Who Supports Labor? The Intersection of Race and Skill in Union Campaigns

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Who Supports Labor? The Intersection of Race and Skill in Union Campaigns

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First and foremost, I thank the union leaders, organizers and members who graciously allowed me into their organization and agreed to be interviewed. The strength of the union in the face of enormous constraints is truly remarkable, and I hope that the stories, experiences and voices of the union and its members are well represented in this work.

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Abstract

In the past half century, there has been an unprecedented decline in labor union membership, organizing ability, political effectiveness and strike activity in the United States. As a result, the ability of labor unions to influence the debate on labor standards and social reforms has experienced a significant decline. Using a mixed method approach, this research explores differences in attitudes and orientations towards labor unions across racial groups in the United States as well as organizational strategies and capacities of a labor union in a right-to-work state. Although African Americans and Latinos have been discriminated against at the hands of organized labor, the quantitative component of this research indicates that minority groups hold more positive attitudes towards unions than whites. In light of this fact, organized labor has been slow to realize that its revitalization may be contingent upon the ability of unions to organize and recruit minority populations and very little emphasis has been placed on the effects of racial differences in attitudes and orientations toward union membership and union support. Although the quantitative component of this research indicates that minority groups hold more positive attitudes towards unions, the qualitative component of this research argues that the challenges of organizing in a cross-class, cross-race union extend beyond racial and ethnic difference to issues of skill. This research, therefore, attempts to illustrate how a labor union in a right-to-work state navigates the intersection of race and skill in union campaigns.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

At 6:00am on a crisp morning in the spring of 2013, a chartered bus pulled into the union parking lot. A group of roughly 40 Campus Workers of the World\(^1\) (CWW) quickly scurried over and began loading the bus with an assortment of banners, flyers, information packets and other union materials. Several members had busied themselves looking over their customized packets of information that were being distributed by the union’s two key organizers. Others milled about the parking lot introducing themselves to members they were not yet acquainted with and chatting about the day’s upcoming events. A graduate student member arrived on his bicycle and began joking about how cold his ride had been and how difficult it was to bike while wearing a suit. After assisting as well as I could with the cargo, I settled onto the bus and began familiarizing myself with the day’s itinerary and informational packets.

The CWW traces its origin to early 1999 when student activists from the Enlightened Alliance of Students (EAS) at the local university, in partnership with a group of faculty and a coalition of community groups, began planning a living wage campaign for university workers. In the spring of 2000, a group of campus staff organized to form the University Employees for a Fair Wage (UEFW) with the explicit goal of allowing university workers to lead the struggle against poverty wages. In October of 2000, UEFW voted to become an independent union of university staff employees and changed their name to the Campus Workers of the World. In 2003, CWW began its affiliation with an international labor union, officially becoming the CWW-ILU. Since 2003, the CWW has grown its membership to roughly 1,500 staff, graduate

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\(^1\) In an effort to protect the confidentiality of research participants, the names of the labor union, student organizations, community partners, union members and elected officials have all been either removed or replaced with pseudonyms.
students and faculty at several colleges and universities across the state and has won numerous victories in the lives of higher education employees. Beginning in 2005, the CWW became active within the state legislature.

The union’s principal concern for the day was attempting to convince state legislators to take measures in order to end the persistence of poverty wages among public higher education support staff. Although there were no specific pieces of legislation that the union was advocating for regarding the issue, union members were trying to raise general awareness of the fact that many full time employees in the state’s higher education system did not make a living wage. Specifically, the union was trying to promote changes to the merit based-percentage pay raise system, arguing that the percentage raises disproportionately benefited the most well off. In lieu of the percentage raises, the union was advocating for flat dollar raises. Additionally, the CWW was trying to safeguard the current pension and earned benefits that were being accrued by public servants. Our team’s primary concern was lobbying for a no vote on HB 703 and SB 1874 which would modify the Consolidated Retirement System (CRS)—a pension system—to operate in a manner more akin to defined contribution plans such as 401ks. In promoting their living wage agenda, the union was attempting to convince legislatures to vote yes for HB 1263 and SB 1936 which would require the state’s higher education institutions to provide free parking to employees who earn less than the average state employee salary and permit other employees to be charged for parking on a tiered scale based on salary. The CWW framed the parking issues as a measure to help keep campus workers out of poverty, and argued that the measure would not come at any cost to taxpayers if the tiered scale was put in place. Although this measure would have increased the amount of money that
faculty members would have to pay in order to park, there was no voiced dissension among faculty members over the issue.

The nearly 100 campus workers who were present for the day’s events were divided into smaller teams to speak with legislators. I was assigned to a team comprised of our union’s president, vice president, and three additional graduate students. Our team was set to meet with two members of the state house of representatives and two members of the state senate. The composition of the teams was crucial. In addition to making sure that at least one constituent of the state congressmen with whom we were meeting was present, the union also wanted to ensure that each group had at least one ranking member of the union who could facilitate discussion and speak on the groups’ behalf. Because our group was comprised of a majority of graduate students, the union thought it necessary that we be accompanied by both the president and the vice president of the union. In total, the union had made appointments with over 50 legislators to discuss issues of fairness and justice for employees in higher education.

Aboard the bus, there was a nervous excitement in the air. Members were making small talk among themselves, and conversations shifted from personal troubles to discussions of strategy and past experiences on the capitol. Two members were stating their frustration with the manner in which the legislators tended to dance around tough and direct questions. Others were declaring their dismay about having to meet with particularly ornery Congress members. The union’s leadership team sat in the front of the bus discussing the logistics for the day among themselves.
At roughly 9:00am, the president of the union rose to make an announcement. He thanked everyone for attending and spoke about a CWW press conference that was scheduled to take place just before lunch. A CWW board member rose and addressed members about the three key talking points we were discussing with our state legislators: pay, pensions and parking. The board member argued that wages distributed on a percentage basis only benefited the top earners and derided the practice of distributing retention bonuses among top administrators while custodians and service workers languished in poverty wages. Beginning in roughly 2005, the president of the state’s flagship university convinced legislators that cost of living raises should be replaced by pay for performance raises despite wide-spread criticism stemming from a lack of clear evaluative standards, lack of transparency, and concerns about employee favoritism. This scheme split funds allocated by the legislature into a 1.5% across-the-board raise and 1.5% pool to be used for merit based pay. The board member encouraged groups to speak with their legislators about implementing a raise floor of $750 in order to accommodate employees who would only gain a pittance if the percentage raises continued to be implemented. Regarding pensions, the union board member instructed the groups to tell their representatives that the current pension plan, the Consolidated Retirement System, was financially solvent and in no need of modifications. The proposed plan, the Hybrid Retirement Plan for State Employees and Teachers, would mean that new employees in higher education would receive a much less stable benefit package. The board member rattled off a variety of statistics to support his case, including estimates of the differentiated return on contributions comparing the two plans. “Defined benefit plans have greater investment returns compared with defined contribution plans that are made up of individual accounts. Numerous studies
have shown that defined benefit plans have a 26% higher return on investment.” The board member also scorned the hybrid retirement plan because it was crafted by the corporate sponsored American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).

The board member’s discussion of issues relating to wages was eloquent and concise, but, aside from the few statistics he offered regarding the modifications to the retirement plan, he was unable to articulate the nuanced application and rationale of the proposed changes to the pension system. The talking points he was offering the groups were based more on philosophical grounds than technical expertise. After concluding his announcement, members, principally faculty members, began asking numerous questions about just what it was we were supposed to be communicating to the legislator and it was obvious that there was significant dissatisfaction and confusion over facets of the pieces of legislation on which the union was taking a stance.

CWW member: What are we supposed to be telling the legislators about pay raises? If there is no piece of legislation to support, what can we really do?

CWW board member: There is no specific legislation, but we want to raise awareness about the issue. We need to communicate to our representatives that the current raise system doesn’t help the folks who are struggling the most.

CWW member: Why are we asking for a $750 raise floor? How was that number decided? Why not $1,000? Weren’t we asking for $1,000 several years ago? As far back as 2008?
CWW board member: There’s no real reason, per se, that we are asking for that amount. I think that there was some data showing that a $750 raise was necessary to keep up with cost of living expenses.

CWW member: I’m confused about the pension proposals. So what are the key differences between the two plans? I mean, is it necessary to change the plans? They’re saying it’s because of demographic changes in the state. Is there any truth to that?

CWW board member: The proposed plan would be much worse for employees. All of the burden and risk is placed on the worker. In the current system, your pension is guaranteed, but in the new system you pension would be at the mercy of the stock market. I’m not sure about the demographic changes, I think they’re just using that as an excuse. The current pension is in fine shape now.

CWW member: I’m still just not sure. What is the alternative? Just to keep the current plan? Would we have to pay more in if we did?

CWW board member: Yeah. We want to keep the current plan. I don’t know if we would have to pay more or not, but even if we did, it would be better in the long run, I think.

It was obvious that the board member was growing increasingly frustrated with the questions. He started to ignore the raised hand of one faculty member who continued to ask questions. At one point, several members near the back of the bus started shouting that they had someone
who could articulate the difference. At first, the board member was reluctant to even acknowledge the group. “It’s okay, I got this.” Eventually, the President of the CWW said to let him speak, and the faculty member did his best to try and explain the difference. Although significantly more clear, the faculty member’s comment did little to remove the confusion surrounding the issue. The question and answer segment was arbitrarily concluded, and it was obvious from the level and tone of discussion that followed that members were still unclear about the union’s position.

Once on the capitol, members joined with their respective teams and began making their way through the legislative halls to meet with representatives. Meetings were brief, usually lasting no more than ten minutes, and they followed a script that was repeated in nearly every encounter. Union members would state that they were present on behalf of the district the politician represented as well as on behalf of campus workers across the state. Next, union members would go through the motions of delivering their proposals and recommendations regarding the pieces of legislation and also provide the representative with a two-page handout, which gave an overview of the recommendations. Responses by the state senators and representatives were equally well rehearsed. They would reminisce on the education they received in the state’s colleges or universities, state how important it was to support higher education across the state, and thank us for our time and enthusiasm. Not one representative addressed the issue of flat-dollar raises, raise floors, or merit based pay, instead moving on to discuss the issues for which there were pending pieces of legislation. The pension proposal was, according to everyone with whom the union spoke, a proposal by the state treasurer who insisted that it was necessary because of the changing demographic composition of the state. In
light of the confusion among union members regarding the complex nature of the pension 
reform, it was interesting to note that many of the representatives seemed equally bewildered. 
“We’re not entirely sure at this point what the proposed plan would entail, but the treasurer 
says it’s something we have to do” one representative told us. The parking bill was unilaterally 
supported, even among Republicans, by the representatives with whom we spoke. 
Conversation was generally steered towards the parking bill and away from the more 
substantive issues of pay and pensions. As the vice president of the CWW put it: “They’re [the 
representatives] just trying to say something that will make us happy, throwing us crumbs 
when we want to talk about bread.” Of course, however, bringing up the issue of parking in the 
first place was the union’s decision. The vice president’s exasperation that the representative’s 
wanted to focus more on this issue was, therefore, self-induced.

There was a definite imbalance in terms of the attention paid to different union 
members within groups. Within the team that I was working with, state representatives 
generally addressed the two ranking union members, the president and vice president, and 
paid scant attention to the questions and concerns of the graduate students. Even in meetings 
in which a graduate student was a constituent of the representative, the congressman would 
generally direct their discussions as they related to the ranking union members. Regarding the 
pension, for example, representatives would try and stymie the discussion by simply telling the 
president and vice president of the CWW that “the new plan will not affect you, only new 
employees.” During some meetings that were supposed to be facilitated by graduate students, 
the president and vice president would often dominate the discussion and take over the duties 
of the facilitator. Although I believe that their actions were well intentioned, it appeared to me
as though the president and vice president were intentionally neglecting the voices of the union’s younger and more radical members.

From my experience, the manner in which the CWW framed issues for the state representatives differed drastically from the union’s normal course of action. Our discussion of mandatory minimum starting salaries for workers on state campuses, for example, was derided not because of its ability to exacerbate economic inequalities, but because, as the union’s president put it, “the state should not be able to dictate to a business what it pays its employees.” Similarly, the union’s key talking point surrounding the parking was, again, not a measure to help employees so much as a measure that “would come at no cost to the taxpayer.” This shift in the style of argument is an example of one of the many challenges that the union faced in a right-to-work state. Appeals to implement certain measures had to be grounded in arguments that paid homage to the privileged position that business held, despite the fact that state universities are not independent businesses, but arms of the state. Gone from the union’s argument were any comments about economic justice or workers’ rights. Instead, the union framed these issues as measures that would curb the freedom that business should hold.

In addition to meeting with individual legislators, the union also used their day on the Capitol to hold a press conference and network with some of their allies and sister organizations from around the state. The press conference was centered on communicating “the other side of pension reform” and featured brief speeches by some of the union’s key officers. In addition to speaking on the proposed pension reform, the press conference also
served as a conduit through which the CWW spoke about the perceived cronyism in the state legislature and the injustices that had been occurring in higher education across the state.

Although the press conference served as a rallying point for CWW members, only one reporter was present. The reporter showed up halfway through the press conference, took a few pictures and left. After the press conference and in between meetings with representatives, the CWW met with organizers and leaders from the different state chapters as well as with the Statewide Coalition for People’s Empowerment (SCPE). As the day concluded, I asked the CWW president if he thought we had changed any minds. “No. But it’s something we have to do. We have to take this fight to the capitol.”

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On a warm spring evening in 2013, the CWW met for its monthly chapter meeting in a small conference room. The room was unusually crowded as the delegation’s dozen or so regular attendees were joined by a group of undergraduates representing the Enlightened Alliance of Students (EAS) and a group of graduate students representing the Graduate Employees Committee (GES) and two faculty members. The agenda for the meeting consisted of a report back on the union’s actions at lobby day and follow up steps to be taken with our state representatives, an outlay of a new postcard campaign directed at obtaining flat dollar pay raises, and an overview of the national convention of the CWW’s international union. The principal discussion for the evening, however, centered on whether or not the CWW should take a stand regarding the issues surrounding Sex Week and whether they should explicitly endorse the student groups who were protesting the decision. Sex Week, a nationally
recognized event designed to promote sexual awareness and health on college campuses, was scheduled to take place for the first time on the states flagship campus in April 2013. One month before the event was scheduled to take place, however, the chancellor of the university pulled $11,000 of the groups $20,000 operating budget in response to threats of budget review from conservative state lawmakers. The CWW’s stake in the issue was raised when GEC asked the union for permission to participate in the protest and to publish an op-ed in the campus newspaper deriding the decision to pull funding from the event. GEC was hoping to utilize the CWW name and logo in public statements and to promote attendance at a protest surrounding the decision to pull funds by emailing CWW members.

During the debate that followed, the union became divided. Certain members, specifically those who were engaged in mobilizing members around an action involving campus custodial workers, were opposed to the union’s involvement in Sex Week. As one organizer stated: “I think this is opportunistic. I think this is going to result in the loss of members. And I think we have more important issues on the table. Besides, what is the link between this issue and workers’ rights?” Others who were more supportive of the measure added that the potential loss of members should not necessarily bar the union from taking up the cause. As the CWW’s vice president stated: “every time we send out an email alert we lose members, that’s always going to happen.” The president of the union was conflicted about the issue, stating that he would need some time to think about it. The president was principally concerned with how to frame the issue. “Can we frame it generally and mildly enough that we don’t alienate members?” Some of the younger members present at the meeting, principally member of EOC, indicated that endorsing the protest could be beneficial and that participating in the march and
endorsing the action could serve as a serious boost to recruitment. One faculty member, who had not been present at any of the year’s previous meetings, succinctly stated that “I think we owe it to them [the students]. We’ve gotten a lot of support from the EAS and GES in the past, and it seems as though this is the direction that the union movement is taking—more progressive voices, more progressive members.” A staff member in the building services department stated his reluctant support. “As a father, I would much rather have my daughter learning about sex in a healthy, informative and professional manner. For that reason I support it. But I do think that other members may feel differently. I think will probably lose some members, yeah.”

The CWW reluctantly decided that GES could take up the issue, publish the op-ed and participate in the march. GES’s participation was contingent, though, upon their limited use of the CWW name, a promise not to carry any CWW banners or other identifying information in the march and instruction that all statements the group released should be framed around issues of academic freedom and student’s rights.

The scenes described above illustrate key commonalities and challenges in the CWW’s organizing efforts. The scenes also introduce us to some of the key actors and divergent groups who steer the CWW’s actions in various locales across the state. These actors include undergraduate and graduate students, campus staff and faculty, and union organizers and elected union officials. The scene also demonstrates the difficulties that these divergent groups must work to overcome in order to engage in effective union organizing. Following Shefner
I argue that one of the most important aspects that a union must navigate is how to incorporate the expectations of divergent groups under one umbrella. Undergraduate and graduate students within the CWW, and to lesser degree faculty members, generally favored more progressive and inclusive campaigns centered on issues of diversity, discrimination and social justice. Often, student members were disappointed that the union was not more radical. Campus staff tended to be more conservative in both their view of the union and the campaigns with which they would like to see the union engage. Staff concerns centered on issues of pay, pay raises and worker grievances. In addition to being the most pressing issues the union addressed, the union’s leadership team and regular attendees at chapter meetings were made up primarily of staff members. The union’s organizers and elected leaders, while made up mostly of campus staff, were possessed with drastically divergent philosophies regarding the path and direction the CWW should take. One of the aims of this work is to ascertain how these divergent groups work together.

This work attempts to address the dilemmas of organizing in a cross-class, cross-gender, cross-racial union in a climate of declining union membership and regressive right-to-work laws. Again following Shefner (2008), popular mobilization of a broad array of constituents is essential for the union’s ability to push university administrators and elected officials to action. Chiefly, this work examines how a cross constituency union organizes at a large university in a right-to-work state. How are attitudes toward the union and its organizing campaigns differentiated by race, class, gender and skill? How do people who are different work with each other in a hostile organizing atmosphere? How do differences within the CWW counterpose to questions of race, class, gender and skill? An understanding of the CWW’s ability to navigate
around these contentious issues is vital not only to the CWW’s operations but to the ability of organized labor to revitalize itself through the construction of inclusive and diverse organizations.

The scenes depicted above also illustrate some of the classic assumptions and questions regarding labor movements in modern societies posed by the likes of Marx ([1847] 1995), Lenin ([1902] 1969), Luxemburg (1906 [2004]), Poulantzas (1968), and Braverman (1974). How does the CWW organize and construct campaigns that address both their member’s economic and political interests? Does action on the part of the CWW occur spontaneously or does the leadership team display vanguarding tendencies in their effort to steer the organization’s course of action? When, and around what issues, will workers organize? A proper understanding of the theoretical antecedents of labor union formation and action is an essential lens through which to observe the CWW’s organizational capacity, strategy and technique.

Although observing the CWW’s strategy through the lens of German, Russian and Italian theorists is useful, it is also necessary to understand that the American labor movement is exceptional. Comparatively speaking, the American labor movement is the weakest and most politically conservative in the developed world (Voss 1993). Any study that focuses on the American labor movement, implicitly or explicitly, must consider the question of why it is so difficult to organize labor in the United States. This project is no different. In analyzing both the attitudes towards organized labor and the actions of contemporary labor unions, this study also tries to address the exceptional nature of the American labor movement as embodied in the

THE MIXED METHOD APPROACH

In order to address these questions, my study utilizes both a quantitative and a qualitative component. Different research questions lend themselves to different modes of analysis, and a mixed method approach is essential to systematically address the research questions that this study posits. The quantitative component of my research makes use of a CBS News 60 Minutes/Vanity Fair 2010 National Survey dataset. The poll, fielded February 26-28, 2010 solicited respondents' opinion about whether they approve or disapprove of labor unions, the impact of labor unions on the national economy and working people, and whether labor unions had too much, too little, or the right amount of influence on American life and politics. That dataset included variables which measured the respondent’s race, which I hypothesize as the key driver in predicting attitudes towards unions. The dataset also provided information on the other predictors I was interested in examining including information about respondent’s sex, age, geographic region of residence, social class, education level, income, political philosophy, political party identification, and religious identification. Using multinomial linear regression, the analysis serves as an effective method for providing an overview of the current trends in attitudes toward labor unions, for drawing generalized conclusions about the impact
of racial differences on attitudes and towards labor unions, and for clarifying some of the recent discrepancies in the relevant research literature. Further, the statistical analysis provides a baseline that can be used in future analysis and that could prove helpful for designing and implementing union strategies to increase minority membership. The quantitative element is also indispensable in guiding my field research and constructing my interview questions. The quantitative component of my project, therefore, provides many advantages.

