Public Policy Congruence and Nationalism in Post-Soviet Spaces

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Public Policy Congruence and Nationalism in Post-Soviet Spaces

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Abstract

Modern countries that were formerly within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence are interesting, because they experienced an exogenous shock—the dissolution of Soviet Union—that caused them to lose a former identity and engage in state-building activities. These state-building activities often involved nationalism. Sometimes, it seemed to rise up from the mass public and sometimes it was being utilized by the political elite. Today, there seems to be a resurgence of nationalism, and it became a question of who is driving it: the mass public or the political elite. I wanted to know how who is driving the public policy process affected the levels of nationalism within six countries that were formerly influenced by the Soviet Union. I conceptualized nationalism as public policies resulting from nationalist feelings and created a list of nine policy options that indicate nationalism. I researched each country in my sample to see how many of the policy options were utilized to create a nationalism score. I developed an equation to calculate public policy congruence, which measures how much public opinion about public policies and actual policy outcomes overlap. After analyzing these metrics, I found that, in this study, countries with median levels of congruence experience higher levels of nationalism than countries with higher or lower congruence.

Keywords: nationalism, congruence, public policy, Soviet
Introduction

In 2014 Russia annexed the Republic of Crimea, officially a part of Ukraine, in what the British Broadcasting Corporation called, “the worst East-West crisis since the Cold War.” (BBC Monitoring, 2018). In March of 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed State Duma Deputies, Federation Council Members, heads of Russian regions, and civil society representatives at the Kremlin. President Putin’s speech contained many of the markers of nationalist rhetoric. He made references to Russia’s glorious imperial history and heavily emphasized the contributions of the Russian military to creating a prosperous modern Russian state. Putin went on to claim that Crimea had always a part of Russia and that the Bolsheviks had arbitrarily transferred ancestral Russian lands in South of Russia to the Republic of Ukraine. Additionally, Putin laments that the majority of the population of Crimea was either ethnic Russians, Ukrainians who spoke Russian as their first language, or Crimean Tartars who had demonstrated an allegiance to Russia through a referendum (Presidential Executive Office, 2014).

Though the Russian Federation violated international norms by annexing sovereign territory to add to its own, Putin’s speech brings up several contemporary issues surrounding the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the role of nationalism within the mass public and the political elite. One key justification for annexing Crimea was to reunite ethnic Russians with their nation. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, territories were left in states that they had not historically been a part of, parts of ethnic groups were isolated from the rest, and the state ideology that had been pushed for the previous decades was no longer in place. The post-
Soviet states had to redefine what their individual “nation” was going to appear as after the exogenous shock of no longer being a part of the Soviet Union.

Nationalism, as demonstrated in Putin’s speech, is a tool that can be used to inspire the masses to view the state a certain way. In the case of Crimea, Putin used nationalist rhetoric to inspire Russian citizens to view Crimea as a part of the Russian nation. Nationalism is not only a tool of the political elites, it is also a tool of the masses. If the Russian claim that those in Crimea voted to be part of Russia is believed, then that would be an example of Russian nationalism coming up from the Crimean masses. In this version of the story, nationalism within this population put pressure on the Russian government to reunite it with its nation.

Nationalism can appear in many forms. As previously stated, it can appear as political rhetoric or even as electoral results. However, it is better to conceptualize nationalism as policies. The decision to annex Crimea was a policy made by the Russian government. But, was that policy motivated by the Russian government’s desire for territory or because the government was listening to the masses? This question leads to a broader research question: How does the driver of the public policy process—the mass public or the political elite—affect the level of nationalistic policies in states that were formerly influenced by the Soviet Union, specifically Russia, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, and the Czech Republic. Throughout this project, I explore the relationship between nationalism and public policy congruence to answer this question.

**Nationalism**

The term “nationalism” is used by a variety of actors to describe various phenomena, and scholars have failed to agree on the exact definition, meaning, and understanding of the
term. Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as, “... a political principle which maintains that similarity of a culture is the basic social bond” (1997, p. 3). Matthew Wright uses nationalism as a way to think about group identification (2011). Frederick Solt describes nationalism as a myth that asserts that some people inherently belong to a certain group, and that group makes up a nation (2011). What some scholars can agree on is that nationalism is a way for people to identify the social unit that they belong to, and by extension, who does not belong in that social unit. Nationalism is a phenomenon that exists at the cross section of culture, society, politics, ethnicity, and economics with equally intersectional and far-reaching implications.

