicated that looking at political and socio-economic factors is challenging, many times inconclusive and unyielding in results thus making it more difficult to map out definitive counterterrorism recommendations to policy-makers. In addition, Gaibulloev, Sandler Sul (2013) explain no impact on economic growth caused by terrorism, despite factoring in bias. Others argue more work must be done as such a conclusion is impactful on monetary policies (Sandler 2014).

Another important gap is suicide terrorism. For a longtime, as adverse economic conditions may cause terrorist groups to recruit more suicide bombers. More recently, the recruitment of educated and economically advantaged suicide bombers allows for more ‘credible’ attacks, gaining more attention and casualties as in the case of Israeli targets in the middle-east (Berrebi Klor 2012).

The role of cyber terrorism in an increasingly technologically growing works remains an area of future research, as terrorist movements continue to use social media such as; twitter, Facebook and Whatsapp as avenues to promote their terrorist and
extremist agenda. Yet another gap remains in various factors that can support an international approach to transnational terrorism. Sanders (2014) uses the example of global communication efforts across countries such as INTERPOL to coordinate locating and apprehending suspects of terrorism, rather than the less impactful role of existing partial counterterrorism cooperation across countries, particularly in the developing world.

The impact of counterterrorism policies remains an existing gap in terrorism studies. It is important to note that due to the limited data available to counterterrorism, including data on precisely how governments may allocate resources and U.S. military aid to partner countries (Enders Sandler 2014). Consequentially, empirical studies are forced to rely on limited examples, which compromises the impact of terrorism various hypothesis. Further, it remains difficult to ascertain the effects of counterterrorism policies and the continual increase in the United States Department of Homeland Security (U.S. DHS) counterterrorism funding which has increased by 9% since its inception (Ender Sandler 2012;328). To date, very few studies have explored counterterrorism and defensive spending since 9/11(Sandler, Arce Enders 2011).

Although earlier research in terrorism studies highlights the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, few studies have explored the unintended consequences these policies may cause. For instance, transference of attacks is critical in considering counterterrorism policies. As Sandler (2014) explains, transference as terrorist changing risks and choosing how and where they may attack. Further,
transference has unintended policy-induced changes in a terrorist behavior. One example is the implementation of metal detectors, which reduced number of airplane attacks and embassy incursions (Enders & Sandler 1993; 2012). However, it led to increased hostage takings due to the relative low cost in the latter. A second example is increased security in the United States, which has resulted in more attacks of Americans on foreign soil, as evident from several transnational attacks, with western and U.S. nationals as targets. In fact, it is estimated that a 40% increase of transnational attackers were aimed at U.S. and western interests and many of those attacks are abroad (Enders Sandler 2012). Similarly, in the Horn of Africa, we observe transference of attacks, as several counterterrorism policies have resulted in the marginalization of groups. The unintended result is that terrorist groups alter their calculus. Rather than directly attacking Embassies and key western interests as frequently within metropolitan areas, they penetrate porous borders in order to recruit and promote their extremist agenda to marginalized and disenfranchised groups.

Another existing gap is the impact of ongoing research on networked terrorist groups. This includes the existence of safe havens, economic and logistical support and intelligence from marginalized and aggrieved groups (Hoffman 2006; Alexander Pluchinsky 1992). Recently in the Horn of Africa, the Al-Qaeda terrorist network extends into Somalia and parts of north-eastern Kenya, allowing for ties amongst groups such as al-Shabaab, thus increasing their relative strength despite having fewer resources than national governments.
This dissertation explores three individual based factors - irredentism, counterterrorism funding and the marginalization of groups. These factors when combined are impactful in the rise of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. To the best of my knowledge there are few similar studies that explore at best, the role of counterterrorism funding. One example is Sander (2014) who explores the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies from a general perspective. However, no study aims to link these three factors as determinants of terrorism.

Over the years, different theories have been developed to explain terrorism across the world, including anarchism, anti-colonialism theory, orthodox theory, religious and economic theory of rational choice. The main premise of this study is to explain the rise of extremism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, I will build on two related theories, i.e. grievance theory and the theory of relative deprivation. While these two theories are informative, aligning with much of the conventional wisdom in attempting to explain conflict, on their own, they are insufficient in explaining terrorism and extremism in the Horn of Africa. Grievance theory, for example, has been proven to be quantitative, logical and essential in understanding conflict and causes of violence, but fails to incorporate the opinions of persons who are involved in disputes, including personal accounts of those in conflict including the collection of personal data and accounts. Therefore, the theory of grievance, though attractive, cannot on its own fully explain terrorism.

Another related theory I shall apply in this study is Relative Deprivation (RD) theory. (Gurr 1997) developed a model of ethno-political rebellion focused around four key
determinants—identity, incentives, capacity, and opportunities. This argument explains "relative deprivation," highlighting the potential for collective violence, which varies with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of society. According to this argument, people can become inured to a bad state of affairs, and frustration and desperation yield to aggressive behavior and violence, thus predicting collective violence by social groups (Gurr 1990). Though a possibility, frustration does not always yield to aggressive or violent behavior. Thus relative deprivation akin to grievance is an ingredient in potential violence, but on its own, cannot fully explain terrorism in the Horn of Africa. In sum, the existing literature is vast and informative, but little has been done to consider the interaction of counterterrorism measures, irredentist claims, and terrorism. Empirically, this is an area that has not been explored but is an essential component in the dialogue between scholars and policymakers in the pursuit of effectively combating terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa.
Chapter III

Theoretical Framework

Various theories have been used to explain the causes of terrorism. However, there is an existing gap in these theories in addressing factors that have both exacerbated and ameliorated extremism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

In this chapter, I will explain the theoretical framework that addresses the research question: *Despite the numerous counterterrorism measures, why do we still observe a rise of extremism and terrorism in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa?*

First, I introduce an overview of my theory. I suggest that three key factors when combined prove to be impactful on terrorism in this region. I introduce the two theories upon which I build my theory, i.e. grievance and the theory of relative deprivation.

I begin with a tale of opportunity and grievance. The grievance is as a result of historical tensions stemming from irredentist claims and national governments exercising heavy handed counter terrorism policies in these areas. Therefore, I argue that national governments exercising heavy-handed counter terrorism policies in these areas result in a likelihood of increased attacks. I further contend that opportunity matters as extremist groups are more likely to attack in irredentist spaces due to the existing porous international borders and easy to access regions in the Horn of Africa resulting in more attacks. Lastly, I argue that marginalization of groups also increases the likelihood of attacks. Owing to the fact that aggrieved groups may resort to violence to call attention to their unmet demands. These groups
also have grievance due to irredentism, the victimization of local civilians by national
governments in the region. Thus these marginalized groups are susceptible to
recruitment from terrorist groups, as they may seek security from their national
governments, who are intended to protect them yet target them. In this theory, I
argue the individual factors are impactful on their own in the security dilemma in
the Horn of Africa. However, when combined, their existence results in a rise of
violent extremism and terrorism, thus suggesting a causal link exists between these
factors. Lastly, I form three main hypotheses that I believe to be impactful in this
study, which will be empirically tested subsequently in the data and methods section.

Overview of the Theory

Therefore, I introduce a theory that builds on elements of the theories discussed
earlier, but focuses on three individual factors and the interaction of these factors on
the terrorism in the region. I suggest that it is not solely group grievance and
marginalization that causes violent extremism and terrorism. I also argue that
heavy-handed counterterrorism policies and irredentism on their own cannot fully
explain terrorism in the region. I explore each factor individually and then combine
these factors to explain the security dilemma in the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, this is a narrative centered around opportunity. I argue in this case,
extremist groups and factions are taking advantage of the unstable irredentist spaces
and the grievances of groups and impact of counterterrorism tactics as leverage for
recruitment and promoting their terrorist and extremist agenda. This theory is about
understanding the role of opportunity as being essential explaining the upsurge of violent extremism and terrorism that we observe in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, one may wonder why territory has led to strife in many parts of the world, causing border disputes, conflict and sometimes war. One possibility is that irredentism has played a crucial role in escalating extremism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Irredentism is the desire of a nation-state to incorporate territory inhabited by people of the same nation but under the suzerainty of a different state (Kromm 1967; Kum 1990; Mayall 1978; Silberman 1959). In most cases, irredentist movements established shortly after independence aimed to reunite their ethnic kin, previously divided by colonial powers has resulted in disputes in different parts of Africa including former Zaire, parts of West Africa and Rwanda. For example, in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the minority Somali population have always felt an alignment with their Somali ethnic kin, as they share a similar culture, lexicon, and religion, which is different from the greater Ethiopia. The same applies to the Afar and Somali population in the coastal and North-Eastern parts of Kenya and Djibouti. As a result, these minority populations have always felt an allegiance not to the nation-state in which they inhabit, but to their ethnic-kin.

Issues of irredentism along the Horn of Africa have always existed, and continue to this day. Historically, there were several implications including increased tensions amongst the minority populations, national governments, and within the larger societies. Often, these tensions were followed by threats of secession and attempts at rebellion by disenfranchised groups. However, the global rise of terrorism and focus
on counterterrorism efforts, has dramatically shifted the trajectory in this region. The implications over the past few decades are significant and include the increased role of disputes over territory in irredentist spaces in the Horn of Africa. There has also been a shift in the security dilemma in these spaces. First, extremist groups have capitalized on existing tensions to further their terrorist and extremist agenda. They do so in various ways, including calls for cultural revival among the minority populations living in irredentist spaces. Second, extremist groups have established territories such as mosques and schools aimed at recruiting youth living in the area. These groups are less concerned about the claims; rather, they use these spaces as recruiting grounds, capitalizing on cultural similarities with minority groups, all in an attempt of promoting their terrorist agenda. For example, the cross-border disputes between the minority Somalis living in the north-eastern region, which is an irredentist space in Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, has been prevalent since independence. More recently, irredentist areas have evolved to prime recruiting grounds for extremist groups and factions.