Some of the questions that the statistical analysis cannot answer, however, are what strategies labor unions are employing in light of the changing demographic profiles and hostile environments in which they operate? How do labor unions operate effectively within the confines of right-to-work to work states? How does the nature of American exceptionalism constrain organizational campaigns? Are labor unions making the right decisions in allocating resources and implementing political campaigns and strategies? How can unions unite and work with very different constituencies within the same work place? The qualitative component of my project, therefore, consists of an ethnographic study of a labor union in a right-to-work state. The field research project consists of intermittent participant and non-participant observations that occurred over the course of a nine month period as well as semi-structured interviews with eight members of the union in a variety of leadership, organizational and occupational capacities. Taken together, the two components of my research provide both a general overview of the current landscape in which labor unions are operating today, as well as more specific data about the prospects and difficulties of organizing in America.
ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS

Chapter two discusses some theoretical perspectives of labor strategies embodied in the works of Marx ([1847] 1995), Lenin ([1902] 1969), Luxemburg (1906 [2004]), Poulantzas (1968), and Braverman (1974). This chapter addresses some of the classic questions and core assumptions of labor union formation and activity. I address when and around what issues individuals are motivated to organize, the role of class as a determinant of organization capacity and the controversial concept of the vanguard as a union strategy. Although some may argue that these theoretical perspectives are outmoded and out of context, it is impossible to understand the current dilemmas facing organized labor in the United States without a proper understanding of some of the key architects of labor strategy in modernity. Without understanding the theoretical antecedents of labor union formation, the particular trajectory of labor history in the United States cannot be properly understood. Further, the discussion presented in chapter two highlights many of the dilemmas and difficult choices that the CWW is encountering as it struggles to gain strength and recognition.

Chapter three provides a brief historical sketch of labor union activity in the United States within the context of American exceptionalism. Chapter three begins with a brief overview of the origins of the term “American exceptionalism” followed by a short summary of why it has been so difficult to organize in the United States. Following Peterson (1963) I argue that labor union activity in the United States can essentially be characterized in three distinct phases. From their earliest foundations in the 1830s, labor unions were given few protections under either federal law or the legal system. Labor unions generally suffered from both their
lack of protection as well as the advantages that were incurred upon big business. In the instances in which labor unions were able to prosper during this period, it was because they purged their ranks of semi-skilled and un-skilled laborers and focused exclusively on highly skilled craft industries. Because of this, blacks, immigrants and women were consistently barred from joining unions and were discriminated against in the few instances in which they formed their own. The second phase of union activity in the United States occurred between 1933 and 1955 and can be characterized by the implementation of New Deal legislation that explicitly acknowledged the right of unions to organize and bargain collectively. Unions during this period experienced significantly more protection from employer discrimination and were afforded considerable safeguards under the judicial system. As a result, we see a massive spike in union membership that has been unparalleled in US history. The third phase of union activity in the United States describes the period since roughly 1955 in which labor unions have experienced a massive retrenchment of their former gains. Key pieces of legislation have undermined the rights of unions, and their ability to bargain collectively and advocate for social reforms has essentially disappeared. The Reagan administrations attack on unions and the emergence of transnational corporations in the era of globalization continues to erode the strength of unions, and union membership has plummeted to a level not seen since the 1920s. The historical sketch is relevant not only to illustrate these three distinct phases but also to show the history of discrimination that women and racial minorities have faced at the hands of organized labor. The checkered relationship between organized labor and racial minorities can help to explain the contemporary attitudes that members of racial minorities hold toward labor unions in the 21st century.
The second section of chapter three discusses the strategies and tactics of two labor unions that were successful in organizing members of racial minorities. Both the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) and the United Farm Workers (UFW) were able to successfully recruit and unionize African Americans and Latinos, respectively, within the confines of certain industries and locales. Principally, both the BSCP and the CWW illustrate successful attempts on the part of labor unions to organize and recruit members of minority populations. Their success highlights the appeal of labor unions to people of color and demonstrates that certain constituencies may be more likely to become members of a labor union.

In Chapter Four, I present the quantitative methodology that allowed me to address one of the project’s research questions: are attitudes toward labor unions differentiated by the race of the respondent. I discuss the origins and selection of the dataset, the variables used in the analysis, the regression diagnostics that were performed and the results of the study. The quantitative component illustrates the persistence of racial differences in attitudes towards labor unions even after controlling for numerous social, political and economic attributes. The analysis also points toward prospects for increasing union membership among certain segments of the U.S. population.

In Chapter Five, I present the qualitative methodology that allowed me to address another of my research questions: how does a union organize in a hostile workplace with multiple constituencies? I discuss several aspects of my field research including sample selection, data collection methods and analytic procedures. The findings presented illustrate the continuing significance of the classic theoretical questions and assumptions regarding
organized labor, the difficulties of organizing across race, class and status and the opportunities and barriers to organizational success in a right-to-work state.

The project concludes with an evaluation of the current trends in organizing strategy in light of the theoretical, historical, quantitative, and qualitative analysis presented. How do people who are different in terms of race, class, skill and occupation work with each other? What does the future hold for the CWW in terms of its organizational strategies and recruitment capacities? The differing experiences of a divergent group of CWW members returns me to my concluding discussion of how race and skill intersect in labor union campaigns in Chapter Six.
CHAPTER 2 SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LABOR STRATEGY

In order to offer a critique of the current trends in labor union organization and counter movement tendencies, it is first essential to understand and articulate a theoretical history of labor organizations in the modern world. This chapter will attempt to highlight some of the chief theoretical origins of labor unions in the works of Karl Marx, V. I. Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Harry Braverman and Nicos Poulantzas. This chapter will address three key issues raised by these theorists: should labor unions organize around the economic or political interests of the working class? When and how do labor movements emerge? And should labor movements be guided by the workers themselves or by a vanguard of intellectual elites? The nature of this theoretical review will serve to highlight some of the historical challenges that labor unions in modernity have faced and will further illuminate the historical trajectory of labor unions in the United States that is described in chapter three.

POLITICAL VERSUS ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Marx ([1847] 1995) discusses the prospect of working class organization and political struggle and argues that attempts by labor associations to promote economic interests are antithetical to their overarching goals. According to Marx, the first attempt at working class organizations in capitalist societies always takes place in the form of combinations. Combinations serve to unite the working class against the capitalist in light of the fact that members of the working class are in competition with one another without collective organizing. Within bourgeois society “an individual’s sense of identity and solidarity with others is in large part repressed in the daily battle of all against all for economic survival”
(Booth 1978: 167). The formation of combinations, therefore, is immediately necessary simply to keep up the level of wages and to drive down the competition that occurs among workers. Although one of the initial aims of combinations is to protect the level of wages of the working class, the key objective is to serve as a counterbalance to united capital and to fulfill the need for solidarity and fellowship. For Marx ([1847] 1995), the notion of solidarity and collective consciousness was essential for a successful labor movement. So much so that Marx argues that the working class will eventually be willing to ransom their wages in favor of maintaining their organizations. Marx argues that, once working class associations realize that their strength resides in the maintenance of the combination, working class associations take on a political character.

Lenin ([1902] 1969) breaches the subject of labor association strategy from a wholly different vantage point than Marx ([1847] 1995). Lenin argues that, in their attempts to formulate and defend working class associations, all working class movements inevitably resort to bourgeois arguments. Lenin is dismissive of the ability of working class movements to articulate an alternative and independent ideology to that of bourgeoisie capitalism. Instead of realizing the need for solidarity and fellowship, working class movements would only become more and more entrenched in defending their economic interests within capitalism. As a result, Lenin argues that there are but two ideologies to choose from: bourgeois or socialist. For Lenin, it was inevitable that labor associations would be subsumed by bourgeois ideology and relegate themselves to bargaining exclusively for their economic interests.
Luxemburg ([1906] 2004) lies in broad agreement with Marx’s ([1847] 1995) assertion that proletarian struggles must assume a political character. Revolutions, mass strikes and trade unions could serve as forms of class struggle with emancipatory potential “only in connection with definite political situations” (Luxemburg [1906] 2004:171). Luxemburg argues that it was a “great mistake” on the part of trade unions to transform general political strikes into a number of small and fragmented economic strikes across Eastern Europe from 1896-1903 ([1906] 2004: 181). When isolated economic strikes occur without any political coloring they result only in small scale sympathetic movements which fail to generate a “general storm” of proletariat action (Luxemburg 1906 [2004]: 196). For Luxemburg, trade unions were, at their best, a necessary and essential conduit for channeling and organizing political action. At their worst, however, Luxemburg recognized how trade unions could sap the political struggle from workers movements and subordinate the political goals to the economic goals.

Poulantzas (1968) attempts to blend the views of both Lenin and Luxemburg with regard to the economic and political role of trade unions within capitalist society. He holds that Lenin too narrowly distinguished between the economic and political stages of trade union formation. According to Poulantzas, Lenin ([1902] 1969) did not exclude trade unions entirely from potential political activity; Lenin simply argued that the political needs of such associations would always be subordinate to their economic needs. The dominance of economic agitation is evident “not by an absence of ‘pertinent effects’ at the level of political struggle, but in a certain form of political struggle” (Poulantzas 1968: 83). The form of political struggle that trade unions embarked upon was, for Lenin, always ineffectual in achieving social democratic reforms for the workers.
Poulantzas (1968) argues, along the lines of Luxemburg (1906 [2004]), that the political role of trade unions was essential for the revolutionary struggle of the working class. Poulantzas was also quick to recognize, however, that many of the failings of trade unions could be ascribed to the failings of working class ideology. Like Lenin ([1902] 1969), Poulantzas illustrates how the lack of political organization on the part of trade unions is related to the subordination of working class ideology to the dominant bourgeois ideology. Where Luxemburg failed, according to Poulantzas, was in her inability “to recognize the ideological role of the party” (1968: 206). Poulantzas further argues that popular unification of the working class can only arise out of doctrinaire class differences with other classes in society. He understands the problems associated with class fragmentation and calls for a Marxist reorientation of class whereby workers define their position according to whether they are owners of capital or sellers of labor power. Poulantzas’ orientation towards labor unions grows out of his Marxist alignment towards class as defined in terms of the struggle between workers and capitalists.

Braverman (1974) takes a more positive stance towards labor unions than either Lenin or Luxemburg, but he is less than sanguine about unionization efforts in light of the capitalist’s ability to coopt working class unions. Although Braverman is, at times, optimistic about labors capability to articulate and carry out revolutionary programs, overall he sees labor as having “lost the will and ambition to wrest control of production from capitalist hands” (1974: 10-11). Unlike Poulantzas (1968) who sees the inability of labor to articulate an alternative ideology as a chief failure of trade unions, Braverman argues that the effects of bureaucratization and scientific management have undermined labor unions effectiveness. Because of the effect of
scientific management and differentiated modes of production, the labor movement as a whole has undergone a weakened impetus for revolutionary change.

Braverman’s (1974) analysis is grounded in what he views as the extraordinary development of scientific technology, scientific management, the productivity of labor and the levels of working class consumption. Braverman argues that the unionized working class has become intimidated by the scale of the capitalist mode of production and, as a result, “has turned evermore to bargaining over labor’s share in the product” (1974:10). Braverman illustrates how the working philosophy of labor unions and Marxists alike turned away from a critique of the mode of capitalist production to focus increasingly on critiques of capitalism as a mode of distribution. Baffled by the scientific intricacy and impressed by the productivity of the labor process, unions came to capitulate to the demands and damaging evolution of capital. In this regard, Braverman argues how the trajectory of unions and Marxist political parties prior to the outbreak of World War I led to “their joint drift toward a thoroughly nonrevolutionary outlook” (1974:10). In essence, Braverman (1974) illustrates how the increasingly complex mode of production and distribution utilized by capitalists has placed a stranglehold on the efforts for revolutionary change. Instead of attempting to understand and dismantle capitalism as a mode of production, unions have settled for simply attempting to gain a larger share of the capitalist pie.

SPONTANEITY

Marx ([1847] 1995) argues that the realization on the part of combinations to sacrifice their wages for solidarity would occur spontaneously. Eventually, the maintenance of wages
would become less important to workers associations than the maintenance of the combination. Once this spontaneous realization occurred, Marx illustrates that workers were willing to sacrifice “a good part of their wages in favor of associations” ([1847] 1995:185). Marx clearly states that it is not until the working class becomes cognizant of its need to counter united capital and strive for solidarity that worker associations begin to assume their political character. Just as the bourgeoisie was able to successfully formulate their ideology and overthrow feudalism and monarchy over time, the workers associations, for Marx, will serve as a necessary launching pad for the formulation of a working class ideology over time. Once combinations reach their zenith and take on this political character, Marx believes that they are primed to begin a struggle against the capitalist class. The combination unites the interests of the working class and serves as a conduit through which it can manifest itself as “a class for itself” (Marx [1847] 1995:189). The working class cannot begin to struggle against the bourgeoisie until it has been so established. Marx argued that “the proletariat became socialist spontaneously and that the proletarian revolution was inevitable” (Hammond 1957:31).

Lenin ([1902] 1969) argued that the spontaneous and organic formation of the working class ideology can only lead to its relegation to bourgeois ideology. The spontaneous formation of working class associations and working class ideology Marx describes leads only to trade-unionism or “the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie” (Lenin [1902] 1969:57). Since no independent ideology can be formulated by working class associations, Lenin’s goal, or the goal of social democracy, is to combat spontaneity. Lenin considers any failed efforts to stymie spontaneity as the equivalent of rejecting socialism. Only after struggling against the spontaneity of working class associations could social democracy finally
find a foothold. Lenin makes the assertion that bourgeois ideology takes hold of spontaneous working class ideology because it is older, more developed and has more means and resources for combating the movement than do socialist ideologies. In order for socialist ideology to take root in society, “it must become imbued with intolerance against those who wish to retard its growth through their subservience to spontaneity.” Further, Lenin argues that socialist ideology must be brought to the working class from without rather than developed from within. Lenin rejects Marx’s theory of combinations and spontaneity and asserts that Marx and Engels could have only arrived at their position of working class spontaneity and ideology because they themselves were members of the bourgeois intelligentsia.

Instead of labor union associations and parliamentary strategies, Luxemburg ([1906] 2004) advocates for spontaneous action on the part of the working class in the form of mass strikes and social upheavals. Luxemburg argued that the techniques employed by workers associations, such as their use of the mass strike, the “heart-beat of the revolution,” had to occur spontaneously ([1906] 2004: 192). Attempts by trade unions and intellectuals to call for and coordinate a mass strike only increased the chances that the movement would fragment and fall prey to economic goals. For Luxemburg, coordinated action on the part of union leaders and leftist intellectuals played only a subordinate role to the mass strike which originated out of the proletariat itself. Luxemburg’s critique is grounded in her overarching opposition to parliamentary compromise and elitist organization schemes. Spontaneity, therefore, should be championed and should supersede the centralization of organizational schemas and programs. The success of the mass strike, for example, “proved that ‘the masses do not exist to be schoolmastered’” (Hudis and Anderson 2004:12).
VANGUARD

Lenin ([1902] 1969) is keen is his observation of the ability of bourgeoisie ideology to co-opt the movement of workers associations. Lenin argues that it is a “profound mistake” to assume that the worker associations will ever formulate an independent ideology ([1902] 1969:109). Lenin provides evidence from Kautsky to illustrate how socialism could never arrive organically out of the modern social process. Kautsky argues that the socialist ideology could only arise out of “profound scientific knowledge” ([1902] 1969:69). The problem, for Kautsky and Lenin, was that the command of science lay not with the proletariat but with the bourgeoisie. As a result, the socialist consciousness had to be imported.

Lenin’s ([1902] 1969) notion of the vanguard stemmed from his belief that the working class, if left to their own devices, would only focus on economic struggles in order to better their lot within capitalism. In order to grapple with the complexities of capitalism and the need for a truly revolutionary movement, working class movements would require careful and conscious leaders to keep the key aims in sight. Lenin believed that a conscious leader was indispensable and should be applauded “when he marches ahead of the spontaneous movement, points out the road, and when he is able ahead of all others to solve all the theoretical, political, tactical and organizational questions which the ‘material elements’ of the movement spontaneously encounter” (Hammond 1957:27). Although he recognized that socialist movement would require the support of the workers themselves, “he felt that the spontaneity of the masses had to be controlled and directed along proper channels” (Hammond 1957:29). Lenin’s vanguardist position applies directly to his attitude toward trade associations.
Union leaders must control the spontaneous action of their members or else they run the risk of betraying their true purpose.

Luxemburg (1906 [2004]) was extremely critical of Lenin’s notion of the vanguard. Luxemburg advocated for providing the proletariat with “a high degree of political education, of class consciousness and organization” but she desired to do so through a “living political school” organized and executed by the proletariat (1906 [2004]: 182). Luxemburg believed that the formation of a true class consciousness could be realized in the day to day struggles that the working class faced and, in stark contrast to Lenin, did not believe that a socialist political party was a necessary vehicle to enact and guide the revolution.

Although there is broad disagreement in the theoretical literature regarding the appropriate measures that labor unions should take to ameliorate the conditions of capital and attempt to bring about a more democratic economy, several key themes do emerge. The argument that the aim of labor organizations should focus on socio-political and not economic agitation is apparent throughout the literature. Attempts by labor unions to agitate and bargain exclusively for economic gains only serves to reinforce the hold that capital has over labor. Capitulating to the ideological underpinnings of capitalism debases the goal of organized labor and the possibility for alternatives. The chief theoretical origins of labor associations in the works of Marx ([1847] 1995), Lenin ([1902] 1969), Luxemburg (1906 [2004]), Poulantzas (1968), and Braverman (1974) provides a vast examination of the historical, cultural and political challenges that labor unions face. That being said, the analysis presented in the following chapter illustrates how labor unions in the United States have moved further and
further away from organizing around systemic social and political change and have come to focus their efforts almost exclusively on bargaining for wages and benefits. The inapplicability of theorists such as Marx, Lenin and Luxemburg within the context of the American labor movement is evident precisely because of the divergent trajectory that unions have taken in the United States. I posit that an understanding of American exceptionalism may provide some insight into why this has been the case in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 3 A SHORT U.S. LABOR HISTORY: WHY HAS IT BEEN SO DIFFERENT?

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In the current age of capital liberalization and globalization, trade unions have come under increasingly damaging attacks (Fantasia and Voss 2004). The ability of labor unions to influence the debate on labor standards and social reforms has experienced a significant decline in the contemporary era (Dixon 2010; Lawler 1990; Wright 2003). This chapter will attempt to highlight some of the historical challenges that labor unions in the United States have faced in order to illuminate the current state of labor in the 21st century. This chapter will analyze some of the key historical trends in labor union movement and activity in the United States and will examine the outcomes of labor unions as a result of social, political and judicial opportunities and constraints. Interspersed throughout this chapter is a discussion of American exceptionalism. The unique characteristics of the U.S. Labor movement compared with other advanced nations can help to illuminate why America has been so different. Further, the notion of American exceptionalism moves us from the classic theoretical questions to contemporary issues facing labor today. I begin with a brief discussion of the origins and use of the term “American exceptionalism” before moving on to examine the three distinct phases of U.S. labor history.

ORIGINS AND USE OF THE TERM AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

The origin of the term “American exceptionalism” is generally attributed to de Tocqueville ([1835] 2002). One theme central to de Tocqueville’s discussion was the way the United States differed from other European countries, notably France, on issues pertaining to
the size of government, the proliferation of voluntary associations and the reconciliation of freedom and equality. Although there is certainly an argument to be made that de Tocqueville’s recognition of these and other American anomalies are reason enough to suggest his implicit endorsement of American exceptionalism a more refined reading of Tocqueville suggests that he believed that the United States shared far more commonalities with Europe than divergences. de Tocqueville’s one scant use of the word “exceptional” indicates as much:

I cannot consent to separate America from Europe, in spite of the ocean which intervenes. I consider the people of the United States as that portion of the English people which is commissioned to explore the wilds of the New World; whilst the rest of the nation, enjoying more leisure and less harassed by the drudgery of life, may devote its energies to thought, and enlarge in all directions the empire of the mind. The position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one ([1835] 2002 517-518).

The only truly exceptional quality that America possessed was, for de Tocqueville, a vast and uncharted expanse of wilderness, which its inhabitants were forced to toil with. Because of this, Americans had neither the time nor the use for the development of art and science. If we are to credit Tocqueville with the term, his usage indicates only “the social scientific idea of exceptionalism, meaning uniqueness in relation to most other nations” (Ceaser 2012:5).

Exceptionalism’s more embellished meaning is generally derived from John Winthrop’s remarks aboard the Arbella in 1630 in which he described the first Puritan settlement that was to be built on the new continent as “the city on the hill” (Ceaser 2012:5). This remark, as
Hodgson (2009) notes, was extolled by Ronald Reagan during his speech before the Conservative Political Action Conference in 1974 and again during his farewell address in 1989. In addition to pointing out the numerous historical flaws that Reagan made when recounting Winthrop's proclamation, Hodgson goes on to state that “[t]he Puritans who sailed to Massachusetts Bay were not unique in their desire for religious and political freedom. All over Europe... there were communities courageously striving for precisely those two freedoms” (2009:8). There was nothing inherently exceptional about either the remarks or the voyage that Winthrop engaged. As Hodgson (2009) notes, the desire for religious and political freedom was, instead, a product of strictly European origin.

The origins of the term “American exceptionalism” are less alarming than the manner in which the term is used in contemporary political rhetoric. “Conservatives” Ceaser argues, “want Americans to think of themselves as special, and they take great pride in pointing to how America is unlike other advanced democracies” (2012:3). Exceptionalism, for conservatives, means minimal income taxes, laissez faire economic policies and limited government. On the world stage, exceptionalism means that America has a right, even an obligation, to unilaterally intervene in the affairs of other countries, to spread democracy and capitalism and to supersede the decrees of the international community (Ceaser 2012). Such notions of exceptionalism were invoked by a cadre of Republicans running for President in 2012 and have been used as a rallying cry for conservatives ever since. “Liberals” according to Ceaser, “would like Americans to think of America as being more ‘ordinary’ and in step with the advanced democracies in the world” (2012:2). Such a view would, for Ceaser (2012), manifest itself, domestically, in increased welfare provisions, progressive income taxes and universal health
care policies. With regards to foreign policy, a more “ordinary” outlook would result in declining military intervention and a drastically improved national image in the eyes of the rest of the world.