Some scholars can agree that nationalism is some phenomenon or feeling that people use to decide who belongs to a national community and who does not. Individual people make up the mass public as well as the political elite across the world, and these individual people are always at different stages of life and facing different circumstances. Because of this, nationalism is experienced differently by different people, and the effects of it look different. When nationalism scholarship is focused on nationalism within the political elite, it can be defined as, “a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). Here, Gellner defines the idea that the geographic boundary of a state should encapsulate only those people that recognize themselves as a part of the national community and are recognized by other members of the community as members of the national community. This kind of thinking often leads to nation-building efforts by the political elite. When nationalism scholarship focuses on the mass public, it can be defined as, “a set of attitudes that shape the perceptions and behaviors or ordinary people as they come into contact with political institutions and engage in social interactions” (Bonikowski, 2016).
While definitions are important when trying to understand the broad and elusive concept of nationalism, it is more important to discuss what nationalism and its effects look like in everyday life. Kosterman and Feshbach define a consequence of nationalism as, “a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance,” which Bonikowski labels chauvinism (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 429). Bonikowski goes on to describe the effects of nationalism as, “anti-immigrant attitudes and bellicose foreign policy preferences....exclusionary conceptions of national membership, excessive forms of national pride, and strong identification with the nation above all other communities. (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 430). These effects are more identifiable and observable than the theoretical concept of nationalism, and therefore one of the main concerns of this study.

For the purposes of this project, I am conceptualizing nationalism as a process that ends in some kind of policy option, such as a lack of a certain policy, the presence of a certain policy, or the results of a certain policy, that indicates that it is an effect of nationalistic sentiments within the mass public or the political elite. I define this process as the idea that the “nation” is a lens through which people (the public, elites, or a combination of both) decide who does and who does not belong to a social group. The feelings of those in the in-group towards those in the out-group may be manipulated or radicalized based on external factors. Given enough momentum, these nationalistic sentiments can be translated into specific public policies.

Scholars of nationalism have created various theories in order to conceptualize the ways that nationalism affects societies and governments. Because this project views nationalism as resulting in a policy option, and it is concerned with who influences these outputs, two theories of interest are primordialism and instrumentalism. These theories represent the relationship
between nationalism and the different public policy drivers—the public and the elites.

Primordialism represents nationalism that is driven by the mass public, and instrumentalism represents nationalism that is driven by the political elite.

According to Weinreich et al., “primordialism is designed as a sentiment, or affect laden set of beliefs and discourses, and a perceived essential continuity from group ancestry to progeny (perceived kith and kin), located symbolically in a specific territory or place (which may or may not be the current place of the people concerned)” (2003, p. 119). The theory of primordialism utilizes history and ancestry as a means of explaining who belongs to the social group of a “nation.” Because of the emphasis on history and ancestry, the theory of primordialism assumes that nationalism is a natural phenomenon that is inherent within people and was and is always present (Gellner, 1997). To support the theory, scholars cite the prevalence of the writings of nationalist historians (Coakley, 2017).

Due to the assumption that nationalism is inherent in people, primordialism is a “bottom-up” approach, meaning that it is strictly societal in nature and comes up from the masses. Primordialists believe that culture causes the most significant cleavages, and thus, affects politics more than any other kind of issue (Béland and Lecours, 2005). Essentially, culture and a person’s nation are inexplicably connected. This difference in culture between people of different nations (nations may not line up with modern state boundaries and there may be multiple home-nations within one modern state boundary) has more of an effect on politics and policy outcomes than anything else.

Though a historically dominant theory within the study of nationalism, primordialism is now largely discredited within the academic community. This is largely because scholars
criticize it for overemphasizing the political importance of identities (Béland and Lecours, 2005). Despite this criticism, primordialism continues to be discussed within the studies of nationalism (Coakley, 2017). Though arguably discredited, the bottom-up and mass-centered aspects of primordialism represent mass-driven public policy within the scope of nationalism, making it a good theory to aid in the conceptualization of mass-public driven public policy processes that result from nationalistic sentiments that lead to a certain set of policy options.

Instrumentalism exists in stark comparison to primordialism. According to Smith, instrumentalism interprets the presence of nationalism as the result of the efforts of political elites, who emphasize the differences between in- and out-groups. This is compatible with the idea of rational self-interest that the study of political science is built on (1998).

Instrumentalism is a top-down approach, meaning that nationalism originates in the upper echelons of society. Instead of assuming that culture is politically dominant, as primordialism does, instrumentalism assumes that manipulative political elites are the most politically important (Béland and Lecours, 2005). It also assumes that nationalism is the result of careful strategic calculations (Coakley, 2017). Saying that political elites manipulate the mass public with nationalist rhetoric and sentiment requires the assumption that doing so is in the best interest of the political elite. The theory of instrumentalism clearly represents a policy model in which political elites are the primary drivers of public policy.

Scholars have clearly debated over where nationalism originates in society. In the context of this project, primordialism and instrumentalism represent a way to visualize who is driving the political processes that result in nationalistic policy options. One can visualize a spectrum where primordialism is on one end and instrumentalism in on the other. The
The primordialist side represents where the public policy process is dominated by the mass public and the political elites are merely conduits for the actions that the public wants carried out. The instrumentalism end represents where the political elite create nationalistic policies without any regard for the opinions of the public. The middle represents equal input from both the masses and the elite. Each country will fall somewhere on this spectrum when nationalism is present.