Thus irredentism is essential in understanding the security dilemma in the Horn of Africa, but on its own does not completely address the rise of violent extremism and terrorism. This leads to a second factor I introduce in my theory—the unintended effects of counterterrorism policies including funding.

Beyond irredentist claims, groups living in these spaces historically faced marginalization and discrimination by both the national government and greater society. Figure 6. illustrates the Somali-Ethiopia regional map of irredentist spaces.
This sense of otherness combined with the rise of terrorist attacks and subsequently counterterrorism funding in the Horn of Africa over the past few years has exacerbated the security dilemma in the area.

Though salient, and discussed in much of the literature, the concept of counterterrorism policies has not been considered as a central role in the rise of terrorism in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa.

In fact, since the early 2000s, counterterrorism coordination among the United States and sub-regions in the Horn of Africa has been significant. Some key shifts include the U.S. military presence in irredentist spaces in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Somalia. Additionally, the establishment of several Counterterrorism initiatives, including national centers, a Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), as part of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Counterterrorism policies in the Horn of Africa was intended to be civilian-oriented, focusing on winning the hearts and the minds of local citizens. However, these efforts have often been met with resentment, and they have been ephemeral and their effectiveness largely left questionable. I argue that counterterrorism policies have created a window of opportunity for recruitment, escalating extremism and terrorism in the area. As an example, since the increase of counterterrorism policies in the Horn of Africa in the early 2000s, several in-person interviews of persons living in sub-regions in the coastal and north-eastern provinces of Kenya and Ethiopia cite several grievances including an increase in severe economic hardship, discrimination, and alienation. Also, several new policies have been implemented in attempts to buttress counterterrorism efforts including penalizing local communities for lack of proper identification, while complicating the process of obtaining relevant identification necessary for opportunities, education and other forms of employment.

Counterterrorism funding has unintended effects in these areas-primarily the marginalization of groups. It has enabled national governments to reach irredentist areas they were previously unable to access due to economic limitations. This has resulted in the indiscriminate targeting of groups living in these spaces, yielding tensions between the government and groups living in these irredentist spaces. Therefore, irredentist areas become an area of opportunity for recruitment and
extremism. In other words, communities being unfairly scrutinized by the full force of the law see no option but to join extremist groups as the national government that is intended to protect them at the same time targets them. Though essential in explaining terrorism in the region, counterterrorism funding on its own cannot explain the rise of extremism and terrorism. However, it is evident that it has yielded for the increased marginalization of groups through indiscriminate targeting. This leads to the third factor which I suggest in my theory-marginalization of groups.

In the Horn of Africa, marginalized groups have fought against political, economic and social exclusion and discrimination, hoping for inclusion in the political and economic processes. However, these attempts have been inefficacious, causing deep-rooted tensions between these groups and the national governments. I argue the marginalization of groups through indiscriminate targeting plays a role in terrorism in these sub-regions. in the Horn of Africa. This marginalization argument is somewhat similar to findings in extant literature which highlights collective disadvantages accompanied with repression by the national government on minority groups, which creates an environment of cohesiveness amongst the disenfranchised groups. (Ross 1993; Crenshaw 1981; Gurr 1993).

The idea is these groups face alienation, and distinguish themselves as the ‘other’ thus creating grievances. These grievances in turn yield opportunity to rise towards violence as a form of rebellion against the national government (Ross 1993; Crenshaw 1981; Gurr 1993; Regan and Norton 2005; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Piazza. (2011) has developed a theory linking poverty, minority economic
discrimination, and domestic terrorism. Piazza’s central argument is that since terrorism is not a mass phenomenon, rather is conducted by politically marginal actors with narrow constituencies, the economic status of subnational groups is a potential predictor of attacks. He uses data from the Minorities at Risk project to determine that countries with minority group economic discrimination are likely to experience attacks, whereas countries without minority groups are significantly less likely to experience terrorism. Piazza finds minority economic discrimination as a strong predictor of domestic terrorism vis-à-vis the general level of economic development. Similarly, my theory outlines the marginalization of groups through indiscriminate targeting by the same national government intended to protect them, makes these groups vulnerable to recruitment, violent extremism and terrorism. In other words, excluded ethnic groups living in irredentist spaces are better equipped to carry out successful attacks since they share deep-rooted cultural, social, clan or family ties, as these bonds served as a loyalty structure and increased sense of security.

My theory argues that irredentism matters, counterterrorism policies including funding have certainly exacerbated the security dilemma in the region, and the marginalization of groups through indiscriminate targeting has also increased opportunity for recruitment in the region. I contend that terrorism in the Horn of Africa is a tale of interactive factors suggesting that a combined effect of irredentism, counterterrorism policies and marginalization of groups living in irredentist areas, results in a rise of terrorism in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa.
**Territorial Opportunity**

To explain why some areas are more susceptible to recruitment, violent extremism and attacks than others, we must look at the concept of territory and how it factors into the rise of terrorism in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa. Though discussed in international security, the concept of territorial opportunity is somewhat novel in international relations, not often considered while exploring causes for terrorism.

Territorial opportunity occurs when extremist groups and factions capitalize on irredentist claims and border disputes to further their terrorist and extremist agenda.

The idea of territorial opportunity rests on the assumption that minority groups living in irredentist spaces along the borders in volatile sub-regions in the Horn of Africa are susceptible to recruitment, violent extremism and terrorism.

An important issue to be considered is that groups living in these spaces remain an attractive target by extremist factions as they are excluded and discriminated against not only by the national governments but by the larger society, thus inhibit feelings of exclusion and otherness. Even more important is extremist groups have a calculus of capitalizing on resolved and unresolved irredentist claims, but are less concern about the claims or the dispute itself. Rather, they aim to maximize historical tensions amongst marginalized groups living in irredentist spaces, the national governments, and the greater society. They do so by taking advantage of irredentist claims and attempts at separatism to exert social and political influence in these volatile areas.
To begin, political movements aimed to unite the territory of an ethnic group with the territories of other segments, have caused some of the most significant conflicts from the 1990s to date. Irredentist movements with a goal of reuniting ethnic kin are found in many parts of the world with efforts to reunite "lost territories." Many governments have attempted to bring together ethnic groups previously divided from colonial boundaries, which has resulted in disputes and sometimes war in former Zaire, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Greece, Iran, Syria, and Turkey (Schrader 1987; Sigwalt 1975; Hintjens 1999). Further, the balkanization of Europe resulted in the wars for Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia; the Kosovo conflict's potential to spawn a Greater Albania, as well as Greek fears of Macedonian irredentism. There is compelling evidence from a variety of contexts that no clear resolution exists for every claim, and irredentism still positing a threat in different parts of the world. As an example, potential Kurdistan threatens Iran, Syria, and Turkey, and irredentist conflict in the Kashmir threatens a nuclear confrontation. (Krystman Zakowska 2015; Visoka 2011; Fawn 2008). When it comes to historical cases in Africa, the implications are most severe, as hundreds of ethnic groups were divided among different states during the partition of the continent. However, the most serious, resilient ongoing irredentist claims in the continent are those between sub-regions in the Horn of Africa.

Since independence, governments in the region have pursued irredentist policies and claims, as a means of uniting members of the same kin against a common enemy(Saidemann and Ayers 2000). Despite the historical tensions and numerous
attempts at peace, in 2014, Somalia filed an irredentist claim against Kenya over its roughly 100,000-kilometer square maritime boundary along the Indian Ocean coast. Somalia claimed the boundary existing between the two countries should be at an equidistant making Kenya’s oil exploration activities in the area unlawful. In turn, the Kenya government cited terrorist and security concerns over the unchartered waters, seeking counterterrorism financial assistance of the United States in securing the contested border.

Another example lies in Ethiopia, where anarchy and cross-border disputes between the minority Somalis and the national government continue to cause high-level group organization and recruitment into extremist groups (Minorities at Risk Dataset 2018). Further, Ethiopians and Somalis in the Horn of Africa have a history of tension, mostly rooted in irredentist claims. Like Kenya, Ethiopia also sought the support of the United States citing security as a key concern to invade Mogadishu. Extremist groups gravitate towards irredentist spaces in the Horn of Africa to further their terrorist and extremist agenda. They are less concerned about the group grievances or the irredentist claims, but use these salient issues as a basis for extremist activities in these sub-regions.

Therefore, sub-regions in the Horn of Africa are no longer only safe havens, but have turned into battlefields where extremist groups and factions hope to secure their ideological and political objectives, and promote their terrorist agenda. Figure 7. is an illustration of the Somali region state and the irredentist area along the Ethiopia-Somali border.
Figure 7. Illustration of the Eastern Ethiopia and the Somali region state.
While it is wrong to assume that groups will align with extremist factions solely on the basis of ethnic kinships, the crucial role of ethnic ties, increased sense of security and sense of material benefit are deemed as attractive to excluded minority groups (Choi and Piazza 2014). For these reasons, I expect that terrorist groups which develop from groups of people with similar ethnic ties may create an avenue for politically excluded groups to readily organize into terrorist cells, as they effectively prevent security and support to their members. In other words, excluded ethnic groups are better equipped to carry out successful attacks if they share deep-rooted cultural, social, clan or family ties, as these bonds served as a loyalty structure and increased sense of security. Figure 8. illustrates the disputed maritime area along the Kenya and Somalia border.

Figure 8. Map illustrating the irredentist area along the Kenya-Somali border.
The above discussion leads to the second compelling factor to be considered since irredentism, and territorial disputes solely cannot fully explain terrorism in this region. Therefore, I explore the integral role of counterterrorism funding in the security dilemma in the Horn of Africa.