The notion of American exceptionalism as employed in conservative rhetoric serves as the key issue with which Hodgson (2009) takes objection. It is not simply the manner in which the likes of de Tocqueville and Winthrop have been taken hostage for political gain, but the insidious nature of American exceptionalism as ideology and foreign policy. For Hodgson (2009), America was once imbued with a liberating set of beliefs, but, in the last half century, America has reneged on many of its promises. “It is also now proving dangerous,” Hodgson argues, “to the United States and to the world, to overemphasize the exceptional nature of the American experience and the American destiny” (2009:9). One of Hodgson’s (2009) most notable contributions is his ability to debunk many of the self-promulgating ways in which the conservative character of exceptionalism has taken root in America. Hodgson’s illustration of the ways in which history has been rewritten, such as with “the Americanization of the Holocaust” and the way in which Americans “exaggerate their own generosity” with regard to foreign aid illuminate the deceptive nature of Conservative exceptionalism (2009: 119, 116). What Hodgson aptly illustrates is that the use of exceptionalism as ideology had led to the corruption of traditional notions of equality and democracy. Without a proper understanding of the myriad ways in which this notion of exceptionalism functions as ethos, “the United States is not likely to recapture the admiration and affection the American people earned by their achievements” (Hodgson 2009:189).
A proper understanding of “American exceptionalism” is essential in order to explore the challenges that organized labor faces in the United States. In order to address the challenge of American Exceptionalism as it applies to the labor movement, Lipset (1996) illustrates how the United States differs from its European and Canadian counterparts in a bevy of societal and political ways. From a societal standpoint, Lipset (1996) illustrates how the lack of a feudal tradition in the United States has stymied the ability of individuals to organize on a class basis. Lipset (1996) argues that the absence of a feudal system and predominance of the liberal tradition have blinded Americans to the rampant inequality and undemocratic nature of its political system. Additionally, the relative increase in the standard of living in the United States has had a detrimental impact on labor organizing. In the instances in which relative affluence did decline, it was usually concentrated among marginalized groups with the lowest levels of political clout and voter participation. Another exceptional factor which Lipset (1996) describes, perhaps as a result of the frontier myth and the opportunity for geographic mobility, is the lack of stable community groups in America which may have had a deleterious effect on the formation of class consciousness. The final societal factor that Lipset (1996) posits is the extreme heterogeneity of the citizenry. A history of racism, a continued and steady stream of immigration and a multitude of religious sects have all combined to fragment and divide the American working class.

From a political standpoint, Lipset (1996) argues that the “gift of suffrage” in the United States was, in notable ways, a curse for the working class and socialist politics. Because Americans were not forced to struggle for the ballot in ways akin to their European counterparts, there was never an opportunity to undergird class politics. Further, as Lipset
notes “Lenin himself stressed that socialism grew through the struggle for electoral democracy” (1996: 86). Another political barrier which prevented the formation of a strong union movement in the United States was the general makeup of the electoral system. Within a two coalition system, Lipset notes “it is almost mandated by the constitution that efforts at slowly building up third parties must fail” (1996:86). Instead of providing opportunities for the gradual development of third parties, the two-party system ensures that effective policies originating within civil society groups and third parties will be co-opted by one of the majority groups. The final political barrier to socialism and unionization that Lipset (1996) describes, and to which Voss (1993) attributes the utmost importance, is the extreme repression that the labor movement in the United States has faced at the behest of organized capital. Labor movements in the United States, Lipset argues, “have suffered from political repression that broke up the continuity of radical protest” (1996:86).

It is within this context of American exceptionalism that I present a short history of labor organizing in the United States. Using a mixture of comparative and historical accounts, I ask whether or not the US labor movement has always been exceptional or if there is a distinct moment at which point the labor movement became exceptional. I further explore the declining ability of unions to influence policy, bargain for wages and contracts and increase membership. Throughout, I pose the question: Why is the US labor movement so different from labor movements in other advanced capitalist nations?
Although the first labor organizations in the United States were formed in the 1790’s, the formation of national organizations did not occur until mid-1830. Eventually, as workers began to see the prospect of creating labor organizations as paying real dividends, unions began to amalgamate across industry lines and the National Trades’ Union was formed in 1834. Like its counterparts in England and France, the National Trades’ Union possessed very narrow artisanal roots. In most instances, early labor associations were organized in a manner similar to medieval guilds (Voss 1993). Generally, an individual would apprentice himself to a master craftsman who was responsible not only for the vocational education of his apprentice but also for providing room, board, tools and the social and economic capital to establish his apprentice in the trade. Here, Voss (1993) takes a somewhat divergent route from that of Lipset (1996) and argues that, although there was certainly no tradition of feudalism in the United States, there was a very rigid hierarchy of social and economic positions in the early nineteenth century and that employers, at least within skilled industries, felt some sense of moral obligation towards their employees. In addition to bargaining for better wages, the National Trades’ Union also concerned itself with numerous social reforms such as “free public schools, abolition of imprisonment for debt, and elimination of property qualifications for voting” (Peterson 1963:8). The National Trades’ Union enjoyed increasing success and membership until the financial panic of 1837. In the years following the panic, the national organization, as well as most of its local subsidiaries, collapsed (Fink 1977). It was not until the 1850s that labor organizations began to rebound in the United States.
Voss (1993) takes a similar stance to that of Peterson and documents how this traditional system of production and reciprocal obligation had all but collapsed by the late 1830’s in both the United States and Europe. Voss argues that the demise of craft industries had less to do with technological advancement than with “expanding markets and improvements in transportation” (1993:27). Merchants now had access to large swaths of raw materials and had to find a way to increase the speed of production while reducing the cost. The increased division of labor all but destroyed the remaining craft industries, but the process also began to erode the differences between skilled and less-skilled workers. Most notably, the push to mechanization, the increased division of labor and the emergence of more and more large factories decreased both the physical distance as well as the skill difference between employees. Although this certainly did not ensure that workers would begin to organize across class lines, Voss argues that it did create a situation in which skilled and less skilled workers worked in the same setting, shared the same fears of being replaced and shared many common grievances. In sum, workers had a sense of decreasing social distance in the period between 1830-1870 which served to lay the ground work for the formation of the Knights of Labor. Further, Voss also illustrates how the trajectory of labor union formation followed similar paths in England and France. Again, Voss diverges from Lipset’s (1996) societal and political barriers to union formation, and argues that “if the earliness of universal suffrage and individualism did mitigate against class consciousness in the United States, it did not do so in any immediate or direct manner. The first moments of working class formation resembled each other much more than they differed” (1993:45).
The spike in labor organizations in the 1850s is generally associated with increased industrial activities and the rising cost of goods in the wake of the California Gold Rush (Peterson 1963). Unlike the National Trades’ Union, unions in the 1840s and 1850s were primarily concerned with bargaining for better wages and hours. Disaster struck labor unions again during the depression of 1857 “when unemployment and wage cuts affected union treasuries and morale” (Peterson 1963:9). The decline of unions during the depression of 1857 is indicative of unionism in the United States during the 19th and early 20th centuries: except in rare cases, during times of financial prosperity the number of labor organizations increase, while during times of fiscal crises union formation and participation decrease dramatically.

It was not until the end of the Civil War that union membership began to increase. Peterson (1963) argues that returning soldiers had an increased interest in organizing for four main reasons. First, unions were able to alleviate some of the problems that resulted from the printing of large amounts of currency during the war such as soaring commodity prices and wage stagnation. Second, returning soldiers found it difficult to return to their old jobs because of the general increase in machine production. Third, existing work standards were being eroded because of immigrant labor and, fourth, improved transportation allowed goods to be manufactured in low cost areas. Although the boom in labor union organization and membership in the wake of the Civil War is important, it also highlights many of the contemporary problems facing the domestic and international labor movement such as the movement’s xenophobic nature and its emphasis on nationalistic interests.
One of the first successful attempts to unite workers across industry lines was the formation of the National Labor Union in 1866. The National Labor Union was a mixture of several trade union and reform organizations. Although its principal interest was the attainment of an eight-hour work day, the National Labor Union “turned more and more to political action and began to espouse varied kinds of reform measures, social and fiscal” (Peterson 1963:9). Interestingly, the more politically active the union became the less successful it was in recruiting new members and organizations. Essentially, the National Labor Union’s political reform approaches “isolated it more and more from the growing economic trade union movement” (Fink 1977:244). The National Labor Union was officially disbanded in 1872 after a failed attempt to form a political party based on labor reform.

The next major labor organization to emerge in the United States was the Knights of Labor, which was formed in the 1880’s. The decreasing social and economic distance between skilled and semi-skilled workers led the Knights of Labor to focus on the recruitment of a diverse and inclusive sector of the working class. In addition to actively recruiting semi-skilled workers, the Knights also began to absorb the remaining craft assemblies that had been weakened or destroyed during the depression of the late nineteenth century. The Knights tactics paid off, and, by the summer of 1885 “a local assembly had been established in nearly every city and mid-size town in the country” (Voss 1993:76). Working class movements in England and France were, according to Voss (1993), similarly thriving. Voss illustrates how, in England, workers were creating a “new” unionism that simultaneously brought less skilled workers into the labor movement and pushed their members towards socialism (1993:100). In France, artisans began to organize less skilled workers and supported “revolutionary
syndicalism” (Voss 1993:100). It is here, however, that the paths of the labor movements in England, France and the United States diverge drastically.

As impressive as the Knights meteoric rise to prominence was, their collapse was equally rapid. Following the Haymarket strikes in Chicago and the violence surrounding the Haymarket bombing in 1886, the Knights were forced to call off their strike against the despised Jay Gould “without winning a single demand” (Voss 1993:78). In the aftermath of these events, workers began to leave the Knights en masse, and the organization was forced into factional battles with the newly formed American Federation of Labor (AFL). However, as Voss (1993) is quick to point out, it was not the events of the Haymarket incident that doomed the Knights or led to the exceptional character of the American labor movement. “Instead, it is the fruit of class struggle waged in the 1880’s between organized labor and organized capital. American industrial relations and labor politics are exceptional because in 1886 and 1887 employers won the class struggle” (Voss 1993:232). Voss documents how the Knights were victims of their organizing success. The growing strength of the Knights led organized capital to form employer associations, and, with the absence of state assistance to labor, these associations were able “to wage a knock-down drag-out fight with the Knights” (Voss 1993:235). Unlike in England and France where new-unionism and radical syndicalism, respectively, undergirded the labor movement for continued expansiveness and political achievement, the collapse of the Knights of Labor once again relegated the American labor movement to small group of skilled workers organized almost exclusively within craft industries. As Voss concludes “the failure of the Knights marks the moment when, from a comparative perspective, the American labor movement began to look exceptional” (1993:235).
The remaining members of the Knights of Labor were essentially disbanded due to conflicts between skilled and unskilled workers. “A false sense of power gripped many rank and file members,” and skilled workers left the union in large numbers to form smaller trade-specific organizations (Fink 1977:167). The fallout of the Knights of Labor highlights another general problem that labor unions face: the hierarchical nature of unions, between skilled and unskilled workers, can result in major discontent among members that can ultimately be fatal to the organization as a whole.

In response to the fallout of the Knights of Labor, the AFL was formed in 1886. Because of the resentment between skilled and unskilled workers that the Knights of Labor witnessed, the AFL granted complete autonomy to each craft-specific union within its ranks. Each trade organization was allowed to draw up its own constitution and rules of governance. Although this move was harmful to the “one-big-union-idea,” it did allow for a considerably more consistent labor agenda to be formed by the AFL. In contrast to previous labor organizations, the AFL “early adopted the policy of concentrating its efforts on the economic front and relegating political action to a minor role” (Peterson 1963:13). As a result of its narrowed role, the AFL was able to make gains in areas that previous labor organizations had failed. During the extended depression of the 1890s, for example, Fink (1977) discusses how the AFL was able to expand its organizational membership as well as its collective bargaining advantage.

The gains made by the AFL during this period, however, were zero-sum in the sense that “it was no doubt its limited coverage of skilled crafts which enabled it to carry on during periods when other forms of organization were unable to survive” (Peterson 1963:13). Furthermore,
the AFL’s disregard of unskilled workers meant that blacks, immigrants and women were disproportionately discriminated against in union memberships. Although racial discrimination was prohibited in the 1890s, blacks were continually excluded through union customs and were barred from membership “except for a few segregated auxiliary unions” (Fink 1977:14). Likewise, there was almost no concern for women workers, “whose place was ideally considered to be in the home” (Fink 1977:14). Similarly, although the AFL removed immigration restrictions in 1900, “many leaders made no secret of their preference for the ‘old’ immigrants (North Europeans) compared to the ‘new’ immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe” (Fink 1977:14). Although this period saw the formation of several unions directed specifically at blacks and women, such as the Colored National Labor Union in 1869 and the Women’s Trade Union League in 1903, Fink argues that all minority labor unions experienced extreme discrimination and “never could rely on either the AFL or individual unions for support” (1977:411). Essentially, the improved bargaining ability of the AFL was due, in large part, to its rejection of socialism and other leftist aims and its discrimination against unskilled workers who were disproportionately made up of women and minorities.

Further compounding the problems that labor organizations faced was the increasing influence that large corporations were gaining during the beginning of the 20th Century. In industries that were dominated by one large corporation, such as the railway and steel industries, labor unions saw their influence wane and eventually disappear. The American Railway Union, for example, “was virtually extinguished after the strike in 1894 in which it faced the combined opposition of the Pullman Company and the Railway Managers Association” (Peterson 1963:14). Similarly, the formation of the United States Steel Corporation in 1901 and
its subsequent adoption of anti-union policies “practically eliminated” the Iron and Steel Workers Union “from all major steel concerns in the country” (Peterson 1963:14).

Exacerbating problems further, this period also witnessed the formation of anti-union organizations, such as the American Anti-Boycott Association in 1902, which “sought to attack unions through the courts” as well as “through political and legislative means” (Peterson 1963:14). The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, for example, allowed the courts “to impose increasing restrictions on the activities of unions” (Peterson 1963:103). The Sherman Anti-Trust Act gave employers “legal protection against boycotts, picketing and other acts of unions which might hinder him from selling his product, or from preventing him from getting new employees to take the place of strikers” (Peterson 1963:103). The Supreme Court subsequently evoked the Sherman Anti-Trust Act against Eugene V. Debs for his leadership in the Pullman Railroad Company strike as well as against the AFL’s nationwide boycott against the Buck Stove and Range Company in 1911. Debs was eventually found guilty and jailed for six months. Essentially, the Court’s opinion towards labor in the early 20th Century “meant that even acts of peaceful persuasion were illegal if they resulted in curtailment of trade and impairment of the ‘good will’ of business” (Peterson 1963:104).

Nowhere was the shift in labor movement organization more visible than it was with the decline of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW; also known as the Wobblies). Founded in 1905, the IWW represented a rejection of the AFL and a return to the “one-big-union-idea.” The main goal of the IWW was “the substitution for the existing government of a workers society in which the unions would own and operate all industry” (Peterson 1963:18). In
contrast to the AFL, the IWW sought to include immigrants and low-wage, low-skilled workers into its membership. Fink (1977) illustrates how the IWW sought to improve working conditions on the job and was successful in organizing boycotts and strikes among depressed textile, silk, agriculture, lumber and mining workers around the country. However, as the United States drifted towards war in 1917, the IWW came under increasing attacks for their anti-war sentiment. Many IWW members refused to register for the draft, and some of their strikes and organizing efforts were directed against industries involved in the war. “Upset by the revolutionary rhetoric, the violence that accompanied IWW strikes and, most of all, the IWW’s opposition to the war effort, agents of the federal government determined to exterminate the IWW menace” (Fisk 1977:153). From 1917-1918, raids and arrests were conducted against thousands of members of the IWW and by the spring of 1918 “virtually all capable IWW leaders were either awaiting trial, in prison, or in exile” (Fink 1977:153).

Ironically, America’s entry into World War I had a positive impact on most other labor organizations in general and the AFL in particular. Representatives from the majority of labor organizations in the United States convened in March of 1917 to create a statement expressing the sentiment of labor organizations and upholding the rights of workers during the war effort. Essentially, the statement “expressed the demand that the organized labor movement be recognized by the government...and that organized labor be given representation in all agencies determining and administering policies of national defense” (Peterson 1963:16). The statement was accepted by the Council of National Defense, the Secretary of Labor and National War Labor Board, and principles of collective bargaining and workers representation were adopted by the major industries involved in the war effort (Peterson 1963:17). As a result, trade unions
began to experience significant gains in their push for better hours, wages and working conditions as well as in their organization’s membership. In 1919 and 1920, for instance, “more than one and a half million joined the various unions, bringing the total membership to over five million. This represented a peak not surpassed until 1937” (Peterson 1963:19). However, this surge in union membership was short lived and many of the gains that unions had made were erased over the next two decades.

In the aftermath of World War I, “employers throughout the country started a movement to destroy unionism” (Peterson 1963:20). The so-called open-shop movement consisted of a variety of manufacturers’ associations, boards of trade, chambers of commerce, bankers’ associations and other organizations that provided aid to employers in the form of “blacklists of union members and furnishing money, spies and strikebreakers to employers involved in strikes” (Peterson 1963:21). As a result, “union after union lost its war and postwar gains under the combined onslaught of the antiunion drives and the wage cuts introduced during the postwar depression of 1921-1922” (Peterson 1963:21). Industry after industry began to reject union agreements and union preferential hiring. Many shop owners reinstated the twelve-hour workday and instituted wage reduction plans. Union membership declined from five million in 1920 to three and a half million in 1924 and “contrary to all similar experiences in the past, continued to decline after the return of business prosperity” (Peterson 1963:21).

The generally cited reason for the decline in unionism during the 1920s was the failure of existing unions to incorporate mass production and low skilled industries into their ranks
(Peterson 1963; Rehmus and McLaughlin 1967). At the time, trade unions were composed almost entirely of skilled workers, and factory based industries, such as the automotive industry, were almost completely absent of union activity. Also contributing to the decline in union membership was the rise of welfare capitalism. Pension plans, life insurance policies and health care programs led many workers to believe that unions were no longer necessary. As a result, unions were no longer able to recruit new members using the same organization drives that had been so successful in the past. In response, many unions began to adopt a new “front door” approach in which “organizers went directly to employers and sought closed shop contracts in return for promises of a more efficient and stable workforce” (Peterson 1963:24). In the few instances in which employers actually allowed unions to recruit in this manner the response was negligible and the organizations served as “little more than company unions” (Peterson 1963:24). By 1933, union membership was at less than three million and labor organizations continued to struggle as a result of the Great Depression of the 1930s (Wright 2003).

1933-1955

It was not until the passage of New Deal Legislation that unions began to see a rebound in membership. With the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933 and the formation of a New Deal coalition of Democrats, labor unions witnessed a spike in membership unprecedented in US history. The National Industry Recovery Act of 1933 was instrumental in promoting a return to unionism and increasing the role of laborers in work place negotiations. Rehmus and McLaughlin (1967) describe the act as having explicitly acknowledged the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively. Further, the act also created national labor boards to ensure that the legislation would be carried out accordingly. Although the National Industry Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, almost all of the basic tenants of the act were recovered in the National Labor Relations Act (also known as the Wagner Act) of 1935. As a result, union membership and activity surged in the years following its passage. Unions began incorporating the “open shop” industries into their ranks and membership in the AFL grew by over 40 percent from 1933-1935 (Fink 1977). In non-union industries, in particular, it was the workers themselves who demanded that labor unions be formed and by the spring of 1934 “probably one-fourth of all industrial workers were employed in plants which maintained company unions” (Peterson 1963:31). This push for organization was conducted in tandem with strikes, walkouts, petitioning and sit-ins that both reverberated with the public and generated a large degree of adverse criticism. Strikes began to decline, however, as labor organizations began to take advantage of the legal rights afforded to them under the National Labor Relations Act (Peterson 1963).

In light of the gains made after the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, the labor movement as a whole was once again concerned with the age-old question of whether labor organizations “should be organized along occupation or craft lines, or whether they should be coterminous with the industries concerned” (Peterson 1963:32). In response to this question, several members of the AFL created the Committee for Industrial Organization in order to promote membership among unskilled and industrial workers. The AFL, however, viewed the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization as “decidedly menacing to its success and welfare” and expelled the unions that had participated (Peterson 1963:33).
Shortly thereafter, the committee reconvened and established the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

The establishment of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) resulted in a dramatic spike in union membership, especially among the unskilled and semiskilled workers, in the years leading up to World War II (Fink 1977). The CIO succeeded in establishing itself in all of the major industrial industries and, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, “both the AFL and CIO unions were able to obtain contractual relations in the new aircraft, shipbuilding, maritime and other war plants” (Peterson 1963:34). Throughout the war, relations between unions and the military remained stable and the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act were upheld. Additionally, the National War Labor Board was established to arbitrate labor disputes and encourage cooperation between managers, laborers and the government.