Figure 1: Spectrum of Nationalist Theories

Policy Options that Indicate Nationalism

As previously stated, the idea of nationalism that is utilized within this project is the idea that nationalistic sentiments result in a policy option that reflects these sentiments. A review of the current literature on nationalism revealed which public policies can indicate nationalistic sentiment. The three broad categories of public policies that can indicate nationalism are citizenship, immigration, and language.

Anthony Giddens defines a “nation” as a “collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary [and uniform] administration, reflexively both by the internal state apparatus and those of the other states” (James, 1996). There are several aspects of this definition of a nation that help explain what public policies relate to
nationalism. The first aspect is the idea of a “collectivity,” which is often referred to as the national community. This idea implies that there is a group of people that are more or less the same. This definition does not describe what turns a simple group into a national community, but it does state the importance of similarity by drawing attention to the fact that all members of the community are subject to “unitary [and uniform]” administration. The community experiences the same things, which can be extended to other aspects of life. They can experience the same culture, language, religion, and laws. Another important aspect is the recognition of members of the community as belonging to that collectivity by both the collectivity’s own state and others. The collectivity is defined by shared experiences, and this dichotomy can be observed by others. Reiterating Matthew Wright’s idea, nationalism is a way of determining who belongs to the community. Any public policy that reflects nationalism must deal with how one becomes part of the national community.

Immigration policies determine how difficult it is for an individual to leave their former national community and enter the physical bounds of another one. Immigration policies also affect how many people can enter a country and if certain groups of people are automatically barred from the very first steps of entrance to the new national community. In the United States in the early 1900’s, a wave of nationalistic sentiment resulted in restrictive immigration policies (Kaplan, 1981). Restricting the immigration process by volume or by type of immigrant sends a clear message about who belongs within the country’s national community.

Not only can a state restrict who is physically able to enter the geographic bounds of the nation, but the state can also control who among the immigrants is eligible for the full rights of citizenship and to fully enter the national community. A lack of full citizenship creates a
reluctance of a population to accept an individual as a member of the national community (Wright, 2011). By allowing certain groups to have preferential access to citizenship, the citizenship policies shape who qualifies to be a part of the nation.

As previously stated, part of being a part of the national community has to do with similar experiences. One of the most distinctive shared features within a nation is the shared spoken language. Fichte believed that sharing a spoken language and being able to understand each other is the most important way that people are bonded together (Kaplan, 1981). Language serves as an excellent determinant as to who belongs within the national community (Béland and Lecours, 2005). After all, what serves as a more prominent and obvious marker as to whether or not two people belong to the same culture than those two people being able to understand each other.

Public policies that indicate nationalist sentiment shape how people see who is and who is not part of the nation. Both immigration and citizenship polices can place restrictions on who, legally, gets to be part of the nation. These legal barriers themselves can define who is and who is not a part of the nation. In addition, they can shape how those already within the national community view those without the legal designations of “legal immigrant” or “citizen.” Language policies can shape how much language functions as a cultural identifier and how much those who do not speak the same language as those within the nation are seen as outsiders. Language policies also indicate which languages are deemed culturally acceptable for those within group. In addition, the acceptance of more languages indicates an increased tolerance or acceptance for differences. Immigration, citizenship, and language policies of a country can provide insight into the nationalism within that country.
Measuring Nationalism

In order to measure the level of nationalism within a country, I created an index of policy options that indicate nationalism. Using the scholarly literature, I created a questionnaire based on the three policy areas of interest for nationalistic policies—citizenship, immigration, and language policies—that asked if a country had a specific kind of policy option. I researched one country in my sample at a time and applied the questionnaire. If the country in question utilized the policy option, I coded the response to the questionnaire as a one. If the country did not utilize the policy option, I coded the response as a 0. Once I collected all of the data, I added the 1s for each country to create a nationalism score that indicated the level of nationalism in each country. Because this is an index, the nationalism scores do not have inherent value. The magnitude of the number does not mean anything. The index only functions to rank the countries by level of nationalism. This section on measuring nationalism will explain why each policy was included on the questionnaire. It will also explain the process of creating the index and present the final index. Figure Two is the complete questionnaire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the country use <em>jus sanguinis</em> as its basis for determining citizenship?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Does the country lack any consideration for <em>jus soli</em> when determining citizenship?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is there a special channel for people of a specific ethnicity to become citizens?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Is immigration decreasing?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Is there any kind of restriction of or ban on a specific population?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is the state the sole creator of immigration policy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the country only have one official language?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Is an immigrant required to demonstrate language proficiency in order to naturalize?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is there an absence of official minority languages?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2: Questionnaire for Nationalism Index*
The first section of the questionnaire pertains to citizenship policy options, meaning how countries award citizenship. Citizenship is a way of legally determining who is a part of the national community. A country with more restrictions surrounding who is legally allowed to be a part of the nation is likely to have more nationalist sentiment than a country with more inclusive policies. A *jus sanguinis*-based citizenship regime grants citizenship based on parental ties and ancestry. A *jus soli* regime uses birth on the soil of the country as the primary basis for granting citizenship (Wright, 2011). Ancestry, and *jus sanguinis*-based citizenship regimes, are ascriptive means of defining a national community, meaning that citizenship is based off of something other than achievement. Ascriptive traits, such as ancestry, cannot be changed or achieved, making them restrictive when used to determine citizenship. A *jus-sanguinis* citizenship regime indicates that only a certain kind of people are capable of being part of the national community. In comparison, *jus-soli citizenship regimes* have been found to indicate more inclusive definitions of a national community (Wright, 2011). Therefore, a lack of a *jus-soli* regime could indicate a lack of an inclusive national community, indicating more nationalism. There are countries where people who can prove their ancestry are automatically or easily become citizens of a country that they have never lived in. This indicates that, for these countries, ancestry or ethnicity is the most important factor for defining a national community. This creates a very clear divide between who is and who is not a part of the community, indicating the presence of nationalism.