**Counterterrorism Policies and Funding**

To be successful, counterterrorism measures need to be visionary, far-reaching and well-coordinated; however, counterterrorism funding in the Horn of Africa has not only exacerbated historical tensions but further ameliorated hostilities within the region.

From the early 2000s, counterterrorism coordination among the United States and sub-regions in the Horn of Africa has been significant. The premise was to enhance the security apparatus in the region and empower communities in volatile areas, including building local security and economic infrastructure. In particular, there was an increased U.S. military presence in irredentist spaces in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Notably, we observe U.S. military presence in the North Eastern Frontier and coastal parts of Kenya and the maritime region of Somalia. The U.S. military also extends into the Lamu Archipelago region, a mostly Swahili and Bajun area, stretching along the northern coast to the Somalia border. (Prestholdt 2011; Kresse 2009; Seesemann 2007; Menkaus 2007; Pflanz 2006).

To further buttress its operations in 2003, the United States established a $100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). This expanded to the
greater region as the Counterterrorism Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CTJF-HOA) was formed as part of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Specifically, both initiatives encompass Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Yemen and Seychelles, and the strategic objectives are to improve the coastal maritime border, and airport security (Shinn 2003). In the case of Ethiopia, CJTF-HOA has provided infantry skills training and small unit tactics against terrorism to the Ethiopian National Defense Forces at the Hurso training camp, northwest of Dire Dawa. The ultimate goal is to establish three new Ethiopian anti-terrorism companies, plus Ethiopia also benefits from the $100 million U.S.-financed East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (Shinn, 2003). Despite numerous efforts to contain the rise of violent extremism and terrorist attacks in the Horn of Africa, counterterrorism initiatives remain counterintuitive, mostly ineffective and short-lived. Therefore, it is important to consider why these efforts remain stagnated, even though a significant amount of security aid is poured into the area.

A first possibility is that counterterrorism funding is biased, being used as a tool to exclude certain groups economically, politically and socially. As an example, the United States support of the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia—a direct impact of counterterrorism policies, generated anger and resentment amongst Somalis in the area. Another related possibility is the perceived value of counterterrorism support as being civilian-oriented, focusing on ‘winning the hearts and minds of citizens.’ Unfortunately, many of the results are short-lived and have been unsuccessful in providing long-term, sustainable solutions to the challenges in the area, as
recruitment and violent extremism continues to escalate. Efforts in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa remain highly ineffective, fragmented and difficult to implement (Schwartz, M., Shetret, L., & Millar, A. 2013). A third possibility is the stringent, indiscriminate policies enacted through counterterrorism funding. For example, in Somalia, a counterterrorism policy aimed at combating terrorist financing resulted in the closing of the Hawala enterprise al-Barakaat, a key financial system in the area. The logic behind the closure was the claim that certain enterprises in the region were financing terrorist cells (Rabasa 2009). However, this policy has devastating effects on many Somalis, who akin to many individuals living in developing countries, depend on funds sent from relatives living abroad given the volatile and unstable national economy (Rabasa 2009).

A fourth possibility is the overlying complexities arising from destabilizing counterterrorism efforts. Extremist groups and factions realize the strategic importance of the breakdown of the social order, civil strife and political crisis to promote their terrorist agenda. In Figure 9, illustrates the fatal events of one sided violence in the Horn of Africa region. Thus, I contend that counterterrorism funding has a significant impact on the security crisis in the Horn of Africa, but is not sufficient on its own to explain the rise of terrorism in this region. Therefore, I introduce a third factor which is the marginalization of groups by indiscriminate targeting. While Figure 10. demonstrates the one sided actors by region.
The Marginalization of Groups

Besides irredentism and counterterrorism policies, another factor acting as a threat to the security dilemma in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa involves the marginalization of groups. First, several interviews with individuals in sub-regions along the coastal and north-eastern provinces of Kenya and Ethiopia still cite severe economic hardship as reasons that youth, living in these areas, resort to extremism and terrorist activity by joining groups such as al-Shabaab and Jaysh-al-Ayman. Such marginalizing practices are examples of the indiscriminate targeting of groups, but also an exclusion by communities at the grassroots level. This disconnect serves as a driving force for members of minority groups to turn to extremism and terrorism, as feelings of despair, alienation, and exclusion rise.

The implications of the marginalization of groups include limited development, lack of access to fundamental rights such as education and job opportunities. Furthermore, heightened ethnic discrimination along cultural, language and religious lines, political exclusion, economic discrimination, and racism has escalated in recent years. The experience of discrimination of minority groups as exploited by terrorist groups, as they attempt to channel the grievances to violent action has occurred in Latin America, Western Europe, Northern Ireland (Cleary 2000; Klausen 2005; O’Hearn 1987). Cyprus against EOKA, Uruguay against the Tupamaros and Italy against the Red Brigades, all highlight exclusion and grievances as a key element in propagating terrorist group support, movement and recruitment activities (Hewitt 1984; Piazza 2011). Other examples include Kurdish terrorism in
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and the Basque movement in Spain (Whitaker 2001; Bradley 2006; Piazza and Choi 2011).

Second, groups are unfairly targeted by the central governments, further increasing their grievances, which are seldom addressed by the national governments. (Piazza 2014) explains that marginalized minority groups can be targets for extremist groups, as the groups focus on ethnic issues along socio-economic, political and other forms of marginalization by the national government.

Furthermore, there is evidence that terrorist groups as agents of mobilization, and discrimination playing a central role in aggrieved communities, that are less likely to work with military and police units, and counterterrorism efforts, which places extremist and terrorist groups at an advantage (Walsh & Piazza 2010; 2011 Sandler 2003). Though significant, marginalization on its own cannot fully explain terrorism in the Horn of Africa, rather combined with irredentism and counterterrorism funding, these three factors become impactful in explaining the rise of terrorism and violent extremism in the region.

In summary, this theory argues when three factors, i.e. counterterrorism funding, marginalization through the indiscriminate targeting of groups, and irredentism when combined contribute to the expansion of recruitment, extremism and terrorist activity in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa. Using three key hypotheses, I will explain why we still observe an increase in recruitment and terrorism in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa despite numerous counterterrorism measures.
Hypothesis I: Sub-regions that experience marginalization from counterterrorism policies are more likely to see an increase in recruitment and terrorism.

DV: Increased attacks

IV: Counterterrorism Policies

In this hypotheses, I should be able to demonstrate that counterterrorism funds are used differently in some sub-regions than others, and show evidence that counterterrorism funding is indeed marginalizing some groups through indiscriminate targeting. Counterterrorism efforts in these regions have several unintended effects. First, ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of communities in the area continues to be a difficult campaign to this day. This campaign and others have targeted the most marginal and isolated of communities, mainly those living in the majority Somali, Arab and Muslim areas, marginalizing these groups.

With an increase in counterterrorism policies, we observe the indiscriminate targeting of ethnic minorities in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa. This causes frustrations amongst these groups, who are more likely to turn to terrorism. Terrorist and extremist groups also strive to extend their influence in these sub-regions by utilizing this unique window of opportunity to broaden their territory and base in fighting against the United States and other western countries. This first hypothesis will demonstrate that marginalization resulting from counterterrorism funding is the underlying factor in the increase in terrorist attacks.

Hypothesis II: Sub-regions that experience irredentism are more likely to see an increase in terrorism.
DV: Increased attacks

IV: Irredentist claims

In this second hypotheses, I will test whether sub-regions in the Horn of Africa experiencing irredentism are more likely to see an increase in terrorist attacks. This is mainly due to the unaddressed grievances of the groups living in these irredentist spaces, increasing the likelihood these groups will use terrorism to have their grievances resolved.

Sub-regions in the Horn of Africa are strife with social and political friction within minority groups that have been historically politically, socially and economically disadvantaged by the central government. For instance, in the case of Ethiopia, the minority Muslim Somali groups in its Oromia region continues to fight for equal rights, and the identity crisis continues today. The Somali minority group in the areas constitute approximately 4.4 million who are virtually all Muslim, holding similar grievances, and facing the same challenges as the Somali minority groups in the north-eastern part of Kenya. Further, its large coastal Islamic community continues to make it one of the principal recruiting grounds for local terrorist sympathizers and supporters. Irredentist groups such as the Oromo Liberation Movement thus use terrorism to address their grievances. If this second hypothesis is correct, it should demonstrate that irredentist spaces in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa are likely to see an increase in terrorism.

Hypothesis III: Sub-regions that experience the marginalization of groups are more likely to see a rise in terrorism.
DV: Increased attacks

IV: Marginalization

This third hypotheses focuses on the marginalization of groups (including stunted economic growth and heightened ethnic tensions). Marginalization is more amplified in irredentist spaces compared to non-irredentist regions. Extremist factions then use this as a window of opportunity to recruit in these irredentist spaces. Therefore, in this hypotheses, I expect to see marginalization resulting in an increase terrorism.

Hypothesis IV: Sub-regions that experience a combination of counterterrorism policies, marginalization and irredentism are more likely to see a rise in terrorism. This last hypothesis will examine the proposition that a combination effect resulting from irredentism, counterterrorism policies and marginalization in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa has increased attacks. Therefore, it is more than just groups grievances, but a combination of indiscriminate targeting in irredentist areas, which results in the marginalization of these groups. Therefore, in this hypotheses, I expect to see my first three hypotheses interacting together, resulting in an increase recruitment and terrorism. In the next section I will test my hypotheses which if proven to be true will be impactful in terrorism studies.
Chapter IV

Data and Methods

In this chapter, I present a detailed research design for the analysis, in order to test the validity of the three hypotheses formulated. I present the dependent and independent variables and utilize a qualitative approach for the analysis. I will highlight the causal factors and linkages to the independent variables. I will also include the concepts previously discussed in the theory: the marginalization of groups, counterterrorism policies and irredentism, by examining specific cases of terrorist attacks that have occurred from 1980-2019 in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa. I will then conclude with a discussion of the implications and limitations of the findings.