Although numerous labor scholars have touted the period 1933-1955 as the most prosperous in American labor history, Davis (1986) argues that this period was simply another phase in the dialectic history of American labor unions. The forged alliance between labor and business that occurred during WWII served as a prequel to the besiegement of labor that would follow for the next half century. Although the Roosevelt government mandated that war industries be unionized, unions were all forced into a “no-strike pledge” that drastically undermined the more radical militancy that had been occurring from 1933-1947 (Davis 1986:54). In addition, the war time relations between the state, employers and labor unions lead to a wholesale bureaucratization of the labor movement. Former radical labor union leaders were transformed into “the postwar era’s ‘new men of power’” whose new strategies
were more likely to be formulated in corporate board rooms than factory floors (Davis 1986:53). For Davis (1986) the alliance that was forged between business and labor during WWII was not the result of labor’s success but was a calculated maneuver on the part of employers and the state to pacify the more radical wings of the American labor movement.

In the wake of World War II “the semblance of union-management cooperation which had been fostered during the war disappeared” (Peterson 1963:35). Workers continued to advocate for increased wages after overtime hours and war bonus payments stopped, but employers argued that increased wages were impossible in lieu of the decline in worker productivity (Peterson 1963). After numerous unsuccessful strikes were launched in 1945-1946, labor unions languished after suffering electoral defeat in the form of an increasingly conservative Republican Congress in 1946. The immediate effect of this was the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. The Taft-Hartley Act essentially removed many of the protections granted to organized labor by the National Labor Relations Act and restricted union activity.

Further exacerbating union problems during this period was the relationship between the CIO and the American Communist Party. While the American Communist Party was unsuccessful in forming mergers with other labor organizations “it found a haven...in the newly established, militant CIO” (Peterson 1963:37). Although hairs were split between the communist and non-communist blocs of the organization, the CIO generally accepted the communist elements so long as they were consistent with their policies. However, the two factions within the organization reached deadlock with regard to whether or not the CIO should participate in the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The WFTU was established in 1945
to unite trade unions across the globe. Although the WFTU achieved success in other countries, most American trade unions rejected the organization because of the sympathetic stance the WFTU held towards communism. The AFL, for instance, never participated in the WFTU, but the Congress of Industrial Workers became an “enthusiastic member” in 1945 (Peterson 1963:37). The CIO membership in the WFTU was short lived, however, and it formally broke from the international organization in 1949 after it became obvious that “the new world organization was being dominated by its Soviet members” (Peterson 1963:37). As a result, the CIO amended its constitution to allow for the expulsion of communist members and immediately invalidated the charters of eleven of its organizations (Fink 1977).

The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and the crackdown on the more radical wings of the CIO signaled an end of the prosperous years of the American labor movement. Once again, the exceptional nature of the labor movement in the United States is evident. Davis illustrates how “the postwar organizing strategy of the CIO...collapsed in midst of new employer-state offensive...coupled with the Cold War bloodletting within the CIO itself—the purge of left-led unions, mass blacklisting, and wholesale intra-CIO raiding. The result was a new stagnation of CIO growth and further gains by the AFL” (1986:54). Davis (1986) argues that the fall of labor’s more militant wings was predetermined by the exceptional character of American history. Whenever and wherever radical labor strategy appeared, both employers and the state coalesced to crush the movements. As described the earlier, both the Knights of Labor and the International Workers of the World suffered from extreme repression when they began to make gains by appealing to low-skilled workers and communist sympathizers, respectively. When viewed in this light, the fall of the CIO in the wake of WWII no longer appears novel.
Complicating matters further for unions during this period were the increasing charges of corruption and racketeering that were being leveled against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and numerous other unions involved with the AFL in 1949-1957 (Fink 1977; Rehmus and McLaughlin 1967). Essentially, the corruption and racketeering charges amounted to counts of extortion, embezzlement and misuse of union funds in addition to the indictment of corrupt labor leaders who signed “substandard contracts with employers in exchange for bribes, thereby forcing employees to work for less pay and under poorer conditions than a legitimate union contract would bring them” (Peterson 1963:38). The charges became so great that a special Senate committee was created to investigate the issues, and several public hearings were held from 1955-1957. The AFL cooperated with the Senate committee and launched their investigation into the issues themselves. In response to the investigations, the AFL drafted a code of ethics and established an ethical practice committee to conduct in-house investigations whenever the need should arise (Fink 1977; Peterson 1963). Essentially, the Senate committee hearings and the ethical practices committee uncovered evidence damaging enough to “expel the Teamsters’ Union and two smaller unions, and to place several more on probation” (Peterson 1963:39).

1955-Present

Perhaps the only positive impact on labor unions that occurred during this period was the merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955. In light of the significant Republican gains in the Congresses of 1946 and 1952 and after the deaths of the two organizations presidents, personal rivals William Green of the AFL and Phillip Murray of the CIO, labor as a whole
recognized the need to act on a united front. The organizations two new presidents, Walter Reuther of the CIO and, more prominently, George Meany of the AFL, were instrumental in drafting and ratifying the merger agreement in 1955 (Fink 1977; Wright 2003). Unfortunately, the merger occurred amid Senate corruption hearings, and the newly merged organization was absorbed in its own internal investigation and the purging of unethical union organizers in the early years of its formation. However, by 1958 the AFL-CIO served as labor’s unified voice against the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act) which was drawn up in response to the Senate committee’s corruption hearings. The Landrum-Griffin Act further restricted union activity and stepped up many of the provisions contained in the Taft-Hartley Act. The act “laid down rules as to how union officers are to be elected and removed, how funds are to be handled, the circumstances under which a union may revoke a local’s charter, and procedures for the protection of members who criticize their union officers” (Peterson 1963:39-40). Although many of the provisions of the act were outgrowths of the Senate committee hearings and were actually endorsed by the AFL-CIO, the bill itself was “generally considered anti-labor legislation” and had a negative impact on recruiting and growth of the AFL-CIO in the subsequent decades (Fink 1977:19).

Although Peterson (1963) is somewhat sanguine about the AFL-CIO merger in 1955, other scholars have taken a more negative stance. Edsall, for example, argues that immediately after the two organizations merged, “the proportion of the workforce represented by labor unions has steadily declined” (1984:141). Declining union density, for Edsall, forced labor into a “deceptively cooperative alliance with big business” (1984:141). During the postwar period, this alliance, though still problematic, generally worked to ensure that workers received at least
paltry increases in wages and benefits. The alliance also served, however, to severely curtail the ability of union members to go on strikes, engage in effective collective bargaining and continue to enforce provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Organized labor’s weakened impetus towards increasing union membership and advocating for reforms that extended beyond wages and benefits moved labor “into a defensive posture, both on internal issues of union jurisdiction and on broader questions of politics and public policy” (Edsall 1984:143).

The AFL-CIO was also mired in accusations of racism that were leveled against it by the Negro American Labor Council in 1960 and throughout the Civil Rights Movement. Founded by A. Phillip Randolph, the Negro American Labor Council was formed specifically to “fight racism within the AFL-Congress of Industrial Workers” (Fink 1977:249). Randolph and the Negro American Labor Council criticized Meany and other AFL-CIO leaders for failing to enforce the anti-discrimination clauses contained in their constitutions and for failing to penalize unions that were openly discriminatory (Fink 1977). Even when the AFL-CIO did act on issues of discrimination, it was only after considerable amounts of criticism from reformers, and penalties were usually quite weak. Meany and Randolph were able to temper a shaky alliance in 1961, however, and both sides began to make conciliatory concessions to one another. The AFL-CIO started to take more forceful action against discriminatory unions, for example, and the Negro American Labor Council defended several AFL-CIO affiliated unions against charges of discrimination from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). In light of these actions, Randolph, before he resigned his leadership in 1969, declared that “although vestiges of discrimination remained, great progress had been made under Meany” (Fink 1977:250). Despite the gains made by the two organizations during the period, the failure
of the AFL-CIO to fully commit to racial justice is one of the many cited reasons for the organizations declining ability to organize the ever-growing number of white-collar workers in the United States (Fink 1977).

In response to the criticism against its ability to organize white-collar workers, the AFL-CIO “created an organizing department and led a major unionizing campaign” in the late 1960s. However, the campaign not only failed to bring low-skilled white-collar workers into its ranks but it actually “lost as many workers to automation as it added to its union rolls” (Fink 1977:18). Upset with the AFL-CIO’s inability to enlist either office workers or workers in traditionally non-union industries, the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), the largest union operating within the AFL-CIO, broke from its ranks in 1968 and joined the International Brotherhood of Teamsters “to correct the organizational and political shortcomings of the AFL-CIO” (Fink 1977:18). Although the alliance was short lived, the defeat of the UAW was indicative of the AFL-CIO’s inability to deal with contemporary labor issues in the United States.

Increased conflict between militant rank-and-file union members and union leaders further exacerbated problems in the AFL-CIO and the labor movement in general. Union leaders were opposed to forms of collective action such as strikes and picketing and, even when union leaders were in favor of collective action, their hands were usually tied by provisions of the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts. Even though “union sanctioned strikes continued, and even grew in number in the 1960s and 1970s” the effectiveness of these strikes was limited because of the legislative sanctions (Fantasia and Voss 2004:58). Because union leaders relied
on contract systems of bargaining, strikes were essentially outlawed for however long the contract stipulated. In essence, the legislation effectively prevented the occurrence of “wild cat” strikes, which were favored by militants and used to ameliorate day-to-day work place conditions, in lieu of “official strikes,” which required union approval and focused almost solely on wages and benefits (Fantasia and Voss 2004). This created a serious dilemma for union leaders “who not only have a stake in the sanctity of the contract they have negotiated and signed, but also are legally required to actively oppose [wild cat strikes]” (Fantasia and Voss 2004:59). Disagreements over collective action serve to highlight just one of the many types of erosion in collective bargaining that unions experienced in the contemporary labor struggle. It also illuminates the concessions that unions made to big business in the post-war economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s. When unions simply commit themselves to bargaining for wages and benefits within the capitalist framework, they not only concede to businesses and corporations but they also severely undermine their ability to advocate for social reforms.

In the 1970s and 1980s unions found that their narrow bargaining agendas during the post-war period had an extremely negative impact on their future success. The vulnerability of Western capitalism to foreign markets in addition to the economic crises and high unemployment of the 1970s left organized labor in a very precarious position. By the opening of the 1980s collective bargaining had been transformed in a way that gave employers considerable advantages. Essentially, employers now viewed the collective bargaining process “as a means of winning back from labor the security and the benefits that had been achieved by earlier generations of workers” (Fantasia and Voss 2004:65). Big business in the 1980s found it increasingly easier to exploit workers under the guise of foreign competition or simply by
threatening to close the company. Faced with the threat of job loss, unions were forced to make concession after concession in the form of contracts, wages and benefits. Similarly, thousands of jobs were cut across industries through the manipulation of established procedure for hiring and quoting (Fantasia and Voss 2004). Even more deplorable, there was a complete absence of union response and the majority of union leaders simply believed that the negative impact was a normal response to economic crisis. It was as if labor leaders simply would not allow themselves “to admit or even perceive that employers were tearing up the social contract and were actually engaged in a fight for the ultimate concession—the complete destruction of union representation” (Fantasia and Voss 2004:66).

This adversarial stance displayed by organized capital further decreased the ability of labor to increase membership and drastically undermined the ability of unions to win representation elections. Edsall (1984) documents how the union victory rate in representation elections dropped precipitously throughout this period. In the 1960’s, victory rates for labor unions attempting to gain representation stood at roughly 58 percent. Beginning in the 1970’s, however, the rate began to decline sharply, from 52 percent from 1970-1974 to 48 percent from 1974-1979 (Edsall 1984). Coupled with the increased hostility displayed by big business, Edsall (1984) draws a sobering conclusion. In the period from 1970-1980, “one in twenty workers who favored the union got fired” (Edsall 1984:152).

Edsall illustrates how both the declining number of workers represented by unions and the increasing aggression displayed towards organized labor has harshly undercut the political effectiveness of unions and has had equally disastrous results for the Democratic Party. Edsall
illustrates how, in the period from 1970-1983, there was a direct correlation between declining union membership and declining Democratic representation in the US congress. Further, as public opinion began to wane for labor unions in the wake of the congressional corruption hearings of 1955-1957, Democratic congressmen began to distance themselves from organized labor. In a move that would have unanticipated consequences for organized labor and the Democratic party, both groups thought it advantageous to sever their ties to one another.

Returning to the theme of American exceptionalism, what is important to Edsall (1984) regarding the break between labor and the Democratic Party is how divergent the move was compared to other advanced capitalist countries. Using a formula first devised by Cameron (1982), Edsall illustrates the importance of labor's influence on the political process in terms of economic policy. Edsall compares the six advanced countries with strong union movements (i.e. Sweden, Norway, Austria, Denmark, Belgium and Finland) with the six countries with weak union movements (i.e. Italy, Canada, United States, Japan, France and Spain) and argues:

By every measure—unemployment rates, taxation, social spending, and income distribution—those countries with strong labor union movements have in place policies of taxation, employment, and social spending advantageous to the working class. Further evidence of the use of government policies aimed at helping the majority of the population dependent upon wage and salary income in countries with strong unions is shown in the use of taxes on wealth. Five of the six strong union countries have an annually collected tax on wealth...and only one of the six weak union countries, use such taxes (1984:147).
Edsall (1984) goes on to illustrate how the welfare state in America is among the weakest in the developed world. The few programs in the United States designed to assist members of the working poor were all developed by the New Deal Democratic coalition. Not coincidentally, Edsall (1984) argues, these welfare programs were all implemented at a time when union membership was growing at its fastest rate in US history. By 1980, organized labor’s ability to provide support for the progressive legislative programs was all but destroyed.

Nowhere was labor’s weakened impetus for political action more pronounced than in Reagan’s unconditional firing of the members of the air traffic controllers union, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, on August 5, 1981. Just months after assuming office, Reagan responded to the nationwide strike of federally employed air traffic controllers by firing all 11,345 participants and quickly filling their positions with strikebreakers. Reagan next moved to have the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization decertified as a union and to bar any of the strikers from working in air traffic control towers ever again (Fantasia and Voss 2004; Early 2009; Wright 2003). Making matters worse, the AFL-CIO remained almost completely silent on the issue as did various other union leaders who represented employees in the airline industry. Essentially, Reagan’s actions amounted to a “conspicuous public humiliation for the trade union movement, one that displayed the degree of economic violence that could be unleashed by a state willing, once again, as it had in the pre-1930s America” (Fantasia and Voss 2004:68).

One of the most insidious effects of Reagan’s actions towards the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization was that employers now viewed union-sanctioned strikes as a means
to separate themselves from unionism in general. Furthermore, Reagan’s measures drastically increased the push for right-to-work laws, which made unions even more difficult to maintain, in states throughout the country. Union membership has plummeted in response, and between 1978 and 1995 unions lost nearly four million members. Unions are still reeling from the losses incurred, and at the beginning of the 21st century union membership in the private sector stood at less than 9 per cent (Fantasia and Voss 2004).

The theoretical and historical reviews illustrate the persistence of classical and contemporary problems associated with the American labor movement. Efforts by unions to organize around social and political issues have largely been subservient to economic interests. The inability of labor unions to coalesce around inclusive campaigns designed to alter the relations between workers and capital has relegated organized labor to bargaining almost exclusively for better wages and lucrative buy out contracts. Contrary to Marx’s ([1847] 1995) argument, unions in the United States have never been willing to ransom their wages in favor of maintaining their organizations. The lack of solidarity among unions, as evidenced by Reagan’s 1984 attack on the air traffic controllers, has drastically undermined the ability of labor to act as a collective voice for the working class. The arguments put forth by both Lenin ([1902] 1969) and Luxemburg (1906 [2004]) regarding the nature of unions and their tendency to fall prey to bourgeois ideology rings true in the United States. Instead of attempting to alter the modes of capitalist production, labor unions have simply competed for a larger slice of the capitalist pie. Their arguments become manifest in light of the capital-labor accord that was reached shortly after the spike in unionization in the 1930s. One key reason for the lack of solidarity among the working class in the United States is illuminated by Poulantzas’ (1974)
argument that class and racial differences in America have caused the labor movement to fragment. Instead of thinking of themselves as members of single class (those who do not own the means of production), workers in the United States have tended to pit themselves against one another in the struggle for economic survival. This is perhaps best illustrated by the AFL’s decision to grant each craft industry its own autonomy as well as in the constant battles over skill and racial differentiation within unions.

While the theoretical underpinnings of Marx, Luxemburg, Lenin, Poulantzas and Braverman are instrumental in identifying and analyzing the difficulties that organized labor faces, the most adequate explanation for the weakness of the labor movement lies in the nature of American exceptionalism. As demonstrated by Lipset, Edsall, and Davis, there are numerous explanatory elements of exceptionalism that have had a bevy of impacts on the (lack of) class consciousness and labor struggles in the United States. Lipset’s societal and political factors aptly illustrate how the United States differs from most other advanced capitalist countries. The absence of feudalism in the United States, the relative affluence of the American populace, the lack of stable communities and the extreme heterogeneity of the population have presented the American labor movement with unique challenges. Further, as documented by both Lipset and Edsall, the American political system has also precluded the formation of more radical labor movements and has prevented the emergence of a political party centered on the interests of the working class. However, what seems to be the most important element, as described by Voss and Davis, is the exceptional nature of organized capital that has exhibited a strangle hold over the labor movement in the states. The extreme backlash exhibited by big business against radical labor movements have pushed unions into a defensive posture and
have stymied the advancement of the labor movement along more radical lines. American
especialism represents the linchpin for understanding why the labor movement in the
United States has been so different.

In light of declining union density and political power of organized labor, unions must
ask: what is to be done? Although no clear-cut answer appears on the horizon, one prospect for
increasing union membership and building a more inclusive campaign could lie with the self-
same individuals who have historically been discriminated against by unions in the United
States. The focus of the following section is an examination of the strategies and techniques
pursued by two labor unions comprised almost exclusively of members of racial minorities: the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and the United Farm Workers. The description of these
two unions also examines the issue of race within the confines of, essentially, segregated
unions. Although these are interesting and important cases to analyze, it should be noted that,
given the racial homogeneity of both the BSCP and the UFW, the issue of race is not overcome,
but normalized. A proper examination of the history of the BSCP and the UFW may still yield
some prospects for revitalizing the labor movement in the twenty-first century.

SEGREGATION, DISCRIMINATION AND RECRUITMENT: ORGANIZING AROUND DIFFERENCE

Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters

Founded on August 25, 1925 by A. Phillip Randolph, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters (BSCP) was one of the first all-black unions in the country (Fink 1977). The early
members of the union founded the BSCP in response to the Pullman’s Employee
Representation Plan, a company union that sought to mediate grievances between labor and
capital. Early efforts of the BSCP to increase recruitment and organize porters consisted of “a savage critique of the Pullman Company’s practices with concrete demands for substantial improvements in working conditions” (Arnesen 2001:89). Early organizers appealed to their fellow employees with promises of increased wages, reductions in working hours, improved working conditions, and abolishment of the tipping system (Arnesen 2001). In addition to personal appeals, Randolph also launched a publicity campaign advocating for unionism among the porters in his monthly journal, the Messenger. Randolph combined pleas for unionism with evidence highlighting the plight of the porters under Pullman managerial practices. Randolph further appealed to government agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Railroad Mediation Board to assist the porters in the unionization campaigns and efforts to improve their working conditions (Fink 1977).

Although the initial organizing push of the BSCP was largely successful (the Brotherhood claimed nearly 7,300 members in 1927) the Pullman Company launched a vicious counteroffensive that seriously compromised the union’s ability to recruit new members into its fray. The Pullman Company began firing known supporters of the BSCP and called on its allies within the African American community to discredit the union and advise the porters not to organize. The Pullman Company took out advertisements in black newspapers such as the Chicago Defender, the Chicago Whip and the St. Louis Argus and enlisted prominent African American journalists such as Robert Abbott to discredit the BCSP and Randolph. The company also retained Perry Howard, an African American Justice Department employee and former porter, who began leveling charges of corruption and communism against Randolph and his supporters (Arnesen 2001). Finally, the Pullman company played on the “historically rooted
antipathy toward organized labor held by a considerable number of African Americans” in order to discourage recruitment and discredit the BSCP (Arnesen 2001:91). By all accounts, the Pullman Company’s counteroffensive was wildly successful (Valien 1940). Randolph and his supporters were barred from African American churches throughout the country, the *Messenger* went out of business and the BSCP was evicted from its headquarters in New York. Membership within the organization dropped precipitously and by 1930 it was estimated that less than 2,000 members remained in the organization (Arnesen 2001; Valien 1940).

In the early 1930s, the fortunes of the BSCP began to change. In order to win back the public sentiment of the African American community, the BSCP began organizing boycotts against newspapers that supported the Pullman company, they organized and sponsored conferences on black labor, and they created a Citizens Committee of African American leaders to encourage unionization (Arnesen 2001:92). Such efforts by the BSCP allowed them to win the endorsements of the NAACP, the Ida B. Wells Club and the AFL who all began providing organizational and financial support to the Brotherhood. By combating the black anti-labor arguments and winning over the support of prominent African American leaders, the BSCP was able to win over a majority of the porters and by 1935 membership in the organization had rebounded to nearly 6,000 (Arnesen 2001; Fink 1977). Although the dedication of the leaders and support from the African American community had a tremendous impact of the BSCP’s organizational push, both Arnesen (2001) and Valien (1940) argue that the single greatest recruitment tool that the BSCP was able to utilize was 1934 amendment to the Railway Labor Act. The amendment placed a ban on company unions and created two new institutions to oversee union representation and contract negotiations. The amendment effectively ended the
Pullman’s Employee Representation Plan and persuaded employees who were still loyal to the company into the BSCP’s folds. A year after passage of the 1934 amendment, the BSCP obtained union recognition as bargaining agent for the porters and were able to successfully secure their first contract with the Pullman Company (Arnesen 2001; Valien 1940).