I found that every country in my sample uses some kind of *jus sanguinis*-based consideration when determining citizenship, and Croatia is the only country that includes some consideration for *jus-soli* based citizenship. (Barasova, 2014; Kovacs and Toth, 2010; Kruma,
Russia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic all lack special ethnic channels for gaining citizenship (Barasova, 2014; Medved, 2013; Salenko, 2012). In Croatia, Article Sixteen of the Croatian Citizenship Law creates a special channel for ethnic Croats who do not maintain a residence and have never maintained a residence in Croatia. Ethnic Croats living abroad can claim Croatian citizenship by declaration (Ragazzi and Stiks, 2010). Hungary claims that there is a “threatened Hungarian identity.” Because of this threatened identity, there are regulations in place that prefer ethnic Hungarians and former Hungarian nationals in the process of acquiring Hungarian citizenship (Kovacs and Toth). In Latvia, if a Latvian or ethnic Liv can prove through documentation that their ancestors resided in Latvia, as it existed from 1881-1940, and that they are in fact an ethnic Liv or member of the national population, then he or she may acquire Latvian citizenship (Kruma, 2015). These citizenship laws seemed to arise from the mixing of populations and division of countries that occurred during the times of the Soviet Union.

The second section deals with immigration. Citizenship deals with who is legally a member of the country. Immigration deals with who is allowed to be within the physical boundaries of the country, and it is the first step towards naturalization. Historically in the United States, restrictive immigration policies have been the result of nationalistic thinking, leading to the Immigration Restriction Acts of 1921 and 1924 (Kaplan, 1981). Nationalistic sentiments not only cause restrictive immigration policies, but restrictive immigration policies can cause nationalism. Restrictive immigration policies send a message about who does and does not belong to the national community. This study makes the assumption that policy is directly related to immigration levels, either directly through policy creating quotas and caps on
immigration, or indirectly through policies dictating the lives of those within the boundaries of the country. Therefore, any decrease in immigration is the result of policies that would either restrict immigration or make the country an undesirable location for an immigrant. This indicates an unwillingness to bring in new people for possible assimilation into the national community. In the same vein, any policy banning a particular population from entry is a clear message that that group is not and will never be a member of the national community. The final immigration question is whether or not the state is the sole creator of immigration policy. A country giving up some of its power to decide who is allowed to come into the country indicates a willingness to accept outsiders and implies multiculturalism, which de-emphasizes the previously established values of the national community (Wright, 2011).

Immigration is decreasing in Croatia, Latvia, and Slovenia, and remaining the same or increasing in Hungary, Russia, and the Czech Republic (Migrant Policy Institute, 2017). Russia bars citizens from Kosovo from entering its borders (IATA). Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, and Russia, who is diplomatically close to Serbia, has become involved in the conflict to minimize the consequences for Serbia, leading to Russia barring Kosovar nationals from entering its borders (Samorukov, 2019). I was unable to find any information or data that indicated that any of the other countries bar any specific group of people from entering their borders. Every country in this sample, other than Russia, is a member of the European Union, which has some degree of control over immigration into the member states.

While citizenship and immigration are legal barriers to entry into the national community, language is a cultural one. Language is a very obvious and visible criterion for
defining a national community (Béland and Lecours, 2005). Inclusive language policy options imply multiculturalism, while restrictive language policy options indicate the presence of nationalism. The presence of a single national language can signal that the population only considers those who speak that language, and no other, to be eligible for membership in the national community. In comparison, the presence of multiple official languages, the presence of protected minority languages, or the absence of any official language can indicate a more inclusive definition of who can be in the national community. Whether or not an immigrant is required to prove proficiency in a specific language signals how salient that language is to the national community’s identity. I believe that the more salient the language, the more likely that the levels of nationalism are higher.