Qualitative Research

A central goal in this study is to demonstrate three crucial factors when combined, have resulted in the rise of transnational terrorism in the Horn of Africa. As I researched extant literature, I found several in-depth studies that explore terrorism quantitatively. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994) explained, research in the social sciences should be both specific and general in nature, encompassing classes of events as well as specific events at particular places. To date, very few studies look at terrorism in the Horn of Africa from a qualitative perspective, which I believe is beneficial as it provides real-world perspectives while further informing the research.
Qualitatively analyzing terrorism allows for more focused, intense evaluation of the explanatory variables. It also provides significant insight into real-world events, thus can serve as a bridge with already existing quantitative studies, to further inform research in conflict studies. Another benefit of a qualitative approach in this research is that it fills the gaps in existing quantitative research studies, as it provides more certainty about causal claims.

Case Studies
The use of case studies in this study is beneficial for several reasons. One advantage is the avenue to evaluate key strategic relationships, behaviors, and interactions between the actors involved. Using case studies also accounts for causal events which can better provide correlations that are influential, which is something which data and large –N analysis fail to recognize. As an example, data analysis may fail to recognize the sequential discrimination of groups over a period of time (as evidenced by in-person interviews, through news reports and press statements), dissatisfaction which translates into grievance, influences the susceptibility to recruitment by extremist groups. Thus, analyzing descriptive evidence which explains events in-detail, is a causal and dependable approach to test theory. Case study analyses also provide in-depth, detailed information which is necessary for determining different causes of extremism and terrorism, thus providing a basis for practical policy recommendations to combat the security dilemma in the region. Moreover, case studies provide historical narratives which are beneficial for
researchers and policymakers alike. These in-depth, real-world events and causal stories thus help in constructing a dataset which others can use for future research. It is essential to note although this study uses a small number of cases studies, it still provides detailed information, therefore serving as a contribution to the existing and growing data sets of case studies on causes for extremism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Finally, the case studies presented in this study provide descriptive statistics as well as causal stories, including the use of graphs and tables in order to demonstrate the validity of the findings.

Case Selection

One important consideration is how to choose cases for in-depth analysis appropriately. Thus, the selected cases fit the trajectory anticipated by the theory by focusing on countries within the Horn of Africa that have the most significant number of terrorist attacks since from 1980-2019. This approach allowed for a detailed examination of whether the causal mechanisms will operate as anticipated and if the theoretical predictions align with the behavior observed. Therefore, the selected cases have a wealth of reliable information including attacks.

The empirical analysis focuses on five countries, i.e. Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Eritrea, and Somalia. These countries were selected because of variance in the independent variables and, the heterogeneous demographic composition of the region.
In many cases, the vast array of languages, culture, religions, and ethnicities, the highly diverse internal dynamics have further been made complex by previously established colonial policies. Specifically, the issue of irredentism with international borders separating members of similar ethnic groups across countries in the region has proved to be problematic.

In Ethiopia, the territorial boundary along the eastern highlands shared with Somalia continues to be complicated, with the minority nomadic Somalis facing economic and political disparities. These concerns continue to fuel aggrieved groups between the Somali minority group living in the Ogaden region and into channeling their frustrations through engaging in violence including terrorism. In this area, the Oromo National Liberation Front (ONLF) a self-determination groups in the region represents the minority ethnic Somali community.

Although the national government faces a complex conflict which escalates the security dilemma in the region, there are also irredentist issues. These include concerns over the aggressive tactics which the government utilizes in the region especially against the minority ethnic Somalis, who on the one hand face severe economic limitations including poverty, and socio-political exclusion which leaves them with a distrust of a government which has long neglected them and now targets them. (Human Rights Watch Report 2008).

In Kenya, the geographic dimension has resulted in tensions particularly in the Coastal and North-Eastern regions of the country. In the Coastal region of Lamu and Old Town Mombasa, colonial borders cause ethnic tensions in the area. In North-
Eastern Kenya, colonial borders have caused ethnic tensions, disputes between the majority Somalis and local Kenyan population. Further, marginalization by law enforcement, and discriminatory, heavy-handed counterterrorism policies have heightened grievances in the regions with groups resorting to violence to garner attention to their cause. In Somalia, the tensions are mainly clan-based with violence exerted against the groups that benefit from counterterrorism funding.

*Al-Shabaab Recruitment, Local Grievance and Terrorist Attacks*

Until 1980, terrorist incidents in the Horn of Africa were isolated and rare events, thus making it difficult to ascertain the causes for the attacks. In fact, between 1974 and 2008, a total of 4,993 terrorist incidents took place in sub-Saharan Africa and, 261 groups claimed responsibility (Elu and Price 2014). Additionally, of the 321 terrorist attacks have occurred in the Horn of Africa since 1975, 288 of them were along the porous borders (Atellah Masinde Mdogo 2019). Moreover, poverty, weak borders, corruption and rising disillusionment among disenfranchised youth have made sub-regions along the Horn of Africa easy targets and potential safe havens for global terrorism (Juliet Elu and Gregory Price 2014).

Further, heavy-handed militant and discriminatory approaches deepen local grievance against the national governments in the area. According to recorded interviews with a human rights campaign activists, relationships between local law enforcement, and the community are tense as the police viewed locals as the enemy, compromising trust and cooperation between the public and state authorities (Crisis Group Commentary 2015).
More recently, there has not only been an increase of terrorist incidents in the region but groups who seek to cause confrontation and capitalize on various windows of opportunity including counterterrorism policies, marginalization of groups and irredentism to further their extremist agenda. These demands by marginalized groups were further aggravated throughout the years due to grievances including the allocation of land from coastal communities to other elites (Crisis Group Commentary 2014).

In addition, the counterterrorism policy response by regional national governments when combating terrorism and its impact on security often fail to consider how religion, ethnicity, colonial legacy, and rational choice interact to condition why some groups in Africa employ terrorist acts as an approach to justify their mission and objectives (Elu and Price 2014). Thus al-Shabaab capitalizes on these grievances and attempts at separatism. For example, Kenyan police officials recently investigated the Mombasa Republican Council, a separatist movement along the Kenyan coast. A statement from 2011 from al-Shabaab stated:
“holy war could help establish Islamic rule in “lost Muslim lands” and, as a corollary, restore inhabitants’ social, political and economic rights”. (Crisis Group Commentary 2014).

From this statement, it is evident that a key strategic objective of al-Shabaab is the establishment of relationships with local ethnic minority groups while focusing on contested areas along porous borders. Furthermore, specific sub-regions in the Horn of Africa are prime recruitment zones for al-Shabaab, as these regions are particularly close to the borders which have a history of tensions stemming from issues of self-governance.

The U.S. Department of State Annual Country Report on Terrorism and Counterterrorism(2016) observes that several countries in the Horn of Africa remain steady counterterrorism partners of the United States. Kenya. As an example, is one of six countries which participate in the President’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI) which focuses on several critical objectives including countering violent extremism. The U.S. has continued to support counterterrorism capacity building throughout the Horn of Africa, including reinforcing of the African Union Mission to Somalia(AMISOM) operational efficacy, contributing to the development and professionalization of Somali’s security sector, and improving regional critical incident response capabilities. Figure 11. shows Al-Shabaab attacks outside Somalia and terrorist attacks in sub-regions from 1975.
Figure 11. Terror Attacks in Sub-regions from 1975. Source: https://www.theelephant.info/data-stories/2019/01/20/a-timeline-of-terror-attacks-in-kenya-since-1975/
Despite local law enforcement operations in countering terrorist incidents and violent extremism in the area, it has been challenging to degrade extremist factions’ safe havens in the Horn of Africa sub-region, thus increasing their ability to plan and execute attacks (U.S Department of State 2016). The most prevalent terrorist group in the Horn of Africa region, al-Shabaab, remains successful by expanding its influence through the recruitment of vulnerable groups, including youth, women, and children from less economically developed areas. In particular, parts of the North-Eastern province along the Kenya-Somalia border continue to act as prime recruitment spots for al-Shabaab militants.

In this next section, I will examine specific cases of terrorist attacks that have occurred from 1980-2019 in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa. I will highlight the causal factors and linkages to my three hypotheses, i.e. counterterrorism policies, irredentism and the marginalization of groups.

**Analysis and Results**

In this study, I used a qualitative approach, in addressing specific areas of my research. To date, very few studies look at terrorism in the Horn of Africa from a qualitative perspective, which I believe is beneficial as it provides real-world perspectives while further informing the research.

Qualitatively analyzing my theory allowed for more focused, intense evaluation of the explanatory variables, thus it serving as a bridge to further inform my study. A qualitative approach in this research has provided more certainty about causal claims. As an example, data analysis did not always the sequential discrimination of
certain groups over a period of time. However, in-person interviews and various news reports and press statements were able to provide more information. Thus, I was able to identify the dissatisfaction of marginalized groups who due to their grievance may resort to violence and thereby increasing the likelihood of an attack. Thus, analyzing descriptive evidence which explains events in-detail, was a dependable approach to test the theory.

**Dependent and Independent Variables**

In a qualitative study, the dependent and independent variables are not always clear. However, for this study, the dependent variable is the attacks. I use three independent variables which are designed to test the hypotheses empirically. The first independent variable is the marginalization of groups. For this variable, I use two datasets; the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset and the Minorities at Risk data set (MAR). Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses on counterterrorism policies, marginalization of groups and irredentism on terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Probability of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism Policies</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalization of groups</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irredentism</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism Policies, Marginalization and Irredentism</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The EPR is a core dataset which recently updated in 2018, with identifying information of all politically relevant ethnic groups, including their access to state power, links to rebel organizations, trans border ethnic kin relations and intra ethnic cleavages in each country in the world from 1946-2017. This dataset is important as it codes information of over 800 groups and the degree to which their representatives held state power from controlling the government, junior or senior partnerships to overt political exclusion and discrimination (EPR 2018).