United Farm Workers

The push towards the formation of the United Farm Workers Union (UFW) began in April, 1962 under the leadership of Cesar Chavez (Fink 1977; Ganz 2000; Shaw 2008). Chavez began the push for unionization in response to the brutal working conditions, unsanitary living conditions and short life expectancies that California farm workers faced (Shaw 2008). Establishing a farm workers union among Mexican immigrants seemed like an impossible challenge at the outset of the UFW’s organizing campaigns, but Chavez and other leaders within the organization were able to construct inventive tactics that focused on grass roots and bottom up recruiting campaigns prior to the push for unionization and winning contracts. UFW leadership believed that one of the biggest mistakes that farm worker organizations had made in the past was attempting to simultaneously organize and strike for contracts (Ganz 2000). In response, early recruitment efforts of the UFW focused on creating a social movement centered around organizing a community of workers andstriking for contracts only after the organization was solidified. As we will see, this approach greatly enhanced the pressure that the UFW was able to put on agricultural employers and led to the largest and most successful unionization effort for Latino workers in the history of the United States (Ganz 2000).
In the early days of the UFW’s organizing campaigns, Chavez held to the belief that a successful farm workers unionization campaign would take considerable time to develop. UFW leaders estimated that it would take five years to recruit members into its folds before the union could launch successful strikes and boycotting campaigns against the growers. In the long interim before unionization, Chavez emphasized the need for individual redress and mutual support and created a Service Center that catered to the personal needs of the organization’s individual members (Ganz 2000). The Center provided services in the form of credit, gas and food cooperatives, health and life insurance plans, a biweekly newspaper and a legal clinic to help its members with the pressing problems they faced in their day-to-day lives. To this end, the UFW’s campaign to assist individual members with their personal troubles was a necessary first step in recruiting members to the union. As Gordon notes, the Service Center “became a part of the union’s story about what it would provide for farm workers...a chit that organizers could trade on to call people into organizing, and a source of proof that the union still cared about its members at times or in places where there was little successful organizing” (2005:229).

In the long run up to the strikes and boycotts that the UFW would eventually launch, the organization also focused on creating a diverse leadership team that could draw on a wide range of sources for support. The leadership team that the UFW recruited was comprised mostly of leaders young Mexican and Mexican American men and women (Ganz 2000). Creating a leadership team of insiders was crucial to building trust for the organization among farm workers and it also allowed for a diverse set of recruitment strategies to flow out of the organization. The UFW also enlisted the help of two white clergymen who helped cultivate
support for the organization among the California Migrant Ministry and other religious groups who were supportive of the farm workers cause. The final component of the UFW leadership team consisted of individuals with a strong professional background in community organizing. The range of networks in which the UFW leadership was affiliated “extended from the farmworker community into the worlds of community organizing, Mexican American activists, religious groups and liberal circles throughout California” (Ganz 2000:1027). The diverse group of leaders within the UFW proved to be a crucial component of their overall recruitment strategy and one of the main factors that led to the organizations eventually success.

Although the Service Center and the diverse leadership team were important components of the UFW’s early organizing campaigns, their primary purposes were to serve as a vehicles for recruiting individuals into the union ranks. As the UFW’s strikes and quests for contracts became more successful, the services provided by the union became a less integral part of their overall strategy. By the spring of 1966, the UFW had successfully recruited a membership of more than 50,000 dues-paying union members and had begun its first strike at the Delano Grape Factory (Ganz 2000). Successful boycotts and strikes continued over the next decade, and by 1977 the UFW held over 100 contracts with agricultural growers and had secured passage of the 1975 California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, which served as the only guarantee of collective bargaining for agricultural employees in the US (Ganz 2000). The eventually success of the UFW was contingent on their ability to establish a maintain a grass roots recruiting campaign centered around social welfare programs and a diverse leadership team.
The ability of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters to successfully recruit and organize African American union members in the 1920s and 1930s is a remarkable feat that cannot be understated. However, in analyzing the recruitment strategies pursued by Randolph and the leadership within the BSCP, too much stock should not be placed in the dedicated and charismatic leadership, the rank and file force of the porters and the ability of the union to garner public support from the broader African American community. Above all else, the success of the BSCP’s recruiting initiatives was contingent upon the passage of the Amended Railway Labor Act of 1934, which guaranteed collective bargaining for the porters and dissolved the Pullman’s Employee Representation Plan. In light of this fact, contemporary labor unions seeking to recruit disenfranchised populations should still acknowledge several key facets of the recruitment strategies utilized by the porters. First, the measures taken by Randolph to increase awareness of the plight of the porters through the *Messenger* raised a significant amount of public support for the unionization effort and influenced a broader discussion of African American unionization generally. Second, by increasing awareness and appealing to the broader African American community, Randolph was able to garner significant resources that sustained the unionization effort during the Pullman backlash. Finally, in light of the impact that the 1934 Railway Labor Act had on the recruitment efforts, contemporary unionization efforts must continually seek out political support in order to secure union legitimacy in the broader labor relations context.

The organizational strength of the United Farm Workers illustrates the ability of labor unions to recruit Latino immigrants and sustain unionization efforts in light of the challenges they face. By shifting the focus of their activities to grass roots campaigns and social movement
unionism, the UFW was able to serve as a de facto social network for Latino immigrants. The ability of contemporary unions to provide both material and emotional support to its members is crucial to ensuring the long-term stability of unionization efforts. Establishing social welfare programs such as food and gas cooperatives, health and life insurance plans and legal clinics will allow unions to remain operative even when successful organizing is not taking place. Further, the diverse leadership team employed by the UFW ensured both broad support for the unions activities and guaranteed that their existed mutual educational opportunities for combating racial and ethnic tensions. Finally, the UFW’s emphasis on the political process helped to ensure passage of the 1975 California Agricultural Labor Relations Act and secured a place at the bargaining table for farm workers over the course of the next decade.

Union efforts to recruit diverse populations face a myriad of challenges. Chief among these challenges is the potential for racial conflict between immigrant and native-born populations and particularly between immigrants and African Americans. However, if unions are able to appeal to minority populations, their prospects for recruiting and sustaining diverse coalitions of union activists will only increase. Further, if members of racial minorities are more perceptive to the prospects of unionization, then the labor movement as a whole could be revitalized by appealing to these potential members. However, before moving on, it should be noted that although an examination of the issue of race may uncover some sympathetic union constituencies, occupation skill differences still present a barrier to the coalescence of union campaigns. It is within this context that we turn to the quantitative analysis of attitudinal differences toward labor unions. If there is a racial difference in attitudes toward labor unions, then the labor movement can capitalize by appealing to these perspective constituencies.
Chapter 4 Quantitative Methodology and Findings: Diverging Perspectives on Unions

As already documented throughout the course of this research, the past half century has witnessed an unprecedented decline in labor union membership, organizing ability, political effectiveness and strike activity in the United States. In order to combat the anti-union political sentiment that has formed in the United States, labor unions must develop effective counterstrategies to increase union membership. Following the path laid out in the discussion of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and the United Farm Workers, the aim of the quantitative component of this project is to ascertain whether blacks and Latinos harbor different attitudes toward labor unions compared to whites. The CBS News 60 Minutes/Vanity Fair 2010 National Survey dataset will be used to determine whether racial differences exist in attitudes towards labor unions. The findings suggest that racial differences in attitudes towards unions persist even after controlling for numerous social and demographic characteristics.

SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS

Data Source

This study utilizes the CBS News 60 Minutes/Vanity Fair 2010 National Survey dataset. This poll, fielded February 26-28, 2010, solicited respondents' opinion about whether they approve or disapprove of labor unions, the impact of labor unions on the national economy and working people, and whether labor unions had too much, too little, or the right amount of influence on American life and politics. A variation of random-digit dialing (RDD) using primary sampling units (PSUs) was employed to collect the data. The PSU’s consisted of blocks of 100 telephone numbers identical through the eighth digit. Phone numbers were dialed from RDD samples of both standard land-lines and cell phones. Within households, respondents were
selected using a method developed by Kish (1949) and modified by Backstrom and Hursh (1963). The method developed by Kish (1949) employed the use of a grid which displayed the number of adults in a household as well as the number of adult women in the household. Each cell of the grid indicated a particular adult within the household, and each grid randomly indicated which adult should be selected. The method was modified by Backstrom and Hursh (1963) so that random selection of a Kish grid for a phone survey would ensure random selection of all adults in the household. The data were adjusted for the fact that people who share a telephone with others have less chance to be contacted than people who live alone and have their own telephones, and that households with more than one telephone number have more chances to be called than households with only one telephone number. The data in this study were also weighted to match United States Census Bureau data on age, sex, race, education, and region of the country. Finally, I dropped 17 cases from the original dataset based on the extreme influence established by the results of Cook’s distance (D) and DFITS tests as well as on the examination of leverage versus residuals-squared plots before and after dropping the 17 cases from my analysis.

**Dependent Variable**

The CBS News 60 Minutes/Vanity Fair 2010 National Survey dataset provides a variety of questions intended to measure specific parameters of labor union support. In order to measure respondents’ support for labor unions generally, I elected to create a standardized scale using four variables that measured specific parameters of union support. The four measures that were scaled are:

1. Do you approve or disapprove of labor unions?
(2) In general, what do you think is the impact of labor unions on the well-being of working people today--do they help, do they hurt, or don’t they have much impact?

(3) Do you think labor unions have too much influence, too little influence, or about the right amount of influence on American life and politics today?

(4) In general, what do you think is the impact of labor unions on the nation’s economy today--do they help, do they hurt, or don’t they have much impact?

All don’t know responses were listwise deleted, and variables were recoded so that higher values indicated greater union support.

There is much theoretical and empirical literature regarding the differences between survey questions that measure events, behaviors, evaluations, attitudes, opinions and values (Bergman 1998, Campbell 1963, Dunlap and Jones 2002, Schaeffer and Presser 2003). The variations and presentation of these terms in the research make it impossible to summarize or accurately describe the precise ways in which they should be applied. For the purpose of this study, I follow Bergman in defining attitudes as “cognitive and evaluative elaborations of an object of thought” (1998:88). In this regard, I argue that the four union variables in my scale are all measuring underlying attitudes toward labor unions. Further, all of the variables in my union scale were mean standardized and checked for internal consistency using principal component factoring with promax rotation. The results of Cronbach’s alpha also indicated high scale reliability, with a coefficient of α=.8618.
Independent Variable

The variable of interest for my study is self-reported race. All of the responses to the race variable were dummy coded as binary variables labeled 1 and 0 (e.g. white=1 nonwhite=0). The response categories consisted of white, African American, Asian and Hispanic. Due to the low representation of Asians in the dataset (N=18), they were excluded from the analysis. In order to determine if members of racial minorities hold different attitudes towards labor unions compared to whites, the racial group white was used as the reference category in my regression models.

Inferential statistics for my race and union variables can be seen in Table 1. A Pearson’s chi square test was conducted to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between race and attitudes toward labor unions compared with the entire sample. There was a significant relationship between being non-Latino white or not and labor union approval or disapproval (Chi square value = 27.59, p<.001), between being non-Latino black or not and labor union approval or disapproval (Chi square value = 26.25, p<.001) and between being Latino or not and labor union approval or disapproval (Chi square value = 4.39, p<.05). There was a significant relationship between being non-Latino white or not and being non-Latino black or not across all three remaining measures of labor union attitudes with the exception of non-Latino whites and non-Latino blacks who reported that labor unions have no impact on workers. With the exception of labor union approval and labor union influence on American life and politics, there was not a significant relationship between being Latino or not and attitudes toward labor unions.
Control Variables

I used a variety of control variables in my regression models in order to illuminate potential differences in union support by race. The first control I utilized was the gender of the respondent. One of the key themes that has begun to emerge in the labor union literature is that women are more likely to support unionization efforts than men (Brofenbrenner 2005; Brofenbrenner and Warren 2007; Godard 2009). In addition to being more supportive of labor unions, women have not suffered as much from the extremely high drop off in union density as men (Brofenbrenner and Warren 2007). The variable for respondent’s gender was dummy coded to create a binary value labeled men (=1).

The second control variable that I examined was age. Theoretically, the impact of age on union support has received mixed analysis in the literature. Fitzenberger, Kohn and Wang (2006) have asserted that as an individual’s age increases their geographic mobility declines and they become more likely to find permanent employment. This, in turn, increases the desirability for a unionized workplace. Wright (2003), on the other hand, has found age to be a detrimental determinant in assessing union support and density. The variable for age in the dataset was broken down into four groups which I, in turn, used to create indicator variables represented in my models. The four age groups are between 18-29, between 20-44, between 45-64 and over 64. Because older people would be more likely to have different union views than working age people, the age group over 64 was used as the reference category.

The third control variable that I examined was geographic region. The dataset contained a variable which measured in what census region respondents lived. The four
categories were Northeast, Midwest, South and West. The implementation of right-to-work laws has drastically undermined the organizational and recruitment capabilities of labor unions and has significantly contributed to the decline in rates of unionization (Dixon 2008; Elias 1971). In the South, West and Midwest, right-to-work laws have had a disastrous impact on the ability of labor unions to organize successfully. Additionally, different regions of the country have drastically different rates of unionization and racial diversity (Dixon 2008). The southern region was chosen as the reference category because of its historically low rate of unionization and its prevalence of racially diverse groups.

I also included a variety of control variables in order to measure social class. Common determinants of class include an individual’s education level (Raths 1954), income (Muntaner Lynch and Oates 1999), and self-identified class status (Davis and Coleman 1989). Poulantzas (1968; 1974) has long held that that popular unification of the working class can only arise once the doctrinaire class differences in society are broken. To this end, he argues that class has an extremely detrimental effect of union organizing generally. For Poulantzas, effective labor organizing can only begin once trade unions find ways to overcome traditional class and racial divides. In order to examine the effects of class on union attitudes, I included variables from the dataset that measured self-identified class status, and education. Although the dataset also contained a variable which measured personal income, the percentage of missing data for the measure was too large to be included in my regression models. The variable in my dataset that measured self-identified class status was initially comprised of five categories that consisted of upper, upper-middle, middle, working and lower. Because there were so few respondents in the upper and lower ranges, I collapsed the class variable into three categories and created
indicator variables of working, middle, and upper class. Upper and upper-middle classes were collapsed together as were working and lower classes. Working class was chosen as the reference category because of the prevalence of working class people in blue collar jobs, which have higher rates of unionization (Blinder 1972). The variable that measured respondent’s education level was comprised of five categories. Because there were enough responses in each educational category to warrant separate analysis, I simply created indicator variables to represent education in my regression models. The five categories consisted of not a high school graduate, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and some post graduate education or graduate degree. High school graduate was used as the reference category in the regression models.

The final controls that I included in my models were variables designed to measure respondent’s political and religious orientations. Although researchers examining unionization efforts may take the effect of political orientation as a given, there has been very little exploration of political ideology and union attitudes. Classic social theorists have stressed the importance of political agitation in union efforts (Luxemburg [1906] 2004; Marx [1847] 1963), but contemporary scholars of labor unions seem not to take political orientation into account. The two variables that measured political orientation in my dataset asked respondents to identify their political philosophy and with which political party they identified. The categories for the variables were, respectively, conservative, moderate, liberal and republican, independent and democrat. Indicator variables of responses for political philosophy and political identification were created to analyze in my regression models. Conservative and Republic were used as the reference groups.
The impact of religion and race on union campaigns has received some attention in the research literature. Among African Americans, Frederickson (1982) has argued that the difference in attitudes towards unions is partially explained through the influence of religious based institutions. Frederickson (1982) illustrates how African American churches, for example, were supportive of collective actions such as the Civil Rights movement, and this support transitioned to a more positive outlook in regards to unions and other organizational efforts. Although there has been some research into African American religious participation and unionization efforts, very little research has examined the impact of religious views on union attitudes among whites and Latinos. In order to address religious orientations in my models, I included a variable that measures respondent’s religious affiliation. The variable asks respondents to indicate their religious preference, and the five categories consisted of protestant, catholic, Jewish, other and none. In order to create response categories that were large enough to analyze, I collapsed the category Jewish into the category other. Catholic was selected as the reference category because of the historical role that the Catholic Church has played in supporting the labor movement in the United States, especially compared to protestant denominations (Gregory 1988).

QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

Descriptive statistics for the research variables are summarized in Table 2. It is interesting to note that while 533 of the 796 respondents indicated that they approved of unions, results for the remaining union variables were mixed. With regards to the impact of labor unions on the economy, 372 respondents indicated that labor unions hurt the economy
with 212 reporting that they had no impact and 212 reporting that they helped the economy. Responses to the question of the impact of labor unions on the workers were more positive, with 398 indicating that they helped, 151 that they had no impact and 247 that they had a hurtful impact on workers. In terms of labor union’s influence on American life and politics, 401 respondents felt that labor unions had too much influence, 257 respondents felt that labor unions had the right amount of influence and 138 respondents felt that labor unions had too little influence. The discrepancy between approval of labor unions and the impact of labor unions on the economy, workers and American life and politics is vexing. It appears as though respondents were supportive of labor unions generally, but harbored more negative attitudes toward labor unions when asked about their specific impact and influence.

(Table 2 about here)

The racial composition of the sample was comprised of an overwhelming majority of non-Latino whites. Six hundred and sixty seven respondents reported that they were non-Latino white with 78 reporting non-Latino black and 38 reporting Latino. The sample contained slightly more women than men, with 406 women compared to 390 men. With regard to age, the sample was fairly evenly distributed with 159 respondents reporting that were between the ages of 18-29, 223 respondents between 30-44, 278 respondents between 45-64 and 136 respondents reporting that they were over the age of 64. The majority of respondents surveyed reported that they lived in the South (n=278), followed by the Midwest (n=191) the West (n=167) and the Northeast (n=160), similar to the proportional distribution of people in the United States. With regard to social class, most respondents reported that they belonged to the
middle class (n=390) with 302 and 103 respondents reporting that they belonged to the working class and upper class, respectively. With regard to the highest level of education attained, 64 respondents reported that they had no high school diploma, 278 reported that they had a high school diploma, 215 reported some college education, 143 reported holding a college degree and 96 reported some graduate education or a graduate degree.

Respondents were fairly evenly divided in their reporting of political philosophy. A slight majority of respondents (n=302) reported a conservative political philosophy followed by moderate (n=287) and liberal (n=207). Similarly, the variable measuring political party identification was fairly evenly divided with 223 respondents reporting that they were Republicans, 287 reporting that they were Independents, and 286 reporting that they were Democrats. With regard to religious affiliation, a vast majority reported protestant (n=429) followed by catholic (n=199), no affiliation (n=11) and other (n=65).

Table 3 displays the complete results of my regression analysis. In Model 1, there is a significant relationship between the race of the respondent and their attitudes towards labor unions and the regression slope is not zero (F=21.17; p<.001). There is a significant relationship between non-Latino blacks and attitudes towards unions (t=6.48; p<.001) indicating that non-Latino blacks tend to score .587 points higher on the attitudes toward union scale compared to non-Latino whites. There is a marginally significant relationship between Latinos and attitudes toward labor unions (t=1.68; p<.1) indicating that Latino’s tend to score .258 points higher on the union scale compared to non-Latino whites. Given the difficulties associated with achieving significance when sample sizes are small, the marginally significant relationship is important.
In Model 2, there remains a significant relationship between the race of the respondent and attitudes toward labor unions when controlling for sex and age and the regression slope is not zero (F=10.86; p<.001). There remains a significant relationship between non-Latino blacks and attitudes towards unions (t=5.98; p<.001) indicating that non-Latino blacks tend to score .558 points higher on average on the attitudes toward union scale compared to non-Latino whites when controlling for sex, and age. The marginally significant relationship between Latinos and attitudes toward labor unions becomes non-significant after controlling for sex and age. Also, consistent with the literature, there was a significant relationship between sex and union attitudes (t= -2.51; p<.05) indicating that men score, on average, .199 points lower on the attitudes toward union scale compared to women. Finally, Model 2 illustrates that there was a significant relationship between individuals who were between the ages of 30 and 44 and attitudes towards labor unions (t= 1.75; p<.05) indicating that individuals between the age of 30 and 44 tend to score .191 points higher on the attitudes toward union scale compared to individuals over the age of 64.