Every country in the sample has a singular official language, except for Slovenia, whose official languages are Slovenian, Italian, and Hungarian (CIA, 2020). In order to become a naturalized citizen of any of the countries in this sample, an immigrant must demonstrate proficiency or knowledge of a specific language (Barasova, 2014; Kovacs and Toth, 2010; Kruma, 2015; Medved, 2013; Ragazzi and Stiks, 2010; Salenko, 2012). According to the Council of Europe, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is, “the European convention for the protection and promotion of the languages used by traditional minorities” (Council of Europe). Signatories of this charter have publicly recognized the existence of minority languages within their borders and have chosen to protect and promote them. Every country except for Latvia has signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe, 2020). I did not find any data or information supporting the claim that Latvia had any official minority languages with any kind of protected or promoted status. In addition, the
Official Language Law decrees that government documents may only be submitted in Latvian (Latvijas Vestnēsis, 2015).

Figure Three summarizes the results of the data collection. A 1 indicates that the answer to the question on the questionnaire was a yes, and a 0 indicates a no. The total scores are reported at the bottom of the chart. Slovenia and the Czech Republic are tied for the lowest levels of nationalism with scores of four. I had expected Russia to have the highest nationalism score; it came in second with a score of 6. Latvia has the highest levels of nationalism with a score of 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Options</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3: Nationalism Index**

**Congruence, Primordialism, and Instrumentalism**

Because nationalism and its effects can appear differently in a variety of circumstances, the public policies that result from nationalistic sentiment overlap with many other pre-established areas of public policy. There is no clear “nationalism policy process” like there are housing policy processes or defense policy processes. For this reason, I found it valuable to look at the public policy process as a whole to see who is driving it and if a country has a primordialist-leaning public policy process or an instrumentalist-leaning policy process.
There is added difficulty to the task of determining the driver of public policy because all of the countries included in this project are democracies. Theoretically, democracies are supposed to be responsive to the demands of the public. In a perfect democracy, the mass-public’s desires about a policy option and the real policy outcome would be exactly the same. However, due to various factors this is never the case. There are various measures of the relationship between public opinion and public policy. The measure used in this study is congruence.

Congruence measures the overlap between the political elite’s and the mass public’s issue priorities, policy preferences, and political ideologies. It essentially measures if the majority of people are getting what they want from their representatives, and it arises from electoral competition (Beyer and Hänni, 2018). The more electoral competition within an electoral district, the more ideological and policy options for the constituents within that district, the more likely the majority of the mass public will elect representatives that more closely resemble their own stance on issues.

Golder and Stramski introduce a typology to conceptualize congruence based on the ratio of constituent to representative. One-to-one congruence is used when one is discussing the ideologies and preferences of one constituent and one representative. Many-to-many congruence is used when one discusses the overlap between many constituents and many representatives. Many-to-one congruence occurs when one is discussing the ideologies and policy preferences of many constituents and one representative (2010). This project utilizes many-to-one congruence, in which the policy position of the government as a whole acts as one representative, to measure to extent to which elites or the mass public drive public policy.
Many-to-one congruence can be graphically depicted in the image created by Golder and Stramski for their 2010 article “Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions” in which $R$ represents the political position of the representative, in this case the government, and $X^*$ represents the most congruent position for the representative to be located at.

![Figure 4: Many-to-One Congruence](image)

The more congruent a state is, the more mass-driven the public policy apparatus is. By comparison, the less congruent a state is, the less mass-driven a public policy apparatus is. If a state’s policy apparatus is not being primarily driven by the mass-public, then it is being driven by those making the public policies—the political elite.

Under the umbrella of many-to-one congruence, Golder and Stramski specify three different ways of conceptualizing many-to-one congruence. In this project, I utilize their conceptualization of absolute median citizen congruence, which is the absolute distance between the median citizen’s preferences and the representative’s preferences. Congruence is high when the absolute distance is small. Absolute median citizen congruence can be measured with the following equation where $MC =$ the ideological position of the median citizen and $G =$ the position of the government. \( AMCC = | MC - G | \) (2010).

A simplified example of absolute median citizen congruence using immigration helps illustrate the concept. If two states, state A and state B, were investigating the congruence of
their immigration policy, they could use absolute median citizen congruence. State A and state B both found that their citizens had a median preference for allowing 10,000 people to immigrate into their countries. State A’s government announced that they would allow 9,000 people into its country. State B’s government announced that it would allow 15,000 people to immigrate into its country. Following the above formula, State A has an absolute median citizen congruence of 1,000 and State B has one of 5,000. In this over simplified example, State A is a much more congruent state than state B because its absolute median citizen congruence is closer to zero.

Measuring Congruence

In order to measure congruence for the purposes of this study, I have adapted Golder and Stramski’s concept of absolute median citizen congruence and Wlezein and Soroka’s data collection methods to design a measure of many-to-one congruence to demonstrate to what degree the mass public or political elites are driving the policy process. To measure congruence, I use the formula:

\[ | \Delta \text{AverageHealthcareSpendingPreferences} - \Delta \text{RealGovernmentSpending} | = \text{congruence}. \]