The second independent variable is irredentist claims. I will utilize the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset. The ICOW data also codes regions in the world that have been subject to irredentist claims dating back 1946-2016.

This dataset will be useful in regards to the identifying where the attacks are occurring and if indeed these areas are contested or not. Lastly, the third variable which is counterterrorism policies including heavy handed tactics. I utilize the One – Sided Violence(OSV) dataset under the Uppsala Conflict Data Program(UCDP).

The OSV data provides data on organized violence for the last 40 years, with its definition of armed conflict which provides information on the number of civilians injured in one sided violence. The OSV data also covers individual events of organized violence which is disaggregated finely to violence that occurs in a given time and place including villages. It also covers violence and use of armed force by the governments of a state against civilians resulting in at least 25 deaths per year, per actor (Croicu Mihai Sundberg 2017).
Findings

It is evident that counterterrorism policies trigger attacks in the area. In fact, of the total attacks in the region, 95 percent are linked to counterterrorism policies. Thus we can conclude there is a relationship between terrorist incidents and counterterrorism polices, and it is a positive predictor of terrorism in the region. In fact, of the total attacks in the region, 13 percent are linked to the marginalization of groups. However, these attacks are not as prevalent as those resulting from other factors.

Thus we can conclude there is a relationship between terrorist incidents and marginalization, however, it is a negative predictor of terrorism in the region. Majority of the attacks occur along porous borders, where irredentist claims are prevalent. As a matter of act, 86 percent of the attacks occurred in irredentist spaces, along porous borders in the region. Thus the relationship between terrorist incidents and irredentism is a positive predictor of terrorism.

It is also evident that all factors have resulted in attacks, thus when all three factors are combined, the likelihood of attacks increases, thus we can conclude that an interaction between all three factors is a positive predictor of terrorism. The Table 2 below illustrates discriminated groups in the Horn of Africa and Table 3 indicates one sided violence in the region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Oroma</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Tigry</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somali (Ogaden)</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somali (Ogaden)</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somali (Ogaden)</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somali (Ogaden)</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somali (Ogaden)</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Anuak</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somali (Ogaden)</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Anuak</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Kunama</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Saho</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Kunama</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. One Sided Violence by National Governments, Horn of Africa Source: UCDP Data 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fatality</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Somalia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Somalia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Somalia</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Terrorist Attacks between 1975-1998**

The first major terrorist incident linking instability in the region and counterterrorism policies was on December 1980. The Norfolk hotel, a Jewish-owned establishment in the heart of Nairobi, Kenya was attacked killing 20 people and injuring 87 others.

Initially, it was unclear if militant groups in the region conducted the attacks. It was believed that a gang of mercenaries and assailants colluded with local contacts to facilitate the attack (The Standard 1981). We know the attacks were linked to counterterrorism policies in the region because immediately after the incident, pro-Palestinian militants claimed responsibility for the attacks citing retaliation for Kenya’s support of an Israeli-led rescue operation in Uganda (Keesings 1976; Jewish Telegraph 2006). The attacks were a retaliation to the Kenya government’s support for Israel in ‘Operation Entebbe,’ a counterterrorist hostage rescue mission carried out to free more than two-hundred and forty-six Israeli passengers when an Israeli bound flight was hijacked and diverted to Entebbe airport in Uganda.

According to intelligence collected before the operation, it was believed that Uganda was compliant with this unprecedented act of international terrorism (Keesings 1976; Jewish Telegraph 2006). Kenya’s then president faced mounting political pressure to allow access to the Israeli Defense Forces during the operation. (Smith 1976 Dunstan 2011 Furst 2016). The next Table 4 below illustrates the attacks in the region since and linked issue i.e. counterterrorism policies, whether the area is an irredentist space and marginalization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Linked Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1980</td>
<td>Hotel bombings, Nairobi</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Embassy bombing,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1998</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hotel bombings,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2002</td>
<td>Kikambala</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2012</td>
<td>Kisauni</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2012</td>
<td>Grenade attack, Mombasa</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2012</td>
<td>Church attacks, Garissa</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2012</td>
<td>Militized attacks, Kismayo</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2012</td>
<td>Mosque, Garissa</td>
<td>Marginalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2014</td>
<td>Malindi</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2013</td>
<td>Mall attacks, Nairobi</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>Car bombings, Moyale</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>Mpeketoni</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>Garissa</td>
<td>Irredentism, Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2015</td>
<td>Village attacks, Yumbis</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2016</td>
<td>Open air market, Galkayo</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2016</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2016</td>
<td>reported)</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>Passenger bus, Mandera</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2016</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2018</td>
<td>Mandera</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2019</td>
<td>Hotel bombings, Nairobi</td>
<td>Counterterrorism policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is now evident that counterterrorism policies in the region triggered the motive behind the attack. According to some analysts and published news stories, the attack was a result of the Kenya government and its role in supporting Israel in regional counterterrorism missions (Jewish Telegraph 2006; USA Today 2013). The United States entered the Indian Ocean with the line carrier USS Ranger in response to threats from Ugandan and anti-Israeli forces that threatened even further military action against Kenya (Keesings 1976). Therefore, the hotel attack demonstrated the vulnerability of the region to significant attacks owing to western and regional counterterrorism policies.

The next large-scale terrorist attack in the Horn of Africa that was linked to counterterrorism policies was not until more than a decade later, during the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The timing of both attacks was well-coordinated, intended to occur within approximately a few minutes of each other. In the Nairobi embassy bombing, 213 people died instantly and 5000 more injured. In the Dar-es-Salaam embassy, 11 people were killed, and more than 80 people injured (Bushnell 2018; Carson 2013). The terrorist group, Al-Qaeda immediately claimed responsibility for both attacks. It is believed that Al-Qaeda motivated the attacks were an act of revenge against Western counterterrorism policies in parts of the middle-east including Afghanistan (Barkan, 2014; Widner, 1992; Adar, 1995).

Before the bombings in East Africa, the United States and other western countries failed to recognize the significant threat of Al-Qaeda, its militant apparatus, and
enduring local infrastructure along with volatile irredentist spaces in the Horn of Africa. Until this point, most terrorist attacks were limited primarily to the Middle-East. Beyond the significant human, financial and property losses incurred, it was evident the attacks were strategized years in advance by then Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden. Osama had used Sudan as his base from 1991-1996, confirming the instability of the region as a convenient platform for terrorist attacks. It also confirmed how attacks are planned and executed efficiently in the Horn of Africa (Lyman Morrison 2004).

Multiple press statements, intelligence reports, and interviews from former United States officials and Ambassadors, confirmed that before the attack on the American Embassy in Nairobi, officials had received detailed warnings that Islamic fundamentalists were plotting a well-orchestrated attack on the building (Bonner Risen 1998). These claims were later corroborated by then-serving U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Prudence Bushnell, who accused her Government of insensitivity with multiple unmet requests for security assistance and precautions to secure the Nairobi embassy building before the attacks (Bushnell 2018; Bonner Risen 1998).

The attacks were significant as they resulted in the establishment of significant counterterrorism policies in the region by western governments, led by the United States. Perhaps one of the most significant reactions by the United States after the attacks included military action against terrorist sympathizers including Sudan. The U.S. attributed the sanctions and military actions on Sudan to multiple Al-Qaeda cells in the country, and the lax visa policies, which allowed for the suspected terrorist
to flow in and out of Sudan with relative ease (U.S. Department of State 2002). After the embassy bombings in 1998, widespread counterterrorism policies became rampant in the region. In addition, concerns by minority ethnic groups over discriminatory and unfair policies further spiraling the Horn of Africa into more frequent attacks in subsequent years.

*Al-Shabaab Regional Strategy of Terrorist Attacks 2000-2010*

Since the 2000s, the terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa has escalated with the majority of the attacks centered around irredentist spaces, and motivated by both marginalization and regional and global counterterrorism policies.

The next set of attacks that were linked to counterterrorism policies in the region was on November 2002. Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group linked to Al-Qaeda and based in neighboring Somalia struck again, killing 15 people at the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, near Mombasa (Carson 2002). Almost simultaneously, multiple shoulder-held anti-aircraft missiles were fired at an Israeli passenger jet which was departing from the Mombasa International Airport (MIA) with 261 passengers aboard. The Al Ittihad al Islamiya group which is linked to Al-Qaeda is believed to be responsible for the attacks.

The attacks were as a result of counterterrorism policies in the region. We know this because immediately after the attacks, several press statements and news reports revealed the elaborate planning of the attacks was due to the country’s cooperation with newly implemented counterterrorism policies in the region. Additionally, the
minority Muslim community had been critical of the recently enacted U.S. funded counterterrorism policies, and the Kenya military and local law enforcement units for practicing heavy-handed tactics on minority groups. Specifically, these groups expressed concerns over harassment, excessive force, and searches without court warrants, on the homes of terrorism suspects (Daily Nation 2002; New York Times 2002; CNN 2002).

As (Layman Morrison 2004) stated, the Kikambala attacks confirmed evidence of the constant militant presence of Al-Qaeda in the region. It also confirmed both an existing terrorist infrastructure in the Horn of Africa, as well as linkages with certain minority groups on the area who felt excluded, marginalized and targeted by the national government. The attacks also confirmed the rise of local-level grass-roots initiated extremism, which had previously been a central part of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in other parts of the world like the Middle-East but was hitherto unnoticed in the Horn of Africa. It also became evident that terrorist attacks were now centered around the Horn of Africa, where existing porous borders, irredentist claims, and marginalized groups remain a problem (Layman and Morrison 2004).