In Model 3, a significant relationship between the race of the respondent and attitudes toward labor unions remains when controlling for sex, age, and geographic region and the regression slope is not zero (F=9.08; p<.001). In Model 3, the relationship between non-Latino blacks and attitudes towards labor unions remains significant (t= 5.46; p<.001) when geographic region is controlled. The significant relationship indicates that non-Latino blacks tend to score .558 points higher on the union scale compared to non-Latino whites when controls are added for geographic region. The relationship between Latinos and attitudes towards unions returns to significance in model three (t=2.14; p<.05) indicating that Latinos
tend to score .268 points higher on average than whites when controls are added for geographic region. The increased level of significance and larger coefficient for Latinos in model three indicated that some type of interaction was occurring after controlling for geographic region. I conducted numerous tests for interaction and I believe that what is occurring in Model 3 is the insertion of suppressor variables. According to Thompson and Levine suppression variables improve the prediction of a concept through the addition of another variable “which is uncorrelated or relatively little correlated with the criterion but is related to another predictor or set of predictors” (1997:11). There is very little agreement in the research about how to treat suppressor variables. For the purpose of this research, the suppressor variables mean little given that the effect appears to go away in models 4 and 5, but it suggests that, in the absence of other controls, some differences may be due to the fact that different types of Latinos with different labor union attitudes live in different parts of the country. For example, Miami is predominantly Cuban, Los Angeles is predominantly Mexican, and New York is predominantly Dominican and Puerto Rican. These groups work in different jobs, have different political orientations, and may have different attitudes toward labor unions (Bohon 2001). The significant relationship between gender and union attitudes persisted in Model 3 (t=-2.55; p<.01) indicating that women tended to score .19 points lower on the attitudes toward union scale, on average, than men. There was a significant relationship between geographic region and attitudes toward labor unions for both the Northeast (t=2.54; p<.05) and Midwest (t=2.42; p<.05) indicating that individuals who reside in these locations scored .294 and .235 points higher, respectively, on the attitudes toward union scale compared
to individuals who live in the South. The geographic region West did not differ significantly from the South in any of the regression models.

(Table 3 about here)

In Model 4, a significant relationship between the race of the respondent and attitudes toward labor unions remains when controlling for sex, age, geographic region, self-identified class status and education and the regression slope is not zero (F=5.99; p<.001). In Model 4, a significant relationship remains between non-Latino blacks and attitudes towards unions (t=5.31; p<.001) indicating that non-Latino blacks score .545 points higher on the attitudes toward union scale compared to non-Latino whites when controlling for sex, age, geographic region, self-identified class status and education. The significant relationship between Latinos and attitudes toward labor unions evident in Model 3 is attenuated after introducing controls for self-identified class status and education. In Model 4, the relationship between gender and union attitudes remained significant (t=-2.60; p<.01) indicating that men tend to score .193 points lower, on average, on the attitudes toward union scale compared to women even after introducing controls for social class and education level. The age group between 30 and 44 returns to marginal significance (t=1.42; p<.10) and the age group between 45 and 64 becomes marginally significant (t=.90; p<.10) after introducing controls for social class and education indicating that these two groups score .187 and .164 points higher, respectively, on the attitudes toward union scale compared to individuals over the age of 64. The relationship between geographic region and attitudes toward unions remain significant for both the Northeast (t=2.55; p<.05) and the Midwest (t=2.47; p<.05) indicating that individuals who
reside in those regions tend to score .286 and .237 points higher on the union scale, respectively, compared to individuals who reside in the south. Neither social class nor educational attainment was a significant predictor of union attitudes in any of the models.

In Model 5, a significant relationship between the race of the respondent and attitudes toward labor unions remains when controlling for sex, age, geographic region, self-identified class status, education, political philosophy, political party identification and religious affiliation and the regression slope is not zero (F=12.27; p<.001). In Model 5, the relationship between non-Latino blacks and attitudes toward labor unions remains significant (t=2.99; p<.01) indicating that non-Latino blacks score, on average, .318 points higher on the attitudes toward unions scale than non-Latino whites when controlling for the other factors. The relationship between gender and attitudes persists, but it is only marginally significant (t=-1.72; p<.10) after introducing controls for political philosophy, political party identification and religious affiliation indicating that women tend to score .14 points higher on the union scale compared to men. In Model 5, the marginally significant relationship between age and union attitudes evident in Model 4 is attenuated after controlling for political philosophy, political party identification and religious affiliation. The relationship between geographic region and attitudes toward unions remain significant in Model 5 for both the Northeast (t=2.00; p<.05) and the Midwest (t=2.60; p<.05) indicating that individuals who reside in those regions tend to score .220 and .231 points higher on the attitudes toward union scale, respectively, compared to individuals who reside in the South even after controlling for political philosophy, political party identification and religious affiliation. Model 5 also shows a significant relationship between political philosophy and union attitudes with conservatives (t=-3.92; p<.001) and moderates (t=-1.73; p<.10).
scoring, on average, .435 and .172 points lower, respectively, on the attitudes toward union scale compared to liberals. Similarly, there is a significant relationship between political party identification and union attitudes with Republicans (t=-5.99; p<.001) and independents (t=-3.13; p<.01) scoring, on average, .561 and .271 points lower, respectively, on the union scale compared to Democrats. There was also a significant relationship between religious affiliation and union attitudes but not in a way that the literature seemed to indicate. Both Protestants (t=1.95; p<.10) and other religions (t=2.10; p<.05) actually tend to score .192 and .289 points higher on the attitudes toward union scale, on average, compared to individuals with a Catholic religious affiliation.

DISCUSSION

The aim of this quantitative analysis was to determine whether or not racial differences exist in attitudes towards labor unions. Pursuant to this end, it is apparent that, racial differences in attitudes towards unions persist even after controlling for numerous social and demographic characteristics. Non-Latino blacks viewed unions more favorably compared to Non-Latino whites even after controlling for sex, age, geographic region, self-identified class status, education, political philosophy, political parity identification and affiliation. Interestingly, Latino attitudes toward labor unions, though significant in Model 1 and marginally significant in Model 3, did not differ significantly from whites after the inclusion of all of the control variables. Contrary to much of the research regarding Latinos and labor unions (Brofenbrenner 2005; Brofenbrenner and Warren 2007; Gordon 2005), Latinos did not exhibit significantly higher attitudes towards unions than non-Latino whites. With that said, it is
dangerous to attempt to generalize from this study given the small number of Latinos present in the sample. However, if subsequent studies demonstrate that Latinos do not differ significantly from non-Latino whites in their attitudes toward labor unions, one possible explanation could be the discrimination that they have historically faced at the hands of organized labor (Gordon 2005; Verba et. al. 1993).

Although documented elsewhere in this research, it is important to reiterate the need for labor unions to increase their density in order to reclaim their lost influence. In order for organized labor to increase membership it is extremely important to increase recruitment among segments of the population that are sympathetic towards labor unions. This analysis has demonstrated that blacks clearly hold more positive attitudes toward organized labor compared to whites, and labor unions would do well to capitalize by appealing to this sympathetic population.

With regard to the other variables that were examined in this study, it was not surprising that gender, geographic region and political philosophy and political party identification remained significant predictors of union attitudes in all models. Brofenbrenner and Warren (2007) have clearly demonstrated the positive impact that women have on the labor movement, both in their overall density and in union recruitment and certification campaigns. Similarly, respondents who resided in the northeast or midwest, areas with high rates of unionization, expressed higher attitudes towards organized labor along the union scale compared to individuals who resided in the south. Various labor scholars have asserted the regional effect of unionization efforts (Blinder 1972; Fantasia and Voss 2004; Goddard 2009;
Lawler 1990) and have illustrated the negative influence of right-to-work legislation on union campaigns (Dixon 2008, 2010). However, although the South remains the most heavily legislated region of the country in terms of right-to-work laws, it also contains a fairly large proportion of non-Latino blacks and Latinos. Further, there is a growing body of literature that indicates that Latinos are migrating to untraditional destinations in the US Southeast (Ansley and Shefner 2009; Bohon, Massengale and Jordan 2009; Bohon, Stamps and Atiles 2008; Cornfield 2009; Fink 2003; Striffler 2005). The new destinations for Latinos are disproportionately located in states with right-to-work laws and extremely low rates of unionization (Cornfield 2009). As Latinos migrate to new destinations, they are beginning to alter the racial and demographic makeup of states throughout the southeast and present labor unions with a unique opportunity to increase union membership in places where they have been unsuccessful in the past. Organized labor must redouble its efforts to oppose the spread of right-to-work legislation and to make inroads into right-to-work states. If these findings are evident of the effect that right-to-work legislation can have on union attitudes in general, than labor unions must work to at least maintain the sway they hold in the Northeast and Midwest. Warren (2011) illustrates how ebb and flow of partisan politics makes the Midwestern states extremely susceptible to conservative’s desire to roll back on pro-labor rulings.

Along these lines, political ideology was significantly correlated with union attitudes. Individuals with self-reported liberal political ideology or identification with the Democratic Party score high on the union attitude scale. Individuals with conservative ideology and who identify with the Republican Party score low on the union attitude scale. Differences in attitudes towards labor unions along the basis of political ideology have been well documented.
in the research literature (Blinder 1972; Clawson and Clawson 1999; Dixon 2008; Gordon 2005). It would be futile to try and provide specific policy prescriptions to try and stem ideological beliefs, but labor unions should at least be cognizant of political demographics in organizational campaigns.

In an effort to curtail the anti-union political sentiment that has fomented in the United States, labor unions must develop effective counterstrategies to increase union membership and make inroads into right-to-work states. One of the best prospects for increasing union membership and revitalizing the labor movement lies in the ability of labor unions to recruit and unionize African Americans and Latinos. The evidence from this study suggests that racial differences do exist in attitudes towards labor unions. Although attitudes certainly do not predetermine outcomes (Dunlap and Jones 2002), they have been shown to function as necessary precondition for determining behavior. Research has shown that attitudes’ regarding a particular issue affect and influence individual’s behavioral intentions towards that issue (Cordano, Frieze and Ellis 2004; Dietz et al. 2009; Youngblood et al. 1984). Given that African Americans exhibit the most positive attitudes towards organized labor, labor unions should devote more resources to organizing workers of color. Further, in order to combat what appears to be a negative attitude towards labor unions on the part of Latinos, unions need to work to unravel their discriminatory past regarding Latinos and Latino immigrants. Labor unions must recognize that a key prospect to improving the future of organized labor hinges on their capacity to appeal to and recruit African Americans and Latinos into their rank and file membership.
It is with this conclusion in mind that I move to a discussion and analysis of the field research I conducted with a labor union in a right-to-work state. This quantitative analysis was instrumental in guiding my initial field research as I was attempting to discover what strategies the CWW was using to try and bolster recruitment among members of minority populations. I was also interested in what impact campaigns to increase minority recruitment could have on the union’s predominantly white membership. It should be stated at the outset, however, that what I uncovered during my time in the field had little to do with questions of race and more to do with issues of skill. What quickly became obvious was that the workforce at the local university was as homogenous as its union. According to the universities own employment records, only 7.6% of its employees are black and only 1.7% of its employees are Latinos. It is interesting to note, though, that the population in the metropolitan area in which the university was located is comprised of 17.0% black residents and 4.8% Latino residents. In light of these conditions, the CWW focused more on how to navigate the precarious skill divides that separated graduate students, staff and faculty.
Chapter 5 Qualitative Methodology and Findings: Internal Differences and Unions

FIELD RESEARCH

The qualitative component of this project draws on information gathered over nine months of field work with the CWW. My fieldwork consisted of intermittent stints of participant and non-participant observations that occurred from January 2013 to August 2013. Additionally, I conducted eight semi-structured interviews, each between one half hour and one hour in length. In a show of reciprocity, I became a dues paying member of the CWW and aided the organizations effort in any way that I could. Although my relationship with the CWW and its members at times interfered with the objective stance I was taking as an ethnographer, I justified my actions as a necessary way to gain access to the CWW and as a harmless token of support for a subordinate political group. My training, like most qualitative researchers, has led me to believe that personal values should not conflict with objective research. Throughout my time in the field, I attempted as best I could to maintain some level of distance with the CWW. In analyzing my data, I similarly tried not to exaggerate the efforts of the union in light of the political and administrative hostility the organization faced. As Shefner illustrates “the very participation in the act of research suggests a taking of sides. I do not suggest that we abandon our political stances in the field or later, but that we recognize them or the opportunities and filters they provide us” (2008:19). In analyzing the organizational strengths and weaknesses of the CWW, I do not believe that my political beliefs have clouded the accuracy of the data, but I
also do not want to disguise the sympathies that I hold. In the end, I must leave it to the readers to decide whether or not my beliefs bias my observations.

Data Collection Sources

Data for this study is derived primarily from the nine months of field work I engaged in between January 2013 and August 2013. During my time with the CWW, I observed the organization and its members in a variety of capacities. I attempted to limit my observations to public access facilities and events that occurred on the university’s campus and the local metropolitan area. At times, my research took me to other locations across the state, such as with the organizations efforts to influence the state legislature, or in its attempts to increase membership at other colleges and universities. Primarily, my observations centered on public displays by the CWW which took the form of marches, speak-outs, and demonstrations, among other activities. At times, I observed interactions that occurred in the union’s office headquarters and at local chapter meetings. I also spent numerous hours with the union’s two key organizers as they executed their daily tasks. Finally, I spent a considerable amount of time with the Graduate Employees Committee (GEC), the graduate student arm of the CWW. Whenever possible, I informed all members of my role as researcher prior to the collection of data.

Sample Selection

The eight members of the CWW that I interviewed for this study were selected based on several criteria. In order to ensure that members of all capacities were interviewed, I selected two members each from groups of elected officials, organizers, rank and file members and graduate students. I limited my selection of these groups to individuals who regularly attended
chapter meetings and union events. A final criterion for selection was that interviewees be members of the local chapter that I was a member of and had greater access. Although this study could have benefited from interviewing members at other local chapters, constraints of time and money limited my ability to select a more inclusive group of respondents. Finally, it should be noted that another limitation of my study was that all of the participants who agreed to be interviewed were white. Again, although the study could have benefited enormously from interviewing members of other races, I was unable to solicit interviews from the union’s black and Latino members.

**Analytic Procedures**

All data from the participant and non-participant observation was originally documented in my field notes. Once an observation had concluded, I transcribed my notes and conducted line by line coding in order to ascertain distinct patterns and strategies in the unions activities. The interviews were originally taped using a digital recorder, and then immediately transcribed. Again, I engaged in line by line coding and analysis of the interviewee’s responses and synthesized the results. Findings from my field research appear in the following section.

**QUALITATIVE FINDINGS**

*Recruitment Strategies in a Multi-Class, Multi-Status Group Union*

The union’s approach to recruiting at the individual level consisted of five overarching strategies: 1) No one joins the union unless they are individually approached and asked to join. 2) The more people who are asked to join the more will join. 3) You cannot get hundreds to join unless hundreds are asked. 4) You cannot get hundreds asking to join without strong organizing
committees. 5) You cannot have functioning organizations/committees unless people are meeting regularly, making plans, working with lists, doing charts, taking assignments and reading.

The overarching strategies materialized on the ground in a variety of ways. The union local’s two key organizers were consistently on college campuses across the state talking with graduate students, staff and faculty at the individual level. Although the union had methods for blanketing events with union applications, the organizers stated that almost everyone who signed up was approached individually. Although there were not necessarily quotas in place, each organizer tried to speak with roughly twenty-five people a day. When opportunities arose to travel to campuses in other locations, their goals were more ambitious in terms of the number of individuals they would try to reach out to. For example, on one organizing trip to a university located several hundred miles away, a group of organizers set a goal of talking to 300 people over the course of three days. The sheer number of individuals with whom they would try to speak was large, but their goals for actually getting people to join the union were much more modest. Of the 300 people they would speak with at this university, they hoped that twelve would join.

In the time I spent with the CWW, the union began to place more and more emphasis on recruiting new members. In pursuit of their goal to reach 1,400 members, the CWW wanted to create organizing committees at each locale and on each college campus. One of these endeavors consisted of the creation of the GEC on the university’s flagship campus. In addition to creating the committee, the organizers also went to some length to help GEC get established
when the committee was still in its infancy. They provided the organization with a pseudo list of objectives that would aid in the establishment of the organization and that would also conform to the union’s strategy for recruiting members at the individual level. The organizers advocated for GEC to draft a mission statement, schedule regular meetings, make some substantive plans for the future, and begin reading a book, *Will Teach for Food: Academic Labor In Crisis* which would serve as an exemplar for future graduate student organizing campaigns.

A final goal that the organizers promoted for GEC to adopt was to begin creating charts for the departments in which they worked. The creation of charts was another strategy that the union employed in order to target and rank potential members. Charts were essentially spreadsheets that the union made for either academic departments or buildings on campus. Each individual who worked in the department or building was placed on the chart along with basic information such as when they held office hours. After making the charts, organizers would systematically attempt to speak to each individual on the spreadsheet and ask them to join the union. Depending on the response, the individuals would be ranked as either 1, 2, or 3. Individuals ranked as 1 were explicitly anti-union. These individuals were either hostile towards the organizers or held deep seated antipathies towards labor unions. As one organizer put it, “Some people will never join. We have heard people say ‘the union shot my granddad!’ more than I would like to admit.” Individuals who were ranked as a 2 were either indifferent towards the union or exhibited only slightly positive or negative remarks when approached to join. One organizer stated that almost everyone he talked to gets ranked as a 2. He generally reserved the ranks of 1 and 3 for individuals who were on the extreme ends of the spectrum in terms of their attitude toward the union. Individuals who were ranked as a 3 were ready and willing to
join the union but, for whatever reason, were unable to do so at the point of initial contact. The most common reason why individuals who were ranked as a three did not join on the spot was because they did not have the bank information necessary to complete the union form. If an individual did receive a rank of 3, the organizers made absolutely sure to return as soon as possible in order to collect their membership application. They argued that there were many instances when people would say they were about to join more as a method of stalling or getting the organizers to leave their office. This was a tactic I encountered numerous times in my efforts to organize graduate students. So many graduate students would express interest in joining or declare that they were about to join every time I approached them to become a member. Unfortunately, at least in my attempts, stating that you were about to join served as an effective method for dodging the issue of membership. Because I had limited capacity to try and recruit new members, and because graduate students maintained such erratic schedules, it was easy for an individual who pledged to join to slip through the cracks.

The key reason for the charts was not to serve solely as a means of identifying and organizing potential recruits. Instead the charts were used to as part of a larger recruitment strategy. If a building or department was comprised of a large number of individuals who were ranked as 2s or 3s, then organizers knew where to dedicate their resources. Further, as individuals in a particular department who were ranked as 3s began to join the union, it became easier to recruit the individuals that were ranked as 2s. The strategy was to try and immediately recruit the people who thought highly of the CWW and hope that their membership and influence might spread throughout their office and department. At one chapter meeting, a union organizer from another state who had some history with the CWW
discussed the ranking system in these terms: “What we try and do is get after those 2s and 3s. If we can make progress there, we can begin to box in those people who we initially had listed as 1s. If everybody around them is a union member, they might start to change their minds.” Thus, the charts and ranking system served as both a method of keeping track of union members as well as a unionization strategy.

In interviews with union members regarding recruitment strategies, responses were differentiated based on their position within the organization. Still, most responses regarding recruitment strategies were consistent with the observations described above. I did find that most members were much more apt to discuss the barriers to recruitment rather than the opportunities. When asked about recruitment strategies, one organizer stated that some members at the university were an easy sell. If a professor had a social justice orientation in their research, for example, then they could be persuaded to join for political reasons. Similarly, graduate students in certain departments, especially the social sciences, were often excited about the prospects and held fewer reservations. Although certain constituencies were comparatively easier to recruit, most potential members expressed numerous uncertainties and misgivings about the union. One organizer stated that the biggest barrier to recruitment was:

...fear of retaliation, retaliation in the form of not getting promoted, not getting a raise or being fired. I think that people have a concept that unions are illegal in [this state] and that’s not true, and then, for that they are weak and don’t have any power. And, I mean, they are a very small percentage of the work force
that’s unionized in [this state], and so that’s true. And that’s what needs to change. And so, and some people do feel fear from management, they have been, you know, intimidated somehow and so they feel that anything could get them more of that. For some people, it’s just that the situation is so tenuous anyways, they don’t want to risk anything. They’ve been trying to get promoted for ten years, some support staff, been trying to get their pay changed and have been completely left out and so they don’t want to have anything on their record that could hurt me or my chances.

Another rank and file union member expressed similar frustration with the culture of fear that had been promoted regarding the union. In this member’s opinion, potential recruits had been sold on the belief that they could lose their jobs if they joined the union.

I think that we live in a society, in a situation, where big business and managers have created this fear. They have tried to tell people, and like, advertised that you, that you shouldn’t join the union. I mean, you can look anywhere and see these types of campaigns. I mean, I think that a lot of the propaganda surrounding these types of campaigns is just that [propaganda], but you know, whether it’s real or imagined, I think that a lot of people believe it. I think that a lot of people are scared about joining the union because there worried that they could get fired.

Whether real or imagined, the fear of retaliation for joining the CWW had a detrimental impact on the organization’s ability to increase membership. Another recurrent theme that
came up in the interviews was the overarching trend towards deindustrialization in the United States. Members stated that there was a belief in the community that unions were responsible for the loss of manufacturing jobs that had occurred. As one rank and file member stated:

I think a lot of folks, so, because it’s a public sector job, there are some, um, protections that keep people here long term, which means that we have a lot of older people who work at [this university]. And, a lot of those people lived through the major period of deindustrialization which happened here, very intensely. And saw where union jobs were, uh, offshored or sent further south, though those places are also already gone, they went to Mexico first and now there out in Southeast Asia. And, the real kind of politics that the ruling class here was able to put out was, blame the unions for that, which said it was too costly to maintain these jobs. And that idea really won a lot of traction in folks. And so, they often say, the union is what lost a lot of people their job.