This is rooted in absolute median citizen congruence (\( \text{AMCC} = | MC - G | \)). The AverageHealthcareSpendingPreferences of a state represents the ideological preferences of the median citizen indicated by MC in absolute median citizen congruence. Instead of finding the preferences of the median citizen, I chose to find the average preference of the citizens in order to account for the extreme viewpoints that are often present in politics. The RealGovernmentSpending represents the position of the government indicated by G.
One aspect of my measure of congruence that is not present in Golder and Stramski’s measure of absolute median citizen congruence is the concept of change over time, which is denoted by the delta (Δ) in my congruence equation. Absolute median congruence is a static measurement. It captures the overlap of ideological position at one point in time. In order to ensure that an observed overlap is not due to a random chance at one specific time, I measure the change in preferences from 2006 to 2016. This translates mathematically as:

\[ |(2016 \text{ Preferences} - 2006 \text{ Preferences}) - (2016 \text{ Real Spending} - 2006 \text{ Real Spending})| = \text{congruence.} \]

This formula calculates how policy preferences changed from 2006 to 2016 and how real government spending changed from 2006 to 2016. Then the formula asks if they changed the same amount. If the preferences and the real spending changed the same amount the result would be 0. Therefore, the higher the number, the more incongruent the state. Because of this, I have chosen to call the results of these calculations incongruence scores.

One helpful aspect of these incongruence scores is how it handles positive and negative change to create something that is easier to understand. If the changes in preferences and spending are in the same direction, both increases or both decreases, it creates a smaller number than if the changes were in two different directions: one increase and one decrease. A smaller number indicates more congruence within a state. For example, if the change in preferences was determined to be an increase of .75 and the change in spending was found to be an increase of $25 on healthcare spending per person then the incongruence score for that country would be |.75 - 25| = 24.25. If the changes were decreases in spending and preferences instead of increases, the data collection process and subsequent formula would yield the same result. |-.75 - (-25)| = 24.25. However, if you consider a situation where the preference for health
care spending increases but the real government healthcare spending decreases, 
\[|.75-(25)|=25.75,\] then the result is a larger number, indicating more incongruence.

Drawing on the data collection methods of Wlezein and Soroka, I use the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Role of Government Survey to discover countries average policy preferences. The ISSP Governmental Role Survey uses a variety of sampling procedures and survey collection procedures to produce a data set about individuals’ preferences for the role of the government in thirty-five different countries. I used two different iterations of the ISSP Governmental Roles Survey, which were conducted in 2006 and 2016. I downloaded both datasets and restricted them based on my sample of countries and the subcategory of health spending. I chose to use health spending because public health spending data is easily available through the World Health Organization.

The survey asked individuals how much the government should spend on healthcare, spend much less, spend less, spend the same as now, spend more, spend much more, or cannot choose. The data had each response written out, so I imported it into the statistical software Stata and recoded it numerically. “Spend much less” became a -2; “spend less,” -1; “spend the same as now,” 0; “spend more,” 1; “spend much more,” 2; and, “cannot choose” or a missing answer became a 5. After I recoded the response, I was able to find the average response for each country, excluding those responses that I coded as a 5.

I used the World Health Organization’s Global Health Expenditure Database to find each country’s domestic general governmental health expenditure per capita (in US dollars). I found the expenditure for each country in the years 2006 and 2016. Once I found the numbers, I was
able to find the change in real spending to subtract from the change in average healthcare spending preferences.

Using Russia as an example, I can demonstrate how I constructed the congruence scores. The Russian government spent $267.17 on healthcare per person in 2016 and $217.75 in 2006. So, the government spent about $49.42 more per person in 2016 than they did in 2006. The average healthcare spending preference in Russia in 2016 was a 1, meaning the average response to the question how much should the government spend on healthcare was “spend more.” In 2006, the average spending preference was a 1.356, which is between a “spend more” and a “spend much more” response. This means that, in 2006, either more survey respondents chose “spend much more” or less survey respondents chose options indicating a desire to spend the same amount or to spend less, creating a -.356 change from 2006-2016. Following the formula, I calculated Russia’s incongruence score:

$$|49.419 - (-.356)| = 49.775.$$ Figure Five reports the complete results of this data collection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Incongruence Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>49.775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>137.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>219.878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>276.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7.737</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers do not have a maximum boundary, and they are ordinal in nature. The closer to zero, the more congruent, but a particularly large number does not have any inherent meaning. The comparison of the numbers is more important than magnitude. Looking at Figure Five, I can say that based on my data and calculations Croatia has the most congruent policy.
process as it relates to health care spending, and the Czech Republic has the most incongruent process. Essentially, I can use the incongruence scores to rank the countries. Figure Six demonstrates how the countries are ranked.

There appears to be a fairly clear division between countries with primordialist-leaning policy processes and countries with instrumentalist-leaning policy processes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primordialist-Leaning Countries</th>
<th>Instrumentalist-Leaning Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 7: Summary of Countries by Policy Process Driver*

**Analysis**

Because the incongruence scores show a clear division between the countries that are more congruent and the countries that are more incongruent, I divided the countries into the two categories—congruent and incongruent—based on their scores. Croatia, Hungary, and Russia are congruent countries. Latvia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic are incongruent countries. I believe that it is beneficial to compare the level of nationalist policies between congruent and incongruent states. Figure Eight shows a graph of the nationalism scores by congruence scores. The states in my sample are labeled across the x-axis. From left to right,
they change from the most congruent to the most incongruent. The thick line divides the congruent states from the incongruent states.