In response to these attacks, the U.S. continued to channel significant security aid towards the Horn of Africa and expanded the scope of policies to combat terrorism in the region. The Bush administration also responded swiftly, shifting from delivering primarily HIV/AIDS and development aid, to designating the Horn of Africa, and the
greater surrounding areas, as a front-line region in the U.S. led war on terror (Lyman Morrison 2004).

Approximately $100 million in security aid was spent in the Horn of Africa over 15 months with roughly $50 million dedicated to volatile borders and coastal regions in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, approximately $14 million was provided by the United States to the newly established Kenyan Anti-Terror Police Unit, responsible for countering threats in the region. (U.S. Department of State 2002; Layman Morrison 2004).

While it seemed prudent to provide significant security aid to the Horn of Africa, the regional socio-economic and political dynamics which inevitably shape the U.S. Counterterrorism policies in the region have complicated results. Several analysts have noted that diplomatic and aid-related pressures and incentives from the United States have resulted in grave human rights violations. This includes alienation and heightened historical frictions between the national government and minority communities as evidenced in parts of Kenya and Ethiopia, as local authorities expanded efforts to apprehend violent extremists and terror suspects (Prestholdt 2011). Further, several western countries including France, the United States, and Italy set up base in Djibouti, to counter any possible threats in the area emanating mainly from parts of the Middle-East via Yemen due to its relative proximity to the Horn of Africa.

The next set of attacks linked to counterterrorism policies, irredentism and marginalization, was on April 2007. As separatist rebels attacked a Chinese-run oil
facility in the Ogaden, a widely contested region in eastern Ethiopia since independence. The attacks resulted in 70 deaths (Gettleman Knowlton 2007). It is now clear the attacks were linked to counterterrorism policies, irredentism, and marginalization of groups and we know this because shortly after the attacks, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) a separatist militant group in eastern Ethiopia claimed responsibility citing grievance against the Ethiopian government for targeting civilians and burning down villages in the area where the minority ethnic Somali group in the Ogaden region and Somalia.

Despite the attacks, the discrimination in this area which is constituted by a mostly Somali and Ogaadeeni clans continues thus heightening grievance. Excluded minority groups turn to violence in order to seek attention to their grievance. There is further evidence on marginalization of minority groups in the Ogaden as hundreds of ethnic Somali are arrested without trial, and allegation of massive human rights violations including rape and torture by government soldiers against the mainly ethnic Somali pastoralist population, restrictions to basic needs such as food and water all as a reaction by the national government responding to the suspected terrorist threats in the region. Furthermore, released press statements and human rights groups reported ethnic Somalis been forcibly displaced, their possessions destroyed, and executions including demonstration killings by Ethiopian soldiers who single out ethnic Somalis have been prevailing in this region (Human Rights Watch Report 2008).
The Ethiopian government continues to minimize the accounts of human rights concerns in the region, instead attributing the situation on the ground as the result of ‘Eritrean-backed terrorists threatening to destabilize Ethiopia.

In addition to marginalization and irredentism as motivators for attacks, it is evident the attacks were as a result of heavy-handed counterterrorism policies in the region. We know this as it is widely speculated the Ethiopian national government focuses on a terrorist narrative in order to garner counterterrorism support from the United States and other western countries on the global war on terror(Human Rights Watch Report 2008). In particular, in May 2009, the U.S. Department of State again certified that:

“Eritrea is “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The absence of Eritrean cooperation has limited the ability of the United States and international partners to counter terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa and, particularly al-Shabaab leaders linked to al-Qaeda. The government of Eritrea has provided safety to officials aligned with the now absolute Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), including U.S. designated terrorist Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who resided in Asmara until may 2009 but is now in southern Somalia leading a fraction of Hizbul Islam” (State Department Report 2009).

It is important to note that troops from regional governments including Ethiopia and Kenya, integrated to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) a regional operation between the Ethiopian, Kenyan, Ugandan, Rwandan and Somali military against insurgents in the region including al-Shabaab. Thus it is clear that the
increase in attacks has been linked to counterterrorism policies and the presence of the regional forces through AMISOM (Aronson 2013; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744; 2007)

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The next set of attacks that were linked to counterterrorism policies in the region was on June 2012 as a hand grenade was tossed at a beer garden in Kisauni constituency, Mombasa where patrons had gathered to watch a football match killing two people and injuring more than 30 (Daily Nation 2012; New York Times 2012). Reports demonstrate that the U.S. and French government warned its citizens to be cautious as the U.S. Embassy in the area had received reports of an attack in one of the Port cities in the region (BBC News 2012).

The attack was a direct response to counterterrorism policies in the region. We know this because earlier reports indicate the Kenya government sending troops into Somalia in support of U.S. and western counterterrorism operations in the region. In particular, earlier in the year, the African Union force in Somalia was boosted from twelve thousand troops to eighteen thousand troops incorporating Kenyan forces. On a broader scale, news reports attributed the attacks were specifically scheduled in retaliation to the Kenyan Navy who has seized explosive device found in the Indian Ocean Coast (New York Times 2012; CNN 2012; Daily Nation 2012).

The next set of attacks that were linked to the marginalization of groups was on August 2012, as a hand grenade was tossed at a police station, killing an officer and
injuring thirteen others (New York Times 2012). We know the attacks are linked to marginalization because according to news reports, a few days before the attacks, there was widespread unrest over the killing of an influential cleric by law enforcement officers (Daily Nation 2012).

According to police statements after his death, officers denied any involvement in the killing. However, the minority Muslim group in the area rejected the explanation and accused police of the murder (Daily Nation 2012). Multiple press reports indicate the attacks were in the port city of Mombasa, an area with a significant number of ethnic Somalis, Arabs, and Muslims who are historically marginalized and more recently, complain regional counterterrorism efforts target them.

Thus we know the marginalization of minority groups motivated the attacks because shortly after the cleric’s demise, riots ensued, and the leading opposition leader called for the local law enforcement to exercise restraint as they conduct their counterterrorism operations (Daily Nation 2012).

The next terrorist incident that was linked to counterterrorism policies was on July 2012 as gunmen attacked the African Inland Church killing 17 people and injuring several others in Garissa, Kenya near the border with Somalia.

Garissa province is approximately 140 kilometers from the Somali border; it is a highly contested area in the region, inhabited by the minority ethnic Somalis. The timing of the attack was well intended to occur at the same time with another attack on a Roman Catholic church in Garissa, which wounded three civilians (New York Times 2012). We know both attacks are linked to counterterrorism policies because
just eight months prior, the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) stormed into Somalia. Further, some analysts also believe that al-Shabaab was retaliating by targeting volatile regions along the Kenya-Somalia border, as well as putting a dent into the local economy by compromising the security apparatus. According to further reports, the Kenya Defense Forces were included in the operation and accused officers of aggression, violence, human right violation such as raping women and firing shots at students and innocent civilians. (BBC News 2012).

The response by law enforcement after the attacks only heightened grievance amongst marginalized groups. Immediately after the attacks, officers burned down the local market and fired live bullets at protesters killing one and injuring 20 others(New York Times 2012). The use of excessive force by military personnel confirmed that marginalized groups living in irredentist spaces are often targeted. Furthermore, press statements and interviews from local civilians expressed the significant economic impact of the deployment of officers in the area. This resulted in missed revenues totaling approximately 1.5 million Kenya shillings, which caused extreme tension between the national government, the local leaders in the area including sheiks and ethnic minority groups(Daily Nation 2012; Standard Media Group 2012; The Star 2012).

The next major attack that is linked to counterterrorism policies and marginalization of groups was on September 2012, as Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) attacked militants in Kismayo, Somalia. This area was strategic for al-Shabaab militants as it is
believed they utilized this port to import weapons and ammunition into Somalia and beyond (BBC News 2012).

We know the attacks were linked to counterterrorism policies and marginalization because immediately after KDF drove Al-Shabaab militants out of Kismayo, Kenyan authorities at the coast, after attacks in 2012, launching a crackdown including the assassination of religious leaders. According to press reports, police closed mosques accused of being associated with jihadist recruitment, though they were later reopened under new leadership. The heavy-handed approach also deepened Muslim grievances against the state (Crisis Group 2018). More reports criticized the tactics which law and military enforcement were using to combat terrorism including launching heavy handed militant crackdown operations indiscriminately targeting Muslim and Somali ethnic groups across the Coastal and Northeastern provinces. (Los Angeles Times 2012).

The next set of attacks that were linked to irredentism and the marginalization of groups was on November, 2014, as six members of a separatist movement-the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) attacked a police barracks police camp along Malindi, a city on the Kenyan coast killing eight civilians (Daily Nation 014; The Star 2014). The MRC is a separatist movement seeking independence for the coastal regions along Kenya’s Indian Ocean. According to some analysts, it is evident the attack was linked to irredentism, as the MRC, capitalizes on local grievance over land, exclusion, and frustration over the economic marginalization of minority ethnic groups along the Coast of Kenya by the national government (Akwiri 2014).
Furthermore, statements from the MRC leaders confirmed that former members might have engaged in the attacks. The attacks are further evidence of the existing tensions in irredentist spaces and the marginalized groups who may use violence as a means to call attention to their unmet demands.

The next large scale attacks that were directly linked to counterterrorism policies was on September 2013 at a popular mall Nairobi, Kenya. Masked gunmen ambushed the Westgate mall killing 67 people with 50 others injured (BBC News 2013; The Washington Post 2013). We know the attacks were linked to counterterrorism policies in the region, as immediately after the attack, al-Shabaab utilized social media accounts to post messaging claiming responsibility and citing retribution against the Kenya Defense Forces presence in Somalia (Al-Jazeera News 2013). Moreover, multiple reports demonstrate the attack was well timed and intended to be a surprise, with demands from al-Shabaab that KDF withdraw their troops from Somalia (Al Jazeera News 2013). It was also later revealed that al-Shabaab conducted the attacks in retaliation of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) in Somalia (The Washington Post 2013).