The notion that unions were responsible for the loss of jobs was expressed in numerous interviews. Another rank and file member argued that some recruitment strategies were stymied because:

“People think that the union is bad or cost them their jobs. I think business and managers have sold this image to a lot of people that if their um, if a job moves overseas or something, then it’s the union’s fault. Well, it must be because those workers wanted to make $40 dollars an hour or something and that’s because of the union and like that’s the reason why the job went overseas.
Another organizer expressed similar sentiments when our conversation was steered towards barriers to increased recruitment:

In a lot of cases I think that if people have had an experience with the union, it was in a factory that has since moved overseas, so, while they may have benefitted from the union at the time, they saw it move overseas, some people end up blaming the union. So bad experiences with unions, even if unions weren’t even at fault. The union didn’t decide to move the company. A lot of people are like, well they knew [the union], they should have told us that it was happening.

Two additional barriers to recruitment that were cited in the interviews involved issues of time and money. One elected official of the CWW stated that having to pay union dues often discouraged potential members from joining.

Our union requires that our members pay dues and I think that that discourages people from joining. I don’t know if like, if that is an actual reason why someone won’t join, not a real reason, you know? But that’s what a lot of people say. But, I don’t think the dues are a real reason, I think that people just say that because it’s hard to respond to if you trying to get someone to join.

This official’s impression that dues were only a fabricated reason for not joining was consistent with my observations. Although the dues that the CWW charged its members were quite modest, it was difficult to argue with someone where personal finances were concerned. The official went on to state that, “People around here are really struggling to make ends meet.
What right do I have to tell someone who’s down on their luck that they need to give us their money?”

A final issue that was brought up in the interviews that discouraged potential members from joining was time. A graduate student member stated that

A lot of people, um a lot of graduate students I talk to, the most common thing they say is time. I don’t have enough time to contribute to this organization. I feel bad if I can’t, if I join but I can’t do anything. And I mean even when you explain to them that like your membership alone is a huge thing, they just keep throwing the time thing at you.”

As with the issue of dues, this member believed that time constraints were not so much a real issue but a means of avoiding membership. Whereas issues of finance were difficult to discuss with staff, issues of time were a tough sell to graduate students. What is difficult to discern, as expressed by the interviewees, is the extent to which these barriers to recruitment were real concerns on the part of potential members or if they were just used to avoid further conversation and interaction with union organizers. Regardless, union leaders, organizers and members were cognizant of the impediments to increased recruitment and attempted to address these concerns in their organizational campaigns.

Organizational Campaigns

The CWW was engaged in a bevy of different campaigns throughout the course of my project. Although there were nuanced differences with regard to the specific type of campaign
the union was engaged in, I found the campaigns could be divided along three key lines: 1) Campaigns that centered on the political process; 2) Campaigns that centered on monetary issues and the mistreatment of workers; and 3) Campaigns to expose the union to a broader audience and promote the union’s image and presence within the Knoxville community.

Prior to the onset of my project, union members had informed me that the CWW had previously engaged in yearly campaigns centered on a particular issue. More recently, the CWW had moved away from labeling a singular issue as their predominant concern for a specific year and had begun to frame their campaigns around The Campus Employees Demand of Rights (CEDR). The CEDR, while not all inclusive, contained nine issues and demands that were drafted in accordance with the union’s overall vision. Framing the union’s campaign around the CEDR allowed the union to both raise awareness to the document as well as to undertake in a plethora of differentiated campaigns that all contained an underlying theme.

Campaigns that were centered on the political process were limited to issues that were being debated in the state legislature. After the lobby day event that was depicted in the introduction had concluded, the CWW continued to roll out its usual tactics regarding their campaigns that centered on the political process. The CWW-ILU website features a rolling Twitter account with updates about what is happening in the state legislature. A few days before a vote is called for a specific piece of legislation pertinent to one of the union’s goals, emails will be sent to all members urging them to call or email their personal representatives and encourage a yes or no vote. The emails include a script that members can use when phoning their representatives as well as an email template that members can send with the
click of a button. Although somewhat limited in its scope, the union tried to keep members informed when a relevant political issue was on the table or needed attention. At times, informational campaigns were launched to sensitize members on certain political issues. For the pension reform, for example, the union hosted a telephone conference with members and a representative from the CWW-ILU with some expertise on pension plans and the proposed reforms. Members had the opportunity to ask questions about the changes and were, again, instructed to contact their representatives and urge a no vote on the legislation.

Although there are numerous overlaps between the union’s campaigns that focused on the political process and the campaigns that focused on pay and workplace grievances, the particular tactics that the union rolled out differed in significant ways. During the course of my field research, for example, the CWW was engaged in a campaign to raise awareness and urge the administration to ameliorate the grievances that the custodial workers had leveled against their supervisors. This campaign materialized on the ground as rank and file members become increasingly frustrated with working conditions. Appeals on the part of custodial workers were made to organizers and elected union officials who met privately to discuss strategy and plan a course of action. After such plans were drafted, elected union officials presented the motion at a chapter meeting to inform members and solicit feedback.

The local campaigns that centered on workplace grievances tended to take precedence over recruitment strategies and campaigns centered on the political process. In the case of the custodial workers, resources and personnel were shifted from certain locales to strengthen the union’s efforts at the university’s flagship campus. Once these and similar plans had been laid
in-house, the union sought to inform the local community and encourage members to take small actions against the administration. A postcard campaign was launched to try and put pressure on upper and mid-level management to take the custodial workers complaints seriously and investigate what they had said. At one chapter meeting, union members were informed of the action and asked to pledge to obtain a certain number of signed postcards from their colleagues. The postcards were then mailed to university president either through campus mail or through the postal service.

The effectiveness of the postcard campaign was brought into question at one chapter meeting. Some members argued that it was unlikely that the postcards would reach the university president and believed that, even if they did, they would not make enough of an impact to solicit a response. Some members preferred to take a different course of action and send a contingent of workers to demand a response from the president in person. Other members were slightly wary of the potential ramifications that such a personalized action could have on the workers and insisted that the postcard campaign was a less risky alternative. An undergraduate representative from the Enlightened Alliance of Students (EAS) offered to volunteer a student coalition to speak with the president in lieu of the custodial workers themselves. The offer was well received, but members still had some reservations. “The EAS has pledged a lot of support in the past,” one member told me, “But has failed to carry through on many of their promises.”

In addition to taking small actions such as mailing postcards, the union also incorporated public components such as speak out’s or community forums to raise awareness for their
campaigns that centered on workplace grievances. In the case of the custodial workers, a community forum was organized for the workers to air their grievances. In order to bolster attendance at these events, the union would conduct phone banking operations to contact members who were listed as activists and inform them of the event. I asked one union member why the union only tried to reach out to members who were labeled as activists during the phone banking operations. “From a resource standpoint, “she said “We simply don’t have the numbers to try and call everyone in a short period of time. Plus, the more active members are much more likely to attend and tell their co-workers about the event. We have some members who have been with us from the beginning, but they will hang up on us as soon we tell them were from the CWW!” The member did indicate that, in order to try and reach out to the full union rolls, mass emails would be sent to all members informing them of the event and the action.

The phone banking operations for the custodial event were quite successful and also provided a lens into what messages resonated with the members with whom I spoke. One woman who I phoned stated: “Oh yeah! This sounds like an important one. I’ll try to make it.” Another gentleman who I contacted expressed a similar sentiment, but was much more forthcoming in his response. He stated that he always paid his union dues, but he apologized for being a less than active union member. He argued that some of the issues and campaigns that the union was focused on just didn’t seem to be that important in the grand scheme of things. He believed that the case with the custodial workers was different, though. This particular grievance was one that he was proud that the union had taken up and that necessitated the support of the CWW members.
In addition to the small actions, public forums, and phone banking operations, the union would always try to reach out to the local media in hopes of getting the event covered. Depending on the type of event or action, the union experienced mixed success in its attempts. The MLK Day march and banquet, as well as the union’s lobby day efforts, received negligible coverage in the media. Their ability to promote the custodial workers grievances, however, has been far more successful. In the weeks that followed the initial complaints, the story was picked up by two local newspapers, three local radio stations, and three local TV stations. In addition to profiling the hazardous working conditions and retaliatory transfers that the custodial workers face, the union has also been able to garner considerable attention as the sole advocate for the building service workers.

The union was also engaged in several campaigns whose prime purpose appeared to be to show solidarity with the community and other community groups as well as to maintain a presence in sympathetic locales. The MLK Day banquet and parade, for example, seemed designed more as means to increase group solidarity and to be visible within the community rather than for any real recruitment or organizational strategy. These types of events did serve as excellent conduits for strengthening ties with allied groups and for promoting broad progressive messages. The MLK Day banquet featured a variety of community groups and advocacy organizations. One of the union’s most sympathetic political representatives was also in attendance for the event. The evening’s key note speaker delivered a broad array of progressive messages and celebrated the effective organizing capacity of the CWW in a right-to-work state with no collective bargaining rights and no dues check off. The union engaged in
similar strategies for promoting group solidarity and community presence at a variety of additional events such as the annual union cook-out and the union yard sale.

As was the case with interview questions surrounding recruitment strategies, member’s opinions towards the union’s organizational campaigns were differentiated based on their position within the union. The union leadership and organizers were generally supportive of the campaigns and argued in favor of their efficiency. Rank and file members and graduate students, while not dissatisfied with the campaigns, stated that there were divergent paths they would like to see the union take.

When asked about the current campaigns that the union was engaged in, one elected official stated that “Living wage and fair raise are the long term ones we focus on the most.” When asked about the effectiveness of these two campaigns, the official expressed their belief that:

It depends on the person, on the type of employee, because obviously we can recruit anyone. But, the folks at the bottom stand the most to gain from those sorts of things. And I think that people do respond to those two things. Because they know that it’s not right, and especially if they have had a good union experience they know that it doesn’t have to be like that. That not only is the pay bad but the benefits suck and so there like, how can they get away with this? And so people do respond to both of those things.

Similarly, one of the union organizers who I spoke with about organizational campaigns indicated that:
We always have a yearly campaign, usually, around the pay raises. Like, if there is a pay increase in the budget, what the percent is going to be, how it’s going to get allocated or whatever. So this year we were trying to get a floor raise and trying to illustrate that the 1.5% increase wasn’t even enough to keep up with the cost of living. We were also trying to show how the merit based increases and the percentage increases were disproportionately benefitting the people at the top.

This sentiment regarding the effectiveness of campaigns centered on wages was echoed by the union’s other elected officials and organizers. Rank and file members and graduate students, however, expressed divergent responses. One rank and file member stated that:

I think that the campaigns focused on the pay raises and stuff are good, I think pay is really important to people, but I think that just getting to have more control over your job would be effective. It’s something that I have advocated for the in the past and something that I want to continue to work on, because, like, I think it’s something that is often overlooked, but something that a lot of um, a lot of different people would be for.

Similarly, a graduate student who I interviewed described their frustration with the current campaigns:

I feel like we are sorely lacking on a campaign that can get a lot of people to join at the same time. It’s always like, living wage this, pushing for the idea of the living wage, living wage that, and that’s an ongoing ask, like an ongoing way of
trying to get people interested. But I wish we were doing more, something more inclusive that appealed not just to people’s wages.

The ongoing struggle to design campaigns that appealed to the diverse groups who made up the CWW presented organizers and elected officials with difficult decisions. Because the CWW was a wall-to-wall union which encompassed every employee at the University, it was often a zero sum game in terms of which constituency to target. Both the difficulties and advantages of the wall-to-wall approach will be highlighted in the following sections. For now, I turn to the racial interaction and conflict experienced by the CWW and its members to highlight some of the opportunities and barriers that the CWW faced regarding minority recruitment.

*Racial Interaction and Conflict*

This section should be prefaced by stating that one of the chief deficits of this research was my inability to identify substantive differences in recruiting strategies and campaigns for minority populations. Perhaps the lack of attention that the union local I was embedded with paid to issues of race is indicative of the homogeneity of the local itself. Although I was never able to obtain exact figures on the racial composition of the union, there were but a scant few instances in which a person of color was present at union events. This was certainly not the case at all CWW-ILU locales. The contingent from another city in the state, for example, was made up of a majority of African American members. Again, I believe that this has much more to do with the racial composition of the cities and campuses in which the CWW operates then it does with any underlying prejudice that minorities have toward the union or vice versa. As one of the organizers in another location made it clear to me: “honey, we were almost all black or
Latino down here, but that’s because [our city] and [campus] have a little more diversity, if you know what I mean.” Still, it is worth noting that the locale where I conducted the majority of my field research did not have any particular strategies or plans to try and increase minority recruitment, and there were some instances in which underlying or blatant racial remarks were issued from individuals we were trying to recruit.

Though there were certainly some key differences in the strategies employed by different organizers, the union had, essentially, a one-size-fits-all strategy for recruiting new members. Their two general techniques that were used included what I dubbed as “political recruitment” and “personal recruitment” strategies. Political strategies included appeals not to personal benefits, but to joining the union for the sake of others and for higher education generally. These strategies included reporting on the number of union members that the CWW currently had enrolled and stating the necessity of reaching a certain number (in most cases 1400 members) in order to illustrate to the universities administration and the state legislature that the union represented a critical mass of employees. Organizers would also tout the need to join for the sake of maintaining academic freedom within the university and for ensuring that future academics had a right to organize. These strategies were employed when organizers were attempting to recruit members in more privileged positions, such as faculty and graduate students.

Personal strategies included appeals to improving issues such as pay, pensions, benefits, and working conditions. Organizers would generally employ this strategy by asking potential recruits what they did not like about their job. If an individual mentioned the pay, the union
would tout its campaign to institute flat dollar raises as opposed to percentage raises. If an individual was upset about the working conditions in which they were forced to toil, the union would discuss its successful campaign to ensure that custodial workers received hepatitis B vaccinations and were now provided with rubber gloves. These strategies were generally used when organizers were attempting to recruit members in occupations of lower prestige, such as grounds workers and building service workers.

In addition to the two recruiting strategies, the union was also cognizant of the power differentials at play when approaching potential recruits. As one organizer stated:

> It is easy for some workers to feel like they are being approached in a very paternalistic way, especially if it’s, like, a graduate student talking to a custodial worker. That’s why we’re trying to make sure that we have faculty recruiting faculty, graduate students recruiting graduate students and staff recruiting staff.

It appeared as though the union had a significantly higher success rate when recruiting was being conducted horizontally rather than vertically. In the same sense, even within departments or buildings on campus, the potential recruitment capabilities were much greater when the union had an initial foot in the door. As of this writing, the union was placing a premium on trying to recruit at least one member from departments and buildings with zero rates of unionization. The same could easily be said of racial differences in recruitment strategies. If a lead organizer in this local CWW chapter was a person of color, it seems reasonable to expect that their opportunities for enhanced minority recruitment would increase.
This is not to say that attempts to increase minority recruitment would not be without their potential downfalls. The union’s decision to take part in the MLK Day march and begin hosting the MLK Day banquet, one member told me, resulted in the loss of a few union members from their rolls. Additionally, there is no question that some underlying racial tension exists within the university’s work force. During one door-knocking endeavor that I took part in, for example, one gentleman stated quite frankly that, “If you all do any work with that Center for African American Studies, then I don’t want to be a part of your organization.” Although certainly not representative of the workforce as a whole, this particular encounter did illustrate some of the difficulties associated with minority recruitment. After the encounter, I asked one elected official if that type of response was something the union encountered regularly. “Yeah,” the official stated, “There’s always going to be racists out there. We don’t want those types of people in the union anyways.”

Interviews with members regarding minority recruitment, interaction and conflict paralleled many of my observations. In nearly every interview I conducted, members indicated that the racial composition and recruitment strategies in which the union engaged were tailored to each locale. Members indicated that the sheer homogeneity of the community and campus where my field research occurred underscored the union’s stances and recruitment strategies. One locale in particular, by contrast, was comprised of a much more diverse workforce and, as a result, a much more diverse union membership. When asked about the racial composition of the union, one organizer told me:
“I mean around the state it looks different on each campus. I don’t think there’s hardly any, well I say that without even knowing, I don’t think we have many members of color here at this campus, but the demographics are pretty different from a place like [different university]. And again, a large percentage of our members there, and there’s like 160 or maybe there getting up to 200, um, are in custodial services which is almost entirely African American and so, the vast majority of our members at the [different university] are African American. But so, at a place like [another university], I mean you’re hard pressed to find like five people of color.”

One of the union’s elected officials echoed the perception of this organizer. When asked about the racial composition of the union, the elected official argued:

    it is definitely majority white, but it really just depends on location. Like [our other state universities] are comprised of a um, a majority of African Americans members. It’s also made up almost entirely of custodial workers who are, um, majority African American. So I really think it just depends on location. But it also depends on the particular section of employment. So like here at [this university] we definitely have minority members in the union, but there almost all custodial workers because that’s who [this university] generally hires for those positions.

Both the demographic characteristics of the community where my field research occurred as well as the hiring practices exercised by the local university played a substantial role in the minority composition of the union. Although the locale in which I conducted my study was
composed of a majority of white workers, there was never any underlying sentiment that racial prejudice was an issue within the union. In several interviews, in fact, members indicated that one of the union’s most successful campaigns centered on the issue of racial equality. In early 2001, the CWW was engaged in a struggle to assist a black professor who was denied tenure. One elected official described the incident as:

> a fight that the union took up, took up to try and help him. We assisted with um, the appeal and tried to raise a lot of media attention and campus support and just, just general support. And we got a lot of support for [the professor] and a lot of support from the black community and the campus community around the issue. We lost that fight, though, He never got tenure, but it was something that the union did, more just because of the issue, but also because it was something we could do to try and help out because of the discrimination.

Another elected official described the incident similarly:

> Some of the biggest mobilization, we had this mobilization, there was an African American professor who was one of the founders of the union, he was a very outspoken critic of the administration, and he was denied tenure. And our union and the student group were very involved in trying to keep him here. There were big marches on campus with hundreds of students. We interrupted meetings. It seemed like we were going somewhere. And they denied him tenure anyways, you know.
The incident, though not as effective as certain union members and elected officials had hoped, illustrates the union’s inclusiveness in at least certain organizational campaigns. Simply because issues of racial justice are not as prominent on the campus where my study was conducted in no way precludes the CWW’s members from engaging in campaigns designed to bolster racial solidarity.

Again, although no one I interviewed believed that racial discrimination was manifest within the CWW, many interview participants did express concern about the potential fallout that could occur if the union took a more radical stance towards issues pertaining exclusively to members of racial minorities. When asked whether or not the union could lose members as a result of campaigns to target minority members, nearly everyone stated that it was a potential issue. One elected official, for example, argued:

Let’s say there were a specific campaign, like let’s say about affirmative action in hiring or seniority which often effects, like depending on how we talked about it, it would, and, I think it some cases our union, because were so small and we need to keep growing, has been a little conservative about this. We frame it as everybody’s interest. But there is actually an established history here in [this community] recognizing that it’s a really majority white place and we need to talk to the white workers about why it’s important to oppose racism... But I think we would lose some people, I don’t know that it would be that many.

The union’s conservative stance described by this official was a recurrent theme in the interviews I conducted. As was the case with the sex week issued described in the introduction,
the potential loss of members was always weighed carefully before the union engaged in comparatively radical campaigns. Views toward membership loss were, again, differentiated depending on the status of the member. Elected officials and organizers were constantly concerned about the loss of members, whereas staff members, and especially graduate students, were less troubled by the prospect. As one organizer stated:

I also believe that our politics should emanate from our members and so if there is not a signification section, um, of our members who want to be active around the issue, and if we think we’re going to lose members, I don’t think we should do it just because it’s good politics.

A staff member, in contrast, was much less concerned over the potential loss of membership if the union took up a radical campaign for racial equality:

If we had a campaign that was targeting like, African Americans or something, I mean, I don’t know, I think there’s a possibility we could lose members, but I’m not sure if that’s really a bad thing. I mean, is that someone that we really want in the union anyway? Racists? So, I mean, if we did lose members, it would probably be people who were less dedicated and involved and probably someone who we didn’t, who we wouldn’t want in the first place.

Similarly, one graduate student stated that the conservatism of certain sections of the union was undermining the ability of the CWW to advocate for more radical issues. A graduate student argues that the loss of a certain section of members could actually benefit the CWW:
There’s a lot of conservatism about how radical we want to be or how many buttons do we want to push. Um, there are, a couple of people, one of the organizers in particular, just is like, well, what if we lose members on this? I don’t want to lose members on this. And that drives me crazy. Like, who cares? Will get the members we want versus the members that are like just members and there sitting on their butts anyways, not doing anything. So I think that, I don’t know, I think that there’s a handful of people that would think the way that I do and there’s other people that would me much more conservative. And that’s an ongoing conflict I think, in meeting spaces.

I return to the issue of the racial solidarity and conflict as well as the differentiated stances that certain segments of the union take regarding campaigns in the following section. For now, it is important to understand that the CWW’s strategies towards racial recruitment and organizing campaigns are differentiated based on the local environment. Had I have had the opportunity to interview members from other locales, I assume that the responses towards racial recruitment and organizing campaigns would have differed significantly. Similarly, the observations and the responses that I solicited during interviews indicated that the CWW was cognizant of the racial discrepancies in membership and that several members were in favor of more inclusive campaigns. Yet, the leadership team’s desire to allow the union members to guide the organization’s strategy may also have decreased the impetus for campaigns centered on race. Due to the perceived homogeneity of the local community (as noted earlier the official statistics reveal much more diversity), the voices that were privileged tended to be disproportionately white. As the interviews indicated, members did not believe that issues of
race served as a major impediment among union members. Instead, members thought that one of the most divisive issues was the challenge of organizing in a workplace where employees were differentiated by skill.