![NATIONALISM SCORES](image)

**Figure 8: Nationalism Scores**

An analysis of Figure Eight could indicate three different conclusions. The congruent countries have two scores that are the same and one that is only a singular point higher. If one only looks at the congruent states, it looks like it might have a negative relationship: as congruence decreases (incongruence increases) nationalism increases. If this were true, one could tentatively think that states that have more instrumentalist-leaning policy processes have more nationalistic outcomes.

This thought is quickly dispelled when one looks at the incongruent states. Latvia, which for all intents and purposes has a median amount of congruence, has the highest level of nationalism in the data set. The two states with the highest levels of incongruence have the lowest levels of nationalism. If Latvia is considered an outlier, then you could conclude that countries with instrumentalist-leaning policy processes have less nationalism than countries with primordialist-leaning policy processes. This is the exact opposite of what the congruent states indicate.
If one looks at the data set as a whole, it would seem that medium amounts of congruence lead to more nationalism than minimum or maximum levels of congruence. Figure Eight looks somewhat similar to a bell curve. It indicates that there is the most nationalism in the middle of the congruence metric, while little nationalism is contained within the wings.

Though three conclusions can be drawn, I find the idea that median amounts of congruence lead to more nationalism to be the most compelling. If nationalism exists within both the mass public and the political elite, then the mass public will pressure their representatives to pass public policies based on those nationalistic sentiments. Political elites may utilize nationalistic rhetoric and pass nationalism-based policies to solidify their positions. It logically makes sense that there would be higher levels of nationalism when both parties in the policy process have equal input. This is a more realistic model of how nationalism and the policy process interact than a model of pure primordialism or of pure instrumentalism.

In addition to analyzing how congruence and nationalism interact, it is also beneficial to examine the individual policy options and their effects on congruence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Options</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 9: Policy Options: Emphasized Congruence*
Figure Nine shows each of the policy options in the nationalism index. A one indicates that the answer to the policy option question was yes, and a zero indicates that the answer was no. The countries in the sample are listed in order from most congruent to the least congruent across the top. The congruent countries are listed in red and the incongruent countries are listed in blue.

Every country in the sample uses *jus sanguinis* as its basis to determining citizenship (Citizenship 1) and requires that immigrants demonstrate proficiency in the official state language (Language 2). Because every country in the sample shares these policy options, I assume that these policy options do not reveal much about the difference in nationalism between congruent and incongruent states.

Five of the policy options are almost identical across all six countries, except for one country being different. While these differences could indicate a fundamental difference between the congruent and incongruent countries, this data set does not contain enough information to be able to determine that.

The most obvious differences between the two sets of countries are encapsulated within policy option Citizenship 3 and Immigration 1. Citizenship 3 asks if there is a special channel for people of a specific ethnicity to become citizens. Of the congruent countries, Croatia and Hungary both have these special channels. Slovenia and the Czech Republic, both incongruent countries, do not have these channels. The majority of congruent states have special citizenship channels, and the majority of incongruent states do not. Immigration 1 asks if immigration is decreasing. Immigration is not decreasing in two of the congruent states: Hungary and Russia. In Latvia and Slovenia, two incongruent states, immigration is decreasing.
In the majority of congruent states, immigration is either staying the same or increasing, and, in the majority of incongruent states, immigration is decreasing.

Taking many liberties and making several assumptions, this data tells me that having a special ethnic channels for immigration and stagnant or increasing immigration are common policy outcomes for congruent, primordialist-leaning countries. Lacking special ethnic channels and having decreasing immigration are common outcomes for incongruent, instrumentalist-leaning countries. These specific policy outcomes as results of nationalism may indicate a fundamental difference between congruent and incongruent countries; however, this research is still too early to be able to say anything for certain. This research does indicate that focusing on immigration and citizenship policy options in future studies could yield interesting results.

Limitations

When I originally conceived the idea for this project, I had hoped that, at the end of this process, I would be able to definitively answer my research question: How does the driver of the public policy process—the mass public or the political elite—affect the level of nationalism in post-Soviet spaces? As I began the process of designing this project and doing the research, I realized that my project was limited by data availability, sampling methods, and external and internal validity, and in the congruence measurement.

The ISSP Governmental Roles Survey contained spending preferences for a number of sub categories. However, finding complete data for every country in my sample between the years of 2006 and 2016 on the exact sub-categories used in the survey was very difficult with the recourses at my disposal. I used health spending preferences and real health spending data due to its availability. However, because I only used health preferences, this project only
learned something about the congruence of the health public policy process, and that
congruence’s effects on nationalism. If I were to continue this project in the future, I would like
to create an aggregate measure of congruence across many different sub-categories of the
public policy process using the model that I developed in this project. An aggregate measure of
congruence would allow me to discover the effects of total public policy congruence on
nationalism, instead of merely health policy congruence.