Some analysts argue that al-Shabaab was opposed to ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ where KDF joined the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012 (Patrick 2016; Ramadhan 2018; Moses 2018). According to the Kenyan Defense Minister for Internal Security at the time, and other senior security officials, the Kenya government intended to create a buffer between Southern Somalia and the Kenyan border. However, multiple media reports indicate that al-Shabaab was retaliating for
Kenya’s involvement in the U.S. sponsored counterterrorism policies in the region (Ramadhan 2018; Moses 2018).

The next incident was linked to the marginalization of groups was on May 2014. There were reports that after the Westgate attacks, Kenyan security forces cracked down indiscriminately on the minority ethnic Somalis on the premise they may be affiliated with the al-Shabaab terrorist group. According to human rights watch agencies, during ‘operation usalama’, security forces targeted thousands of ethnic Somalis living in Kenya, resulting in the forcible relocation of at least 1,000 Somalis to refugee camps and the forcible expulsion of 359 Somalis from Kenya (Amnesty International 2014; Human Rights Watch 2015; World Report 2015). Though this incident was not a terrorist attack, it confirmed a few things. First, while the national government had legitimate security concerns, targeting already marginalized groups in the guise of effective counterterrorism efforts only increased feelings of alienation and grievance, creating a suitable environment for marginalized ethnic groups to resort to violence as a reaction for the tactics received from the government. Second, according to press reports, the operation also allowed for al-Shabaab to recruit and plan further attacks. Al-Shabaab capitalized on the marginalization of minority groups, using this as a window of opportunity to recruit members based on exclusion, and being targeted by the national government intended to protect civilians (Crisis Group 2015).

The next set of attacks linked directly to counterterrorism policies in the region was on May 2014 in Djibouti. Djibouti is one of the countries in the Horn that is perceived
to experience few incidents of terrorism. Nevertheless, in May 2014 in Djibouti, two people walked into a restaurant filled with western military personnel and blew themselves up injuring 11 (Reuters 2014). According to analysts, the attacks happened because of the presence of U.S., Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and other NATO allies’ presence in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti specifically hosts bases for many western troops linked to the African Union Mission in Somalia-AMISOM (Gartenstein-Ross Appel 2014). In addition, a statement released shortly by an al-Shabaab spokesperson also stated:

“The attack was conducted in retaliation to the active role of French crusaders in massacres and persecutions, and equipping Djiboutian military troops in Somalis”.

(Reuters News 2014)

According to some analysts and government officials, the attack was significant for several reasons; first, it confirmed that attacks in the Horn of Africa are spread out in different sub-regions including Djibouti, which shattered the assumption of a long stretch of insulation from terrorist incidents. Second, the attacks confirmed a linkage between counterterrorism policies and the attacks. We know this because according to analysts, Djibouti serves as a base for camp Lemonnier which houses approximately 960 troops since 2011. Camo Lemonnier also serves as a base for the training of local security forces as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM). It is also home to the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa which is a staging ground for counterterrorism operation both in the Horn of Africa and Yemen (Gartenstein-Ross Appel 2014).

The next set of terrorist attacks was directly linked to the marginalization of groups and counterterrorism policies was on June 2014 in Mpeketoni, Lamu County. During the attacks, 60 people were killed as masked gunmen hijacked a van and raided a hotel and police station (Daily Nation 2014). We know counterterrorism policies, and marginalization of groups triggered the attacks because according to media news reports, al-Shabaab cited two reasons after the incident. The first objective was in retaliation for land grabbing practices by the national government, and the second objective was al-Shabaab avenging the presence of Kenyan troops in Somali and the killing of the ethnic minority groups as well as Muslims (BBC News 2014; VOA News 2014). The attacks shed some light on the role of marginalization and terrorism in this region. In fact, in 2018, roughly 58 students abandoned universities to join terrorist groups in Somalia, Libya, and Syria (Daily Nation 2018).

The next large scale set of attacks linked to the marginalization of groups and counterterrorism policies was on April 2, 2015, when armed men attacked the Garissa University College in northeastern Kenya, killing 147 civilians. The attack was the largest in the region since the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Daily Nation News 2015; BBC News 2015).

It is evident that the marginalization of groups and counterterrorism policies triggered the attacks. We know this because prior the incident, several analysts expressed concern over the heavy-handed government tactics in the region which
included the indiscriminate targeting and arrests of the minority ethnic Somali group (Aggrey and Abdimalik 2015; Ariel 2015).

In addition, they were concerned about creating an atmosphere of exclusion, resentment, and grievance among the ethnic minority groups (Reuters News 2015). According to reports and in-person interviews from students of the Garissa University College, unknown persons were spotted in the area, prompting part of the institution to be shut down. Further interviews from student survivors confirmed the attackers proclaimed they were al-Shabaab members, retaliating against the deployment of Kenyan troops in Somalia and their support of AMISOM (Agence France Press 2015). In addition, there were also issued warnings of an imminent attack on the institution (Christian Science Monitor 2015; The East African 2015). Press reports released two statements by al-Shabaab. The first statement declared,

‘the attacks were to avenge the violence against the ethnic Somali groups living in the North-Eastern province and southern Somalia’ (Zambia Times 2015).

A second statement released shortly after the attacks on Garissa College University on April 2015 declared,

“Security in your lands will not be achieved until security in the lands belonging to Somali Muslims including North Eastern province and the coast are achieved. We will stop at absolutely nothing until all lands are liberated from Kenyan occupation
a long and gruesome war targeting the Kenyan public, until security becomes a reality in Muslim lands including North Eastern province and the Coast. Until all lands are liberated from Kenyan occupation” (*International Crisis Group Africa* 2018).

The next set of attacks occurred in January 2016 as al-Shabaab fighters attacked the El Adde military base in Somalia killing at least 140 Kenyan Defense Forces soldiers (Citizen News 2012). To date, the exact number of casualties was withheld from the public thus remain an enigma. However, it is widely believed that several civilians living in the area were affected. We know the attacks were linked to counterterrorism policies because according to various media reports, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility in retaliation of African Union military troops in Somalia (Citizen News 2012; Al Jazeera News 2012; Standard Media Group 2012).

The next set of attacks linked to counterterrorism policies were on February 2016 when an explosive device hidden in a laptop exploded on an aircraft very shortly after departing from Mogadishu International airport (MIA) killing passengers (BBC News 2016). Another attack on August 2016, as al-Shabaab targeted Puntland government offices in an open-air market near Galkayo, Somalia where two bombs killed at least 23 security personnel and injured 80 others (Citizen News 2012). Once more al-Shabaab was responsible for both the attacks. We know the attacks were linked to counterterrorism policies as reports indicated that al-Shabaab continues to conduct
attacks in opposition to the presence of regional and western troops in the area (Crisis Group 2018).

The next set of attacks related to counterterrorism policies in the region was on October 2016, as militants from al-Shabaab and leader of ISIS in Somalia occupied several coastal towns in Bari, Puntland which forced residents to flee. Later, a bomb exploded in a popular restaurant in Mogadishu killing three and injuring multiple others (US Department of State 2016). It is evident that counterterrorism policies triggered the attacks. We know this because a report by the U.S. Department of State indicated the attacks happened in a strategically located near the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) which is a key location where counterterrorism policies and intelligence operation are believed to planned. Second, the attacks were close to the Jilaow Prison where many fighters from al-Shabaab are imprisoned (US Department of State 2016).

In addition to the more significant attacks in the region, other lesser terrorist attacks have occurred without much international attention. The first small scale terrorist incident directly linked to counterterrorism policies was on December 2015 in Garissa county, in the village of Yumbis roughly 70 kilometers from the Kenya-Somali border. During the attacks, multiple police cars were set ablaze, and al-Shabaab claimed that at least 20 policemen were killed and one wounded. A second small-scale attack linked to counterterrorism policies in the region included a June 2016 attack when al-Shabaab killed five police officers who were escorting a passenger bus in Mandera county. The bus driver sped away; however, a police vehicle nearby was torched after
being hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, burning two victims and killing three others (Associated Press 2016). We know both attacks were linked to counterterrorism policies in the region, because according to news reports, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility citing rebellion to the Somali government, which is backed by western countries and African Union peacekeeping forces (The Telegraph 2014; Daily Nation 2014).

A third small scale attack occurred on July 2016 attack where al-Shabaab killed six bus passengers in Mandera County and an October 2016 attack wherein two separate attacks, al-Shabaab killed at least twelve civilians at a hotel and six civilians at a worker’s dormitory in Mandera county (US Department of State 2017). Other small scale attacks include a 2017 ambush where al-Shabaab armed men attacked more regions along the border in Lamu county and north-eastern county, killing three security personnel and four children. Another ambush on the Secretary of the Ministry of Public Works in Lamu County on July 2018 led to the deaths of 13 civilians. Other small scale attacks include a May 4, 2018, an attack in Mandera county, North-Eastern, Kenya which resulted in the death of multiple police officers and a July 2018 attack on Somalia’s Ministry of Interior resulted in nine deaths (Counter Extremism Project 2018; US Department of State 2017; Crisis Group 2018). We know these small scale attacks are linked to counterterrorism policies because multiple reports have indicated that Mandera region as a new al-Shabaab target since 2015, as the armed group aims to retaliate the presence of Kenyan soldiers in
the African Union troops in southern Somalia, thus carrying out attacks along mostly accessible and porous borders in the region (Al Jazeera News 2016).