Skill Divides and Recruitment

As the quantitative data analysis indicated, racial differences play a key role in attitudes and orientations towards labor unions. The indication that members of racial minorities hold more favorable attitudes towards organized labor presents unions with a unique opportunity to expand membership through more inclusive organizing strategies. This opportunity, however, has not yet manifested itself in any substantive ways on the campus where this study was conducted. Instead, what members indicated as the key challenge facing the CWW was how to address the skill divides that have cropped up in its recruitment and organizing strategies. As noted extensively throughout the historical overview, the issue of skill divisions among and within labor unions has plagued the American labor movement from its genesis (Fink 1977; Peterson 1963; Rehmus and McLaughlin 1967; Voss 1993). The AFL emerged in 1886 as an outgrowth of the resentment between skilled and unskilled workers that the Knights of Labor witnessed before their collapse. As a result, the AFL granted complete autonomy to each craft specific union within its ranks (Voss 1993). Although this autonomy quelled the animosity between workers of different skill levels, it severely fragmented the labor movement as a whole (Peterson 1963). Thus, the effort of the CWW to unite employees across traditional occupational divides presents the organization with both unique opportunities and challenges.
Essentially, what the CWW must constantly ask itself is how do people who are different work with each other, especially in a hostile organizing atmosphere?

One elected union official described the difficulties of organizing in a workplace that is greatly differentiated by skill

One thing I didn't say earlier about the union is that unlike a lot of unions, which would divide up secretaries from custodians from lecturers, our union is a wall to wall union. We try to see the interests of all of our members and be able to give, um, credence to everyone's issues as opposed to just one set of workers. And, because we're trying to cover everyone that means a lot of times that we're trying to organize people who are effectively middle management, who have kind of a nice job or have some relevant control over their work. These are not people who other unions would typically try to organize. But because we are wall to wall, we will sometimes try to do that. Sometimes this a problem for these mid-management types, and so they won't join because we're not advocating for just their interests.

This official's depiction of the unique difficulties that the CWW faced was echoed by other members. According to members, it was a tough sell to try and convince someone with an adequate salary and a significant degree of autonomy to join the union. Further, the offers and arguments presented to potential members had to change in response to skill differences. One rank and file member elaborated on this difficulty:
I think it can present sometimes real, tough, stuff, when we’re trying to choose what to focus on. Especially around pay. We have a lot of, for instance, faculty members in the union. And, so, a lot of times when we’re trying to say, we need pay to go up from $9 an hour to $11 an hour, and, um, that effects almost no faculty and so we really have to figure out how do we play on folks, kinda, just sympathies and the principal, the basic principal of solidarity, which is totally difficult to do in this society. In class society, in neoliberal society, solidarity doesn’t sell as easy as one would hope it would.”

As this quote illustrates, appeals to economic outcomes would only work on a certain segment on the workforce. In this case of faculty members, as this interviewee noted, the union’s effort to improve minimum wages would have little to no effect on their financial position. As a result, the union organizers would sometimes attempt to gain faculty membership by appealing to their sympathies. This strategy, however, was generally only used as a last resort. After an unsuccessful attempt to get a faculty member to join, one union organizer confessed that, “I’m sure I could get guilt them into joining if I tried hard enough, but I want to be able to offer some benefits for joining beyond just sympathy.”

The difficulties associated with faculty membership were made even more complex when it came to staff. Far from lumping staff members together as their own constituency, the union was cognizant of the vast differences that separated staff members who occupied dissimilar positions:
Like we have this campaign that’s going on in the building services with the night shift custodians who are being like verbally harassed and put in these unsafe conditions, and that stuff doesn’t resonate even with low wage workers who are like, say, secretaries. It’s very unlikely that a secretary is going to be, like, reamed out in front, at the front desk of an office. Or, you know, a lecturer or something. Even though those people all share the same wage demand, those conditions are different and I think a typical union would want to address them through separate kinds of stuff.

Furthering dividing the union membership was the precarious position of graduate students. The amalgamation of graduate employees who served as both pseudo-faculty or staff and students presented union organizers with even more dilemmas. Chiefly, organizers stated that graduate students were a hard sell because of the tuition waivers and stipends they received from the university. Because most graduate students felt fortunate to be in the position they were in, organizers believed that they were somewhat less likely to join. Other graduate students felt vulnerable precisely because of the funding they received from their university:

I mean, don’t get me wrong, I love the union, it’s my thing. But like, this is going to sound terrible, but if the university was like either quit the union or you’re going to lose your funding, I would fold in a second. I mean, I don’t think that’s ever going to happen, but if it came down to it, there’s no way I’m taking a stance with, like, my entire education and future career prospects on the line.
Another difficulty that graduate students presented for organizers was the manner in which they would dodge requests to join. One organizer stated that:

> Some grads are just not into the idea or try to over intellectualize the idea. Who sit there and try to prove me wrong about a bunch of stuff. They’ll cite all this theory and try to argue every point. It seems like most of the time they just want to argue for the sake of it, or they’ll just point out some flaw in our logic as a reason not to get involved.

The different constituencies at the university required the union to devise unique campaigns and strategies that were sometimes counterproductive. Using the Sex Week controversy as an example, what appealed to graduate students may have resulted in the loss of staff members. Likewise, the union’s effort to improve the salaries of the lowest paid workers has little to no impact on most faculty members. The intersection of skill and, to a lesser degree, race within the CWW membership is one of the most difficult issues for the union to navigate. The ability of CWW to elicit solidarity between all segments of its members is crucial for the organization’s success. It is precisely this subject which I turn to in the concluding chapter.
Chapter 6 Conclusion

THE INTERSECTION OF SKILL, RACE AND SOLIDARITY IN UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS

In the past half century, there has been an unprecedented decline in labor union membership, organizing ability, political effectiveness and strike activity in the United States. The precise cause of this decline is as elusive as it is damaging. A complex web of forces has coalesced to restrain and undermine the labor movement in the United States. The exceptional nature of the American labor movement, the precipitous decline in union density and the aggressive anti-union sentiment on the part of big business are but a few of the factors that have led to the abysmal decline of labor’s influence in the United States. With that said, labor unions still remain the major organizations most adept at improving the lives of working class people in the United States (Edsall 1984).

In order to combat the anti-union political sentiment that has formed in the United States, this thesis has argued both that labor unions must develop effective counterstrategies to increase union membership and build inclusive campaigns that resonate with diverse segments of the American populace and that a specific unions experience with recruitment has necessitated the building of solidarity as a chief means to accomplish this goal. As the quantitative data analysis indicated, one of the best prospects for increasing union membership and revitalizing the labor movement may reside in the ability of labor unions to recruit underrepresented groups of African Americans and Latinos. In light of this fact, organized labor has been slow to realize that its revitalization is contingent upon the ability of unions to organize and recruit diverse groups of low and semi-skilled workers.
As the historical overview illustrated, the effects of race, immigration and skill have curtailed numerous efforts at solidarity among the working class and have had a significantly negative impact on organized labor. Historically, labor unions were able to gain increased political legitimacy through the systematic expulsion of African Americans, immigrants and low skilled workers from their rank and file union membership (Peterson 1963; Fink 1977). The origins of the AFL, for instance, can be traced to the fallout of skilled workers from the ranks of the Knights of Labor. The decision on the part of the AFL to grant autonomy to each craft industry cemented the skill division within the American labor movement. Similarly, throughout the 19th and 20th Century, the AFL-CIO was mired in accusations of racism and discriminatory hiring practices. As noted earlier, AFL-CIO president George Meany was criticized by prominent African American leaders such as A. Phillip Randolph for failing to enforce the anti-discrimination clauses contained in union constitutions and for failing to penalize unions that were openly discriminatory (Fink 1977). Even the United Farm Workers (UFW), arguably the most pro-immigrant union affiliated with the AFL-CIO, has a rather bleak track record of appealing to Latino workers. Gordon (2005) describes particular instances where UFW organizers actually pressed the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to arrest and deport undocumented workers who were serving as strikebreakers during the Delano grape strike.

In spite of the history of exclusion and discrimination that they have faced at the hands of organized labor, the quantitative component of this project illustrated that African Americans and Latinos continue to exhibit more positive attitudes towards unions than whites. Additionally, the literature exploring racial differences in attitudes towards unions also revealed
that minority populations “manifest a stronger sense of social injustice, greater relative
deprivation, more crystallized class consciousness, and greater union support” (Schulman,
Zingraff and Reif 1985). Further, as Brofenbrenner and Warren (2007) have illustrated,
unionization efforts at workplaces comprised of a majority of white employees have the lowest
win rates at 35 percent. Workplaces comprised of a majority of African Americans and Latinos,
on the other hand, have significantly higher win rates at 53 percent (Bronfenbrenner and
Warren 2007).

Although the data on racial differences in attitudes towards labor unions indicates that
organized labor may be able to increase recruitment by targeting minority populations, both
the data on racial demographics of the university where this study was conducted as well as the
qualitative component of this project illustrate that issues of race are not at the forefront of the
CWW’s recruitment strategies and organizational campaigns. At least for the time being, the
pressing issue for this CWW chapter revolves around the age-old question of skill. Again, we
return to the research questions of how do people who are different work with each other in a
hostile organizing atmosphere? How do differences within the CWW counter pose to questions
of race, class, gender and skill? The ability of the CWW to effect positive change in its member’s
lives is contingent on the organization’s ability to create solidarity among the divergent groups
it claims to represent.

THE SEARCH FOR SOLIDARITY IN A MULTIPLE CONSTITUENCY UNION

In several key ways, the strategies and actions pursued by the CWW parallel the
theoretical and historical trajectories of labor unions in the United States. As Marx ([1847]
classically formulated, attempts by labor associations to promote economic interests are antithetical to their overarching goals. The CWW’s reliance on economic strategies in both their appeals to potential members and their organizational campaigns may indeed undermine their ability to promote more radical changes in the future. Of course, Marx ([1847] 1995) also allowed that the initial strategy pursued by labor unions would always materialize in the form of efforts to increase their members wages but that, eventually, unions would serve as a counterbalance to united capital and to fulfill the need for solidarity and fellowship.

Founded in 2001, the CWW is still an infant organization. The need to respond to issues such as wage stagnation, merit based pay increases and pension reform, therefore, is a necessary first step in its quest for increased recruitment and influence within the university system. In addition, one thing that the CWW felt it had to respond to were the felt needs of its members. As we have seen, the CWW’s response to the hardships that its members faced almost always initially materialized in the form of campaigns centered on pay. Although these campaigns have been criticized throughout the course of this research, the importance of improving the wages of employees at the university should not be understated. Further, these actions are, in the opinion of CWW members, undergirding the future capacities of the union. As one of the elected leaders stated:

I think it’s hard to admit you’re weak but, I, I don’t think that we’re that powerful of an organization yet. We’re positioning ourselves to be powerful. And, we know how to exploit our openings and really take advantage of that, but, um, right now, the labor movements is weak and in the south it’s especially weak and
among public sector workers in the south it’s even more weak. And so, you know, were somewhat effective, but we don’t, we, often what we can do is force them to a negotiating table and then they still get most of what they want. We get a little of what we want or we kinda get small things. We haven’t gotten anything big. And, you know, that’s tough, but, it’s just gonna have to be a long term thing.

This union official went on to describe several courses of action they would like to see the union pursue, but, again, argued that, for the time being, the CWW had to focus on piece-meal reforms in order to illustrate to its members that it was building an impetus for substantive change.

Another instance in which the CWW’s evolution is supported in the theoretical literature is in regards to the spontaneity of its actions. The CWW originated out of spontaneous action on the part of staff, students and faculty. In the spring of 2000, a coalition of campus workers organized to form the University Employees for a Fair Wage (UEFW) with the explicit goal of allowing university workers to lead the struggle against poverty wages. According to the CWW, this action arose organically in response to the persistent attack on wages, benefits and pensions at the university. The union’s first rally enjoyed the support of nearly 500 students, faculty and staff, and the organization was successful in its attempt to force the president of the university to the bargaining table. The initial strategy of the union was consistent with Luxemburg’s argument that the techniques employed by workers associations, such as their use of the mass strike, the “heart-beat of the revolution,” had to occur spontaneously (1906 [2004]:
Attempts by trade unions and intellectuals to call for and coordinate a mass strike, for Luxemburg (1906 [2004]), only increased the chances that the movement would fragment and fall prey to economic goals. The fact that the union’s initial spontaneous efforts were centered around economic goals, however, seems to give more credence to Lenin’s argument that the spontaneous formation of working class associations and working class ideology leads only to trade-unionism or “the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie” ([1902] 1969:57). Since, according to Lenin, no independent ideology can be formulated by working class associations, his goal was to combat spontaneity. Only after struggling against the spontaneity of the working class associations could the possibility for more radical workplace restructuring gain traction. Lenin’s controversial reliance on the vanguard to structure and guide trade union movements is, in many ways, consistent with the leadership style that the CWW employs. Although none of the elected union officials would admit that the overall strategy of the CWW was guided by a handful of select members, the lack of participation on the part of the vast majority of workers was evident throughout my research. One graduate student expressed their dissatisfaction at the lack of participation from the majority of the members:

I think that another issue is that our meetings are at a time when most of membership can’t go and, so, and if people have kids or whatever it can be hard to make it to that meeting. I think that the union really prides itself on, like, taking up issues that are important to workers and being led by the workers, but it’s always the same 5 or 10 people at the meetings making decisions. So, I think
that making our meeting spaces more accessible, or like having multiple meetings for different kinds of workers.

What is interesting to note about the CWW is that the organizations “spontaneous” origination as well as it’s “vanguardist” leadership style were both implemented with the explicit goal of improving the economic conditions of campus workers. The emphasis on economic goals from the outset of the union’s formation set the stage for its actions over the next decade. As noted earlier, the reliance on classical theorists such as Marx, Lenin and Luxemburg is useful as an interpretive schema, but can be somewhat lacking in terms of its explanatory power regarding contemporary labor unions. Especially in the United States, the exceptional nature of the American labor movement has precluded contemporary unions from even conceiving of alternative approaches and strategies. Braverman’s (1974) argument regarding the state sponsored crackdown on socialist unions and Marxist political parties prior to the outbreak of World War I is discouragingly accurate. The increasingly complex mode of production and distribution utilized by capitalists in the United States has placed a stranglehold on the efforts for revolutionary change. Instead of attempting to understand and dismantle capitalism as a mode of production, American labor unions have settled for simply attempting to gain a larger share of the capitalist pie. Even this strategy, however, has been muted in recent decades. Contemporary labor unions are now increasingly focusing their efforts on the defense of wages in lieu of wage increases and social demands. One exception to this current trend in labor strategy is the Change to Win organization which broke away from the AFL-CIO in 2005. Change to Win explicitly acknowledges the need for labor unions to devote more resources towards recruiting new members and advances policy prescriptions that extend
beyond the realm of economic goals. However, as of yet, Change to Win has not advanced a concrete strategy for achieving these goals beyond attempting to lobby and pressure the federal government to enact legislation in support of its broad agenda (Tilly 2011).

The historical trajectory of the American labor movement has placed many impediments in the path of contemporary unions. As Voss (1993) noted, the collapse of the Knights of Labor in the late nineteenth century relegated the American labor movement to small group of skilled workers organized almost exclusively within craft industries. The business labor accord described by Peterson (1963) and Edsall (1984) further impeded the pursuit of social and political change by organized labor. The collapse of labor’s political wing in the late twentieth century dealt yet another blow to labor’s influence and organizational possibilities (Edsall 1984). Thus, the climate that the CWW inherited presented it with a bevy of organizational dilemmas. The CWW’s situation within a right-to-work state has made its efforts all the more difficult. And yet, the organizational outcomes of the CWW cannot be understated. The CWW’s ability to increase union membership at a time when the national density of organized labor is undergoing a precipitous decline is a monumental achievement. The fact that is has increased membership in a right-to-work state has made this achievement all the more impressive. The CWW’s continuous attempts to lobby political representatives and exert its influence over the state legislature, however ineffective they are for the time being, are also laudable efforts that should not be discounted. The union’s wall to wall organizing approach has also attempted to overcome the historical skill divides that have plagued the labor movement from its origin. This final point, the CWW’s ability to unite employees across contentious skill divides, may be both its greatest weakness and its greatest strength.
In adopting a wall to wall organizing approach, the CWW is actively working to overcome many of the skill divides that have historically fragmented the labor movement in the United States. The historical overview illustrated that one of the key ways to improve the prestige and bargaining power of a labor union was to expel women, minorities and low-skilled workers. The CWW’s effort to break down the barriers that separate the diverse array of workers in a university setting, when viewed in this light, is a truly valiant goal. In several key respects, the CWW’s efforts to unite administrators, faculty members, adjunct faculty, secretaries, maintenance workers and graduate students has resulted in a complete reversal of the hierarchical ordering of university employees. The CWW’s efforts to improve the lives of its members, for example, always begin with a focus on the most exploited. This strategy has resulted in actions that focus primarily on attaining improved wages for the CWW’s lowest paid members. This strategy has also meant that, at least for the time being, the needs of administrators, faculty members, and adjunct faculty have gone unaddressed. In order to recruit high skilled university employees, therefore, the CWW must still rely on appealing to their political sympathies. Until the CWW has something to offer to each of its divergent constituencies, its membership gains will be dependent upon fostering a sense of solidarity among all workers in higher education.

IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Though it is impossible to assume that the experiences of the chapter of the CWW where this study was conducted are indicative of other higher education unions, I suspect that the key difficulties and opportunities raised in this research are being experienced by labor
unions across the United States. How can the labor movement foster a sense of solidarity among divergent groups of workers? The CWW has attempted to do so by appealing to the political sympathies of its highly skilled members and potential members and by appealing to the personal conditions of its semi-skilled and low-skilled members and potential members. The CWW has also attempted to illustrate to its members that the needs of the university’s most exploited employees deserve the greatest attention. This bottom up approach to organizing may well prove successful if the CWW is indeed able to systematically address the needs and concerns of higher skilled workers as it grows in strength and number and builds solidarity as a major reason to participate. If the university is able to provide raises to faculty members, the needs of the more privileged may be less important, and solidarity building can continue to be the CWW’s strategy.

Further examination of the divergent chapters of the CWW is necessary in order to determine what role race plays at more heterogeneous locales. Given that, as my interview participants stated, that other chapters are comprised of a considerably more diverse union makeup, it is necessary to explore the types of organizational and recruitment campaigns they employ. A similar exploration would be necessary at locales that are even more homogenous than my study location in order to ascertain whether the strategies differ in significant regards.

Further studies of the CWW are also necessary in order to determine if the challenges faced by the chapter I was engaged with are present across the state. If, again as stated by my interview participants, certain locales are comprised of a majority of one type of employee, then it would be necessary to determine why that is the case and whether they are employing
strategies to appeal to a wider audience. Are other locales more or less successful at navigating the skill divides experienced by this CWW chapter?

The CWW represents but one sector of the unionized workforce. Although I suspect that the difficulties they have encountered are experienced by unions in other occupational areas, it is difficult to discern if the question of skill is as apparent in other industries as it is in higher education. This thesis suggests that one of the most important questions facing a higher education labor union is where to allocate resources and how to strategize in a multiple constituency union. In order to explore this topic in more detail, it would be useful to examine labor unions in other industries and locations. Perhaps subsequent studies will reveal that the pursuit of solidarity is not as elusive as it may seem.


APPENDIX
Table 1. Inferential Statistics-Pearson’s Chi Square. Weighted Percentages shown.

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<td>Union Impact on Economy</td>
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***p<.001  **p<.01  *p<.05  p<.10
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. Frequencies Shown.

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| Independent Variable                               |         |
| Race                                               |         |
| Non-Latino White                                   | 667     |
| Non-Latino Black                                   | 78      |
| Latino                                             | 38      |

| Control Variables                                  |         |
| Men                                                | 390     |
| Age Group                                          |         |
| Between 18 and 29                                  | 159     |
| Between 30 and 44                                  | 223     |
| Between 45 and 64                                  | 278     |
| Over 64                                            | 136     |
| Region                                             |         |
| Northeast                                          | 160     |
| Midwest                                            | 191     |
| South                                              | 278     |
| West                                               | 167     |
| Social Class                                       |         |
| Working                                            | 302     |
| Middle                                             | 390     |
| Upper                                              | 103     |
| Educational Attainment                             |         |
| No High School Diploma                             | 64      |
| High School Diploma                                | 278     |
| Some College                                       | 215     |
| College Degree                                     | 143     |
| Some Grad School or Grad Degree                    | 96      |
Table 2 Continued. Descriptive Statistics. Frequencies Shown.

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N=796
Table 3. Regression Results. Coefficients Shown (Standard Error in Parentheses).

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***p<.001 ** p<.01 *p<.05 \p<.10
VITA

Zachary Joseph McKenney is a graduate student in the Sociology department at the University of Tennessee. His substantive focus is in political economy with research interests in American exceptionalism, the American labor movement, anti-systemic global movements, critical theory, immigration, qualitative methodology, quantitative methodology and race. He plans to pursue a Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Tennessee.