Another limitation is sampling methods, which is also related to data availability. I knew
that I was interested in studying nationalism at the country level, and I knew that I wanted to
study countries that had been affected by the exogenous shock of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. My desire to study a very specific subset of states greatly limited my ability to have a
large sample size. I used two different iterations of a surveys that only surveyed about thirty-five
countries every time it was conducted, and it did not always survey the same thirty-five
countries. I had to find a set of post-Soviet countries that were included in both surveys.
Unfortunately, this left me with a very small, non-random sample of six. Due to the small
sample size, I was unable to do any statistical analysis.

One problem with having a convenience sample is that any findings from this study are
only applicable to this study. I am able to report congruence scores and nationalism scores and
the trends that I observed from these six very specific cases. However, I am unable to predict
how congruence would affect nationalism within any other countries, if I were to add more.
Additionally, because I used a convenience sample, I am unsure if the observed results are true,
because they could be the result of a sampling bias. A random sample would be needed to
conclusively know if the results are true.
Nationalism is very hard to define and it is very hard to measure. I created a list of policy options that I believe indicate nationalistic sentiment based on the literature. However, it is impossible to say how much nationalism played into the policy makers decision-making process when they were creating and passing the policies. Any of these policies could have been created for a variety of reasons. I did not include any control variables in this study, so I cannot say if the trends in nationalism that I observed were due to policy congruence or a different, unaccounted for factor.

The measure of congruence has a few limitations as well. Firstly, I believe that, if the project were repeated, it would be beneficial to standardize real government spending. Population size and the differences in magnitudes of the overall budgets of the countries may not accurately represent the real changes occurring in healthcare spending. Under the current measure, countries might have changing populations or bigger budgets to create bigger changes that would affect the results. I think that a better way to measure congruence would be to use healthcare spending as a percentage of a countries over all budget, and then standardize those numbers to the same -2 to 2 scale used for preferences.

An additional limitation in the measurement of congruence is that the changes in healthcare spending preferences are subtle and a bit confusing. In most of the cases, the average preference moved less than a point in the negative direction. This makes it appear as if, from 2006-2016, the average preference of the citizens was to spend slightly less money on healthcare, however this is not the case. All of the countries had average spending preferences between a 1 and a 2, with the exception of the Czech Republic, which had average preferences between a 0 and a 1. The Czech Republic’s average healthcare preferences were between
“spend the same as now” and “spend more.” The rest of the countries had preferences between “spend more” and “spend much more.” The average preferences never shifted to the negatives, which would indicate the responses “spend less” or “spend much less.” I believe that this is an important distinction to draw attention to.

Despite the limitations of this project, I feel that I created a solid foundation for future studies investigating the relationship between public policy congruence and nationalism. I developed metrics for the measurements of both congruence and nationalism, and started an index that can be built upon. If I were to continue working on this project, I would want to use a random sample of countries that is big enough to support statistical analysis, include relevant control variables, and standardize the real spending data within the measure of congruence.

Conclusion

In this project, I sought to understand the relationship between who the driver of public policy within a country is and the level of nationalism. I developed a measure of public policy congruence based on a survey asking inhabitants of certain countries about their preferences on governmental health spending and real health spending data. Using this data, I applied a mathematical equation that created incongruence scores. Incongruence scores describe how much public opinion about public policies and the actual public policy outcomes overlap.

I also created a nationalism index based on scholarly literature about what kinds of policy options and outcomes indicate the presence of nationalism within a country. I created a nine question questionnaire asking whether or not a country had that specific policy option. I applied the questionnaire to each country and then added up the policy options that were present in order to create a nationalism score.
Then, I analyzed the relationship between the incongruence scores and the nationalism scores and came up with three tentative conclusions. Due to data availability, I was unable to have the sample size large enough to utilize the statistical methods to draw concrete conclusions. However, I did end up with three tentative findings that could be verified in further studies. The first finding is that the highest levels of nationalism are located in countries that have median amounts of congruence. When I ranked the countries in my data set from most congruent to least congruent, Russia and Latvia fell right in the middle. Both countries had the highest nationalism scores with scores of six and seven respectively. This conclusion makes sense because if you have nationalistic sentiment within the mass public and the political elites are utilizing nationalism, and both parties are equally collaborating in the public policy process, then there would likely be more nationalistic policy outcomes than if all of the nationalism was coming from one party. Additionally, both parties having input in the process is a much more realistic model of the public policy process than only one of them having all of the input.

In addition to analyzing the relationship between congruence and nationalism, I also investigated the individual policy options and their relationships with congruence. I tentatively found that having special immigration channels for specific kinds of people and stagnant or increasing immigration are often the policy options utilized by congruent, primordialist-leanin countries. In comparison, not having these special immigration channels and decreasing immigration appear to be the policy options utilized by incongruent, instrumentalist-leanin countries. These findings are specific to this data-set and cannot be applied to broader samples. Due to limitations, my findings are tentative, however I have created a solid foundation to further investigate the relationship between congruence and nationalism.
References