The latest significant attack directly linked to counterterrorism policies in the region was on January 2019 when gunmen with explosives stormed the Dusit D2 Hotel in Nairobi, killing 25 people and injuring dozens more (Daily Nation 2019). The attacks were well timed to coincide with the three-year commemoration of the El-Adde attacks, which happened in Somalia, killing over 200 Kenya Defense Forces stationed as part of the AMISON peacekeeping force. The El-Adde attacks occurred on January 15, 2016, the exact day the Dusit D2 hotel attack. The linkage to counterterrorism policies is evident and we know this because media and official reports indicated that al-Shabaab immediately claimed responsibility for this attack and stated the ‘well-timed attack in retaliation of regional and western policies in the region, as well as the presence of KDF in AMISOM (Daily Nation 2019; Standard Media Group 2019; New York Times 2019).

Suggestions for Future Research

It is clear from the sequence of incidents that majority of the terrorist attacks occur along with border areas; however, these attacks sometimes expand towards the major cities. Reports by the U.S. Department of State and National Intelligence Services cite shortages on operational effectiveness, resources, training and border security initiatives as high on the list of national security and counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa (State Department Counterterrorism Reports 2014).
Thus security issues along largely unmonitored and uncontrolled borders have resulted in multiple terrorist attacks both small-scale and large-scale. A 2017 United Nations report on terrorism across the globe indicated that al-Shabaab utilizes asymmetrical tactics to elongate counterterrorism efforts in the hopes of exhausting the organized, security forces in the region (UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy 2017).

From the details of the attacks, it is evident that terrorist groups are focused on attacking local citizens and disrupting security forces in the area towards the aim of increasingly putting an economic strain on the already fragile local governments. It is also evident these attacks were well-orchestrated operations intended for targets within Somalia and along its neighboring borders, particularly in irredentist spaces which are mainly located along contested border in the region. Thus, terrorist groups have a few objectives. The first objective was to capitalize on local grievances. This is evident as the number of attacks in the north-eastern especially in Wajir, Garissa and Mandera town and Lamu county in the coast. Terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab tap into this propaganda as these areas constitute of minority groups who face economic, political exclusion and local grievances due to limited power and resources, by highlighting the role of secession and the illegitimate Kenyan state in these areas. Lastly, it is evident that the group continue to conduct attacks in response to marginalization and counterterrorism policies in the region.
During this study, I experienced some limitations. First, irredentist claims are novel in terrorism studies. I am not aware of studies that seek to explain the role of claims on attacks even though claims stemming from territorial boundaries are strife across the world. Therefore, I argued that spaces facing claims are likely to observe terrorism. I suspect it would be beneficial for future research to reevaluate this relationship in other parts of the continent and world.

Second, it would be useful to reevaluate the role of counterterrorism funding once a detailed, in-depth database is available. To date, there are several reports on how much funding is allocated to counterterrorism projects in regions across the world. However, a comprehensive database with a Large-N is missing. It would be interesting to analyze such data across different regions globally quantitatively.
Chapter V

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In this chapter, I present my conclusion for the study then offer policy recommendations. I also discuss the policy implications of the findings of this research. I also offer suggestions on how this research can be further developed in the future.

A Narrative of Opportunity and Grievance

In this study, I developed a theory which argued three individual factors when combined increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the Horn of Africa. In developing this theory, I build upon the theoretical models of relative deprivation and grievance (Gurr 1990). Grievance, as a result of historical tensions stemming from irredentist claims is prevalent in some ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, I argue that national governments exercising heavy-handed counter terrorism policies in these areas result in a likelihood of increased attacks. I further contend that opportunity matters as extremist groups are more likely to attack in irredentist spaces due to the existing porous international borders and easy to access regions in the Horn of Africa resulting in more attacks. Lastly, I argue that marginalization of groups also increases the likelihood of attacks. Owing to the fact that aggrieved groups may resort to violence to call attention to their unmet demands. These groups also have grievance due to irredentism, the victimization of local civilians by national governments in the region. Thus these marginalized groups are
susceptible to recruitment from terrorist groups, as they may seek security from their national governments, who are intended to protect them yet target them. This is narrative of opportunity, where terrorist groups capitalize on grievance as a window of opportunity to recruit and promote their terrorist agenda.

I suggest that it is not solely marginalization that causes violent extremism and terrorism nor heavy-handed counterterrorism policies or irredentism, rather a combination of all three factors. This theory is about understanding the role of opportunity as being essential explaining the upsurge of violent extremism and terrorism that we observe in sub-regions in the Horn of Africa.

Policy Implications

The findings have policy implications. To begin, my study finds support that marginalization of groups results in terrorism in the Horn of Africa. This finding is also consistent with other terrorism scholars who argue that political movements are spiraled by group grievances. Since the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam U.S. embassies, the African Union (AU) has stepped up efforts to deal with terrorism on the continent. Through the AU, AMISON has been active in Somalia. Continental conferences, such the Counterterrorism Convention of 1999, adopted following the U.S. embassy bombings, and the AU Counterterrorism Plan of Action Conference in 2002, as well as the AU Protocol to the Convention in 2004 have culminated in capacity building and, the exchange of information, and other elements aimed at strengthening cooperation in the area of Counterterrorism in the continent
(Gatuiku 2016). Also, in 2004, the AU established the African Centre for the Study and Research on terrorism (CSRT). The Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD) Capacity Building Program Against terrorism (ICPAT) established in 2006 has focused on building the capacities of member states by working to promote greater inter-agency coordination on counterterrorism within individual IGAD member states; strengthening border control and providing training and sharing information (IGAD Ministerial Report on legal cooperation against terrorism, 2007).

On its part, the European Union (EU) anti-terrorism support in the Horn region has been undertaken through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the Africa-EU Partnership Agreement, both of which call for cooperation in the areas of security, politics and development, as well as Action Plan to Combat Terrorism (EU Partnership Agreement, Article 11a 2005). The EU supports the peace process in Somalia and has also initially trained the Somali forces through the EU Training Mission in Somalia (Kimunguyi 2011). The 2006 U.N. General Assembly adaptation of the Global Strategy to Counter terror (UNGC-T) was also significant in enhancing cooperation between the U.N and HOA countries against terror. The U.N. HOA plan addresses issues such as conducive conditions that spread terror, strengthening capacity building, rule of law and human rights. The plan addresses what many observers have perceived to be the real grievances and the underlying political and socio-economic issues in the Horn (Schwartz 2016).
The U.S. continues to provide support to countries in the Horn of Africa in order to combat the security threat in the region. As an example, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) stationed in Djibouti, provides support for AMISOM, including training. The U.S. operations from Djibouti has certainly ensured some stability within some areas in Djibouti, as well as extending into the Gulf of Aden (Jones Gray 2013).

In 2009, the U.S. established the partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), intended to build the capacity of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across the Horn to counter terrorism. PREACT uses military, local law enforcement and development resources to achieve its objectives, including reducing the capacity of terrorist attacks, border security, countering the financing of terrorism, and reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism. (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2014). PREACT supplements Washington’s anti-terror efforts that include support for AMISOM, promoting stability and governance in Somalia and the HOA. It has coordinated joint training exercises in Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan first responders and law enforcement professionals to support efforts to enhance regional coordination and cooperation, protect shared borders, and respond to terrorist incidents. Similar, training has been provided for Kenyan and Ugandan prosecutors. However, these operations are limited, undermining their relative success. This is primarily because efforts have focused less on governance due to the issue of sovereignty of state’s thereby undermining long term goals of effectively containing...
the terror threat in the region. Further, counterterrorism efforts in the region continue to face various difficulties, such as the lack of adequate national counterterrorism specialists and language barriers faced by foreign counterterrorism specialists. One policy recommendation is the United States must continue to eliminate violence in the region. Perhaps incorporating grassroots-level focus on improving issues of governance such as the local security apparatus, building and maintaining local infrastructure, job creation, enhancing education may empower youth, women and other vulnerable groups in these spaces, thus curbing the terrorism threat.

A second policy recommendation would be to strengthen the efficacy of counterterrorism measures in the region by interacting with regional security forces including law enforcement. In addition, incorporating sustainable solutions to counterterrorism, with respect to issues of governance, training of local civilians and officials to become experts in identifying terrorist threats might yield long-term results. This would be more advantageous than importing experts that have less regional linguistic and cultural acquaintance. It would help to decrease the threat of conflicts with its potentials of steering favorable conditions for terrorism to thrive (Rahasa, A, 2006).

A third recommendation is incorporating persuasive measures to reduce state-sponsored terror. This would apply to groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front(ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front(OLF) both supported by Eritrea to weaken Ethiopia; likewise, the Eritrean National Front(ENF) and the Eritrean
Liberation Front (ELF), supported by Ethiopia to weaken Eritrea (Gatuiku, Peter, 2016).

A fourth policy recommendation is for the U.S. to foster sufficient governance in countries in the region such as Somalia, Sudan and other volatile contested regions such as South Sudan, as these often poorly governed areas are more susceptible to attacks.

A fifth policy recommendation would be containing reactionary and punitive responses by local law enforcement and intelligence services in the region. The greater Horn of Africa region faces heavy-handed, discriminatory, and arbitrary responses which further isolate aggrieved communities and reduce their trust in national governments. Improving the relationship with local communities and national governments would limit terrorism-related challenges in the region. Lastly, national governments in the region must recognize the role they play in framing the underlying challenges faced by marginalized groups in the region. Governments in the Horn of Africa must lead with accountability and political inclusion of groups, and distributing national wealth and good equitably. In addition, mediation practices to reconcile decade long historical tensions might yield long-term sustainable results in curbing terrorism in the region. In doing so, the levels of grievance are minimalized, thus eliminating the rise of violent extremism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
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Vita

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